Probability Basics

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
Probabilistic Inference

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- Suppose there's a variable X whose value you would like to know, but don't
- ▶ Suppose there's another variable Y whose value you do know
- ▶ Suppose you know probabilities about how values of X and Y go together
- lacktriangle There's a standard way to use the probabilities to make a best guess about X
- ▶ In Speech Recognition you want to guess the words which were said, in Machine Translation you want to guess the best translation. To introduce the basic probabilistic framework we will first look though at entirely different kinds of example.

Duda and Hart's fish example

Suppose there are 2 types of fish. You might want to design a fish-sorter which seeks to distinguish between the 2 types of fish (eg. salmon vs. sea bass) by the value of some observable attribute, possibly an attribute a camera can easily measure (eg. lightness of skin)



images from Duda and Hart, Pattern Recognition

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If you observe a fish with a particular value for x, what is the best way to use the observation to predict its category?

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choose
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So if you know both $P(x|\omega)$ and $P(\omega)$ for the two classes ω_1 and ω_2 can now pick the one which maximises $P(x|\omega)P(\omega)$

though widely given the name 'Bayesian Classifier' this really doing nothing more than saying pick the ω which makes the combination you are looking at as likely as possible.

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
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
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
(2) is by definition of conditional probability, (3) is by Product Rule, and (4) because denominator P(x) does not mention ω , it does not vary with ω and can be left out




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▶ Basically up to about x=12.5, $P(x|\omega_2) > P(x|\omega_1)$ and thereafter the relation is the other way around.




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


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- **b** but this does not mean ω_2 should be chosen for x < 12.5, and ω_1 otherwise.
- ▶ the plot shows only half of the $P(x|\omega)P(\omega)$ referred to in the decision function (1): the other factor is the a priori likelihood $P(\omega)$

Assuming a priori probs $P(\omega_1)=2/3$, $P(\omega_2)=1/3$, the plots below show $P(\omega_1,x)$ and $P(\omega_2,x)$, normalised at each x by P(x) (ie. it shows $P(\omega|x)$)



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- ▶ So roughly for x < 10 or 11 < x < 12, ω_2 is the best-guess
- ▶ So roughly for 10 < x < 11 or 12 < x, ω_1 is the best-guess

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- if $p(x|\omega_1) = p(x|\omega_2)$, the evidence tells you nothing, and the decision rests entirely on $p(\omega_1)$ vs $p(\omega_2)$
- if $p(\omega_1) = p(\omega_2)$, then the decision rests entirely on the class-conditionals: $p(x|\omega_1)$ vs. $p(x|\omega_2)$

'prior' and 'posterior'

have seen that

$$rg \max_{\omega} P(\omega|x) = rg \max_{\omega} (p(x|\omega)p(\omega))$$

- often $p(\omega)$ is termed the prior probability (guessing the fish *before* looking)
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$$\arg\max_{\omega} \underbrace{P(\omega|x)}_{\text{posterior}} = \arg\max_{\omega} (p(x|\omega) \underbrace{p(\omega)}_{\text{prior}})$$

- ► So can choose by considering $P(x|\omega)P(\omega)$.
- it can sometimes surprise that for all the ω , $P(x|\omega)P(\omega)$ might be tiny and not sum to one: but recall its a joint probability, so it incorporates the probability of the evidence, which might not be very likely.

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- It also must be the case that

$$P(x) = \sum_{\omega} P(\omega, x) = \sum_{\omega} P(x|\omega)P(\omega)$$

so P(x) can be obtained by summing $P(x|\omega)P(\omega)$ for the different values of ω , the same term whose maximum value is searched for in (1)

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- Without dividing through by P(x) you get basically the much smaller joint probabilities. The maximum occurs for the same ω as the conditional probability and the ratios amongst them are the same as amongst the conditional probs.

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- 1. p(jed) = 0.01
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- 3. $p(omg|\neg jed) = 0.1$

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hence choose ¬jed



we have

$$p(omg|jed)p(jed) = 0.01, p(omg|\neg jed)p(\neg jed) = 0.099$$

both values are quite small, and they do not sum to 1

this is because they are alternate expressions for the joint probabilities p(omg, jed) and $p(omg, \neg jed)$, and summing these gives the total omg probability, which is not that large.

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Raising the prior prob for jed to p(jed) = 0.1, changes the outcome to

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$$p(jed|omg) = 0.526, p(\neg jed|omg) = 0.474$$

Or alternatively decreasing the prob of hearing OMG from anyone else to 0.001, changes the outcome to

$$p(jed|omg) = 0.917, p(\neg jed|omg) = 0.083$$

Recap

```
Joint Probability P(X,Y)
Marginal Probability P(X) = \sum_{Y} P(X, Y)
Conditional Probability P(Y|X) = \frac{P(X,Y)}{P(X)} ... really \frac{count(X,Y)}{count(X)}
 Product Rule P(X, Y) = P(Y|X) \times P(X)
    Chain Rule P(X, Y, Z) = p(Z|(X, Y)) \times P(X, Y) =
                p(Z|(X,Y)) \times P(Y|X) \times p(X)
Conditional Independence P(X|Y,Z) = P(X|Z) ie. X ignores Y given Z
Bayesian Inversion P(X|Y) = \frac{P(Y|X)P(X)}{P(Y)}
      Inference to infer X from Y choose X = \arg \max_{X} P(Y|X)P(X)
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Further reading

see the course pages under 'Course Outline' for details on particular parts of of particular books which can serve as further sources of information concerning the topics introduced by the preceding slides