

# Efficient Two Way Replay Protection (2WRP) And Beyond

## Pre-Release Version

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### Abstract.

Two Way Replay Protection is a method for a cryptocurrency fork to protect itself from valid transaction hashes being re-broadcast "across the fork block". Without it, for instance, someone can monitor the network of a fork and then perform a "replay attack" against the original chain, to steal all value inside Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXOs) inside the replayed transaction hash.

Various methods have been designed to implement 2WRP, some do the job, but bloat the chain with custom opcodes, which also causes interoperability problems. Others will provide protection, EXCEPT if a large group of miners collude, which is sub-optimal.

In this paper the authors present the most efficient known way of implementing 2WRP for any Bitcoin-based fork, which does not require changing internal datastructures, nor soft or hard forks, nor storing any extra data in the blockchain at all.

Additionally, methods for completely avoiding the need for 2WRP are introduced.

**Keywords:** cryptographic protocols, electronic commerce and payment, financial privacy.

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# Introduction

**HushList** is a protocol for anonymous mailing lists using the encrypted memo field of the zcash protocol.

Technical terms for concepts that play an important role in **HushList** are written in *slanted text*. *Italics* are used for emphasis and for references between sections of the document.

The key words **MUST**, **MUST NOT**, **SHOULD**, and **SHOULD NOT** in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119] when they appear in **ALL CAPS**. These words may also appear in this document in lower case as plain English words, absent their normative meanings.

This specification is structured as follows:

- Notation – definitions of notation used throughout the document;
- Concepts – the principal abstractions needed to understand the protocol;
- Abstract Protocol – a high-level description of the protocol in terms of ideal cryptographic components;
- Concrete Protocol – how the functions and encodings of the abstract protocol are instantiated;
- Implications

## High-level Overview

The following overview is intended to give a concise summary of the ideas behind the protocol, for an audience already familiar with *block chain*-based cryptocurrencies such as **Bitcoin** or **Zcash**.

Value in **Hush** is either *transparent* or *shielded*. Transfers of *transparent* value work essentially as in **Bitcoin** and have the same privacy properties. *Shielded* value is carried by *notes*, which specify an amount and a *paying key*. The *paying key* is part of a *payment address*, which is a destination to which *notes* can be sent. As in **Bitcoin**, this is associated with a private key that can be used to spend *notes* sent to the address; in **Hush** this is called a *spending key*.

A *transaction* can contain *transparent* inputs, outputs, and scripts, which all work as in **Bitcoin** [Bitcoin-Protocol]. It also contains a sequence of zero or more *JoinSplit descriptions*. Each of these describes a *JoinSplit transfer* which takes in a *transparent* value and up to two input *notes*, and produces a *transparent* value and up to two output *notes*.

## Types Of Transactions

All Zcash forks have what we will classify into FOUR categories of transactions.

Let  $t \rightarrow t$  be called a *transparent* transaction, which is identical to a **Bitcoin** transaction, consisting entirely of transparent inputs and outputs. **HushList** protocol implementations **MUST NOT** create *transparent* transactions, they do not protect metadata in any way and lack memo fields. These transactions can be done with traditional wallet software and does not have any part in **HushList** protocol.

Let  $t \rightarrow z$  be called *shielding* transactions, which takes transparent value stored in UTXOs and transforms them to *Shielded* value stored inside of *notes* which are protected by *zk-SNARKs*.

Let  $z \rightarrow z$  be called *Shielded* transactions, which take *Shielded* value from one *Shielded* address to another, and is fully protected by *zk-SNARKs*. **HushList** implementations **MUST** support these transactions, and additionally **SHOULD** educate users that they are the most private type of transaction, which minimized metadata leakage.

Let  $z \rightarrow t$  be called *deshielding* transactions, which take *Shielded* value stored in *notes* in  $z$  and transfer them to UTXOs stored in  $t$ . **HushList** **MUST NOT** create *deshielding* transactions, as they leak metadata and can potentially link a previously *Shielded* address  $z$  to a transparent address  $t$ . **HushList** implementation **SHOULD** attempt to prevent, at all costs, accidentally sending to a  $t$  address via the `z.sendmany` RPC command.

An easy way to summarize the support transactions of **HushList** is to say: All receivers must be *shielded* addresses, senders can be either *transparent* or *shielded* addresses.

Each **HushList** **MUST** have a default blockchain and network that it is attached to, and the default chain **SHOULD** be HUSH. The default network **MUST** be assumed to be "mainnet" if not specified, similar to how the \*master\* branch is assumed in many Git commands if not specified. The user **MUST** be able to set their GLOBAL default chain (not implemented yet) as well as a default chain for each list.

Each list also has a taddr+zaddr dedicated to that list, so the user has dedicated addresses to send pseudo/anon messages, as well as default fee and amount. The default amount is 0.0 and the default fee is currently 0.0001 but these numbers are subject to change.

**HushList** supports file attachments and embedding arbitrary binary data, it is not limited to ASCII. **HushList** does not impose file size limits and network fees and CPU/RAM costs provide natural incentives for spammers to find cheaper and easier-to-access dumping grounds.

## Design of HushList

The design of **HushList** is inspired by Git. The reference implementation is a command-line program which is a very thin wrapper around an API, which is implemented as a various Perl modules. **HushList** uses many of the same subcommands as Git which have intuitive meanings, which provide "easy-onramps" to learn how to use the CLI.

This document specifies a protocol and the authors provide a reference implementation of this protocol in cross-platform Perl which can be easily installed on millions of computers around the world via CPAN and other methods.

**HushList** should work across any platform that supports Perl and the coin being used. In this case, cryptocurrencies are much less portable than Perl, so Perl will not be the limiting factor.

The reference implementation is written in a maintainable and testable way such that it can easily evolve as the Protocol evolves.

It is hoped that in the future there will be many implementations of **HushList**, running on various blockchains and using various software stacks. The design of **HushList** is compatible with Simple Payment Verification (SPV) light wallets and a future version of **HushList** will learn to speak to an ElectrumX backend server, which natively supports Hush as of the upcoming 1.2.1 release.

## Reference Implementation

The reference implementation is developed as Free Software under the GNU Public License Version 3 on Github at the following URL:

<https://github.com/leto/hushlist>

This code is still in active development, consider it EXPERIMENTAL and ONLY FOR DEVELOPERS at this point pending a security review. This is the bleeding edge, folks.

The current reference implementation can send and receive memos, including files on disk or simple strings of text, as long as they are up to 512 bytes.

Multipart **HushList** memos (file attachments) and public HushLists are still in development.

## Account Funding

On first run, **HushList** creates a new shielded zaddress  $z_F$  to fund transparent addresses for pseudonymous sending via the **z.sendmany**RPC method.

It may be funded by the user from any taddr or zaddr with no loss of privacy.

For each pseudonym the user sends from (may be globally used or per-list), a taddr  $t_L$  is created and a de-shielding transaction is done from  $z_F \rightarrow t_L$  which will allow the user to send memos to the given **HushList** on behalf of the  $t_L$  pseudonym. Since **HushList** memos have, by default, an amount of 0.0, all the costs associated with using **HushList** are network costs. Users may additionally add a non-zero amount to a **HushList** memo.

For each **HushList** the user wants to be part of, **HushList** will create a brand new zaddress  $z_L$  (it **MUST NOT** reuse an existing address) and fund that address via a shielded  $z \rightarrow z$  transaction between  $z_F \rightarrow z_L$ .

If there are no taddr or zaddr funds in the entire wallet, **HushList** **SHOULD** present the user a taddr + zaddr which can be used to "top up" the current **HushList** wallet from another wallet/exchange/etc.

## HushList Contacts

**HushList** maintains a database of contacts which use the address as the unique ID and additional metadata. Since **HushList** supports multiple blockchains, it **MUST** have a contact database for each chain. Each chain **MUST** have its own contact namespace, so you can have Bob on Hush and Bob and Zcash and they will not conflict.

**HushList** internally associates lists to Contacts, not the address of a contact. This allows the user to update the address of a contact in one place and things work correctly the next time the address of that contact is looked up. Lists contain Contacts and Contacts have addresses.

A **HushList** contact may only have ONE address, either taddr or zaddr, but not both.

To have a taddr and zaddr for a person, you can simply create two contacts, such as tBob and zBob. In terms of the metadata that is revealed when communicating with tBob or zBob, they are quite different, and it is healthy for metadata minimization to consider them as two different contacts.

If one has the addresses for a set of contacts on multiple chains that are supported, say ZEC, HUSH and KMD, then a user may send a memo to members across multiple blockchains to ensure delivery and subvert censorship of a single chain.

## HushList Creation

### Private HushLists

A private **HushList** is simply a list of contacts stored locally and costs nothing. The **Zcash** protocol itself has a max of 54 recipients in a **z.sendmany**RPC currently, so **HushList** implementations should not allow lists with more than 54 recipients at this time.

### Multi-Chain Private HushLists

A user may choose to send a **HushList** memo via multiple coins as long as there is a valid address for each Hush Contact on for each coin. For example, if you have addresses for three of your friends on each of the **HUSH**, **KMD** and **ZEC** chains, then you may choose to redundantly send a memo on all of the chains. This provides a backup of the data on the other chains should one of them be blocked (such as dropping any packets for certain peer-to-peer ports), filtered or temporarily inaccessible.

Additionally a user may choose to send day-to-day memos on a inexpensive chain such as **HUSH** which has lower network difficulty and for things that need to have **Bitcoin**-level security, an archive copy to **KMD** can be sent. **KMD** uses the delayed-Proof-Of-Work [dPOW] algorithm ensuring that once the information is engraved on the Bitcoin blockchain, it would be required both blockchains in question to be compromised to prevent accessing the data.

## Public HushLists

A public **HushList** means publishing the PRIVATE KEY of a taddr (or potentially a zaddr) such that this address is no longer owned by a single individual. By intentionally publishing the PRIVATE KEY in a public place, the owner has put all FUNDS and more importantly, the metadata of all transactions to that address, in the public domain.

By default, **HushList** MUST refuse to publicize the PRIVATE KEY of an address that has non-zero balance. **HushList** implementations **SHOULD** protect users from accidental monetary loss in every way possible. Even so, a user could accidentally send funds to an address that has been publicized and this very real confusion is still looking for good answers.

Very recent developments in **Zcash** might allow the potential to use "viewing keys" in the future, but as this feature has not been fully merged to master at this time and lacks a RPC interface, **HushList** chooses to use PRIVATE KEYS which are core **Zcash** protocol that is well-supported in all forks. If "viewing keys" are one day to be used, that feature will need to be merged into multiple **Zcash** forks, which does not seem likely in the near-term.

Since creating a private **HushList** requires making a transaction on the network to store data in the memo-field, it has a cost. This cost will be the fee of the transaction, most likely around 0.0001 but each chain is different and fees obviously change as blockchains get more active.

## List Subscription

When the private key for a list is imported into HushList, either from the blockchain, URI or manual entry, the private key is added to the user's wallet, along with a user entered or approved name and description for the list (if provided in on-chain or uri encoded metadata). HushList creates a unique taddr + zaddr for each list so that the user may choose to send each message to the list psuedonymously or anonymously or a mixture of both. There is no loss of privacy to send memos to the same **HushList** with a psuedonym tAlice and an anon handle zBob if the user so chooses.

Subscribing to a **HushList** is completely free, it is simply the act of importing data to your local wallet.

To facilitate applications being able to uniquely identify public **HushLists** we introduce a new URL scheme where there username is the currency symbol of the cryptocurrency and the password field is the network, i.e.

hushlist://COIN:NETWORK@K

COIN can be the currency symbol of a compatible cryptocurrency such as HUSH (Hush) , KMD (Komodo) , ZEC (Zcash), ZCL (Zcash Classic), ZEN (ZenCash) and potentially BTCP (Bitcoin Private).

NETWORK is will often be "mainnet" but this schema allows for the very real use case of developers iterating through various testnets and supports "sidenets" for those that want to isolate data from mainnet.

K is the base58-formatted PRIVATE KEY as returned by the **dumpprivkey** RPC method of the associated coin.

When COIN and NETWORK are omitted, they default to HUSH and "mainnet" respectively, so

hushlist://K

is equivalent to

hushlist://HUSH:mainnet@K

## Sending To A List

One may send to a **HushList** from a **taddr** (pen name, psuedonym) or **zaddr** (anonymous shielded address) which is implemented in the client via the **z\_sendmany** RPC method. Up to 54 recipients may be in a single shielded transaction. v1 of HushList only supports HushLists of this size, but v2 may implement larger HushLists by breaking large recipient lists into multiple sends.

One may send a string of text via the **\*send\*** subcommand or send the contents of a file via the **\*send-file\*** subcommand. If one sends a string of text, there is no metadata related to that at all, locally. It only exists encrypted in a memo field on the chain. If one uses the **\*send-file\*** command, it may be prudent to securely delete the file from the filesystem after it is sent, depending on the needs of the user.

Each HushList has a dedicated default chain that it is attached to. When looking up **HushList** contacts for a given list, their address on that chain will be retrieved.

A unique feature of **HushList** is that **speech=money**, so you may always attach a non-zero amount of **HUSH**, **ZEC**, **KMD**/etc to each memo to a **HushList**. Currently you must send each member of a **HushList** the same amount in one memo, but you may send different amounts in different memos.

## Receiving Messages

At any time later, after the transaction has entered the blockchain, memos sent to a given address can be downloaded and viewed by those parties who have valid private keys or viewing keys.

Clients can poll the local full node periodically at a user specifiable default interval OR, by default, the same as the average block time for the chain in question. For the **Hush** chain, this is 2.5 minutes.

If for any reason a **HushList** user wants to PROVE with cryptographic certainty that they knew certain information at a certain time, all they would need to do is publish the PRIVATE KEY of an address which made the transaction that contains the information.

This is the so-called "investigative journalist" or "whistle-blower" use case. An individual can send themselves **HushList** memos "just in case" they need to prove something in the future. This can be considered "data as insurance".

## Costs

Sending **HushList** memos requires making a financial transaction and by default, **HushList** sends the recipient a transaction for 0.0 **HUSH** (or **ZEC** etc) with the default network fee (currently 0.0001 for **ZEC +HUSH**). The fee amount **MUST** be configurable by the user. In the reference implementation of **HushList** it be changed via the **HUSHLIST\_FEE** environment variable. Additionally, every **HushList** has it's own configurable fee declared in the configuration file for that list. The user may set a higher fee on some lists to ensure faster delivery while using lower fees on other lists which are not as time sensitive.

## Examples

The first **HushList** memo was a  $t \rightarrow z$  transaction which also included a non-zero amount of 0.055555 **HUSH**. It is viewable on the Hush block explorer here:

<https://explorer.myhush.org/tx/30a38c7ba0929efb7cd54d3b724d9eb1d9cb03f35381a94d889bc4cffb0593bf>

One may note that the **zaddr** associated with this transaction does not appear anywhere in the explorer, because shielded addresses never show up directly in the public blockchain. Network transaction analysis is not possible on **zaddrs**. The explorer only shows that a JoinSplit occurred and that change was given to a **taddr**.

Nevertheless, the follow text is forever embedded in the 512 byte memo field of the above transaction:

A beginning is the time for taking the most delicate care that the balances are correct.

– "Manual of Muad'Dib" by the Princess Irulan

Once men turned their thinking over to machines in the hope that this would set them free. But that only permitted other men with machines to enslave them.

– Reverend Mother Gaius Helen Mohiam

Polish comes from the cities; wisdom from the desert.

– Arrakeen villager saying

Be prepared to appreciate what you meet.

– Fremen proverb

Note that the transaction does leak the metadata of the amount, since it was a de-shielding transaction, from  $t \rightarrow z$ . All **HushList** memos have amount=0.0 by default so this is not normally a concern.

## Metadata Analysis

The biggest concern for metadata leakage in **HushList** is in de-shielding  $t \rightarrow z$  transactions which leak amount metadata.

The only time **HushList** does a de-shielding transaction is when the local wallet has 0 shielded value and it must transfer value from a taddr OR when the user chooses to send from a psuedonymous taddr to a **HushList**.

The first case we call a "shielded top-up" and happens rarely but we would not want to always have the same default amount to "top-up" because that amount can be searched for on the public chain. For this reason, we add some noise to the exact amount of our topups. For instance, if the user wanted to move up to 1 HUSH, we would generate a random number between 0.9 and 1.0 and then subtract it from the top-up amount. Then all **HushList** users would have slightly different top-up amount instead of a few easily searchable amounts.

In the second case, normal transactions will have amount=0 which will stand out and network transaction analysis is possible. If these psuedonyms choose to actually send non-zero amounts, network analysis can be made harder since most **HushList** messages use amount=0.

## User Stories

This section contains various "User Stories" of how potential users can use the various features of the **HushList** protocol to meet their needs.

### "Pen Name" user story - Amanda

Let Amanda have a transparent address  $t_A$  and let there be a PUBLIC **HushList** with shielded address  $z_L$ .

Amanda sends **HushList** memos from  $t_A$  to a PUBLIC **HushList** with a de-shielding transaction, ie.

$t_A \rightarrow z_L$ .

Any person who is subscribed to this public **HushList** will be able to see Amandas memos, yet Amandas identity is "psuedonymous", i.e. everybody knows that every message from  $t_A$  is the same person, but her identity remains



unknown. If at any time in the future, Amanda would like to \*cryptographically prove\* that she is the identity behind  $t_A$ , all she must do is publish the PRIVATE KEY of  $t_A$ . If any transparent value resides in  $t_A$ , it can simply be moved to another address before publication.

Of course Amanda is free to never reveal her identity and remain a pseudonym indefinitely.

Amanda needs to be concerned about her IP address being tied to  $t_A$  by a passive network attacker who records the Internet and is encouraged to use a proxy, Tor or other means depending on risk and operational security needs.

"Oppressed Minority" user story - Francesca and Nicolau

Francesca and Nicolau live in a place where their local religion/government/organization is oppressed by a larger religion/government/organization that controls everything around them, yet they still want to safely communicate.

### "Security Researcher" user story - Gordon

Dana wants to communicate 0-day exploits about nation-state infrastructure to the people that run this critical infrastructure, without anybody else listening in on this very sensitive information.

### "Whistleblower" user story - Martha

Martha has data about something that must be transported from internal-only systems, to external places, preferably many, while knowing that the data is not tampered with or even viewed until the appropriate time.

### "Censored Journalist" user story - Billy

This is an extension of the "Pen Name" User Story. Let's say that for some reason a journalist Billy is already known publicly, but is censored from all media locally in various places. Billy can use HushList to publish his writing (and also source data, encrypted or not) to multiple blockchains to make it permanently mirrored across thousands of servers and very hard to censor.

## Special Thanks

A special thanks to Daira Hopwood for an inspiring Zcash Protocol document and for making the ~~ME~~ infrastructure open source, which was used to make this document. HushList is built on the shoulders of giants and to all the people that have made the Bitcoin and Zcash ecosystems what they are, thank you.

Additionally, a special thanks to the Komodo Platform[Komodo], which has embraced Hush as one of the first cryptocurrencies to be added to their BarterDEX [BarterDEX] atomic swap platform and continues to support the Hush Community in various ways.

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