Game Theory and Vaccination

Seminar: Epidemics, Infodemics and Mobility

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
Group 1

18.07.2022

Vaccination Game

Group interest versus self-interest in smallpox vaccination policy


Chris T. Bauch and Alison P. Galvani and David J. D. Earn , 2003



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
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
- Individual Equilibrium ($p = p_{ind}$): $E_{Vac}(p_{ind}) = E_{delayer}(p_{ind})$
- Group optimum $(p = p_{gr})$: $C(p) = -pE_{vac}(p) - (1 - p)E_{delayer}(p)$ $\frac{dC(p)}{dp}|_{p=p_{gr}} = 0$

Recreation the paper's plots



The SEIDV Model

- S: susceptible
- E: infected but not yet infectious
- I: infectious
- D: removed (dead/immune) due to smallpox
- V: removed (dead/immune) due to vaccination



Website with SEIDV model




Figure: Link to the website: https://seidv-model.web.app

Payoff Functions for Corona Vaccination

Strategy for Vaccination:

$$E_{vac} = -d_{v}$$

$$E_{unvac} = -d_{cov} \cdot \frac{(I(T_2, age) - I(T_1, age))}{N(age)}$$

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- How does age affect vaccination decision?
- Risk of death for Corona is age dependent d_{cov} = d_{cov}(age)
- Infection fatality rate (d_{COV}(age)= IFR)

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


Figure: Infection fatality rate for different ages groups from [Sorensen, Reed JD et al., 2022] and calculated mean for age groups

Calculating critical age for covid vaccination

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- Age groups:
 - 0-4
 - 5-14
 - 15-34
 - 35-59
 - ≥60
- critical age: $E_{vac} = E_{unvac}$

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


Figure: finding critical age for Covid19 vaccination from $T_1 = \text{January } 2021 \text{ to } T_2 = \text{July } 2021$

Result: Critical age depends on time period of planning

Critical age:

Probability of dying from vaccination = probability of dying due to Covid-19 during period of time ΔT




Figure: Critical age $E_{vac} = E_{unvac}$ for Covid19 vaccination as a function of time period of planning, simulated on (a) real data (b) data from the SEIDV prediction with Covid19 data² for T_1

Population size: [Statista Research Department, 21.06.2022] , Covid19: [Kaggle, 01.07.2022] .

Result: Critical age over the course of the pandemic

Fixed the time period $\Delta T = 1$ month




Figure: Critical age for decision time period $\Delta T = 1$ month over one year (2021) of the pendemic, simulated on (a) real data (b) data from the SEIDV prediction Covid19 data³ for T_1

³[Our World in Data, 2020].

Conclusion and Outlook

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- Time period of decision decreases for the elderly people. They needs to get vaccination as soon as possible.
- Low infectious rate extends the range of age not to get vaccination within the fixed period of time.

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- Not all people can decide rationally.
- SEIDV is not good enough for real pandemic.
- Assumption on vaccination efficiency

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Outlook

 Feedback loop: decision based on game theory also affects the vaccination rate

References



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Martin Henze

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