DexLego: Reassembleable Bytecode Extraction for Aiding Static Analysis

Zhenyu Ning and Fengwei Zhang

COMPASS Lab Wayne State University

Outline



- Introduction
- System Overview
- ► Implementation
- Evaluation
- Conclusions

Outline



- ► Introduction
- System Overview
- Implementation
- Evaluation
- Conclusions


Introduction



Why still doing static analysis?


Packing Technique





Packing Technique





Packing Technique



- Previous Android Unpacking Systems: DexHunter [1], AppSpear [2]
 - Assuming a clear transition between the packer's code and the original code.
 - Using method-level collection to collect code.

Self-modifying Code



```
public void example() {
    helper();
    Log.d("Hello World!");
}
```

Self-modifying Code



```
public void example() {
   helper();
   Log.d("Hello World!");
}
```

```
public void example() {
   helper();
   Log.d("Password is 1234!")
   }
```

- Android allows the applications modify its bytecode at runtime.
- ► These changes cannot be detected by current static analysis tools.

Reflection



```
public class Main extends Activity {
      protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
        //...
3
        // 55 is the index of method "reflectiveLeak" in the method
             array of class "Main"
        Method reflectiveLeakMethod = getClass().getMethods()[55];
5
        reflectiveLeakMethod.invoke(this, "sensitive data");
7
      public void reflectiveLeak(String data) {
9
        // leak data
        SmsManager.getDefault().sendTextMessage("800-123-456", null,
             data, null, null);
13
   }
```

Dynamic Code Loading



- Additional DEX files can be downloaded from cloud at runtime.
- Malicious activities in these DEX files are ignored by current static analysis tools.

Introduction



Why not using dynamic analysis?

Dynamic Analysis



Challenges of Dynamic Analysis

- Implicit Flows
- Performance Overhead vs Accuracy

Our Goal



DexLego: Instruction-level collecting and offline reassembling


- Use dynamic approach to collect executed instruction.
- Improve the current static analysis via offline reassembling.

Outline




- Introduction
- ► System Overview
- Implementation
- Evaluation
- Conclusions





























Outline



- ► Introduction
- System Overview
- ► Implementation
- Evaluation
- Conclusions



Simply list the executing instructions one-by-one?



```
public void example() {
   int i;
   for (i = 0; i < 10000; ++i) {
      Log.d("Hello World!");
   }
}</pre>
```



```
public void example() {
   int i;
   for (i = 0; i < 10000; ++i) {
      Log.d("Hello World!");
   }
}</pre>
```

```
public void example() {

Log.d("Hello World!");

...

10 ...
```



- ▶ Record both the index and the content of each instruction.
- Instruction with same index and content will not be repeatedly collected.



How about self-modifying code?



Collection Tree

- ▶ A independent tree for each execution of each method.
- Each node indicates a piece of changed code.



```
// No malicious activities
    public void benign() {}
   // Leak data
    public void malicious() {}
6
   // Modify line 12 to
         "malicious()" at runtime
    public void helper() {}
9
    public void execute() {
10
       for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {</pre>
11
           benign();
12
           helper();
13
14
15
```



```
// No malicious activities
    public void benign() {}
3
    // Leak data
    public void malicious() {}
6
    // Modify line 12 to
         "malicious()" at runtime
    public void helper() {}
9
    public void execute() {
10
        for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {</pre>
11
            benign();
12
            helper();
13
14
15
```

```
// No malicious activities
   public void benign() {}
   // Leak data
   public void malicious() {}
   // Modify line 12 to
         "malicious()" at runtime
   public void helper() {}
Q
    public void execute() {
       for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {</pre>
11
           malicious();
12
           helper();
14
   }
15
```



```
// No malicious activities
    public void benign() {}
   // Leak data
    public void malicious() {}
6
   // Modify line 12 to
         "malicious()" at runtime
    public void helper() {}
9
    public void execute() {
10
       for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {</pre>
11
           benign();
12
           helper();
13
14
15
```

Root Node



i = 0

```
// No malicious activities
    public void benign() {}
3
    // Leak data
    public void malicious() {}
6
    // Modify line 12 to
         "malicious()" at runtime
    public void helper() {}
9
10
    public void execute() {
       for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
11
12
           benign();
           helper();
13
14
15
```

Root Node for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {



i = 0

```
// No malicious activities
    public void benign() {}
3
    // Leak data
    public void malicious() {}
6
    // Modify line 12 to
         "malicious()" at runtime
    public void helper() {}
9
10
    public void execute() {
        for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {</pre>
11
12
            benign();
            helper();
13
14
15
```

Root Node for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) { benign(); }



i = 0

```
// No malicious activities
    public void benign() {}
3
    // Leak data
    public void malicious() {}
6
    // Modify line 12 to
         "malicious()" at runtime
    public void helper() {}
9
10
    public void execute() {
        for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {</pre>
11
12
            benign();
            helper();
13
14
15
```

Root Node for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) { benign(); helper(); }</pre>



i = 1


```
// No malicious activities
    public void benign() {}
3
    // Leak data
    public void malicious() {}
6
    // Modify line 12 to
         "malicious()" at runtime
    public void helper() {}
9
10
    public void execute() {
       for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
11
           malicious();
12
           helper();
13
14
15
```

Root Node for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) { benign(); helper(); }



i = 1

```
// No malicious activities
    public void benign() {}
3
    // Leak data
    public void malicious() {}
6
    // Modify line 12 to
         "malicious()" at runtime
    public void helper() {}
9
10
    public void execute() {
       for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {</pre>
11
12
           malicious();
           helper();
13
14
15
```




Instruction-level Collection



i = 1

```
// No malicious activities
    public void benign() {}
3
    // Leak data
    public void malicious() {}
6
    // Modify line 12 to
         "malicious()" at runtime
    public void helper() {}
9
10
    public void execute() {
       for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {</pre>
11
12
           malicious();
           helper();
13
14
15
```





```
Root Node
    for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
          benign();
          helper();
Child Node
malicious();
```



```
Root Node
    for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
          benign();
          helper();
Child Node
malicious();
```

```
public void execute() {
    for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
        benign();
        helper();
    }
}</pre>
```



```
Root Node
    for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
          benign();
          helper();
Child Node
malicious();
```

```
public void execute() {
    for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
        if (RANDOM_VALUE) {
            benign();
        } else {
        }
        helper();
        }
}</pre>
```



```
Root Node
    for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
          benign();
          helper();
Child Node
malicious();
```

```
public void execute() {
   for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
      if (RANDOM_VALUE) {
        benign();
      } else {
        malicious();
      }
      helper();
    }
}</pre>
```

Implementation



- ▶ Replace the reflective calls with the direct calls during bytecode collection.
- ▶ Use force execution to improve the code coverage.

Outline



- Introduction
- System Overview
- Implementation
- ► Evaluation
- Conclusions



- ► Testbed Specification
 - ► LG Nexus 5X
 - A dual-core 1.8 GHZ Cortex-A57 cluster and a quad-core 1.4 GHZ Cortex-A53 cluster
 - Android 6.0 and TWRP Recovery



Can we correctly reconstruct the behavior of apps?



Table: Test Result of Different Packers.

Applications	HTMLViewer	Calculator	Calendar	Contacts
# of Instructions	217	2,507	78,598	103,602
360 [3]	✓	✓	✓	✓
Alibaba [4]	\checkmark	✓	✓	✓
Tencent [5]	\checkmark	✓	\checkmark	\checkmark
Baidu [6]	✓	✓	\checkmark	\checkmark
Bangcle [7]	\checkmark	✓	\checkmark	\checkmark



How is DexLego comparing with other tools?



- ▶ 134 samples from DroidBench [8].
- ▶ 3 static analysis tools: FlowDroid [9], DroidSafe [10], HornDroid [11].
- 2 unpacking tools: DexHunter [1], AppSpear [2].




Figure: F-Measure of DroidBench samples.





Can DexLego work with real-world packed apps?



Table: Analysis Result of Packed Real-world Applications.

Package Name	Version	# of Installs	Original	Reassembled
com.lenovo.anyshare	3.6.68	100 million	0	4
com.moji.mjweather	6.0102.02	1 million	0	5
com.rongcai.show	3.4.9	100 thousand	0	3
com.wawoo.snipershootwar	2.6	10 million	0	4
com.wawoo.gunshootwar	2.6	10 million	0	5
com.alex.lookwifipassword	2.9.6	100 thousand	0	2
com.gome.eshopnew	4.3.5	15.63 million	0	3
com.szzc.ucar.pilot	3.4.0	3.59 million	0	5
com.pingan.pabank.activity	2.6.9	7.9 million	0	14



How about code coverage?



Table: Samples from F-Droid [12].

Package Name	Version	# of Instructions
be.ppareit.swiftp	2.14.2	8,812
fr.gaulupeau.apps.InThePoche	2.0.0b1	29,231
org.gnucash.android	2.1.7	56,565
org.liberty.android.fantastischmemopro	10.9.993	57,575
com.fastaccess.github	2.1.0	93,913

Table: Code Coverage with F-Droid Applications.

	Class	Method	Line	Branch	Instruction
Sapienz [13]	44%	37%	32%	20%	32%
Sapienz + DexLego	87%	88%	82%	78%	82%



Performance overhead?



▶ 7.5x, 1.4x, and 2.3x overhead on Java score, native score, and overall score, respectively.




Figure: Performance Measured by CF-Bench [14].



Outline



- Introduction
- System Overview
- Implementation
- Evaluation
- ► Conclusions

Conclusions



- DexLego leverages instruction-level bytecode collecting and offline reassembling to aid existing static analysis tools.
- It helps to overcome the weakness of static analysis and increases the analysis accuracy with reasonable performance overhead.

References I



- Y. Zhang, X. Luo, and H. Yin, "DexHunter: Toward extracting hidden code from packed Android applications," in *Proceedings of the 20th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security* (ESORICS'15)., 2015.
- [2] W. Yang, Y. Zhang, J. Li, J. Shu, B. Li, W. Hu, and D. Gu, "AppSpear: Bytecode decrypting and DEX reassembling for packed Android malware," in *Proceedings of the 18th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID'15)*, 2015.
- [3] Qihoo 360 Inc., "360Protector," http://jiagu.360.cn/protection, 2014.
- [4] Alibaba Inc., "AliProtector," http://jaq.alibaba.com/, 2014.
- [5] Tencent Inc., "TencentProtector," http://legu.qcloud.com/, 2014.
- $[6] \quad \mathsf{Baidu\ Inc.,\ "BaiduProtector,"\ http://app.baidu.com/jiagu/,\ 2014.}$
- [7] Bangcle Ltd., "BangcleProtector," https://www.bangcle.com/, 2013.
- [8] EC SPRIDE Secure Software Engineering Group, "DroidBench," https://github.com/secure-software-engineering/DroidBench, 2013.
- [9] S. Arzt, S. Rasthofer, C. Fritz, E. Bodden, A. Bartel, J. Klein, Y. Le Traon, D. Octeau, and P. McDaniel, "FlowDroid: Precise context, flow, field, object-sensitive and lifecycle-aware taint analysis for Android apps," in Proceedings of the 35th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI'14), 2014.
- [10] M. I. Gordon, D. Kim, J. H. Perkins, L. Gilham, N. Nguyen, and M. C. Rinard, "Information flow analysis of Android applications in DroidSafe," in *Proceedings of the 22nd Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS'15)*, 2015.
- [11] S. Calzavara, I. Grishchenko, and M. Maffei, "HornDroid: Practical and sound static analysis of Android applications by SMT solving," in *Proceedings of the 1st IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy* (EuroS&P'16), 2016.

References II



- [12] F-Droid, "F-Droid," https://f-droid.org/, 2011.
- [13] K. Mao, M. Harman, and Y. Jia, "Sapienz: Multi-objective automated testing for Android applications," in Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis (ISSTA'16), 2016.
- $[14] \quad \text{Chainfire, "CF-Bench," https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=eu.chainfire.cfbench, 2013.}$

Thank you!




Questions?

zhenyu.ning@wayne.edu


http://compass.cs.wayne.edu







v1 = 0



























































malicious()



