A Survey of Real Sybil Attacks (under construction)

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ABSTRACT
1. INTRODUCTION

The sbyil attack was first described by Douceur [8]. Nowadays, it is a well-known attack on both centralized and decentralized systems and an active research area. In the sybil attack, malicious users create an unbounded number of *sybil* identities. Using these sybils, malicious users can perform several attacks. Hoffman et al. (2009) identified five classes of attacks:

1. Self-promoting: Attackers boost their own reputation or increase their gain/profit.

2. Whitewashing: Attackers avoid consequences of abusing the system and repair their own reputation to continue their attacks.

3. Slandering: Attackers manipulate the reputation of other users inside the system by e.g. false reports.

4. Orchestrated: A combination of the three attacks mentioned above.

5. Denial of Service: Attackers prevent the calculation and dissemination of reputation values.

Often these sybils are indistinguishable from real users and therefore a threat to systems relying on user input. Decentralized systems are particularly vulnerable. Without a central authority to certify users, decentralized systems are vulnerable to a variety of attacks, including the sybil attack [10]. Douceur argues that a central authority which certifies all identies may tbe the only effective solution, however even when a centralized authority is present, it still may not be feasible to certify real users and can even compromise the anonymity of peers [14, 6].

Sybil attacks occur in a variety of systems and networks e.g. overlay networks [20], social networks [3, 4, 15], content rating systems [12, 21] and vehicular ad hoc networks [18]. Because of the impact and difficulty of these attacks, there are already surveys on surveys [13, 16, 23].

The focus of this survey will not be yet another survey on the current state of the art, but will focus on real-world attacks using Sybil, eclipse and sinkholing techniques. We perceive these to be belonging to the same broad class of attacks. The goal is to provide a list of scientific articles and describe the datasets used in their evaluations. Sybils can be assigned a taxonomy as they can be compromised nodes, fake nodes [17] or whitewashed nodes, however we do not make this distinction inside datasets. The outcome of this survey will be the largest structured collection of various datasets which are collected if the data is publicly available or if the authors are willing to share their data. Additional datasets are added as well which were either created by means of manual annotation or by other parties.

The list of datasets will, for instance, cover fake profiles on social networking sites (Facebook), communication systems (Twitter), search engine link farms, auction sites, review sites, sock puppets on news sites, and various other Internet-deployed systems. A key challenge is the diversity and formatting of these datasets. The goal is to design a unifying format to enable scientists to easily use all available datasets for their latest research findings with minimal effort.

The survey will provide a structured listing with key aspects of each dataset, including, description, origin, size, creation date, and copyright license.

2. DATASETS IN SCIENTIFIC ARTICLES

We have composed a list of scientific articles on the topic of the sybil attack. We list – where applicable and available – the year, amount of nodes in the dataset, amount of sybils, whether it concerns real or synthetic data and whether the dataset is publicly available and mentioned in the paper. The results of this can be found in Table 1.

Our conclusion based upon this review is that even though most datasets use real data, often the sybils are fake or the ground-truth is missing. Some articles do not mention details of their dataset, such as amount of sybils, whether the ground-truth is known or the exact amount of nodes in their dataset. Moreover, we conclude that none of the articles mention the availability of their dataset nor actively promote it for further research.

3. DATASETS

As observed in Section 2, none of the datasets used has a ground truth. To allow further research to evaluate their work, a list of datasets is provided in Table . For each dataset, its key aspects such as size, creation date, origin To ensure minimal effort required to use the datasets, we have parsed all obtained datasets into one unifying format. This format will be explained first.

3.1 Format

The format of each dataset is as follows: *Very nice format here.*

3.2 Datasets with ground-truth
3.3 Datasets without ground-truth

4. CONCLUSION

In this paper we provided an overview of scientific articles and investigated their datasets used. From this, we conclude that even though most articles use real-world data, most papers do not or not accurately mention the details of their dataset. Moreover, we conclude that no article actively promotes/offers its dataset for further research.

We therefore gathered the datasets used in these scientific papers and added some additional datasets by means of third parties and creating new datasets ourselves using manual annotation and other means. The result is an overview of datasets which have one unifying format, are publicly available and can be used for further research.

Year	Mechanism	# Nodes	# Sybils	Real-world data	Dataset availability
2004	Overlay defense* [20]	5050	1010	No	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2005	Defending sensors* [29]	No simulation	No simulation	N/A	N/A
2006	Self-registration* [7]	±500	±20	No	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2006	SybilGuard [27]	1. 1.000.000 2. 10.000 3. 100	±100	No	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2006	Computational Puzzles [2]	No simulation	No simulation	N/A	N/A
2008	Sybillimit [26]	1. 932.512 2. 900.822 3. 106.002 4. 1.000.000	TBD	1. Yes 2. Yes 3. Yes 4. No	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2008	Cluster Analysis* [25]	1. 101 2. 94	All possible pairs: 1. 5.050 2. 4.371	Yes (Since it concerns real devices in this paper, we perceive it as real data)	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2009	SybilInfer [5]	1. 1.000 2. ±33.000	1. 100 2. ± 2.000	1. No 2. Yes	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2009	Timestamp series [18]	No simulation	No simulation	N/A	N/A
2009	SyMon [11]	50.000	2.500 to 25.000 in steps of 2.500	No	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2009	Dsybil [28]	1. 496.622 2. 2.339 3. 480.189 4. 6.040 5. 105.283	Unknown	Yes	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2009	SumUp [21]	3.002.907	No ground truth Estimation: 12% (360.349)	Yes	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2011	GateKeeper [22]	1. Varying (Synthetic) 2. 446.181 3. 539.242	1. Varying 2. 43.725 sybils admitted 3. 76.572 sybils admitted	1. No 2. Yes 3. Yes	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2011	Mitigating* [12]	> 65.000 (Sybil network attached, no information on size)	Not mentioned	Yes, real sybils unkown	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending

Year	Mechanism	Nodes	Sybils	Real data	Availability
2011	Leveraging* [4]	542.133	16.264 (3%)	Yes	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2011	Incorperating trust* [15]	1. 4.158 2. 82.168 3. 11.204 4. 8.638 5. 7.066 6. 33.696 7. 75.879 8. 614.981 9. 1.000.000 10. 1.000.000 11. 1.000.000 12. 1.000.000 13. 1.134.890	Not mentioned	Yes	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2012	SybilDefender [24]	1. 3.072.441 2. 3.097.165	10.000, 5.000, 1.000 (Compromised nodes)	Yes	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2013	Sok [1]	1. 718.115 2. 26.588 3. 63.392 4. 92.117	Various	Yes	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2013	SybilShield [19]	100.000	500 (generated)	Yes, sybils are synthetic	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending
2014	SybilRank [3]	1. 10.000 2. 18.772 3. 9.877 4. 10.000 5. 7.115 6. 10.000 7. 10.000 8. 10.000	5.000 (connected to each dataset)	Yes, sybils are synthetic	• No link in paper • Public availability unknown • Author response pending

Table 1: Current state of the art reviewed on their datasets. (* = mechanism was not named by the author(s)).

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