

# Meddle: Transparency and Control for Mobile Network Traffic

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## ABSTRACT

Today’s mobile systems make it difficult to obtain visibility into network traffic and provide few mechanisms for changing how devices and apps use the Internet. As a result, we have a poor understanding of – and limited ability to improve – network performance, battery consumption, data-quota usage, and privacy in the mobile environment. In this paper, we address these issues using *Meddle*, a platform that improves transparency for mobile networking traffic and enables fine-grained control over flows generated by mobile devices.

*Meddle* achieves this by using virtual private networks (supported by nearly all devices) to forward traffic from devices to a server that uses software middleboxes to modify, shape and/or block network traffic before forwarding it to the destination. Unlike previous work, *Meddle* provides the ability to characterize and control mobile-device traffic from user devices regardless of the OS, carrier or access technology – without rooting the device or modifying the default OS. Further, *Meddle* allows us to experiment with new techniques for interposing on mobile traffic in a way that improves performance, resource consumption and privacy.

This paper describes the architecture of *Meddle* and results from its initial deployment, showing that it imposes a modest overhead while providing users with services previously unavailable on mobile devices. We further use the network flows traversing *Meddle* to reveal unexpected and alarming network behavior of mobile apps made visible through our approach. Last, we discuss how *Meddle* can address these and other issues in the mobile environment without requiring app or OS modification.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Mobile systems consist of walled gardens inside gated communities, i.e., locked-down operating systems running on devices that interact over a closed and opaque mobile network. Despite a large collection of privacy, policy and performance issues in mobile networks [7, 12, 25, 16], users and researchers are faced with few options to characterize and address them.

In this paper, we demonstrate that we can provide the necessary framework to simultaneously address many of these issues for users and researchers by using middleboxes accessible through virtual private network (VPN) tunnels, an approach we call *Meddle*. *Meddle* works for nearly all mobile devices out of the box: Android, iOS, Windows 8 (non-ARM) and Blackberry all support VPNs, thus providing a portable mechanism to tunnel traffic to servers outside of the carriers’ control regardless of the mobile device’s network. Once packets arrive at VPN servers, we use a variety of software-middlebox [23] approaches to transform traffic to and from mobile devices. Together, these features enable the following new opportunities for characterizing and controlling network traffic in the mobile environment.

First, *Meddle* provides a portable, pervasive, passively-gathered view of mobile network activity from mobile devices. It is portable in that VPNs work on nearly all devices and they capture traffic regardless of which carrier or access technology (e.g., cellular or Wi-Fi) is being used. It is pervasive in that *Meddle* ensures a device’s VPN is always connected when devices access the Internet, offering a comprehensive and continuous view of network traffic generated by devices. By tunneling traffic to a server we control, *Meddle* enables low-cost passive monitoring of traffic naturally generated by users, OSes and apps on their own devices.

Second, *Meddle* provides a new point of control over mobile network traffic. This enables researchers to investigate what-if scenarios for the impact of new middleboxes as if they were deployed in carrier networks. These include new app-accelerators, mobile-specific security filters and protocol manipulation to improve power consumption and data quota usage. Importantly, service providers and users can take advantage of these features without requiring any support from carriers or new OS-specific apps installed by users.

Last, *Meddle* facilitates participation from a large number of users, allowing us to characterize and evaluate mobile systems in the wild. It offers a low barrier to adoption – on modern mobile OSes, users need only a few taps to install *Meddle* and once installed there is no maintenance required. Also, *Meddle* explicitly aligns the goals of researchers and users

by offering free and easy-to-use services that include device-wide ad-blocking, privacy/security filters and parental controls at the network layer – functionality that mobile network providers and OSEs do not currently make available.

This paper provides the following key contributions. First, we describe the design and implementation of *Meddle* (§2). We demonstrate the scalability and reasonable overheads of tunneling traffic from large numbers of mobile users through our servers (§3). Second, we present measurement results gathered from our initial deployment of *Meddle* comprising of 14 users interacting with the system for 30 days (§4). We use data collected from our IRB-approved study to highlight key advantages that our platform offers compared to previous work. Third, we describe several services that we built on top of *Meddle* (§5). Last, we must address the additional security, trust and privacy concerns that arise when tunneling traffic outside of carrier networks into a third-party distributed service. We discuss these issues and others in §6. We survey related work in §7 and conclude in §8.

## 2. GOALS AND ARCHITECTURE

In this section, we discuss the motivation for *Meddle*, describe our goals for the system and present an architecture to meet those goals.

### 2.1 Motivation

*Meddle* is motivated by the fact that users and researchers currently have a limited view – if any – into how devices and apps generate network traffic. In addition, there are few mechanisms available for shaping, modifying or blocking this network traffic.

This can be harmful to users, as apps may generate sufficient traffic to cause overage charges on cell phone bills. Even when the volume of traffic is small, a periodic network activity can quickly deplete battery charge by preventing power management policy of the device to correctly operate [17]. Further, apps can use the network to leak personal information or track users without consent [12].

Researchers likewise suffer from a lack of visibility and control over network traffic. It is common to use testbeds or proprietary ISP datasets to reveal network usage and its impact on data quota, battery life and privacy. However, the coverage and representativeness of these results can be limited by the use of i) a single carrier’s network, ii) a small testbed with a single, custom operating system and iii) a single access technology (cellular or WiFi). Once researchers identify a problem with network traffic, addressing it can be challenging. OS developers are slow to adopt changes, app developers may be unwilling to modify their code and carriers often have no incentive to deploy new in-network functionality.

### 2.2 System Goals

The two primary goals for *Meddle* are 1) to provide comprehensive visibility into mobile networking traffic and 2)

facilitate the development of new solutions and services for mobile networks. We further identify the following sub-goals that address limitations of previous work.

- *Portability*. We want a solution that works regardless of operating system, access technology and provider, without requiring advanced (and possibly warranty-voiding) techniques such as rooting a phone.
- *Pervasiveness*. For maximum transparency, our system should provide seamless visibility into all network traffic generated by devices. This means continuous monitoring over time and as users move with their devices.
- *Deployability*. Our solution should be easy to use, immediately deployable and incur reasonable costs (or none at all) for users.
- *Isolation*. To prevent existing in-network devices from interfering with these new solutions and services, our system should provide network-traffic isolation.
- *Control*. To enable new solutions and services, our system should enable users and researchers to shape, modify or block network traffic.

### 2.3 Design and Architecture

To meet the above goals, we build a system that redirects all mobile-device network traffic to a server outside the carrier’s network, thus providing a point of control where one can characterize, modify or block this traffic before sending it to the intended destination. Importantly, we observe that we can do this today without any additional support for devices or carriers: the key idea is to combine software middleboxes (e.g., packet filters, proxies, etc.) with virtual private networks (VPNs).

#### 2.3.1 Design

We use VPNs to achieve our goals of portability, pervasiveness, deployability and isolation. Specifically, major mobile OSEs provide built-in VPN functionality for enterprise customers to enable access to resources in the enterprise’s private network for employees “on the road”. In *Meddle*, we use VPNs as a portable mechanism<sup>1</sup> to tunnel traffic from mobile devices to a machine outside of the carrier’s network for the purpose of analysis and interposition.

We use software-middlebox techniques to meet the goal of providing control over network traffic in the mobile environment [23]. Middleboxes are traditionally used in managed networks (e.g., in enterprises and ISPs) to implement policies and enhanced services over IP. In *Meddle*, we use middleboxes as a mechanism not only to implement custom policies and services for users and service providers, but also for measuring networks and experimenting with alternative protocols for the mobile environment without requiring access to mobile carrier networks.

<sup>1</sup>Android, BlackBerry and iOS and Windows 8 all support VPNs natively, representing more than 86% of the mobile device market[8].



Figure 1: *Meddle* architecture. Devices use VPN connections to tunnel all traffic to one of potentially many *Meddle* servers dynamically chosen to optimize for performance. Each *Meddle* server uses a device- or user-specific profile to determine the set of services that will operate on the tunnel’s network traffic.

### 2.3.2 Architecture

Figure 1 depicts an architectural diagram for how we realize this approach via *Meddle*. Devices use VPN connections to tunnel all traffic to one of potentially many *Meddle* servers. We envision that *Meddle* can run as a single-user system in a user’s home network or in a hosted data center, or it can run as a shared, distributed and/or virtualized cloud-based service (e.g., on Amazon EC2). The figure depicts the latter, where multiple *Meddle* replicas are available for any given device.

In the distributed scenario, when a device attempts to connect to *Meddle*, we direct it to a nearby *Meddle* server in a similar way to how the Akamai CDN uses DNS to redirect Web clients to nearby content caches [3]. To optimize for performance, the service can send VPN clients to a server that is relatively near the location at which data exits the mobile carrier’s network to enter the Internet. This technique can also redirect clients based on server load, reachability and availability.

To meet the goal of providing control over network traffic in the mobile environment, each *Meddle* server uses software-middlebox techniques, or *meddleboxes* to interpose on network traffic. These middleboxes can (i) implement custom services for users such as packet filtering, caching, and intrusion detection, (ii) monitor network traffic characteristics, and (iii) allow us to experiment with alternative algorithms and protocols for the mobile environment. The system maintains a per-device and per-user profile to determine the set of services that will operate on the tunnel’s network traffic.

Meddleboxes are monolithic in our current implementation, meaning that all middlebox features are within the same

*Meddle* server. When deployed in the cloud and at scale, this could lead to suboptimal scaling because users might adopt middlebox features unevenly. To address this, we are developing a cloud-based distributed middlebox deployment where each service runs in its own virtual machine (VM) and a user’s traffic is routed through a series of these VMs using a software-defined network to set up per-user routes on demand.

While the *Meddle* architecture is straightforward, there are a number of challenges we must address in building a viable deployment. In the next section, we describe how we achieve continuous monitoring of network traffic across platforms, then demonstrate that the power, data-volume and latency overheads are reasonably small.

## 3. IMPLEMENTATION

In this section, we describe our current deployment, we discuss how we addressed several challenges toward achieving the goals listed in the previous section and we present empirical results demonstrating the feasibility of our approach in terms of reasonably low overhead.

### 3.1 Meddle Details

The design of *Meddle* facilitates widespread adoption because it is supported out-of-the-box by the vast majority of smart mobile devices (smartphones and tablets) and is easy to deploy on servers. Manually configuring a VPN generally requires filling out five fields on an Android phone, and the VPN configuration can be distributed using a single file on iOS. These configurations are primarily required to drive the key exchange algorithms required to establish the VPN tunnels. The two most popular key exchange algorithms are IKEv1 [11] and IKEv2 [13]. Android devices support IKEv2 while iOS devices currently support only IKEv1 for tunnel establishment. The advantage of IKEv2 is that the VPN tunnel is generally established using 4 packets compared to 15 packets exchanged to establish the tunnel using IKEv1.

**iPhone support.** We support *Meddle* on iOS using the “VPN On-Demand” feature, introduced in version 3.0 of iOS. This was originally intended to allow enterprises to ensure their employees’ devices always establish a VPN connection before contacting a specified set of domains. Using trial-and-error, we discovered that VPN On-Demand uses suffix matching to determine which domains require a VPN connection.

We use each alphanumeric character as the set of domains that require a VPN connection. This ensures that a connection is established before *any* network activity.

**Android support.** As of Android 4.2, Android supports “always on” VPN connections that ensure all traffic is always tunneled. At the time of writing, this has been released only for one week and only for a subset of Android devices so we have not extensively tested the effectiveness of the solution.

Instead, we rely on a feature that allows apps to manage VPN connections, introduced in Android 4.0. We modified the StrongSwan implementation of a VPN client [27] to en-

sure that the VPN reconnects each time the preferred network changes (*e.g.*, when a device switches from cellular to Wi-Fi).

**Server-side implementation.** In our current implementation, *Meddle* uses native IPsec, implemented via StrongSwan [26], to establish VPN tunnels and custom packet filters plus Vyatta middlebox software [32] to shape traffic. Both of these software artifacts are supported on vanilla Linux operating systems, which in turn run on nearly all servers.

### 3.2 Feasibility

Because our approach in part depends on users installing a VPN configuration and tunneling all traffic through *Meddle*, we evaluate whether the cost to the user in terms of performance, power and data quota is sufficiently low.

**Data consumption.** IPsec encapsulation slightly inflates packet sizes, in addition to preventing carrier middleboxes from applying their own compression. We measured the overhead of the tunnel in terms of data overhead from IPsec headers and keep-alive messages, finding that it ranges from 8–12.6%.

For our measurements, we capture the encrypted packets exchanged by our *Meddle* servers and the clients that use *Meddle*. We performed the packet capture for 14 days during which 19 devices tunneled their traffic via our *Meddle* servers. During this time interval we also capture the packets that were encapsulated in the IPsec packets. We use these samples to compute the increase in the amount of bytes transferred due to encapsulation and the keep-alive messages. During the 14 day period we observe that the median of the increase to be 8.23%, with a maximum increase of 12.6%.

**Performance.** By forcing user traffic to an intermediate server and interposing on flows, we may add latency both due to additional hops and due to processing time at the *Meddle* server. We envision a DONAR-style deployment where users are dynamically redirected to different *Meddle* servers based on network conditions and server load [34]. Given this model, we evaluate whether we can locate servers near mobile-network egress points using a deployment such as PlanetLab, and found that this is generally the case.

For this experiment, we used data from approximately 10 mobile phones located throughout the US and issued traceroutes from the devices to targets in Google and Facebook’s networks. We then used the first non-private IP address seen from the mobile device on the path to a server. We assume that this corresponds to the first router adjacent to the mobile carrier’s public Internet egress point. Note that we could not simply ping the device IPs because mobile carriers filter inbound ping requests. Using this set of egress adjacencies, we determined the round-trip time from each PlanetLab site, then took the average of the nearest five sites to represent the case where a host at the nearest site is unavailable due to load or other issues. The average latency to each router was between 3 ms and 13 ms, with a median of 5 ms. Thus, when

compared to RTTs of 10s or 100s of milliseconds that exist in mobile networks, the additional latencies from traversing *Meddle* servers is expected to be relatively small or even negligible.

**Power consumption.** Tunneling traffic to a *Meddle* server requires that all traffic be encrypted by the mobile device. While this is already commonly performed for SSL connections, *Meddle* requires an *additional* layer of encryption. We observed a 10% increase in power consumption when streaming an HD video to Android and iPhone devices using our IPsec tunnel. We believe that this overhead is reasonably low, and we note that this cost for encryption comes with the added benefit of increased privacy from third parties. To put the overhead in context, the iPhone 5 advertises 8 hours of LTE browsing per charge; with the VPN enabled this would reduce to 7 hours and 12 minutes.

An interesting research question is whether it is possible to *reduce* power consumption using *Meddle*. For example, Qian et al [19, 18, 17] found that traffic shaping (a service that *Meddle* provides) can significantly reduce the power consumed by devices when periodic application traffic and radio resource timers are out of sync.

**Scalability.** If wildly successful, we would like to ensure that *Meddle* scales gracefully and that there are sufficient resources to support large numbers of concurrent users worldwide. Based on our initial analysis using StrongSwan on commodity hardware, we found that each connection consumed on average less than 1% of CPU time. Thus, we expect to be able to support up to hundreds or small number of thousands of users per server, which is in line with low-end VPN appliances sold by Cisco and Vyatta. A recent study [2] showed that current rates for 3G networks in the US were between 0.59 and 3.84 Mbps; assuming devices are uniformly distributed across carriers, we expect to be able to support 250 simultaneous users (saturating their download capacity) for every 1 Gbps of bandwidth at the server.

### 3.3 Current Deployment

The analysis in the following sections relies on data gathered from our current prototype deployment. This consists of *Meddle* servers at the University of Washington, UC Berkeley and Inria, along with 19 devices from 14 users participating in an IRB-approved study.

**Summary statistics.** *Meddle* has been running since September 2012. The deployment includes 8 Android devices and 11 iOS devices (3 iPads, 7 iPhones and 1 iPod Touch). These devices connect to *Meddle* via 15 different service providers, four of which are cellular providers. Together, our users have generated 30.2 GB of traffic since November 1, 2012.

**Data collected.** We collect full packet traces from these users (with informed written consent) and we code the data using random identifiers to protect identities. We do not attempt to decrypt any SSL traffic, and all packet traces are encrypted using a public key before being stored on disk. The private decryption key is stored on a separate server. Users

Protocol	Service	Android		iOS	
		Flows	Bytes	Flows	Bytes
TCP	HTTP	14.87	74.31	16.07	82.01
TCP	SSL	37.19	24.35	37.64	17.31
UDP	-	40.52	0.98	42.34	0.49
TCP	other	2.08	0.22	1.13	1.89
Other	-	5.35	0.14	2.82	0.09
<i>total</i>		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 1: Percentage of flows and bytes from iOS and Android devices. *SSL is responsible for the majority of TCP flows from iOS and Android devices.*

may opt out and choose to delete their data at any time.

## 4. CHARACTERIZING MOBILE TRAFFIC

One of the key advantages of *Meddle* is that it serves as an ideal vantage point for monitoring network traffic generated by mobile devices across devices, OSes and carriers. In this section we highlight some of the key observations we can make using *Meddle*.

### 4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Below, we use several descriptive statistics to summarize our dataset and provide context for the remainder of the section. We focus on the type of traffic being generated, how it varies per OS and how it varies over different access technologies.

**Comparing across OSes.** A key advantage of our approach is that it allows passive network monitoring across multiple OSes. In contrast, studies that rely on a custom, modified OS can monitor only devices configured to run the specific OS. Table 1 directly compares Android and iOS, focusing on the portion of traffic using several key protocols.

We classify IP flows as either TCP, UDP, or other. We further classify TCP flows as either HTTP, SSL, or other. The SSL flows include HTTPS, IMAP, and other services that rely on SSL to secure the connection between the mobile client and the remote server. TCP flows that are not classified as either HTTP or SSL are classified as other.

First, we observe that DNS is responsible for more 93.5% of the UDP flows. The rest of the flows are due to services such as Skype.

Second, we observe that most TCP traffic is HTTP, in line with previous results. Third, the majority of bytes are transferred over unencrypted channels. This is mainly due to streaming video (*e.g.*, Netflix and YouTube) over HTTP.

Last, we find the majority of TCP flows are sent over SSL, and this fraction is nearly identical for Android and iOS. We believe this occurs across platforms because the majority of flows come from e-mail, messaging and social networking, all of which use secure channels regardless of the OS.

On balance the number of bytes transferred per unit time in Android, and the number of flows, is larger than the same

Protocol	Service	Wi-Fi		Cellular	
		Flows	Bytes	Flows	Bytes
TCP	HTTP	16.91	83.52	13.03	56.14
TCP	SSL	38.18	15.83	36.14	41.42
UDP	-	41.43	0.49	41.56	1.67
TCP	other	1.38	0.16	1.95	0.4
Other	-	2.12	0.01	7.2	0.3
<i>total</i>		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 2: Percentage of flows and bytes using Wi-Fi and Cellular as access technology. *The share of SSL traffic over Cellular networks is larger than its share over Wi-Fi.*

for iOS. We found that iOS devices generated about 11.7 MB of traffic per hour while Android devices generated about 15.5 MB/hr, and increase of 33%. Further, Android devices contributed more flows (505 per hour vs. 363 per hour), an increase of 40%. It is difficult to account for the impact of user behavior on device-generated traffic; that aside, one explanation is that Android devices generate more bytes and flows due to the relatively permissive API for running code in the background on Android. In contrast, iOS quickly kills processes that are in the background, preventing them from generating network traffic after only a few seconds of losing the foreground.

**Comparing across access technologies.** Another key advantage of *Meddle* is that it allows us to passively monitor traffic regardless of whether a device is on Wi-Fi or cellular, without needing any OS modifications or imposing any constraints on user mobility. In contrast, studies relying on traffic seen over campus Wi-Fi [4] miss traffic over cellular connections; those from cellular providers [9] miss Wi-Fi traffic. As a point of reference, we found that the portion of network traffic generated by devices were nearly equally split (60/40) between Wi-Fi and cellular (respectively), motivating the need to monitor both.

In Table 2, we summarize the network traffic generated by *Meddle*-enabled devices over Wi-Fi and cellular. The first key observation is that the portion of HTTP bytes sent over Wi-Fi and cellular are significantly different. Upon further inspection, we found that Wi-Fi is the preferred medium to transfer media content, which generates relatively large flows. Another key reason is that apps such as Google Plus image backup on Android allow users to upload their images only over Wi-Fi. In line with the difference in HTTP traffic ratios, we note that SSL traffic is the dominant type in cellular connections.

We note that the portion of “other” flows for cellular on Android is a relatively large 7.2%. This corresponds to ICMP traffic and occurs because several users run *Mobiperf*, an application that performs regular network-measurement tests using ICMP, and the measurements occur only over cellular connections.

**Enabling direct performance comparisons.** Historically,




Figure 2: Median and quartile peak transfer rates for users when on Wi-Fi compared to cellular. Many users see significantly better performance from Wi-Fi; however, users with LTE often receive better performance over cellular than Wi-Fi.

cellular performance has lagged significantly behind Wi-Fi, mainly for capacity reasons. With the advent of LTE and the increased interference from dense Wi-Fi deployments, we investigate whether this common knowledge remains valid.

Previous work by Sommers et al. [24] studied this question using SpeedTest results from a metro area, but did not have sufficient location accuracy to directly compare performance over Wi-Fi and cellular for the same device. When considering a broad geographic region in aggregate, they found better performance from Wi-Fi in the vast majority of cases.

To directly compare Wi-Fi and cellular performance for the same device, we determine the maximum transfer rate per hour for each device, then focus on cases where there was a sample for Wi-Fi and cellular in the same hour. We restrict our analysis to users that transferred more than 100 MB of data in a single month. Figure 2 depicts the median and quartiles of these peak rates. The graph shows that for many users Wi-Fi is better than cellular. However, users 4, 6 and 7 often have better peak transfer rates over cellular – mainly due to adoption of LTE. For user 4, however, we see that Wi-Fi performance is poor compared to other users, indicating that some users may see better connections over cellular connections even if they are not using LTE. This highlights opportunities for proposals such as 3G onloading [29].

## 4.2 Case Study: Device Specific Apps (iOS Push)

In this section, we present the results of a detailed case study of iOS push. We focus on this application because it represents an OS-managed service on an operating system that received little research attention due to its closed-source




Figure 3: Median number of push notifications seen per hour for three devices. A significant number of updates occur at all hours, even during idle and “do not disturb” periods.

nature.

We set out to answer the following questions: (1) What is the empirical network impact of push notifications and does the measured activity coincide with published documentation? (2) Using *Meddle*, is there any relevant data traffic that is not captured by the VPN tunnel? (3) What is the impact of a VPN connection on network behavior? (4) Can we use network traffic alone to infer the state of the device?

**iOS Push Under the Microscope.** The Apple Push Notification Service (APNS) implements push for iOS. The documentation for APNS provides limited details about the implementation, but does specify expected behavior (*e.g.*, push connections are established over cellular connections even if Wi-Fi is available).

We explicitly verified all provided documentation and confirmed that all statements are true with the exception of the notification behavior with an iPad. The documentation states that the iPad will always remain associated with a Wi-Fi AP, even if it is not plugged in. Our experience shows this is not the case on an iPad 2.

We now further investigate the behavior of iOS push over time for three characteristic users. Figure 3 plots this in terms of the median number of push notifications received per user per hour. During the period, all users were in the same time zone.

First, the figure shows that all three users see significant numbers of push notifications even in idle, overnight periods. It is unclear what the value of such traffic is. Second, we clearly see significant differences in the volume of traffic among users. User 1 has registered to receive push notifications from multiple apps, while Users 2 and 3 have not. Last, we note that even with iOS 6’s “do not disturb” (DND) feature, push notifications continue to be sent during DND




Figure 4: Distribution of the interarrival times of Ethernet frames for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone plugged-in, with Wi-Fi and cellular enabled, and no VPN enabled. For each bin of 1 second, we count the number of interarrivals in that bin.

periods. Specifically, User 2 has enabled DND between midnight and 7am, but there is no noticeable change in APNS traffic. In summary, we can use *Meddle* to help understand the network behavior of closed systems; further, we identify several opportunities where we believe the OS can reduce or eliminate push traffic (during idle periods).

**Interaction between *Meddle* and the power management policy on iOS.** In the remainder of this section, we perform controlled experiments to understand the interaction between *Meddle*’s VPN connection and the power management policy on iOS. In summary, we find that the impact of the VPN depends on the power state and network interfaces used (Wi-Fi or cellular) on the device – but we show that the current power management policy on iOS might adversely impact the energy consumption when the APNS is heavily used. Further, we find that the changes in traffic patterns are relatively easy to identify, meaning *we can use traffic from Meddle to infer when a device is plugged in and which access technologies are available*.

All the following experiments are performed on an iPhone 4 with iOS 6.0.1. At the beginning of each experiment we close all applications and restart the iPhone. The iPhone is connected in Wi-Fi to a controlled access point on which we perform a tcpdump on the Wi-Fi interface and monitor the Wi-Fi association between the access point and the iPhone. Each experiment lasts for around 1 hour.

**Behavior when plugged in.** When an iPhone is plugged-in, it always remains associated with the Wi-Fi access point if Wi-Fi is enabled on the device. We performed a first set of experiments to observe the traffic to and from an idle iPhone. We see in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 that the largest interarrival between two frames is in the order of 10 seconds for both the VPN and no VPN scenarios. We also observe no noticeable difference in the arrival of frames with time for both scenarios. (The corresponding figures are omitted for space reasons.) *Thus, it appears that the VPN connection has no*




Figure 5: Distribution of the interarrival times of Ethernet frames for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone plugged-in, with Wi-Fi and cellular enabled, and VPN enabled. For each bin of 1 second, we count the number of interarrivals in that bin.

*noticeable impact on network traffic pattern when the device is plugged in.*

**Behavior when on battery.** In a second set of experiments, we consider a default iPhone setting with cellular and Wi-Fi enabled, and the iPhone unplugged. This corresponds to a typical setting for a user on move. We observed relatively large interarrival times for frames in this case (many on the order of 100s of seconds). These cases correspond to periods during which the Wi-Fi interface of the iPhone is not associated to the access point for energy saving.

Surprisingly, even though the iPhone is idle, the traffic pattern is not regular (Fig. 6). To understand this irregularity, we made a new experiment with cellular disabled. The largest interarrival is still in the order of 550 seconds, as in the case with cellular enabled, but we have less variety in the interarrival times. This is confirmed by Fig. 7 that shows a regular succession of short periods during which frames are exchanged and long periods during which the wifi interface is not associated to the access point.

Therefore, there is an evidence that the cellular connection triggers the association of the iPhone Wi-Fi interface with the access point. This is confirmed by experiments we performed with iMessage, which uses the push notification infrastructure of Apple. When both cellular and Wi-Fi are enabled on an iPhone, a permanent connection to the push notification infrastructure of Apple is setup on the cellular interface. Each time an iMessage is received, it is piggybacked on the push notification message (when short enough). Interestingly, the Wi-Fi interface is always woken-up even if no payload is sent on it. We don’t know the exact reason for this behavior, but it may have an adverse impact of battery life for users with frequent push notifications, *e.g.*, heavy users of SMS, twitter, facebook, games, *etc.*

In summary, APNS allows apps to interact with the user despite a strict energy-saving policy that prevents apps running in the background; however, *the systematic wake up of*




Figure 6: Cumulative distribution of the Ethernet frames arrival with time for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone unplugged, with Wi-Fi and cellular enabled, and no VPN enabled.




Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of the Ethernet frames arrival with time for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone unplugged, with Wi-Fi enabled, and no VPN enabled.

*the wifi interface might lead to an unnecessary severe increase in power consumption.*

*Behavior when Meddle is enabled.* We performed a third set of experiments with the VPN enabled. This set of experiments shows the interaction between *Meddle* and the power management policy. We see in Fig. 8 that there is no noticeable differences when enabling *Meddle* with Wi-Fi only. However, when enabling both Wi-Fi and cellular the frames interarrival time and the cumulative arrival of frames (Fig. 9) is significantly different. This difference between scenarios with and without cellular is due to the persistence of the cellular connection. Indeed, on the one hand, if messages are sent to the device when the cellular connection is disabled, they will be lost if the Wi-Fi interface is sleeping. Therefore, the Wi-Fi association periods are triggered by an internal device policy only. On the other hand, when the cellular connection is enabled, all messages sent to the device will be received. If the Wi-Fi interface is sleeping, messages received on the cellular interface will wake up the Wi-Fi interface. In that case, the Wi-Fi association periods are not only




Figure 8: Cumulative distribution of the Ethernet frames arrival with time for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone unplugged, with Wi-Fi enabled, and VPN enabled.




Figure 9: Cumulative distribution of the Ethernet frames arrival with time for a one hour experiment with an idle iPhone unplugged, with Wi-Fi and cellular enabled, and VPN enabled.

triggered by an internal device policy, but by external events too, which explains the very different interarrival times seen in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, and in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9.

The main question that remains is: what are these messages received on the cellular interface? In Fig. 9, we observe a pattern with a periodicity of around 45 seconds. This pattern does not exist when the VPN is disabled as shown in Fig. 6. We conclude that this periodicity is mostly due to keep alive messages of the VPN for NAT traversal. In Fig. 6, we observe what looks like a random wake up of the Wi-Fi interface when the VPN is disabled. We explored tcpdump traces for this scenario and for the scenario with the VPN enabled, looking for messages that explain the apparent randomness, but we did not find any such messages. Therefore, we guess that packets that do not use the VPN tunnel are received on the cellular interface. Such packets might be sent by the cellular provider to the device.

In conclusion, though *Meddle* appears to capture all IP traffic it may miss traffic in the circuit switched network when a cellular connection is enabled.



### 4.3 Case Study: Longitudinal Measurements

A key advantage of our approach is that we can monitor app behavior over time and as updates occur. This can lead to surprising or otherwise unpublicized revelations about network activity.

One prominent example is Google searches from mobile devices. In the desktop environment, we have grown accustomed to these searches occurring over HTTPS connections, which protects user privacy, *e.g.*, from carriers and from other users at open Wi-Fi hotspots.

In the mobile environment, however, we noticed that the default browsers on iOS and Android send user queries in the clear. In fact, each letter is sent as the user types it for the purpose of Google Suggestions. We observed this behavior on Android 4.0 and Android 4.1. In the case of iOS devices we observed search queries in the clear on devices running iOS 5.

Interestingly, as of iOS 6 and Android 4.2 these searches are now sent using HTTPS, addressing a significant privacy vulnerability. To the best of our knowledge this change has not been publicized.

### 4.4 Case Study: Misbehaving Apps

Smartphone users are often faced with the decision whether or not to trust an app downloaded from the iPhone App Store or the Android Market. The user can access some information *a priori* regarding the app’s behavior, *e.g.* via reading reviews or inspecting the permissions requested, but this provides at best an incomplete and at worst and incorrect view. Although some undesirable app behavior is obvious – *e.g.* pushing advertisements to the notifications bar, installing unwanted third-party software, *etc.* – the app’s network behavior remains generally invisible to the user even after installation. *Meddle* allows users and researchers to see this behavior and draw conclusions about whether it is appropriate. To guide our analysis in the rest of this section, we define several key network-usage properties that describe a “well behaved” app:

- Protection of personally identifiable information (PII): transmitting PII only when required for application functionality, and if transmitting PII, doing so over HTTPS rather than HTTP.
- Conservation of power and data quota by making only necessary use of network.
- Communication only with servers needed for the applications intended purpose, with preferably a limited number of entities contacted by the app overall.

**Survey of privacy violations in the wild.** In our dataset, we were surprised to find several examples of PII sent in the clear. Specifically, we identified IMEI (device unique identifiers) and GPS coordinates in HTTP request strings. Offending apps include The New York Times, The Weather Channel, Fox News, ESPNCRicInfo, FirstPost and Angry Birds.

For many of these apps, the privacy violations are due to included software for displaying ads. The key takeaway is that privacy violations from tracking software is pervasive and often easy to detect. When using *Meddle*, users limit their exposure to eavesdroppers because the connection to the *Meddle* server is encrypted. Further, in the next section we discuss how *Meddle* can strip this information.

**Controlled experiments.** While the above examples indicate clear examples of undesirable app behavior, it is more difficult to determine which traffic is strictly necessary for app functionality and which can be removed through blocking at a *Meddle* server. With this in mind, we used *Meddle* to perform a small app-by-app analysis of network usage behavior.

We downloaded six of the most popular apps from the Android Market and installed them on a fresh install of Android 4.1. The apps fall into the following categories: a mainstream image-sharing app, two popular games, a weather app, a settings

management app, and a risqué app serving various images. We interacted with each app for between 7 and 15 minutes to understand network behavior when the app is being used.

**Leaking PII.** None of the apps we installed for these experiments leaked PII over HTTP. However, there was evidence that the weather app was making use of a tracking service, contacting a third-party service which markets itself as specializing in “device tracking and fraud prevention.” It is unclear why a weather app requires a service for fraud prevention.

**Third Party Contacts.** The settings app and the game apps contacted a limited number of third parties. The settings app contacted Amazon, Google, a hosting service, and two CDN services. One game app contacted only Amazon, Google, and a single CDN provider, the other contacted only Amazon, Google, a private server belonging to the game developer, and three CDN/Ad services. The weather app, the image app, and the risqué app both contacted a large number of third party services; the weather app contacted 10 and the risqué app contacted 19.

**Resource Consumption.** Finally, we considered resource consumption towards both battery life and data caps.

The risqué app and the image app by far exhibited the largest traffic volumes: on average, the risqué app consumed 23.37 Kbps and the image app consumed 22.84 Kbps. Both apps were downloading large numbers of images. The weather app and settings app consumed 4.49 Kbps and 6.27 Kbps respectively; the games apps had much more limited bandwidth consumption with only 1.5 and 1.7 Kbps consumed each.

To evaluate behavior towards battery life, we considered the fraction of 30-second intervals during which no traffic was sent by the phone, rather than the amount of traffic sent overall. This metric captures cases where apps generate frequent traffic that causes the radio to stay powered for an ex-

Android	iOS
mercuryapps.foxnews.com	www.engadget.com
www.google.com	itunes.apple.com
www.quora.com	iadctest.qwapi.com
opml.radiotime.com	www.google.com
www.pandora.com	beacon.flipboard.com

Table 3: Top five sites using counterproductive compression.

tended period of time. The games apps, which were the best performers in terms of bandwidth consumption, were some of the worst performers in terms of radio usage: 78% and 66% of 30-second intervals generated network traffic. The worst performers overall were the settings app and the image app, which both generated traffic during 85% of 30-second intervals. The weather app, and the risqué app generated traffic during 23% and 49% of 30-second intervals respectively.

**Summary.** The risqué app acted maliciously in installing unwanted apps; whether or not the weather app acted maliciously through its use of a third party tracking service is unclear. However, all apps, even those that were decidedly non-malicious, had some questionable network behavior by contacting multiple third parties and making inefficient use of bandwidth and battery life. *Meddle* can help ameliorate some of these concerns: data consumption and third-party contacts can be restricted by blocking DNS lookups and connections to ad services. In §5.1, we discuss these filtering capabilities further.

## 4.5 Case Study: Traffic Optimization

In this section, we use *Meddle* to investigate whether there are opportunities for reducing data consumption using compression. For example, companies such as Onavo charge a fee for subscribers to use their compression proxies.

In our data set we observed that 42.45% of the all the HTTP flows (1.06% by volume) have a mime-type containing “text.” This implies that the content can be potentially compressed by the remote server. Importantly, our analysis reveals that 23% of HTTP flows are uncompressed, and these flows contribute only 0.5% of our users’ total data. Thus, we believe there are few meaningful opportunities for injecting compression at a meddlebox; instead, we believe most improvements will come from transcoding media content to lower bitrates and resolution.

Interestingly, we also observe that compression is counterproductive for 4% of the all the flows that have a mime-type containing “text” – the volume of data after compression is larger than the volume before compression. In Table 3 we present the top five sources of traffic for which compression is counterproductive. As one example, we find that despite good intentions, Google’s use of compression for search responses generally does more harm than good.

## 5. CONTROLLING MOBILE TRAFFIC

In this section, we use two case studies to highlight some of the advantages *Meddle* provides as a new point of control for mobile networking traffic. We then discuss several new applications that take advantage of *Meddle*’s location outside of a mobile network.

### 5.1 Packet Filtering

Packet filtering is a common technique implemented in today’s middleboxes. These can be used for implementing security policies, censoring content or preventing applications from harming the network (*e.g.*, P2P). In *Meddle*, we use packet filtering to enable a number of features that are currently either unavailable or poorly implemented.

**Device-wide ad blocking.** Content and service providers typically use revenue from advertisements to cover their costs, enabling “free” access for users. Given the additional costs in terms of data volume, battery consumption and potentially reduced privacy from tracking, it is unclear just how “free” these services truly are. For example, Vallina-Rodriguez *et al.* [30] observe that ads account for 5% of daily traffic from more than 50% of Android users in a large European ISP.

To understand the impact of ads using *Meddle* as a vantage point, we analyzed our traces and identified traffic for ads and analytics (A&A) servers in terms of the portion of total traffic. Figure 10 presents our results. The x-axis represents users and the y-axis indicates the percent of total traffic generated by A&A servers for all traffic and for only cellular traffic.

We first observe that the amount of A&A traffic per user is highly variable but can be significant. For example, the user with the largest total volume of traffic (user 1) saw 54.25 MB of ad traffic. The user with the largest portion of ad traffic (user 11) saw approximately 3% of all traffic coming from A&A servers, which corresponds to 8.3 MB.

Next, we observe that the amount of ad traffic can differ significantly based on whether the user is on cellular or not. Thus, a view of A&A traffic that considers only cellular traffic can miss significant activity. To determine whether ad traffic differs across access technology, we use the following metric. First we find the ratio of a user’s ad traffic over cellular to that over Wi-Fi. Next, we find the ratio of a user’s overall traffic over cellular to that over Wi-Fi. We then take the ratio of the two, with the ad-traffic ratio in the numerator. If A&A traffic were evenly distributed with non-A&A traffic, we expect the ratio to be close to 1.

We include this ratio in parentheses in the figure. Users that do not have a cellular connection (tablets) have a value (-). Most A&A traffic occurs relatively evenly regardless of access technology (*i.e.*, most of users have value in the range of 1). For user 4, there is a clear exception. We were able to isolate this to a specific app using the request user agent. In this case, the we identified the traffic as coming from Niantic, a service that supports Google’s Field Trip and Ingress apps. These are examples of augmented reality apps; we observe that their rising popularity could significantly impact




Figure 10: Portion of user’s traffic generated by ads and analytics (A&A). A significant portion of traffic (up to 3%) comes from A&A servers. For most users the A&A traffic occurs independently of access technology, but for some users it occurs much more often on cellular than on Wi-Fi.

users’ data usage over cellular.

Our results, along with related work, highlight the fact that A&A traffic can be significant. However, there is no current standard for opting out of unsolicited advertising; those that exist for tracking are not widely supported. Not surprisingly, many users have turned to software that blocks A&A servers. For example, more than 20 million users have installed AdBlockPlus<sup>2</sup>, one of several tools for this purpose. Unlike the desktop environment, mobile device browsers do not provide support for ad blocking; further, most interactions occur inside of apps where browser plugins cannot help.

*Meddle* makes it easy to implement an efficient, device-wide ad blocker. In our current implementation, we use a DNS-based filter to block ads, analytics, and mediation sites.<sup>3</sup> A key feature of our solution is that it works regardless of whether SSL is used because DNS requests occur out of band from the secure connection. Further, our response for the DNS request is an IP address corresponding to `localhost`, meaning that devices will generate no external network traffic when failing to resolve the ad servers.

Our ad blocking engine relies on a publicly available list of domains for A&A servers [1]; we augment this list of domains using recent research on mobile ads [12, 15]. From our initial deployment, we observed a 0.05% to 3% reduction in total traffic at each mobile device due to our ad blocking engine. In addition to the DNS-based filter, we are currently implementing a filter that blocks requests for URLs matching a regular expression, as done by AdBlockPlus.

<sup>2</sup><http://www.adblockplus.org>

<sup>3</sup>The service is disabled by default, so users must opt in to enable blocking.

Finally, we note that wholesale blocking of advertisements may be considered harmful to the long-term viability of services that do not charge fees. In Section 5.3, we discuss an alternative model that incorporates a Privad proxy implemented as a meddlebox.

**Do not disturb.** Many users do not turn off their devices at night, even while asleep. In our study, we found that most (89%) of the devices were active for at least one entire 24-hour period. Network traffic occurring during those periods is generally not helpful for the user; worse, such traffic may cause audible alerts that wake up the user. In part to address this, iOS 6 introduced a “Do not disturb” feature that silences the phone. We are unaware of such support on Android.

*Meddle* enables a cross-platform and cross-device “Do not disturb” for network traffic. Users specify the hours when traffic should be blocked and the corresponding meddlebox will drop all traffic. Further, for critical notifications, users can specify hosts that should *not* be blocked. An interesting area of future work is to map apps to their network-traffic signatures, enabling users to specify per-app policies via *Meddle*.

**Content Restrictions.** Existing controls for restricting access to content from mobile devices (*e.g.* parental controls) tend to focus on which apps a user cannot run. For example, a parent can block the Facebook app on an iOS device. To the best of our knowledge, there is no way to prevent a user from using a Web browser to access the Facebook site, unless all Web browser activity is blocked.

In general, blocking all browser activity is too prohibitive. Using *Meddle*, however, we can blacklist traffic only for all IPs known to belong to a content or service provider. For example, to block Facebook we would block IPs belonging to Facebook, as well as any traffic using Facebook SSL certificates (*e.g.*, for accessing content hosted by CDNs).

## 5.2 Traffic Manipulation

An advantage of *Meddle* is that it provides isolation from carriers’ in-network middleboxes, which may block, modify or shape certain network traffic. However, toward the goal of improving transparency in mobile networks (especially for non-*Meddle* users), we would like to be able to identify when, how and what network traffic is subject to carrier manipulation.

In this section, we describe how we use *Meddle* to detect HTTP interference via in-flight Web page changes. We believe our technique is general to other protocols.

The problem of HTTP interference was highlighted by Reis et al. [21]. The authors demonstrated that although a small percent of users were affected by in-flight changes, those changes tended to introduce vulnerabilities such as overflows and cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. They proposed and deployed *Web Tripwires*, Javascript code that detects in-flight page changes. The main limitation of their study is that the approach requires each Web site to modify their content to include a tripwire.




Figure 11: Overview of the *Meddle* Web tripnet. A Web page is loaded through the VPN tunnel, where a middlebox inserts a Web tripwire. The tripwire causes the browser to reload the Web page using the address of a transparent proxy server that is accessed using an unencrypted connection. After the proxied version of the page is loaded, the browser or a middlebox can compare the two pages to identify potential interference.

**Web Tripnets.** Using *Meddle*, we extended tripwires to alleviate this limitation. Namely, we use *Meddle* to inject a tripwire on *any* page without requiring support from Web site developers – an approach we call a *Web Tripnet*.

When enabled, the Web tripnet works as follows (depicted in Fig. 11). First, the device requests a Web page via HTTP (1). Because the *Meddle* connection is encrypted, the device’s provider cannot alter the page in flight. When the Web server response arrives at the *Meddle* server (2), we insert a Web tripwire before forwarding the response to the user.

To detect whether the carrier would have manipulated the page without *Meddle*, we create a *pigeonhole* by configuring the device’s VPN settings to send traffic for a particular site in the clear. When the Web tripwire attempts to load another copy of the Web page (3), the request is redirected (using DNS) to a transparent proxy that forwards the request to the intended server, retrieves the Web page and delivers it to the device in the clear (thus exposing it to carrier manipulation). Upon receiving the page over an unencrypted channel, the device’s browser sends both versions of the Web page (tunneled and untunneled) to the *Meddle* server for analysis.

**Experimental Results.** We conducted a survey of HTTP manipulation using two US carriers (Verizon and T-Mobile) and one French carrier (Orange). To determine if the user agent can impact manipulation from carriers, we tested using Android, iOS and a desktop (tethered) browser. We tested the top 100 sites according to Alexa, in addition to a random sample of 100 of the 10,000 most popular sites. Our analysis did not identify any carrier manipulation. This is not entirely surprising, since most manipulation identified by Reis et al. occurred due to software installed inside a user’s network.

An interesting observation is that we found one example

where Facebook over Verizon included a promotional link specific to Verizon, even when the connection was proxied through a host at the University of Washington. Further analysis showed that the Squid proxy’s X-Forwarded-For field was being populated with an address in Verizon’s network, and Facebook was modifying the page accordingly. When we removed the X-Forwarded-For field, the promotional link no longer appeared.

### 5.3 New Applications

*Meddle* allows researchers to explore the space of applications that offload networking traffic from mobile devices to a server where power and data quota are less scarce. We list several key applications that can benefit from our approach.

- **P2P offloading.** P2P services tend to benefit from multiple connections and symmetric bandwidth contributions from participating hosts. Both are costly in the mobile environment. *Meddle* can ease these costs by offloading the maintenance of P2P connections to a middlebox.
- **Privad.** Instead of simply blocking ads, *Meddle* is an ideal location to deploy anonymizing systems that support targeted advertising, as suggested by Guha et al. [10].
- **Tor.** *Meddle* improves privacy in mobile networking by encrypting the connection from the mobile device to the *Meddle* server. We can further improve privacy and anonymity by providing a Tor middlebox that establishes and manages onion-routed connections.
- **Privacy Preserving Photo Sharing.** Ra et al. [20] propose using indirection to support privacy-preserving photo-sharing for mobile users. *Meddle* provides an ideal vantage point from which to deploy this service without requiring users to install additional apps.

## 6. DISCUSSION

In this section, we discuss several key issues and limitations for an indirection-based deployment such as *Meddle*.

**Privacy and trust.** As discussed in §3.3, we collect traces from users as part of an IRB-approved study. We take great care in protecting user privacy – data is encrypted before being stored, the private key is not stored on the server where data is recorded and any PII sent in the clear by apps is stripped from our datasets as soon as we identify it.

While this fine-grained data is useful for informing the design of middlebox solutions (e.g., identifying and stripping personally identifiable information from unencrypted HTTP traffic), it can be prohibitive for a large-scale study. In the next phase of our deployment (currently under IRB review) we will capture only packet headers and lengths. With a lower privacy risk, we believe we can recruit a larger number of users and obtain informed consent via a Web site.

Regardless, users may still be uncomfortable with sending all their traffic through a *Meddle* service, be it in a hosting center or in the cloud. We are making all of our code open source so that users can install *Meddle* on servers in their own networks (e.g., in their home network). Users may opt

to use this option instead; however, they will also be responsible for updating *Meddle* to include the latest new features and bug fixes. We expect that most users interested in running *Meddle* will be content with using our hosted *Meddle* service with anonymized packet headers being collected.

**Acceptable use.** Similar to any service providing Internet access, *Meddle* needs an acceptable use policy (AUP) to ensure that we are not liable for user activity. We model our AUP after the one provided by EC2, one of our potential hosting providers. Users are informed of this AUP at install time. If we are notified of an AUP violation, we can isolate the user generating the traffic because each user is given separate certificate-based credentials. This makes it easy to remove offending users without disrupting compliant users.

**ISP objections.** Many mobile carriers deploy in-network middleboxes for traffic engineering purposes. By tunneling *all* traffic, these boxes lose the ability to implement ISPs' policies, which could lead to suboptimal performance for our users and for other users sharing the network.

We believe that addressing such concerns is straightforward. First, we do not expect *every* device to run *Meddle*. If we were to attract even 1% of mobile users that would be a surprisingly huge success. Thus we do not expect *Meddle* to significantly impact overall traffic in a mobile network. Second, if *Meddle* traffic were to become a significant traffic engineering challenge, we argue that transparency can go a long way toward addressing the issue. Namely, given sufficient information we can implement policies to address problematic traffic using either middleboxes or pigeonholes that send traffic outside of the VPN tunnel.

**Scalability and reliability.** If successful, *Meddle* will face scalability and reliability challenges as the number of users increases. In terms of scalability, we believe that, in return for valuable measurement and experimentation data, we can justify funding to support some number of thousands of users. For a larger deployment, we may have to consider a paid service or alternative economic models. By running the service in the cloud and using DNS-based redirection, we expect service unavailability to be relatively rare.

**Limitations.** We believe that *Meddle* enables a large number of interesting studies and experiments in the mobile environment. However, there are limits to its effectiveness.

First, *Meddle* captures only network traffic. It does not allow us to gain access to sensors on the device, information about what apps are running or control over those apps on the device. An interesting question is what are the limits of what one can infer from a device's network traffic alone. We have shown that iOS network traffic exhibits clear, identifiable differences when plugged in versus running on battery, lending evidence that we can successfully infer properties of the phone previously available only by querying from an app on the device. Likewise, we used SSL certificates to distinguish which app generates requests to a CDN.

Second, *Meddle* may miss some data traffic. For example, we found evidence that iOS push was using signaling on a

circuit-switched channel (SMS). We believe the volume of "missing" traffic is small; however, it remains to be seen how this holds generally and over time. As mobile networks transition to all-IP, it will be interesting to see if an approach like *Meddle* can indeed capture all of a device's traffic.

Last, *Meddle* incurs costs that may dissuade adoption. We discussed several of the overheads based on establishing a VPN tunnel. One area of future work is to improve VPN protocols to reduce the time to establish a connection.

## 7. RELATED WORK

*Meddle* builds upon two existing technologies: VPNs and middleboxes. In our current implementation, we rely on an IPsec [14] implementation to tunnel traffic to *Meddle* servers. Sekar et al. [22] investigated consolidating middleboxes to reduce costs and improve load balance. Sherry et al. [23] explore the opportunities enabled by moving middleboxes to the cloud, which includes simplifying management for enterprise network administrators. In contrast, our work focuses on the mobile capabilities that software middleboxes enable rather than a redirection architecture for enterprise networks.

*Meddle* provides researchers with a cross-platform, cross-carrier technique for capturing network usage patterns from mobile devices. Previous work used on-demand active measurements to characterize performance [33, 25]; however, these measurements are restricted to the time and location at which users run the tests. Gerber et al. [9] use passive measurements alone to estimate transfer rates in a single carrier's network; *Meddle* enables such analysis across multiple carriers and access technologies.

We use *Meddle* to investigate security and privacy issues in the traffic that mobile devices generate. By monitoring and controlling information at lower layers in the software stack, previous work [7, 12, 28] has shown that existing apps leak significant private information. In *Meddle*, we take this downward mobility to an extreme, moving off the end-host entirely and eliminating the restrictions of a lab setting. We demonstrated that many identifiers are being leaked in the clear, which our approach can block or modify without needing any additional support (*e.g.*, taint tracking) from the operating system. We are investigating opportunities for detecting information leakage when apps use encrypted channels and/or obfuscation.

*Meddle* allows us to improve data and energy consumption by blocking unsolicited content such as advertisements, and by blocking unwanted traffic during idle periods. Vallina-Rodriguez et al. [31] demonstrated that ads account for a significant portion of data consumption. Pathak et al. [16] showed that ads can consume a significant fraction of an app's overall energy consumption. Importantly, *Meddle* not only allows us to characterize unsolicited content, but also allows us to block it without OS or app modification.

The CloneCloud [5] and MAUI [6] projects explored the space of moving functionality from mobile devices into the

cloud. By interposing on user traffic, *Meddle* will allow us to explore some of this functionality without requiring OS modifications.

## 8. CONCLUSION

In this work we described *Meddle*, a system that improves transparency and control for mobile network traffic. We achieve portable, pervasive and passive coverage by using VPN connections to redirect device traffic to a server we control. We then use software middleboxes to interpose on traffic and thus provide users and researchers with control of flows from mobile devices. Our solution exhibits reasonably low overheads, provides comprehensive visibility into mobile network traffic, and allows us to easily deploy new services without requiring additional support from devices, OSes, apps or service providers. We are currently expanding our user base, building a software infrastructure that efficiently supports a distributed deployment on cloud infrastructure and deploying new services that run atop *Meddle*.

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