Name of Project: Externalisation of EU borders and the transformation of state relations in Niger

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What is the research about: The research explores the unintended consequences of EU border externalisation particularly looking at the transformation of relations between local populations and the central state after the adoption and enforcement of law 036. It aims at uncovering potential changes in locals' perceptions of the government, their trust in institutions, political inclusivity, and perceived social status. This study particularly targets those economically reliant on migration-linked activities or living in areas where migration represents an important source of income.

Context: The Sahel region has increasingly become the focus of the European Union policies aimed at curtailing irregular migration. As Angel Losada (the EU Special Representative for the Sahel) puts it 'the security in the Sahel is the security for Europe'. The EU has adopted a multi-layered strategy focusing on development, security and military to ensure state stability while decreasing the flow of migrants towards Europe. The EU's policy outputs comprise a myriad of programs such as EUCAP Sahel (EUCAP Niger, EUCAP Mali), the EU Emergency Trust Fund, the Sahel Regional Action Plan, military support to the G5 Sahel).

Scholars have identified several discrepancies in the EU's outputs and outcomes to point out a profound disconnect with local populations' needs and perception of migration (Bøås, 2020). Urged by the EU, the government in Niger adopted law 036 to criminalise migrant smuggling while only 2% of the population perceived cross-border trade as a security threat (Danish Demining Group 2014). Building on previous studies, this research will examine the possible erosion of local compromises in Niger resulting from the EU's approach to migration. Niger's political stability relies on patronage politics with ethnic minorities allowing for frontier zone activities (Raineri, 2018). To what extent the change in migration policies initiated by the EU deteriorates patronage-clients relations between the state of Niger and those two transnational ethnic groups ?

Method : Mixed-research method. The qualitative methods include interviews and surveys. For the quantitative part of the research I will be using a difference-in-differences method (<u>Lechner, 2011</u>) to assess Bøås conclusion on destabilisation and political trust erosion.

Method:

Datasets: I will be using the Afrobarometer data R5, R6, R7 https://afrobarometer.org/data/327

Dependent Variables:

I want to evaluate *political trust* so I select within the Afrobarometer dataset Trust in the president, the army, the police, parliament/national assembly, elected local government council, and traditional leaders.

• To have a better comparability between variables I standardize them with mean 0 and deviation 1.

Control Variables: Based on existing literature I control for variables that are likely to impact political trust

Age: Value of 1 if age is less than 25 (0 otherwise)

Gender: male = 1 female = 0 Living Area : Urban = 1 Rural = 0

Education: Value of 1 if secondary education or higher level (0 otherwise)

For poverty as it not directly addressed in the survey I take Gates and Justesen (2012) method and I code as 1 respondents who reports having gone without food 'many times' and 'always' (0 otherwise)

For robustness checks I will add a control variable on Public goods.

Eliminating responses coded as 'missing' or 'refused'

Difference-in-differences:

- I define treatment on all individuals living in Agadez, Zinder and Tahoua. The control group is formed by Maradi, Dosso, Tillabéri
- 2. My pre-treatment period is 2013 (R5), my post-treatment period are 2015 and 2018 (R6 & R7)

$$y_{igt} = \beta \times T_{it} + \gamma \times T_{it} \times A_t^{post} + \kappa \times X_{igt} + \mu \times X_{igt} \times A_t + \delta_t + \mu_{igt} + \alpha_g$$

 y_{igt} is the variable of interest of individual i, g indexes group, and surveyed at time t. γ is our average treatment effect and so our coefficient of interest multiplied by the dummy T_{it} which takes the value of 1 if the individual was surveyed in one of the treatment region and 0 otherwise. It is multiplied with our 2 post-treatment years.

 $\beta \times T_{it}$ controls for unobserved differences between groups

 X_{it} are our covariates previously identified (also interact with each survey year for time varying effects) μ_{it} is our individual standards errors and δ_t are the time fixed effects α_g group effects

Model for multiple groups.

https://personal.utdallas.edu/~d.sul/Econo2/lect 10 diffindiffs.pdf

3. General Settings for DD Analysis: Multiple Groups and Time Periods

The DD and DDD methodologies can be applied to more than two time periods. In the first case, a full set of time-period dummies is added to (1.1), and a policy dummy replaces $d2 \cdot dB$; the policy dummy is simply defined to be unity for groups and time periods subject to the policy. This imposes the restriction that the policy has the same effect in every year, and assumption that is easily relaxed. In a DDD analysis, a full set of dummies is included for each of the two kinds of groups and all time periods, as well as all pairwise interactions. Then, a policy dummy (or sometimes a continuous policy variable) measures the effect of the policy. See Gruber (1994) for an application to mandated maternity benefits.

With many time periods and groups, a general framework considered by BDM (2004) and Hansen (2007b) is useful. The equation at the individual level is

$$y_{igt} = \lambda_t + \alpha_g + \mathbf{x}_{gt} \mathbf{\beta} + \mathbf{z}_{igt} \mathbf{\gamma}_{gt} + v_{gt} + u_{igt}, \ i = 1, \dots, M_{gt},$$
(3.1)

where *i* indexes individual, *g* indexes group, and *t* indexes time. This model has a full set of time effects, λ_t , a full set of group effects, α_g , group/time period covariates, x_{gt} (these are the policy variables), individual-specific covariates, \mathbf{z}_{igt} , unobserved group/time effects, v_{gt} , and individual-specific errors, u_{igt} . We are interested in estimating $\boldsymbol{\beta}$. Equation (3.1) is an example of a *multilevel model*.

One way to write (3.1) that is useful is

$$y_{igt} = \delta_{gt} + \mathbf{z}_{igt} \boldsymbol{\gamma}_{gt} + u_{igt}, \ i = 1, \dots, M_{gt},$$
(3.2)