

observation of the absence of penis in the female and patients suffering from ejaculatio praecox regard the female organs with superstitious awe. One form which castration phobia takes is the fear of the loss of the member in the sexual act. The sudden impotence, the premature ejaculation constitutes a timely rescue from the threatened danger.

The author regards all these facts as confirmatory of his view that those suffering from ejaculatio praecox have never attained a normal degree of development and an adult attitude toward the object. There is not complete fixation of the libido at an infantile level, such as Freud has shown to be at the root of the paranoiac, but there is a disturbing influence from strongly narcissistic tendencies. The author calls attention to the element of infantile narcissistic exhibitionism in those subject to ejaculatio praecox, and to the narcissistic over-valuation of the products of the person's own body. There is an ambivalency associated with exhibitionism, the desire to exhibit to the mother (or the woman, the mother-substitute) and at the same time a disdain for the person to whom the exhibition is made, and both values are recognizable in patients of this stamp. Finally, the author calls attention to another allied phenomenon which is more rarely met with by physicians, namely, retarded ejaculation, to which he applies the name impotentia ejaculandi—due also to narcissistic fixation. The psychoanalytic treatment in these cases must be directed against the fundamental narcissism. [J.]

**Freud, S.** THE UNCONSCIOUS. [Internat. Zeitsch. f. aertz. Psychoanalyse, Vol. III, Nos. 3, 4, 5.]

In the average individual as well as those varying from the average the data of consciousness are to the highest degree fragmentary. Psychic acts take place which can only be explained by supposing other acts of which, in consciousness itself, there is no evidence. When by certain influences exercised in a supposed unconscious we bring about in consciousness certain results definitely aimed at, the existence of the unconscious is incontestably proved. Many of the latent elements of the psyche can be transformed into conscious processes or be replaced by the latter; they can be described by the categories which are applied to the conscious psyche, such as ideas, decisions, etc., and indeed of many of them we are forced to admit that they differ from conscious processes solely in the fact that we are unaware of them. We may gain an idea of our own unconscious in the same way as we gain an idea of the existence of consciousness of other creatures—by inference. Each one of us may say: "all those acts and expressions which I notice in myself and which I am unable to connect with the rest of my psychic life I may judge as though they belonged to another person and could receive illumination from the psychic life of that person." In this way we are enabled to interpret those acts which we refused to recognize as belonging to our psyche. This process of forming judgments notwithstanding the resistances of our own personality leads to the discovery of a second

consciousness, rather than to that of an unconscious. The psychoanalytic assumption of a second soul seems thus, on the one hand, an extension of the primitive animism; but, on the other, an application of the principle of "correction" which Kant found necessary for the proper estimation of sense perceptions. Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are all subjectively conditioned and that they should not be thought to reveal the thing-in-itself, which would be to compound phenomenon with noumenon. In the same way psychoanalysis admonishes us not to mistake the conscious aspect as a revelation of the real nature of the unconscious. The psychic, like the physical world, may not be at all as it is perceived by us. We may find satisfaction, however, in the experience that the inner object is more accessible to us than is that of the external world.

Though the characteristic of being unconscious is the quality of certain psychic processes it is by no means their only characteristic. Psychic acts of very different sorts have this one quality in common—unconscious repressed elements that are merely latent and differ in no way from conscious processes, and other elements which, if they should become conscious would stand in most striking contrast with the conscious elements. And thus it comes that the words conscious and unconscious must sometimes be used in a merely descriptive manner to denote a condition of the element and at other times to designate an element as an integral part of a system. It is to the latter aspect that the author mainly directs attention in this article.

Studying the organization of the systems to which certain psychic elements belong and the typical characteristics of these elements, the author states that in general, in becoming conscious, the psychic elements pass through two phases. Between the two phases is a deciding process, the censor, which determines whether a psychic element is fitted for admission to consciousness. Having passed this censor the element remains in the foreconscious until circumstances secure its entrance into consciousness proper. If it should be found that there is a second censor between the foreconscious and consciousness we should have three phases for the psychic element and psychoanalysis would have advanced still further in the direction of a dynamic explanation of mental life to take the place of a mere description of it.

Discussing the unconscious from the point of view of localization, the author states that anatomical connections, though obviously existing in a general way must be disregarded because of the difficulties presented by a psychophysical parallelism. The psychic elements may be regarded as following their own necessities, and then two possibilities in regard to their relative localization present themselves: (1) that in passing from the unconscious to the foreconscious or to consciousness a new impression may be formed with the preservation of the first one; or (2) the transition may consist in a transformation, or alteration of condition. The first appears the cruder but at the same time the more adaptable concept;

the second the more probable, but less plastic. In the present state of knowledge it is impossible to decide the question definitely.

In regard to the content of the different systems the author states that ideas may exist either in the conscious or the unconscious; that instincts are never conscious; and that it belongs to the essential nature of emotions to be conscious. In cases where the nature of emotion is not at first recognized it is, upon recognition of that nature, spoken of as having previously been unconscious—from a negligent use of terms, however; for it is not the feeling which is unconscious but its idea, which has been separated from it and repressed. One of three fates may overtake an emotion: it may continue to exist as such; it may be transformed wholly or in part into a qualitatively different affect (especially into anxiety); or it may be suppressed, that is, its development may be prevented. According to this view the repression really prevents the instinctive craving from being transformed into mental expression—a discovery of special interest, for it shows that consciousness normally dominates the emotional as well as the motor system. If the conscious system be assumed to preside over emotional activity, this would explain the special rôle of the substitute idea in the neuroses. The development of the affect may proceed directly from the unconscious and then a form of anxiety is the result, or it may attach itself to a substitute idea in the conscious system and then the emotion is not only set into activity by this idea, but its qualitative character is determined thereby.

The repression takes place on the boundary between the unconscious and the foreconscious and consists in a withdrawal of the foreconscious energy with preservation of the unconscious energy—an assumption which seems confirmatory of the view that the process does not consist in a topographic change but in a functional modification of the condition of the element. Now the mere thrusting back of an element still possessed of energy to return to consciousness would not insure its continued exclusion. To bring this about an opposing energy is brought into effect in the form of a substitute.

The characteristics which distinguish the unconscious elements (the original instincts, trends, or tendencies) from other psychic elements are: mobility of energy in the form of displacement or condensation (the primary processes), absolute indestructibility, absence of time relations, domination by the pleasure-pain principle instead of by the principle of reality.

Repression is far from being the only form of intercourse between the conscious and unconscious systems. One striking example of their coöperation is phantasy. Here formations so highly organized that they seem to belong to consciousness hover on its very threshold. They are wholly unfit for admission into the conscious system, however, and under normal conditions are thrust back into the unconscious the moment they receive any accession of energy. It appears as though they pass the censor between the unconscious and the foreconscious only to meet

with a second censor between this latter and consciousness, suggesting the existence of three psychic systems.

How far the unconscious can be influenced by consciousness has not as yet been determined. Upon the possibility that another person can influence consciousness and thus reach the unconscious the psychoanalytic treatment is based. It may, however, be assumed that the spontaneous influencing of the unconscious from consciousness would be a long and difficult process, if it were possible at all.

The transference neuroses do not furnish very abundant nor very definite information concerning the unconscious. It is the narcissistic disturbances which have given us the best data concerning it. Since 1908 the analysis of dementia praecox (Kraepelin) or schizophrenia (Bleuler) has shown that this disease form is characterized by a peculiar failure of the object of interest; the libido is first turned to phantasy creations and finally becomes introverted; no new object is sought and the ego reverts to a primitive objectless condition. A further characteristic of this disease is the peculiar speech disturbance—words are distorted or used in bizarre ways, and are joined together in such manner as often to render the speech of these patients unintelligible. From the study of numerous instances the author comes to the conclusion that the words are subjected to changes analogous to those which in dreams the concrete images of the things undergo—that is there is condensation and displacement. It would seem as though the verbal idea of the object is present though there is no trace of the object itself. Attention is thus attracted to the verbal image in contradistinction to those impressions which constitute the image of the object as furnishing a clue to an important difference between the conscious and unconscious content. It is the concrete image of the thing which exists in the unconscious, while in consciousness the image of the thing exists plus the verbal image.

The formal law which obtains in the transference neuroses, namely, that repression is a process which takes place on the boundary between the unconscious and consciousness cannot be applied to schizophrenia without modification. It is apparent to the most casual observer that in this latter disorder the flight from reality is much more fundamental and profound. The anomaly that the verbal image, obviously belonging to the highest and most fragile psychic formations should be intact amidst the destruction of other more hardy elements is accounted for by the author upon the supposition that the verbal image here represents a first stage of recovery. Our psychic activity moves in two opposite directions—either from the unconscious toward consciousness or vice versa. Despite all repression this second path must remain open and is accessible to efforts to regain the object. In ordinary abstract thinking there is danger of neglecting the relation of the word to the unconscious idea and in thus dispensing with the object, abstract thinking, according to the author, presents a resemblance to the thought processes of schizophrenia. [J.]