# **Design Document**

#### **Data Structures**

```
// utility type for authentically encrypted arbitrary data
type TaggedCipherText struct {
    CipherText []byte
    Tag
               []byte
}
// uuid: hash("User/" + username);
// symmetric enc key = PBKDF(password, uuid)
// symmetric mac key = HBKDF(password, "mac")
type User struct {
    Username string
    DecKey
             PKEDecKey
    SignKey DSSignKey
    rootKey []byte // == PBKDF(password, uuid)
}
// if accessing:
       uuid: hash("FileInfo/" + username + filename)
//
//
       symmetric enc key = HBKDF(User.RootKey, filename + "/encKey")
       symmetric mac key = HBKDF(User.RootKey, filename + "/macKey")
// if sharing, hybrid encryption:
       uuid: random
//
//
       enc/dec key: recipient's
       sign/verify key: sender's
type FileInfo struct {
    selfID
                uuid.UUID
                string // owner's username
    0wner
                string // inviter's username
    RootInviter string // root inviter's username
    FileID
                uuid.UUID
    FileKeyID
                uuid.UUID // uuid of the file's FileKey
}
// uuid: random
// if sharing:
       enc/dec key: recipient's
//
//
       sign/verify key: user(sender)'s
// if accessing:
       enc/dec key: user(recipient)'s
//
       sign/verify key: inviter(sender)'s in normal case,
//
                        owner's if owner has revoked access of another root inviter;
//
                        data is considered valid if it can be verified by either key
//
type FileKey struct {
```

```
selfID uuid
   EncKey []byte // AES Key for encryption/decryption
   MacKey []byte // AES Key for MAC
}
// uuid: random
// symmetric enc key = FileKey.EncKey
// symmetric mac key = FileKey.MacKey
type File struct {
   NumBlocks
                      int // number of FileBlocks associated with this file
   LastBlockId
                      uuid
    InvitationTableID uuid // uuid of the file's InvitationTable
}
// uuid: random
// symmetric enc key = HBKDF(FileKey.EncKey, "Block/" + block index)
// symmetric mac key = HBKDF(FileKey.MacKey, "Block/" + block index)
type FileBlock struct {
   Data
                []byte
    PrevBlockId uuid
}
// uuid: random
// symmetric enc key = HBKDF(FileKey.EncKey, "InvitationTable")
// symmetric mac key = HBKDF(FileKey.MacKey, "InvitationTable")
// e.g. {B: [B's FileKey uuid, D's uuid, E's uuid, F's uuid], C: [C's uuid, G's uuid]}
type InvitationTable map[[]byte][]uuid
```

### **Helper Functions**

- func AuthEncrypt(data []byte, encKey []byte, signKey []bytes) TaggedCipherText
  - Encrypts data with encKey and puts the MAC of the ciphertext in tag .
- 2. func AuthDecrypt(data TaggedCipherText, decKey []byte, verKey []byte) ([]byte, error)
  - Verifies the tag with verKey and decrypts data.CipherText with decKey.

#### **User Authentication**

When a user signs up, we deterministically generate the uuid for the user by hashing the username. We then check if that uuid already exist (which means the username is already taken). If it is, we return an error. If it is not, we generate a random salt and hash the password with the salt. We then generate a pair of RSA encryption/decryption keys and a pair of RSA signing/verification keys. We store the two public keys in the keystore. We also generate an empty <code>FileTable</code> struct. We *encrypt-then-MAC* each of them with symmetric keys generated from the hashed password. Then we store needed fields in a <code>User</code> struct and encrypt it with the hashed password. Then we create an <code>UserContainer</code> struct and store the salt and the *encrypted* <code>User</code> struct in it. Lastly we store the <code>UserContainer</code> and the authentically encrypted <code>FileTable</code> in the datastore.

When a user logs in, we generate the uuid for the user by hashing the username. We then retrieve the salt from the datastore and hash the inputted password with the salt. We then try to decrypt the encrypted User with the hashed inputted password. If the decrypted bytes can be un-marshalled into a valid User struct, then we know the password is correct and return the User struct, otherwise we return an error.

### **Multiple Devices**

Note that the User struct is the only thing we reuse (stores locally instead of fetch on-the-fly) and none of its fields are mutable (never changes after the user is created). So multiple devices are trivially supported.

#### File Storage and Retrieval

When user stores a file, we first determine if the file already exist in the user's FileTable. If it does, we retrieve the file's uuid and keys from the FileTable and fetch the file from the datastore. Then we verify and decrypt the File struct with the file's key. We retrieve the LastBlockID and fetch the FileBlock from the datastore. Now we verify and decrypt the FileBlock with the file's keys, retrieve the PrevBlockID, and delete this current FileBlock from the datastore. We repeat the process until we reach the first FileBlock. Now we create a new FileBlock with the content, authentically encrypt it with the file's keys, and store it in the datastore under a random uuid. We then update the File struct with the new FileBlock 's uuid and authentically encrypt it with the file's keys. If the file does not exist, we first create two random symmetric keys for the file. Then we create a new FileBlock with the content, authentically encrypt it with the file's keys and store it under a random uuid. Now we create a new File with the FileBlock 's uuid as the LastBlockID, authentically encrypt it with the file's keys, and store it under a random uuid. We then update the FileTable with the new file's uuid and keys.

When user loads a file, we first determine if the file exist in the user's <code>FileTable</code>. If it doesn't, we return an error. Otherwise, we retrieve the file's <code>UpdateKeysInvitationID</code> and check if this uuid exist in datastore. If so, we fetch the <code>Invitation</code> struct from the datastore and verify it with owner's verification key and decrypt it with our decryption key. Then we update the file's key with the ones from this <code>Invitation</code>, delete the <code>Invitation</code>, and replace the <code>UpdateKeysInvitationID</code> with a new random uuid. Now we are sure that we have the up-to-date keys for the file, we fetch the <code>File</code> struct from the datastore and verifies and decrypt it with the file's keys. If we updated the keys, we also need to find the corresponding <code>InvitationNode</code> and copy the new <code>UpdateKeysInvitationID</code> to there. We retrieve the <code>LastBlockID</code> and fetch the <code>FileBlock</code> from the datastore. Now we verify and decrypt the <code>FileBlock</code> with the file's keys and retrieve the block's content and <code>PrevBlockID</code>. We repeat the process until we reach the first <code>FileBlock</code>. Now we concatenate all the <code>FileBlock</code> s' data and return it.

#### **Efficient Append**

We need to download the user's FileTable and the corresponding File struct. We also need to upload the new FileBlock and the updated the File struct. The total size of data is scaled with only the size of the append.

## **File Sharing**

When creating the invitation, we create a Invitation struct containing the file's uuid and keys. We then authentically encrypt the Invitation struct with the recipient's public encryption key and the sender's private signing key and store it in the datastore under a random uuid. We then update the InvitationTable with the new invitation's uuid. This uuid is returned by the function. When the recipient accepts the invitation, we first fetch the Invitation struct from the datastore, then verify it with the sender's public verifying key and decrypt it with the recipient's private decryption key. Now we fetch the File from datastore and verify and decrypt it with the file's keys. We then find the corresponding InvitationNode in the InvitationTable and change the InvitationID field to nil. We then update the recipient's FileTable with the file's uuid and keys. Now the recipient has access to the file. The process is the same for both the file owner and non-owners.

Take the diagram as reference and suppose A revokes B's access. We first fetch the File struct from the datastore and decrypt it with the file's keys. We then fetch the InvitationTable from the datastore. We iterate through the all InvitationNode s for each root node in InvitationTable and delete each Invitation associated with the node. Then we delete the key "B" from the map InvitationTable. Now we generate new keys for the file. We then decrypt all FileBlocks of the file with the old keys, and encrypt them with the new keys as well as the File struct. Then we update the owner's FileTable with the new keys. Then we iterate through the InvitationNode s of each node in InvitationTable (now without key "B"). For each node, we create a new Invitation struct with the file's uuid and new keys. We then encrypt the Invitation struct with the recipient's public encryption key and the owner's private signing key and store it in the datastore under the uuid specified in the UpdateKeysInvitationID field.