

# Meddle: Transparency and Control for Mobile Network Traffic

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## ABSTRACT

Today’s mobile systems make it difficult to obtain visibility into network traffic and provide few mechanisms for changing how devices and apps use the Internet. As a result, we have a poor understanding of – and limited ability to improve – network performance, battery consumption, data-quota usage, and privacy in the mobile environment. In this paper, we address these issues using *Meddle*, a platform for improving transparency for mobile networking traffic and enabling fine-grained control over flows generated by mobile devices.

*Meddle* achieves this by using virtual private networks (supported by nearly all devices) to forward traffic from devices to a server that uses software-middlebox techniques to modify, shape and/or block network traffic before forwarding it to the destination. Unlike previous work, *Meddle* provides the ability to characterize and control mobile-device traffic on user devices regardless of the OS, carrier or access technology – without rooting the device or modifying the default OS. Further, *Meddle* allows us to experiment with new techniques for interposing on mobile traffic in a way that improves performance, resource consumption and privacy.

This paper describes the architecture of *Meddle* and results from our initial deployment, showing that it imposes reasonable overhead while providing users with services previously unavailable on mobile devices. We further use the network flows traversing *Meddle* to reveal unexpected and alarming network behavior of mobile apps made visible through our approach. Last, we discuss how *Meddle* can address these and other issues in the mobile environment without requiring app or OS modification.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Mobile systems consist of walled gardens inside gated communities, i.e., locked-down operating systems running devices that interact over a closed and opaque mobile network. Despite a large collection of privacy, policy and performance issues in mobile networks [1, 2, 4, 3], users and researchers are faced with few options to characterize and address them.

In this paper, we demonstrate that we can provide the necessary framework to simultaneously address many of these issues for users and researchers by using middleboxes accessible through VPN tunnels, an approach we call *Meddle*. *Meddle* works for nearly all mobile devices out of the box: Android, iOS, and Blackberry all support VPNs, thus providing a portable mechanism to tunnel traffic to servers outside of the carriers’ control regardless of the mobile device’s network. Once packets arrive at VPN servers, we use a variety of software-middlebox approaches to transform traffic to and from mobile devices. Together, these features enable new opportunities for characterizing and controlling network traffic in the mobile environment.

First, *Meddle* provides a portable, pervasive, passively-gathered view of mobile network activity from mobile devices. It is portable in that VPNs work on nearly all devices and they capture traffic regardless of which carrier or access technology (e.g., cellular or WiFi) is being used. It is pervasive in that *Meddle* ensures a device’s VPN is always connected when devices access the Internet, offered a comprehensive and continuous view of network traffic generated by devices. By tunneling traffic to a server we control, *Meddle* enables low-cost passive monitoring of traffic naturally generated by users, OSes and apps on their own devices.

Second, *Meddle* provides a new point of control over mobile network traffic. *Meddle* enables researchers to investigate what-if scenarios for the impact of new middleboxes as if they were deployed in carrier networks. These include new app-accelerators, mobile-specific security filters and protocol manipulation to improve power consumption and data quota usage. Importantly, service providers and users can take advantage of these features without requiring any support from carriers or new OS-specific apps installed by users.

Last, *Meddle* facilitates participation from a large number of users, allowing us to characterize and evaluate mobile systems in the wild. It offers a low barrier to adoption – on modern mobile OSes, users need only a few taps to install *Meddle* and once installed there is no maintenance required. Also, *Meddle* explicitly aligns the goals of researchers and users by offering free and easy-to-use services that include device-

wide ad-blocking, privacy/security filters and parental controls at the network layer – functionality that mobile network providers do not currently make available.

This paper provides the following key contributions. First, we describe the design and implementation of *Meddle*. We demonstrate the scalability and reasonable overheads of tunneling traffic from large numbers of mobile users through our servers. Second, we present measurements results gathered from our initial deployment of *Meddle* comprising XX users lasting XX days. We use data collected from our IRB-approved study to highlight key advantages that our platform offers compared to previous work. Third, we describe several services that we built on top of *Meddle*. Last, we must address the additional security, trust and privacy concerns that arise when tunneling traffic outside of carrier networks into a third-party distributed service. We discuss these issues and others in Section ??.

## 2. GOALS AND ARCHITECTURE

In this section, we discuss the motivation for *Meddle*, describe our goals for the system and present an architecture to meet those goals.

*Meddle* is motivated by the fact that users and researchers currently have a limited view – if any – into how devices and apps generate network traffic. In addition, there are few mechanisms available for shaping, modifying or blocking this network traffic.

This can be harmful to users, as apps may generate sufficient traffic to cause overage charges on cell phone bills. Even when the volume of traffic is small, a periodic network activity can quickly deplete battery charge by preventing power management policy of the device to correctly operate. Further, apps can use the network to leak personal information or track users without consent.

Researchers are in a similar bind. It is common to use testbeds or proprietary ISP datasets to reveal network usage and its impact on data quota, battery life and privacy. However, the coverage and representativeness of these results can be limited by the use of i) a single carrier’s network, ii) a small testbed with a single, custom operating system and iii) a single access technology (cellular or WiFi). Once a problem with network traffic has been identified, addressing it can be challenging. OS developers are slow to adopt changes, app developers may be unwilling to modify their code and carriers often have no incentive to deploy new in-network functionality.

### 2.1 System Goals

The two primary goals for *Meddle* are 1) to provide comprehensive visibility into mobile networking traffic and 2) facilitate the development of new solutions and services for mobile networks. We further identify the following sub-goals that address limitations of previous work.

- *Portability*. We want a solution that works regardless of operating system, access technology and provider,

without requiring advanced (and possibly warranty-voiding) techniques such as rooting a phone.

- *Pervasiveness*. For maximum transparency, our system should provide seamless visibility into all network traffic generated by devices. This means continuous monitoring over time and as users move with their devices.
- *Deployability*. Our solution should be easy to use, immediately deployable and incur reasonable costs (or none at all) for users.
- *Isolation*. To prevent existing in-network devices from interfering with these new solutions and services, our system should provide network-traffic isolation.
- *Control*. To enable new solutions and services, our system should enable users and researchers to shape, modify or block network traffic.

## 2.2 Design and Architecture

### 2.2.1 Design

To meet the above goals, we propose building a system that redirects all mobile-device network traffic to a server outside the carriers network, thus providing a point of control where one can characterize, modify or block this traffic before sending it to the intended destination. Importantly, we observe that we can do this today without any additional support for devices or carriers: the key idea is to combine software middleboxes (e.g., packet filters, proxies, etc.) with virtual private networks (VPNs).

We use VPNs to achieve our goals of portability, pervasiveness, deployability and isolation. Specifically, major mobile OSes provide built-in VPN functionality for enterprise customers to enable access to resources in the enterprise’s private network for employees “on the road”. In *Meddle*, we use VPNs as a portable mechanism<sup>1</sup> to tunnel traffic from mobile devices to a machine outside of the carrier’s network for the purpose of analysis and interposition.

We use software-middlebox techniques to meet the goal of providing control over network traffic in the mobile environment. Middleboxes are traditionally used in managed networks (e.g., in enterprises and ISPs) to implement policies and enhanced services over IP. In *Meddle*, we use middleboxes as a mechanism not only to implement custom policies and services for users and service providers, but also for measuring networks and experimenting with alternative protocols for the mobile environment without requiring access to mobile carrier networks.

### 2.2.2 Architecture

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<sup>1</sup>Android, BlackBerry and iOS all support VPNs natively, representing more than 86% of the mobile device market[?].




Figure 1: *Meddle* architecture. Devices use VPN connections to tunnel all traffic to one of potentially many *Meddle* servers dynamically chosen to optimize for performance. Each *Meddle* server uses a device- or user-specific profile to determine the set of services that will operate on the tunnel’s network traffic.

Figure 1 depicts an architectural diagram for how we realize this approach via *Meddle*. Devices use VPN connections to tunnel all traffic to one of potentially many *Meddle* servers. We envision that *Meddle* can run as a single-user system in a user’s home network or in a hosted data center, or it can run as a shared, distributed and/or virtualized cloud-based service (e.g., on Amazon EC2). The figure depicts the latter, where multiple *Meddle* replicas are available for any given device.

When a device attempts to connect to *Meddle*, we direct it to a nearby *Meddle* server in a similar way to how the Akamai CDN uses DNS to redirect Web clients to nearby content caches [?]. To optimize for performance, the service can send VPN clients to a server that is relatively near the location at which data exits the mobile carrier’s network to enter the Internet. This technique can also redirect clients based on server load, reachability and availability.

To meet the goal of providing control over network traffic in the mobile environment, each *Meddle* server uses software-middlebox techniques, or *meddleboxes* to interpose on network traffic. These meddleboxes can (i) implement custom services for users such as packet filtering, caching, and intrusion detection, (ii) monitor network traffic characteristics, and (iii) allow us to experiment with alternative algorithms and protocols for the mobile environment. The system maintains a per-device and per-user profile to determine the set of services that will operate on the tunnel’s network traffic.

TODO: Discuss the interior of a meddlebox.

While the *Meddle* architecture is straightforward, there are a number of challenges we must address in building a

viable deployment. In the next section, we describe how we achieve continuous monitoring of network traffic across platforms, demonstrate that the power, data-volume and latency overheads are reasonably small.

### 3. IMPLEMENTATION

In this section, we describe our current deployment, we discuss how we addressed several challenges toward achieving the goals listed in the previous section and we present empirical results demonstrating the feasibility of our approach in terms of reasonably low overhead.

#### 3.1 Meddle Details

To facilitate widespread adoption, *Meddle* is supported out-of-the-box by the vast majority of smart mobile devices (smartphones and tablets) and is easy to deploy on servers. Manually installing a VPN generally requires filling out five fields on a Android phone, and the VPN configuration can be distributed using a single file on iOS.

[TBD: Ashwin: Insert primer on VPNs.]

**iPhone support.** We support *Meddle* on iOS using the “VPN On-Demand” feature, introduced in version 3.0 of iOS. This was originally intended to allow enterprises to ensure their employees’ devices always establish a VPN connection before contacting a specified set of domains. Using trial-and-error, we discovered that VPN On-Demand uses suffix matching to determine which domains require a VPN connection.

We use each alphanumeric character as the set of domains that require a VPN connection. This ensures that a connection is established before *any* network activity.

**Android support.** As of Android 4.2, Android supports “always on” VPN connections that ensure all traffic is always tunneled. At the time of writing, this has been released only for one week and only for a subset of Android devices so we have not extensively tested the effectiveness of the solution.

Instead, we rely on a feature that allows apps to manage VPN connections, introduced in Android 4.0. We modified the StrongSwan implementation of a VPN client to ensure that the VPN reconnects each time the preferred network changes (e.g., when a device switches from cellular to WiFi).

**Server-side implementation.** In our current implementation, *Meddle* uses native IPsec, implemented via StrongSwan [?], to establish VPN tunnels and Vyatta middlebox software [TBD: AL: give a reference] to shape traffic. Both of these software artifacts are supported on vanilla Linux operating systems, which in turn run on nearly all servers.

#### 3.2 Feasibility

Because our approach in part depends on users installing a VPN configuration and tunneling all traffic through *Meddle*, we evaluate whether the cost to the user in terms of performance, power and data quota is sufficiently low.

**Power consumption.** Tunneling traffic to a *Meddle* server requires that all traffic be encrypted by the mobile device. While this is already commonly performed for SSL con-

nections, *Meddle* requires an *additional* layer of encryption. We observed a 10% increase in power consumption when streaming an HD video to Android and iPhone devices using our IPsec tunnel. We believe that this overhead is reasonably low, and we note that this cost for encryption comes with the added benefit of increased privacy from carriers.

An interesting research question is whether it is possible to *reduce* power consumption using *Meddle*. For example, Qian et al [?, ?, ?] found that traffic shaping (a service that *Meddle* provides) can significantly reduce the power consumed by devices when periodic application traffic and radio resource timers are out of sync.

[TBD: Ashwin: Add newer analysis]

**Data consumption.** IPsec encapsulation slightly inflates packet sizes, in addition to preventing carrier middleboxes from applying their own compression. We measured the overhead of the tunnel in terms of data overhead from IPsec headers and keepalive messages, finding that it ranges from 8–12%. For our measurements, we setup *Meddle* as a VPN gateway for an iPhone and Android phone. On each phone, we accessed the Internet using the VPN tunnel for about one hour. Our test traffic was generated by activities that we expect to be typical of mobile device usage: Web searches, map searches, online shopping, downloading popular apps, emailing and reading the news. We also uploaded a picture to Facebook and Twitter, streamed a video on YouTube, and played a popular game (Angry Birds).

**Performance.** By forcing user traffic to an intermediate server and interposing on flows, we may add latency both due to additional hops and due to processing time at the *Meddle* server. We envision a DONAR-style deployment where users are dynamically redirected to different *Meddle* servers based on network conditions and server load [?]. Given this model, we evaluate whether we can locate servers near mobile-network egress points using a deployment such as PlanetLab, and found that this is generally the case.

For this experiment, we used data from approximately 10 mobile phones located throughout the US and issued traceroutes from the devices to targets in Google and Facebook’s networks. We then used the first non-private IP address seen from the mobile device on the path to a server. We assume that this corresponds to the first router adjacent to the mobile carrier’s public Internet egress point. Note that we could not simply ping the device IPs because mobile carriers filter inbound ping requests. Using this set of egress adjacencies, we determined the round-trip time from each PlanetLab site, then took the average of the nearest five sites to represent the case where a host at the nearest site is unavailable due to load or other issues. The average latency to each router was between 3 ms and 13 ms, with a median of 5 ms. Thus, when compared to RTTs of 10s or 100s of milliseconds that exist in mobile networks, the additional latencies from traversing *Meddle* servers is expected to be relatively small or even negligible.

[TBD: What is the cost in terms of end-to-end perfor-

mance?]

[TBD: Are there cases where we actually improve performance due to detouring? (I’ve decided not to mention this because it’s not a sure thing.)] [TBD: In case the carrier is performing traffic differentiation to penalize some bandwidth consuming traffic, using a VPN might significantly improve performance. I don’t know whether traffic differentiation is something common on mobile networks. (that was an answer to Dave question. If he discards it, also drop my comment.) ]

**Scalability.** If wildly successful, we would like to ensure that *Meddle* scales gracefully and that there are sufficient resources to support large numbers of concurrent users worldwide. Based on our initial analysis using StrongSwan on commodity hardware, we found that each connection consumed on average less than 1% of CPU time. Thus, we expect to be able to support up to 100s or small number of thousands of users per server, which is in line with low-end VPN appliances sold by Cisco and Vyatta. A recent study [?] showed that current rates for 3G networks in the US were between 0.59 and 3.84 Mbps; assuming devices are uniformly distributed across carriers, we expect to be able to support 250 simultaneous users (saturating their download capacity) for every 1 Gbps of bandwidth at the server.

### 3.3 Current Deployment

The analysis in the following sections rely on data gathered from our current prototype deployment. This consists of *Meddle* servers at the University of Washington, UC Berkeley and Inria, along with 20 devices from 14 users participating in an IRB-approved study.

**Summary statistics.** *Meddle* has been running since September 2012. The deployment includes 8 Android devices and 12 iOS devices (4 iPads, 7 iPhones and 1 iPod Touch). These devices connect to *Meddle* via 15 different service providers, XX of which are cellular providers. Together, our users have generated 30.2 GB of traffic since November 1, 2012.

**Data collected.** We collect full packet traces from these users (with informed written consent) and we code the data using random identifiers to protect identities. We do not attempt to decrypt any SSL traffic, and all packet traces are encrypted using a public key before being stored on disk. The private decryption key is stored on a separate server. Users may opt out and choose to delete their data at any time.

While this fine-grained data is useful for informing the design of middlebox solutions (*e.g.*, identifying and stripping personally identifiable information from unencrypted HTTP traffic), it can be prohibitive for a large-scale study. In the next phase of our deployment (currently under IRB review) we will capture only packet headers and lengths. With a lower privacy risk, we believe we can recruit a larger number of users and obtain informed consent via a Web site.

## 4. CHARACTERIZING MOBILE TRAFFIC

### 4.1 Initial Results

Protocol	Service	Android		iOS	
		Flows	Bytes	Flows	Bytes
TCP	HTTP	14.87	74.31	16.07	82.01
TCP	SSL	37.19	24.35	37.64	17.31
UDP	-	40.52	0.98	42.34	0.49
TCP	other	2.08	0.22	1.13	1.89
Other	-	5.35	0.14	2.82	0.09
<i>total</i>		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 1: Percentage of flows and bytes from iOS and Android devices. **[TBD: Verify total 100 for final results]** *SSL is responsible for the majority of TCP flows from iOS and Android devices.*

Protocol	Service	Wi-Fi		Cellular	
		Flows	Bytes	Flows	Bytes
TCP	HTTP	16.91	83.52	13.03	56.14
TCP	SSL	38.18	15.83	36.14	41.42
UDP	-	41.43	0.49	41.56	1.67
TCP	other	1.38	0.16	1.95	0.4
Other	-	2.12	0.01	7.2	0.3
<i>total</i>		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 2: Percentage of flows and bytes using Wi-Fi and Cellular as access technology. **[TBD: Verify total 100 for final results]** *The share of SSL traffic over Cellular networks is larger than its share over Wi-Fi.*

Objective coverage of meddle across access technology and devices

I plan to use these two tables to introduce the results in the following sections.

In Table 1.

We classify the IP flows as either TCP, UDP, or other; all IP flows that cannot be classified as either TCP or UDP are classified as other. We further classify TCP flows as either HTTP, SSL, or other. The SSL flows include HTTPS, IMAP, and other services that rely on SSL to secure the connection between the mobile client and the remote server. TCP flows that are not classified as either HTTP or SSL are classified as other.

In our traces we observe that DNS is responsible for more 93.5% of the UDP flows. The rest of the flows are due to services such as Skype which is not widely used by users in our dataset.

HTTP is the dominant protocol of traffic. SSL flows outnumber the HTTP flows however the bytes per SSL flow is significantly smaller than the bytes per HTTP flow. This is because of the media content from streaming sites such as YouTube and Netflix is streamed over HTTP.

In Table 2.

7.2 of cellular traffic classified as other is an artifact of our

Time	Bytes Downloaded	Query String
1353489965.97	356	a
1353489966.19	321	aw
1353489966.47	300	awe
1353489966.88	301	awes
1353489967.36	302	aweso

Table 3: Table

user base that includes researchers who tend to troubleshoot connectivity issues using icmp packets.

Though the fraction of flows for HTTP over Wi-Fi and Cellular remain the same, the byte shares are different. This is because Wi-Fi is the preferred medium to transfer media content. The flows that transfer media content typically have more bytes compared to flows that do not contain media content.

SSL traffic is typically compressed - discussion on compression opportunities for HTTP over Cellular networks refer to section ... for more details. We can refer to this section to introduce compression.

The increase in HTTP traffic over Wi-Fi is also because apps such as Google Plus (image backup on Android) allow users to upload their images only over Wi-Fi.

## 4.2 Case Study Device Specific Apps - iOS Push

text from Arnaud on iOS Push. How push works

When a push notification is received, the iOS device connects to port 5223 of a nearby Apple server. For each iOS device in our dataset we logged the timestamp at which these connections were established. From this set of connections we then selected the connections established between midnight at 6 am of the users local time. For each user, we computed the median of time interval between successive connections. We observe this median to be in the range of 190 seconds to 590 seconds. This time interval depends on the different apps for which the user has enabled notifications.

A user can disable notifications for specific time intervals on devices running iOS 6. In our dataset, three devices had notification disabled during different time intervals. During these time intervals we did not observe any traffic serving notifications.

## 4.3 Case Study Longitudinal Measurements - Google Search

We now use Google search as an example of longitudinal studies that are possible using using Meddle.

In Table 3 we present a sample search session on Android 4.0. During this session, we observe that each key stroke by the user resulted in a unique GET query made to a Google server. We observe similar behavior on Android 4.0, Android 4.1, and Android 4.2 **[TBD: confirm]**. In the case of iOS devices we observed search queries in the clear on de-



vices running iOS 5. On devices running iOS 6 we observe that search queries take place over SSL. [TBD: Privacy similar to desktop sentence.]

#### 4.4 Case Study Filtering Intrusive Traffic

#### 4.5 Case Study Traffic Optimization - Compression

#### 4.6 Case Study Suspicious Apps

#### 4.7 Case Study Interference By Service Providers

### 5. TRANSPARENCY AND CONTROL

Example Apps (highlight things we can do with meddle)  
- Begin with a sentence/intro-para on using middleboxes to offloading activities and offer device wide services - Middlebox based packet monitoring - cross \* possible - passive - real traffic 24x7 - actual users - Network traffic characterization - Longitudinal study of network traffic - undersbehavior of apps - Device wide services - service like packet filtering that is not limited to an app - Ad blocking - Platform for malware detection and blocking - Parental controls - Deployment of new protocols and services - Users can opt in for specific service - Mobile story for services like Freedom, CCNs, etc. - service in a VM where users opt in for services - Generic Proxy - Privad - Anti-censorship

### 6. DISCUSSION

Privacy  
Acceptable use  
ISP objections  
Scalability  
Pigeonholing traffic for monitoring ISPs  
Limitations - only network traffic (nothing on device) - not all traffic is captured - cost?

### 7. RELATED WORK

*Meddle* builds upon two existing technologies: VPNs and middleboxes. In our current implementation, we rely on an IPsec [?] implementation to tunnel traffics to *Meddle* servers. Sherry et al. [?] explore the opportunities enabled by moving middleboxes to the cloud, which includes simplifying management for enterprise network administrators. In contrast, our work focuses on the mobile capabilities software middleboxes enable rather than a redirection architecture for enterprise networks.

*Meddle* provides researchers with a cross-platform, cross-carrier technique for capturing network usage patterns from mobile devices. Previous work used on-demand active measurements to characterize network measurements [?, 4]; however, these measurements are restricted to the point at which users run the tests. Gerber et al. [?] use passive measurements alone to estimate transfer rates in a single carrier's

network; *Meddle* will enable such analysis across multiple carriers.

We expect to use *Meddle* to investigate security and privacy issues in the traffic that mobile devices generate. By monitoring and controlling information at lower layers in the software stack, previous work [1, 2, ?] has shown that existing apps leak significant private information. In *Meddle*, we take this downward mobility to an extreme, moving off the end-host entirely and eliminating the restrictions of a lab setting.

The CloneCloud [?] and MAUI [?] projects explored the space of moving functionality from mobile devices into the cloud. By interposing on user traffic, *Meddle* will allow us to explore some of this functionality without requiring device modifications.

\*\* Middleboxes in the cloud - Sekar Hotnets'11, Sekar NSDI'12, Sherry Sigcomm'12 \*\* Security and Privacy of Apps - Taintdroid, Appfence, Third party tracking NSDI'12, - We can act on it without the need to root the phone - computation is offloaded to the middlebox \*\* Ads and Analytics for Mobile - Valina-Rodriguez IMC'12, other mobile measurements papers from IMC'12 - Appfence - We not only report activities but also provide an interface that users can use to filter ads and analytics \*\* User Behavior and Energy consumption - Falling Asleep Angry Birds - Appsensor MobileHCI'12 - Meddle is passive - Who killed my battery - WWW'12 \*\* Web caching - ATT papers - periodic nature stuff

### 8. ADDITIONAL AUTHORS

### 9. REFERENCES

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### 10. PUSH NOTIFICATIONS AND POWER MANAGEMENT ON IOS

[TBD: AL: this section is not intended to be as is in the final report, but just a collection of results that can be incorporated in the final document if needed.]

All the following experiments are performed on an iPhone4 with iOS 6.0.1. At the beginning of each experiment we




Figure 2: Distribution of the interarrival times of Ethernet frames for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone plugged-in, with Wi-Fi and 3G enabled, and no VPN enabled. For each bin of 1 second, we count the number of interarrivals in that bin.




Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of the Ethernet frames arrival with time for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone plugged-in, with Wi-Fi and 3G enabled, and no VPN enabled.

close all applications and restart the iPhone. The iPhone is connected in Wi-Fi to a controlled access point on which we perform a tcpdump on the Wi-Fi interface and monitor the Wi-Fi association between the access point and the iPhone. Each experiment lasts for around 1 hour.

When an iPhone is plugged-in, it always remains associated to the Wi-Fi access point if Wi-Fi is enabled on the device. We performed a first set of experiments to observe the traffic to and from an idle iPhone. We see in Fig. ?? and Fig. ?? that the largest interarrival between two frames is in the order of 10 seconds for both the VPN and no VPN scenarios. We also observe no noticeable difference in the arrival of frames with time for both the VPN (see Fig. ?? and no VPN (see Fig. ??) scenarios. We don't claim this traffic to be typical, in particular, our access point is a Windows 7 machine sending SSDP traffic to announce available ser-




Figure 4: Distribution of the interarrival times of Ethernet frames for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone plugged-in, with Wi-Fi and 3G enabled, and VPN enabled. For each bin of 1 second, we count the number of interarrivals in that bin.




Figure 5: Cumulative distribution of the Ethernet frames arrival with time for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone plugged-in, with Wi-Fi and 3G enabled, and VPN enabled.




Figure 6: Distribution of the interarrival times of Ethernet frames for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone unplugged, with Wi-Fi and 3G enabled, and no VPN enabled. For each bin of 1 second, we count the number of interarrivals in that bin.




Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of the Ethernet frames arrival with time for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone unplugged, with Wi-Fi and 3G enabled, and no VPN enabled.

vices. Instead, we use it to understand in our experimental setup the background traffic.

In a second set of experiments, we consider a default iPhone setting with 3G and Wi-Fi enabled, and the iPhone unplugged. This corresponds to a typical setting for a user on move. We observe in Fig. ?? some very large frames interarrival times. All interarrival times larger than 10 seconds correspond to periods during which the wifi interface of the iPhone is not associated to the access point for energy saving. Surprisingly, whereas the iPhone is idle, we do not observe any regular pattern in the arrival of the frames in Fig. ?. In order to understand this irregularity, we made a new experiment with 3G disabled.

We observe in Fig. ?? that the largest interarrival is still in the order of 550 seconds, as in the case with 3G enabled, but we have less variety in the interarrival times. This is con-




Figure 8: Distribution of the interarrival times of Ethernet frames for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone unplugged, with Wi-Fi enabled, and no VPN enabled. For each bin of 1 second, we count the number of interarrivals in that bin.




Figure 9: Cumulative distribution of the Ethernet frames arrival with time for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone unplugged, with Wi-Fi enabled, and no VPN enabled.






Figure 10: Distribution of the interarrival times of Ethernet frames for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone unplugged, with Wi-Fi and 3G enabled, and VPN enabled. For each bin of 1 second, we count the number of interarrivals in that bin.

confirmed by Fig. ?? that shows a regular succession of short periods during which frames are received and long periods during which the wifi connection is not associated to the access point.

Therefore, there is an evidence that the 3G connection might trigger the association of the iPhone wifi interface with the access point. This is confirmed by experiments we performed with iMessage that is using the push notification infrastructure of Apple. When both 3G and Wi-Fi are enabled on an iPhone, a permanent connection to the push notification infrastructure of Apple is setup on the 3G interface. Each time an iMessage is received, it is piggybacked on the push notification message (when short enough). However, the Wi-Fi interface is always woken-up even if no payload is sent on it.

We observed this same behavior on the tcpdump traces used to plot Fig. ?. We observe that the Wi-Fi interface is woken-up (we observe a specific ARP and DHCP exchange that takes place for each Wi-Fi association to the access point), but no payload is exchanged. In this case, as we do not use a VPN, we cannot monitor the 3G traffic using *Meddle*, but we guess that traffic received on the 3G interface trigger the wake of the Wi-Fi interface. We plan to further explore this issue.




Figure 11: Cumulative distribution of the Ethernet frames arrival with time for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone unplugged, with Wi-Fi and 3G enabled, and VPN enabled.




Figure 12: Distribution of the interarrival times of Ethernet frames for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone unplugged, with Wi-Fi enabled, and VPN enabled. For each bin of 1 second, we count the number of interarrivals in that bin.




Figure 13: Cumulative distribution of the Ethernet frames arrival with time for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone unplugged, with Wi-Fi enabled, and VPN enabled.