

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

BEHIND THE GLASS DOOR  
UNRAVELING HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE IN OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE

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BY CHRIS LIAO

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## Abstract

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Advisors: Ali Hortacısu, Jesse Shapiro

Hierarchies/OSS: Luis Garicano, Josh Lerner, Frank Nagle

Econ Friends: Jordan Rosenthal-kay, Noah Sobel-Lewin

Research Supervisors: Scott Nelson, Thomas Sargent, George Hall, James Traina

Undergrad Econ Dept: Victor Lima, Kotaro Yoshida

Friends

Family

UChicago IT: Colin Hudler

OSS contributors: Anna Woodard + various survey respondents

# 1 Introduction

**Paragraphs 1-2: Motivation.** After reading these paragraphs a reader in any field of economics should believe that if you answer your research question your paper will make an important contribution.

The development of open source software (OSS), software that can be accessed, modified and redistributed without additional cost, is an \$8.8 trillion industry (Hoffmann, Nagle, and Zhou 2024). OSS components are present in 70-90% of all software and have been adopted by businesses across many industries, such as tech, retail and auto (Nagle 2017). This paper was produced using OSS such as LaTeX, Overleaf and Python. The distribution of OSS sans cost means that many organizations that develop OSS software projects are unlike traditional firms because their "employees" — OSS contributors who help build the software — are volunteers. Consequently, the full time job of many OSS contributors is not developing OSS, so their contribution time to OSS is their choice. However, as volunteers, OSS contributors also have time freedom, as they, not the firm, determines how to allocate their time across different tasks. OSS organizations aren't totally unrecognizable when compared with traditional firms either. OSS organizations have multiple layers of hierarchy. Both the organizational structure and the contributors in the organization are affected by technological advances, ranging from economy-wide developments such as the advent of artificial intelligence to OSS-specific shocks platform improvements by OSS hosting sites like GitHub.

While OSS development has been studied extensively, the relationship between OSS organizational structure and OSS development, and the impact of technological advancement on that dynamic is not well understood. Developing an economic model that can help us better understand OSS development is crucial because of the importance of OSS in the economy. Using the lens of OSS organizational structure to study OSS development is important because OSS cannot be produced without the work of its contributors, whose tasks and roles are affected by OSS organizational structure. Moreover, understanding how technological advances affect the relationship between OSS organizational structure and OSS development is also important for two reasons. First, the digital and technology-focused nature of OSS development means that OSS contributors, and hence, the organization, are likely to be among the first affected by technological advances. Moreover, understanding the impact of technological advances can help policymakers and OSS stakeholders make more informed decisions about OSS. The hierarchical nature of OSS organizations makes it tempting to apply models of hierarchy from the economics literature (Garicano 2000); however,

those models are insufficient because they are inspired by traditional firms with typical employment structures.

**Paragraphs 3-4: Challenges.** These paragraphs explain why your research question has not already been answered, i.e., what are the central challenges a researcher must tackle to answer this question.

The organizational structure of OSS development has been widely documented by researchers as a hierarchical process, but how that hierarchy affects OSS development have not been widely studied (Crowston and Howison 2006). Economists have modelled hierarchical structure in traditional firms, but modelling hierarchical structure in OSS development requires solving two challenges that existing models are not equipped for (Garicano 2000). First, the model must incorporate the constrained nature of an OSS contributor's contribution time and their time freedom. Existing models fail because they model traditional firms that determine what tasks their employees do and how much time they spend on the job. In OSS development, contributors choose what tasks to work on, and their total contribution time is their choice, not the OSS organization's choice (Lerner and Tirole 2002). Second, the model must describe the decision making process of OSS organizations, which differ from traditional firms. Traditional firms decide how to allocate employees across the hierarchy after observing employee wages and training costs, which they incur. OSS organizations also determine the allocation of employees across the hierarchy, but wages and training costs are not part of their decision making function as they incur none of those.

A model that solves both of these challenges will allow us to characterize the decisions that OSS contributors and organizations make. These changes are necessary because existing models of hierarchy produce puzzling results when applied to OSS organizations. One notable result from the hierarchy literature, applied to OSS development, is that OSS contributors ranked higher on the hierarchy should never be the ones writing code to solve new tasks. This is not true in OSS software development, as the data shows plenty of highly ranked contributors solving newly encountered problems.

**Paragraph 5: This Paper.** This paragraph states in a nutshell what the paper accomplishes and how.

In this paper, I develop a model of hierarchical structure in OSS development, where OSS contributors have time freedom and OSS organizations, who aren't responsible for paying or assigning tasks to contributors, determine the hierarchy's structure. Solving for the equilibrium OSS contributors' and organization's decision functions is the key to characterizing how hierarchical structure affects OSS development, my first aim.

Using these equilibrium results, I follow the hierarchy literature in examining how technological advances - specifically, the cost of knowledge acquisition and the cost of communication - affects organizational structure and subsequently OSS development, accomplishing my second aim. Finally, I use novel microdata on OSS development from GitHub, the world's largest OSS hosting platform to compare my model's predictions to the empirical reality of OSS development.

**Paragraphs 6-7: Model. Summarize the key formal assumptions you will maintain in your analysis.**

The hierarchical model I propose features two layers of hierarchy. OSS contributors in both ranks are risk neutral and choose between spending time acquiring knowledge, or performing various tasks that help further develop the OSS. Following the hierarchy literature, OSS contributors within a rank are homogeneous (Garicano 2000). OSS contributor incentives differ by rank; while lower rank contributors are mostly concerned with finding a problem solution, higher rank contributors prioritize the project's overall welfare. OSS organizations want to promote the optimal number of highly rank contributors to maximize output; however, while they do not pay wages or assign tasks, they do incur costs for hiring and coordinating with lots of highly ranked OSS contributors.

**Paragraphs 8-9: Data. Explain where you obtain your data and how you measure the concepts that are central to your study.**

**Paragraphs 10-11: Methods. Explain how you take your model to the data and how you overcome the challenges you raised in paragraphs 3-4.**

**Paragraphs 12-13: Findings. Describe the key findings. Make sure they connect clearly to the motivation in paragraphs 1-2.**

**Paragraphs 14-15: Literature. Lay out the two main ways your paper contributes to the literature. Each paragraph should center around one contribution and should explain precisely how your paper differs from the most closely related recent work.**

## 2 Model

### 2.1 Background

An OSS project's development can be abstracted to solving a variety of tasks; example tasks include fixing software bugs, implementing new features or writing documentation for the codebase. These tasks are solved by OSS contributors from the project, whose

task-solving ability depends on the task difficulty  $z \in [0, 1]$  and their own knowledge  $k \in [0, 1]$ , as tasks of difficulty  $z$  can only be solved by those with knowledge  $k \geq z$ .

There are two types of agents whose decision-making process we're interested in: OSS contributors, and the OSS project. OSS contributors are characterized by their rank: read or write. Read rank contributors are below write rank contributors on the hierarchy. One real-world example of a read rank contributor is a OSS project user whose encountering some bugs related to that software. He needs the bug solved to accomplish his primary mission and he's not interested in contributing to the project beyond helping find a solution to the bug so he can continue using the software. On the other hand, a write-rank contributor is typically a longstanding contributor to the OSS project. She's knowledgeable about a large proportion of the project's scope and importantly, her rank also provides a signal to employers about her skill level. The more developed and well-known the project is, the more her career prospects improve, because it will increase her visibility to employers offering attractive positions (Hann et al. 2002).

All OSS contributors spend time  $t_p$  in production, the term I use for solving new tasks, and acquiring knowledge  $k$ . A real-life example would be the time tradeoff a contributor makes between reading documentation about the project's different aspects, which helps them understand a larger proportion of the project's scope, and spending time solving additional pieces of the encountered problem. While the two choices are substitutes, being an effective contributor would be difficult without having spent time on both tasks as well. Read rank contributors attempt to solve all tasks that they encounter using effort  $t_p^r$ , but their limited knowledge  $k^r < 1$  means they cannot assess whether their proposed solution is correct. As a consequence, write rank contributors also spent time  $t_h^w$  helping correct incorrectly solved problems. Following the literature (Garicano 2000), I assume that write rank contributors correct all incorrect problems solutions. I denote distinguish between task type using variable letters or subscripts, and rank-specific variables using superscripts. Following Bloom et al. 2014, all write-rank contributors have perfect knowledge  $k^w = 1$  which allows the project to solves all tasks it encounters. This is a reasonable assumption as I'm focused on studying how organizational structure affects software development, not how the level of programmer knowledge affects software development. I also follow the literature and assume that within a rank, contributors are homogeneous 0(Garicano 2000).

The OSS project's role is to allocate contributors across the hierarchy. I normalize the total number of OSS contributors to 1 and since there are only two ranks in the hierarchy, when the project promotes  $\beta_w$  contributors to write rank, there are  $1 - \beta_w$

read rank OSS contributors. In my primary results, I assume that given the optimal number of contributors  $\beta_w^*$  the OSS project promotes to write rank, there are  $\beta \geq \beta_w^*$  contributors who want to be promoted. This may not always be realistic, as some OSS contributors may not want to be promoted so  $\beta < \beta_w^*$ . The OSS project takes into account the decision function of OSS contributors and how their equilibrium decisions may be affected by the project's choice of  $\beta_w^*$  when choosing  $\beta_w^*$ . I assume that the OSS project is aware of the decision function of its contributors because each rank's specific incentives, as I described earlier, are well known and documented in the literature on incentives for contributing to OSS (Lerner and Tirole 2002, Lakhani and Hippel 2003, Krogh, Spaeth, and Lakhani 2003, Robert G. Wolf and Karim R. Lakhani 2003).

In OSS development, write rank contributors also spend time approving problems. Approving problem solutions is important because it provides a signal to the general public that problem solutions are correct. In my model, I omit approval from the write rank contributor's choice set because adding it does not provide additional interesting insights about how organizational structure affects OSS development. Approving problem solutions is critical for project success, so it's a responsibility that will always have to be fulfilled by write rank contributors and has the straightforward effect of taking time away from production for write rank contributors.

## 2.2 Set Up

### 2.2.1 Read Rank

Tasks of difficulty  $k$  appear with probability  $f(k)$  and associated CDF  $F(k)$ . In expectation, read-rank contributors with knowledge  $k^r$  that spend  $t_p^r$  time in production solve  $t_p^r F(k^r)$  tasks correctly. Since all tasks solved incorrectly by read rank contributors are corrected by all write-rank contributors, in expectation,  $t_p^r(1 - F(k^r))$  of each read-rank contributor's incorrectly solutions are fixed.

The read rank contributor's utility is affected by the proportion of all tasks they attempt that they solve correctly. While their primary goal is to obtain a solution, they also benefit from being the problem solver. In OSS development, contributors acquire skills from learning how to solve problems that have long-run benefits, and their ability to use problem solutions in their primary mission is enhanced when they provided and understand the solution. They face costs of  $c_r(t_p^r, k^r)$  because of the opportunity cost of time. Thus, a read rank contributor solves

$$\max_{\{k^r, t_p^r\}} u_r(t_p^r F(k^r) + \omega_r(t_p^r(1 - F(k^r)))) - c_r(t_p^r, k^r) \quad (1)$$



$\omega_r < 1$  helps mediate the reduced benefit read rank contributors receive when their problems are solved by others. I make the following assumptions about  $u_r, c_r$ .

1.  $u_r$  is linear. Thus,  $u_r(x) = \alpha_r x + \beta_r$  where  $\alpha_r > 0, \beta_r \in \mathbb{R}$ . Since read rank programmers make their decisions only knowing the expectation of their outcomes, practically, this assumption allows me to apply linearity of expectations and remove the expectation. This assumption is reasonable because the utility read rank contributors believe they will get for solving  $t_p^r$  problems with knowledge  $k^r$  is invariant to the dispersion in their quantity of problems solved created by dispersion in  $F(k^r)$ . I believe read rank contributors are invariant to dispersion because observing programming problem difficulty dispersion ex ante is also a tall order. This problem is further amplified by the fact that read-rank programmers, who are primarily users, not developers of the relevant software, may have limited domain-specific knowledge about implementing the relevant problem solutions.
2. The first derivative of the cost function is increasing. Formally,

$$\frac{\partial c_r}{\partial t_p^r} > 0 \quad \frac{\partial c_r}{\partial k^r} > 0$$

Intuitively, contributing to OSS costs time that could be spent on an OSS contributor's primary mission.

3. The second derivative and cross partials of the cost function are increasing. Formally,

$$\frac{\partial^2 c_r}{\partial (t_p^r)^2} > 0 \quad \frac{\partial^2 c_r}{\partial (k^r)^2} > 0 \quad \frac{\partial^2 c_r}{\partial t_p^r \partial k^r} > 0$$

An extreme but helpful motivating example is to compare the marginal cost of spending 10 minutes contributing to OSS, which is much higher when you have only contributed for 10 minutes, as opposed to when you have already contributed for 23 hours that day, and you really should grab an hour or two of sleep!

4. The marginal cost of the initial time spent contributing to OSS is negligible. Formally,

$$\lim_{k^r \rightarrow 0^+} \frac{\partial c_r}{\partial k^r} = 0 \quad \lim_{t_p^r \rightarrow 0^+} \frac{\partial c_r}{\partial t_p^r} = 0$$

The assumption's practical effect is that the optimal choice of  $k^r, t_p^r$  will always be economically interesting as their choice of  $t_p^r > 0, k^r > 0$ . I make this assumption because this paper is focused on actual, not hypothetical OSS contributors.

### 2.2.2 Write Rank

The project's perceived success by outsiders is determined by its output. In aggregate,  $1 - \beta_w$  read-rank contributors are expected to solve  $(1 - \beta_w)t_p^r F(k^r)$  tasks correctly. Each write-rank contributor spends  $t_p^w$  time solving new tasks correctly with their perfect knowledge and  $t_h^w$  time helping correct read rank contributors solutions. Since all incorrect problem solutions are corrected,  $\beta_w t_h^w = h(1 - \beta_w)t_p^r(1 - F(k^r))$ . The  $h > 1$  represents communication costs encountered in helping correct problems. Note that  $t_h^w$  is decreasing in  $\beta_w, t_p^r$  and  $F(k^r)$ , and increasing in  $h$ . In aggregate,  $\beta_w$  write rank contributors solve  $\beta_w t_p^w + (1 - \beta_w)t_p^r(1 - F(k^r))$  tasks and in total, the project solves

$$(1 - \beta_w)t_p^r + \beta_w t_p^w$$

problems correctly.

Note that since their helping time  $t_h^w$  is fixed, I can define it perfectly as a function of  $\beta_w, h, t_p^r$  and  $k^r$  in the write rank contributor's problem. Accordingly, the write ranked contributor faces costs  $c_w \left( t_p^w, t_h^w = \frac{h(1 - \beta_w)t_p^r(1 - F(k^r))}{\beta_w}, k^w = 1 \right)$  from contributing, so they solve

$$\max_{\{t_p^w\}} u_w \left( (1 - \beta_w)t_p^r + \beta_w t_p^w \right) - c_w \left( t_p^w, t_h^w = \frac{h(1 - \beta_w)t_p^r(1 - F(k^r))}{\beta_w}, k^w = 1 \right)$$

I make the following assumptions about  $u_w, c_w$

1.  $u_w$  is linear. Thus,  $u_w(x) = \alpha_w x + \beta_w$ ,  $\alpha_w > 0$ . As described in **jr'mythical'1995**, even experienced software developers are unable to reliably estimate the time required to complete a project, even if they understand the conceptual difficulty of a problem. Thus, because write rank contributors do not observe problem difficulty dispersion, linear utility is a reasonable assumption.
2. The first derivative of the cost function is increasing in. Formally,

$$\frac{\partial c_w}{\partial t_p^w} > 0 \quad \frac{\partial c_w}{\partial t_h^w} > 0$$

3. The second derivative of production in the cost function are increasing. Formally,

$$\frac{\partial^2 c_w}{\partial (t_p^w)^2} > 0 \quad \frac{\partial^2 c_w}{\partial (t_h^w)^2} > 0 \quad \frac{\partial^2 c_w}{\partial t_h^w \partial t_p^w} > 0$$

4. The marginal cost of the initial time spent contributing to production in OSS is

negligible. Formally,

$$\lim_{t_p^w \rightarrow 0^+} \frac{\partial c_w}{\partial t_p^w} = 0 \quad \lim_{t_h^w \rightarrow 0^+} \frac{\partial c_w}{\partial t_h^w} = 0$$

### 2.2.3 Organization

The OSS organization's objectives are not as simple as maximizing its perceived output. While the OSS organization benefits from increased output, it encounters coordination problems from having too many write ranked programmers. For example, the costs of hiring, screening and coordinating with different write ranked contributors increases as the number of write ranked contributors  $\beta_w$  increase. I describe this cost as  $c_o(\beta_w)$ . Practically, this prevents the OSS organization from promoting everyone to write rank, which is what it would do absent  $c_o$ . This reflects the empirical reality of OSS organizations, which are largely composed of read rank contributors.

Thus, the OSS organization solves

$$\max_{\{\beta_w\}} u_o \left( (1 - \beta_w)t_p^r + \beta_w t_p^w \right) - c_o(\beta_w)$$

I make the following assumptions about  $u_o, c_o$

1.  $u_o$  is linear. Thus,  $u_o(x) = \alpha_o x + \beta_o, \alpha_o > 0$ . Abstractly, we can think about the OSS organization's conception of problem difficulty dispersion as the ability of a few write ranked contributors (who also have additional managerial responsibilities) to perceive problem difficulty dispersion. These special write ranked contributors are responsible for promoting people. **jr'mythical'1995** states that the difficulty of estimating how long a project takes to complete typically comes from the manager's misestimation. From this, we can conclude that organizations also cannot observe problem difficulty dispersion so linear utility is a reasonable assumption.
2. The first derivative of the cost function is increasing. Formally,

$$\frac{\partial c_o}{\partial \beta_w} > 0$$

3. The second derivative of the cost function is increasing. Formally,

$$\frac{\partial^2 c_o}{\partial (\beta_w)^2} > 0 \tag{2}$$

4. The marginal cost of coordinating with the first write rank programmer is negligible. Formally,

$$\lim_{\beta_w \rightarrow 0^+} \frac{\partial c_o}{\partial \beta_w} = 0$$

## 2.3 Solving the Model

### 2.3.1 Read Rank

Solving for the first order conditions tells us that read rank programmers find  $k^r, t_p^r$  solving

$$\frac{t_p^r(1 - \omega_r)f(k^r)}{F(k^r) + \omega_r(1 - F(k^r))} = \frac{\frac{\partial c_r}{\partial k^r}}{\frac{\partial c_r}{\partial t_p^r}}$$

### 2.3.2 Write Rank

The write rank contributor's problem so

$$\max_{\{t_p^w\}} u_w((1 - \beta_w)t_p^r + \beta_w t_p^w) - c_w \left( t_p^w, t_h^w = \frac{h(1 - \beta_w)t_p^r(1 - F(k^r))}{\beta_w}, k^w = 1 \right)$$

Note that  $\frac{\partial u_w}{\partial \beta_w} = \alpha_w$  so

$$t_p^w \text{ solves } \alpha_w \beta_w - \frac{\partial c_w}{\partial t_h^w} \frac{\partial t_h^w}{\partial \beta_w} \frac{\partial \beta_w}{\partial t_p^w} = \frac{\partial c_w}{\partial t_p^w}$$

We also know that  $\frac{\partial t_h^w}{\partial \beta_w} = -\frac{ht_p^r(1 - F(k^r))}{(\beta_w)^2}$ .

### 2.3.3 Organization Solution

The organization's problem is

$$\max_{\{\beta_w\}} u_o((1 - \beta_w)t_p^r + \beta_w t_p^w) - c_o(\beta_w)$$

so

$$\beta_w \text{ solves } \alpha_o(t_p^w - t_p^r) = \frac{\partial c_o}{\partial \beta_w} \tag{3}$$

## 2.4 Analysis

### 2.4.1 Contributor Time Allocation

The key question we're interested in is whether write rank programmers code ( $t_p^w > 0$ )? In Garicano 2000, we observe that the factory manager never picks up a hammer. While this aligns with our knowledge of factory production, in OSS development, highly ranked project members still write code and spearhead the production of new software features. Thus, we want a model that's able to reflect this empirical reality. Recall that

$$\alpha_w \beta_w = \frac{\partial c_w}{\partial t_p^w} + \frac{\partial c_w}{\partial t_h^w} \frac{\partial t_h^w}{\partial \beta_w} \frac{\partial \beta_w}{\partial t_p^w}$$

First, we know the LHS  $\alpha_w \beta_w > 0$ . We also know that  $\frac{\partial t_h^w}{\partial \beta_w} < 0$  and  $\frac{\partial c_w}{\partial t_h^w} > 0$  so  $\frac{\partial t_h^w}{\partial \beta_w} \frac{\partial c_w}{\partial t_h^w} < 0$ . Finally,

- $\alpha_w \beta_w > 0$
- $\frac{\partial t_h^w}{\partial \beta_w} < 0$  and  $\frac{\partial c_w}{\partial t_h^w} > 0$  so  $\frac{\partial t_h^w}{\partial \beta_w} \frac{\partial c_w}{\partial t_h^w} < 0$
- By 3,  $\frac{\partial c_o}{\partial \beta_w}$  is increasing in  $t_p^w$ . By 2, the concavity of the organization's cost function means that  $\frac{\partial c_o}{\partial \beta_w}$  is also increasing in  $\beta_w$ . Thus,  $\frac{\partial \beta_w}{\partial t_p^w} > 0$ .

Since  $\lim_{t_p^w \rightarrow 0^+} \frac{\partial c_w}{\partial t_p^w} = 0$ , if  $t_p^w = 0$ , then  $\alpha_w \beta_w < 0$ . As  $\frac{\partial^2 c_w}{\partial (t_p^w)^2} > 0$  then  $\alpha_w \beta_w > 0$  requires  $t_p^w > 0$ .

### 2.4.2 Comparative Statics

What is the impact of an increase in  $\frac{\partial c_r}{\partial k^r}$ ,  $\frac{\partial c_w}{\partial k^w}$  (cost of knowledge for read or write rank contributors) or  $h$  (communication costs) on

1.  $t_p^r, k^r$  - How do read rank contributors change their time allocation?
2. The next three statistics of interest are all interrelated, so the best approach is to analyze them simultaneously. We're interested in
  - (a)  $\frac{\beta_w}{1-\beta_w}$  - organization response - span of workers on each level
  - (b)  $t_p^w$  - write rank contributor time allocation response
  - (c)  $t_h^w = h \frac{(1-\beta_w)}{\beta_w} t_p^r (1 - F(k^r))$  - write rank contributor time allocation response

The statistics in the previous two points combine to inform us about how contributors of all ranks and organizations change their time allocation in response to technological changes. These are valuable because they tell us how OSS contributors might adapt their workflows when new technologies are adopted. They also tell us how organizations restructure themselves

3.  $(1 - \beta_w)t_p^r F(k^r)$  - how much work is done by read rank contributors in aggregate.
4.  $\beta_w t_p^w$  - how much work is done by write rank contributors, in aggregate. If I find both of the statistics above, I can also analyze how overall work share is changing and how that's evolving with the quantity of people on each level of the hierarchy,  $\beta_w$
5.  $\beta_w t_h^w \iff h(1 - \beta_w)t_p^r F(k^r)$  - how much helping is done

The statistics in the aforementioned three points help us understand how technological advances affect the quantity and scope of responsibilities contributors at different levels of the hierarchy have to take on in response to technological change.

## 2.5 Robustness

1. Show that my results are invariant to setting  $k^w = 1$  as long as  $k^w > k^r$  fairly important
2. Once I have my results, I can explain how heterogeneity within rank would impact my results
3. Show how the results change when  $\beta_w$  is capped.
4. Impact of adding approval?
5. How can I affect  $\beta_w$  by discincentivizing write rank contributors when  $\beta_w$  is too high
6. How can I justify that write rank programmers and organizations are invariant to inputs with mean preserving spreads in  $u_w, u_o$ ? Not sure it's very true...