

PROGRAMS OF DENIAL: UNLOCKING THE GATES TO SKILLED IMMIGRATION
THROUGH PROJECT PAPERCLIP, 1945 TO 1947

By

JAMES EVAN SCHROEDER

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN HISTORY

WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY
Department of History

MAY 2019

© Copyright by JAMES EVAN SCHROEDER, 2019
All Rights Reserved

To the Faculty of Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the thesis of JAMES EVAN
SCHROEDER find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

Noriko Kawamura, Ph.D., Chair

Matthew Sutton, Ph.D.

Raymond Sun, Ph.D.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to thank the Washington State University History Department for generously offering me a teaching assistantship throughout the course of my research. This research was also made possible through generous funding provided by the Edward M. and Margery H. Bennett History Fellowship, the Mansfield Scholars Foundation Continuing Education Scholarship, and the Sherman and Mabel Smith Pettyjohn Memorial Scholarship. The Thomas S. Foley Institute for Public Policy & Public Service also provided important financial assistance that helped me conduct archival research in Washington DC. During the research process, the librarians and archivists at the National Archives and Records Administration and the Air Force Historical Research Agency provided me with valuable and much appreciated assistance locating and accessing numerous military and State Department records.

I would also like to thank the members of my thesis committee. Dr. Matthew Sutton and Dr. Raymond Sun both provided me with valuable assistance during this project, helping me focus my research and strengthen my thesis. I would especially like to thank my advisor and committee chair Dr. Noriko Kawamura. Dr. Kawamura's constant support and insightful advice has helped me throughout this entire process, while her skill as an educator has strengthened my grasp of history and foreign relations. I would also like to express my gratitude to all the faculty, staff, and colleagues who provided me with invaluable assistance and guidance during my time at Washington State University. I am particularly thankful for the feedback I received from Dr. Jennifer Thigpen and graduate students Samantha Edgerton and Zach Hagadone when crafting my thesis proposal. Finally, I would like to thank my family, and am immensely grateful for all their love and support.

PROGRAMS OF DENIAL: UNLOCKING THE GATES TO SKILLED IMMIGRATION
THROUGH PROJECT PAPERCLIP, 1945 TO 1947

Abstract

by James Evan Schroeder, M.A.
Washington State University
May 2019

Chair: Noriko Kawamura

In the decades following World War II as many as sixteen-hundred German and Austrian researchers and technicians immigrated with their families into the United States through a government program known as Project Paperclip. Established in 1945, Paperclip was initially conceived as a short-term military operation to develop technology for use against Japan. The specialists were to remain in military custody for the duration of their employment, a policy which received support from State Department officials determined to control access to German scientific and technical knowledge.

Paperclip's evolution into a long-term immigration program in early 1946 challenged this consensus. Incentivized by rising tensions with the Soviet Union, this change placed greater responsibility on the shoulders of the State Department, the organization responsible for granting immigration visas. Required to adhere to laws restricting the immigration of fascists, many State Department officials were reluctant to risk criticism by flouting regulations. As a result, they mandated that all immigration applications be processed according to legally permissible procedures. Despite subsequent military accusations of obstructionism, this thesis demonstrates

that the military's own shortages of family housing and funding posed the most potent barrier to recruitment. Restricting their capacity to process recruits, these shortages pressured officers to free space by enabling specialists to leave military custody as American citizens, a dilemma that demonstrates how competing bureaucratic priorities placed military officers in conflict with recalcitrant State Department officials.

Seeking a legally permissible compromise, State Department officials modified and redefined their own legal obligations, attempting to facilitate immigration while avoiding responsibility. In late 1946 the State Department granted the Joint Chiefs of Staff authority to authorize visas, and in late 1947 they granted the military and Justice Department full authority to determine the security risk posed by specialists. This thesis argues that this interdepartmental conflict and eventual compromise over Paperclip illustrates the practical limitations and unexpected bureaucratic and legal obstacles that shaped the United States government's implementation of national security policy in the aftermath of World War II. Together these forces helped establish technological superiority and skilled immigration as critical components to the emerging American national security state.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ABBREVIATIONS	vii
CHAPTER	
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER TWO: EXPLOITING THE SPOILS OF POSTWAR EUROPE: RECRUITING AND TRANSPORTING AXIS SPECIALISTS INTO THE UNITED STATES.....	28
CHAPTER THREE: THE LIMITS OF DENIAL: CONFLICTS OVER IMMIGRATION POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY	64
CHAPTER FOUR: A BELATED COMPROMISE: THE AMERICAN ARMED SERVICES ASSUME AUTHORITY OVER SKILLED IMMIGRATION THROUGH PAPERCLIP	105
CONCLUSION.....	144
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	151

ABBREVIATIONS

AAF	Army Air Forces
ASF	Army Service Forces
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
CIC	Counterintelligence Corps
CIOS	Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DEFSIP	Defense Scientists Immigration Program
DPs	Displaced Persons
FEA	Foreign Economic Administration
FIAT	Field Information Agency, Technical
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IWG	Interagency Working Group
JB	Jet-Bomb
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JIOA	Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency
MIC	Military Industrial Complex
MID, G-2	Military Intelligence Division
MIS	Military Intelligence Service
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
OMGUS	Office of Military Government United States
OTS	Office of Technical Services
POWs	Prisoners of War
RG	Record Group
SANACC	State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
SWNCC	State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
USAF	United States Air Force
USFET	United States Forces European Theater
USHMM	United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
USSTAF	United States Strategic Air Forces

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

On April 14, 1955, a thousand citizens gathered at a local high school in Huntsville, Alabama.¹ On a stage in the auditorium Wernher von Braun, alongside 102 fellow German rocket engineers, technicians, and their spouses took the oath of American citizenship.² This was a surprising twist of fate for a man who, just a decade prior, had been engaged in a bitter and brutal war against his newly adopted country. Von Braun's name ultimately became well known for the role he played in the development of rockets for the American missile and space programs. However, he was just one of the hundreds of German and Austrian personnel recruited from the remnants of the Third Reich to work in the United States after World War II.³ Although the total contributions these recruits made to the technological infrastructure of the United States is impossible to quantify, these recruits participated in revolutionary developments in diverse fields ranging from spaceflight and medicine to missiles and chemical weapons.⁴ Their presence in the United States represents a period of interagency conflict and compromise that helped create the American national security state.

This national security state did not emerge fully formed. American goals and perceived interests changed and adjusted as government officials shifted their attention away from a vanquished Germany and towards potential threats to future American security. This was not an immediate shift, but a process that began even before Japan officially surrendered. Out of this

¹ Monique Laney, *German Rocketeers in the Heart of Dixie: Making Sense of the Nazi Past during the Civil Rights Era* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 116.

² Michael Neufeld, *Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 2007), 290.

³ Laney, *German Rocketeers*, 25-26.

⁴ Annie Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program That Brought Nazi Scientists to America* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2014), xiii.

process came Project Paperclip, a nebulous program established in 1945 designed to facilitate the recruitment and exploitation of German and Austrian scientists and technicians.⁵ Exploitation, a term commonly used by the American officials implementing Paperclip, refers to the process whereby the services of these recruits were employed in the interests of the United States government.⁶ Although they were popularly known as “scientists” the official term used was “specialists,” indicative of the fact that their ranks contained scientists, technicians, engineers, and administrators.⁷ This study refers to them as “Axis specialists” to reflect the fact that although the majority of the initial recruits came from Germany, many Austrians were in their ranks as well. Under the auspices of the Paperclip program as many as fifteen hundred Axis specialists immigrated to the United States with their families in the decade and a half following World War II.⁸

The celebratory atmosphere that day in Huntsville obscures the controversial decision to hire these specialists. Many once counted among the most distinguished minds of the Nazi regime, and their presence in the United States challenged denazification, immigration, and security policies. This study examines the American bureaucrats who were faced with this dilemma, focusing on the relationship between the State Department and military representatives administering Paperclip from late 1945 to the end of 1947, when Paperclip officially ended its “acquisition” phase.⁹ Although the State Department and military agreed in principle that these valuable specialists should be exploited, the officials in charge of implementing Paperclip

⁵ Brian E. Crim, *Our Germans: Project Paperclip and the National Security State* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018), 3-4, 61.

⁶ Clarence, G. Lasby, *Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), viii.

⁷ Neufeld, *Von Braun*, xv; Edna Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948, Volume II*, in *History of AAF Participation in Paperclip, 1945-1947*, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1514.

⁸ Crim, *Our Germans*, 3; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 270.

⁹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 5, 87, 153, 187-189.

frequently clashed over administrative procedures and legal responsibility. This conflict forced Paperclip to undergo a process of constant bureaucratic redefinition and revision that helped blur the distinction between military and industrial technologies, both seen as vital elements to national security. The State Department's eventual administrative accommodation with the military represents an important moment of realignment as the United States bureaucracy began developing a shared concept of national security rooted in technological superiority that placed American interests in a zero-sum relationship with the Soviet Union.

The concept of national security is a critical element of this study and provides a useful framework for analyzing decision-making and policy choices within the United States government. This study uses Melvyn Leffler's definition of national security ideology to help analyze how and why Paperclip was implemented and resisted. National security is defined as the imperative to "protect domestic core values from external threats."¹⁰ Core values are defined as the union of a nation's economic, political, and military interests with national ideological and moral objectives.¹¹ John Clifford's argument that national governments must be understood as a series of opposing and inflexible bureaucracies rather than unified entities adds additional insight to the evolution of Paperclip. Policies advocated by national leadership are hindered and slowed by this diffusion of agency throughout the bureaucratic hierarchies. This obstruction stems from interdepartmental conflict created by conflicting loyalties between departments, and a lack of flexibility instilled by established procedures. Individual officials can also pursue personal agendas, further undermining official initiatives.¹²

¹⁰ Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 3rd ed., ed. Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 25.

¹¹ Leffler, "National Security," 28-29.

¹² J. Garry Clifford, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 2nd ed., ed. Michael Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 91-95, 100-101.

Paperclip was a broad program that is closely related to many diverse fields of research. There are numerous historical works that explore different perspectives and dynamics of Paperclip. This study expands and supplements existing studies by examining the formative role of the relationship between the State Department and the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA), the military led body administering Paperclip.¹³ Focusing on this relationship is critical to explain the program's structure and to illustrate the creation and redefinition of immigration and national security priorities. One of the most important works produced on the history of Paperclip is Clarence Lasby's 1971 *Project Paperclip*, the first scholarly monograph to focus on the project.¹⁴ Lasby analyses the chronology of the program, and the many parallel agencies participating in the exploitation of German resources. His research is valuable for its breadth and provides an expansive overview of the early history of the program. Lasby supplements his research with an analysis of the experiences of the Germans and Austrians who participated in Paperclip, using responses received from 165 questionnaires submitted to Paperclip researchers in 1960 and 1961 to examine their motivations for volunteering and their relationships with their American hosts.¹⁵

Although Lasby examines the relationship between the State Department and the military, he relies predominantly on military sources, having been unable to attain access to State Department records. Perhaps as a result, he is often uncritically supportive of military actions taken in the implementation of Paperclip, focusing his criticism on the State Department over their conflicting priorities, confused immigration procedures, and inflexible bureaucracy. This also helps explain his limited and vague examination of the interactions between the State

¹³ Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 191.

¹⁴ Crim, *Our Germans*, 15; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*.

¹⁵ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 271-272.

Department and the military-led JIOA, since many of the most fruitful sources are State Department documents produced by Samuel Klaus, the State Department's representative on the JIOA. Lasby merely refers to Klaus as "the one man," whose obstructionist behavior helped delay the implementation of Paperclip.¹⁶ This study expands on Lasby's analysis by using State Department and military records to illuminate the contribution that shortages of military funding and housing made to these delays, helping to illustrate the divergent objectives influencing the relationship between military and civilian officials within the Paperclip program.

This research also relies on scholarship critical of Lasby's analysis. Several monographs published in the mid-1980s focused on Paperclip, coming after the surprise announcement in 1984 that famed rocket scientist Arthur Rudolph had been forced to renounce his American citizenship because of the accusation that he bore responsibility for the treatment of slave laborers at the rocket factory near Nordhausen, Germany.¹⁷ Writing in the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, investigative journalist Linda Hunt criticized the program, portraying Paperclip as a malicious conspiracy perpetrated in secret by American military and intelligence officers.¹⁸ She later expanded her criticism in her 1991 book *Secret Agenda*, in which she draws upon a wide range of sources, including numerous personal interviews, government records, and Freedom of Information Act requests. The great value of Hunt's research is her examination of Paperclip from its commencement in 1945 to its covert completion in the early 1970s. When examining the JIOA, Hunt portrays Samuel Klaus as one of the few voices of morality within the program. Although Hunt's study can be accusatory in tone, she offers an important analysis of

¹⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 15, 59-60; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, vi-ix, 159-162, 224-227.

¹⁷ John Gimbel, "German Scientists, United States Denazification Policy, and the 'Paperclip Conspiracy'," *The International History Review* 12, no. 3 (August 1990): 441; Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 428-429.

¹⁸ Linda Hunt, "U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 41, no. 4 (April, 1985): 16-24.

interdepartmental rivalries and personality conflicts that provides useful insight. This examination of interagency relationships is limited by the book's expansive timeframe and by Hunt's predominant focus on the morality of recruiting former Nazis. Arguing that the JIOA engaged in deceptive and conspiratorial practices to bring war criminals into the United States, Hunt's research leaves out many of the interactions and concerns of the participants in Paperclip, instead focusing on the corrupting influences of German science on the United States government.¹⁹

Tom Bower's 1987 *Paperclip Conspiracy* offers another important perspective that places Paperclip within the context on American and British exploitation and recruitment efforts. Like Lasby and Hunt, he examines the conflict within the State Department over visa procedures, focusing on negotiations between the JIOA leadership and Samuel Klaus. He argues that Paperclip stemmed from an admiration for German technology based on Germany's demonstration of military power during World War II. This admiration, along with foreign competition for the specialists, influenced Paperclip's evolution into a program designed to deny scientific knowledge to foreign countries. Similar to Hunt, Bower portrays the continuation of Paperclip after 1947 as a conspiracy within the government, implemented without the knowledge of President Harry Truman. His research offers an international perspective attained by extensive research into British archives, but like Hunt, Bower focuses much of his research on the actions of Klaus and his role as a lone obstructionist.²⁰ This study will expand on Bower's analysis by focusing on the relationship between the JIOA and the State Department's Office of Controls,

¹⁹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 91; Linda Hunt, *Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), ix-5, 123, 157-160.

²⁰ Tom Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Battle for the Spoils and Secrets of Nazi Germany* (London: Michael Joseph, 1987), 1-5, 125, 133-135, 141, 147-148, 164, 209-225, 231, 252, 257, 272.

the branch responsible for implementing visa policy. An analysis into this relationship demonstrates that many State Department officials accepted Paperclip but remained committed to their own legal responsibilities, frightened of potential public and Congressional criticism.²¹

An additional study into the morality of Paperclip was published in 2014. Annie Jacobson's *Operation Paperclip* expands on Hunt's research by tracking the lives of numerous individual specialists who participated in Paperclip, using archival research and personal interviews to provide a more nuanced analysis into the results of the program. Like Hunt, Jacobson emphasizes the hypocritical nature of Paperclip, examining the disparity between Paperclip's stated prohibitions barring entrance to war criminals and active Nazis and the reality of the sordid backgrounds of many of the Axis specialists. Jacobson provides important insights into the relationship between the State Department and the JIOA but focuses on this relationship within the context of morality rather than national security. She emphasizes the distaste within certain elements of the State Department over the prospect of hiring former Nazis due to past crimes and elevates the role of Klaus in slowing the early expansion of Paperclip. Focusing on the history of Paperclip into the early 1950s, Jacobson's research provides important historical context for the program, while emphasizing the contributions and influence the recruits exerted on American chemical and biological weapons programs during the Cold War.²²

Jacobson provides a broad but valuable analysis, that weaves individual lives and experiences together to examine the hypocrisy and moral dilemmas of Paperclip. Her broad examination of numerous individual specialists disrupts her analysis into the inner bureaucratic dynamics of the program, however. By focusing on the security and political dilemmas, this

²¹ Department of State, *Register of the Department of State, December 1, 1946* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), 94-96.

²² Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, xi-xiv, 192-194, 279-282, 315, 451-462.

study complements Jacobson's research into the moral dilemmas of the Paperclip program. Although Hunt, Bower, and Jacobson all make important contributions to the study of Paperclip, examining the specific legal arguments expressed by State Department officials provides additional insight into the role of Paperclip in the burgeoning national security state. This study supplements these analyses by examining how the early Paperclip program actually complemented State Department objectives to prevent the transfer of German scientific and technical knowledge to other countries, and by demonstrating how the conflict over Paperclip reflected bureaucratic self-interest and self-preservation. This would only resolve in 1947 once State Department officials managed to free themselves from the legal responsibility of certifying that Paperclip specialists posed no threat to the internal security of the United States.

Any study of Paperclip cannot ignore the myriad of economic interests that drove the program's implementation. John Gimbel's 1990 *Science, Technology, and Reparations* provides an excellent examination that places Paperclip within the context of the large-scale reparations policies pursued by the United States after WWII. Gimbel argues that Paperclip developed into a denial program due both to Cold War competition over the specialists, and as a way to sell the program to the State Department. However, it also received support from commercial interests in the United States. Gimbel compiles recorded interviews between Paperclip specialists and military contractors, arguing that Paperclip enjoyed a close relationship with the Department of Commerce and private industry.²³ He expands his analysis in a later article, criticizing Hunt and Bower's interpretations of Paperclip as a deceptive and rogue operation. Instead, Gimbel argues that Paperclip was approved at the very highest levels of government. This was not a

²³ John Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 27, 37-38, 52-59, 171-172.

“conspiracy,” but was instead a deliberate and legitimate policy.²⁴ Gimbel avoids an in-depth examination of Paperclip, focusing primarily on the numerous economic exploitation programs pursued by the United States inside Germany. However, his research offers a useful analysis into these parallel programs and provides a basis for researching the numerous economic and political factors that influenced the implementation of Paperclip.

Martin Lorenz-Meyer continues this examination of American reparations policies in his 2007 book *Safehaven*. Although he only briefly mentions Paperclip, this study provides a valuable analysis of Safehaven, a program that originated in 1944 designed to hinder German trade and to seize Nazi resources located in neutral countries. Lorenz-Meyer discusses the role of the Federal Economic Administration (FEA) in planning and facilitating the program, the dominant debates and motivations of the participating government agencies, and Safehaven’s influence and impact in neutral countries during and after World War II. This study complements Gimbel’s analysis of American postwar reparations policy in occupied Germany, and Lorenz-Meyer even argues that Safehaven was an international reparations program designed to attain German assets while preventing the resurrection of Nazi Germany.²⁵ Although Lorenz-Meyer does not examine Paperclip directly, his research provides an important perspective for examining the motivations of the State Department and the backgrounds of the Safehaven employees, many of whom were later involved with Paperclip.²⁶

Monique Laney’s 2015 *German Rocketeers* focuses away from the economics of Paperclip to instead supplement historiography focusing on the legal, ethical, and political

²⁴ Gimbel, “German Scientists,” 441-443, 464.

²⁵ Martin Lorenz-Meyer, *Safehaven: The Allied Pursuit of Nazi Assets Abroad* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007), 1-5, 26, 32, 117, 335-337.

²⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 99; Lorenz-Meyer, *Safehaven*, 44.

relationship between the United States government and Wernher von Braun's rocket team. Laney takes a new approach by conducting a community study focused on the perceptions and experiences of the rocket team in Huntsville, Alabama. Using interviews conducted with surviving Germans and locals, Laney analyses the construction of memory in Huntsville regarding the rocketry program, and the historical experience of German specialists and families living and interacting within the community. Laney argues that a sense of shared whiteness, together with the community's Cold War fears and the economic growth from the rocketry program, allowed the dominant white population in Huntsville to accept and celebrate Paperclip's accomplishments. She places her research within the context of the 1924 Quota Act and the McCarren-Walter Act of 1952, providing a valuable analysis regarding Paperclip's relationship within American immigration policy. She argues that these specialists represent a unique group of highly educated immigrants, whose arrival predated the United States government's official preference for skill introduced in 1952.²⁷ Her focus on Huntsville precludes a detailed study of resistance within the State Department but does provide an important foundation for examining the controversy over Paperclip's visa and immigration procedures.

One of the most valuable sources this study relies upon that helps place Paperclip within the context of immigration law and economic and political policies is Brian Crim's 2018 *Our Germans*, that engages in a broad overview of the creation, implementation, and legacy of Paperclip. Crim examines the role of the Cold War in redefining American national security objectives and argues that Paperclip represents one step in the construction of a "permanent

²⁷ Laney, *German Rocketeers*, 21, 29-30, 41, 94-95, 202-203.

Military-Industrial Complex.”²⁸ Although he does not produce as comprehensive an economic history as Gimble, this analysis provides a fresh approach towards Paperclip’s relationship to American military and defense infrastructure. The United States government focused on preparing for the next world war, which required investment in science and a reliance on technology. Crim does provide the most comprehensive analysis of the State Department’s relationship with the JIOA and argues that this conflict resulted from conflicting national security priorities. Klaus and many at the State Department remained committed to diplomatic efforts designed to prevent the resurrection of Nazism, pursuing programs like Operation Safehaven to stop the flow of Nazi personnel and assets into neutral countries.²⁹ These objectives conflicted with the emerging national security bureaucracy’s belief in the omnipresent threat presented by the Soviet Union.³⁰

Crim’s research provides an important resource to use when analyzing the construction of national security objectives, and the shift in immigration and visa policy during the implementation of Paperclip. Nevertheless, much of his research focuses on the role played by Klaus in the JIOA. This study expands on Crim’s research by examining the broader dynamics between the State Department and the JIOA to place Klaus within the context of interagency deliberations and intransigence over Paperclip. Examining the funding and housing issues that impacted the implantation of Paperclip, and the reasons why the State Department and the military eventually reached a compromise that circumvented these bureaucratic obstacles allows this study to illustrate how resource shortages and legal traditions shaped the formation of the American national security state.

²⁸ Crim, *Our Germans*, 3-16, 59, 87, 99.

²⁹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 7, 10-12, 57, 87, 91-93; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 9.

³⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 7.

This litany of reputable research examines many of the dynamics within the Paperclip program, but there are questions that remain to be explored. Although the State Department's relationship with the JIOA has been frequently studied, research has often focused on how these dynamics resulted in the recruitment of former members of the Nazi Party, rather than on the motivations that influenced military and State Department officials involved in the program's administration. There has been little research done on the reasons why the State Department agreed to cooperate with the military on the implementation of Paperclip in 1945, and on why the military later came under pressure to ensure that the specialists became immigrants and American citizens. This study explores the motivations that shaped this interdepartmental cooperation, as well as the ways in which disparate organizational responsibilities temporarily overrode shared concepts of national security to create conflict and gridlock. Although many studies touch upon the conflict between the military and the State Department, there is a dearth of research into how this conflict was influenced by military funding and housing concerns. While many departments within the United States government agreed that technological development contributed to national security, the practical pursuit of this objective forced the military and the State Department to overcome traditional bureaucratic obstacles and prerogatives. The result was the establishment of a program that helped institutionalize technological superiority and skilled immigration as national security imperatives.

The Paperclip program originated out of cooperative efforts between the American and British Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) to control and exploit German technology. During 1945, these Allied intelligence initiatives provided the United States with a plethora of information detailing German technological advances in fields such as aeronautics and rocketry. The

possibility of recruiting the German scientists themselves to help decipher and develop this technology proved enticing to many operatives and bureaucrats from intelligence services and the military. This led the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to sanction Project Paperclip in July 1945 as an American program that coordinated recruitment and allocation efforts with the British government.³¹

Originally code-named Overcast and administered under the auspices of the War Department, Paperclip was designed to temporarily recruit 350 German and Austrian specialists for military research and development programs in the United States. The immediate objective of Paperclip was to exploit German knowledge related to the emerging fields of jet aircraft and rocketry, facilitating American efforts to develop military technology to support the war effort against Japan.³² The prospect of hiring these specialists on a long-term basis as a form of “intellectual reparations” to enhance the technological infrastructure of the United States was an important component to this decision.³³ However, the initial Paperclip program was predominantly military in nature, and in the initial months the potential employers were limited to military agencies and contractors.³⁴

Paperclip represents an important example of interagency cooperation within the military that continued into the postwar period. Although the United States Army, Army Air Forces, and

³¹ Harriet Buyer and Edna Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, in *History of AAF Participation in Paperclip, 1945-1947*, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 694-695; Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 18-19, 22-23, 37-41.

³² Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 78-79, 105; *History of the Air Research and Development Command 1 July-31 December 1954, Volume I*, Historical Division, Air Research and Development Command, 265 in box 35, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

³³ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, vii; Letter from Secretary of War to Secretary of State, December 13, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

³⁴ Memo from John Weckerling, G-2, to CG AAF, “Segregation of Overcast Personnel with Respect to Civilian Installations and Research Personnel,” February 28, 1946, box 990, file: Research January to March 1946, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

navy disagreed over strategies, funding, and resource allocation, they shared the conviction that the recruitment of Axis specialists would advance American national interests. This represents an initial American attempt to perpetuate what Melvin Leffler defines as “preponderant power,” promoting American national security by maintaining economic and technological superiority.³⁵ Although the military departments would at times dispute the allocation of Axis specialists, they cooperated with each other and with Britain in the interests of perpetuating American dominance.³⁶

This conception of national interest was also shared by State Department officials, many of whom conceded the military value that these specialists offered.³⁷ Although the State Department had the responsibility to issue visas for immigration to the United States, the entrance of these specialists under military custody made visas unnecessary. The military assumed full responsibility for the security and custody of all specialists in the United States. The State Department gave the military its approval for Paperclip upon the understanding that the specialists would remain in military custody throughout the duration of their stay.³⁸ This understanding between the military and the State Department continued so long as the specialists remained in the United States on a temporary basis. Cooperation would be strained, however, once military attempts to facilitate the long-term exploitation and immigration of these

³⁵ Melvyn Leffler, *Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 10, 19, 44, 222-223, 271, 359

³⁶ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 110-111; Interagency Conference, “Proposed Procedure for Placing Alien Scientists on Payrolls of Private Concerns and Still Retaining Military Custody,” December 5, 1946, box 19, file: JIOA Meetings, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

³⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 87, 89, 101.

³⁸ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 747-748; Memo from Clayton Bissel, “Exploitation of German Specialists in Science and Technology in the United States,” July 6, 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 938-942; Memo from William Clayton to John J. McCloy, June 15, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA; Crim, *Our Germans*, 88-90.

specialists challenged procedures while forcing the State Department assume greater responsibility.

Recruitment of foreign specialists continued after the surrender of Japan, as military officers adapted their positions to argue that the use of Axis talent remained critical to perpetuate American military superiority in the postwar world.³⁹ The need to coordinate military recruitment and allocation of specialists led the JCS to establish the JIOA, a subcommittee that assumed administrative responsibility for Paperclip at the end of 1945.⁴⁰ Although led by the military, the JIOA governing board contained a State Department member, and it was advised by representatives from numerous civilian departments.⁴¹ Realizing that cooperation with the State Department was essential for the long-term success of Paperclip, the JCS also attempted to coordinate military and civilian policy in late 1945 by appealing to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), the forerunner to the National Security Council.⁴²

During this period new interests and imperatives came to the forefront, resulting in the March 1946 expansion of Paperclip to allow for the eventual immigration of the specialists and their families.⁴³ This program was limited to those specialists classified as being vital to “national security,” a definition used for scientists employed by military agencies. This early program also established an outline for a separate, civilian recruitment effort through the Commerce Department, whose recruits were defined as being in the “national interest” due to their potential to contribute to public knowledge.⁴⁴ This portion of the program faced resistance

³⁹ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 20, 39.

⁴⁰ Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 191; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 107.

⁴¹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 59-60; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 26.

⁴² Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 133; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 91.

⁴³ Crim, *Our Germans*, 63.

⁴⁴ Memo from Klaus, “Coordination Immigration of German Scientists,” June 28, 1946, Document DG 25, box 11, file DG 2 of 2, Interagency Working Group (IWG), RG 59, NARA; SWNCC 257/5, March 4, 1946, box 18, file: MS Policies, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

due to its stated use of public funds for private interests, and was never implemented.⁴⁵ These military and civilian interests later merged, when Paperclip was further expanded in September 1946. Officially approved by President Truman, this expanded program allowed for the sponsorship of up to one thousand German and Austrian specialists for military and civilian purposes, although the military retained ultimate control over administration.⁴⁶ The changes that occurred during these several months represent an important change in American foreign policy and in official definitions of national security.

Throughout this process the omnipresence of private interests encouraged the integration of German knowledge with American industry.⁴⁷ However, although Paperclip received early support from the Commerce Department and private industry, recruiting skilled specialists for military research and development programs remained a primary objective of Paperclip from 1945 to 1947, reflecting the inherently militaristic nature of the new national security state.⁴⁸ An equally important factor that pushed the early expansion of Paperclip was the concept of denial, reflecting an American desire to prevent the recruitment of German specialists by any country other than Britain.⁴⁹ This represents the process by which American national interests were defined within an international context, relative to the actions and interests of other nations. A similar conceptual framework of social relationships developed by E. P. Thompson argues that

⁴⁵ Lasby, *Project Paperclip* 231-232; "The Paperclip Project: Its Concept, Implementation, and Control," January 30, 1959, box 2674, Publication "P" Files, RG 319, NARA, 14.

⁴⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 63; Memo from the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman, August 30, 1946, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1946*, vol. 5 of *The British Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), 689-691, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v05/d448>.

⁴⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 5, 63-65, 155-157.

⁴⁸ Crim, *Our Germans*, 153; Memo to General Hilldring, "Recent Developments Affecting Paperclip," April 4, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁹ CG USFET to JCS, "Appendix B to SWNCC Memo August 20, 1946," July 17, 1946, Document DG 19C, box 11, file: DG 1 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA; Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 38; "SWNCC 257/5," March 4, 1946, box 565, file: 1-B, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

interests are not simply shared objectives within a group but are produced by the creation and definition of these shared objectives in opposition to other groups and interests.⁵⁰ In this mold, just as the pursuit of preponderance defined American national interests in opposition to any nation that would challenge American superiority, denial defined American national security as dependent upon preventing the loss of German specialists to foreign nations.

Stemming from fear induced by reports from Europe that countries such as France and the Soviet Union were hiring Germans from the American occupation zone, this policy of denial was defined as much by the desire to prevent other nations benefiting from Axis knowledge as it was about using that knowledge for American gain.⁵¹ By the end of 1946, this definition had shifted to focus on denying specialists to the Soviet Union. Demonstrated by the American military's requests to allow friendly nations other than Britain to hire Axis specialists, this shift in focus reflects the steadily worsening tensions with Russia that would develop into the Cold War.⁵² As the military pushed the recruitment of specialists beyond what their funding and programs required, they stretched the limits of their resources that were already strained by budget cuts and demobilization initiated by the Truman administration. This not only hindered the importation of specialists but incentivized the allocation of Paperclip specialists to private industry, where the same effects of denial could be achieved without the same expense.⁵³

This pursuit of denial during 1946 and 1947 pushed the military into conflict with the State and Justice Departments, whose cooperation was necessary to enable the immigration and

⁵⁰ E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 9.

⁵¹ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 37-38.

⁵² Memo from Samuel Klaus to Col. Booth, JIC, "JIOA 1/14," January 6, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁵³ "Conference Between Using Agencies," November 26, 1946, box 19, file: JIOA Meetings, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC; Memo for the Files, "JIOA," July 29, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA S Klaus Memoranda for File, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

long-term employment of specialists in the United States.⁵⁴ Although State Department officials agreed with the fundamental objectives of Paperclip, the expansion of the program to include immigration forced them to assume responsibility for the specialists. This created resistance within the State Department, as officials sought to protect themselves while retaining control over the visa process, attempting to discharge their bureaucratic responsibilities while simultaneously protecting domestic security and avoiding public criticism.⁵⁵

The State Department's actions during this period reflect numerous pressures and considerations that restricted its freedom of action. One aspect of this was the desire to avoid the mistakes of World War I, when German remilitarization had benefited from research overseas. This determination to prevent the rise "of a 'Fourth Reich'" not only influenced State Department attitudes towards Germans in the United States, but was implemented through the Safehaven program, an interagency effort designed to seize German assets and repatriate German personnel in neutral countries.⁵⁶

More important perhaps, was the argument that although the original Paperclip program had adhered to the standards set by Safehaven by retaining the specialists in military custody, allowing these specialists to immigrate would free them to travel back to Europe where their knowledge of American defense technology would ensure their recruitment by Russia.⁵⁷

Throughout this period the State Department was also undergoing internal security evaluations

⁵⁴ Crim, *Our Germans*, 107; Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948*, 1523.

⁵⁵ Crim, *Our Germans*, 90-91; Memo from Bosquet Wev to Hamilton Robinson, March 17, 1948, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA; Memo from K.M. Schmedemann to Director, JIOA, "Report on Conference with Mr. Cummings," April 10, 1947, box 19, file: MS JIOA State, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

⁵⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 87, 91-93; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 9; "German Scientists Program," July 17, 1947, Document DG 28, box 11, file: DG 2 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁷ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 696, 700-701; Crim, *Our Germans*, 87, 94.

resulting from 1945 revelations about Soviet espionage networks.⁵⁸ In these circumstances, State Department employees were reluctant to assume responsibility for hiring former Nazis, an action that was feared would draw criticism from the public and Congress.⁵⁹

It is important to note that there does not appear to have been significant disagreement over the morality of hiring Nazis during this early debate over Paperclip, either within the military or in the State Department. Employment through Paperclip was ostensibly barred to specialists accused or suspected of committing war crimes, and to those deemed “ardent Nazis.”⁶⁰ This classification was determined by the specialists’ publicly espoused loyalties, whether they had joined the Nazi Party before 1933, and their position within the Nazi hierarchy. However, these definitions were sufficiently vague to allow the military extensive leeway when searching for potential recruits. Although not the focus of this study, there has been a passionate historical debate over the extent to which the JIOA concealed incriminating information from investigative reports, and the extent to which these actions allowed former Nazis to escape justice.⁶¹ The State Department disavowed the recruitment of war criminals and ardent Nazis, and did request assurances from the military that no “so-called war criminals” would be allowed to immigrate through Paperclip.⁶² However, the majority of the arguments used by State Department officials against the long-term immigration of these specialists focused on their own

⁵⁸ Mark T. Hove, United States Department of State, *History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State* (Washington DC: Global Publishing Solutions, 2011), 76-78.

⁵⁹ Memo from J.W. Riddleberger to J. H., Hildring, “Suggested revisions in SWNCC 257/25,” November 22, 1946, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA; Memo from Herbert Cummings to Hamilton Robinson, “CON’s responsibility in the German Scientists Program,” February 25, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁶⁰ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 78; Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 193.

⁶¹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 42-43, 72-74, 103; Gimbel, “German Scientists,” 441-442.

⁶² Memo from George Marshall to Kenneth Royall, August 12, 1947, box 19, file: State to JIOA, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

legal responsibilities to internal security, and the danger of public criticism should the backgrounds of Paperclip specialists become widely known.⁶³

State Department officials attempted to protect themselves from possible recrimination by adhering to established immigration and security procedures. These procedures were not inflexible, and during 1946 and 1947 State Department officials in the Office of Controls and the JIOA negotiated with the military over the practicality and necessity of these requirements.⁶⁴ As a result of these deliberations, at the end of 1946 the State Department modified immigration regulations to allow the JCS to certify that specialists were eligible for immigration visas.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, these changes failed to address all the legal technicalities that continued to prohibit the immigration of fascists while the United States remained in a technical state of war, leading the State Department to continue to insist that all immigration dossiers for specialists contain detailed information and security investigations.⁶⁶ These were difficult for the military to obtain due to manpower shortages in Europe, a dearth of available information, and the specialists' own questionable backgrounds.⁶⁷

⁶³ Crim, *Our Germans*, 93, 100; Memo from Herbert Cummings to Hamilton Robinson "CON's responsibility in the German Scientists Program," February 25, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁶⁴ Memo from Bosquet Wev to S.J. Chamberlin, "Exploitation of German and Austrian Scientists and Technicians in Science and Technology in the United States," July 2, 1947, box 993, file: Research 014.32, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; Memo from C.R. Welte, to JIOA, "Notes on Conference with Miss Rebecca Wellington, CON," May 26, 1947, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA; Memo from Hamilton Robinson to Thomas Ford, April 9, 1947, box 9, file: Department of State (Misc) From January 1947 through December 1947, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁶⁵ "Extract of Status of Papers," December 10, 1946, box 565, file: 1-D, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA; "SWNCC 257/25," November 5, 1946, box 565, file: 1-D, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA; "Title 22: Foreign Relations, Chapter I: Department of State, Part 61: Visas: Documents Required of Aliens Entering the United States," *Federal Register* 11, no 249 (December 24, 1946): 14611.

⁶⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 90; Memo from K. M. Schmedemann to JIOA, "Report on Conference with Mr. Cummings, Department of State, Concerning Immigration Dossiers," April 10, 1947, box 9, file: Department of State (Misc) From January 1947 through December 1947, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA; Memo from M. L. F., July 25, 1947, box 993, file: Research 014.32, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; Memo from Silver to Mr. Robinson, "Paperclip," July 2, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁶⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 42-43, 71-74, 90.

The resulting delays in the implementation of Paperclip angered the armed services, and military members on the JIOA attacked the State Department for its intentional obstructionism in the face of “the far greater threat of Communism.”⁶⁸ This process created a power struggle within the American government, as the State Department and military representatives within the JIOA each attempted to assert authority over the processes of immigration and citizenship. Contrary to later arguments expressed by angry military officers, the State Department never directly prevented the military from recruiting specialists into military custody. However, the limited resources and facilities the military officials had been allocated for Paperclip meant that immigration visas were needed in order to adequately “farm out” the specialists to private industry.⁶⁹ This would transfer the responsibility for surveilling the specialists from the military to the Justice Department, while freeing space in military housing and budgets for additional recruits.⁷⁰ These actions could also improve the specialists’ morale, making the offer of American employment more competitive while helping convince recruits to remain in the United States on a long-term basis.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Memo from Bosquet Wev to S.J. Chamberlin, “Exploitation of German and Austrian Scientists and Technicians in Science and Technology in the United States,” July 2, 1947, box 993, file: Research 014.32, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; Memo from Bosquet Wev to Hamilton Robinson, March 17, 1948, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁶⁹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 93, 170; “Memorandum,” July 11, 1947, box 105, file: Files of Samuel Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁷⁰ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 719-720; Memo from George McDonald to CG AMC, “Future Employment of German Scientists,” December 11, 1946, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1343-1345; “Notes on January 24, 1947 Conference on Transfer of German Scientists to Civil Employment,” box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; SWNCC 257/29, March 19, 1947, box 565, file: 1D, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

⁷¹ “The Paperclip Project: Its Concept, Implementation, and Control,” January 30, 1959, box 2674, Publication “P” Files, RG 319, NARA, 5; “SWNCC 257/5,” March 4, 1946, box 18, file: MS Policies, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

The struggle between the State Department and the military lasted until the end of 1947.⁷² Finally in July 1947 the State Department, facing Congressional and military criticism, suggested amending immigration policy to formally exempt specialists from immigration law.⁷³ On August 12, 1947 in a letter to Secretary of War Kenneth Royall, Secretary of State George Marshall wrote that the State Department's adherence to antiquated wartime regulations had disrupted immigration through Paperclip. To correct this, Marshall announced he would coordinate efforts with the Justice Department to modify these regulations whereby specialists could be exempted should the JCS certify that their immigration was "highly desirable in the national interest." In return for this cooperation, the State Department would assume that the military would not certify any aliens considered to be war criminals.⁷⁴ This policy would effectively shift legal responsibility for granting visas to the military employing agencies. Although this was agreed to by both the JCS and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Attorney General argued that such a change in regulations was unnecessary.⁷⁵

An acceptable compromise was finally reached during a series of meetings between the JCS and the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State in September and October 1947. Blending the concepts of national interest and national security, it was determined that both definitions would be applied to justify a specialist's recruitment. Should the JCS intend to certify that the immigration of a specialist was "in the national interest," their name and paperwork would be forwarded to the Department of Justice, along with a certification stating that the

⁷² Crim, *Our Germans*, 90-91, 98, 109-111.

⁷³ Memo from Robinson to Peurifoy, "Operation Paperclip," July 18, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁷⁴ Memo from George Marshall to Kenneth Royall, August 12, 1947, box 19, file: State to JIOA, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

⁷⁵ Memo from Hamilton Robinson to Bosquet Wev, April 6, 1948, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

specialist's presence promoted the "national interest" and "national security" of the United States. The State Department would then deem a favorable decision rendered by the Attorney General as sufficient evidence that a specialist was eligible for an immigration visa.⁷⁶ This essentially allowed the State Department to avoid all legal responsibility for Paperclip, while simultaneously allowing the American military establishment to commandeer the definition of national security in the context of skilled immigration.

Paperclip's bureaucratic evolution in the United States occurred against the backdrop of larger British and American intelligence collection efforts that had been in operation since the end of WWII. British and American investigative teams traveled through Germany, confiscating and copying documents and collecting German technical knowledge. These efforts were resented by Germans and drew criticism from American officers such as Military Governor of Germany Lucius Clay, who argued that it was disruptive to the German economy. These exploitation programs were created as temporary initiatives in special war-time circumstances, but the ill-will they engendered helped ensure their official conclusion on June 30, 1947.⁷⁷

Although the Paperclip program had evolved to facilitate long-term immigration, the recruitment phase of the program was designed to be temporary, and followed the initial trajectory of other postwar intelligence collection programs.⁷⁸ A combination of factors including the shortage of funding in the 1947 and 1948 budgets, and an increase in negative publicity

⁷⁶ "Proposed Procedures with Respect to the Entry into the United States for Residence of Aliens Certified in the National Interest," October 13, 1947, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁷⁷ Lucius Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1950), 443; Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 4, 60-61, 128-132.

⁷⁸ "Intelligence Division Position in Forcing Consideration by SANACC of Further Procurement under Project Paperclip," box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

helped influence this decision.⁷⁹ American attitudes towards Germany had also been shifting towards a more conciliatory position that prioritized German economic recovery and Western alignment over denazification and reparations.⁸⁰ German shortages of necessities such as food and coal at the end of 1946, and the economic unification of the British and American zones at the start of 1947 gave further impetus to Allied efforts to strengthen the German economy.⁸¹ Clay had previously expressed support for Paperclip.⁸² However, his reluctance at the end of 1947 to authorize the transfer of specialists deemed valuable to German economic recovery indicates that this also influenced the debate, placing Paperclip within the larger picture of a communist containment policy that was dependent upon a strong Western Europe.⁸³ A War Department meeting in March 1947, one day before the Truman Doctrine was announced, set Paperclip's end date for June 30, 1947.⁸⁴ This was later extended to September 30, 1947 after the Air Forces requested more time to complete operations.⁸⁵ Although this marks the end of the first procurement phase of Paperclip, recruitment efforts would increase again as the Korean War two years later revitalized military budgets.⁸⁶

Paperclip may have officially concluded in late 1947, but the bureaucratic controversy between the State Department and the military that it engendered helped to unify the American national security state. Although State Department officials shared many of the same policy

⁷⁹ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 220-221; Memo from Secretary of War, "Implementation of Project Paperclip," March 15, 1947, box 989, file: March 1, 1947 to March 15, 1947, Army Decimal Files, 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁸⁰ Mary Fulbrook, *The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 131, 134-135; Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 117, 156.

⁸¹ Fulbrook, *The Divided Nation*, 134; Konrad H. Jarausch, *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995*, translated by Brandon Hunziker (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 76, 82-83.

⁸² Crim, *Our Germans*, 71.

⁸³ "Minutes of JIOA Meeting," November 21, 1947, box 994, file Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 181-182.

⁸⁴ Fulbrook, *The Divided Nation*, 138; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 220.

⁸⁵ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 221.

⁸⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 157-158; Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 338.

objectives and concerns as their military counterparts in the immediate postwar world, the State Department's bureaucracy remained orientated towards combating the threat of Nazism while observing legal obligations both in the United States and around the world. The administrative conflict among military and State Department officials over visa and security regulations resulted in a cumbersome process, but ultimately helped create one of the first programs for skilled immigration while shaping a shared definition of national security that prioritized technological superiority.⁸⁷

This research relies on a variety of archival sources, including government memos, reports, and policy papers, many of which are stored at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. These archives include several record groups created by agencies involved with Paperclip. Two of the most important archival collections are the "Records of the Secretary of Defense" and the "Records of the Army Staff." These collections contain critical information regarding the formation and administration of Project Paperclip, including records of JIOA correspondence and unclassified JIOA reports. In addition, they contain ample records documenting the War Department's lengthy participation in Paperclip, and the interagency conversations and arguments that ensued from 1945 through 1948.

The "Records of the Department of State" are another important resource used for this research. These records contain memos and documents pertaining to the State Department's involvement in postwar Germany, and discussions over policy decisions and departmental objectives regarding science and technology in Germany. These also contain many valuable records produced by the State Department's representative on the JIOA, Samuel Klaus, who carefully documented the duration of his tenure with Paperclip. Another archival repository used

⁸⁷ Laney, *German Rocketeers*, 21.

for this research is located at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in Washington, DC. After publishing *Secret Agenda*, Linda Hunt donated 41 boxes of records to the USHMM pertaining to her research into Paperclip. These records offer an important compilation of information regarding Paperclip and are drawn from numerous sources to paint a broad overview of the program's policies and procedures.⁸⁸

These governmental records can contain inherent weaknesses. The desired information can be scattered across record groups created by numerous agencies and departments. In addition, the available records may be detailed but do not always offer the personal information and perspectives attainable from private papers and journals. Many of these documents reflect the mechanics of the Paperclip program without a detailed examination of the intentions or influences behind these policies. However, these records remain important sources to use when reconstructing Paperclip as it was discussed and implemented. Together, they offer insight into the internal decisions, processes, and conflicts within the program. An analysis of the conversations and proposed policy changes, together with an examination of the historical context that shaped the production of these records, can help determine common attitudes influencing support and resistance to specific policies.

The evolution of Paperclip from a temporary military program implemented during World War II to develop weapons for use against Japan, into a long-term recruitment and immigration program designed to deny German science to foreign nations represents a pivotal moment in the emergence of the Cold War and the formation of the American national security state. Paperclip represents an important moment when the use of skilled immigrants was deemed vital to national interests. Analyzing the evolution of Paperclip reveals a dialectic relationship

⁸⁸ Crim, *Our Germans*, 14, 74, 91, 99.

between competing bureaucratic responsibilities. Military policies were forced to conform to a framework established by the State Department, whose legal responsibilities were in turn revised and redefined to reflect changing perceptions of national security. By forcing the State Department and the military to interact and come to a consensus over administrative procedures, this program helped solidify the American government's commitment to skilled immigration through Paperclip while simultaneously militarizing conceptions of national security. Paperclip reflects not just a balance of power between military and civilian prerogatives but marks a moment when the aggressive pursuit of military technology emerged as a critical element of American foreign policy and national security.

CHAPTER TWO

EXPLOITING THE SPOILS OF POSTWAR EUROPE: RECRUITING AND TRANSPORTING AXIS SPECIALISTS INTO THE UNITED STATES

The Allied invasion of Western Europe in the summer of 1944 presented the United States and Britain with unprecedented opportunities to collect intelligence about Axis technology. These efforts were facilitated by the May 1945 capitulation of Germany, placing Allied armies in control over the resources and personnel of the Third Reich. Many American military officers came to argue that captured technology could be best exploited if the enemy specialists who had designed it were recruited as well. However, there was no established program or procedure in place to guide this recruitment. Originally codenamed Overcast, Project Paperclip was established as a temporary solution to this problem, recruiting specialists under contracts that lasted up to one year. The American military sought agreement from the State Department when planning Overcast, using the ongoing war against Japan to justify these measures. Significantly however, the military also appealed to the State Department by portraying Overcast as a way to restrict German militarism and control access to military technology. The State Department eventually accepted the military's proposal to transport Axis specialists into the United States outside of regular visa procedures, provided that they remained in military custody for the duration of their employment. Paperclip was conceived to support the American war effort against Japan, but early interdepartmental cooperation demonstrates that it was also seen as a way to control the movement and research of the Axis specialists while simultaneously promoting national security through technological supremacy.

During World War II Germany pursued an aggressive research program that emphasized military science and technology. To determine German technological capabilities and to capture

valuable research and scientists, Britain and the United States formed the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (CIOS), a network of British and American civilian and military intelligence organizations. Established in August 1944, CIOS coordinated T (Target) Forces in Europe, small groups of intelligence specialists who operated behind the advancing Allied armies to find and secure targets CIOS deemed technologically significant.⁸⁹ Although one important purpose behind these collection efforts was to acquire technology to aid the war effort against Japan, strengthening civilian industry was an important component as well.⁹⁰ CIOS efforts were supplemented through unilateral programs pursued by the American government.⁹¹ Operation ALSOS targeted German nuclear research, while the Naval Technical Mission, the Army Air Forces (AAF) Operation LUSTY, and technical teams from the United States Army scoured German territory for exploitable technology.⁹² Together these efforts collected hundreds of tons of documentation and thousands of tons of equipment related to German military and industrial research. In 1946 alone, roughly four million pages of German technical documents were microfilmed. In addition, teams collected a vast array of weapon prototypes and airplanes, one hundred disassembled V-2 rockets, chemical agents, and even a submarine.⁹³

Many of these operations were disbanded after Germany's capitulation on May 8, 1945, with American personnel from CIOS separating to form Field Information Agency Technical (FIAT) on May 31, 1945.⁹⁴ This branch took over responsibility for the technological

⁸⁹ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 3-4, 9; Lorenz-Meyer, *Safehaven*, 51.

⁹⁰ Memo from CD to ITP, "Problems Arising out of Disclosure in the United States of Technical Information Acquired in Germany," July 11, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁹¹ Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 37.

⁹² Crim, *Our Germans*, 35; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 21-22.

⁹³ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 63; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 25-26; Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 283.

⁹⁴ Crim, *Our Germans*, 80; Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 60; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 106; Richard L. Merritt, *Democracy Imposed: US Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 294.

exploitation of Germany in the American zone, collecting information and coordinating Paperclip personnel until FIAT's disbandment on June 30, 1947.⁹⁵ Paperclip was just one aspect of the Allied technical exploitation of Germany. Organizations such as FIAT and the Office of Technical Services (OTS) in the Commerce Department recruited teams of investigators to travel occupied territory conducting interviews, uncovering trade secrets, and copying millions of pages of documentation. President Harry Truman facilitated these efforts on June 8, 1945, implementing Executive Order 9568 authorizing a special interagency Publication Board to review and publish information acquired by public institutions. Truman's Executive Order 9604 two months later allowed for the publication of select material captured from enemy nations. Together these efforts helped ensure that any knowledge gained through FIAT and OTS could be compiled into reports for sale to the public. Historian John Gimbel argues that although an accurate calculation is impossible, the total value these diverse efforts brought to American industry likely amounted to five billion dollars.⁹⁶

American military officers and policymakers eagerly pushed the United States government to take advantage of this unique opportunity to capture and exploit enemy technology. Many argued that the services of the specialists who had designed this technology should be exploited as well, to further American knowledge in military fields such as rocketry and aeronautics.⁹⁷ Air Force General Kenneth B. Wolfe, traveled to Europe in April of 1945 as part of the Joint War-Navy Committee on secret weapons. In early May he advocated for the recruitment of German specialists to benefit the American aircraft industry while controlling future German technological development. The committee eventually advocated for the

⁹⁵ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 132; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 20, 30.

⁹⁶ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 26-27, 63, 67, 81, 94-96, 152, 163-164, 170.

⁹⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 55, 59; Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 18-19, 22-23.

recruitment of specialists for the exclusive purpose of developing weapons for use against Japan but held that this program must be limited and temporary.⁹⁸ Allied knowledge about these specialists benefited from the ALSOS team's discovery of the Osenburg List in early 1945, containing the names of 15,000 Axis personnel. Compiled by the head of the German Planning Office Werner Osenburg, it had been created to coordinate the human resources of the Third Reich.⁹⁹ This list, together with names gained through interrogations helped Allied forces compile lists of Axis specialists desired for recruitment.¹⁰⁰

There does not appear to have been any one individual who dominated the policymaking process that led to the decision to recruit these specialists. Paperclip instead appears to have developed organically, incentivized by military advocates in Europe and Washington DC. It is perhaps not surprising that during wartime, many initial supporters of Overcast justified their position in terms of the program's potential contribution to the war effort.¹⁰¹ During 1945 however, there was also uncertainty within the American government over how long the war against Japan would last. In addition, many military officers were worried about the potential casualties of an invasion of the Japanese home islands, remaining convinced that cooperation with the Soviet Union was necessary to secure a Japanese surrender. Throughout this period Allied forces were engaged in heavy combat across the Pacific, and American strategic bombing

⁹⁸ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 60-61, 64-66.

⁹⁹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 41; Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 17.

¹⁰⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 41; "JIOA Meeting," April 25, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA German Scientists, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁰¹ Memo from Director of Intelligence to General Bissell, GSC, "Employment of German Scientists in Furtherance of the War Effort Against Japan," May 14, 1945, box 989, file: Research through September, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

raids were devastating Japanese cities. It is understandable that any action taken in Germany would focus on providing the American military with as many advantages as possible.¹⁰²

The Department of the Navy took the first action, proceeding separately from the War Department on the initial recruitment of specialists. On May 1, 1945 before any program had yet commence, the Naval Technical Mission detained Herbert Wagner, the inventor of the Henschel HS-293 glide bomb developed for use against ground and sea targets.¹⁰³ The navy's objective was to use Wagner's skill and his Hs 117 Schmetterling antiaircraft missile against Japan.¹⁰⁴ Just days after his capture, Naval Intelligence requested permission from the War Department to transport Wagner to the United States for employment. Adding further impetus to this decision was the May 15 capture of U-234, a German submarine in-route to Japan carrying samples and blueprints of weapons as well as a large quantity of uranium.¹⁰⁵ After receiving approval, the navy quickly enlisted Wagner and his two assistants into the Special Devices Center at Long Island, New York.¹⁰⁶ This center would also house Project 77, the navy's investigation into the weaponry recovered from U-234.¹⁰⁷ It was the War Department who would initiate an official interdepartmental program however, seeking to provide specialists to assist with the research activities of its own services.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰² Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 44-45, 53-55, 80, 90-91. 102-105.

¹⁰³ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 32, 66-67; "Hs 293 A-1 Missile," Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, accessed December 10, 2018, <https://airandspace.si.edu/collection-objects/missile-air-surface-henschel-hs-293-1>.

¹⁰⁴ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 66-67; "Hs 117 Schmetterling (Butterfly) Missile," Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, accessed December 10, 2018, <https://airandspace.si.edu/collection-objects/missile-surface-air-henschel-hs-117-schmetterling>.

¹⁰⁵ Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 104.

¹⁰⁶ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 66-67; Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 105.

¹⁰⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 62.

¹⁰⁸ "Outline for Briefing General Eisenhower on German Scientists Exploitation Program, 11 March 1947," box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

The War Department received an infusion of support for this recruitment program on May 2 when members of the German rocket team, including Wernher von Braun, surrendered to the American Army from a ski lodge in the Bavarian mountains.¹⁰⁹ They had been part of the German rocket program, a massive project employing thousands of workers and tens of thousands of slave laborers in an investment proportionally equivalent to the Manhattan Project.¹¹⁰ These efforts had successfully produced an early cruise missile, the V-1, as well as the revolutionary V-2 ballistic missile, both of which gained infamy through their deployment against Allied cities.¹¹¹ Germany had also designed a wide range of anti-aircraft and air-to-surface missiles, and had even developed rough schematics for an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.¹¹² This research proved attractive to American officers concerned with missile development. The United States military had ongoing rocket programs, although early development had been plagued by interagency rivalry as each military branch sought control over the new technology. Indeed, development remained divided during the 1940s, and Army Ordnance, the AAF, and the navy each pursued separate programs. In 1944 a compromise was reached within the War Department to help coordinate army and AAF development efforts, with the army gaining jurisdiction over ballistic missiles and the AAF gaining jurisdiction over cruise missile technology. This jurisdiction, together with the fact that Army Ordnance chose to direct its own production and development lines, allowed them to make immediate use of the V-2 rocket technology and specialists within their own projects.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Neufeld, *Von Braun*, 198-200.

¹¹⁰ Michael Neufeld, *The Rocket and Reich: Peenemunde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era* (New York: Free Press, 1995), 206-207, 264, 273.

¹¹¹ Neufeld, *The Rocket and Reich*, 147-148, 230, 264.

¹¹² Nels A. Parson Jr, *Missiles and the Revolution in Warfare* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 25, 27-28; Neufeld, *The Rocket and Reich*, 283-284.

¹¹³ Jacob Neufeld, *The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1960* (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 7-8, 36, 43.

Colonel Holgar Toftoy led the Army Ordinance's Special Mission V-2, with the objective of capturing this rocket technology and equipment for use in the emerging rocket program at White Sands Proving Ground, New Mexico.¹¹⁴ Major Robert Staver accompanied one of these Special Mission V-2 teams to the underground V-2 production plant near Nordhausen, Germany in April 1945.¹¹⁵ Negotiations at the Yalta Conference placed Nordhausen within the Soviet Union's zone of occupation, forcing Staver to hastily collect V-2 rocket components and documents for assembly in the United States.¹¹⁶ During his exploration however, he discovered many rocket specialists who had remained in the region.¹¹⁷ On May 22 Staver sent a cable to Washington DC requesting permission to evacuate these specialists as well. Arguing that their knowledge about missile technology could be used in the war against Japan, Staver advocated for the recruitment of one hundred specialists for work developing rockets in the United States.¹¹⁸

His request reflected the larger confusion within the War Department over precise policies regarding the exploitation of Axis personnel. On May 14, 1945, Assistant Chief of Staff for the War Department Military Intelligence Division (MID), G-2 General Clayton Bissell was informed that many in the War Department, including the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces (ASF) General Brehon Somervell, wished to receive authorization to recruit specialists for use against Japan.¹¹⁹ Somervell followed this request up with a letter to the Chief

¹¹⁴ David H. DeVorkin, *Science with a Vengeance: How the Military Created the US Space Sciences After World War II* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1992), 48.

¹¹⁵ James McGovern, *Crossbow and Overcast* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1964), 63-64, 164-165; Neufeld, *Von Braun*, 206.

¹¹⁶ Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 98-100; Neufeld, *Von Braun*, 206.

¹¹⁷ Neufeld, *Von Braun*, 206.

¹¹⁸ McGovern, *Crossbow and Overcast*, 173-174, 242.

¹¹⁹ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 68; Memo from Director of Intelligence to General Bissell, GSC, "Employment of German Scientists in Furtherance of the War Effort Against Japan," May 14, 1945, box 989, file: Research through September, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

of Staff, emphasizing the advantages the specialists could offer in the war against Japan and warning that if no action were taken they would likely be recruited by the Soviet Union.¹²⁰ The Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), created in 1944 as a joint British and American command under the leadership of General Dwight Eisenhower, also wrote to the War Department on May 15 requesting a policy decision regarding captured personnel.¹²¹

These exploitation requests were supported by the AAF. In fact, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett and Commanding General of the Air Forces Henry Arnold had both supported the development of missiles to counter the German V-weapons. By 1945 the AAF had used captured V-1 parts to construct replica missiles known as Jet-Bombs (JB). Although not ready in time for combat, by the end of the war the AAF had ordered and received over one thousand such weapons.¹²² General Arnold himself forwarded a cable to the Chief of Staff on behalf of the AAF advocating for the recruitment and shipment of German V-weapon specialists to the United States. Arnold argued that this solution offered the most direct benefits to the United States. By transplanting the research, development, and production of V-weapons to the United States, American engineers and manufacturers could remain employed while the country would reap the benefits of German knowledge. This would also prevent American technical knowledge from being copied in Germany and would honor Allied regulations mandating German demilitarization.¹²³

¹²⁰ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 68.

¹²¹ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 38; "Military Agency Records RG 331," National Archives and Records Administration, accessed December 10, 2018, <https://www.archives.gov/research/holocaust/finding-aid/military/rg-331.html>; Memo from SHAEF to War Department, May 15, 1945, box 989, file: Research through September, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

¹²² Neufeld, *Ballistic Missiles*, 8, 12, 44; Parson, *Missiles and the Revolution*, 44.

¹²³ Memo for the Chief of Staff, "Manufacture of V-1 and V-2 Missiles in Germany," box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

Chief of Staff George Marshall supported these efforts, and wrote to Eisenhower in early May suggesting that the United States could use JB and V-2 missiles against Japan.¹²⁴ Eisenhower would go on to attribute the successful Allied occupation of Europe to the German army's delay in deploying V-weapons against the invasion force.¹²⁵ Somervell also confirmed that the ASF supported Arnold's suggestions in a memo submitted to the Deputy Chief of Staff.¹²⁶ The AAF does not appear to have imitated Ordnance's efforts to recruit rocket specialists however, instead relying on private industry for missile development. The AAF did support a policy for recruitment but used arguments that appear to have emphasized overall benefits to technological development to justify the employment of Axis specialists. The AAF's alternative rocket program and reliance on military contractors may be one explanation for why some of their initial arguments failed to emphasize the specialists' potential contributions to the war in the Pacific.¹²⁷

General Arnold also pursued additional scientific efforts on behalf of the AAF by working with Theodore von Karman, the aeronautical director at the California Institute of Technology (Cal Tech). In 1945 while von Karman was serving the director of the Scientific Advisory Group for the AAF, he traveled to Europe upon Arnold's request to assess what the technological advancements made during World War II meant for future warfare. His experience overseas convinced him that it was necessary for the AAF to focus its resources on developing

¹²⁴ Neufeld, *Ballistic Missiles*, 12; Memo from Marshall to Eisenhower, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

¹²⁵ Neufeld, *Ballistic Missiles*, 41.

¹²⁶ Memo from NDD to the Deputy Chief of Staff, "Manufacture of V-1 and V-2 Missiles in Germany," May 26, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA; Memo from Brehon Somervell to NDD, "Manufacture of V-1 and V-2 Missiles in Germany," May 24, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

¹²⁷ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 69, 104; Neufeld, *Ballistic Missiles*, 44.

jet and rocket technology.¹²⁸ During his tour, von Karman also interviewed Dr. Osenburg, and became an advocate for a limited recruitment program for Axis specialists.¹²⁹ Von Karman himself was a primary beneficiary of Overcast, with Army Ordinance hiring the Gutenberg Aeronautical Laboratory he directed at Cal Tech to test the V-2's captured by Staver.¹³⁰

On May 14, 1945, Assistant Chief of Air Intelligence General James Hodges wrote to the MID G-2 explaining that the AAF was planning to request specialists for employment in the United States and needed information on the appropriate process.¹³¹ Donald Putt, Chief of Air Force Technical Services also threw in his support, writing to General Wolfe on May 18, 1945 expressing the need for jet aircraft designers in the United States.¹³² Putt would later argue that specialists provided the United States with the opportunity to save “billions of dollars of research and thousands of manhours” in areas of specialized research.¹³³ Deputy Commanding General of US Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) Hugh Knerr responded on May 30, expressing his support for Putt's idea. The next day Kneer wrote to Carl Spaatz, Commanding General of USSTAF to argue that a future program was a cost-effective way to strengthen AAF technological capabilities. Showing foresight, Kneer also suggested that a future program could extend for

¹²⁸ Neufeld, *Ballistic Missiles*, 24, 39.

¹²⁹ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 103; Memo from Theodore von Karman to CG AAF, “Recommendations for Organizing Reference Center for German Scientific and Technical Material in USSTAF,” May 5, 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 123.

¹³⁰ Neufeld, *Ballistic Missiles*, 36, 39.

¹³¹ Memo from James Hodges to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, “German Scientists and Technological Experts,” May 14, 1945, box 991, file: Implementation and General History, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

¹³² Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 69; Letter from Colonel Putt to General Wolfe, May 18, 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 913.

¹³³ Memo from Donald Putt to General L. C. Craigie, “Foreign Technical Intelligence Information,” November 21, 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1055-1057.

several years. However, he dismissed the idea that the specialists should be employed by civilian industry, arguing that any initial program would be primarily military in composition.¹³⁴

These army and AAF requests had an influence on officials in the War Department. General Bissell responded to the ASF on May 18, confirming that the War Department would develop the necessary recruitment program.¹³⁵ Two days later, the Chief of Staff wrote to Somervell explaining that there would be a coordinated program operated through MID G-2.¹³⁶ On May 25 Toftoy responded to Staver's request for the extradition of rocket specialists around Nordhausen, informing him that a recruitment program was under development in Washington DC, and that he was authorized to evacuate all specialists to areas of American occupation.¹³⁷ This number would eventually exceed one thousand specialists and family members. A June 2 cable from Eisenhower to the War Department supporting the recruitment of specialists lent further weight to Staver's actions.¹³⁸ Eisenhower also defended Staver from Soviet accusations of looting, arguing that his actions were necessary to support the war effort against Japan.¹³⁹

Although many American officers in favor of exploitation focused on the practical contribution Axis specialists could make to the development of military technology, these arguments cannot be separated from the evolving geopolitical confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Allied Powers met at Potsdam from July to August 1945,

¹³⁴ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 69-70; Memo from Hugh Kneer to CG USSAF, June 1, 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 920.

¹³⁵ Memo from Clayton Bissell to Director of Intelligence, ASF, "Employment of German Scientists in Furtherance of the War Effort Against Japan," box 989, file: Research through September 1945, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

¹³⁶ Memo from Chief of Staff to CG ASF, "German Scientists," May 20, 1945, box 989, file: Research through September 1945, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; "War Department: Military Intelligence Division, 8/26/1918-4/19/1947, Organization Authority Record," National Archives and Records Administration, accessed December 10, 1945, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/10511458>.

¹³⁷ McGovern, *Crossbow and Overcast*, 173-174; Neufeld, *Von Braun*, 207-208.

¹³⁸ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 45, 70.

¹³⁹ Memo from Dwight Eisenhower to Harry Truman, August 8, 1945, in *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Occupation, 1945; VI*, ed. Alfred D. Chandler Jr. et al. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 259-261.

attempting to resolve these tensions by establishing an outline for the governance of the postwar world. These deliberations did little to mitigate tensions over the fate of Eastern Europe. Many in the American government remained fearful that the Soviet Union would expand into the void left by the collapse of the Third Reich, strengthening their economic and military capacity until they could one day challenge the United States.¹⁴⁰

Employing Axis specialists would be one way the Soviet Union could speed this process. However, while the possibility that specialists would be recruited by the Soviet Union would later frighten American officials, it does not appear that the initial push for exploitation in the summer of 1945 represents the emergence of an inevitable Cold War.¹⁴¹ Although the threat of losing specialists to the Soviet Union would become a common justification for exploitation in the United States, early policies formulated in 1946 also emphasized the threat of losing the specialists to countries such as “France, Spain, Egypt, [and] Argentina.”¹⁴² Competition extended to Britain, although both the British and American Chiefs of Staff generally cooperated on the overall recruitment of specialists, reflecting the continuation of an “Anglo-American alliance.”¹⁴³ The evolution of Overcast instead reflects a definition of national security that prioritized American technological superiority over the rest of the world. This indicates that American military officials held the assumption that military technological development was a zero-sum game. Any specialist who was hired by any nation, even an ostensible ally, represented a loss for the United States.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 81; Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 6-10, 15, 36-38, 49-51; Merritt, *Democracy Imposed*, 64.

¹⁴¹ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 37-38; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 68, 80.

¹⁴² Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 38; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 97; Memo from Secretary of War to Secretary of State, December 13, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁴³ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 38; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 35, 97; Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 61.

¹⁴⁴ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 38.

Translating these national security objectives into practical policies was a separate challenge. The War Department may have held extensive authority to implement policies in an occupied Germany, but any program to bring foreign citizens into the United States would need at least nominal support from the State Department. The State Department had authority over legal admission to the United States, and its consular offices were responsible for issuing immigration visas and six-month visitor visas to foreign citizens.¹⁴⁵ Although many in the State Department acknowledged the potential benefits of Overcast, their authority over visas placed them in a position of power that would prove a roadblock once Overcast expanded to include the possibility of immigration.¹⁴⁶ The initial attitude of State Department officials reflected administrative obligations to uphold American policy that prioritized controlling the transfer of German scientific knowledge and movement of skilled personnel in the interests of national security.¹⁴⁷ This also reflected the fact that many of the restrictions on immigration from Germany that had been put in place during the war remained, including a ban on the legal issuance of visas to any applicant who had been a Nazi or who was affiliated with Fascists.¹⁴⁸ These restrictions would not ease until the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 pushed American consuls in Germany to resume regular visa activity.¹⁴⁹

The State Department implemented these objectives through Safehaven, a multifaceted program developed during 1944 to combat German influence and commercial relationships in neutral countries. Safehaven's goal was to destroy German militarism and to defend the world

¹⁴⁵ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 116, 225; Crim, *Our Germans*, 88, 90-91, 99; Lasby, Project Paperclip, 90-91, 106-107.

¹⁴⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 87, 89-90, 93.

¹⁴⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 87, 91-94; Memo from W. L. Clayton to John J. McCloy, June 15, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁴⁸ Memo from Silver to Mr. Robinson, July 2, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁴⁹ CON to USPOLAD, June 30, 1948, box 19, file: State to JIOA, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

against the resurrection “of a ‘Fourth Reich.’”¹⁵⁰ To accomplish this, Safehaven called for seizing overseas German assets, preventing the flight of German capital, and blocking the escape of dangerous individuals and war criminals.¹⁵¹ This also entailed “the control of German individuals (including scientists)” who threatened to resurrect German militarism.¹⁵² Although planned by the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), Safehaven also fell within the administration of the Treasury and State Departments. This led to interagency power struggles and bickering which threatened the program.¹⁵³ By 1945, in the aftermath of these struggles the program had largely fallen under the purview of the State Department.¹⁵⁴

Even before Safehaven, the United States had combated Nazism in Latin America. Participating in the Rio Conference of 1942, the United States had worked with the Pan American Union to establish the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense, a panel to prevent Axis subversion by preventing dangerous German immigrants from gaining citizenship.¹⁵⁵ The State Department pursued Safehaven’s objectives through international agreements such as the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace in Mexico City in February and March of 1945. Out of the resolutions signed at this conference, Resolution VII pledged to block the spread of totalitarianism and to prevent the establishment of the Axis

¹⁵⁰ Samuel Klaus, quoted in Lorenz-Meyer, *Safehaven*, 1-2, 48, 337.

¹⁵¹ William Z. Slany, and Department of State, *U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II: Preliminary Study*, Department of State, 1997, 15; Donald P. Steury, “Tracking Nazi Gold: The OSS and Project Safehaven,” *Studies in Intelligence*, no. 9 (Summer, 2000): 35-36.

¹⁵² “Outline for Briefing General Eisenhower on German Scientists Exploitation Program, 11 March 1947,” box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

¹⁵³ Lorenz-Meyer, *Safehaven*, 32-33; Steury, “Tracking Nazi Gold,” 36.

¹⁵⁴ Slany, *U.S. and Allied Efforts*, 20.

¹⁵⁵ Department of State, *The Department of State Bulletin* (Washington DC: Office of Media Services, 1942), 117, 128-129; Memo from Laurence Knapp to Spruille Braden, “Paper Clip Project,” October 2, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA General File, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; Memo from Acting Secretary of State to USPOLAD Murphy, January 8, 1946, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. 5 of *The British Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), 799-800, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v05/d535>.

powers in Latin America, while Resolution XLII agreed to restrict the immigration of Axis agents into the Western Hemisphere.¹⁵⁶

Safehaven eventually halted during the 1950s, by which time it had managed to confiscate roughly 45 million dollars of German capital in neutral countries. Although this amount was less than had been hoped for, historian Martin Lorenz-Meyer argues that Safehaven was ultimately successful at collecting postwar financial and technological reparations from Germany.¹⁵⁷ The Safehaven program also involved many of the same officials who later influenced the implementation of Paperclip. One lawyer working for the FEA who strongly advocated for Safehaven was Samuel Klaus. Klaus could be intransigent in his commitment to his legal responsibilities, and eagerly supported combating the spread of Nazi influence abroad, a danger he felt continued to threaten the United States.¹⁵⁸ While employed by the State Department in 1946, Klaus would represent the department's interests in the Paperclip program.¹⁵⁹

While working on Safehaven, Klaus traveled to Europe with Foreign Activity Correlation Division officer Herbert Cummings. In addition, head of the Division of Economic Security Affairs Seymour Rubin helped administer Safehaven for the State Department. Both Cummings and Rubin would eventually come to critique the Paperclip program.¹⁶⁰ Much of the support for Safehaven in the State Department reflected lessons taken from World War I. Fearing that German scientists would pursue banned technological research overseas, many officials were

¹⁵⁶ Memo to Mr. Acheson and Mr. Braden, May 14, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; Pan American Union, *Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace: Mexico City, February-March 1945*, Washington DC: Pan American Union, 1945.

¹⁵⁷ Lorenz-Meyer, *Safehaven*, 326, 335-336.

¹⁵⁸ Crim, *Our Germans*, 57, 91-92.

¹⁵⁹ Lorenz-Meyer, *Safehaven*, 177.

¹⁶⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 94-95, 99; Lorenz-Meyer, *Safehaven*, 31-32, 34-35, 44, 48, 58, 177.

unwilling to grant Axis specialists access to unrestricted travel and research opportunities.

Despite his past history with Safehaven, Klaus remained dutifully professional. He acknowledged the practical benefits of employing specialists in the United States but feared the security risk and potential public relations debacle should the State Department assume responsibility for granting specialists visas.¹⁶¹

At least on the surface, Safehaven and Overcast appeared to be inherently at odds. In fact, one prominent argument later expressed by State Department officials such as Klaus was that Overcast contradicted American obligations under Safehaven. While Safehaven attempted to track down and restrict the movement of Nazi personnel, Overcast apparently offered these same individuals a safe haven in the United States.¹⁶² Indeed, many historians have also argued that the objectives of Paperclip were at odds with the Safehaven program.¹⁶³ However, it is significant that the State Department officials primarily voiced these arguments after Overcast expanded in early 1946 to include the prospect of immigration, placing more responsibility and impetus on the State Department. While Safehaven intended to control the spread of German technology, assuming responsibility for granting Axis specialists free reign to travel throughout the United States and back to Europe was not something that the officials in charge of issuing visas found appealing.¹⁶⁴

Despite this apparent conflict, there was little inherent contradiction between Safehaven and the original Overcast program in 1945. In fact, during a 1947 briefing the War Department

¹⁶¹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 57-58, 87, 93-94.

¹⁶² Memo from Laurence Knapp to Spruille Braden, "Paper Clip Project," October 2, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA General File, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; "State Department Problems-German Scientists," April 26, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA German Scientists, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁶³ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 207, 298; Crim, *Our Germans*, 91-93, Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 194; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 56-57.

¹⁶⁴ Crim, *Our Germans*, 63, 94, 99.

traced the origins of Paperclip back to joint military-State Department cooperation on Safehaven that had attempted to regulate the movement of Axis personnel. This cooperation emerged out of Operation Eclipse, an umbrella term used to refer to the overall British and American occupation strategy in Germany.¹⁶⁵ Eclipse called for the exploitation of German science and for the detention of Axis personnel specializing in military and industrial technology to prevent the resurgence of a “German War Machine.”¹⁶⁶ So long as a military exploitation program on American soil retained the specialists in military custody and under careful surveillance, it could fulfill Safehaven’s stated goals to combat the resurgence of Nazi influence and German military potential by controlling Axis technology and personnel.¹⁶⁷

Many of these policies placing restrictions on German science were later implemented during the subsequent American occupation of Germany, although in a confused and ineffective manner.¹⁶⁸ The 1944 Morgenthau Plan calling for punitive measures including the complete disarmament, deurbanization, and denazification of Germany had never been officially accepted, but the JCS pursued similar measures when crafting JCS 1067, the postwar American occupation procedures. Although originally written in 1944, this paper went through several revisions before being approved on May 11, 1945.¹⁶⁹ This called for a temporary suspension of all German technical research, the disbandment of all facilities and the arrest of individuals who contributed

¹⁶⁵ “Outline for Briefing General Eisenhower on German Scientists Exploitation Program, 11 March 1947,” box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; Earl F. Ziemke, *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1975), 163.

¹⁶⁶ “Allied Forces Supreme Headquarter: Operation ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan,” April 25, 1945, Defense Technical Information Center, <https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA606377>.

¹⁶⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 89; Memo from Mr. Hutton to Colonel McCormack, “Exploitation of German Specialists in Science and Technology in the United States,” October 31, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁶⁸ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 63, 137.

¹⁶⁹ Merritt, *Democracy Imposed*, 55-59, 62-63, 180-181.

to Nazism and German militarism.¹⁷⁰ However, JCS 1067 provided little concrete guidance, allowing administrators to adapt policies to meet the circumstances.¹⁷¹ In addition, many officials in the State and War Departments opposed the more extreme policies in JCS 1067 that called for invasive long-term efforts to democratize and de-nazify Germany.¹⁷² For example, by September 6, 1946 at a speech in Stuttgart, Secretary of State James Byrnes repudiated the punitive nature of JCS 1067 and the strict policy of denazification, instead emphasizing the reestablishment of German authority. Policies towards denazification and demilitarization grew increasingly relaxed throughout 1946, until JCS 1067 was formally replaced in July 1947 with JCS 1779, designed to promote stability over social change.¹⁷³

Despite this confusion, placing limitations on German military research and implementing Safehaven remained important priorities for the State Department in late 1945. The reasons for the relatively easy cooperation the military initially enjoyed with the State Department can be attributed to the fact that as the specialists were in military custody, they were outside of the State Department's jurisdiction.¹⁷⁴ The military did not need the State Department to take any action or pass any policy, but only to look the other way while the military utilized the services of specialists, in similar manner as they had thousands of German prisoners of war (POWs).¹⁷⁵ This process of negotiation between the military and the State Department over

¹⁷⁰ "Directive to Commander in Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany," April 26, 1945, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945*, vol. 3 of *European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1968), 484-503, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v03/d351>.

¹⁷¹ Merritt, *Democracy Imposed*, 64-65; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 54-55.

¹⁷² Merritt, *Democracy Imposed*, 62-63, 67.

¹⁷³ Atina Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 167, 174; Merritt, *Democracy Imposed*, 68-69.

¹⁷⁴ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 117; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 90.

¹⁷⁵ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 747-748, 817-820; "Former German POW Gives Up After 40 Years," *New York Times*, September 12, 1985; Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948*, 1541.

Overcast initiated in late May, when support for a recruitment program pushed the War Department to send a May 21 memo delegating authority to the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) to coordinate and transport personnel.¹⁷⁶ The next day, army representatives sent by Bissell presented a recruitment proposal for forty specialists to Frederik Lyon, a Division Chief in the State Department's Office of Controls, the department branch responsible for regulating immigration and travel. This proposal was accompanied with the assurance that the specialists were needed for their knowledge about rocket technology, and that all would be in military custody, outside of State Department jurisdiction.¹⁷⁷

Although Lyon's response was positive, no official agreement appears to have been reached by May 28 when Undersecretary of War Robert Patterson wrote to the War Department recommending a recruitment program.¹⁷⁸ Patterson emphasized that the specialists could be used against Japan but admitted that they might also be security risks. To mitigate these problems, he recommended quietly bringing a small number of specialists into the United States on a temporary basis. Patterson further argued that Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy could help establish appropriate procedures for this process by bringing the matter before the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).¹⁷⁹ Established in 1944 and organized at the level of assistant secretary, the SWNCC was a forerunner to the National Security Council, and served

¹⁷⁶ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 68; McGovern, *Crossbow and Overcast*, 242-243; Memo from L. F. Cranford to Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, "German Civilian Technicians," May 21, 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 914.

¹⁷⁷ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 117; Department of State, *Register of the Department of State, December 1, 1946* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), 94-97.

¹⁷⁸ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 71.

¹⁷⁹ Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 106; Memo from Robert Patterson to Secretary, General Staff, "German Scientists," May 28, 1945, box 989, file: Research through September, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 119.

as one of the forums through which the military services and the State Department could coordinate foreign policy.¹⁸⁰

The War Department proceeded to unilaterally develop policies, conducting a series of interservice conferences in June to discuss recruitment and to develop a basic operating procedure.¹⁸¹ After attaining permission from the JCS on June 5 to proceed with a program, Marshall sent a letter to Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in the United States describing the proposed program. Seeking Allied cooperation, Marshall wrote that the primary purpose was to hire German specialists to develop technology for the war in the Pacific. This program would be temporary, and any information gained would be shared with the British.¹⁸² Wilson responded by writing that the British Chiefs of Staff would cooperate and indicated that they were in fact preparing an exploitation program of their own. However, Wilson suggested that a long-term program might be beneficial for technological development, while simultaneously ensuring that Germans who had gained knowledge about Allied technology would not be hired by another country after their employment had terminated.¹⁸³ Nevertheless, Marshall maintained that for now the United States would continue to pursue a temporary program targeting Japan. He wrote that although benefits to “post-war research will result inevitably,” the long-term development of American research projects was

¹⁸⁰ Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 133; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 91.

¹⁸¹ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 700.

¹⁸² Memo from Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, “Employment of German Civilian Scientists and Technicians in the United States,” June 5, 1945, box 989, file: Research through September, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; Memo from Clayton Bissell to Chief of Staff, “Employment of German Civilian Scientists and Technicians in the United States,” June 5, 1945, box 989, file: Research through September, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; “Wilson, Henry Maitland Wilson, Baron, b. 1881, Person Authority Record,” National Archives and Records Administration, accessed December 10, 2018, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/10572454>.

¹⁸³ Memo from H. Maitland Wilson to General Marshall, “Employment of German Civilian Scientists and Technicians in the United States,” June 14, 1945, box 991, file: Implementation and General History, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

“not the primary purpose of the project.” Marshall noted that this policy could be revised, but assured Wilson that the British Chiefs of Staff would be notified in the event that the JCS decided to pursue “a long-range program.”¹⁸⁴

During this month McCloy discussed the issue with the SWNCC, and the State Department gave “tentative approval” for the program.¹⁸⁵ On June 15 Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton drafted a letter stating that the department supported a very limited number of specialists being transported into the United States for use against Japan. Significantly Clayton, who had also been a State Department representative at the Mexico Conference in 1945, wrote that this program provided the opportunity to control German research and the movement of specialists, preventing “their knowledge and capacities from being utilized in ways inimical to our interests.”¹⁸⁶ This would also have the effect of preventing dangerous technology from falling into the hands of countries other than the United States, essentially denying the specialists to the rest of the world. Clayton’s letter does not appear to have been stringent enough on restrictions governing the disposition of the specialists however, and disagreement within the State Department prevented it from being sent to McCloy. However, even the Assistant Chief of the Special Problems Division Albert Clattenburg, who had disagreed with Clayton’s initial letter accepted the justifications for recruitment.¹⁸⁷ Writing to Lyon on June 18, Clattenburg argued

¹⁸⁴ Memo from G. C. Marshall to Air Marshal D. Colyer, “Employment of German Civilian Scientists and Technicians in the United States,” July 3, 1945, box 991, file: Implementation and General History, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

¹⁸⁵ Memo from Clayton Bissell to Chief of Staff, “Employment of German Civilian Scientists and Technicians in the United States,” June 5, 1945, box 4, file: Overcast, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

¹⁸⁶ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 119; Department of State, *Register of the Department of State, December 1, 1946* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), 178-179; Letter from W. L. Clayton to John J. McCloy, June 15, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁸⁷ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 119; Department of State, *Register of the Department of State, December 1, 1946* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), 178; Memo from A. E. C. to Mr. Lyon, June 18, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

that although the primary objective was to “repatriate dangerous Germans throughout the world,” he would support a recruitment program provided that the specialists retained the status of POWs and remained imprisoned for the duration of their employment.¹⁸⁸

The State Department’s reluctant support for exploitation was all the War Department needed, and by early July they completed a final draft of procedures for a future recruitment program. Announced on July 6 these policies were limited in scope, calling for the temporary recruitment of a few “essential” specialists for work in the United States.¹⁸⁹ The policy stated that since the specialists would be repatriated to Germany, they should be carefully controlled to ensure that they did not gain too much exposure to classified American technology. A study published with these procedures reflected the diverse motivations among the program’s supporters in the army and the AAF, stating that while the specialists could provide important contributions to the war effort against Japan, their research could also strengthen the postwar American military.¹⁹⁰ The program was also ostensibly barred to specialists accused or suspected of committing war crimes, although the understaffed military investigators in Europe proved poorly equipped to conduct thorough investigations.¹⁹¹

Commencing on July 16, 1945, this newly created program was assigned the code word Overcast three days later.¹⁹² The War Department’s MID G-2 administered Overcast from Washington DC, while United States Forces European Theater (USFET) G-2 coordinated the

¹⁸⁸ Memo from A. E. C. to Mr. Lyon, June 18, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁸⁹ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 700-701.

¹⁹⁰ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 700-701; Memo from Clayton Bissel, “Exploitation of German Specialists in Science and Technology in the United States,” July 6, 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 938-942.

¹⁹¹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 71-72; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 77-78.

¹⁹² Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 699; Memo from AGWAR to USFET, July 1945, box 4, file: Overcast, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

specialists in Europe.¹⁹³ This operation allowed for the voluntary recruitment of 350 German specialists for work in the United States under contracts that lasted six months with the option to extended to 12 months.¹⁹⁴ One hundred of these specialists were allocated to Toftoy for missile development against Japan, although he eventually ignored this restriction by hiring 127 instead.¹⁹⁵ The initial limitations and restrictions of Overcast are likely why Clayton informed McCloy that the State Department would cooperate, provided that any information acquired from the specialists would be made publicly available.¹⁹⁶ Under this program the State Department would consider the specialists on parole, outside of regular visa regulations. However, the specialists would remain in military custody for the duration of their stay, “housed, fed, and supervised” by the recruiting agency responsible for them.¹⁹⁷ Although Overcast was a War Department program, the navy proved willing to cooperate, and within two months was an active partner.¹⁹⁸ The August 17 ceasefire and the subsequent surrender of Japan on September 1 brought an end to World War II and to the stated goal of Overcast.¹⁹⁹ Ironically, the first specialists to arrive through Overcast would enter the United States on September 20, well after the war had ended.²⁰⁰

The end of World War II did not immediately change the implementation of Overcast, although it called the program’s original objectives into question. On September 3 Eisenhower

¹⁹³ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 78; Memo from R. D. Wentworth to J. L. Walker, January 24, 1946, box 4, file: Overcast, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

¹⁹⁴ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 120; Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 704.

¹⁹⁵ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 102.

¹⁹⁶ Memo from John J. McCloy to the Deputy Chief of Staff, July 4, 1945, box 991, file: Implementation and General History, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

¹⁹⁷ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 701; Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948*, 1541.

¹⁹⁸ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 77-78; “Outline for Briefing General Eisenhower on German Scientists Exploitation Program, 11 March 1947,” box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

¹⁹⁹ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 88-90.

²⁰⁰ Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 178-179; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 116.

sent a letter requesting that the War Department reassess Overcast, arguing that the number of personnel was too limited considering that their knowledge and skills represented some of the few reparations the United States could expect from Germany.²⁰¹ Writing to MID G-2, General Bryan Conrad of USFET G-2 argued that the war had proven the necessity of peacetime weapons development.²⁰² Other officers such as General Bissell supported merging military technology with civilian science, effectively perpetuating a Military Industrial Complex (MIC).²⁰³ On October 20 Bissell got his desire when he stated that the administration and objectives of Overcast were being reassessed, but that it was thought the Commerce Department should play a larger role in the postwar dissemination of information gained from Axis specialists.²⁰⁴ Patterson himself would later argue that although Overcast had originated in response to the war against Japan, it provided an opportunity for the United States to promote broader military and economic development.²⁰⁵

The secondary objectives of Overcast now became its primary objectives. Just as short-term military research programs can simultaneously complement larger long-term policies supporting technological supremacy, there is no one simple answer as to why military officers pushed to continue Overcast once war had ended. On the surface was the belief that there had simply not been enough time to properly exploit the specialists.²⁰⁶ In addition, although fighting was over, military officers had little incentive to purposely jeopardize research programs they

²⁰¹ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 134.

²⁰² Memo from Bryan Conrad, GSC to Clayton Bissell, August 23, 1945, box 989, file: Research May to December 1945, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

²⁰³ Memo from Clayton Bissell to General Conrad, September 17, 1945, box 989, file: Research May to December 1945, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

²⁰⁴ Memo from Clayton Bissell, "Exploitation of German Scientists in the US," October 20, 1945, box 989, file: Research October to December 1945, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

²⁰⁵ Letter from Secretary of War to Secretary of State, December 13, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

²⁰⁶ "JCS 1363/3," August 27, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

believed were essential to national security. Their experience during World War II had convinced many not just of the pivotal role technology would play in future wars, but of the necessity of coordinating and expanding national research and development efforts to maintain perpetual “military preparedness” to counter the threat of “total war.”²⁰⁷ The fact that such programs could simultaneously deprive nations such as the Soviet Union of access to technology that could one day be used against the United States was an additional benefit, and one that would only grow as tensions in Europe increased during 1946.²⁰⁸ These attitudes also reflected a growing recognition among government officials that military strength alone was not sufficient to ensure the security of the United States. Instead, as historian Melvin Leffler argues, a nation’s military was just one element of its “war-making capabilities” that were determined by broader economic and technological development, and industrial potential.²⁰⁹ As a result, the perception that Overcast was necessary to strengthen the United States against Japan smoothly transitioned into the belief that Overcast strengthened the postwar United States against the world.

The support Overcast received from private industry and from the Department of Commerce, as well as the porous borders separating military and civilian employment indicates that the role of commercial interests cannot be ignored in this decision to create a joint military-civilian program.²¹⁰ During the war, many private businesses had sent representatives to Europe to help the American government collect intelligence and produce technical reports. Upon returning to the United States, many became advocates for Germans they had met and wished to employ. Industry also had a direct role in Overcast, and Gimbel estimates that by the mid-1948

²⁰⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 6-11; Michael Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 14, 209.

²⁰⁸ Crim, *Our Germans*, 63, 138-139.

²⁰⁹ Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 10-11.

²¹⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 63-65, 155-157.

about five hundred interviews had been conducted at Wright Field, Ohio between specialists and military contractors from companies such as Lockheed, Westinghouse, Rangertone, and Douglas Aircraft. In addition, the military fielded requests from universities and numerous other private companies who had heard about American technological exploitation in Germany and who wanted to profit from the program.²¹¹ For example, the AiResearch Manufacturing Company wrote to Putt on September 19 requesting information on recruiting specialists from Germany for work on gas turbines.²¹² Putt responded that unfortunately there was not yet a policy for civilian employment, but that these specialists would be recruited as soon as one was implemented.²¹³

John Green, Director of the Commerce Department's OTS was a particularly vocal advocate for a civilian recruitment program. His place as the Commerce Department's representative on the JIOA further expanded his influence on Overcast policy.²¹⁴ Soon after the formation of the JIOA, Green notified JIOA Director E. W. Gruhn that temporarily employing the specialists as POW's was unlikely to make a difference to American industry. Instead, he favored an expansion of the program to facilitate the long-term immigration "as an acquisition to our scientific talent."²¹⁵ On October 11 the War Production Board also sent a letter to Secretary of War Robert Patterson requesting specialists for private industry.²¹⁶ Henry Wallace himself even brought up the possibility of a Commerce program that would recruit up to 50 specialists to

²¹¹ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 30, 53-54, 107.

²¹² Letter from James Tothill, Administrative Assistant to CG T-2 Intelligence, Wright Field, September 19, 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1024.

²¹³ Letter from D. L. Putt to AiResearch Manufacturing Company, October 23, 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1023.

²¹⁴ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 26-28.

²¹⁵ Memo from J. C. Green to Colonel E. W. Gruhn, October 17, 1945, box 2, file: JIOA 1 (Exploitation of German Scientists in US), JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

²¹⁶ Memo from Clayton Bissell, "Exploitation of German Scientists in the US," October 20, 1945, box 989, file: Research October to December 1945, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

help American industry when communicating with Truman that December.²¹⁷ Overcast was a military program however, and even after it expanded in 1946 to allow for civilian employment through sponsorship from the Commerce Department, the participating departments were primarily military.²¹⁸ Out of 706 specialists recruited between Overcast's inception and July 1953, roughly 41% worked for the Air Force and 35% for army, while the navy employed 15% and 9% worked for the Commerce Department.²¹⁹ Nevertheless, this support for a civilian program helped prompt the military to modify Overcast to meet the needs of the postwar United States. As historian Brian Crim writes, civilian industry "helped prolong Paperclip," enabling specialists to leave the military for civilian employment while ensuring their "integration into the national security state."²²⁰

As World War II gradually came to an end, the administration of Overcast began to transition. On August 12 the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had been asked by the War Department to examine the allocation of specialists between the United States and Britain.²²¹ First established in 1941 and later placed under the authority of the JCS, the JIC focused on coordinating national intelligence. In the several months following the end of the war in Europe the JIC produced a multitude of intelligence reports that were submitted to the JCS, many of which warned about the future Soviet threat. In September the JIC warned that the Soviet Union was avoiding a confrontation in order to buy time to rebuild its military and economic strength. They predicted that although an impending war was unlikely during this process of

²¹⁷ Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 202.

²¹⁸ Crim, *Our Germans*, 59-60; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 231-232.

²¹⁹ "Statistical Report of Aliens Brought to the United States as "Paperclip," "Project 63," and "National Interest" Cases," Document DG 13, box 11, file: DG 1 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

²²⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 156-157.

²²¹ "JIC 314," August 13, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA; "JIC 317/M," August 20, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

reconstruction, the Soviet Union would likely be at full strength in seven years. That October the JIC further warned that the Soviet Union would likely divert additional resources to the development of aeronautical technology to counter American air forces. In addition, the JIC warned that Soviet occupation forces had access to a wealth of German rocket equipment and facilities. Just as frightening was the suspicion that the Soviet Union had already recruited many German scientists specializing in missile development to help exploit this captured technology.²²²

Many of the JIC's initial justifications for an expanded Overcast also focused on the potential contributions the specialists could make to the technological infrastructure of the United States. The JIC argued for an interim exploitation program that include civilian as well as military departments and held that a long-term program should be developed by the SWNCC. Although many State Department officials voiced their disapproval for this expanded program, Paul Hutton from the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation successfully argued that the program was acceptable so long as all interested departments were allowed to contribute to the formation of policy. Lyon, who served as the State Department's JIC representative, supported Hutton by arguing that since the department was represented on many of the interdepartmental committees involved with Overcast, they would still control the formation of policy. As a result, the State Department acceded to the JIC's proposal.²²³

²²² Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 191-192; Larry A. Valero, "The American Joint Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945-1947," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed December 10, 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/summer00/art06.html>.

²²³ "JIC 317/M," August 20, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA; "JIC 317/1," August 22, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA; "JIC 317/2," August 24, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA; Memo from Mr. Hutton to Colonel McCormack, "Exploitation of German Specialists in Science and Technology in the United States," October 31, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA; Department of State, *Biographic Register of the Department of State, October 1, 1945* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), 147.

This policy recommendation had already been forwarded to the JCS, resulting in JCS 1363/3. This paper reaffirmed the argument that the surrender of Japan had come too soon to fully utilize the specialists, and that an interim policy was needed until more comprehensive procedures for military and civilian exploitation were implemented.²²⁴ On September 13 the JCS sent the SWNCC a memo arguing that the evidence in Germany indicated that the specialists could make enormous contributions to research in the United States, but that if time was wasted they might leave Germany and their “expert knowledge [would] be lost.”²²⁵ That same day an amended version of JCS 1363/3 was approved, authorizing the JIC to develop an interim exploitation program. This would be coordinated through the JIC’s subcommittee, the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA).²²⁶

The JIOA was led by military officers who were appointed annually to the positions of director and deputy director.²²⁷ They oversaw military representatives and an advisory committee consisting the eight civilian departments and agencies represented on the JIC, although this structure was later reformed into a governing committee chaired by representatives from AAF Intelligence, MID G-2, Naval Intelligence, and the State Department.²²⁸ The origins

²²⁴ “JCS 1363/3, August 27, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA; Memo from Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD to CG USFET, September 17, 1947, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA; “The Paperclip Project: Its Concept, Implementation, and Control,” January 30, 1959, box 2674, Publication “P” Files, RG 319, NARA, 2.

²²⁵ “SWNCC 257/D,” January 31, 1946, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

²²⁶ “Exploitation of German Specialists in Science and Technology in the United States,” September 13, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 26; “JCS 1363/3, August 27, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

²²⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 59-60; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 26; Memo from Daniel E. Ellis to JIC, “Designation of Deputy Director, JIOA,” October 19, 1949, box 19, file: JIC-JCS Meetings, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

²²⁸ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 740-743; Crim, *Our Germans*, 59-60; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 26. The eight civilian organizations represented on the JIOA included the “Treasury, Justice, Interior, Commerce, [and] Agriculture” Departments, as well as the War Production Board, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, and the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Quoted from Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 740-741.

of the JIOA are vague, and it has been argued that the organization was in operation as early as June 1945.²²⁹ However, it appears that the JIOA was officially established by the JIC in September 1945. Initially the JIOA assumed many of the former functions of CIOS, receiving, processing, and distributing captured information.²³⁰ By October the JIOA and the JIC began to outline a procedure for a military-civilian exploitation program.²³¹ The JIOA became one of the primary organizations responsible for Overcast that December when the JCS assigned it administrative responsibility. This change was intended to facilitate greater cooperation between the military and the State Department over immigration law and procedures. The JIOA assumed responsibility for coordinating the allocation of specialists between different government departments, and for allocating specialists between the United States and Britain. They were also tasked with facilitating the legal immigration for any specialists desired for permanent exploitation.²³²

As the JIC continued to formulate a policy for a joint military-civilian program, dissention began growing within the State Department. In October Paul Hutton of the Office of Controls wrote that although many in the State Department agreed that the military had the right to employ specialists through Overcast, they did not feel that the needs of private industry were as vital to national security. At a division meeting it was posited that allowing former enemy specialists into the United States would pose security problems, and that it would prove impossible to successfully minimize the knowledge gained by the specialists about American

²²⁹ James D. Marchio, "Days of Future Past: Joint Intelligence in World War II," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 1996): 122.

²³⁰ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 739, 751; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 107.

²³¹ "JIOA 1," October 12, 1945, box 2, file: JIOA 1 (Exploitation of German Scientists), JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

²³² Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 742-744; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 107, 128.

technology. In addition, there was no way to legally allow them to immigrate, and the State Department would become the target of criticism should knowledge about this program become public.²³³ Many also feared that any relaxation of restrictions would make the State Department appear hypocritical given its obligations through Safehaven. Instead, they argued that an acceptable solution would be for the specialists to retain POW status under military custody, allowing the State Department to avoid accepting any public or official responsibility.²³⁴

Although there was yet no policy to facilitate the eventual immigration of these specialists, there was an ongoing debate within the government over whether this would one day be the policy. The State Department Coordinating Committee met on November 9, 1945 to assess a policy paper addressing the possibility of this immigration. Although it was feared that a prohibitive number of specialists would be needed to effect positive change on American technology, they admitted that it was unrealistic to expect the American authorities to be able to exercise complete control over specialists should they remain in Europe. Ironically, despite the potential security risks inherent in Overcast, this program was still seen as the best method for controlling the dissemination of potentially dangerous German technology.²³⁵

The Coordinating Committee finally decided to advise continued restrictions on the movement of “dangerous Germans,” to prevent them from escaping to neutral countries.²³⁶

Although the original policy paper had called for a temporary hold to any immigration until

²³³ Department of State, *Register of the Department of State, December 1, 1946* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), 278; Memo from Mr. Hutton to Colonel McCormack, “Exploitation of German Specialists in Science and Technology in the United States,” October 31, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

²³⁴ Memo from Mr. Hutton to Colonel McCormack, “Exploitation of German Specialists in Science and Technology in the United States,” October 31, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

²³⁵ Memo from S. J. Rubin, “Immigration and Emigration of German Scientists: Third Report of Sub-Committee,” November 16, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

²³⁶ Memo from S. J. Rubin, “Immigration and Emigration of German Scientists: Third Report of Sub-Committee,” November 16, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

greater international cooperation had been achieved, many in the department felt that there was no reason to limit immigration so long as the specialists met the legal visa requirements.²³⁷ They finally agreed that specialists could be brought into the United States, but that those requiring visas should be carefully screened for dangerous political affiliations. In addition, even the temporary entrance of Axis specialists should require the military's certification that their presence was critical to American technological development.²³⁸ Once again, this would allow the department to stay within its legal obligations without placing its objectives and reputation at risk. Emphasizing this risk, Seymour Rubin noted a November 17 *New York Times* article claiming that 88 Germans had secretly entered the United States.²³⁹

This commitment to security and control placed the State Department at odds with military officials like Putt who were becoming increasingly supportive of relaxing restrictions on the specialists. Administering Overcast specialists working for the AAF at Wright Field, Ohio, Putt argued that although the program had been successful, its temporary nature and "Prisoner of War" attitude limited its effectiveness.²⁴⁰ Instead, he wrote to the office of General Spaatz arguing that it was in the country's best interest to provide a long term program that included the possibility of immigration, or at the very least, the possibility that the specialists could be transferred to private industry when their contracts were over.²⁴¹ Putt followed this letter up on

²³⁷ Memo from Mr. Johnson to Mr. Thompson and Mr. Hiss, "Coordinating Committee Meeting of Emigration of German Scientists and Their Immigration into the US," November 9, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

²³⁸ Memo from S. J. Rubin, "Immigration and Emigration of German Scientists: Third Report of Sub-Committee," November 16, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

²³⁹ Memo from S. J. Rubin to Mr. Riddleberger, November 20, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

²⁴⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 65; Memo from D. L. Putt to CG AAF, "German Technicians in This Country," November 6, 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1073-1075.

²⁴¹ Memo from D. L. Putt to CG AAF, "German Technicians in This Country," November 6, 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1073-1075.

November 28, writing to Kneer that including the possibility of citizenship would further motivate the specialists while solidifying their status in the United States. He also criticized the policy of strict military custody, writing that by treating the specialists as POWs the military hindered the dissemination of research to AAF contractors. Arguing that Overcast's current lack of funding and resources damaged morale and productivity, Putt suggested that the specialists could instead be farmed out to private industry.²⁴² Putt's attitude reflected a genuine concern for research productivity that merged with what Crim has argued was the American military's assumption that many foreign research personnel were inherently innocent of the crimes perpetrated by Nazi Germany, a belief based on the assumption that the pursuit of knowledge is theoretically above the realm of politics. This attitude would enable German scientists to be quickly absorbed into the American MIC once they had arrived in the United States.²⁴³

By the end of the year the military went on a campaign to ensure State Department support for an expanded program that increased the number of specialists permitted into the United States while facilitating civilian employment. On November 30, 1945 JIOA Director Gruhn wrote to Clayton that exploitation efforts were suffering from the limits and restrictions imposed by the original program. Urging Clayton to make a speedy decision, Gruhn wrote that many of the specialists in Germany were being hired by other countries, including the Soviet Union, and that their services would soon be unavailable. Arguing that many private companies desired to hire these specialists, Gruhn wrote that an expansion of Overcast stood to benefit civilian industry. It is important to note that the key points within the letter emphasized that this

²⁴² Memo from D. L. Putt to General Knerr, "Exploitation of German Scientists in the United States," November 28, 1945, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1064-1066.

²⁴³ Crim, *Our Germans*, 10-12, 65-66.

new program would recruit specialists for the positive contributions their research could make, rather than to merely deny their research to other nations. Seeking to assuage Clayton's fears, Gruhn assured him that no one with "anti-democratic principles" would be recruited.²⁴⁴ Even Assistant Secretary of State Willard Thorp was told by the military that an expanded program was needed because Soviet troops were advertising employment opportunities to specialists in Germany.²⁴⁵

These efforts extended to the highest levels of government. On December 13, 1945 Patterson wrote to Secretary of State James Byrnes to convince him of the merits of Overcast, writing that it remained an important program for ensuring that the United States received the full benefit of German technological knowledge. Reflecting the United States' burgeoning MIC, Patterson argued that Overcast would not only have a positive impact on the American military, but it would help American industry in general. Attempting to dispel potential objections, Patterson emphasized that the military carefully policed the specialists to ensure none were security threats. He further argued that the presence of the specialists in the United States under military custody was a successful solution to control the threat of recidivism in Germany, something that would essentially fulfill the State Department's obligations under Safehaven.²⁴⁶

On January 7, Acting Secretary of War Kenneth Royall wrote to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that the SWNCC was developing a long-term program, but was encountering problems reaching an acceptable agreement with the State Department. He argued that if

²⁴⁴ Memo from Colonel E. W. Gruhn to William L. Clayton, "Importation of German Scientists and Technologists for the Benefit of US Science and Industry," November 30, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

²⁴⁵ Memo from Willard Thorp to Mr. Riddleberger, January 9, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

²⁴⁶ Letter from Secretary of War to Secretary of State, December 13, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

Overcast was to expand to encompass civilian agencies, it would likely need broad support. Referencing Patterson, Royall requested that Forrestal send a letter to Byrnes as well.²⁴⁷ On January 29 Forrestal wrote to Byrnes in support of an expanded Overcast, acknowledging Patterson's letter while reiterating many of his points. He emphasized that the War and Navy Departments were "in full agreement" on the necessity of Overcast, and reflected on the potential contributions these specialists could make.²⁴⁸ The military's persistence ultimately proved successful when, on January 31, the SWNCC declared its intention to collaborate with the JCS on a long-term exploitation program. The initial policy paper was a simple one-page announcement, but it included a copy of the JCS memo sent in September extolling the contributions the specialists could make to American technological development and warning that this opportunity could be lost should other countries recruit them first. As a result, the SWNCC proposed taking preliminary steps to research and outline policies for a long-term program that would coordinate exploitation between the military and civilian departments of the United States government.²⁴⁹ This was only the beginning of an exploitation program that would evolve over numerous policy papers and interagency discussions to eventually allow for the recruitment and immigration of one thousand specialists, assigning a reluctant State Department greater responsibility while simultaneously challenging the original conception of Overcast.²⁵⁰

The evolution of Overcast after May 1945 represents a shared perception within the United States government that future military strength depended on technological development.

²⁴⁷ Letter from Acting Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, January 7, 1946, box 990, file: January to March 1946, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

²⁴⁸ Letter from James Forrestal to James F. Byrnes, January 29, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

²⁴⁹ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 91; "SWNCC 257/D," January 31, 1946, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

²⁵⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 63, 99.

Overcast was originally established as a temporary military research program in the war against Japan. Even during this period however, American military officers advocating for a recruitment program recognized the porous nature of technology, and the potential use for recruited specialists in private industry. In the case of private military contractors, civilian employment easily meshed with the military's pursuit of technological superiority. Civilian interests also played a role, although the pursuit of military technology remained a priority. Competition with other nations for the recruitment of specialists also incentivized Overcast, and although the Cold War had not yet developed, the Soviet Union emerged as an ominous competitor. Ultimately, it was necessary for Overcast to be accepted by the State Department, whose jurisdictional power governed American borders. The military was able to do this not only because State Department officials accepted the argument that Overcast could support the war against Japan, but because State Department officials saw the program as one path to accomplish their objectives of controlling German military science. Future challenges to this interdepartmental cooperation would emerge around these fault lines, as the expansion of Overcast weakened the security policies of the original program while challenging the State Department's traditional power over immigration and American citizenship.

CHAPTER THREE

THE LIMITS OF DENIAL: CONFLICTS OVER IMMIGRATION POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

On February 15, 1946, page six of *The New York Times* ran the headline “130 German Scientists Are at Work in US on Experiments for the Army and Navy.” Citing an official announcement by Secretary of War Robert Patterson, the article claimed that a total of 270 German scientists specializing in a wide range of military technologies would eventually enter the United States to work on projects for the American military. The article failed to mention how long they would stay and provided little foresight into the turbulent debates that emerged between the military and the State Department over this question.²⁵¹ In March 1946 this program, codenamed Project Paperclip, evolved from a short-term operation designed to temporarily recruit and exploit Axis specialists for military research in the United States into a long-term program designed to facilitate their immigration and eventual citizenship. The program’s structure was loosely defined, and during 1946 remained in a constant state of fluctuation as policies were revised and adapted in response to evolving national security objectives. When rising tensions strained relations with the Soviet Union, attempts to retain skilled specialists brought the possibility of immigration to the foreground. The State Department now assumed direct responsibility for granting specialists immigration visas. Legally obligated to adhere to restrictive security regulations for visa applicants, these officials became nervous about negative reactions from the public and Congress if they granted citizenship to specialists whose questionable Nazi backgrounds and ideologies posed potential security threats. Although these restrictions delayed visa applications, shortages of military family housing were perhaps as

²⁵¹ “130 German Scientists Are at Work in US on Experiments for the Army and Navy,” *New York Times*, February 15, 1946.

important at delaying the implementation of Paperclip. Paperclip may have evolved into an immigration program to compete with the Soviet Union while perpetuating long-term American technological superiority, but the bureaucratic delays it experienced implementing recruitment and immigration policies demonstrate how postwar American national security objectives were forced to conform to the limits of military resources.

The reason why Paperclip quickly evolved from a simple exploitation program in July 1945 into a program that prioritized the immigration of skilled personnel provides important insight into the symbiotic relationship between technological superiority and national security in the postwar United States. The cooperation between the State Department and the military over the establishment of this program demonstrates a consensus on the importance of human capital to the perpetuation of American power. However, this consensus also highlights the diverse obligations held by military and State Department officials, obligations that would ultimately force officials in the State Department to adhere to their legal responsibilities to process specialists according to the requirements established by American immigration law. The numerous factors exerting pressure on State Department officials charged with coordinating immigration through Paperclip will be examined, to explain why these resulted in a delay processing visas that incurred the anger of military officers who charged the State Department with obstructionism. Building upon existing studies into the dynamics of the Paperclip program, this chapter reassesses the origins of this delay to reveal the subtle ways in which military funding and housing dramatically shaped the implementation of Paperclip.²⁵² Analyzing these

²⁵² See Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*; Crim, *Our Germans*; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*; Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*.

practical limitations suggests the extent to which resource shortages and bureaucratic concerns shaped American foreign and military policy in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

During January of 1946 the United States military continued to pursue efforts to exploit Axis technological knowledge through Project Overcast, a program that allowed for the temporary recruitment and transportation of 350 specialists to the United States under military custody.²⁵³ This continued at a steady pace since Overcast's establishment in mid-1945, and by February roughly 160 people had been recruited for work at army, Army Air Force (AAF), and Naval installations across the United States. The Army Ordnance rocket team at Fort Bliss, Texas and the AAF research center at Wright Field, Ohio, were two of the largest such installations to house these specialists.²⁵⁴ The War Department had originally determined that the families of specialists should remain in Germany due the shortage of transportation and the temporary nature of Overcast.²⁵⁵ The American military did work to mitigate the hardships of these families however, all of whom faced the prospect of surviving in nations that were recovering from the destruction of World War II. During this period Germans suffered from a devastated economy and poor living conditions, exacerbated by shortages in food and coal.²⁵⁶ To mitigate these hardships a housing complex was established near Landshut, Germany. This enabled the American military to provide food and housing to the families of Overcast specialists working in the United States.²⁵⁷

The military directed these efforts through United States Forces, European Theater (USFET), an organization that played an important role investigating specialists and coordinating

²⁵³ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 117, Crim, *Our Germans*, 63.

²⁵⁴ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 116, 251-252, 257; Laney, *German Rocketeers*, 24-26.

²⁵⁵ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 704-705.

²⁵⁶ Fulbrook, *The Divided Nation*: 130; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 272.

²⁵⁷ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 115.

transportation out of Europe.²⁵⁸ The overall American occupation of Germany was primarily directed by the Office of Military Government-United States Zone (OMGUS), the bureaucratic structure directing political policy during the early American occupation of Germany.²⁵⁹ This was a significant challenge given the approximately twenty million displaced persons (DPs) and refugees traversing Europe in the immediate aftermath of World War II.²⁶⁰ Like USFET, OMGUS helped facilitate the implementation of Overcast in Europe by recruiting and investigating specialists.²⁶¹ Both organizations were originally headed by General Dwight Eisenhower until he was replaced by General Joseph McNarney in November 1945.²⁶² McNarney faced the difficult prospect of policing and providing for many of the specialists in Germany, and even wrote to the War Department in November requesting permission to provide supplies of food and clothing to specialists seeking refuge from the Soviet zone.²⁶³

McNarney was also forced to deal with the uncertainty surrounding Overcast, still deemed a temporary program.²⁶⁴ On January 24, 1946 Colonel R. D. Wentworth, McNarney's subordinate who helped direct Overcast from Europe, pushed the War Department to make a final decision on whether or not to maintain the program's limit of 350 specialists so USFET could make the proper arrangements in Europe.²⁶⁵ American policy in Germany was also greatly influenced by Deputy Military Governor Lucius Clay well before his ascension to the post of

²⁵⁸ "SWNCC 257/24," Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1291-1295; "The Paperclip Project: Its Concept, Implementation, and Control," January 30, 1959, box 2674, Publication "P" Files, RG 319, NARA, 22.

²⁵⁹ Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany, 1944-1955* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1957), 22, 29.

²⁶⁰ Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies*, 131.

²⁶¹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 71; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 165, 216, 238.

²⁶² Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 442; "Records of U.S. Occupation Headquarters, World War II," National Archives and Records Administration, accessed February 4, 2018, <https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/260.html>.

²⁶³ "JIC 317/9/D," December 10, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

²⁶⁴ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 700-701.

²⁶⁵ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 211; Memo from R. D. Wentworth to J. L. Walker, January 24, 1946, box 4, file: Overcast, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

military governor of OMGUS on March 15, 1947.²⁶⁶ Clay was initially supportive of Allied efforts to exploit captured Axis technology. Although he supported denazification, he even reluctantly suggested that specialists who had not undergone denazification trials should remain in the United States rather than returning to Germany.²⁶⁷

Although World War II had only been over for several months, many military officers continued to promote the value of these recruitment efforts as necessary to the long-term security of the United States. On January 2, 1946, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Herman Struve Hensel wrote to Secretary of War Robert Patterson, arguing that Overcast remained essential to the security of the United States. Hensel argued that the continued pursuit of this program would simultaneously promote the technological superiority of the American military while preventing other countries such as Russia from benefiting from the services of these specialists. After commenting that the AAF was already formulating a policy designed to confine specialists to the American zone in Germany, Hensel then pledged the navy's support for future exploitation.²⁶⁸

Hensel's letter met with strong support in the War Department. Acting Secretary of War Kenneth Royall responded on January 14, assuring the navy that although Overcast remained in effect, a more comprehensive program had been submitted to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) to facilitate military-civilian cooperation.²⁶⁹ Both Paterson and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal wrote letters to Secretary of State James Byrnes seeking to ensure

²⁶⁶ Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 442-443; Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 67-68.

²⁶⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 54, 71; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 96-97.

²⁶⁸ Joel C. Christenson, *Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs: A Brief History* (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014), 12; Memo from H. Struve to Robert Patterson, January 2, 1946, box 990, file: January to March 1946, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

²⁶⁹ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 91; Memo from Kenneth Royall to Secretary of the Navy, January 14, 1946, box 991, file: Implementation and General History, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

State Department support for the continuation of Overcast into 1946.²⁷⁰ These letters were well received by Byrnes. His productive discussions with Patterson over the future of Overcast even prompted State Department official Harrison Freeman Matthews, the Acting Chairman of the SWNCC, to write to Byrnes in late February confirming that he was prepared to support an expansion of Overcast.²⁷¹

Government officials in the Commerce Department were also eager for the continuation of Overcast, advocating for the program's expansion into the realm of civilian industry. Commerce Department Secretary Henry Wallace's December 4 letter to President Harry Truman had suggested an exploitation program that recruited fifty specialists for the benefit of American industry. Ironically, although Truman never responded to Wallace, in a separate correspondence to his advisor Vannevar Bush, Truman expressed reluctance to increase "competition" for American scientists.²⁷² Despite Truman's initial trepidation however, Commerce Department officials continued to support Overcast. This included Director of the Office of Technical Services (OTS) John Green, another prominent advocate for Overcast. As both Wallace's subordinate and a Commerce Department liaison to the military, Green occupied an influential position in Overcast's bureaucracy.²⁷³ On January 10 he wrote to Overcast administrator Colonel E. W. Gruhn repeating Wallace's suggestion for an expansion to allow the Commerce

²⁷⁰ Letter from James Forrestal to James F. Byrnes, January 29, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA; Letter from Secretary of War to Secretary of State, December 13, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

²⁷¹ Memo from H. Freeman Matthews to Mr. Secretary, February 26, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA; Memo from H. Freeman Matthews to Secretary of State, "Exploitation of German and Austrian Specialists in Science and Technology in the United States," box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA; Dennis Hevesi, "H. Freeman Matthews Jr., 78; Worked on Camp David Accords," *New York Times*, July 26, 2006.

²⁷² Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 133-134.

²⁷³ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 27-28.

Department to allocate fifty specialists to private industry.²⁷⁴ On January 16, 1946 Green submitted another request, this time to Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William Clayton. In his letter he requested Clayton's assistance securing State Department action to facilitate interviews between specialists and private industry, and to develop policies that would allow for the "importation of German scientists for permanent acquisition."²⁷⁵

Green's support for an expansion of exploitation policies complemented the convictions held by Deputy Commanding General Donald Putt at Wright Field. Putt wrote to Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development Curtis Lemay on January 23, 1946 to argue that "every effort should be made" to benefit from German technological developments in the field of aviation.²⁷⁶ Putt believed that the progress Paperclip specialists had made on guided missiles while at Wright Field had "saved the American taxpayer millions of dollars and many man hours."²⁷⁷ Speaking to the Dayton Country Club, Putt would later claim that Paperclip was a tremendous opportunity for the United States to benefit from the massive quantity of time and material that Nazi Germany had invested in research programs. Although the United States was ahead of Germany in many fields, German technical knowledge was at times "2 to 15 years" ahead of the United States in areas of research such as rocketry and aeronautics.²⁷⁸ It is difficult to assess the validity of Putt's claims. Nevertheless, Nazi Germany conducted extensive research and development into these fields of military technology. Considering historian John Gimbel's

²⁷⁴ Memo from J. C. Green to E. W. Gruhn, January 10, 1946, box 4, file: Policy, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

²⁷⁵ Memo from J. C. Green to William Clayton, January 16, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

²⁷⁶ Memo from D. L. Putt to Curtis Lemay, "Research and Development of Solid Fuel Rockets," January 23, 1946, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1109-1110.

²⁷⁷ Memo from D. L. Putt to Stewart Symington, "Work of German Scientists," March 26, 1946, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1475.

²⁷⁸ Speech from Donald Putt to Dayton Country Club, May 7, 1946, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 452-462.

research into the American occupation of Germany and his subsequent claim that the United States acquired billions of dollars' worth of technological reparations, it is likely that Putt was substantively correct in his assertion.²⁷⁹

That January, Putt attacked the security regulations influencing the terms of military custody, arguing that restrictions on communication and interviews between specialists and research institutions slowed research projects and demoralized recruits.²⁸⁰ This criticism provided the incentive the AAF needed, and by February permission had been granted for on-base interviews.²⁸¹ The War Department tentatively approved this policy, but with the instructions that interviews were to be limited to military contractors. They emphasized that these restrictions were intended to prevent specialists from gaining a full picture of American technological development but suggested that expanding Overcast to allow for the "absorption of exploited scientists through citizenship" would remove this security threat.²⁸²

During January of 1946 the JCS and the SWNCC examined the future of Overcast, discussing the possibility of allowing the Axis recruits to become American citizens, ensuring their technical skills were permanently retained by the United States. During this period the United States government came to define a desirable specialist as one of "outstanding prominence of ability in any field."²⁸³ Specialists with skills in areas of "direct military significance," and experienced military and industrial administrators were also included under

²⁷⁹ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 152; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 12-14, Neufeld, *The Rocket and Reich*, 272-273

²⁸⁰ Memo from D. L. Putt to Curtis Lemay, "Research and Development of Solid Fuel Rockets," January 23, 1946, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1109-1110.

²⁸¹ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 785.

²⁸² Memo from John Weckerling to CG AAF, "Segregation of Overcast Personnel with Respect to Civilian Installations and Research Personnel," February 28, 1946, box 4, file: Policy, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

²⁸³ Crim, *Our Germans*, 6, 63; "Definitions of Scientists and Technicians to be Applied in Implantation of JCS Policy," box 566, file: 1-E, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

this umbrella.²⁸⁴ To coordinate recruitment efforts, the War Department established guidelines that classified Axis specialists into four categories. Category I included scientists “under exploitation who have demonstrated scientific talents” that stood to benefit the military, while Category II encompassed specialists in “industry with indirect benefits to the Armed Services.” Category III allowed for a broad range of “outstanding men in any field of direct or indirect interest to the Armed Services,” while Category IV encompassed any specialist “whose talents and potentialities have not been confirmed.”²⁸⁵

These categories reflected the growing postwar perception that the balance of power in the world had shifted.²⁸⁶ It is perhaps cliché to say that the United States enjoyed enormous military, technological, and economic strength at the end of World War II. Historian Melvyn Leffler argues that a central component to this national strength was the United States’ “technological prowess,” as well as its “access to industrial infrastructure [and] skilled labor.” Retaining and perpetuating this power was perceived to be essential to the preservation of domestic American values such as “individual liberty, representative government, free enterprise, private property, and a marketplace economy.” However, with this newfound power came fears that success was temporary. The Soviet Union emerged as the primary contender during this time, threatening to coopt the “skilled labor of more advanced countries.”²⁸⁷

This threat in turn coincided with fears that the United States was experiencing a shortage of educated personnel. On February 11 Admiral Luis de Florez of the Office of Research and

²⁸⁴ “Definitions of Scientists and Technicians to be Applied in Implantation of JCS Policy,” box 566, file: 1-E, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

²⁸⁵ Memo from John Weckerling to CG ASF, “Plans for Extended Exploitation of Overcast,” February 6, 1946, box 4, file: Policy, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

²⁸⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 7.

²⁸⁷ Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 2-3, 5-6, 10, 13.

Inventions announced to Congress that the Soviet Union was recruiting German scientists as part of a massive research and development initiative. Arguing that the navy “was hampered by lack of qualified personnel,” he advocated for funding postwar research and development efforts, and for learning “a lesson from Russia” by competing with them to recruit German specialists.²⁸⁸ Admiral Florez remained an advocate for Overcast, and pushed for cooperation between the AAF and navy to recruit specialists in the fields of ramjet technology and rocketry.²⁸⁹ Eisenhower was also a supporter of continued technological development, and on April 30 he distributed a memo to the War Department announcing that “the future security of the nation” depended on harnessing technological resources. Advocating for continued investment in military research, and for greater cooperation between military and civilian specialists, Eisenhower wrote that the United States owed its victory in World War II to the efforts of civilian researchers.²⁹⁰

In his analysis of Overcast, historian Clarence Lasby argues that fears about the future of American technology were spurred in part because many young men had served in World War II, reducing university enrollment rates. In addition, the process of demobilization pushed “nearly 20 percent” of American specialists to leave government employment for civilian industry.²⁹¹ A study conducted in 1947 for Truman concluded that the military was suffering from “manpower shortages in certain fields,” and that some research and development programs

²⁸⁸ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 149; Sidney Shalett, “Asks Full Support of Navy Research,” *New York Times*, February 12, 1946.

²⁸⁹ Report signed by Ira Eaker, “Exploitation and Employment of German Scientific and Technical Personnel,” March 29, 1946, box 4, file: Overcast, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

²⁹⁰ Memo from Dwight Eisenhower to Directors and Chiefs of General and Special Staff Divisions and Bureaus, and the Commanding Generals of the Major Commands, April 30, 1946, in *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Chief of Staff; VII*, ed. Louis Galambos et al. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 1046-1050.

²⁹¹ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 149-150.

were understaffed by nearly 40 percent.²⁹² This shortage was exacerbated by the higher salaries the best American scientists could expect from private industry. The study argued that the dearth was “a seriously limiting factor” to technological development, although it predicted that conditions would prove temporary as postwar graduation rates absorbed the vacancies.²⁹³ Journalist Linda Hunt argues that Paperclip provided a cost-effective way to address this shortage, and that in certain cases Axis specialists were willing to work for roughly “\$2,000 a year less than their American counterparts.”²⁹⁴

It was within this context that McNarney’s November memo regarding the allocation of resources to German evacuees was received, prompting Eisenhower and the JCS to order the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to investigate the current status of specialists in Germany.²⁹⁵ The JIC was a special intelligence organization staffed by military and State Department representatives that was formed to provide the JCS with “intelligence estimates and policy papers.”²⁹⁶ On January 5, 1946, the JIC submitted its report to the JCS, writing that the only restrictions on the expansion of Soviet power were “shortages of (1) industrial facilities and (2) competent scientists and technicians.” To make matters worse, many specialists were leaving the American zone to work for the Soviet Union, tempted by generous Soviet employment offers or coerced by Soviet agents.²⁹⁷ These efforts reportedly involved kidnapping, although Operation

²⁹² Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 149-150; John R. Steelman, *Science and Public Policy: A Report to the President*, vol. 1 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), 18.

²⁹³ Steelman, *Science and Public Policy*, 19, 53.

²⁹⁴ Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 127.

²⁹⁵ “JIC 317/9/D,” December 10, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

²⁹⁶ Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 26; Larry A. Valero, “The American Joint Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945-1947,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed February 4, 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/summer00/art06.html>.

²⁹⁷ “JIC 317/10,” January 5, 1946, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

Osoaviakhim, a program that forcibly transported sixty-five hundred Germans to the Soviet Union would not be implemented until late 1946.²⁹⁸

The JIC further argued that if the Soviet Union continued to recruit specialists, it could potentially achieve technological parity with the United States “in the fields of atomic research and guided missiles.” The JIC warned that the Soviet Union was well on its way to achieving this parity having already acquisitioned large quantities of German scientific material and facilities. The JIC further claimed that the recruitment of German specialists had likely saved the Soviet Union years of research into atomic weaponry. Just as frightening was the suggestion that the United States may have already been surpassed in fields such as “infrared, television, and jet propulsion.”²⁹⁹ The JCS had previously supported sharing information attained from Germany with “the United Kingdom, the USSR, and France,” as well as “nations other than the occupying powers.”³⁰⁰ This included allowing foreign powers to interrogate detainees under the supervision of an American representative. The JIC pushed the JCS to reverse this position, even drafting an order to McNarney for American forces in Europe to halt all interrogations of German specialists and to prevent them from leaving the American zone.³⁰¹

The report concluded that the JCS should prepare a new exploitation policy with the intention of preventing other countries from recruiting German specialists. Significantly, the JIC recommended listing the top one thousand specialists in the American zone whose research contributed to either military or civilian technology. Examining ways to make the United States more competitive in its recruitment offers, the JIC concluded that security restrictions imposed

²⁹⁸ Crim, *Our Germans*, 81, 126-127.

²⁹⁹ “JIC 317/10,” January 5, 1946, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

³⁰⁰ Memo from A. J. McFarland to SWNCC, “Exploitation of German Scientists and Technicians,” February 19, 1946, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

³⁰¹ “JIC 317/10,” January 5, 1946, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

on the specialists to limit their exposure to sensitive information only hindered their long-term value to the United States. In addition, “concern over their families and their own uncertain future” damaged morale.³⁰² This report inferred that a potential solution to the threat of Soviet exploitation was to revise the terms of employment through Overcast to make American offers more competitive.

After receiving the JIC report on January 20 the JCS proceeded to consider the future of Overcast.³⁰³ Efforts to revise Overcast received a boost on January 23 when the British Chiefs of Staff announced through the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) that they intended to recruit specialists for civilian employment. The United States and Britain were already cooperating on the recruitment of specialists for military exploitation.³⁰⁴ This new proposal offered to extend this cooperation to encompass civilian industry. Since British preparations would conclude by February 1, the British Chiefs of Staff requested that the JCS decide by March 1 whether or not they planned to implement to a similar program. They also expressed support for greater cooperation between American and British Field Information Agency Technical (FIAT) teams “to freeze” specialists in Europe, writing that these efforts had already succeeded in restricting the movement of roughly “700 scientists... in the United States and British zones.”³⁰⁵

The United States military supported continued efforts to coordinate exploitation with British forces in Germany. On February 1, 1946, Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower wrote

³⁰² Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 206; “JIC 317/10,” January 5, 1946, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

³⁰³ “Decision Amending JCS 1363/10,” February 19, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA; “JCS 1363/10,” January 20, 1946, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

³⁰⁴ “CCS 870/12,” January 23, 1946, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA; Memo from Lincoln to Acting Chief of Staff, “Exploitation of German Scientists and Technicians for Civil Purposes (JCS 1363/12),” February 15, 1946, box 565, file: 1-B, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

³⁰⁵ “CCS 870/12,” January 23, 1946, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

to McNarney urging him to facilitate cooperation between American and British FIAT teams.³⁰⁶ Eisenhower followed this up on February 4, 1946, repeating his request to coordinate exploitation efforts in a letter to the JCS.³⁰⁷ Spurred on by the proposals made by the British and the JIC, the JCS officially approved the JIC's recommendations on February 19, ordering McNarney to freeze all specialists in the American zone.³⁰⁸ This could be accomplished either by physically detaining the specialists or by simply denying them permission to exit the American zone.³⁰⁹

These discussions occurred against the backdrop of prominent political events that have since been used to highlight the evolution of the Cold War and the rising tensions during 1946. Joseph Stalin's speech on February 9 described new economic changes to the Soviet Union, but to many in the United States his ideological attacks on capitalism foretold future Soviet aggression and expansion.³¹⁰ On February 22, 1946 Foreign Service Officer George Kennan responded to a State Department request for information on the motivations behind Russian policy by submitting his famed Long Telegram to his superiors in the State Department. Arguing that tensions with the Soviet Union were the result of internal political dynamics, Kennan wrote that the only policy the United States could pursue was to oppose and contain the expansion of Soviet power. This proposal melded with increasingly hostile attitudes towards the Soviet Union

³⁰⁶ Memo from Dwight Eisenhower to Joseph Taggart McNarney, February 1, 1946, in *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Chief of Staff; VII*, ed. Louis Galambos et al. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 817.

³⁰⁷ "JCS 1363/11," February 4, 1946, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

³⁰⁸ "Decision Amending JCS 1363/10," February 19, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

³⁰⁹ CG USFET to JCS, "Appendix B to SWNCC Memo August 20, 1946," July 17, 1946, Document DG 19C, box 11, file: DG 1 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA; Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 82.

³¹⁰ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 145; Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 103.

within the United States, and with the American government's search for a new and coherent foreign policy strategy for the postwar world.³¹¹

As the international relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated, the SWNCC initiated proceedings to establish policies for a long-term exploitation program in Europe.³¹² A basic outline known as SWNCC 257/5 was finally established on March 4, 1946 and received informal approval from Truman.³¹³ This new program expanded Overcast by establishing guidelines for both military and civilian exploitation. The paper argued that there were numerous German and Austrian specialists whose knowledge could benefit the United States. Criticizing the original Overcast program, the SWNCC agreed with the JIC and the JCS that security controls hindered specialists' long-term research, while their uncertain status in the United States and the desire to be with their families damaged their morale and productivity. Writing that the British Chiefs of Staff wished to coordinate military and civilian exploitation programs with the United States, the SWNCC added that "Great Britain, France, and the USSR will proceed unilaterally" with or without American involvement.³¹⁴

The SWNCC emphasized that although many specialists were being approached by the Soviet Union, many were also choosing to sign generous long-term contracts with France.³¹⁵ These contracts offered reasonable salaries, "allowed families to accompany the scientists," and promised French citizenship.³¹⁶ Repeating the JIC's argument that the knowledge possessed by Axis specialists was of critical importance to American national security, the SWNCC concluded

³¹¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment a Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 18-23.

³¹² "SWNCC 257/D," January 31, 1946, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

³¹³ Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 226; "State Department Problems: German Scientists," April 26, 1946, Document DG 33A, box 11, file: DG 2 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

³¹⁴ "SWNCC 257/5," March 4, 1946, box 565, file: 1-B, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

³¹⁵ "SWNCC 257/5," March 4, 1946, box 565, file: 1-B, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

³¹⁶ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 169.

that the United States had no choice but to deny their employment with other countries by transporting the specialists and their families into the United States. Since specialists would be exposed to militarily sensitive information about the United States regardless of whether their exploitation was short-term or long-term, it was in the interests of national security to facilitate long-term recruitment and subsequent immigration. This would help ensure that recruited specialists remained in the United States on a permanent basis.³¹⁷

The SWNCC established Appendix B to allow for the American military to recruit specialists whose employment was certified by the JCS to be “in the interest of national security.”³¹⁸ This was essentially an expansion of Overcast to enable the families of specialists to join them in the United States. The State Department would then transmit their information to American consuls which would subsequently provide the specialists with either immigration visas or visitor’s visas. The SWNCC carefully stated that the proposed program would not impact continued recruitment through Overcast but would only provide the specialists with the opportunity to receive immigration status.³¹⁹ Appendix C outlined a similar immigration program for civil employment, but stipulated that the specialists would be recruited “in the national interest” under the direction of the Commerce Department.³²⁰ Additionally, on March 13 shortly after SWNCC 257/5 was implemented the program’s codename changed to Paperclip after residents at Landshut nicknamed their complex “Camp Overcast.”³²¹

³¹⁷ “SWNCC 257/5,” March 4, 1946, box 565, file: 1-B, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

³¹⁸ “SWNCC 257/5,” March 4, 1946, box 565, file: 1-B, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

³¹⁹ Memo from Howard McGrath to James Byrnes, April 23, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA; “SWNCC 257/5,” March 4, 1946, box 565, file: 1-B, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

³²⁰ “SWNCC 257/5,” March 4, 1946, box 565, file: 1-B, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

³²¹ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 115, 155; Memo from John Grille to Assistant Chiefs, “Substitution of Code Word,” March 13, 1946, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1191.

As Overcast changed to Paperclip and the policy expanded to include the possibility of immigration, top State Department officials appear to have assumed that efforts at interdepartmental cooperation with the military had succeeded. Shortly after SWNCC 257/5 was enacted Byrnes responded to Forrestal's January letter, writing that SWNCC 257/5 would achieve the desired results of denying specialists to other countries, while fully exploiting them in military and civilian research.³²² Clayton's Deputy Willard Thorp wrote to Green on March 27 confirming that SWNCC 257/5 had achieved Green's expressed objectives of establishing a long-term exploitation program.³²³ Byrnes proceeded to work developing the specific recruitment and immigration procedures needed to fulfill the policies stipulated in SWNCC 257/5. In March he wrote to Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace and Attorney General Tom Clark requesting their opinions on the new policies to facilitate immigration.³²⁴ Wallace responded on March 14, confirming that the Commerce Department would cooperate with Appendix C of SWNCC 257/5.³²⁵

The State Department also received an April 23 response from Howard McGrath of the Attorney General's office, who wrote that immigration laws applied to both the military and civilian programs. McGrath added that immigration from Germany whether through government programs or private initiatives was technically allowed, so long as the German citizen qualified under immigration law. However, he concluded that the present situation in Germany made it

³²² Memo from James Byrnes to James Forrestal, March 7, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA; Memo from James Forrestal to James Byrnes, January 29, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

³²³ Memo from Willard Thorp to J. C. Green, March 27, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

³²⁴ Memo from James Byrnes to Henry Wallace, March 7, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA; Memo from James Byrnes to Tom Clark, March 7, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

³²⁵ Memo from Henry Wallace to James Byrnes, March 14, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

unlikely and “almost impossible” for any Axis citizen to enter the United States outside of Paperclip. In addition, legislation such as the Act of June 20, 1941 requiring the State Department to refuse visas to individuals whose entrance was deemed “contrary to the public safety of the United States” could further hinder this immigration.³²⁶ Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson responded on May 2, agreeing that specialists should adhere to immigration law, but adding that these restrictions should not hinder the employment of specialists under military custody.³²⁷

This response reflected the important changes that had redefined Paperclip, but also hinted at the problems that would plague the program for more than a year. The adaptation of Paperclip to include immigration was a significant revision from the original Overcast program. Although military officers had frequently advocated for the long-term employment of Axis specialists, this new policy established clear guidelines for the permanent acquisition of skilled labor, citing human capital as a critical element of national security. Historian Monique Laney writes that Paperclip became “one of the first expressions of favoring scientists and technical professionals over other immigrants.”³²⁸ This is not entirely accurate, as previous immigration acts did include limited exceptions for “professors, students, and ministers.”³²⁹ Despite these small exceptions however, immigration to the United States during this period was severely

³²⁶ Memo from Howard McGrath to James Byrnes, April 23, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

³²⁷ Memo from Dean Acheson to Tom Clark, March 4, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

³²⁸ Laney, *German Rocketeers*, 29-30.

³²⁹ Erika Lee, “A Nation of Immigrants and a Gatekeeping Nation: American Immigration Law and Policy,” in *A Companion to American Immigration*, ed. Reed Ueda (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 14.

restricted, primarily governed by the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 that limited immigration by assigning quotas based on an individual's "national origin."³³⁰

Although total immigration into the United States was limited to 150,000 people each year, the racial preferences ingrained in the law assigned "85 percent of the quotas to northern and western European nations."³³¹ On September of 1945 the annual quota for Germany was set at 25,957, while Austria was set at 1,413.³³² The specialists who immigrated through SWNCC 257/5 would need to apply for these quota slots.³³³ The allocation of this quota was revised when, seeking to ease the plight of "seven to eleven million displaced persons" rendered stateless after World War II, Truman issued an executive order on December 22, 1945 "reserving half of the quotas of European countries for DPs."³³⁴ However, Visa Division officer Robert Alexander subsequently claimed that "90% of the [German] quota is kept for displaced persons, and the like." Although he added that this would not prohibit Paperclip Germans from receiving visas, these reservations reflect an important alternate priority that influenced the State Department's attitude towards German immigration.³³⁵ In addition, it was feared that it would be bad publicity for the State Department to grant former Nazis preferential treatment over many of the people who had suffered due to their actions.³³⁶

³³⁰ Rodger Daniels, *Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants Since 1882* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 51-55, 81; Laney, *German Rocketeers*, 28-29.

³³¹ Laney, *German Rocketeers*, 29.

³³² "German Immigrant Quota Set," *New York Times*, September 29, 1945.

³³³ Memo from Samuel Klaus to Acheson, "Entry of 1000 German Specialists and their Families," August 26, 1946, Document DG 21A, box 11, file: DG 1 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

³³⁴ Daniels, *Guarding the Golden Door*, 98, 103; Memo to Secretary of State, Attorney General, Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Secretary of Commerce, "Directive by the President on Immigration to the United States of Certain German and Austrian Specialists in Science and Technology," box 103, file: JIOA S Klaus Memoranda to Staff, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

³³⁵ Memo for the Files, "JIOA Meeting," April 24, 1946, Document DG 32, box 11, file: DG 2 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

³³⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 90.

It was the regulations that had been established immediately during World War II that proved the most troublesome to the implementation of Paperclip. Under the Act of June 20, 1941 (55 Statute 252), the State Department was obligated to deny visas to any alien who stood to “endanger the public safety of the United States.”³³⁷ It also granted the President of the United States greater regulatory power over “the entry and departure of aliens,” allowing President Roosevelt to issue Proclamation 2523 that facilitated “the exclusion of aliens whose entry into the United States would be prejudicial to the public interest.”³³⁸ This declaration also resulted in “wartime regulations” such as Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 58.53 that repeated Roosevelt’s prohibitions on the immigration of dangerous aliens.³³⁹

Once changes to Paperclip made the State Department responsible for granting the specialists’ citizenship, these immigration regulations assumed a new importance. Significantly, the State Department and the military generally agreed on the importance of exploiting German knowledge and denying dangerous specialists to other countries.³⁴⁰ In the words of Leffler, within the United States government “more striking than the rifts are the remarkably similar beliefs, goals, and priorities that knit its top officials together.”³⁴¹ However, there a number of

³³⁷ *An Act to Authorize the Refusal of Visas to Aliens Whose Admission into the United States Would Endanger the Public Safety*, Public Law 113, *US Statutes at Large* 55 (1941-1942): 252; Memo from Peyton Ford to Ernest Gross, February 6, 1948, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA; Memo from Howard McGrath to James Byrnes, April 23, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

³³⁸ *An Act to Authorize the Refusal of Visas to Aliens Whose Admission into the United States Would Endanger the Public Safety*, Public Law 113, *US Statutes at Large* 55 (1941-1942): 252; Eliot B. Coulter, *Visa Work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service* (Washington DC: Office of Public Affairs, 1949), 9.

³³⁹ Coulter, *Visa Work of the Department of State*, 9, 14; “Title 22: Foreign Relations, Chapter I: Department of State, Part 58: Control of Persons Entering and Leaving the United States Pursuant to the Act of May 22, 1918, as Amended,” *Federal Register* 10, no 145 (July 21, 1945): 9000-9001; Memo from Bosquet Wev to S. J. Chamberlin, “Exploitation of German and Austrian Scientists and Technicians in Science and Technology in the United States,” box 993, file: Research 014.32, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; Memo from MLF, “Conference with Lt. Col. Pixton and Col. Munson in Mr. Petersen’s Office,” July 25, 1947, box 993, file: Research 014.32, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

³⁴⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 86-87; John Gimbel, “German Scientists, United States Denazification Policy, and the ‘Paperclip Conspiracy,’” *The International History Review* 12, no. 3 (August 1990): 442-443.

³⁴¹ Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 179.

significant factors that fractured this consensus, exemplified by the bitter disagreements between military and State Department officials within the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA).³⁴² These would ultimately be used to justify delaying the implementation of the immigration policies of Paperclip, pushing the SWNCC to present a further revised program to President Truman for formal approval.

Ever since December of 1945 the JCS had delegated administrative responsibility over Paperclip to the JIOA, an organization led by an advisory committee staffed by military and civilian representatives of the same departments that comprised the JIC. This was later reformed into a governing committee in 1946 as part of a push for organizational efficiency.³⁴³ Led by Director E. W. Gruhn and Chairman Bosquet Wev, the governing committee was primarily staffed by Monroe Hagood from Army Intelligence, L. F. Cranford from AAF Intelligence, and Francis Duborg of the Office of Naval Intelligence.³⁴⁴ Numerous other military personnel participated at meetings, including Holgar Toftoy from Army Ordnance, Putt representing the AAF, and Green for the Department of Commerce.³⁴⁵ Wentworth participated as well, serving as McNarney's representative.³⁴⁶

During this period Samuel Klaus, working as Special Assistant to the Secretary for Research and Intelligence was assigned to represent the State Department on the JIOA.³⁴⁷ He coordinated between the military officers on the JIOA and the State Department's Office of

³⁴² Crim, *Our Germans*, 87.

³⁴³ Crim, *Our Germans*, 59-60; Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 740-743.

³⁴⁴ Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 26-27, 35-36; Memo for the Files, "JIOA Meeting," April 25, 1946, Document DG 33, box 11, file: DG 2 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

³⁴⁵ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 27; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 2, 35.

³⁴⁶ Memo for the Files, "JIOA Meeting," April 24, 1946, Document DG 32, box 11, file: DG 2 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

³⁴⁷ Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 36; Department of State, *Register of the Department of State, December 1, 1946* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), 2, 297.

Controls, the branch “charged with the security of the United States... including visas and counterintelligence.”³⁴⁸ Klaus was a lawyer chosen by Colonel Alfred McCormack from the office of the Secretary of Intelligence for his previous “experience in German security problems.”³⁴⁹ This likely referred to Klaus’ past with the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) working on Operation Safehaven, a government program designed to combat the flow of Nazi capital and personnel abroad.³⁵⁰ Historian Brian Crim writes that the State Department held a “different conception of national security” that remained oriented towards the threat of Nazi Germany, while the military prioritized the threat posed by the Soviet Union.³⁵¹ Many State Department officials remained committed to the pursuit of Safehaven, which promised to control the spread of dangerous German technology while preventing the “revival of the German war potential.”³⁵² However, as Crim also writes, many in the State Department, including Klaus, appreciated the value of recruiting Axis specialists.³⁵³

Although the State Department had been reluctant to support Paperclip in 1945, they had granted their approval upon the belief that while the specialists remained in military custody, the exploitation program achieved many of the initial objectives of Safehaven.³⁵⁴ The change in policies to allow for immigration threatened to dismantle this achievement. As immigrants, specialists would be free to travel the United States without supervision, and even worse, to

³⁴⁸ “Analysis of Extension of Remarks of Congressman Busbey in Congressional Record, March 25, 1948, Page A 1982 ff,” box 105, file: Files of Samuel Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

³⁴⁹ Department of State, *Biographic Register of the Department of State, October 1, 1945* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), 191; “German Scientists Program,” July 17, 1947, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 24.

³⁵⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 91; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 9.

³⁵¹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 87.

³⁵² Crim, *Our Germans*, 86-87; “Outline for Briefing General Eisenhower on German Scientists Exploitation Program, 11 March 1947,” box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

³⁵³ Crim, *Our Germans*, 87, 93.

³⁵⁴ Memo from A. E. C. to Mr. Lyon, June 18, 1945, box 6793, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA; “Outline for Briefing General Eisenhower on German Scientists Exploitation Program, 11 March 1947,” box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

travel to Europe where their knowledge about the American military infrastructure could make them valuable employees to nations such as the Soviet Union.³⁵⁵

The American military also weighed the danger to national security should specialists return to Germany.³⁵⁶ However, although the military and the State Department shared the same trepidation about the potential security risks posed by the specialists, they came to fundamentally different conclusions. The State Department believed that the solution was to maintain the policy of military custody, with the intention of eventually repatriating the specialists.³⁵⁷ The military departments however, eager to pursue their own research and development programs and anxious to present attractive employment offers to the specialists, believed that the best way to ensure secrecy was to allow the specialists to gain citizenship, enabling them to permanently reside in the United States after becoming citizens.³⁵⁸ This attitude was summarized in an AAF report stating, “since Germany itself is unlikely to become our antagonist again in the lifetime of the now living scientists, and since FBI surveillance of the individuals can now be arranged, the risk is at least commensurate with the advantage to be gained.”³⁵⁹ This not only reflects a willingness to incorporate former enemy specialists into American research programs in the

³⁵⁵ Crim, *Our Germans*, 94; Memo from Klaus, “JIOA,” July 29, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA S Klaus Memoranda for File, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

³⁵⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 109; “SWNCC 257/5,” March 4, 1946, box 565, file: 1-B, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

³⁵⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 87, 94; Memo from Samuel Klaus to Acheson, “Entry of 1000 German Specialists and their Families,” August 26, 1946, Document DG 21A, box 11, file: DG 1 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

³⁵⁸ “SWNCC 257/5,” March 4, 1946, box 565, file: 1-B, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

³⁵⁹ Report signed by Ira Eaker, “Exploitation and Employment of German Scientific and Technical Personnel,” March 29, 1946, box 4, file: Overcast, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC. Although the military departments were primarily responsible for supervising the specialists, by late 1946 the FBI was responsible for submitting security reports to be included in the specialists’ immigration dossiers. For more information see Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 745; Memo from Edward F. Witsell to EUCOM, CGAAF, CG AGF, “Security Regulations for Project Paperclip,” April 12, 1947, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055; Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 105.

interests of technological supremacy, but illustrates how alliances and threat assessments began to respond to an increasingly visible Cold War dichotomy.

This immigration was seen by the State Department as a direct challenge to international agreements such as the Inter-American agreements established to defend against Nazi “activities in the Western Hemisphere.”³⁶⁰ Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs Spruille Braden, the official charged with implanting these policies, argued that the State Department should adhere to all preexisting international agreements designed to combat Nazi influence in Latin America. His reluctance partially represented these bureaucratic obligations.³⁶¹ However, during his service as Ambassador to Argentina, Braden also became strongly opposed to Argentinian dictator Juan Perón. Braden believed that Perón supported Nazi Germany, and worried that fascist influences in Latin American threatened to revive the military threat of Germany.³⁶² These fears were exacerbated by the large flow of German refugees to Argentina in the aftermath of World War II. Braden worried that a program like Paperclip would be seen to support Perón’s actions and could endanger the United States.³⁶³ Braden attempted to persuade Acheson that the specialists should remain in custody as POWs.³⁶⁴ After conferring with Braden and Deputy Assistant Secretary Joseph Panuch, as well as Assistant Secretary of State John

³⁶⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 95; Memo to Acheson and Braden, May 14, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

³⁶¹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 95; “German Scientist Program,” July 17, 1947, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

³⁶² Crim, *Our Germans*, 95-96; Albert P. Vannucci, “Elected by Providence: Spruille Braden in Argentina in 1945,” in *Ambassadors in Foreign Policy: The Influence of Individuals on US-Latin American Policy*, ed. C. Neale Ronning and Albert P. Vannucci (New York: Praeger, 1987), 49, 53, 58-59.

³⁶³ Crim, *Our Germans*, 96.

³⁶⁴ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 45.

Hilldring's representative Ernest Gross, Acheson ordered Klaus to ensure that the State Department did not take any action that violated these agreements.³⁶⁵

These factors illustrate that the State Department's approach towards Paperclip was shaped by the fact that they were the department responsible for processing immigration visas.³⁶⁶ Writing more than one year later, Klaus remembered that many within the State Department's Office of Controls felt that they "had the sole statutory responsibility for immigration."³⁶⁷ Although the military could recruit specialists at will, it was the State Department who would need to officially approve their access to American citizenship. They were the department responsible for upholding immigration law, and they would be the ones who could be easily blamed should a public backlash develop against the use of former Nazis.³⁶⁸

Saxon Bradford and Herbert Cummings, both Assistant Chiefs at the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, and Visa Division Chief Howard Travers are described to have been particularly determined to adhere to legal regulations on visas.³⁶⁹ Travers supported doing everything possible to assist in the implementation of Paperclip, but argued that the State Department needed authorization from Truman to process the large number of specialists the military was planning to recruit.³⁷⁰ When describing the bureaucratic complexity of the program, Lasby quotes a source who claimed, "everyone wanted a piece of the cake... but nobody wanted

³⁶⁵ Crim, *Our Germans*, 97; Department of State, *Register of the Department of State, December 1, 1946* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), 365; "German Scientist Program," July 17, 1947, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

³⁶⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 93, 99, 106.

³⁶⁷ "German Scientist Program," July 17, 1947, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

³⁶⁸ Crim, *Our Germans*, 87, 90, 93.

³⁶⁹ Department of State, *Register of the Department of State, December 1, 1946* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), 97, 152; "German Scientist Program," July 17, 1947, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

³⁷⁰ "German Scientist Program," July 17, 1947, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

to hold the platter.”³⁷¹ The State Department might have supported the recruitment of specialists in the interests of national security, but they resisted the prospect of opening themselves up to criticism from the American public and Congress.³⁷²

The threat of criticism and accusations for hypocrisy increased when denazification policies took effect. JCS 1067, the directive implemented in 1945 that helped shape American occupation policy in Germany, ostensibly placed employment and political restrictions on former Nazis who were “more than nominal participants,” or who were “active supporters of Nazism or militarism.”³⁷³ The August 1, 1945 Potsdam Protocol agreed upon by the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union even adopted this wording as part of a unified effort to de-nazify Germany.³⁷⁴ There were few clear guidelines on how to implement denazification however. Many Germans whose knowledge and experience were needed to rebuild the economy and government of Germany could technically be disqualified from employment due to their past Nazi affiliations. As a result, implementation of denazification in the American zone was often haphazard and disorganized.³⁷⁵

On March 5, 1946 Lucius Clay implemented the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism.³⁷⁶ Establishing a German-run court system, it mandated that all Germans 18 years or older were to complete *Meldebogen* forms to determine their guilt under

³⁷¹ Unnamed naval officer, quoted in Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 155.

³⁷² Crim, *Our Germans*, 87, 90, 93; “German Scientist Program,” July 17, 1947, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

³⁷³ JCS 1067 in Merritt, *Democracy Imposed*, 62, 180-181.

³⁷⁴ Merritt, *Democracy Imposed*, 181; “Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference,” August 1, 1945, in US State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945*, vol. 2 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1960), 1478, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d1383>; Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 166-167.

³⁷⁵ Merritt, *Democracy Imposed*, 181-183.

³⁷⁶ Memo from Robert Murphy to Secretary of State, March 7, 1946, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. 5 of *The British Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), 667-671, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v05/d438>.

denazification law.³⁷⁷ The Allied Control Authority had been established to coordinate occupation policy between the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.³⁷⁸ On April 29, 1946 the control council of the ACA officially approved Law 25 designed to regulate military research in Germany. It repeated many of the directives in JCS 1067 designed to control research in the American zone, calling for restrictions on research “for military purposes” that contributed to German “war potential.”³⁷⁹ Although Crim argues that “enforcement was lax,” this served as a justification that State Department officials later used when arguing that Axis specialists posed a security threat to the United States.³⁸⁰

SWNCC 257/5 ostensibly adhered to denazification law by barring all “active Nazis” from entering the United States under Overcast.³⁸¹ There is an extensive body of literature debating the morality of hiring former Nazis and the guilt of the specialists recruited through Paperclip.³⁸² Although not the focus of this study, convenience appears to have dictated the decisions made by the American military recruiters. The restrictions on active Nazis proved flexible enough that Crim argues “the JIOA defined the term to suit its own interests.”³⁸³ Nevertheless, this flexible definition threatened the State Department officials who would have to grant entrance visas to the specialists.

The potential for criticism over Paperclip grew throughout 1946. This appears to have worried State Department officials concerned about public attitudes towards the occupation of

³⁷⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 42; Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 49; Merritt, *Democracy Imposed*, 183.

³⁷⁸ Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 28-29, 107.

³⁷⁹ Allied Control Authority, *Enactments and Approved Papers*, vol. 3 (Washington DC: Army Library, 1946), I, 103-106; Crim, *Our Germans*, 56.

³⁸⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 56; Memo to Acheson and Braden, May 14, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

³⁸¹ SWNCC 257/5,” March 4, 1946, box 565, file: 1-B, ABC Files, RG 165, NARA.

³⁸² See Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*; Crim, *Our Germans*, Hunt, *Secret Agenda*; Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*.

³⁸³ Crim, *Our Germans*, 72.

Germany. This attitude was reinforced by a State Department study at the end of 1946 that claimed that in the United States “about one quarter of the total public” had expressed interest in American foreign policy.³⁸⁴ The exploitation program itself had also been announced to the American public on October 1, 1945, and a series of press releases had been provided to explain the general purpose of the program.³⁸⁵ The issue had attracted a diverse array of critics, including the Federation of Atomic Scientists, the Society for the Prevention of World War III, the American Jewish Congress, Rabbi Stephen Wise, and even Albert Einstein.³⁸⁶ Gallup Poll even conducted a survey on December 1946 on the issue of Axis specialists, and found that “a ratio of ten to seven” felt Paperclip was “a ‘bad idea.’” However, these protests were “relatively short-lived,” and primarily occurred during 1947.³⁸⁷

Much more dangerous to the future of Paperclip was the possibility that the United States Congress would pass legislation prohibiting the immigration of former fascists. On July 4, 1945, HR 3663 was introduced to the House of Representatives by Texas Representative Ed Gossett.³⁸⁸ Known as the Gossett Bill, it barred “aliens who have served in the armed forces of countries at war with the United States,” as well as “any person who is or at any time has been a member of the Nazi Party, or the Fascist Party.”³⁸⁹ A series of congressional hearings were held during the first half of 1946, but although it was supported by the House, the measure died in the Senate. Gossett resubmitted the bill again as HR 6869, although this too failed to pass the Senate.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁴ Office of Public Affairs, “Information on Occupation of Germany,” November 25, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

³⁸⁵ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 184-185.

³⁸⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 111; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 196-197.

³⁸⁷ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 191-192.

³⁸⁸ HR 3663: Report 2041, box 103, file: JIOA S Klaus Memoranda to Staff, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 161.

³⁸⁹ HR 3663: Report 2041, box 103, file: JIOA S Klaus Memoranda to Staff, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

³⁹⁰ Robert A. Divine, *American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 161; Memo from Bosquet Wev to Francis Duborg, “HR 6869,” box 2, file: Immigration, JIOA General Correspondence,

Nevertheless, the possibility that it would pass made legislation a prominent point of discussion, creating uncertainty in the State Department over the appropriate policies to pursue, and pushing Wev to ask the War Department and navy to lobby Congress on behalf of Paperclip.³⁹¹ This idea was supported by Director of Intelligence Stephen Chamberlin, who pushed Eisenhower to influence the War Department to take a stand in support of continued exploitation.³⁹²

The State Department was likely cautious about negative publicity during this period due to revelations about Soviet espionage that made the department particularly sensitive to criticism over lax security procedures. At the end of 1945 confessions made by Igor Gouzenko implicated Director of the State Department's Office of Special Political Affairs Alger Hiss of espionage.³⁹³ Testimony by Elizabeth Bentley and past allegations by Whittaker Chambers provided further evidence of Hiss' guilt. This security breach drew the attention of Congress and prompted the State Department to enact stricter background checks. It also created paranoia within the department about the dangers of "disloyal employees," and prompted new legislation giving "the Secretary of State 'absolute discretion' to terminate any Department employee."³⁹⁴ Ironically, in July of 1946 it was Klaus who was instructed to conduct a security investigation into the thoroughness and accuracy of background checks. His report was highly critical of security failures in the State Department, and although the report has since been criticized for

RG 330, NARA; United States Congress, *Hearings Before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives on HR 3663*, part 1 and 2, 79th Congress, 2nd sess., 1946.

³⁹¹ "Basic Information by the State Department in Connection with Application of German Scientists for Visas to Enter the United States," June 17, 1946, Document DG 23, box 11, file: DG 1 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA; Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 221; Memo from Bosquet Wev to Francis Duborg, "HR 6869," July 18, 1946, box 2, file: Immigration, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

³⁹² Memo from S. J. Chamberlin to Chief of Staff, "Exploitation and Denial of German and Austrian Specialists," July 30, 1946, box 991, file: Implementation and General History, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

³⁹³ Hove, *History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security*, 76-77; Memo from R. L. Bannerman to Russell, "Hiss, Algernon," May 10, 1946, box 105, file: Hiss, Alger, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

³⁹⁴ Hove, *History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security*, 40, 77, 79.

inaccuracies, it indicates the strange conundrum Klaus found himself in when asked to review security procedures for Axis specialists.³⁹⁵

Together, these factors contributed to the tension on the JIOA, which met frequently towards the end of April 1946 to develop immigration procedures for an expanded Paperclip program.³⁹⁶ Klaus argued that “the State Department had a statutory duty to prevent the entry of people who would affect our security.” Immigration dossiers would need to contain sufficient information to indicate that specialists who held sensitive knowledge planned to stay in the United States permanently. Klaus reported that “there seemed to be considerable confusion” over the amount of authority the State Department held, and that many of the military representatives were unaware of the difficulties involved with immigration law. After the meeting, Army Intelligence contacted Cummings to tell him that Klaus “was not cooperative.”³⁹⁷ The State Department’s security concerns that Klaus subsequently submitted to the JIOA on April 26 laid out many of the central controversies surrounding the expansion of Paperclip, including ACC Law 25 and Safehaven. Significantly, the document argued that “for the protection of the Department from reasonable criticism now, or in the future, the Department should insist upon a maximum of security protections in the selection of immigrants.”³⁹⁸

The military officers on the JIOA did not agree with Klaus’ stipulations, and after meeting with a representative of the War Department days later, Klaus wrote that he “had the impression” that the JIOA had claimed “the State Department was creating ‘legal

³⁹⁵ Crim, *Our Germans*, 90-91; Hove, *History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security*, 79.

³⁹⁶ Memo from George McDonald to CG AMC, “Morale of German Scientists,” May 10, 1946, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1247-1248.

³⁹⁷ Memo for the Files, “JIOA Meeting,” April 24, 1946, Document DG 32, box 11, file: DG 2 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

³⁹⁸ “State Department Problems: German Scientists,” April 26, 1946, Document DG 33A, box 11, file: DG 2 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

obstructions.”³⁹⁹ At a subsequent meeting with the War Department on May 1, Klaus listed the Inter-American agreements, Safehaven, and denazification regulations as the primary factors shaping the State Department’s attitude, and stated that “the Government, especially the State Department, should go on record as having taken all possible security precautions.”⁴⁰⁰ Reflecting the State Department’s reluctance to free the specialists from military custody, Klaus provided the War Department with a memo clarifying that the United States government could not legally control the movement of specialists once they had received immigration visas.⁴⁰¹

State Department officials also resisted the JIOA’s initial discussions involving the expansion of Paperclip from 350 to 800 specialists. Travers informed Klaus that the State Department would be unable to accept these plans for expansion without a presidential order.⁴⁰² Klaus repeated this argument to his colleagues at the JIOA on May 21, 1946, insisting that immigration would be hastened once Truman “formally opened up the quota to such cases.”⁴⁰³ Throughout this process Klaus found the military to have little understanding of visa regulations, and on June 13 was forced to argue that even “the Secretary of State could hardly be expected to waive security requirements which, in any event, were imposed by law and not by him.”⁴⁰⁴ Klaus later explained that he resisted “granting visas *en masse*” because even the State Department was

³⁹⁹ Memo for the Files, “German Scientists: Legal Problems,” May 2, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA S Klaus Memoranda for File, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁰⁰ Memo from Monroe Hagood to Vandenburg, “Conference on German Scientists,” May 3, 1946, box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁴⁰¹ “Basic Information by the State Department in Connection with Application of German Scientists for Visas to Enter the United States,” June 17, 1946, Document DG 23, box 11, file: DG 1 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA; “German Scientists: Legal Problems,” May 2, 1946, box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁴⁰² Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 156; Memo for the Files, May 14, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA S Klaus Memoranda for File, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁰³ Memo for the Files, “JIOA Meeting,” May 21, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA German Scientists, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁰⁴ Memo for the Files, “JIOA Meeting,” June 13, 1936, box 103, file: JIOA German Scientists, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

required to adhere to legal immigration requirements that demanded “individual investigations.”⁴⁰⁵

The State Department held an interagency conference with the War and Navy Departments in June 1946 to develop the procedures visa requirements for Paperclip and agreed to develop a list of visa requirements.⁴⁰⁶ Anger towards Klaus likely solidified when, on June 19, he handed the JIOA the document titled “Basic Information Required by the State Department.” Containing “forty separate conditions” including interrogations and background checks, the document called for extensive security investigations while stating that consuls would only approve visas within the limits of established immigration law.⁴⁰⁷ Although the document stated that ten immigration dossiers for AAF employees had been submitted to the State Department for consideration, it held that they did not contain enough “substantial information.”⁴⁰⁸

Reflecting the combativeness of the meetings, on July 8, 1946 Wev forwarded Klaus’ requirements to Robert Frye of the Commerce Department’s Office of Planning and Budget to show “what we are up against.”⁴⁰⁹ Crim writes that there was “personal animosity between Klaus and Wev, likely stemming from Wev’s conviction that Klaus was purposely obstructing Paperclip.”⁴¹⁰ Wev questioned Klaus’ authority, and attempted to undermine his role on the JIOA after the submission of the State Department’s requirements by suggesting that the chairman

⁴⁰⁵ “German Scientists Program,” July 17, 1947, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁰⁶ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 714-715.

⁴⁰⁷ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 219; “Basic Information by the State Department in Connection with Application of German Scientists for Visas to Enter the United States,” June 17, 1946, Document DG 23, box 11, file: DG 1 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 157.

⁴⁰⁸ “Basic Information by the State Department in Connection with Application of German Scientists for Visas to Enter the United States,” June 17, 1946, Document DG 23, box 11, file: DG 1 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁰⁹ Memo from Bosquet Wev to Robert Frye, July 8, 1946, box 1, file: Department of Commerce, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁴¹⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 101-102.

should be granted the power to take unilateral action on policy decisions.⁴¹¹ Many on the JIOA shared Wev's hostility and continued to criticize Klaus for obstructionism decades later.

Although these reflected genuine bureaucratic disagreements, it is also important to note that these tensions were also indicative of personal prejudice. Klaus was Jewish, and many officers on the JIOA appear to have interpreted his objections to Paperclip as intentional sabotage.⁴¹² One JIOA member even told Cummings to "get that little Jew off the Committee...He's a menace."⁴¹³ This lack of professionalism only exacerbated the difficulties experienced by the military and the State Department reaching an acceptable solution.

Much of the JIOA's anger stemmed from the fact that they found it extremely difficult to submit the necessary information for immigration visas. The backgrounds of the specialists themselves were frequently suspect, and past affiliations with the Nazi Party and related organizations made the military recruiters reluctant to include complete and accurate information in their immigration dossiers.⁴¹⁴ In addition, shortages of personnel and resources in Europe hindered attempts both to control movement in the American zone, and to physically gather the information needed to fulfill the State Department's visa requirements.⁴¹⁵ An AAF report supportive of Paperclip admitted that personnel shortages prevented the United States from attaining the "maximum benefit from exploitation of German personnel."⁴¹⁶ The American

⁴¹¹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 101-102: Memo to the Files, "JIOA Meeting," May 6, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA German Scientists, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; Memo for the Files, "JIOA Meeting," June 11, 1946, Document DG 34C, box 11, file: DG 2 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

⁴¹² Crim, *Our Germans*, 104, 170.

⁴¹³ Major Simpson, quoted in Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 220.

⁴¹⁴ Crim, *Our Germans*, 42-43, 72-73.

⁴¹⁵ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 716; Crim, *Our Germans*, 42-43, 71-73.

⁴¹⁶ Report signed by Ira Eaker, "Exploitation and Employment of German Scientific and Technical Personnel," March 29, 1946, box 4, file: Overcast, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) in Germany charged with investigating specialists was swamped with different objectives that included “denazification, war crimes inquiries, and ... counter-intelligence.” Crim argues that the CIC was “severely understaffed and unprepared for its myriad responsibilities.”⁴¹⁷

This overextension only became worse at the start of 1946 as the United States began to focus its intelligence networks against the Soviet Union, reducing the thoroughness and speed of Paperclip security investigations.⁴¹⁸ This shortage extended to the United States. At a June 25 meeting with the JIOA, Wev argued that the military was unlikely to be able to fulfill State Department requirements for a “substantial investigation” of specialists due to the “lack of personnel.”⁴¹⁹ From the State Department’s perspective, the fact these military investigations were to be conducted by the technical services only made matters worse. Klaus even implied that the JCS had implemented this policy to ensure that immigration dossiers passed State Department inspection, writing that this “was a deliberate attempt to exclude investigation by experts” from professional intelligence organizations.⁴²⁰

Military officers frequently argued that Klaus’s obstructionism was delaying immigration through Paperclip.⁴²¹ Wev repeated these accusations in 1947 when speaking to a Congressional Committee about the future of the Paperclip program, and they came back to haunt the State Department during the 1950s.⁴²² He would further warn that the State Department’s delays over immigration “will adversely affect the exploitation program and impose unwarranted burdens on

⁴¹⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 71.

⁴¹⁸ Crim, *Our Germans*, 71-72.

⁴¹⁹ Memo for the Files, “JIOA Meeting,” June 25, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA German Scientists, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁴²⁰ Memo for the Files, “German Scientists,” October 9, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA German Scientists, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁴²¹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 104-105; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 111.

⁴²² Crim, *Our Germans*, 163, 168-169.

the War and Navy Departments.”⁴²³ However, as Klaus later wrote, during his entire tenure with the JIOA the military had “a complete and free hand to bring in any German they wanted without consultation or even notification to the State Department.”⁴²⁴ Although visa applications were delayed, transportation into the United States under military custody should not have been affected by the State Department’s visa regulations. Even JIOA representative Montee Cone admitted that although Klaus could be rude, he had not prevented the recruitment of specialists into military custody. Instead, it was only the acquisition of immigration visas that was being delayed.⁴²⁵ Nevertheless, examining the reasons why military officers saw these visas as critical to exploitation efforts illustrates how the availability of family housing, both on American military bases in the United States and at Landshut, Germany, played an indirect but significant role in the implantation of Paperclip.

Family housing became an issue because the military services were required to provide adequate facilities for the specialists.⁴²⁶ However, throughout 1946 and 1947 there was a shortage of family housing on and near military bases such as Wright Field and Fort Bliss where many of the specialists were housed.⁴²⁷ Significantly, specialists hired through Paperclip were in the United States on a voluntary basis. Many wished to be with their families and regretted

⁴²³ Memo from Bosquet Wev to S. J. Chamberlin, “Exploitation of German and Austrian Scientists and Technicians in Science and Technology in the United States,” July 2, 1947, box 993, file: Research 014.32, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁴²⁴ “German Scientists Program,” July 17, 1947, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁴²⁵ Crim, *Our Germans*, 74; Memo from MFC, July 9, 1947, box 993, file: Research 014.32, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁴²⁶ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 815; SWNCC 257/22, August 24, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴²⁷ Air Force History Museums Program, *Home Field Advantage: A Century of Partnership between Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and Dayton, Ohio, in the Pursuit of Aeronautical Excellence* (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: US Government Printing Office, 2004), 119, 144; John A. Hamilton, *Blazing Skies: Air Defense Artillery Fort Bliss on, Texas, 1940-2009* (Washington DC: Army Defense Department, 2009), 65; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 251, 257.

leaving them behind in a war-torn Germany. In addition, they often refused to sign or renew contracts with the United States government until they received assurances that they would be joined by their families within a short period of time.⁴²⁸ In fact, Henry S. Aurand, the Army Director of Research and Development, wrote that “less than 5%” of interviewed specialists wished to enter into contracts that separated them from their families.⁴²⁹ As a result, these family housing shortages created what one Air Force report terms “a bottleneck” by preventing families from leaving Europe for the United States, subsequently resulting in overcrowding at Landshut.⁴³⁰ This in turn delayed recruitment of specialists, who would not leave for the United States until their families were safely housed in Germany.⁴³¹

At Wright Field where roughly 160 specialists were housed by 1947, many of the initial dwellings they occupied were “poorly constructed.”⁴³² These housing shortages were exacerbated by economic growth that had strained conditions at Wright Field during the war, helping to create what one study describes as “the chronic family-housing shortage... throughout the 1940s.”⁴³³ In part, the temporary nature of the initial Overcast program led authorities at Wright Field to underestimate the financial resources needed to implement the program.⁴³⁴ To make matters worse, they faced bureaucratic obstacles that blocked funds needed to construct

⁴²⁸ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 719-720, 815; “The Paperclip Project: Its Concept, Implementation, and Control,” January 30, 1959, box 2674, Publication “P” Files, RG 319, NARA, 9, 23.

⁴²⁹ Memo from H. S. Aurand to Chief of Staff, “Exploitation and Denial of German and Austrian Specialists,” July 31, 1946, box 991, file: Implementation and General History, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; “Henry S. Aurand: Lieutenant General, United States Army,” Arlington National Cemetery Website, last modified September 20, 2006, accessed April 19, 2019, <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/hsaurand.htm>.

⁴³⁰ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 704, 707, 719-720, 815.

⁴³¹ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 719-720.

⁴³² Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 750; Crim, *Our Germans*, 68.

⁴³³ Air Force History Museums Program, *Home Field Advantage*, 119, 144.

⁴³⁴ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 814.

additional facilities.⁴³⁵ Even funds for the first specialists recruited through Overcast had to be loaned by the “Wright Field Officers Club.”⁴³⁶ Specialists who were single were able to use barracks, but the logistics became more complex once the expansion of Paperclip ensured that the specialists’ dependents would need to be housed as well.⁴³⁷

Putt himself had commented in 1945 on the difficulties “due to lack of personnel, funds, and facilities.”⁴³⁸ Putt discussed the housing issue again at a meeting at Wright Field on October 25, 1946 after the expansion of Paperclip made clear that a large number of specialists could soon be entering the United States.⁴³⁹ Even specialists in single housing at Wright Field had to be relocated in February 1947 as part of an effort by the military “to relieve the critical housing shortage” being experienced by American employees at Wright Field.⁴⁴⁰ Writing to AAF Intelligence on July 25, 1947, Deputy Commanding General Howard M. McCoy claimed that there was “no additional government housing available at Wright Field” for use by the families of specialists.⁴⁴¹

Although the AAF looked at constructing a trailer park on base to relieve the shortage, this was denied due to the questionable legality of establishing private housing inside the boundaries of Wright Field. A third possibility was to allow the specialists to move off-base into Dayton. However, the policy of allowing specialists to own property in the United States was

⁴³⁵ Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948*, 1642-1643.

⁴³⁶ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 814.

⁴³⁷ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 815; Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948*, 1635-1636.

⁴³⁸ Memo from D. L. Putt to General Knerr, “Exploitation of German Scientists in the United States,” November 28, 1945, box 4, file: Overcast, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

⁴³⁹ Memo from W. R. Clingman to Colonel McCoy, “German Scientists,” March 24, 1947, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2056, 105.

⁴⁴⁰ Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948*, 1632.

⁴⁴¹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 67; Memo from H. M. McCoy to CG AAF, Attn: Capt. Macken, “Housing for Dependents of German Scientists,” July 25, 1947, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2056, 259-260.

strongly opposed given their questionable status under immigration law. In addition, many specialists eventually forced to find civilian housing on their own faced difficulties due to the “severe housing shortage...for families with several children” that Dayton itself was experiencing.⁴⁴² McCoy’s solution was to recommend that the AAF do everything possible to ensure that the specialists received immigration visas, clearing the military of responsibility for housing while allowing them to continue working for the AAF as American citizens.⁴⁴³

The army experienced similar problems finding suitable family housing. Since October of 1946 both the army and navy had conducted missile testing at White Sands Proving Grounds, New Mexico, sharing the operational costs. Having only been established in February of 1945, many facilities still needed to be constructed. Housing facilities remained in poor condition in late 1946, exacerbated by cost-saving measures enacted by the AAF that removed family housing at Alamogordo Air Base assigned to employees at White Sands.⁴⁴⁴ While working at White Sands, Wernher von Braun’s rocket team used dilapidated facilities and faced equipment shortages.⁴⁴⁵ Although the army would eventually house roughly 132 of these specialists at Fort Bliss, here too the army was experiencing shortages of housing. In fact, in 1944 there had been “no family housing units of any kind,” and by 1946 there was a “critical shortage of family-housing” on base.⁴⁴⁶

On July 30, 1946, Chamberlin wrote to the Chief of Staff warning that “the major problem to be faced implementing the proposed interim policy and procedure is housing,” and

⁴⁴² Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948*, 1640, 1643-1644.

⁴⁴³ Memo from H. M. McCoy to CG AAF, “Housing for Dependents of German Scientists,” July 25, 1947, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2056, 259-260.

⁴⁴⁴ DeVorkin, *Science with a Vengeance*, 59, 109-110, 115.

⁴⁴⁵ Neufeld, *Von Braun*, 219.

⁴⁴⁶ Hamilton, *Blazing Skies*, 65, 88-89; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 251; Neufeld, *Von Braun*, 217.

that there was a “extreme shortage of family housing throughout the United States,” as well as a dearth of supplies for construction. Even American military personnel who had families were residing in housing that was “a discredit to themselves and the Army.” To mitigate these shortages, Chamberlin recommended staggering the arrival of new families each month throughout the implementation of Paperclip.⁴⁴⁷ Later at a briefing in 1947 Eisenhower heard that it had been Truman’s August 6, 1946 “economic retrenchment” that had created one of “the most serious difficulties” the Paperclip program experienced, due to the delays it caused in the construction of family housing.⁴⁴⁸ On March 18, 1948, Director of Research and Development for the United States Air Force (USAF) L. C. Craigie outlined problems that had been encountered during the early implementation of Paperclip. It is significant that although he included the State Department’s visa policies, he blamed much of Paperclip’s inefficiency on the military’s own “inability to provide family housing and like conveniences.”⁴⁴⁹

It is ironic that within the historiography of Paperclip, discussions of an issue such as family housing have rarely appeared in examinations of a program inherently orientated towards transporting immigrant families into the United States. Frequently historians focus on exposing the American government’s preferential treatment of former Nazis or on the relationship between Paperclip and larger systems of commerce and industry.⁴⁵⁰ However, it is just as important to recognize the limits and restrictions of governmental bureaucracy, and the diverse internal forces

⁴⁴⁷ Memo from S. J. Chamberlin to Chief of Staff, “Exploitation and Denial of German and Austrian Specialists,” July 30, 1946, box 991, file: Implementation and General History, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁴⁴⁸ “Outline for Briefing General Eisenhower on German Scientists Exploitation Program, 11 March 1947,” box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁴⁴⁹ Memo from L. C. Craigie to Director of Intelligence, Attn: General McDonald, “Utilization of German Scientists by USSR and US,” March 18, 1948, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2056, 491.

⁴⁵⁰ See Crim, *Our Germans*; Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*; Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*.

that so many military and State Department officials were forced to confront when shaping the American national security state. In the end, the physical capacity of the military departments, together with financial realities and practical concerns proved to be as important to the delays experienced by Paperclip as were any of the immigration restrictions imposed by the State Department. Miscommunication and distrust between the officials on the JIOA only exacerbated these problems. Klaus' later assertions that the State Department had done nothing to hinder recruitment through Paperclip indicates that he did not appreciate the dilemma that State Department visa regulations had imposed upon the military, and the problems the employing agencies were experiencing with processing and housing specialists.⁴⁵¹ Confusion over bureaucratic objectives and concerns was thus not limited to the military departments, but endemic in the JIOA.

Over the course of 1946 Paperclip evolved from a temporary military program born out of the search for reparations and military technology to aid in the war against Japan into a program for skilled immigration designed to facilitate the citizenship and residency of former enemy specialists. Incentivized by a growing recognition about the importance of technology to national security, and by fears that competition was depriving the United States of the opportunity to recruit these specialists, the military and State Department agreed to an expansion of Paperclip to include the prospect of immigration. State Department officials quickly realized that they were in an impossible situation, obligated to remain within the requirements of immigration law when issuing visas, and fearful about receiving the brunt of any public backlash over Paperclip. The visa requirements they submitted helped delay the immigration applications

⁴⁵¹ "Analysis of Extension of Remarks of Congressman Busbey in Congressional Record, March 25, 1948, Page A 1982 ff," box 105, file: Files of Samuel Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; "German Scientist Program," July 17, 1947, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

of specialists, but it was family housing shortages on military bases that slowed the physical transportation of the specialists to the United States. When it became clear that American authorities in Europe were unable to prevent specialists from accepting employment offers with other countries, the military and the State Department once again pushed to revise Paperclip policies to enable the program to circumvent all bureaucratic obstacles. This process took time however, and disagreements between the State Department and the military over the issue of immigration would continue throughout 1947.

CHAPTER FOUR

A BELATED COMPROMISE: THE AMERICAN ARMED SERVICES ASSUME AUTHORITY OVER SKILLED IMMIGRATION THROUGH PAPERCLIP

In July of 1946 the United States government appeared to have succeeded at exploiting captured German technology and personnel through Project Paperclip. Roughly 175 specialists were already in the United States employed on military projects, and at White Sands, New Mexico the first V-2 rockets had been test-launched the previous April.⁴⁵² Despite this success, a critical barrier to the program's successful implementation remained. Paperclip's expansion in March 1946 to allow specialists to immigrate permanently to the United States had placed responsibility for granting immigration visas on the shoulders of the State Department. Acknowledging the potential benefits of Paperclip but reluctant to become the target of public criticism and to compromise their obligations under immigration law, State Department officials attempted to avoid assuming direct responsibility for certifying that former Nazis posed no risk to the security of the United States. Instead, they sought to modify and reinterpret immigration regulations to ensure that the military and Justice Department assumed the risks associated with Paperclip. The American military faced increasing pressure to come to terms with the State Department. Although family housing shortages had long plagued Paperclip, as the months went on financial retrenchment further reduced the military's capacity to process and house specialists. These shortages also played an important role in the modification of Paperclip's policies to allow specialists to transition from military to civilian employment. Immigration visas were needed first however, to facilitate this employment transition while freeing space in housing and budgets for new recruits from Europe. The State Department and the military

⁴⁵² Memo, Interdepartmental Meeting, June 5, 1946, Document DG 16, box 11, file: DG 1 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA; Neufeld, *Von Braun*, 222.

engaged in a lengthy and at times bitter process of negotiation. In late 1947 a compromise was finally reached that allowed Paperclip to remain ostensibly within the confines of immigration law, but that placed full responsibility for the security risks on the shoulders of the American military establishment.

The prolonged debate over Paperclip's immigration policies demonstrates the conflicting relationship between national security objectives and legal obligations. Although the American military and the State Department both held a similar respect for German scientific achievements and worked together to restructure American immigration policy to promote national security through technological superiority, they operated within separate and distinct paradigms. The armed services of the United States may have attempted to shape national policy to accomplish their own objectives, but the State Department had their own responsibilities rooted in federal law that they were unwilling to abandon. The evolution of Paperclip and the eventual compromise between the State Department and the military establishment is an important example of how a program for skilled immigration forced the military to shape its national security objectives within the framework of this legal tradition, a union that conversely altered the spirit and, in some cases, the very wording of the legislation itself to reflect changing national security prerogatives.

Prospects for cooperation between the military and the State Department were initially promising in early 1946. All departments were represented on the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA), the subcommittee designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to help coordinate and administer Paperclip, and discussion soon turned towards the correct procedures to facilitate visa applications for the Axis specialists. However, the document titled "Basic Information Required by the State Department" that the State Department's representative

Samuel Klaus had handed to the military officers of JIOA reduced this optimism. The State Department's uncompromising requirements for security investigations and reluctance to violate legislation that restricted the immigration of former fascists soon made it clear that immigration visas would not be forthcoming. Obligated to adhere to their legal responsibilities and fearful that any actions taken would draw the ire of Congress and the American public, State Department officials were reluctant to assume undue responsibility for the immigration of the military's alien employees.⁴⁵³

As discussed in the previous chapter, the shortage of family housing increased the military's demand for immigration visas. Many specialists in the United States were unwilling to renew their contracts unless they were joined by their families. In addition, many of the specialists still in Europe were unwilling to leave for the United States unless certain that their families were safely housed at the American family housing complex at Landshut, Germany. This complex became overcrowded however, due to delays that were encountered transporting families into the United States. The housing shortage thus slowed the flow of specialists to the United States while imposing restrictions on the volume of specialists the military could transport and process.⁴⁵⁴ One potential solution to mitigate this shortage was to speed up the immigration of specialists, facilitating their employment in a civilian capacity.⁴⁵⁵ This reflected the long-term objectives of Paperclip which called for permanently denying the services of

⁴⁵³ "Basic Information by the State Department in Connection with Application of German Scientists for Visas to Enter the United States," June 17, 1946, Document DG 23, box 11, file: DG 1 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA; Crim, *Our Germans*, 90; Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 45; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 25-26; "German Scientists Program," July 17, 1947, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; Memo from Silver to Mr. Robinson, "Paperclip," July 2, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁵⁴ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 704, 707, 719-720, 815; "The Paperclip Project: Its Concept, Implementation, and Control," January 30, 1959, box 2674, Publication "P" Files, RG 319, NARA, 9, 23.

⁴⁵⁵ Memo from H. M. McCoy to CG AAF, "Housing for Dependents of German Scientists," July 25, 1947, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2056, 259-260.

specialists to other countries while ensuring that the United States retained technological dominance in the world.⁴⁵⁶ The State Department's visa requirements thus proved to be unintentionally restrictive on multiple levels, forcing the military to seek a compromise.

As progress on the immigration of specialists stalled, American occupation forces struggled to promote German economic growth and to feed the population.⁴⁵⁷ By mid-1946 American officials were anxious to secure "Europe's economic stabilization" to combat the influence of the Soviet Union and the German communist party.⁴⁵⁸ This resulted in an agreement on July 30 to merge the American and British zones.⁴⁵⁹ The Allied Powers also debated the possibility of a unifying all four zones of Germany, a prospect supported by the Deputy Governor of Germany Lucius Clay. Together these developments threatened the American military's agenda of limiting the movement of specialists out of the American zone. Originally implemented in early 1946, these orders to freeze specialists were intended to deny their services to other countries by countering the recruitment efforts of France and the Soviet Union. Difficulties implementing this policy were only exacerbated by Commanding General of United States Forces in Europe (USFET) Joseph McNarney's June order relaxing travel restrictions "between the American and British zones."⁴⁶⁰ This placed pressure on officials in Washington DC to find a solution to immigration before the opportunity to recruit specialists had been lost.

The need for the military and State Department to reach even a temporary solution increased again on July 17 when the McNarney contacted the JCS to warn that loosening travel

⁴⁵⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 5, 63, 67; Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 10.

⁴⁵⁷ Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 113.

⁴⁵⁸ Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 118-119.

⁴⁵⁹ Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 119; Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 182-183.

⁴⁶⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 124; "Decision Amending JCS 1363/10," February 19, 1945, box 564, file: 1-A, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA; Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 46-47; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 106; Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 119.

restrictions were endangering denial efforts. It was not only unrealistic to assume that the United States could offer sufficient incentives to persuade every specialist to refuse generous French and Soviet employment offers, but restrictions on hiring fascists in Germany only served to ensure that blacklisted specialists sought work elsewhere. Instead, the only way to successfully deny specialists to France and the Soviet Union was to either imprison them in Germany or to evacuate them to the United States and Britain. McNarney's ultimate recommendation was for the JCS to cancel the denial program in Germany. Instead, he argued that the United States should focus on controlling specialists either too valuable or too dangerous to be ignored by recruiting them through Paperclip.⁴⁶¹ Historian John Gimbel argues that this memo "activated the Washington bureaucracy," pushing military and State Department officials to expand Paperclip.⁴⁶² This interpretation is correct, and is supported by the frequent references to McNarney's memo that appear throughout later State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) policy papers.

As a result of this pressure, the State Department and the military began to develop new revisions for Paperclip intended to allow specialists to postpone their visa applications until after they had arrived in the United States. Indeed, Klaus was a supporter of these changes despite subsequent accusations that he delayed Paperclip's implementation. At a meeting on July 2 with Ernest Gross from the office of Assistant Secretary of State John Hildring, the current SWNCC chairman, Klaus argued that given the slow progress that had been made at achieving an agreement over immigration, it would make more sense "to expand the military custody program

⁴⁶¹ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 47; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 166-167; Memo from CG USFET to JCS, July 17, 1946, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. 5 of *The British Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), 682-684, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v05/d444>.

⁴⁶² Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 47-48.

to bring in as many as possible.”⁴⁶³ This would deny specialists to other countries while allowing the State Department to remain faithful to its legal obligations by avoiding direct responsibility for immigration visas.

Spurred on by the State Department’s visa requirements and by McNarney’s memo, Hilldring worked with Assistant Secretary of War Howard Peterson in July to facilitate the transportation of specialists into the United States.⁴⁶⁴ On July 15, 1946, Peterson’s superior, Secretary of War Robert Patterson, wrote to Army Director of Research and Development Henry S. Aurand to argue that Paperclip was making insufficient progress at employing specialists. Although he admitted that the program should comply with existing laws, Patterson argued that “regulations and administrative rulings” should be adjusted to hasten the program.⁴⁶⁵ His worries were shared by Director of Intelligence Stephen Chamberlin, who wrote to the War Department leadership to argue that the SWNCC could not delay any longer and should quickly establish additional policies to facilitate exploitation.⁴⁶⁶

Aurand himself agreed with these arguments, and in a letter to the Chief of Staff on July 31, 1946, he claimed that Paperclip provided the United States military with a valuable opportunity to incorporate German research. However, he argued that this opportunity would be jeopardized if other countries recruited these specialists before the United States had the chance

⁴⁶³ Crim, *Our Germans*, 104; Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 48; Memo for the Files, “JIOA,” July 2, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA S Klaus Memoranda for File, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; “SWNCC 257/22,” August 24, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁶⁴ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 221-222.

⁴⁶⁵ “Henry S. Aurand: Lieutenant General, United States Army,” Arlington National Cemetery Website, last modified September 20, 2006, accessed April 19, 2019, <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/hsaurand.htm>; Memo from H. S. Aurand to Chief of Staff, “Exploitation and Denial of German and Austrian Specialists,” July 31, 1946, box 991, file: Implementation and General History, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; Memo from Robert Patterson to Director of Research and Development, July 15, 1946, box 991, file: Implementation and General History, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁴⁶⁶ Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 37; Memo from S. J. Chamberlin, “Exploitation and Denial of German and Austrian Specialists,” July 30, 1946, box 991, file: Implementation and General History, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

to employ them. The only option to prevent this from happening was for the Chief of Staff to accede to Chamberlin's request for support.⁴⁶⁷ The JCS subsequently wrote to the SWNCC informing them that immigration through Paperclip appeared unlikely, and that a new policy must be devised. No time should be wasted, given the valuable knowledge these specialists possessed, and the possibility that they would be lost to the United States if delays continued.⁴⁶⁸

Officials in the State Department were also frustrated by the delays that had been encountered. On July 23, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Panuch met with a representative from Hilldring's office to advocate for a new policy that would "by-pass the visa people" by ensuring that immigration regulations did not restrict the exploitation program.⁴⁶⁹ Although Panuch was pointed, he was not entirely accurate. At a meeting with Hilldring several days later, Klaus clarified that the State Department's visa requirements only applied to the immigration of specialists and did not prevent their employment in the United States.⁴⁷⁰ At a JIOA meeting in July, Klaus was informed of the War Department's decision to revise Paperclip to allow for the immediate transportation of specialists to the United States outside of visa regulations. Klaus agreed, and told the JIOA's new Director, Colonel Thomas Ford, that the State Department had long supported this policy of postponing visa applications until proper security checks could be conducted.⁴⁷¹ Before State Department officials agreed to concrete

⁴⁶⁷ Memo from H. S. Aurand to Chief of Staff, "Exploitation and Denial of German and Austrian Specialists," July 31, 1946, box 991, file: Implementation and General History, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁴⁶⁸ Memo from A. J. McFarland to SWNCC, "Exploitation and Denial to Other Nations of German and Austrian Specialists in Science and Technology," August 5, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁶⁹ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 222; Hove, *History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security*, 79; Memo from Heneman to Hilldring, "Import of German Scientists," July 23, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁷⁰ Memo for the Files, "JIOA," July 29, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA S Klaus Memoranda for File, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁷¹ "Analysis of Extension of Remarks of Congressman Busbey in Congressional Record, March 25, 1948, Page A 1982 ff," box 105, file: Files of Samuel Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 107; Memo for the Files, "JIOA Meeting," July 12, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA German Scientists, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; Memo for the Files, "JIOA," July 23, 1946, Document DG 29, box 11, file: DG 2 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

action however, they desired presidential authorization for any policy revision.⁴⁷² On July 29 when Klaus conveyed Visa Division Chief Howard Travers' request for a presidential order, Hilldring agreed that officials in the Visa Division "were entitled to that protection."⁴⁷³

Under pressure to speed the implementation of Paperclip, the SWNCC worked to develop a program that would allow the military to recruit future citizens outside of the normal immigration process, moving to amend SWNCC 257/5 in late August. The SWNCC argued that although SWNCC 257/5 had made legal provisions for the immigration of whole families, the requirements presented by the State Department had proven too extensive to ensure a fast visa application process.⁴⁷⁴ A new policy was needed quickly because the contracts signed by the first recruits through Paperclip were scheduled to conclude in September. In addition, many of the specialists already in the United States were considering returning to Europe unless they could be assured that their families would soon join them in the United States.⁴⁷⁵ The SWNCC wrote that it was this desire to remain with their families that constituted the primary factor motivating specialists to refuse contracts with the United States government.⁴⁷⁶

A new policy was also needed to counter recruitment efforts by France, the Soviet Union, and even Argentina. The SWNCC argued that the "illegal departure" of specialists "from the US and British zones of Germany," as a result of these efforts "constitutes a loss to US scientific and

⁴⁷² Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 177; "Explanatory Note in Connection with Presidential Directive," July 3, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA; Memo for the Files, "JIOA," July 2, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA S Klaus Memoranda for File, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; Memo from Heneman to Hilldring, "Import of German Scientists," July 23, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁷³ Crim, *Our Germans*, 93; Memo for the Files, "JIOA," July 29, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA S Klaus Memoranda for File, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁷⁴ "SWNCC 257/22," August 24, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁷⁵ Memo from John Samford to Director of Intelligence, "Shipment of Families of German Scientists to the United States," September 20, 1946, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1281; "SWNCC 257/22," August 24, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁷⁶ "SWNCC 257/22," August 24, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

technical progress and a potential threat to national security.”⁴⁷⁷ Citing McNarney’s July 17 memo, the SWNCC determined that swift action was needed before unification efforts in Germany removed all restrictions on movement. The SWNCC’s solution was to formulate a revised Paperclip program that was labeled SWNCC 257/22, Appendix B. Under this new “Revised Paperclip,” the War and Navy Departments could recruit as many as one thousand specialists in the interest of national security.⁴⁷⁸ The Commerce Department could also nominate specialists within this quota who would be recruited for civilian employment. After traveling to the United States, the specialists would be joined by their families. To maintain morale, the dependents of specialists already in the United States would be first on the waiting list. All would be transported to the United States “as rapidly as transportation from the Theater and housing in the United States can be made available.”⁴⁷⁹

This new program explicitly allowed aliens to avoid immigration law to expedite the recruitment process. All aliens transported into the United States would remain “under temporary, limited military custody until such time as visas are granted or repatriation is accomplished.”⁴⁸⁰ This permitted specialists and dependents to temporarily avoid all immigration laws, granting the military time to compile the personal investigations and paperwork necessary to ensure that they received visas. New contracts would also be available that would allow the best salaries that budgetary regulations would permit.⁴⁸¹ All individuals entering the United States were to be investigated by USFET to determine the security risk that they posed and their

⁴⁷⁷ “SWNCC 257/22,” August 24, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁷⁸ Memo from M. J. Hagood to Director of Intelligence, “Implantation of Revised Paperclip Program,” October 30, 1946, box 989, file: August 30, 1946 to December 31, 1946, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; “SWNCC 257/22,” August 24, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁷⁹ “SWNCC 257/22,” August 24, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁸⁰ “SWNCC 257/22,” August 24, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁸¹ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 48; “SWNCC 257/22,” August 24, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

past relationship with the Nazi Party. “Active supporters of Nazism or militarism” were ostensibly barred from participation in Paperclip.⁴⁸² This determination was typically reserved for individuals whose membership in the Nazi Party predated 1933, those who had been members of the Nazi hierarchy, or anyone suspected of war crimes.⁴⁸³ The SWNCC qualified this restriction however, stating that “neither position nor honors awarded a specialist under the Nazi Regime solely on account of his scientific or technical ability” would bar a specialist from participating in Paperclip.⁴⁸⁴ To ensure that the specialists posed no security risk, they would be surveilled while in the United States for a period of time determined by their work history and the results of their background investigations.⁴⁸⁵

After official approval was given for SWNCC 257/22 on August 21, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson submitted the policy paper to President Harry Truman on August 30. Stating that McNarney had warned that “many of the specialists may be lost to us,” and that both the JCS and the SWNCC agreed on Paperclip’s importance to the United States, Acheson encouraged Truman to support the new proposal.⁴⁸⁶ Acheson’s efforts were successful, and on September 3, 1946 Truman threw his official support behind the revised Paperclip program.⁴⁸⁷ The SWNCC subsequently issued a memo authorizing McNarney to continue the denial program

⁴⁸² “SWNCC 257/22,” August 24, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁸³ Crim, *Our Germans*, 42; Memo from R. F. Ennis to Public Relations Division, “Press Release on Project Paperclip,” February 20, 1947, box 989, file: February 1947, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁴⁸⁴ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 48; “SWNCC 257/22,” August 24, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁸⁵ “SWNCC 257/22,” August 24, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁸⁶ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 176-177; Memo from Lauris Norstad to CG Manhattan Engineer District, “Exploitation of German and Austrian Specialists in Science and Technology in the United States,” September 11, 1946, box 565, file: 1-D, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA; “SWNCC 257/23,” September 6, 1946, box 565, file: 1-D, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁸⁷ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 176-177.

in Germany for the duration of Paperclip, and authorizing him to “make every effort short of physical restraint” to prevent the departure of specialists from Austria.⁴⁸⁸

The establishment of SWNCC 257/22 provided the State Department with the presidential approval they desired. However, the technical details of the immigration process still needed to be outlined and agreed upon. Shortly after Truman submitted his approval for a revised program, the State and Justice Departments held an interagency conference with the military at which it was agreed that immigration through Paperclip would use the preexamination procedure.⁴⁸⁹ Preexamination had originally been established in 1935 to process the immigration applications of aliens already in the United States. Under immigration law, aliens were required to physically leave the United States if they wished to submit their visa applications. The preexamination procedure expedited this process by allowing the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to review and approve immigration paperwork while aliens were still in the United States. For Paperclip specialists this process saved time and addressed security concerns that would be raised by returning to Germany.⁴⁹⁰ If approval for immigration was granted through preexamination, the alien could make the relatively short trip to Canada to submit a formal visa application at an American consulate.⁴⁹¹ Consulates in Mexico were also made available to Paperclip specialists in an effort to speed the application process.⁴⁹²

⁴⁸⁸ “JCS 1363/30,” November 21, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA General File, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁸⁹ Memo from Attorney General to James Byrnes, October 1, 1946, box 6794, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁹⁰ Laney, *German Rocketeers*, 31; “SWNCC 257/25,” November 5, 1946, box 565, file: 1-D, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁹¹ “JIOA Standard Operating Procedure,” March 19, 1947, box 19, file: MS JIOA Operate, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC; Abraham D. Sofaer, “The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of the Informal Agency Process,” *The Journal of Legal Studies*, 1, no. 2 (June 1972): 350-351.

⁴⁹² Laney, *German Rocketeers*, 31.

The SWNCC drafted this policy as SWNCC 257/25 on November 5.⁴⁹³ Even this policy encountered some resistance from State Department officials over perceived infringements upon their legal obligations. The Visa Division was initially opposed due to the belief that the new Paperclip program threatened to infringe on the authority of consuls to make independent decisions about the suitability of visa applicants, a responsibility stipulated by the Immigration Act of 1924.⁴⁹⁴ On November 18 Klaus wrote to Panuch, assuaging departmental fears about SWNCC 257/25 by assuring him that the document provided consuls with sufficient authority to retain independence.⁴⁹⁵ Shortly thereafter Hilldring was informed that congressmen reviewing immigration policy had recently expressed these same fears about preexamination to George Haering, the new Chief of the Visa Division. Haering subsequently suggested modifying the language of SWNCC 257/25 to reaffirm consular independence.⁴⁹⁶

In response to these concerns from within the State Department and from Congress, Hilldring amended the document to include the phrase “ultimate responsibility for determining the applicants eligibility for visas will, of course, remain with the consuls.”⁴⁹⁷ The SWNCC approved this new policy on December 9, 1947.⁴⁹⁸ However, action was still needed to ensure that the JCS had the formal authority to recommend the names of specialists to immigration services, and that once recommended, these specialists would be admissible under the American

⁴⁹³ Laney, *German Rocketeers*, 31; “SWNCC 257/25,” November 5, 1946, box 565, file: 1-D, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁴⁹⁴ Memo from Visa Division, “Comments on SWNCC Paper 257/25 and Enclosures,” November 7, 1946, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁹⁵ Memo from S Klaus to Panuch, “SWNCC Paper 257/25,” November 18, 1946, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁹⁶ Memo from J. W. Riddleberger to J. H. Hilldring, “Suggested Revisions in SWNCC 257/25,” November 22, 1946, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁹⁷ Memo from J. H. Hilldring to Secretary, SWNCC, November 27, 1946, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁹⁸ “Extract of Status of Papers,” December 10, 1946, box 565, file: 1-D, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

quota system. In mid-December, the State and Justice Departments moved to revise federal regulations to enable immigration through Paperclip by amending Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Section 61.313. Formally enacted on December 24, this revision allowed the issuance of First-priority nonpreference quota visas to immigrants “recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as persons whose admission is highly desirable in the national interest.”⁴⁹⁹

The revisions Paperclip underwent in late 1946 established the basic framework that the program would maintain until its procurement phase officially concluded on September 30, 1947.⁵⁰⁰ To the consternation of the military officers involved however, these changes did not immediately translate into a smooth and fast visa application procedure that was acceptable to the State Department. Some of the delay was caused by the need to develop new long-term contracts.⁵⁰¹ Although available in October 1946, these contracts were not finalized until January 1947.⁵⁰²

Agreeing upon new contracts proved to be just one of the roadblocks to immigration. Negotiations over the procedures to attain citizenship continued to flounder as State Department officials resisted compromising their legal obligations and risking public criticism. Truman’s approval of SWNCC 257/22 and the revision to immigration law in December had created a door

⁴⁹⁹ “Title 22: Foreign Relations, Chapter I: Department of State, Part 61: Visas: Documents Required of Aliens Entering the United States,” *Federal Register* 11, no 249 (December 24, 1946): 14611.

⁵⁰⁰ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 269.

⁵⁰¹ Memo from Thomas Ford to Director of Intelligence, “Exploitation of German and Austrian Specialists in Science and Technology in the United States,” November 22, 1946, box 4, file: Policy, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁵⁰² Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 721. Long-term contracts were restricted to specialists who had already been in the United States under six to twelve-month short-term contracts. New recruits were required to sign short-term contracts and would remain in temporary employment until they had proven their worth in the United States. After their short-term contract had expired specialists could sign the new long-term contract, which was roughly one year long and was renewable every June. Unlike short-term contracts, these included the option of citizenship, and enabled the families of specialists to join them in the United States. For more information on Paperclip contracts see Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 721; Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948*, 1566-1570.

to allow the specialists to obtain visas, but that door remained sealed by additional immigration regulations that the legal revisions had not addressed. The principle barrier was Title 22 CFR 58.53 that required the State Department to bar admittance to individuals “whose entry is deemed to be prejudicial to the public interest.”⁵⁰³ During this this period the United States had no formal peace treaty with Germany.⁵⁰⁴ Although it was pointed out that the law only explicitly targeted “anarchists and communists,” the phrasing of the legislation ensured that so long as the United States remained in a technical “state of war” with the Axis Powers, all members of the Nazi Party would be excluded by default.⁵⁰⁵ This regulation proved to be a thorn in the side of Paperclip’s policies, helping delay immigration for an additional year.⁵⁰⁶

The military departments faced additional pressure to acquire immigration visas during this time, as financial retrenchment began to impact their capacity to employ specialists.⁵⁰⁷ The United States entered a period of rapid demobilization, with the strength of the armed services dropping from 12 million at the end of World War II to 1.6 million in 1947.⁵⁰⁸ Defense spending also fell as Truman attempted to balance the federal budget while supporting domestic social programs. On January 12, 1946 Truman had announced plans to dramatically slash the national budget from a high of \$100 billion in 1945 down to \$67 billion in 1946 and \$36 billion in

⁵⁰³ “Title 22: Foreign Relations, Chapter I: Department of State, Part 58: Control of Persons Entering and Leaving the United States Pursuant to the Act of May 22, 1918, as Amended,” *Federal Register* 10, no 145 (July 21, 1945): 9000-9001; Memo from Mr. Knight, to Mr. Silver, June 12, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁰⁴ Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 457.

⁵⁰⁵ Memo from Silver to Mr. Robinson, “Paperclip,” July 2, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁰⁶ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 229; Memo from Hamilton Robinson to Bosquet Wev, April 6, 1947, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁵⁰⁷ “Outline for Briefing General Eisenhower on German Scientists Exploitation Program, 11 March 1947,” box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵⁰⁸ Kevin N. Lewis, *National Security Spending and Budget Trends Since World War II* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1990), 119, 122.

1947.⁵⁰⁹ Military spending mirrored this predicted drop, falling from \$83 billion during fiscal year 1945 to \$43 billion in 1946. Spending plummeted again in 1947, dropping to \$13 billion for the fiscal year.⁵¹⁰

Throughout this period of fiscal retrenchment, the expansion of American strategic commitments around the world placed strains on the military as “commitments outran capabilities.”⁵¹¹ Lasby argues that despite funding cutbacks, military research and development budgets remained high at over \$500 million by 1947.⁵¹² However, this funding was also spread out over multiple military departments and numerous research projects.⁵¹³ Seeking to cut expenses, the AAF even reduced \$29 million allocated to rocketry programs down to \$13 million by 1947, forcing a reduction in the number of research projects from twenty-eight to nineteen.⁵¹⁴

These funding cutbacks also impacted the army’s implementation of Paperclip. In mid-1946 and 1947 Army Ordnance was forced to abandon or downsize missile projects, and to reduce the number of specialists requested through Paperclip. In 1951 when Wernher von Braun reminisced about Paperclip, he criticized budgetary shortfalls he experienced while working for the military, comparing the financial retrenchment to “counting pennies.” Space historian Michael Neufeld even argues that the lack of work caused by this reduction in funding helped persuade von Braun to reach out to the American public to advocate for spaceflight.⁵¹⁵ In fact, in early 1947 Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower was informed “that, with the exception of the Air

⁵⁰⁹ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 70-73, 76; Harry Truman, “Message to the Congress on the State of the Union and the Budget for 1947,” Public Papers: Harry S. Truman 1945-1953, accessed February 20, 1947, <https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1460&st=&st1=>.

⁵¹⁰ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 393.

⁵¹¹ Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 179, 221-223.

⁵¹² Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 218-219.

⁵¹³ Neufeld, *Von Braun*, 219-220.

⁵¹⁴ Neufeld, *Ballistic Missiles*, 26.

⁵¹⁵ Neufeld, *Von Braun*, 219, 224.

Corps and Ordnance, none of the technical services of the War or Navy Departments would be able to pay from their 1947 or 1948 funds the cost of exploiting all the German scientists that they had requested.”⁵¹⁶

To make matters worse, what funding there was for research was not easily reallocated to help construct additional family housing.⁵¹⁷ Eisenhower was told that as a result of these housing and funding shortages, the arrival of families had been delayed until the end of 1946.⁵¹⁸ In addition, military agencies proved unwilling to assume the expense of recruiting specialists purely for denial purposes. Klaus angrily commented on this problem, writing that the navy’s JIOA representative “was pushing for denial by immigration without exploitation, because the Navy had no money to hire the specialists on the denial list.”⁵¹⁹ At a conference in April, 1947 Chamberlin admitted that when it came to recruiting specialists for denial, “we don’t have the money to pay them.”⁵²⁰ Hilldring also received a memo from a State Department official to this effect, informing him that thus far the military had only recruited specialists for exploitation, and that “because of reduced funds, they do not contemplate bringing in pure denial cases at their own expense.”⁵²¹

One solution to housing and budgetary shortages that allowed military departments to simultaneously deny specialists to other countries while avoiding the expense and difficulties

⁵¹⁶ “Outline for Briefing General Eisenhower on German Scientists Exploitation Program, 11 March 1947,” box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵¹⁷ Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948*, 1642-1643; “Outline for Briefing General Eisenhower on German Scientists Exploitation Program, 11 March 1947,” box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵¹⁸ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 220; “Outline for Briefing General Eisenhower on German Scientists Exploitation Program, 11 March 1947,” box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵¹⁹ Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 37; Memo for the Files, “JIOA Meeting,” June 18, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA German Scientists, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁵²⁰ “Notes on Conference Held 3 April 1947,” box 19, file: JIOA Meetings, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

⁵²¹ Memo to General Hilldring, “Recent Developments Affecting Paperclip,” April 4, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

associated with paying and housing them was “farming out” recruits to private industry.⁵²²

Chamberlin held an interagency conference on November 26, 1946 to address this issue, with the stated purpose of finding a “solution regarding the strain on military funds and housing.”⁵²³

Generals Curtis LeMay and Norris B. Harbold argued that although the Army Air Forces were refurbishing old facilities into housing units, space limitations made it necessary to transfer specialists to civilian employment, freeing space for new recruits.⁵²⁴ The Quartermaster and Signal Corps representatives stated that they were experiencing similar problems, and agreed that farming out specialists could be a possible solution.⁵²⁵

Preparations for providing temporarily salaries and housing for specialists until they could be transferred to civilian employment were subsequently discussed at a conference held on December 2, 1946.⁵²⁶ A final procedure for transferring specialists from military to civilian employment was finally established in April 1947, although it was not implemented until that December. Under the new procedure, as soon as a long-term contract neared its expiration date the specialist’s name would be sent to the Commerce Department, which would take action to

⁵²² “Notes on Conference Held 3 April 1947,” box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵²³ “Notes on Conference Between the Using Agencies, Air Forces, Budget Division, and Intelligence Division RE Further Action Necessary to Implement Project Paperclip,” November 26, 1946, box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵²⁴ “Major General Norris B. Harbold,” United States Air Force, accessed April 19, 2019, <https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Biographies/Display/Article/106845/major-general-norris-b-harbold/>; Memo from George McDonald to CG AMC, “Future Employment of German Scientists,” December 11, 1946, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1343-1345; “Notes on Conference Between the Using Agencies, Air Forces, Budget Division, and Intelligence Division RE Further Action Necessary To Implement Project Paperclip,” November 26, 1946, box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵²⁵ “Notes on Conference Between the Using Agencies, Air Forces, Budget Division, and Intelligence Division RE Further Action Necessary to Implement Project Paperclip,” November 26, 1946, box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵²⁶ Memo from M. J. Hagood to Director of Intelligence, “Proposed Procedure for Placing Alien Scientists on Payrolls of Private Concerns and Still Retaining Limited Military Custody,” December 5, 1946, box 989, file: August 30, 1946 to December 31, 1946, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

facilitate their entrance into civilian industry.⁵²⁷ Before specialists were eligible to transfer to civilian employment however, it appears that the dossiers containing their immigration paperwork needed to be submitted to the JIOA.⁵²⁸ This process was further hindered by the fact that all specialists lacking immigration visas had to remain in military custody while in the United States. As Chamberlin would argue in April 1947, it was preferable to wait until the specialist had received a visa before transferring them to civilian employment. A United States Air Force (USAF) report would later claim that this was a “principle obstacle” restricting civilian employment.⁵²⁹

Ironically, despite this reliance on civil industry as an avenue for denial, the Commerce Department’s own “national interest” initiative in SWNCC 257/5 does not appear to have survived the immigration and visa debate. Gimbel argues that even if it had wished to sponsor specialists, the Commerce Department lacked the capacity to investigate alien citizens. In addition, sponsorship of immigrants for select private companies would have opened the department up to accusations of favoritism.⁵³⁰ Instead, during the first years of Paperclip, Commerce Department officials appear to have limited themselves to their role under SWNCC

⁵²⁷ Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948*, 1581, 1621-1622; Memo from S. J. Chamberlin, “Procedure for Transfer of Alien Specialists from Military to Civilian Exploitation,” April 10, 1947, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055, 1420-1422.

⁵²⁸ Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948*, 1619; Memo from Douglas Eiseman to CG AMC, “Immigration of German Scientists and Technicians,” April 25, 1947, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2056, 155; Memo from Thomas Ford to F. C. Macken, “Information Required for Immigration of German Scientists,” April 14, 1947, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2056, 138.

⁵²⁹ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 747-748; “Notes on Conference Held 3 April 1947,” box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵³⁰ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 44.

257/22, recommending specialists for civilian industry and coordinating their transition from military employment.⁵³¹

Ultimately even these efforts to use civilian employment as a means of denial led military officials back to the need to reach a compromise with the State Department over visa applications. On February 24, 1947 Herbert Cummings of the State Department was given responsibility for reviewing immigration policy on Paperclip.⁵³² The next day Cummings summarized the State Department's obligations under Paperclip. He argued that the Office of Controls was, first and foremost, under an obligation to follow the law. It should not let itself get corralled by the military into compromising its second obligation, that of protecting domestic security. Although Cummings wrote that the level of support Paperclip was receiving from the upper levels of the government made immigration inevitable, any shortcomings or lapses in security investigations would "reflect not upon the War Department but on the State Department – both in the public mind and in the matter of ultimate legal responsibility."⁵³³ This pressure and sense of inevitability placed State Department officials in an impossible position. The only solution was to seek a way to implement Paperclip that simultaneously freed the department of any legal accountability.

The military officers on the JIOA do not appear to have appreciated the limitations legal responsibilities imposed on the State Department's freedom of action. The JIOA had submitted immigration dossiers for ten specialists in mid-1946 to test the immigration process, but these

⁵³¹ Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948*, 1621-1622; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 234; "SWNCC 257/22," August 24, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁵³² Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 256-257; "Phone Call Between Mr. Flinn and Maj. Schmedemann," February 24, 1947, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁵³³ Crim, *Our Germans*, 99; Memo from Herbert Cummings to Mr. Robinson, "CON's Responsibility in the German Scientists Program," February 25, 1947, box 95, Klaus Files, file: Relations with CON, RG 59, NARA.

had been rejected a few weeks later due to insufficient information.⁵³⁴ Although additional dossiers had since been submitted to Cummings, no specialist had yet received a visa when Klaus was confronted at a JIOA meeting on February 27 by angry military representatives.⁵³⁵ The officers pressured Klaus to promise State Department support for processing visa requests for specialists wanted for civilian employment, and Ford even threatened to speak to Congress if Klaus did not cooperate. He would not allow Klaus to see the names of the specialists desired for exploitation however, arguing that such “information was classified.”⁵³⁶

As journalist Linda Hunt suggests, this may have been to hide incriminating information about the specialists from the State Department.⁵³⁷ However, it is important to note that one JIOA representative later claimed that none of the members in attendance had been familiar with the individuals on the list.⁵³⁸ Indeed, Ford’s behavior may have simply been an attempt to bully Klaus into agreeing to circumvent immigration regulations. If this is the case, Ford failed in his efforts to expedite Paperclip. As a result of this confrontation Klaus refused to cooperate with the JIOA, arguing that the State Department would not blindly assume responsibility for specialists without vetting them first.⁵³⁹ These tensions created bad blood between the JIOA membership. In fact, many military officers were unhappy that the State Department was represented on JCS

⁵³⁴ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 45; Memo from Bosquet Wev to Captain G. A. Sinclair, September 20, 1946, box 4, file: Navy: Miscellaneous, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁵³⁵ Crim, *Our Germans*, 105; Memo from Cecil R. Welte to JIOA, “February Report, Exploitation Division,” March 4, 1947, box 8, file: Reports, Periodic, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA; Memo from Cecil R. Welte to JIOA, “March Report, Exploitation Division,” April 4, 1947, box 8, file: Reports, Periodic, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA; “Phone Call Between Mr. Flinn and Maj. Schmedemann,” February 24, 1947, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁵³⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 105-106; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 107-108; Memo for the File, “JIOA,” February 27, 1947, box 103, file: JIOA German Scientists, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁵³⁷ Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 107-109.

⁵³⁸ Crim, *Our Germans*, 74; Memo from MFC, July 9, 1947, box 993, file: Research File 2: 014.32, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵³⁹ Memo for the File, “JIOA,” February 27, 1947, box 103, file: JIOA German Scientists, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

organizations at all. One representative argued that the State Department should not be an equal member in military organizations but should merely be present in an advisory capacity, and Klaus later complained that the JIOA was giving the State Department “a complete run-around.”⁵⁴⁰

This intraorganizational conflict culminated in March 1947 when Klaus ceased representing the State Department on the JIOA. Although previous historians have framed Klaus’ departure as a forced reassignment, this appears to have been the consensual result of bureaucratic restructuring.⁵⁴¹ After the tense meeting in February, Klaus wrote to Special Assistant to the Secretary for Research and Intelligence William Eddy requesting that he facilitate the State Department’s withdrawal from the JIOA. Citing Ford’s reluctance to provide complete lists of specialists, Klaus argued that the military believed the State Department’s only role in Paperclip should be to blindly issue visas. He accused the military of attempting “to use the State Department as a shield to protect the military services in the event of legal or public criticism.”⁵⁴² Although the State Department was responsible for visa applications, their lack of control over the JIOA placed the department at risk of incurring “serious embarrassment.”⁵⁴³ This sentiment indicates Klaus’ concern regarding potential fallout over the State Department’s close affiliation with the military when implementing Paperclip. Disentangling the department

⁵⁴⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 104-105; Memo for File, “JIOA,” February 26, 1947, box 103, file: Withdrawal from JIOA, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; Memo for the Files, “JIOA Meeting,” July 12, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA German Scientists, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁴¹ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 256; Crim, *Our Germans*, 109; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 111, 123; Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 287.

⁵⁴² Memo from Mr. Klaus to Mr. Eddy, “JIOA,” March 3, 1947, box 103, file: Withdrawal from JIOA, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁴³ Department of State, *Register of the Department of State, December 1, 1946* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947), 2; Memo from Mr. Klaus to Mr. Eddy, “JIOA,” March 3, 1947, box 103, file: Withdrawal from JIOA, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

from compromising obligations was the first step to distancing the department from Paperclip in general.

Klaus' desire to leave the JIOA was shared by Ford, who complained to Chamberlin about Klaus' obstructionism. Ford argued that Klaus had failed to provide feasible and clear immigration requirements, and that he had shown open disapproval for the Paperclip program. Blaming Klaus for the State Department's delay processing immigration dossiers, Ford wrote that Klaus was too stringent in his interpretations of international agreements and security obligations. If these restrictive policies were not reinterpreted, it would be lucky if any Germans would qualify for immigration.⁵⁴⁴ Given Klaus' past observations that the military officials on the JIOA failed to understand or appreciate the authority of the State Department, it appears that general confusion and a clash of personalities poisoned the relationship between Klaus and the military membership of the JIOA.⁵⁴⁵

In early April 1947 the State Department finally withdrew from the JIOA, establishing an internal committee to process Paperclip visa applications. Avenues of communication remained however, thanks to the efforts of Cummings who served as a liaison officer between the Office of Controls and the JIOA.⁵⁴⁶ To the military's dismay, Cummings did not prove any more compromising than Klaus. The State Department's departure was an important step that officials took to distance themselves from Paperclip, but the action had done nothing to remove the

⁵⁴⁴ Memo from Thomas Ford to General Chamberlin, "Mr. Samuel Klaus, State Department Representative on Governing Committee, JIOA," March 13, 1947, box 993, file: Research File 2: 014.32, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵⁴⁵ Memo for the Files, "JIOA," July 23, 1946, Document DG 29, box 11, file: DG 2 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁴⁶ Memo from D. R. Welte to JIOA, "May Report, Exploitation Division," June 2, 1947, box 19, file: MS JIOA Reports, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC; Memo from Mr. Robinson to Mr. Peurifoy, "Operation Paperclip," July 18, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA; "Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 2c-266, The Pentagon, on Wednesday, 9 April 1947, at 1430," May 1, 1947, box 19, file: JIC-JCS Meetings, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

immediate legal concerns that had plagued Klaus' tenure with the JIOA. Although the JIOA submitted 24 dossiers to the State Department, these were all found to contain insufficient information and were subsequently returned.⁵⁴⁷ On April 4, 1947 Ford wrote to Hilldring to argue that the JIOA was merely following the procedures that had been established in 1946. Arguing that the specialists had been surveilled for over a year and were thus unlikely to constitute a security threat, Ford urged Hilldring to establish a final policy that clarified the information required for a complete immigration dossier. This would help speed the process of immigration and enable the armed services to facilitate "transfers to civilian employment... in the interests of governmental economy."⁵⁴⁸ Hilldring informed Ford that the Director of the Office of Controls Hamilton Robinson was compiling an outline for the JIOA to use when submitting dossiers.⁵⁴⁹

In his letter to the JIOA on April 9, Robinson attempted to reach an acceptable compromise. He indicated that many of the specialists who had been recruited had entered the United States before they had the chance to go through denazification procedures. In addition, there was often not enough information in the dossiers to provide the State Department with sufficient evidence to make a ruling on whether or not the specialists constituted a security threat to the United States. Robinson wrote that it would help the State Department if the JIOA arranged for investigations to be conducted into the specialists' personal lives in Germany, and to ensure that applications included biographical profiles along with lists and explanations of all

⁵⁴⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 74; Memo from K. M. Schmedemann to JIOA, "Report on Conference with Mr. Cummings, Department of State, Concerning Immigration Dossiers," April 10, 1947, box 9, file: Department of State (Misc) From January 1947 through December 1947, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁵⁴⁸ Memo from Thomas Ford to J. H. Hilldring, "Immigration Procedure for German and Austrian Scientists Brought to the United States under Project Paperclip," box 9, file: Department of State (Misc) January 1947 through December 1947, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁵⁴⁹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 99; Memo from J. H. Hilldring, to Colonel Ford, April 8, 1947, box 9, file: Department of State (Misc) January 1947 through December 1947, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

political affiliations.⁵⁵⁰ In a response, the JIOA informed Cummings that in many cases the requested information was unavailable. Cummings responded by arguing that many State Department officials felt they had an obligation to ensure that the immigration applications they received contained all the information available. Although the State Department was working to establish a smooth immigration procedure, it needed to publicly justify any visas that were granted.⁵⁵¹

Concerns over Paperclip's publicity during this period also prompted the military to conduct an overall review in early March. Of particular concern was a recent news report by journalist Drew Pearson revealing that the United States had attempted to hire Karl Krauch, an industrialist awaiting trial at Nuremburg for war crimes. Pearson appears to have been partially correct. Although Krauch's name was on a JIOA recruitment list and a letter had been sent to his last known residence to confirm his address, he had never been offered a contract.⁵⁵² Nevertheless, on March 11 and 12 Chamberlin and the War Department leadership briefed Eisenhower on the history and dynamics of Paperclip, winning the Chief of Staff's continued support for the program.⁵⁵³

Despite this affirmation, as a result of these meetings War Department officials determined that the procurement phase of Paperclip during which specialists were actively

⁵⁵⁰ Memo from Hamilton Robinson to Colonel Ford, April 9, 1947, box 9, file: Department of State (Misc) January 1947 through December 1947, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁵⁵¹ Memo from K. M. Schmedemann to JIOA, "Report on Conference with Mr. Cummings, Department of State, Concerning Immigration Dossiers," April 10, 1947, box 9, file: Department of State (Misc) January 1947 through December 1947, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁵⁵² Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 255; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 113; Memo from COMGENUSFET to War Department, March 13, 1947, box 5, file: Chapter 3 Press, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC; Memo from War Department, to COMGENUSFET, March 11, 1947, box 5, file: Chapter 3 Press, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

⁵⁵³ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 255; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 220; "The High Points of Conferences on Paperclip," box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

recruited in Europe should conclude on June 30, 1947.⁵⁵⁴ On March 19, 1947 the SWNCC drafted SWNCC 257/29, a revision that intended to formalize the procedures for civilian employment while establishing June 30 as the end date for procurement. Clarifying that Paperclip had always been considered an “urgent interim measure,” the SWNCC explained that it was preferable to conclude the procurement phase “on or before the end of the present fiscal year (30 June, 1947).”⁵⁵⁵ This deadline was later extended to September 30, 1947 after the AAF argued that it needed time to finish transporting forty specialists to the United States.⁵⁵⁶ A safeguard was subsequently established in the form of an escape clause, allowing specialists to be brought to the United States for either exploitation or denial after September 30 “on a case by case basis.”⁵⁵⁷ Once the procurement phase came to an end, all that was left would be to ensure that those specialists who had been recruited by the United States remained in the country as American citizens.

There are numerous reasons why the procurement phase came to a formal conclusion on September 30, and there is likely no one answer that explains the War Department’s decision. Historian Tom Bower argues that negative publicity towards Paperclip was rising in March 1947. This prompted military officials like Special Assistant Dean Rusk to inform Peterson that Paperclip should be limited in scale to ensure that the military, State Department, and the president could provide the program with their full support without having to justify questionable

⁵⁵⁴ Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948*, 1536; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 220; “Outline for Briefing General Eisenhower on German Scientists Exploitation Program, 11 March 1947,” box 994, file: Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵⁵⁵ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 220; “SWNCC 257/29,” March 19, 1947, box 565, file: 1-D, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁵⁵⁶ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 268.

⁵⁵⁷ “The Paperclip Project: Its Concept, Implementation, and Control,” January 30, 1959, box 2674, Publication “P” Files, RG 319, NARA, 16; “SWNCC 257/35,” August 1, 1947, box 566, file: 1-E, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

recruitment decisions.⁵⁵⁸ In addition, potential returns would diminish the longer Paperclip recruited specialists. As the SWNCC wrote, “the prolonged continuance of this project nullifies the reason for which it was designed.”⁵⁵⁹ Adding further incentive was the fact that Fiscal Year 1947 concluded in June. Since military officers were expecting funding cuts for Fiscal Year 1948, they may well have hoped to tie up budgetary loose ends.⁵⁶⁰ Significantly, June 30, 1947 was also the date when the United States concluded its efforts to find and extract technological knowledge and reparations from Germany through the Field Information Agency Technical (FIAT) organization.⁵⁶¹

The decision to terminate Paperclip was made within the context of larger shifts in American foreign policy that would help define the Cold War. Even as Eisenhower was being briefed on Paperclip, Truman was giving a speech that would become known as the Truman Doctrine. This new policy called for using American economic and military power to contain the spread of communism around the world. Although not an open-ended commitment, this initiative promised to further strain the United States’ budget and resources, a fact that Eisenhower knew well. The resurrection of a defeated Europe emerged as the most important and immediate priority within this context. In January 1947 George Marshall had been named Secretary of State, and in early June he became the face of the Marshall Plan, an economic aid program designed to stabilize Europe and counter communist influence.⁵⁶²

⁵⁵⁸ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 252, 255-256.

⁵⁵⁹ “SWNCC 257/29,” March 19, 1947, box 565, file: 1-D, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁵⁶⁰ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 220; “SWNCC 257/29,” March 19, 1947, box 565, file: 1-D, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁵⁶¹ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 131-132.

⁵⁶² Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 145-147, 156-159, 174.

These foreign policy changes reflected a reorientation away from denazification, with many Americans instead perceiving Germany to be a potential ally in the struggle against communism. Achieving economic stability in Germany emerged as a primary objective for American occupation forces eager to end the expensive policy of supporting the German population.⁵⁶³ Clay had already halted reparations in May 1946, arguing that they caused unnecessary damage to the German economy. He supported extending this protection by halting all American exploitation efforts in Germany. Although there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Clay's arguments played a significant role in the decision to terminate recruitment through Paperclip, after the official procurement phase had ended, Clay proved reluctant to release additional specialists to the United States for fear that their loss would damage the German economy.⁵⁶⁴ Conversely, Lasby argues that this changing geopolitical landscape helped solidify the United States government's commitment to retaining those Paperclip specialists who were already in the United States.⁵⁶⁵ As permanent immigrants, specialists could continue to aid in the struggle against communism while promoting American economic and military strength.

The target of this American power changed as well, fluctuating in response to the developing Cold War. Although Paperclip had been originally conceived as a way to deny Axis specialists to all other countries, the emerging threat of the Soviet Union began to blur these boundaries, as hatred of fascism became replaced by the fear of communism. In late 1946 the JIOA even suggested establishing a policy to allow German specialists to immigrate to Latin

⁵⁶³ Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 151-152, 155, 283, 505-506; Merritt, *Democracy Imposed*, 68-69.

⁵⁶⁴ Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 122, 129-133; Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 117-118; "Minutes of JIOA Meeting," November 21, 1947, box 994, file Research Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵⁶⁵ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 213.

America using the same selection process as the American Paperclip program.⁵⁶⁶ The State Department was initially reluctant to support this expansion, and Hilldring and wrote to Acheson that since Paperclip had been conceived as a military operation, the standards that were being used were not suitable for immigration into Latin America.⁵⁶⁷ By early 1947 however, the JIC submitted a report to the JCS arguing that it was “in the national interest” for the United States to allow the immigration of German specialists to “Brazil and other allied nations of the Western Hemisphere.”⁵⁶⁸

This represents an important shift in the stated objectives of Paperclip. Recruitment was now a means of denying specialists to countries that were “potentially hostile to the United States,” rather than simply all other countries besides the United States and Britain, a policy that pointedly targeted the Soviet Union.⁵⁶⁹ The JIC stated that the services of specialists could benefit many American allies “in the defense of the Western Hemisphere,” demonstrating the increasingly bipolar power structure defining the Cold War.⁵⁷⁰ The SWNCC disapproved of this revision however and instead advocated reviewing applications made by Latin American countries on a “case by case basis.”⁵⁷¹ Despite this setback, it appears that by 1948 an agreement had been established between Britain and the United States to enable “Third Countries” to recruit specialists whose loss would not damage national security, and who were not deemed vital to

⁵⁶⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 96-97; Memo from Mr. Braden to Mr. Klaus, “JIOA 1/14: Exploitation of German Scientists by Other American Republics,” December 3, 1946, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁶⁷ Crim, *Our Germans*, 96-97; Memo from J. H. Hilldring to Mr. Acheson, “Comments of Mr. Braden and Mr. Klaus on JIOA 1/14 and Related Matters,” January 6, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁶⁸ “SWNCC 257/28,” March 14, 1947, box 565, file: 1-D, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁵⁶⁹ Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 6; “SWNCC 257/21/D,” August 21, 1946, box 565, file: 1-C, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA; SWNCC 257/28,” March 14, 1947, box 565, file: 1-D, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁵⁷⁰ Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 132; SWNCC 257/28,” March 14, 1947, box 565, file: 1-D, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

⁵⁷¹ “JCS 1363/41,” June 17, 1947, box 566, file: 1-E, ABC Files 1940-1948, RG 165, NARA.

Germany's economic recovery.⁵⁷² These changes thus not only demonstrate a shift in basic perceptions of the United States' role in the world, but also manner in which national security concerns both motivated and restricted new policies.

Although these political and economic changes placed pressure on the military and the State Department to reach an agreement, they did little to speed the processing of visa applications.⁵⁷³ In the summer of 1947, the State Department came under fire from congressmen angry about this delay. Although originally worried about receiving congressional criticism over their support of Paperclip, the State Department, and Klaus in particular, now found themselves targeted by accusations of obstructionism.⁵⁷⁴ During the summer of 1947 at a meeting of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, Senator Joseph Ball and Senator Styles Bridges both accused Klaus of delaying Paperclip, consequently allowing the Soviet Union time to recruit specialists.⁵⁷⁵ This congressional inquiry served as an opportunity for military officers such as Ford and JIOA Chairman Bosquet Wev to throw fuel on the fire by attacking Klaus and the State Department for obstructionism.⁵⁷⁶ When Navy Captain Wyman Packard contacted Wev years

⁵⁷² Crim, *Our Germans*, 97; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 151; Memo from R. D. Wentworth to C. R. Welte, "European Command Policy for Handling Requests on Governmental Level from United States, United Kingdom, and from Third Countries for German Scientists, Engineers, and Technicians," box 14, file: Interoffice Correspondence, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁵⁷³ This period also brought significant changes to the structure of American military and intelligence organizations when, in July 1947, the United States government implanted the National Security Act of 1947. Although new departments such as the United States Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency were created, these bureaucratic changes took place over the course of two years and did not immediately impact the Paperclip program. The most noticeable change occurred in November 1947, when the SWNCC was re-designated the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC). See Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948*, 1516-1517; Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 175-176; "Records of Interservice Agencies," National Archives and Records Administration, accessed February 20, 2018, <https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/334.html>.

⁵⁷⁴ Crim, *Our Germans*, 163; "German Scientists Program," July 17, 1947, box 103, file: JIOA Reports by S Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁷⁵ "Memo for the File," July 1, 1947, box 105, file: Files of Samuel Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; Wyman H. Packard, "Technical Information," in *A Century of US Naval Intelligence* (Washington DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 1996), 165.

⁵⁷⁶ "Analysis of Extension of Remarks of Congressman Busby in Congressional Record, March 25, 1948, Page A 1982ff," box 105, file: Files of Samuel Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; Crim, *Our Germans*, 99-101, 109-110,

later, Wev claimed that his testimony had prompted the subcommittee to withhold appropriations from the State Department until a compromise with the military had been reached.⁵⁷⁷ There is no evidence that State Department appropriations were withheld due to these testimonies, and the specific stipulations of these congressional threats are unknown. However, these hearings took place within the context of broader attacks against the State Department over perceived communist sympathies.

This criticism predated testimony on Paperclip, and even in 1946 Congress had ordered the State Department to fire all “disloyal employees.”⁵⁷⁸ By 1947, newly empowered Republicans warned that the American government had been infiltrated by communists, accusing the Truman Administration of fostering disloyalty among government employees.⁵⁷⁹ Klaus was portrayed as “working in the Communist cause,” and Senator Bridges claimed that sixty-two employees remained employed by the State Department over the objections of the Senate.⁵⁸⁰ One memo even accused “the administration of Dean Acheson,” with attempting “not only to protect Communist personnel in high places, but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity.”⁵⁸¹

This confrontation was highly demoralizing for State Department officials. After a grueling session before the Senate Appropriations Committee Eddy complained to Klaus that “he didn’t know why any of us worked for the Government if we were to be submitted to this kind of

163-164; “Memorandum for the File,” July 1, 1947, box 105, file: files of Samuel Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁷⁷ “Memorandum,” July 9, 1947, box 105, file: Files of Samuel Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; Packard, “Technical Information,” 165, 169.

⁵⁷⁸ Hove, *History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security*, 79.

⁵⁷⁹ Hogan, *Cross of Iron*, 253-255; Hove, *History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security*, 86-87.

⁵⁸⁰ “Memorandum,” July 22, 1947, box 105, file: Files of Samuel Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; “Memorandum,” July 22, 1947, box 96, file: Miscellaneous, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁸¹ *Congressional Record*, 81st Congress, 2d sess., 1950, 96, pt. 8: 10806.

treatment.”⁵⁸² This conflict spilled out into the public on July 18 when Senator Bridges went on *Meet the Press* to condemn the States Department for creating a bureaucratic “roadblock” that had enabled the Soviet Union to recruit German specialists in “jet propulsion, [and] the development of rockets and missiles,” as well as “some of the best men they had on germ warfare.”⁵⁸³ These official and public attacks only impressed upon State Department officials the need for an imminent solution to the visa dilemma. A July 18 memo from Robinson to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John Peurifoy claimed that the State Department was experiencing “pressures from the military authorities and Congress to expedite the regularization of the status of these scientists.”⁵⁸⁴ The only way to resolve this acrimony would be for the State Department “to take positive measures to resolve this impasse.”⁵⁸⁵

This impasse between the military and the State Department began to clear that summer, even as this congressional testimony was being given. Many of the officials responsible for issuing immigration visas were under pressure to either relax State Department regulations or to step out of the way. Indeed, as a representative from the Office of Controls made clear to the JIOA at a May meeting, immigration visas were the only viable option for retaining the specialists in the United States on a permanent basis. However, at the present time these could not be issued unless the JIOA submitted immigration dossiers with sufficient information to allow the State Department to defend itself on any “borderline cases.”⁵⁸⁶ The only alternative

⁵⁸² “Memorandum,” July 11, 1947, box 105, file: Files of Samuel Klaus, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁸³ Crim, *Our Germans*, 163; “Extract of Interview of Senator Bridges on “Meet The Press,” July 19, 1947, box 5, file: Chapter 3 Press, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

⁵⁸⁴ Memo from Mr. Robinson to Mr. Peurifoy, “Operation Paperclip,” July 18, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA; Hove, *History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security*, 84.

⁵⁸⁵ Memo from Mr. Robinson to Mr. Peurifoy, “Operation Paperclip,” July 18, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁸⁶ Memo from C. R. Welte to Director, JIOA, “Notes on Conference with Miss Rebecca Wellington, Office of Controls, Department of State,” box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

that presented itself was the possibility of changing immigration regulations to exempt the State Department from legal responsibility for security.

On June 12, Solomon Silver with the Office of Controls and George Knight from the State Department's Legal Office prepared an olive branch for the military in an attempt to accomplish this task. Knight suggested that Silver inform the War Department that although SWNCC 257/25 had allowed the JCS certification to serve as "presumptive evidence" that the specialists posed no security threat, it was not "conclusive" evidence. As a result, the State Department had been forced to insist on additional security regulations, exemplified by Robinson's April 9 letter. If these were too strenuous and unfeasible, Section 58.53 of the Code of Federal Regulations could be revised "to exempt from the Section those aliens who are in the United States under the Paperclip Project," provided they still received security certifications from the JCS.⁵⁸⁷ This would effectively remove the State Department from any legal obligation to screen the specialists for security purposes.

Silver subsequently repeated this idea to Robinson, writing that unless the State Department made a substantive change that allowed it to overlook "past political affiliations," it would be unlikely that any specialists would be allowed to immigrate so long as "war-time visa regulations" like 22 CFR 58.53 remained on the books.⁵⁸⁸ Robinson agreed that this was necessary, and wrote that many State Department officials acknowledged that retaining specialists in the United States was in the interest of "national security."⁵⁸⁹ To many in the State Department it seemed that this solution would enable immigration through Paperclip to proceed

⁵⁸⁷ Memo from Mr. Knight to Mr. Silver, June 12, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁸⁸ Memo from Silver to Mr. Robinson, "Paperclip," July 2, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁸⁹ Memo from Mr. Robinson to Mr. Peurifoy, "Operation Paperclip," July 18, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

in the interest of national security while simultaneously allowing them to avoid direct responsibility. Informing Peurifoy that this policy would facilitate the implementation of Paperclip by enabling Nazis to achieve citizenship, Robinson also warned that these actions risked negative publicity. It was worth the risk however, because it would successfully circumvent visa regulations by passing responsibility for determining the security threat of a specialist to the military.⁵⁹⁰ Hilldring's subordinate Ben O'Sullivan supported this reasoning and argued that although the State Department had wished to speed the immigration process, the lack of available security information created a dilemma. The best solution would be to simply allow the JCS to determine a specialist's security credentials and to accept their recommendation without further debate.⁵⁹¹

At a June meeting attended by Hilldring and Robinson, State Department officials agreed to pursue this policy option, and in July brought this solution to the attention of the War, Navy, and Justice Departments.⁵⁹² Attorney General Tom Clark conveyed his approval but wished to discuss the practical changes with the State Department in more detail.⁵⁹³ In preparation for an agreement, Hilldring wrote to the SWNCC at the end of July to inform them of these proposed changes to regulations.⁵⁹⁴ These discussions culminated when Marshall contacted Clark to gain

⁵⁹⁰ Memo from Mr. Robinson to Mr. Peurifoy, "Operation Paperclip," July 8, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁹¹ Memo for the Files, "German Scientists," October 9, 1946, box 103, file: JIOA German Scientists, Klaus Files, RG 59, NARA; Memo from M. L. F., July 25, 1947, box 993, file: Research File 2: 014.32, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵⁹² Memo from M. L. F., July 25, 1947, box 993, file: Research File 2: 014.32, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; Memo from Mr. Merrill Tribe to Mr. George Knight, "Paperclip," box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁹³ Memo from M. L. F., July 25, 1947, box 993, file: Research File 2: 014.32, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁵⁹⁴ Memo from J. H. Hilldring to SWNCC, "Clarification of Present SWNCC Policy of Civil Exploitation of German and Austrian Specialists in the United States," July 31, 1947, box 6795, Central Decimal File, 862.542, RG 59, NARA.

an official confirmation that the Justice Department would support this policy revision.⁵⁹⁵

Having confronted the specter of communist expansion during a recent trip to China, Marshall remained committed to limiting the growth of Soviet power. A supporter of exploitation, he feared the consequences should the Soviet Union absorb the resources and personnel of “Western Europe and Western Germany.”⁵⁹⁶

The USAF had also contacted Clark seeking to secure Justice Department cooperation. The USAF representative argued that the State Department’s strict adherence to immigration law had delayed Paperclip, but that any further roadblocks would damage the American rocket program. Repatriating specialists back to Germany where they could accept offers of employment with the Soviet Union would be a blow to American research efforts and a critical threat to national security.⁵⁹⁷ Marshall wrote to Secretary of War Kenneth Royall on August 12, confirming the State Department’s intention to revise immigration regulations, producing what Gimbel describes as “the first break in the *Paperclip* logjam.”⁵⁹⁸ These communications preceded interdepartmental conferences on September 26 and October 1 at which representatives from all the involved departments sought to reach a final agreement on immigration.⁵⁹⁹

It was at the third conference, held on October 2, 1947, that almost two and a half years of bureaucratic conflict was finally resolved. Surprisingly, the Justice Department argued that

⁵⁹⁵ Memo from G. C. Marshall to Kenneth C. Royall, August 12, 1947, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁵⁹⁶ Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 126-128, 169-170, 191.

⁵⁹⁷ “Department of Justice Involvement in ‘Operation Paperclip’ and the Space Program,” Records of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, RG 255, National Archives at Atlanta, <https://www.archives.gov/atlanta/exhibits/item452-exh.html>.

⁵⁹⁸ John Gimbel, “German Scientists,” 443, 460; Memo from G. C. Marshall to Kenneth C. Royall, August 12, 1947, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁵⁹⁹ “Department of Justice Involvement in ‘Operation Paperclip’ and the Space Program,” Records of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, RG 255, National Archives at Atlanta, <https://www.archives.gov/atlanta/exhibits/item452-exh.html>; Gimbel, “German Scientists,” 460-461; Memo from Clingerman to Colonel McCoy, “Immigration Visa for ‘Paperclip Specialists,’” October 15, 1947, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2056, 337-338.

revisions to immigration law were unnecessary. Instead, after the JCS certified that the specialist was in the national interest, the Justice Department would provide its own security certification. The specialists would then be preexamined to certify that they were legally admissible as immigrants.⁶⁰⁰ This was not a substantial change in policy, since the FBI was already responsible for submitting a security report on each specialist to be included in their immigration dossier.⁶⁰¹ In fact, it is likely that Justice Department representatives agreed to this compromise due to the fact that, as Special Assistant to the Attorney General Heather Graham Morison claimed, their own legal responsibilities centered around defending “the internal security of the United States.”⁶⁰² FBI Director John Edgar Hoover himself argued that the FBI was “primarily responsible” for defending “the internal security of this country.”⁶⁰³ While State Department and military officials had bickered over the technicalities of immigration law, it had been easy for Justice Department representatives to maintain “a most cooperative attitude” when dealing with the JIOA.⁶⁰⁴ Once it became clear that, one way or another, the specialists were in the United States to stay, the Justice Department quickly moved to assert its influence on the immigration process.

The State Department agreed to accept any rulings the military and Justice Department made regarding both the security threat posed by the specialists and their potential value to the

⁶⁰⁰ Memo from Hamilton Robinson to Bosquet Wev, April 6, 1947, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA; Memo from John Peurifoy to W. Stuart Symington, April 7, 1948, box 993, file: Research File 2: 014.32, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA.

⁶⁰¹ Buyer and Jensen, *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, 745.

⁶⁰² Memo from Walter J. Rozamus to JIOA, “Immigration of paperclip Specialists,” October 16, 1947, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁶⁰³ Memo from Director FBI to H. Graham Morison, “German Specialists and Scientists in the United States Under the Protective Custody of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency,” November 6, 1947, box 19, file: MS FBI, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

⁶⁰⁴ Memo from Bosquet Wev to S. J. Chamberlin, “Delays Encountered in the Department of Justice in Processing the Immigration into the United States of German Scientists,” April 27, 1947, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

United States. Upon receiving a positive confirmation that a specialist should be allowed to immigrate, the State Department would coordinate the specialist's visa application appointment with the appropriate consulate and supply a recommendation from the Secretary of State stating that their immigration was critical both to "the national security" and "the national interest" of the United States.⁶⁰⁵ As Robinson implied when responding to Wev's inquiries into future standards for immigration dossiers, this agreement relaxed the security requirements imposed by the State Department by placing the impetus on the military instead.⁶⁰⁶ This policy allowed officials in the State Department to successfully circumvent their legal obligations, avoiding responsibility for certifying that former Nazis posed no security threat to the United States while remaining ostensibly faithful to the letter of the law. Significantly, by surrendering responsibility to the military and the Justice Department, the State Department effectively reinterpreted their obligations to analyze the specialists' security records while simultaneously granting the military exclusive authority to define national security within the context of Paperclip.

The State Department also pushed to reinterpret its commitment to consular independence. On January 18, 1948 Marshall instructed all American consuls that when examining a visa applicant's past political affiliations, they should avoid making hasty decisions based on the wording of security regulations. Instead, they should examine "all facts in each case" as well as the applicant's current actions to determine if there was a genuine security risk in admitting them to the United States.⁶⁰⁷ Several specialists were subsequently selected as test

⁶⁰⁵ "Proposed Procedures with Respect to the Entry into this United States for Residence of Aliens Certified as Persons Whose Admission is Highly Desirable in the National Interest," box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁶⁰⁶ Memo from Hamilton Robinson to Bosquet Wev, April 6, 1947, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁶⁰⁷ Memo from Marshall to All Diplomatic and Consular Offices, January 19, 1948, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

cases to establish legal precedence. This would provide the JIOA with a stable and clear immigration procedure while allowing the remaining specialists to become American citizens.⁶⁰⁸ The number of specialists in the United States under Paperclip had more than doubled since the start of 1946, amounting to roughly 483. By March 1948 about 150 had been specifically selected as potential immigrants.⁶⁰⁹ The first test-case was aeronautical engineer Heinz Schmitt. After completing preexamination in the United States he proceeded to the consulate in Niagara Falls, where he received his long-awaited visa on April 7, 1948.⁶¹⁰

Despite this progress the immigration process was still slow during 1948, although it appears that at this point the primary source of the delay was the Justice Department. Although the Justice Department received dossiers for 70 of the recommended specialists, by April 30, 1948 these had yet to be processed, a delay that was blamed on the FBI's own security requirements.⁶¹¹ The full extent of the Justice Department's relationship with the military is not the subject of this study. However, it appears that once the hurdles imposed by the State Department had been cleared, Wev and Chamberlin were able to successfully win FBI support for Paperclip. This support was by no means guaranteed. In November 1947 Hoover wrote that

⁶⁰⁸ Gimbel, "German Scientists," 461-462; Memo from Bosquet Wev to Edward Shaughnessy, February 10, 1948, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA; Memo from Bosquet Wev to JIOA, "Documents to be Presented by German Specialists when appearing before Consular and Immigration Officials," December 12, 1947, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁶⁰⁹ "Gist of Proposed reply to Congressman Fulton," box 994, file: Unlabeled, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; Memo from Bosquet Wev to JIOA, "Recommendation of German Specialists for Immigration," March 17, 1948, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁶¹⁰ Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 229; Memo from Bosquet Wev to Edward Shaughnessy, February 10, 1948, box 2, file: Immigration Diary, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

⁶¹¹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 107-108; Memo from A. R. Bolling, "Immigration of Paperclip Specialists," April 16, 1948, box 992, file: Research 014.32 Undated, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; Memo from C. R. W. to JIOA, "April Report, Exploitation Division," April 30, 1948, box 14, file: Interoffice Correspondence, JIOA General Correspondence, RG 330, NARA.

individuals who participated in Nazi affiliated organizations constituted a security threat and should be prohibited from attaining citizenship status.⁶¹²

Hoover later reversed his position, although there is little detailed evidence as to why he made this decision. The explanation that is most frequently used is that Hoover and Chamberlin reached an agreement during a meeting in the summer of 1948. At this meeting Chamberlin claimed that Hoover “readily agreed that the program appeared to be of the greatest importance to national security and to the national interests,” and subsequently agreed to expedite FBI security investigations of the specialists.⁶¹³ Hoover “indicated that he was not disturbed because of Nazi affiliations,” and that he instead perceived communism to be the primary security concern.⁶¹⁴ Ultimately it was Hoover’s cooperation that helped remove this last hurdle to immigration. By October when a JIOA report submitted to Chamberlin announced that several specialists had received visas, it credited these results to his productive meeting with Hoover.⁶¹⁵ However, it could just as easily have given credit to the countless hours of work that military and State Department officials had committed to seeking an acceptable compromise on the issue of immigration visas.

Since its establishment in 1945, Paperclip was a focal point for conflict between the military and the State Department. Although the American military pushed for an expedited

⁶¹² Crim, *Our Germans*, 107; Memo from Director FBI to H. Graham Morison, “German Specialists and Scientists in the United States Under the Protective Custody of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency,” November 6, 1947, box 19, file: MS FBI, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

⁶¹³ Crim, *Our Germans*, 107-109; Memo from S. J. Chamberlin to George McDonald and Thomas Inglis, “German Scientists Program,” May 11, 1948, box 19, file: MS FBI, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

⁶¹⁴ Memo from S. J. Chamberlin to George McDonald and Thomas Inglis, “German Scientists Program,” May 11, 1948, box 19, file: MS FBI, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

⁶¹⁵ Memo from Montee Cone to Director of Intelligence, “Progress Report: Immigration of Paperclip Specialists,” October 19, 1948, box 19, file: MS FBI, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

program to accomplish its objective of perpetuating American technological superiority, the State Department operated within the confines of immigration laws. This commitment to legal responsibilities restricted the State Department's policy options while increasing the risk of potential criticism. Although the military and the State Department cooperated on major policy decisions on Paperclip, the officials implementing Paperclip were forced to balance conflicting bureaucratic prerogatives and objectives. As a result, while military officers pushed to speed to process of immigration visas and to hastily transport Axis specialists into the United States, State Department officials remained firmly entrenched in their commitment to processing visas according to the requirements stipulated by immigration law. As a result, although an agreement to facilitate recruitment through Paperclip was reached in September 1946 and immigration law was changed at the end of that same year, State Department officials remained trapped by a tyranny of legal technicalities. It was only after several bitter months that a legal solution was developed placing full responsibility for security investigations onto the military and Justice Department. Paperclip may have developed as a temporary reparations program, but its evolution illustrates the perpetual conflict between laws and orders, and the way in which national security policies shape and are in turn shaped by legal traditions and civilian bureaucracy.

CONCLUSION

The evolution of Project Paperclip from a temporary exploitation program into a comprehensive immigration program represents an important point in the development of the American national security state. An examination of Paperclip illustrates the motivations driving the United States government to retain technological supremacy as an essential component to the perpetuation of American military and economic power. Paperclip proved to be a nebulous program that ultimately revised and redefined immigration regulations while uniting the American military and State Department through a shared commitment to the pursuit of national security through skilled immigration. The bureaucratic conflict between the State Department and military officers implementing Paperclip demonstrates some of the barriers that restricted this vision. The evolution of Paperclip further reflects larger narratives about the origins of the Cold War, and the resulting paradigm shift as fear towards communism and the Soviet Union pushed the United States to seek allies amongst former enemies.

During World War II the United States cooperated with Britain to seize and exploit captured German technology. These exploitation efforts continued after the fighting in Europe had ended, as the Allies attempted to extract “intellectual reparations” from a defeated Germany.⁶¹⁶ Although American military officers supported the use of captured German equipment, many also argued that even greater benefits could be gained if the United States exploited the specialists who had developed this technology. The ongoing war against Japan provided a strong justification for this recruitment, and supporters argued that German technology could be used to achieve victory in the Pacific. However, an important secondary objective was the possibility that these specialists could promote the long-term development of

⁶¹⁶ Office of Technical Services Director John Green, quoted in Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations*, 28.

military technology in the United States. Although commercial interests were also at play and many businesses saw potential profit from employing these specialists, the early program focused primarily on the pursuit of military technology in the interests of national security. As a result of this support, the War Department established Project Overcast in mid-1945 to recruit 350 specialists for temporary employment in the United States. World War II ended shortly thereafter, before the newly recruited specialists had a chance to arrive. Despite these developments, the implementation of Overcast continued, and the pursuit of military technology in the interests of national security quickly became the primary objective. This illustrates how the exploitation of Axis personnel easily merged with military research programs and the growing Military Industrial Complex, helping to establish technological superiority as a critical element of American power.

Overcast received early but qualified support from State Department officials. This interdepartmental cooperation was facilitated by the program's stipulation that the specialists would remain in military custody, ostensibly accomplishing many of the State Department's own objectives that called for restricting German technological development while controlling the movement of potentially dangerous personnel. This demonstrates that there was an initial consensus within the American government that the recruitment of Axis specialists was beneficial to national security, but also indicates that the State Department's support was granted within the framework of their legal obligations. When Overcast expanded to include the prospect of immigration, this consensus began to fracture as resistance within the State Department grew.

Numerous factors contributed to the decision to reform Overcast into an immigration program, reflecting the evolution of post-World War II national security imperatives. As the United States adjusted to accept its new role as a dominant nation in the world, technological

superiority emerged as a critical objective to ensure the perpetuation of American power. As a result, the United States needed a pool of skilled personnel to staff research programs and to strengthen the nation. The Soviet Union emerged as the primary contender for power during this period. American officials feared the consequences should Soviet recruitment programs allow them to achieve technological parity with the United States. French recruitment efforts posed an additional problem, threatening to deprive the United States of the opportunity to recruit valuable personnel. Anxious to deny specialists to other countries while simultaneously promoting the long-term technological development of the United States, the American military and State Department agreed to expand Overcast in March 1946. Now called Paperclip, this expanded program ostensibly allowed specialists to work for civilian industry while enabling their permanent immigration under established law.

Tensions grew as these changes placed more responsibility on the State Department, the bureaucracy responsible for approving immigration visas. The State Department insisted that all potential immigrants had to be eligible for citizenship under regular immigration law. The visa procedures the State Department issued proved to be difficult for the military to fulfill however, due to the shortage of investigative personnel in Europe and the questionable backgrounds of the specialists. The State Department's uncompromising adherence to this policy reflected not only their commitment to controlling German scientific research, but also their legal responsibility to operate within the boundaries of immigration law. Shoring up these convictions was the fear that the State Department would become the target of recriminations from the American public and Congress should any undesirable aliens receive immigration visas. Although the State Department was accused of obstructionism, it was the military's own shortage of family housing that slowed the recruitment and transportation of specialists to the United States. This

controversy illustrates how bureaucratic politics and competing obligations shaped the postwar pursuit of American national security objectives and demonstrates some of the practical limitations and shortages faced by the American military as it struggled to adapt itself to a new world order.

State Department and military officials attempted to circumvent these prohibitive regulations in August by allowing the specialists to enter the United States outside of immigration law with the understanding that they would eventually apply for citizenship through the appropriate legal process. A new immigration procedure was established later that year, and quota regulations were modified that December to ensure that the specialists would be eligible for visas. Immigration delays continued however, due in part to wartime visa regulations that prohibited the immigration of fascists. State Department officials maintained that so long as they were legally responsible for reviewing visa applications to determine the security threat posed by an applicant, they would need immigration dossiers to include complete background checks and all available information. This would enable them to adhere to their legal obligations while protecting the department from potential criticism.

The State Department's reaffirmation of its adherence to immigration law came at an inopportune time for the military. Demobilization and cuts to defense spending had begun to impact military capabilities, prompting a series of conferences in 1946 and 1947 to establish procedures for transferring specialists from military to civilian employment. Immigration visas were needed to help facilitate this transition, which would allow the military to deny specialists to the Soviet Union without the added expense of salaries, support staff, equipment, and facilities that would be needed if the specialists were employed on military-funded projects. A final agreement between the State Department and the military was eventually reached in late 1947.

This legally circumvented the State Department's obligation to wartime regulations by simply reassigning responsibility for certifying that the specialists were not security threats onto the shoulders of the military and the Justice Department. Ultimately, this change represented a victory in a sense for State Department officials, who successfully avoided compromising their professional integrity while simultaneously ensuring that the United States retained skilled personnel as permanent citizens. However, this also reflected a retreat. The State Department surrendered control over access to American citizenship to the Justice Department and the armed services while essentially granting the American military establishment the authority to define national security.

Paperclip ostensibly halted its procurement phase on September 30, 1947.⁶¹⁷ Recruitment efforts slowed, and in February 1948 the JIOA commented that no additional specialists had been requested through Paperclip's escape clause since September.⁶¹⁸ Indeed, the quota of one thousand recruits that had been established the previous year was underutilized, and by 1948 only about five hundred specialists had been transported into the United States under Paperclip.⁶¹⁹ Recruitment efforts received a boost in mid-1948 however, when the communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the burgeoning conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over Berlin pushed the American government to reprioritize defense spending.⁶²⁰

Additional recruitment programs were formed within this context, operating under the umbrella of Paperclip. Project National Interest was initiated in mid-1947, and was designed to

⁶¹⁷ Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy*, 268-269.

⁶¹⁸ "JIOA Governing Committee Meeting," February 11, 1948, box 19, file: JIOA Meetings, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC.

⁶¹⁹ Crim, *Our Germans*, 63; "Gist of Proposed reply to Congressman Fulton," undated, box 994, file: Unlabeled, Army Decimal Files 1941-1948, RG 319, NARA; Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 315.

⁶²⁰ Crim, *Our Germans*, 140-142; Hogan, *Cross of Iron*, 102-103, 111-112, 118; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 140-142; Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 204-205.

recruit specialists in military technology for purposes of civilian employment.⁶²¹ Recruitment through National Interest appears to have commenced once the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and the resumption of “normal consular services” in Europe facilitated Commerce Department efforts to coordinate recruitment into private industry.⁶²² The CIA also took advantage of the framework of National Interest to remove specialists from Europe, having been granted a yearly quota that allowed the agency to transport one hundred people per year into the United States in the interest of national security irrespective of immigration law.⁶²³ Indeed, covert cooperation between American intelligence organizations and war criminals from Germany and Eastern Europe has been the source of much controversy.⁶²⁴ National Interest was moderately successful, and by 1953 roughly 129 specialists had entered the United States under the program.⁶²⁵

In late 1950 an additional program was established, codenamed Project 63. Prompted by the outbreak of the Korean War and by fears that a Soviet invasion of Europe might soon be forthcoming, this program focused on recruiting specialists who might be of value to the Soviet Union. Funding and recruitment efforts through Paperclip and its subsidiary programs would wax and wane over the years. During the 1950s Paperclip was renamed the Defense Scientists Immigration Program (DEFSIP). It appears to have continued to operate under this name until funding restrictions and new military priorities brought the program to a gradual end in 1973.

⁶²¹ “Enclosure E: Current Projects Implemented by the JIOA,” box 19, file: JIC-JCS Meetings, Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, DC; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 125.

⁶²² Crim, *Our Germans*, 154; Lasby, *Project Paperclip*, 234-235.

⁶²³ Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 125-126.

⁶²⁴ For more information about the escape of Nazi war criminals and their employment with American intelligence services see Eric Lichtblau, *The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler’s Men* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014); Christopher Simpson, *Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War* (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988); Gerald Steinacher, *Nazis on the Run: How Hitler’s Henchmen Fled Justice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁶²⁵ “Statistical Report of Aliens Brought to the United States as ‘Paperclip,’ ‘Project 63,’ and ‘National Interest’ Cases,” Document DG 13, box 11, file: DG 1 of 2, IWG, RG 59, NARA.

There is little agreement over the total number of specialists recruited through Paperclip, but estimates range from Brian Crim's total of fifteen hundred to Linda Hunt's figure of sixteen hundred.⁶²⁶ Paperclip's conclusion mirrored a new chapter in American history, as the American public increasingly questioned the morality behind the recruitment of former Nazis and the United States government's relationship with suspected war criminals.⁶²⁷

The bureaucratic conflict between the State Department and the military over immigration through Paperclip represents an important moment in the American military's pursuit of national security through technological superiority. During these years the framework was established for the targeted recruitment and exploitation of skilled immigrants, demonstrating a recognition of the benefits such immigration conferred on the United States' military and technological infrastructure. This thesis argues that the resulting conflict between the State Department and the military from 1945 to 1947 illustrates how skilled immigration emerged as a critical component to the American national security state, and provides insight into how national security programs during the Cold War were restricted and shaped by competing bureaucratic and legal obligations that limited their effectiveness while simultaneously challenging and changing the spirit and wording of American law. It is ironic that although Paperclip was implemented to perpetuate American power in the interest of national security, this program faced some of its greatest resistance from the same domestic political and legal traditions it had been established to defend.

⁶²⁶ Crim, *Our Germans*, 3, 157; Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 1, 140-142, 175-176, 194, 227-228, 264; Jacobson, *Operation Paperclip*, 338.

⁶²⁷ Hunt, *Secret Agenda*, 230-231.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources: Unpublished

Linda Hunt Papers, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington DC

Box 4, File: Overcast
Box 18, File: MS Policies
Box 19, File: JIC-JCS Meetings
Box 19, File: JIOA Meetings
Box 19, File: MS FBI
Box 19, File: MS JIOA Operate
Box 19, File: MS JIOA Reports
Box 19, File: MS JIOA State
Box 19, File: State to JIOA
Box 21, File: Wright Field
Box 35, Bound Report: 1954 Paperclip

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA)

Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, 1763 – 2002, Central Decimal Files, 1910 – 1963.

Decimal File 1945-1959: 862.5211/1-148 to 862.542/12-3145, Box 6793
Decimal File 1945-1959: 862.542/1-146 to 862.542/10-3146, Box 6794
Decimal File 1945-1959: 862.542/11-146 to 862.542/12-3147, Box 6795

Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, 1763 – 2002, Files of Samuel Klaus Relating to Downed Aircraft Incidents, Prisoners of War, and Other Matters, 1944 – 1962.

Box 95, File: Relations with CON
Box 96, File: Miscellaneous
Box 103, File: JIOA General File
Box 103, File: JIOA German Scientists
Box 103, File: JIOA Reports by S Klaus
Box 103, File: JIOA S Klaus Memoranda for File

Box 103, File: JIOA S Klaus Memoranda to Staff

Box 103, File: Withdrawal from JIOA

Box 105, File: Files of Samuel Klaus

Box 105, File: Hiss, Alger

Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, 1763 – 2002, Select Documents Released Under the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Acts Relating to Nazi War Crimes, 7/30/1940 - 4/12/2002.

Box 11, File: DG 1 of 2

Box 11, File: DG 2 of 2

Record Group 165: Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, 1860 – 1952, American - British Conversations Correspondence Relating to Planning and Combat Operations, 1940 – 1948.

Box 564: 471.1 to 471.6 (10-7-43), File: 1-A

Box 565: 471.6 (10-7-43) Sec. 1-B to (10-7-43), File: 1-B

Box 565: 471.6 (10-7-43) Sec. 1-B to (10-7-43), File: 1-C

Box 565: 471.6 (10-7-43) Sec. 1-B to (10-7-43), File: 1-D

Box 566: 471.6 (10-7-43) Sec. 1-E to Atom (8-17-45), File: 1-E

Record Group 319: Records of the Army Staff, 1903 – 2009, Series: Decimal Files, 1941 – 1948.

Box 989: 400.112: Research (May 14, 1945) -- 400.112: Research (May 14, 1945), File: Research through September.

Box 989: 400.112: Research (May 14, 1945) -- 400.112: Research (May 14, 1945), File: Research May to December 1945.

Box 989: 400.112: Research (May 14, 1945) -- 400.112: Research (May 14, 1945), File: August 30, 1946 to December 31, 1946

Box 989: 400.112: Research (May 14, 1945) -- 400.112: Research (May 14, 1945), File: Research October to December 1945

Box 989: 400.112: Research (May 14, 1945) -- 400.112: Research (May 14, 1945), File: February 1947.

Box 989: 400.112: Research (May 14, 1945) -- 400.112: Research (May 14, 1945), File: March 1, 1947 to March 15, 1947

Box 990: 400.112: Research (May 14, 1945) -- 400.112: Research (May 14, 1945), File: January to March 1946

Box 991: 400.112: Project (May 14, 1945): 000.7 -- 009, File: Implementation and General History

Box 992: 400.112: Project (May 14, 1945): 012.2 -- 014.32, File: Research 014.32 Undated

Box 993: 400.112: Project (May 14, 1945): 014.32 -- 014.33, File: Research 014.32

Box 994: 400.112: Project (May 14, 1945): 014.33 -- 032, File: Research Undated

Record Group 319: Records of the Army Staff, 1903 – 2009, Publications Files, 1950 – 1951, Paperclip Project: Intelligence Division, Paperclip Project Intelligence Division.

Box 2674, File: Paperclip Project Intelligence Division

Record Group 330: Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1921 – 2008, JIOA General Correspondence, 1947 – 1952.

Box 1, File: Department of Commerce

Box 2, File: Immigration

Box 2, File: Immigration Diary

Box 2, File: JIOA 1 (Exploitation of German Scientists in US)

Box 4, File: Navy: Miscellaneous

Box 4, File: Policy

Box 8, File: Reports, Periodic

Box 9, File: Department of State (Misc) From January 1947 through December 1947

Box 14, File: Interoffice Correspondence

National Archives and Records Administration, Atlanta, Georgia

National Archives at Atlanta. "Operation Paperclip." Accessed March 11, 2019.
<https://www.archives.gov/atlanta/exhibits/item452-exh.html>.

United States Air Force Microfilm

Buyer, Harriet and Edna Jensen. *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, May 1945 to March 1947*, in *History of AAF Participation in Paperclip, 1945-1947*. Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055.

Jensen, Edna. *History of USAF Participation in Project Paperclip, September 1946 to April 1948, Volume II*, in *History of AAF Participation in Paperclip, 1945-1947*, Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC, Microfilm A2055.

United States Air Force Records. Air Force Historical Research Agency, United States Air Force, Washington DC. Microfilm A2056.

Primary Sources: Published

“130 German Scientists Are at Work in US on Experiments for the Army and Navy,” *New York Times*, February 15, 1946.

Allied Control Authority. *Enactments and Approved Papers*. Vol. 3. Washington DC: Army Library, 1946.

Allied Forces Supreme Headquarter: Operation ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan,” April 25, 1945, Defense Technical Information Center, <https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA606377>.

An Act to Authorize the Refusal of Visas to Aliens Whose Admission into the United States Would Endanger the Public Safety, Public Law 113, *US Statutes at Large* 55 (1941-1942): 252.

Clay, Lucius D., and Smith, Jean Edward. *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945-1949*. Indiana University, Bloomington. Institute of German Studies. Publication of the Institute of German Studies at Indiana University. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974.

Coulter, Eliot B. *Visa Work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service*. Washington DC: Office of Public Affairs, 1949.

Department of State. *Biographic Register of the Department of State, October 1, 1945*. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945.

Department of State. “The War: Third Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics,” *The Department of State Bulletin* 6, no. 137 (February 7, 1942): 117-142.

Department of State, *Register of the Department of State, December 1, 1946*, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Chief of Staff; VII*. Edited by Louis Galambos, Joseph P. Hobbs, Elisabeth F. Smith, Duan Van Ee, and Elizabeth S. Hughes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Occupation, 1945; VI*. Edited by Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Louis Galambos, Stephen E. Ambrose, Joseph P. Hobbs, Elisabeth F. Smith, Duan Van Ee, and Elizabeth S. Hughes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945. Vol. 3 of *European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1968.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. Vol. 5 of *The British Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe*. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1969.

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945. Vol. 2. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1960.

“German Immigrant Quota Set,” *New York Times*, September 29, 1945.

- Hevesi, Dennis. "H. Freeman Matthews Jr., 78; Worked on Camp David Accords." *New York Times*, July 26, 2006.
- Pan American Union. *Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace: Mexico City, February-March 1945*. Washington DC: Pan American Union, 1945.
- Shalett, Sidney. "Asks Full Support of Navy Research." *New York Times*, February 12, 1946.
- Steelman, John R. *Science and Public Policy: A Report to the President*. Vol. 1. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947.
- "Title 22: Foreign Relations, Chapter I: Department of State, Part 58: Control of Persons Entering and Leaving the United States Pursuant to the Act of May 22, 1918, as Amended," *Federal Register* 10, no 145 (July 21, 1945): 8997-9002.
- "Title 22: Foreign Relations, Chapter I: Department of State, Part 61: Visas: Documents Required of Aliens Entering the United States," *Federal Register* 11, no 249 (December 24, 1946): 14611-14612.
- Truman, Harry. "Message to the Congress on the State of the Union and the Budget for 1947." In *Public Papers: Harry S. Truman 1945-1953*. Accessed February 20, 1947.
<https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1460&st=&st1=>.
- United States Congress. *Congressional Record*. 81st Congress, 2d sess., 1950, Vol. 96, pt. 8.
- United States Congress. *Hearings Before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives on HR 3663*, part 1 and 2. 79th Congress, 2nd sess., February 21, 27, 28, and March 6, 20, 27, and May 8, 1946.

Secondary Sources

- Air Force History and Museums Program. *Home Field Advantage: A Century of Partnership between Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and Dayton, Ohio, in the Pursuit of Aeronautical Excellence*. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: US Government Printing Office, 2004.
- Arlington National Cemetery Website. "Henry S. Aurand: Lieutenant General, United States Army." Last modified September 20, 2006. Accessed April 19, 2019.
<http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/hsaurand.htm>.
- Bower, Tom. *The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Battle for the Spoils and Secrets of Nazi Germany*. London: Michael Joseph, 1987.
- Christenson, Joel C. *Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs: A Brief History*. Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014.
- Clay, Lucius. *Decision in Germany*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1950.
- Clifford, J. Garry. *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*. 2nd ed. Edited by Michael Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

- Crim, Brian E. *Our Germans: Project Paperclip and the National Security State*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018.
- Daniels, Roger. *Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants since 1882*. 1st ed. New York: Hill and Wang, 2004.
- DeVorkin, David H. *Science with a Vengeance: How the Military Created the US Space Sciences after World War II*. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1992.
- Divine, Robert A. *American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957.
- “Former German POW Gives Up After 40 Years.” *New York Times*, September 12, 1985.
- Fulbrook, Mary. *The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918-1990*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment a Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Gimbel, John. “German Scientists, United States Denazification Policy, and the 'Paperclip Conspiracy'.” *The International History Review* 12, no. 3 (August 1990): 441-465.
- Gimbel, John. *Science, Technology, and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990.
- Grossmann, Atina. *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
- Hamilton, John A. *Blazing Skies: Air Defense Artillery Fort Bliss on, Texas, 1940-2009*. Washington DC: Army Defense Department, 2009.
- Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.
- Hogan, Michael J. *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Hove, Mark T., United States Department of State. *History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State*. Washington DC: Global Publishing Solutions, 2011.
- Hunt, Linda. *Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
- Hunt, Linda. “U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 41, no. 4 (April, 1985): 16-24.
- Jacobson, Annie. *Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program That Brought Nazi Scientists to America*. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2014.
- Jarausch, Konrad H. *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995*. Translated by Brandon Hunziker. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

- Laney, Monique. *German Rocketeers in the Heart of Dixie: Making Sense of the Nazi Past during the Civil Rights Era*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015.
- Lasbey, Clarence, G. *Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War*. New York: Atheneum, 1971.
- Lee, Erika. "A Nation of Immigrants and a Gatekeeping Nation: American Immigration Law and Policy." Edited by Reed Ueda. *A Companion to American Immigration*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.
- Leffler, Melvyn P. "National Security," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*. 3rd ed., Edited by Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Leffler, Melvyn. *Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.
- Lewis, Kevin N. *National Security Spending and Budget Trends Since World War II*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1990.
- Lichtblau, Eric. *The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler's Men*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014.
- Lorenz-Meyer, Martin. *Safehaven: The Allied Pursuit of Nazi Assets Abroad*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007.
- Marchio, James D. "Days of Future Past: Joint Intelligence in World War II," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 1996): 116-123.
- McGovern, James. *Crossbow and Overcast*. New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1964.
- Merritt, Richard L. *Democracy Imposed: US Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
- National Archives and Records Administration. "Military Agency Records RG 331." Accessed December 10, 2018. <https://www.archives.gov/research/holocaust/finding-aid/military/rg-331.html>.
- National Archives and Records Administration. "Records of Interservice Agencies." Accessed February 20, 2018. <https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/334.html>.
- National Archives and Records Administration. "Records of U.S. Occupation Headquarters, World War II." Accessed February 4, 2018. <https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/260.html>.
- National Archives and Records Administration. "War Department: Military Intelligence Division, 8/26/1918-4/19/1947, Organization Authority Record." Accessed December 10, 1945. <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/10511458>.

- National Archives and Records Administration. "Wilson, Henry Maitland Wilson, Baron, b. 1881, Person Authority Record." Accessed December 10, 2018. <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/10572454>.
- Neufeld, Jacob. *Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1960*. Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990.
- Neufeld, Michael. *The Rocket and Reich: Peenemunde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era*. New York: Free Press, 1995.
- Neufeld, Michael. *Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War*. New York: A.A. Knopf, 2007.
- Packard, Wyman H. "Technical Information." In *A Century of US Naval Intelligence*, 158-169. Washington DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 1996.
- Parson, Nels A., Jr. *Missiles and the Revolution in Warfare*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962.
- Satterfield, Paul and David Akens. *Army Ordnance Satellite Program*. Huntsville, AL: Army Ordnance Corps, 1958.
- Simpson, Christopher. *Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War*. New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988.
- Slany, William Z., and Department of State. *U.S. and Allied Efforts To Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II: Preliminary Study*. Department of State, 1997.
- Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum. "Hs 117 Schmetterling (Butterfly) Missile." Accessed December 10, 2018. <https://airandspace.si.edu/collection-objects/missile-surface-air-henschel-hs-117-schmetterling>.
- Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum. "Hs 293 A-1 Missile." Accessed December 10, 2018. <https://airandspace.si.edu/collection-objects/missile-air-surface-henschel-hs-293-1>.
- Sofaer, Abraham D. "The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of the Informal Agency Process." *The Journal of Legal Studies*, 1, no. 2 (June 1972): 349-421.
- Steinacher, Gerald. *Nazis on the Run: How Hitler's Henchmen Fled Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Steury, Donald P. "Tracking Nazi Gold: The OSS and Project Safehaven." *Studies in Intelligence*, no. 9 (Summer, 2000): 35-50.
- Thompson, E. P. *The Making of the English Working Class*. New York: Vintage Books, 1966.
- United States Air Force. "Major General Norris B. Harbold." Accessed April 19, 2019. <https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Biographies/Display/Article/106845/major-general-norris-b-harbold/>;

Valero, Larry A. "The American Joint Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945-1947." Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed December 10, 2018. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/summer00/art06.html>.

Vannucci, Albert P. "Elected by Providence: Spruille Braden in Argentina in 1945." *Ambassadors in Foreign Policy: The Influence of Individuals on US-Latin American Policy*. Edited by C. Neale Ronning and Albert P. Vannucci. New York: Praeger, 1987.

Ziemke, Earl F. *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*. Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1975.

Zink, Harold. *The United States in Germany, 1944-1955*. New York: D. Van Norstrand Company, 1957.