

Tables of Evidence – Japan’s Involvement in Intl. Environmental Agreements

	Interest in Issue	Record of Participation	Record/Difficulty of Compliance
Climate Change	Japan faces similar dilemmas as other developed countries concerning climate change. Rising sea levels threaten millions of citizens. severe weather events such as heatwaves, heavy rainfall, and typhoons. Other dangers include loss of coral reefs, decrease in rice paddy crops. Noted to be in a loose alliance with non-EU, but developed, countries (Umbrella Group). ¹ Believes that development issues must be addressed simultaneously with environmental issues because of previous history with unsafe development. Frequently aids developing countries with financial support and knowledge transfer. Japan’s leading strategy toward climate change has consistently been largely shaped by technological advancement (such as improving energy efficiency), as its high-tech industry thrives. ²	1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Multilateral Agreement; Swing State . Originally not interested, agreed with U.S. position. However, domestic industry changes affected stance. Japanese auto industry committed to lowering CO2 emissions by 8.5%, which “encouraged” government to adopt the UNFCCC stabilization goals. ³ 1997 Kyoto Protocol: Multilateral Agreement; Swing State . Originally part of veto coalition against new negotiations. ⁴ Yet had interest in success due to hosting the conference, as well as being the only country who took a pledge to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at the time. ⁵	1992 UNFCCC: Medium, Medium . Continued to take part in negotiations. Japan created policy to meet goals; however, lack of reporting mechanisms on adopted policy did not meet UNFCCC guidelines on multiple occasions. ¹² However, third-parties have reported low progress. ¹³ 1997 Kyoto Protocol: Medium, Medium . Did pass domestic laws to address reductions of greenhouse gases. ¹⁴ Refused to take on commitments in the second commitment period. ¹⁵ Japan Business Federation was highly opposed to public push to limit emission in 2009, and the effectiveness of earlier attempts had been stifled by poor economic conditions. ¹⁶

¹ Chasek et al. (174).

² <https://www.oecd.org/env/country-reviews/2450219.pdf>

³ Chasek et al. (102, 166)

⁴ Chasek et al. (167).

⁵ van Asselt, H., Kanie, N. & Iguchi, M. Japan’s position in international climate policy: navigating between Kyoto and the APP. Int Environ Agreements (2009) 9: 319. doi:10.1007/s10784-009-9098-6

¹² http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/compliance/plenary/application/pdf/cc-ert-2007-8_report_of_centralized_idr_of_nc4_of_japan.pdf (6).

¹³ <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/11/17/national/japan-among-worst-performers-fighting-climate-change-germanwatch/>

¹⁴ Schreurs, Miranda A. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States. Cambridge University Press, 2003. (253).

¹⁵ Chasek et al. (179).

¹⁶ <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/a8e68aad-9abf-4add-8273-a7714949d15.pdf> (11)

		<p>2008 Japan-UNDP Joint Framework for Building Partnership to Address Climate Change in Africa: Multilateral Agreement; Leading State.⁶ Encouraged high investment in developing countries.⁷</p> <p>2015 Project for Japan - Caribbean Climate Change Partnership; Multilateral Agreement; Leading State.⁸ (Meant to increase investment capacity and cooperation regarding sustainable development issues). Completed due to similar economic and development issues in the region, as well as limiting imports, as well as reduce barriers to trade, information, and investment.⁹</p> <p>2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement: Multilateral Agreement; Swing State. Provided “limited input,” arguing that treaty was not fair to Japan in required</p>	<p>Overall, did not live up to commitments, but did make some progress.¹⁷</p> <p>2008 Japan-UNDP Joint Framework for Building Partnership to Address Climate Change in Africa: Good, Easy. Followed through with capacity building and financial support.¹⁸</p> <p>2015 Project for Japan - Caribbean Climate Change Partnership; Good, Easy. Has begun capacity building, financial support, knowledge transfers, and scientific cooperation efforts.¹⁹</p> <p>2015 Paris Agreement: Unknown. Japan has publicized its intentions to meet the requirements and committed to aid other countries during implementation.²⁰ Yet Japan has been criticized for its use/exportation of coal burning technology.²¹</p>
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⁶ <https://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/cc/submission151127.pdf> (14)

⁷ http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/12/1185423_1080.html See also <https://www.undp-aap.org/resources/news/leaders-africa-japan-and-undp-highlight-need-build-adaptation-achievements-africa>

⁸ http://www.bb.undp.org/content/barbados/en/home/operations/projects/environment_and_energy/japan-caribbean-climate-change-partnership.html

⁹ <http://www.eurasiareview.com/09112016-a-rising-sun-over-the-antilles-japans-new-era-of-caribbean-investment-analysis/>

¹⁷ Sofer, Ken. Climate Politics in Japan: The impacts of public opinion, bureaucratic rivalries, and interest groups on Japan’s environmental agenda. Sasakawa Japan, Forum Iss. 1. 2016. (1)

¹⁸ <https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/44171794.pdf>

¹⁹ <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/?p=12369>

²⁰ <https://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/cc/161108.html>

²¹ <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-paris-japan-idUSKBN1330J9>

		action/harm to economy as compared to U.S. and China. ¹⁰ Credibility had been damaged by refusal to take on secondary commitments from Kyoto also. ¹¹	Third-Party sources argue that Japan's target/efforts are inadequate to prevent lasting damage. ²²
Species Conservation	Species conservation is usually directed by its economic impact on Japan, yet plays a "full" role in international conservation of biodiversity and heritage areas (full, presumably, meaning active). ²³ Another source notes that "In the historical trajectory of Japan's biodiversity diplomacy, however, Japan often acted as a dragger or a laggard while being a supporter of selected issues." ²⁴ This is reflected in evidenced gathered for this analysis. Large importer of foreign wildlife products. ²⁵ The value of Southern Bluefin Tuna in Japan, for example, is very high, and prone to overfishing; Japan is one of top producing countries, and top consuming country of the fish. ²⁶ Establishing strict quotas is against the fishing industry's interests. Whaling seems to be driven more by cultural impact than economic impact at this	1946 International Whaling Convention: Multilateral Agreement; Veto State. Fought regulatory efforts on commercial efforts until losing 1985 vote on moratorium. Large economic and cultural interests existed (both for consumption & production), little domestic opposition pressure. Cultural influence seems to have had the larger effect. ²⁷ Continues 'scientific whaling' efforts even though denounced by ICJ. ²⁸ Nervous about losing access to U.S. markets. ²⁹ Industry has large role in decision-making; Japanese commissioner to IWC is President of Japanese	1946 International Whaling Convention. Poor, Medium. While Japan has agreed to a ban on commercial whaling, the country continues to circumvent the ruling under scientific justifications. Domestic support and commercial value has declined; international fines and rulings have been previously ignored. ⁵⁷ Has stated intentions to resume commercial whaling after scientific research demonstrates the sustainability of the practice. ⁵⁸ International aid practice has gained veto support. ⁵⁹ 1949 IATTC: Good, Medium. Japan is forced to consider long-

¹⁰ <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/a8e68aad-9abf-4add-8273-a77714949d15.pdf> (13)

¹¹ Ibid. (14).

²² <http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/japan.html> See also <https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/paris-climate-conference-japan-ib.pdf>

²³ <https://www.oecd.org/env/country-reviews/2450219.pdf>

²⁴ <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/a8e68aad-9abf-4add-8273-a77714949d15.pdf> (15).

²⁵ <https://www.env.go.jp/en/nature/biodiv/intel.html>

²⁶ http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?251610/Stock-recovery-plan-for-Pacific-Bluefin-tuna-urgently-needed

²⁷ Chasek et al. (55). See Smith 2014 Ch. 8.

²⁸ Chasek et al. (243-252).

²⁹ Chasek et al. (16).

⁵⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/15/photos-japanese-whalers-killing-minke-sanctuary-says-sea-shepherd>

⁵⁸ <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/04/01/japanese-fleet-returns-from-antarctic-hunt-with-333-whales.html>

⁵⁹ Chasek et al. (248).

	<p>point, but interest in resuming whaling to economic profitability may explain some of this practice. Hesitant to implement the precautionary principle as it may limit fishing in general, and create precedent in other issue areas. On foreign species, stance usually determined by trade relations/reputation concerns. Overall, wary of regulation which seeks to affect certain species which are significant to Japan and the action's implications on future international policy.</p>	<p>Whaling Association in general.³⁰</p> <p>1949 Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: Multilateral Agreement. Swing State. (responsible for the conservation and management of fisheries for tunas and other species taken by tuna-fishing vessels in the eastern Pacific Ocean). Joined as a late entrant in 2008, has cosponsored regulation since.³¹ In 2014, vetoed regulation regarding shark capture, citing "economic reasons."³²</p> <p>1966 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas; Multilateral Agreement: Swing State. As with other Tuna treaties, Japan seeks to limit damage to industry. Utilizes a need for hard evidence to implement regulation as a delay tactic.³³</p>	<p>term strategies to Bluefin Tuna due to high industry importance. Cooperation in international agreements of IATTC gives Japan leverage in future decision-making processes. However, compliance hasn't meant the saving of the species, as Pacific Bluefin Tuna stock is more than 95% depleted.⁶⁰ It's compliance is increased largely because the agreement is often ambiguous and ineffective.⁶¹</p> <p>1966 ICCAT: Poor, Medium: Japan somewhat abides by regulations. Yet these regulations are frequently made to limit any harm, and are not especially effective at saving the species in question. Enforcement rules are poor, and investigations reveal illegal fishing.⁶²</p>
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³⁰ Chasek et al. (101).

³¹ <http://www.pacifictunaalliance.org/news/press-announcements/great-strides-the-iattc.html>

³² http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/blue_planet/news/?uNewsID=225991&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wwf%2Fmarine+%28WWF+-+Marine+News%29&utm_content=Google+Feedfetcher

³³ Japan's Tuna Fishing Industry: A Setting Sun Or New Dawn? (138).

⁶⁰ <https://news.mongabay.com/2016/10/is-it-time-for-a-moratorium-on-commercial-fishing-of-pacific-bluefin-tuna/>

⁶¹ Bauer, Sarah E. (2016) "Picking Up the Slackline: Can the United States and Japan Successfully Regulate Commercial Fishing of Bluefin Tuna Following Failed Intergovernmental Attempts?," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 91: Iss. 5, Article 8. (4).

⁶² Bauer, Sarah E. (2016) "Picking Up the Slackline: Can the United States and Japan Successfully Regulate Commercial Fishing of Bluefin Tuna Following Failed Intergovernmental Attempts?," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 91: Iss. 5, Article 8. (6).

		<p>1975 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora: Multilateral Agreement; Swing State. “Chose not to block efforts” to maintain good trade relations with U.S. & Europe concerning ban on ivory trade.³⁴ Little domestic pressure.³⁵ Ivory trade was reinstated in 1990s, continues to operate. Veto State concerning ivory trade since; obtained concession in 2016 negotiations to continue market despite ban.³⁶ Concerning other species, also held reservations.³⁷ Promised to enter reservation on any ban regarding Bluefin Tuna in 2010, and followed through, with the proposal defeated.³⁸</p> <p>1991 Drift Net Fishing U.N. Resolution. Veto State. High use by Japanese fisherman.</p>	<p>1975 CITES: Poor, Medium.⁶³ Specifically considering the ivory trade, Japan has continued to operate markets. When domestic ban was enacted, allowed illegally obtained specimens to register. Failed to prevent exports to other countries. Weak legislation and loopholes exist.⁶⁴ Still imports musk oil from musk deer (often illegally), tortoise shell (took an exception despite imminent extinction).⁶⁵ On other species, bilateral agreements to protect migratory birds exists and are enforced with Russia, China, USA, and Australia.⁶⁶ Has complied with certain permit requirements on exports, as well as increased monitoring efforts on endangered species and increased international aid.⁶⁷ Had</p>
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³⁴ Chasek et al. (58). See also <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/17/science/ivory-trade-is-banned-to-save-the-elephant.html>

³⁵ Chasek et al. (55).

³⁶ <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/10/03/national/cites-calls-nations-end-legal-ivory-trade-bid-end-poaching/>

³⁷ <https://www.env.go.jp/en/nature/biodiv/intel.html>

³⁸ <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/world/europe/20iht-tuna.html> See also

<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/19/science/earth/19species.html>

⁶³ Weiss, Edith Brown, and Harold Karan Jacobson. *Engaging countries: strengthening compliance with international environmental accords*. MIT press, 2000. (273)

⁶⁴ <http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2016/09/30/Exposed-The-dirty-secrets-of-Japan%E2%80%99s-illegal-ivory-trade> See also https://s3.amazonaws.com/environmental-investigation-agency/assets/2016/09/dirty_secrets_of_japans_illegal_ivory_trade/Japans_Dirty_Secret_English.pdf for full report.

⁶⁵ Braatz, Susan M. *Conserving biological diversity: a strategy for protected areas in the Asia-Pacific region*. Vol. 23. World Bank Publications, 1992. (5).

⁶⁶ <https://www.env.go.jp/en/nature/biodiv/intel.html>

⁶⁷ https://cites.org/eng/news/sundry/2013/20130904_sg_japan.php

		<p>Yielded to U.S. pressure on reputational/access to markets grounds.³⁹ Little domestic opposition.⁴⁰</p> <p>1992 Convention on Biological Diversity: Multilateral Agreement; Swing State. Opposed to certain provisions in the agreement, Japan conceded to signing due to reputational (losing prestige) concerns. Accused of breaking from U.S. position for independent image.⁴¹ Also, the state is concerned about food security, more than preservation, so research aspect of agreement was attractive.⁴²</p> <p>1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna; Regional Multilateral agreement (Australia, Japan, New Zealand)⁴³</p>	<p>held a number of reservations (<20) on various species of sharks and whales.⁶⁸</p> <p>1991 Drift Net Fishing: Good, Medium. Japan has enforced the ban since.⁶⁹</p> <p>1992 Convention on Biological Diversity: Poor, Medium.⁷⁰ Has set goals to meet evolving deadlines; yet record of meeting those deadlines is uneven.⁷¹ Has monitoring and reviewing mechanisms in place; conducted scientific surveys and contributed to knowledge base while limiting biodiversity loss.⁷²</p> <p>1993 Convention on the Conservation for Southern Bluefin Tuna: Poor, Hard. Tuna has only increased in value, limiting the willingness of Japan take the</p>
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³⁹ http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-26/news/mn-214_1_drift-net & Chasek et al. (16). See <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/583/03/IMG/NR058303.pdf?OpenElement> for resolution text. See also <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/11/27/japan-to-end-drift-net-fishing-in-bow-to-worldwide-pressure/092ba8d1-944a-4eb2-90ff-32fa293a8995/>

⁴⁰ Chasek et al. (55). http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-04/business/fi-671_1_drift-net

⁴¹ Chasek et al. (58).

⁴² YU-JOSE, LYDIA N. "Global Environmental Issues: Responses from Japan." Japanese Journal of Political Science 5.1 (2004): 23-50. Print.(10)

⁴³ See text of agreement here:

https://www.ccsbt.org/sites/default/files/userfiles/file/docs_english/basic_documents/convention.pdf

⁶⁸ <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/a8e68aad-9abf-4add-8273-a77714949d15.pdf> (16).

⁶⁹ <http://www1.american.edu/TED/driftpjap.htm>

⁷⁰ Bauer, Sarah E. (2016) "Picking Up the Slackline: Can the United States and Japan Successfully Regulate Commercial Fishing of Bluefin Tuna Following Failed Intergovernmental Attempts?," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 91: Iss. 5, Article 8. (4).

⁷¹ Chasek et al. (194)

⁷² <https://www.cbd.int/countries/?country=jp>

		<p>Swing State. Value of Southern Bluefin Tuna is very high for use in Sashimi; Japan has direct economic stake.⁴⁴ Interested in creating agreement which favors domestic fishermen to avoid worse international policy.⁴⁵ Yet was nervous on restricting catch limits due to industry harm.⁴⁶ Japan vetoed a precautionary approach that would have further limited catch.⁴⁷</p> <p>1993 UN Fish Stocks Agreement: Multilateral agreement; Veto State. Active domestic industry of distant water fishing placed Japan on veto coalition. Specifically argued that coastal states were equally responsible for stock depletion; supported non-binding conservation guidelines.⁴⁸ By 1995, Japan was still resisting</p>	<p>requisite action to save the species. The species is still overfished.⁷³ Japan has made some efforts in producing substitutes, as well as limiting catch, but third-parties argue this is not enough progress, as practically 97% of the fish stock is depleted. A 2015 meeting ended with no new action.⁷⁴</p> <p>1993 UN Fish Stocks Agreement: Multilateral agreement; Good, Medium. Japan agreed to implement part 6 in 1996 (responsibility & liability section), and other provisions in 2006.⁷⁵ Japan has largely followed the rules of the agreement as a FAO member.⁷⁶</p> <p>2010 Nagoya Conference: Poor, Medium. Example of</p>
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⁴⁴ <https://www.ccsbt.org/en/content/about-southern-bluefin-tuna>

⁴⁵ Japan's Tuna Fishing Industry: A Setting Sun Or New Dawn? (140).

⁴⁶ Serdy, Andrew. "The New Entrants Problem in International Fisheries Law" Cambridge University Press. 2016. (190) Print.

⁴⁷ Marr, Simon. The precautionary principle in the law of the sea: modern decision making in international law. Vol. 39. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003. (157)

⁴⁸ Chasek et al. (237).

⁷³ <http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2016/12/27/annual-pacific-bluefin-tuna-auction-continues-despite-species-dire-status>

⁷⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/04/warning-over-pacific-bluefin-tuna-stocks-as-japan-meeting-ends-in-stalemate>

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http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#Agreement%20for%20the%20implementation%20of%20the%20provisions%20of%20the%20Convention%20of%2010%20December%201982%20relating%20to%20the%20conservation%20and%20management%20of%20straddling%20fish%20stocks%20and%20highly%20migratory%20fish%20stocks See text of the agreement at

http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/fish_stocks_agreement/CONF164_37.htm

⁷⁶ Smith 2004 (113).

		<p>agreement on procedural methods and possible use of the precautionary principle to ban fishing, once precedent was in place.⁴⁹ This principle could then be used against them, perhaps concerning whaling.⁵⁰ Despite this, Japan accepted the approach possibly to avoid blame for the collapse of negotiations.⁵¹ It successfully obtained regional management of high seas fisheries conservation.⁵² In 1998 negotiations in determining the 1999 International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity, high regulation of the Japanese fishing industry already in place led to strong position on international regulations (quotas on Bluefin tuna/migratory species).⁵³ Loss of distant fishing catch encouraged more regional approach.⁵⁴ Moreover, Chinese and South Korean fishermen were fishing off Japan's own coast,</p>	<p>checkbook diplomacy and interest in maintaining appearance of active player in environmental negotiations.⁷⁷ Delayed ratification, along with vague wording (lobbied for by Japan) limited effectiveness.⁷⁸</p>
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⁴⁹ Chasek et al. (239).

⁵⁰ Smith 2014 (95e).

⁵¹ Chasek et al. (239).

⁵² Smith 2014 (94).

⁵³ Chasek et al. (99).

⁵⁴ Smith 2014 (104).

⁷⁷ <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/a8e68aad-9abf-4add-8273-a77714949d15.pdf> (19).

⁷⁸ <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/a8e68aad-9abf-4add-8273-a77714949d15.pdf> (21)

		<p>prompting new regulation to prevent direct competition.</p> <p>2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing; Multilateral Agreement: Swing State. Hosted the conference, yet heavily committed to achieving satisfactory aims in conference, leading it to veto multiple drafts that produced unfavorable “guaranteed access” in favor of “benefit sharing.”⁵⁵ Committed large amounts of money (>\$5 billion) to efforts to secure support.⁵⁶</p>	
Protected Areas & Fisheries	<p>Due to a lack of internal natural resources, Japan’s importing of timber affects international deforestation policy.⁷⁹ After high development and increased population growth throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, combined with WW2 and post-WW2 liberalization policy, the need for international timber constitutes a serious vulnerability in the Japanese economy, encouraging action on international agreements.⁸⁰ Japan has commissioned studies on desertification, offering financial assistance for the UNCCD to aid African countries.⁸¹ The country</p>	<p>1980 Ramsar Convention: Multilateral agreement; Swing State. Participated in negotiations, yet with reservations due to domestic requirements. Yet ended up agreeing to ease domestic and international pressure.</p> <p>1984 Japan-Soviet Fisheries Agreement: Bilateral agreements; Leading State. Built on a 1956 agreement; reinforced in 1985 and</p>	<p>1980 Ramsar Convention: Good, Medium. Has implemented protections for wetlands in Southeast Asia, along with holding international workshops and supplying foreign aid.⁹⁵ Has legislative and domestic NGO support. Reintroduced various species, and support local efforts to protect breeding habitats, lowering pesticide use, and restore wetlands.⁹⁶</p>

⁵⁵ <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/a8e68aad-9abf-4add-8273-a77714949d15.pdf> (18)

⁵⁶ <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/a8e68aad-9abf-4add-8273-a77714949d15.pdf> (19)

⁷⁹ <http://www.jatan.org/eng/tropicaltimber.html>

⁸⁰ Weiss, Edith Brown, and Harold Karan Jacobson. *Engaging countries: strengthening compliance with international environmental accords*. MIT press, 2000. (275)

⁸¹ <https://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/dss/ssdss200903.pdf>

⁹⁵ <https://www.env.go.jp/en/nature/biodiv/intel.html>

⁹⁶ http://ramsar.rgis.ch/cda/en/ramsar-documents-standing-ramsar-east-asian/main/ramsar/1-31-41%5E18492_4000_0__

	<p>is heavily dependent on foreign lumber. Fisheries are integral to Japan's economy as well.⁸² High regulation on distant water catch (taking place in international waters) limits potential catch for Japan. The delegation has frequently aimed to minimize high seas regulation.⁸³ Smith (2004) notes that "in general, Japan seeks to counter measures that limit fishing effort and restrict fishing grounds while promoting the cause of expanded access to sustainable fisheries worldwide."⁸⁴ Food security also influences agreements, pushing for ensured access. Bilateral agreements exist between Japan and Russia, South Korea, China, and other regional actors to secure Japan's ability to access markets and local fisheries.⁸⁵ Japan offers international aid to assist domestic private sector, incentivize fisheries agreements with Japan, and encourage economic cooperation.⁸⁶ Domestically, however, trends in late 20th century indicate declining interest in nature conservation; same report questions commonly-held notion of special relationship between Japanese citizens and nature as</p>	<p>1998. 1984 agreement established EEZ boundaries, snow crab/salmon quotas, and scientific cooperation on stock status. 1985 agreement focused on Soviet rivers, ensured joint management for salmon and scientific cooperation to maintain salmon stock. 1998 agreement resolved fishing area around northern disputed islands, and again, revised salmon regulations.⁸⁸</p> <p>1993 International Tropical Timber Organization: Multilateral Agreement; Lead State. (Provided an effective framework for cooperation and consultation between countries producing and consuming tropical timber).⁸⁹ Japan took a leading role to secure imports of timber due to high domestic consumption.⁹⁰</p>	<p>These efforts do also support local inhabitants as well, which incentives efforts.⁹⁷</p> <p>1984 Japan-Soviet Fishing Agreement: Good, Medium. Recent tensions in the past two years have limited cooperation, but the agreement seems to be working still.⁹⁸ Incidents of illegal fishing are uncommon, but do occur, and usually resolved.⁹⁹</p> <p>1993 International Tropical Timber Organization: Good, Medium. Japan, dependent on international timber imports, has made serious efforts toward maintaining steady long-term supply. Yet the same motivations encourage limited cooperation on some aspects of the agreement; for example, a need for good producer relations</p>
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⁸² Finley, Carmel. All the Fish in the Sea: Maximum Sustainable Yield and the Failure of Fisheries Management. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011. Print.

⁸³ Smith, Roger D. Japan's International Fisheries Policy: Law, Diplomacy and Politics Governing Resource Security. Routledge, 2014. (94).

⁸⁴ Smith 2014 (114).

⁸⁵ Smith 2014 (113).

⁸⁶ Smith 2014 (117).

⁸⁸ Smith 2004 (115).

⁸⁹ <https://intl.denr.gov.ph/index.php/international-organizations/article/3>

⁹⁰ Weiss, Edith Brown, and Harold Karan Jacobson. *Engaging countries: strengthening compliance with international environmental accords*. MIT press, 2000. (274) See also <http://www.env.go.jp/en/focus/jeq/issue/vol17/relay.html#c1>

⁹⁷ <http://www.ramsar.org/news/ramsar-implementation-in-japan>

⁹⁸ <http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/english/news/worldupdate/20150626.html>

⁹⁹ <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/10/25/national/russia-releases-japanese-fishing-boat-seized-last-month/>

	<p>urbanization occurs – evidence shows otherwise in that period.⁸⁷</p>	<p>1996 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification: Multilateral Agreement: Swing State. Japan itself is not highly affected by desertification concerning domestic land. Yet globally, aftereffects would hurt Japan, due to loss of forests (heavy importer of timber), and negative effects on biodiversity and population.⁹¹ However, plays an active role in negotiations, promising financing, studies, and knowledge transfer.⁹²</p> <p>1997 Japan-China Agreement: Bilateral agreement; Leading State. Established EEZ/joint boundaries, permitted access to each other's fisheries, and created joint fishing commission.⁹³</p> <p>1999 Japan-South Korea fishing agreement: bilateral agreement; Leading State. Established fishing rights, joint fishing commission,</p>	<p>with timber producing countries incentivized cooperation, even as Japan fights against sustainable usage with other consuming countries.¹⁰⁰</p> <p>1996 Desertification agreement: Good, Easy. Financial and science-related contributions only, and followed through with them.¹⁰¹</p> <p>1997 Japan China Fishing Agreement: Good, Hard. Does not contain dispute mechanism.¹⁰² Tense relations with China have made cooperation difficult. China occupies Japanese fishing ground illegally, even attacking Coast Guard boats on occasion.¹⁰³</p> <p>1999 Japan-South Korea Fishing Agreement: Good, Medium. Recent dispute over S.K. snow crab catch threatening Japanese fishermen have had negative impact on negotiations. Disputed island also</p>
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⁸⁷ <https://www.oecd.org/env/country-reviews/2450219.pdf>

⁹¹ <http://www.neaspec.org/sites/default/files/1.3%20Mr.%20Jun%20Hirano.pdf>

⁹² <https://www.env.go.jp/en/nature/desert/efforts.html>

⁹³ Smith 2004 (116).

¹⁰⁰ Weiss, Edith Brown, and Harold Karan Jacobson. *Engaging countries: strengthening compliance with international environmental accords*. MIT press, 2000. (276)

¹⁰¹ <https://www.env.go.jp/en/nature/desert/efforts.html>

¹⁰² Kim, Sun Pyo. "The UN convention on the law of the sea and new fisheries agreements in north East Asia." *Marine Policy* 27.2 (2003): 97-109. (107).

¹⁰³ <http://dailycaller.com/2016/10/10/japan-gears-up-for-battle-with-illegal-chinese-fishermen/> See also <http://time.com/4463943/japan-china-fishing-marine-iuu-environment-google-skytruth/>

		and EEZ/joint boundaries. ⁹⁴	limits cooperation on joint fishing zone. ¹⁰⁴
Hazardous Waste & Pollution	The rapid growth of Japan since WW2, combined with the development of the high-tech industry, resulted in serious issues of hazardous waste negatively affecting the population and immediate environment. Prominent incidents with toxic chemicals, smog, and waste have left a lasting impact on domestic management. In its response, Japan is forced to balance industry interests with health and safety concerns. Japan is focused on maintaining competitiveness across industries which produce hazardous waste in international policy discussions. ¹⁰⁵ Acid rain was a prominent issue in Japan during development. The government took serious action to combat this issue during the 1980s and 1990s with good progress. ¹⁰⁶ Air pollution from China and the Koreas negatively affect the Japanese environment, encouraging recent cooperation efforts. ¹⁰⁷ Efforts to clean the domestic environment have resulted in somewhat advanced clean/renewable technology,	1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention); Multilateral Agreement: Veto State . ¹⁰⁹ Previously had history of deals with Soviet Union to dump radioactive waste in Sea of Japan (East Sea). Opposed ban also due to “powerful construction and metal industries” opposing ban. ¹¹⁰ Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (MARPOL 73/78 Convention): Multilateral agreement; Swing State . (Intended to limit marine pollution along Japanese coastline). Had already instituted law in 1970 to limit pollution from ships.	1972 London Convention: Poor, Medium . Did abide by the radioactive material ban once enacted due to international consensus. Yet still dumped hazardous waste as byproduct of construction and smelting industries for at least 20 years after signing. ¹²³ Since 2000s, better response. 1978 Prevention of Pollution from Ships: Good, Medium . Up to 2000s, incidents of ship pollution have continued, enforcement was poor. Yet has strengthened measures in 21 st century. ¹²⁴ Also, improvements in the legal system have occurred, including strict liability and repair fund. ¹²⁵ Strong response since early 2000s. 1987 Montreal Protocol: Good, Medium . Originally a

⁹⁴ Smith 2004 (116)

¹⁰⁴ Smith 2014 (116).

¹⁰⁵ YU-JOSE, LYDIA N. "Global Environmental Issues: Responses from Japan." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 5.1 (2004): 23-50. Print.

¹⁰⁶ Wilkening, Kenneth E. Acid Rain Science and Politics in Japan: A History of Knowledge and Action Toward Sustainability. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2004. Print.

¹⁰⁷ <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1781331/china-and-japan-agree-cooperate-pollution>

¹⁰⁹ Weiss, Edith Brown and Harold Karan Jacobson. *Engaging Countries : Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords*. The MIT Press, 1998. Global Environmental Accords (281).

¹¹⁰ Wiess et al. (281).

¹²³ Wiess et al. (281).

¹²⁴ <https://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/marine/conservation.html> See also <https://www.oecd.org/env/country-reviews/2450219.pdf> (9).

¹²⁵ <https://www.oecd.org/env/country-reviews/2450219.pdf>

	<p>along with an environmentally-conscious public.¹⁰⁸</p>	<p>Yet measures laid out in the agreement took ten years to implement. However, since then has updated laws regularly to keep pace with international standards, as believes marine conservation requires cooperative international effort.¹¹¹</p> <p>1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer: Multilateral agreement; Veto State. (Intended to reduce/eliminate the use of CFCs in production). Was a large producer of CFCs at the time, fought against regulatory efforts. Behind in finding substitute substances, nervous about losing market share. Agreed to phase-out “only” after firms agreed to eliminate.¹¹²</p> <p>1993 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of</p>	<p>blocking state, but after passing, has implemented due to reputational concerns, albeit slowly.¹²⁶ With technological developments, however, satisfactorily meeting requirements.¹²⁷</p> <p>1993 Basel Convention: Poor; Hard. As recently as 2016, incidents involving illegal dumping of hazardous waste were recorded from Japan.¹²⁸ To be fair, Japan promised to take legal action against the exporter in question.¹²⁹ Has continued imports of hazardous waste as recently as 2008.¹³⁰ Declared nothing in the agreement requires notice or consent.¹³¹</p> <p>2001 Control of Transboundary Movements of Wastes: Poor; Hard. OECD reports no exporting of hazardous waste to</p>
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¹⁰⁸ http://content.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1730759_1734222_1734215,00.html See also <http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151111005531/en/Eco-Products-2015---Gathering-Japans-Cutting-Edge-Environmental> as well as <http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/jpscmm/mcmorranspring2014eaa.pdf>

¹¹¹ <https://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/marine/conservation.html>

¹¹² Lechner, Frank J, and John Boli. World Culture: Origins and Consequences. Malden, MA, USA: Blackwell Pub, 2005. Print. (527, 528). Chasek et al. (56, 100).

¹²⁶ <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/a8e68aad-9abf-4add-8273-a77714949d15.pdf> (3)

¹²⁷ Weiss, Edith Brown and Harold Karan Jacobson. *Engaging Countries : Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords*. The MIT Press, 1998. Global Environmental Accords (282).

¹²⁸ <http://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/advanced/1047618/196-tonnes-of-hazardous-waste-being-sent-back-to-japan>

¹²⁹ http://www.env.go.jp/en/recycle/basel_conv/

¹³⁰ OECD Environmental Performance Reviews OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Japan 2010

¹³¹ <http://www.basel.int/?tabid=4499#JP>

		<p>Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal: Multilateral Agreement; Swing State. (Intended to minimize the transboundary movement of hazardous waste by requiring Parties to become self-sufficient in managing wastes)¹¹³ Advocated for regional capacity support and technology transfer consistently in meetings.¹¹⁴ Agreed partly due to reputational concerns.¹¹⁵ In general, “uncooperative attitude” toward hazardous waste agreements.¹¹⁶</p> <p>2001 Control of Transboundary Movements of Wastes Destined for Recovery Operation: Multilateral Agreement (OECD member countries, under Basel Convention); Swing Role. (establishes</p>	<p>developing countries for disposal, as well as following ‘prior informed consent’ guidelines in early 2000s.¹³² Yet waste poses a difficult problem, with little domestic disposal area, massive technical issues, and large amounts of waste.¹³³ As such, illegal exports have continued.¹³⁴ Still, Japan has done a better job in implementing legal reforms to respond when incidents are reported, but economic interests are considered in this process.¹³⁵</p> <p>1996 Nuclear Test-Ban: Good, Easy. Very small commitment, has followed through with expected actions. Net benefits are clear, as Japan does not have nuclear weapons.¹³⁶</p> <p>2013 Minamata Convention: Good, Easy. Since the</p>
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¹¹³ http://archive.ban.org/library/JPEPA_Report_BAN_FINAL_29_Aug_071.pdf (2)

¹¹⁴ Earth Negotiations Bulletin. Vol. 20 No. 05 Friday, 10 December 1999 & Vol. 20 No. 17 Friday, 29 October 2004 & Vol. 20 No. 24 Friday, 1 December 2006

¹¹⁵

YU-JOSE, LYDIA N. "Global Environmental Issues: Responses from Japan." Japanese Journal of Political Science 5.1 (2004): 23-50. Print. (6)

¹¹⁶

YU-JOSE, LYDIA N. "Global Environmental Issues: Responses from Japan." Japanese Journal of Political Science 5.1 (2004): 23-50. Print. (11).

¹³² <https://www.oecd.org/env/country-reviews/2450219.pdf> (9).

¹³³ Jun Ui, An overview on solid waste and hazardous waste in Japan, Conservation & Recycling, Volume 7, Issue 2, 1984, Pages 67-71, ISSN 0361-3658,

¹³⁴ Kojima and Michida ed., Economic Integration and Recycling in Asia: An Interim Report, Chosakenkyu Hokokusho, Institute of Developing Economies, 2011 (4).

¹³⁵ http://archive.ban.org/library/JPEPA_Report_BAN_FINAL_29_Aug_071.pdf

¹³⁶ DiFilippo, Anthony. Japan's nuclear disarmament policy and the US security umbrella. Springer, 2006.

		<p>procedural and substantive controls for the import and export of hazardous and non-hazardous waste for recovery between OECD member nations). Played active role in negotiates, but largely to ensure its voice was heard. Still apprehensive on developing regulation.¹¹⁷</p> <p>1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: Multilateral Agreement. Leading State. Japan does not have nuclear weapons, yet heads efforts to ban testing and decrease nuclear arms in the world due to WW2 atomic bombing.¹¹⁸ Also, is protected by U.S. as an ally, and against North Korea successfully testing nuclear weaponry due to regional threat.¹¹⁹</p> <p>2013 Minamata Convention on Mercury: Multilateral agreement; Leading State. (Intended to</p>	<p>domestic incident, Japan committed to the reduction of mercury, began monitoring efforts in 2007, and has domestic laws which are stricter than the 2013 agreement.¹³⁷ Japan also supports developing countries in the implementation of this process after the 1956 disaster.¹³⁸ This was most likely due to domestic and international reputational pressure.¹³⁹</p> <p>2001 Stockholm Convention on POPs: Poor, Medium. Japan already developed laws to prohibit numerous chemical substances in the wake of previous environmental issues.¹⁴⁰ Yet as a high-tech country, many chemicals are still in use which may constitute harm to the environment, even if they are not currently banned under the convention. Furthermore, Japan took a long time to even institute the rules of the convention, only</p>
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¹¹⁷ See

[http://www.basel.int/Countries/NationalReporting/StatusCompilations/ComplitionPart1\(2011\)/tabid/3505/Default.aspx](http://www.basel.int/Countries/NationalReporting/StatusCompilations/ComplitionPart1(2011)/tabid/3505/Default.aspx) questions 3a, 4d, 5, 6, 7.

¹¹⁸ <https://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2015/japan-and-kazakhstan-to-spearhead-efforts-for-banning-nuclear-testing/>

¹¹⁹ DiFilippo, Anthony. Japan's nuclear disarmament policy and the US security umbrella. Springer, 2006.

¹³⁷ <http://www.env.go.jp/en/focus/jeq/issue/vol11/feature.html>

¹³⁸ https://www.env.go.jp/en/chemi/mercury/h28_s0202.html See

<https://www.env.go.jp/en/chemi/hs/minamata2002/index.html> for summary and consequent actions of incident.

¹³⁹ <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/a8e68aad-9abf-4add-8273-a77714949d15.pdf>

¹⁴⁰ http://www.pops.int/documents/implementation/nips/submissions/JAPAN_full.pdf

		<p>reduce/eliminate presence of mercury in manufacturing, emissions, mining, consumer products, and trade). In 1956, Japan suffered a mercury spill in the town of Minamata which resulted in serious water pollution and had serious negative ramifications for marine and human life, encouraging a rapid response to prevent similar mistakes in the future. Reputational concerns/easy implementation motivations also relevant.¹²⁰</p> <p>2001 Stockholm Convention on POPs: Multilateral agreement; Swing State. (Intended to reduce/eliminate persistent organic pollutants from production/use/trade).¹²¹ Focused on limiting use of precautionary principle due to high industry use of chemicals. Japan advocated for sovereign control and lengthy risk analysis before banning chemicals.¹²²</p>	<p>following up on proper waste disposal of PCBs, for example, in 2016.¹⁴¹</p>
Water	Japan has strong interests in limiting marine regulation unfavorable to it. Historically, the island-nation has been in favor on	1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Multilateral Agreement; Swing State . Active	1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Good, Medium . Strong interests in maintaining

¹²⁰ <https://www.epa.gov/international-cooperation/minamata-convention-mercury>

¹²¹ <http://chm.pops.int/TheConvention/Overview/tabid/3351/Default.aspx>

¹²² Chasek et al. (146)

¹⁴¹ <http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/japan-pcb-special-measures-act-amended/>

	<p>maximum freedom, influenced by its strong shipping and fishing industries. With few natural resources, Japan also is interested on the possibilities of marine resource mining.¹⁴² The country has taken a fairly active role in international environmental policy discussions, as the net effect of participation is positive, ensuring access to international markets for its products and the security of its imports/exports. Fisheries-management and regulations affect domestic industry.¹⁴³</p>	<p>participation due to high import/export industries, along with fishing industry.¹⁴⁴ While provisions were not exactly what Japan wanted, interest in creating stable law, along with maintaining competitiveness and reputational concerns brought about a yes vote.¹⁴⁵ Was initially opposed to Exclusive Economic Zone due to importance of distant water catch (often within the proposed EEZ of other countries) at that time (unpopular with fishing industry).¹⁴⁶ Yet after disputes with Soviet Union/U.S., creating mutual exceptions to allow for fishing in Chinese/Korean areas, and increasing price of oil, Japan dropped its objection. Industry interests changed, and with it, official position.¹⁴⁷</p>	<p>high sea freedoms have resulted in high compliance. Yet disputed areas with Korea and China have complicated matters concerning seabed rights and the EEZ. Ratified UNCLOS in 1996 due to these regional worries on direct competition and protecting local resources.¹⁴⁸ Disputed areas with South Korea are usually under shared jurisdiction. Issues with China are more difficult to resolve, including: limits to EEZ, passage to ships, and resources in disputed sea beds. Even though the UNCLOS apparently favors China concerning on the seabed issue, Japan refuses to concede.¹⁴⁹</p>
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¹⁴² <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/sea/convention.html>

¹⁴³ Chasek et al. (99).

¹⁴⁴ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/sea/convention.html>

¹⁴⁵ OGISO, MOTOO. "Japan and the UN-Convention on the Law of the Sea." *Archiv Des Völkerrechts*, vol. 25, no. 1, 1987, pp. 58–81. (65).

¹⁴⁶ OGISO, MOTOO. "Japan and the UN-Convention on the Law of the Sea." *Archiv Des Völkerrechts*, vol. 25, no. 1, 1987, pp. 58–81. (72).

¹⁴⁷ OGISO, MOTOO. "Japan and the UN-Convention on the Law of the Sea." *Archiv Des Völkerrechts*, vol. 25, no. 1, 1987, pp. 58–81. (73). See also Kawasaki-Urabe, Yutaka, and Vivian L. Forbes. "Japan's ratification of UN law of the sea convention and its new legislation on the law of the sea." *BOUNDARY AND SECURITY BULLETIN* 4 (1996): 92-100.

¹⁴⁸ Smith 2004 (114).

¹⁴⁹ http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/hsiung/sea_power.pdf (5). See also Wells, Linton. "Japan and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea." *Ocean Development & International Law* 2.1 (1974): 65-91.

Statistics Summary

Table 1. (n=29)

Role in Negotiations			(Issues)	Climate	Species	P. Areas & Fisheries	Haz. Waste	Water
Leading	8	~27.5%	Leading	2	0	4	2	0
Swing	16	~55.5%	Swing	3	6	2	4	1
Veto	5	~17%	Veto	0	3	0	2	0

Table 2. (n=28)*

Incidence Rates of Compliance Categories				
<i>Record</i>	<i>Difficulty</i>			
		Easy	Medium	Hard
	Poor	0	7	3
	Medium	0	4	0
	Good	5	8	1

Table 3. (n=28)*

Relation of Negotiating Role to Compliance			
	Leading	Swing	Veto
Poor, Medium	0	5	2
Poor, Hard	0	3	0
Medium, Medium	0	2	0
Good, Easy	4	1	0
Good, Medium	3	4	3
Good, Hard	1	0	0

*2015 Paris Agreement not included in table 2 & 3, as long-term compliance is currently unknown.