

THE PATHWAY OF PEACE

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stand, but addressed his audiences on his knees. In April, 1841, he left New York for his home in Minot. He reached Portsmouth the 9th of that month. As he retired his wife said, "Now let us kneel down and thank God that you are safe returned." They knelt and prayed. On lying down he felt the approach of death, but before help could be called he passed beyond. He lies buried in Portsmouth, and on his tomb appears:

WILLIAM LADD

Born May 10, 1778

Died April 9, 1841

Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall
be called the children of God

Erected by the American Peace Society

Such were the activities of William Ladd, the Apostle of Peace, and during the years which he gave so much to the cause of peace he also found time to carry on his large farm at Minot. He improved the general conduct of agriculture in the neighborhood; he planted orchards; he moved among his neighbors, respected and much liked. He contributed to every good cause. He became an advocate of temperance. He lectured to his fellow-townsmen on that subject. What he preached he practiced.

No account of William Ladd would be complete without mention of the rugged man who was his pastor and friend, Elijah Jones, who became pastor of the church at Minot in 1823, and there continued for more than fifty years. To this man must be attributed the Christian, if that term may be used, touch of all of William Ladd's writings, for it must have been noted from the foregoing that William Ladd's conception of peace was of a religious origin. This is most clearly seen in his treatment of the Lovejoy episode. The idea of a Christian peace permeates his great essay on a congress of nations.

The homestead of William Ladd at Center Minot is now in the hands of strangers. The elegance of his mansion house is no more. The white church in which he worshiped yet graces the Minot hilltop, and near by, in the churchyard, sleeps Elijah Jones; but the idea that William Ladd gave to the world in his great essay yet lives and grows greater and more sublime as men of our day seek a world peace under its benign and simple doctrine, and as it becomes more and more evident that the better ordering of the world lies in a congress of nations and a world court.

Among Maine men who have a claim to fame, none have a greater and sounder cause for respectful memory than William Ladd of Minot, "The Apostle of Peace."

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THE PATHWAY OF PEACE

BY HONORABLE CHARLES E. HUGHES

Secretary of State of the United States

Delivered before the Canadian Bar Association at Montreal, September 4, 1923, and published here with the author's consent.

"WAR," said Sir Henry Maine, "appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention." It is hardly that; it would seem to be an occasional experience, rather than an achievement. To one who reviews the history of strife from "the universal belligerency of primitive mankind," peace appears merely as the lull between inevitable storms always gathering in some quarter with the fateful recurrence of the operations of nature. Nineteen centuries of Christian faith, with its evangel of peace on earth and good will to men, with its sweet reasonableness and constant appeals through myriad activities to man's highest hopes, have erected no effective barrier to war. It maintains hospitals, it cares for the wounded and soothes the dying; it shines resplendent in countless lives of supreme self-sacrifice; but it leaves untouched the fields of carnage and unimpaired the justification of noble and generous spirits in the use of the most ruthless instrumentalities of destruction. The economic satisfactions proffered by an advancing civilization and dependent upon peace, the enticements of soft living, the hopes of families, the tenderest attachments, are all futile to oppose the summons to arms. The resources of science, all inventive skill, the long discipline of the organization of trade and industry, everything that can be commanded in thought and action, in accumulated stores and capacity of production, are under pledge to the god of war.

We may gain something in our quest for peace if we recognize at once that war is not an abnormality. In the truest sense, it is not the mere play of brute force. It is the expression of the insistent human will, inflexible in its purpose. The culture of civilization has strengthened, not enfeebled it. It is the old human spirit with the latest equipment. As Winston Churchill has said of the "valiant spirit of man in the late war": "Son of the Stone Age, vanquisher of nature with all her trials and mosters, he met the awful and self-inflicted agony with new reserves of fortitude. * * * His nervous system was found in the twentieth century capable of enduring physical and moral stresses before which the simpler natures of primeval times would have collapsed. Again and again to the hideous bombardment, again and again from the hospital to the front, again and again to the hungry submarines, he strode unflinching. And withal, as an individual, preserved through these torments the glories of a reasonable and compassionate mind." It was with this equipment,

spiritual as well as material, at a time when peace was lavishly bestowing the choicest rewards of human effort, that the nations that had most to lose plunged into the most ruinous and horrible conflict known to history.

When we consider that the inability to maintain a just peace attests the failure of civilization itself, we may be less confident of the success of any artificial contrivances to prevent war. We must recognize that we are dealing with the very woof and warp of human nature. The war to end war has left its curse of hate, its lasting injuries, its breeding grounds of strife, and to secure an abiding peace appears to be more difficult than ever. There is no advantage in shutting our eyes to the facts; nor should we turn in disgust of panaceas to the counsel of despair. The pathway of peace is the longest and most beset with obstacles the human race has to tread; the goal may be distant, but we must press on.

It is not surprising that many should be captivated by the proposal, with its delusive simplicity and adequacy, for the outlawry of war. War should be made a crime, and those who instigate it should be punished as criminals. The suggestion, however futile in itself, has at least the merit of bringing us to the core of the problem. Even among its sponsors appear at once the qualifications which reflect the old distinction, so elaborately argued by Grotius, between just and unjust wars. "The grounds of war," said he, "are as numerous as those of judicial actions. For where the power of law ceases, there war begins." He found the justifiable causes generally assigned for war to be three—defense, indemnity, and punishment. War is self-help, and the right to make war has been recognized as the corollary of independence, the permitted means by which injured nations protect their territory and maintain their rights. International law leaves aggrieved States who can not obtain redress for their wrongs by peaceful means to exact it by force. If war is outlawed, other means of redress of injuries must be provided. Moreover, few, if any, intend to outlaw self-defense, a right still accorded to individuals under all systems of law. To meet this difficulty, the usual formula is limited to wars of aggression. But justification for war, as recently demonstrated, is ready at hand for those who desire to make war, and there is rarely a case of admitted aggression, or where on each side the cause is not believed to be just by the peoples who support the war.

There is a further difficulty that lies deeper. There is no lawgiver for independent States. There is no legislature to impose its will by majority vote, no executive to give effect even to accepted rules. The outlawry of war necessarily implies a self-imposed restraint, and free peoples, jealous of their national safety, of their freedom of opportunity, of the rights and privileges they deem essential to their well being, will not forego the only sanction at their command in extreme exigencies. The restraints they may be willing to place upon themselves will always be subject to such conditions as will leave them able to afford self-protection by force, and in this freedom there is abundant room for strife sought to be justified by deep-seated convictions of national interests, by long-standing grievances, by the apprehension of aggression to be forestalled. The outlawry of war, by appropriate rule of law making war a crime,

requires the common accord needed to establish and maintain a rule of international law, the common consent to abandon war; and the suggested remedy thus implies a state of mind in which no cure is needed. As the restraint is self-imposed, it will prove to be of avail only while there is a will to peace.

It is this difficulty which constantly suggests recourse to force to maintain peace. Peoples who would engage in war, it is said, must be compelled to be peaceful; there should be an international force adequate to prevent aggression and to redress wrongs. The analogy of domestic peace is pressed; the force of the State—that is, of all the people—maintains the authority of the municipal law and compels public order. The analogy has held good in the case of great empires and within the range of their imperial power. The earliest empires, established through conquest and the greed of dominion, doubtless diminished wars among the subject peoples while the imperial authority continued, and the centuries of the *pax Romana* were made possible by the unchallengeable sway of Rome. It is unfortunately true that it is self-determination which makes for war and places obstacles in the way of all plans for keeping the peace. Thirty-five years ago the most distinguished of publicists found some promise of peace in the alliance of the three emperors and in the consequent isolation and agreement for peaceful adjustment of a limited group of questions which otherwise might lead to conflict. But time has shown how illusory are alliances of great powers so far as the maintenance of peace is concerned.

In considering the use of international force to secure peace, we are again brought to the fundamental necessity of common accord. If the feasibility of such a force be conceded for the purpose of maintaining adjudications of legal right, this is only because such an adjudication would proceed upon principles commonly accepted, and thus forming part of international law, and upon the common agreement to respect the decision of an impartial tribunal in the application of such principles. This is a limited field where force is rarely needed and where the sanctions of public opinion and the demands of national honor are generally quite sufficient to bring about acquiescence in judicial awards. But in the field of conflicting national policies, and what are deemed to be essential interests, when the smoldering fires of old grievances have been fanned into a flame by a passionate sense of immediate injury, or the imagination of peoples is dominated by apprehension of present danger to national safety, or by what is believed to be an assault upon national honor, what force is to control the outbreak? Great powers agreeing among themselves may indeed hold small powers in check. But who will hold great powers in check when great powers disagree? The trust in force must in truth be trust in common agreement behind the force. And we are thus brought back to the sentiment of peoples, to the common accord which makes peace possible. The application of force when there is disagreement means war, not peace; and then the basis of confidence, if found at all, is merely in the disparity of arms.

All contrivances for maintaining peace by economic pressure, as well as by military force, depend upon the

sentiment which will apply the pressure and direct the force when the test comes. Such arrangements are likely to fail when they are most needed, because national interests are diverse and unanimity of action under stress of crises involving conflicts of opinion is well-nigh impossible. The independence and equality of States is the postulate of international relations. There is no path to peace except as the will of peoples may open it. The way to peace is through agreement, not through force. The question then is not of any ambitious general scheme to prevent war, but simply of the constant effort, which is the highest task of statesmanship in relation to every possible cause of strife, to diminish among peoples the disposition to resort to force, and to find a just and reasonable basis for accord. If the energy, ability, and sagacity equal to that now devoted to preparation for war could be concentrated upon such efforts aided by the urgent demands of intelligent public opinion, addressed not to impossibilities but to the removal or adjustment of actual differences, we should make such approach to our goal.

Over against the arbitrament of war we put the reign of law. But the reign of law is limited by the content of the law and by the processes of its development. International law consist of those principles and rules of conduct which civilized States regard as obligatory upon them, and hence are generally observed in their relations with each other. They are deduced by reason and exemplified by practice, and, resting on general consent, can be modifier or added to only by consent. Lord Mansfield described the law of nations as "founded upon justice, equity, convenience, the reason of the thing, and confirmed by long usage." Lacking in definite sanction other than public opinion, it is in constant danger of being supplanted by considerations of expediency whenever the exigency is so severe, or the immediate advantages so great, or opinion so divided, as to warrant the risk. There was abundant illustration of this in the recent war, which began in "repudiation of every element of fundamental right upon which the law of nations rests" and was prosecuted with but slight regard to any obligatory principle which was thought to stand in the way of success. If we are to live in a world of order and of peace the foundations of international law must be secured, its postulates must be re-asserted, and there must be expert attention to its development in dealing with the unsettled questions of a legal nature which have arisen in international intercourse.

It has been said that if the founders of international law did not create a sanction, they did create a law-abiding sentiment. This is in truth the most important sanction, and to-day there is need that this law-abiding sentiment should be re-created and that the tendency, increased by nine years of war and the confusion and unrest following war, to rely on force should be checked. It is not that the field of law is broad; it is necessarily a narrow one, limited, as has been said, to those principles and rules of general application which have found general acceptance. But the spirit which maintains the law within that field, which recognizes its restraints although self-imposed, which safeguards the independence, the equality, and the proper jurisdiction and privileges of the members of the family of nations and

assures the sanctity of international engagements—this upholding of correlative rights and obligations—is of vital importance not simply with respect to these rights and obligations in themselves but in producing the will to peace. However narrow may be the field in which the principles of law obtain, there will be no peace in the world if the spirit of men permits these principles to be trampled upon as self-interest may prompt.

It is, therefore, most desirable that all discussion of international relations should not revolve about questions of policy and expediency, however important these may be, but that along with this necessary discussion there should be the determination to re-establish the law, to quicken the sense of the obligation of States under the law. As soon as possible the codification of international law should be undertaken, not merely to give formal definiteness to accepted principles, but to heighten the respect for these postulates and rules by fresh discussion and restatement. And with this enterprise, attention should be given to the resolution of all the manifold uncertainties and diversities of opinion as to matters which properly belong within the domain of law, and to the provision of new rules needed to meet new situations. It would be difficult to conceive a process requiring more deliberation and patience. For at every step the general consent of nations must be had, and at every step, except in the simplest matters, the opposing policy and objections of some nation will be encountered. The difficulty must be met by conferences which have the sole object of promoting the codification and development of law. It must be met by the aroused and insistent purpose of the members of the bar, who by their unremitting and organized endeavor may produce among their peoples the profound conviction that there will be no continuing peace unless conscience and a dominant sense of justice demand and insure the supremacy of law.

As legal principles and rules are supported by general acceptance, we may look with confidence for the general support of opinion in their application and vindication through impartial tribunals. The difficulty here is not the acceptance of the theory of judicial settlement, but in establishing entire confidence in the impartiality of tribunals and their freedom from political influence. It must also be recognized that questions arise which, although requiring for their solution the application of principles of law or the interpretation of treaties, touch so closely the vital interests or the pride and honor of States that they are unwilling to allow the settlement to pass into other hands. And beyond all questions of law there lie the most difficult situations, where there are no determining principles, where national policies and ambitions conflict, where nations seek expansion and opportunities of trade by spheres of political and economic influence among weaker peoples, where rivalries are embittered by mutual distrust and ever-present fear, where intrigue is the busy servant of the lust of power, where compelled adjustments have left deep wounds and a passionate desire for a redress of injuries inflicted by force and sought to be redressed by force. As against these causes of strife, creating the disposition to look for pretexts for the use of force, efforts to maintain a permanent peace have thus far proved to be futile. Plans for commissions of inquiry

for periods of cooling off, for the use of good offices, are all important and may be efficacious to a gratifying extent. But these measures deal with cases already aggravated, and it may well be doubted whether in grave crises they would avail. Great powers, well armed and having a vivid sense of opportunity, supported by popular clamor for the vindication of national interests, are disposed to seize what they believe to be within their grasp. Resistance by force means war. Fear of opposing force may stay the hand, but this does not mean peace—rather, renewed preparation and a waiting for the day. There is only one way to make peace secure and that is the difficult but necessary effort to translate particular controversies into voluntary reasonable agreements. To this purpose, of a definite, concrete sort, rather than to fanciful programs, the intelligence of peoples should be devoted.

We have to take account of both the advantages and disadvantages of democratization. It is generally thought that democracies are disposed to peace, but this is yet to be demonstrated where there is deep feeling and a national sense of injury. Great wars, involving vast populations, can not be fought without public support, but the most serious causes of war are precisely those which carry popular appeal. The peoples of the warring nations were never so united as during the last war, and this was equally true of both sides. A sense of injury is easily created and confused with the sense of justice. A despot may be as indisposed to war as any people, and democracies never lack leaders to inflame popular passion. While we should expect peoples to be slow to war in minor exigencies, the test comes when national sentiment is deeply aggrieved.

Apart from this, it is necessary to reckon with the special difficulties inherent in the democratic organization of government with respect to the endeavor to maintain peace by concluding international agreements which end controversies closely affecting national interests. There are, indeed, governments with an essentially democratic basis where the executive power is still able to conclude many important international agreements without reference to the legislature; but this is due to the persistence of special traditions. Usually in democracies there is a final or coordinate authority which rests with the parliament or legislature. The negotiations of so-called plenipotentiaries, the engagements of foreign offices, the conclusions of conferees, are thus merely preliminary. The more important the agreements, as insuring peace by settling bitter disputes, the more certain it is that they will involve mutual concessions. Thus in each country it is likely to be insisted that the other has gained at its expense, and this gives exceptional opportunity to critics who assume the most extreme positions on patriotic grounds. In the case of the Webster-Ashburton treaty, Daniel Webster was accused of taking upon himself to act for the British envoy and of making twelve important sacrifices of the interests of his country, while Lord Palmerston asserted that the treaty was a capitulation, the result of the incompetence and weakness of Lord Ashburton. Since the recent Washington conference those who are dissatisfied with the naval treaty in Great Britain, Japan, and the United States have sought to make it appear in each of these countries that its par-

ticular interests were sacrificed to the others; of course these critics can not all be right, and I am happy to say that the manifest result of their conflicting contentions is to put even in a clearer light the essential fairness of the arrangement.

Aside from honest criticism, modern negotiations between democracies furnished rare opportunities for the ready tongues of demagogues. There are to-day serious questions between peoples which ought to be taken up and settled in order to heal festering sores. But those in charge of foreign affairs do not dare to undertake to negotiate agreements because they know that in the presence of attack inspired by political or partisan motives the necessary adjustment could not receive approval of the legislative branch and would evoke such an acrimonious controversy on both sides that matters would be made worse instead of better. The discussion of international agreements naturally and properly engages the attention of the public press, but that also not only gives opportunity for reasonable criticism, but for the pseudopatriots to seize a point of vantage against the government they desire to attack. Conferences are often treated as though they provided an actual solution of all difficulties, but for most countries they accomplish nothing unless the conclusions are ratified by a popular assembly. Democracies may be loath to go to war, but they are extremely difficult agencies of international compromises in the interest of peace.

In this task of promoting peaceful settlements diplomacy is indispensable. Conferences are simply an extension of its method where a number of States are parties to the negotiations. No one can fail to realize the importance of having the public deeply interested and well informed upon policies, interests, and undertakings in order to maintain a check upon improper aims and a wholesome attitude toward foreign relations, but there is a necessary distinction to be observed with respect to the conduct of negotiations. While intrigues and secret understandings, breeding suspicion and leading to counter intrigues and secret arrangements, are the appropriate instruments of the injurious rivalries and ambitious schemings which make for war, premature publicity is a serious handicap to the honorable negotiations which seek to end dangerous disputes. Concessions will not be made and fair compromises are rendered almost impossible in the presence of the keen, efficient, and indefatigable news gatherers who naturally regard it as a primary obligation to let nothing escape their ken or their pen. It is inevitable that fragments of information should be picked up, that the pieces of the puzzle should be inaccurately joined, and that the interests of peaceful adjustments should be in constant danger of being sacrificed to "scoops."

It is suggested that all would be easy if negotiators would simply tell the public everything that they are doing. But the trouble is that in every negotiation, as all business men know, there are preliminary positions to be taken, tentative plans to be discussed, arguments to be presented and demolished and nothing can be accomplished if every suggestion, every advance and every retreat must be publicly made. Negotiators under such restriction would inevitably take their positions not to promote a settlement, but to win public approval by the firmness and vigor of their partisan-

ship. Eager as democracies may be for peace in the abstract, it is easy to excite a public clamor for "no compromise" in the concrete. But the point is not that the negotiators of democratic governments will be disposed to conduct their proceedings in public, the difficulty is that in the midst of their work when patience and reticence, and an equable public temper are needed, misleading statements, misapprehensions and unfounded rumors are likely to become current and perhaps also make necessary, in order to avoid greater difficulties, disclosures which it would be in the interest of successful prosecution of the negotiations to withhold for the time being. Open diplomacy is openness of results; the absence of secret agreements and understandings, not the immediate publication of all intermediate steps. When we consider the self-imposed restraints that are necessary in the interest of peace, is it too much to hope that to a much greater degree there will be embraced in these, as a matter of public interest, the self-imposed restraint upon publicity before disclosures in relation to negotiations are properly authorized? If we are to have peace, we must develop a public sentiment which will aid in conserving the opportunities to work for peace by facilitating the practical arrangements that make for the adjustments of peace.

Perhaps the most troublesome sources of irritation are to be found in the subjects which States properly decline to regard as international in the legal sense. Every State, jealous of its sovereign rights, refuses to permit the intrusion of other nations into its domestic concerns. In every plan for the arbitration of international controversies, domestic questions are perforce excluded. But in these days of intimate relations, of economic stress, and of intense desire to protect national interests and advance national opportunity, the treatment of questions which from a legal standpoint are domestic often seriously affects international relations. The principle, each nation for itself to the full extent of its power, is the principle of war, not of peace. Let it be recognized that force is the inevitable resort of unrestrained selfishness; that peace is to be reconciled with national aims only as an enlightened self-interest permits the reasonable restraint that is consistent with the fair opportunity of others,—in a world where we must either fight or "live and let live" in a decent regard for the welfare of others as well as our own.

But how are we to take proper cognizance of the just interests of other States in the turmoil of politics and amid the contests of local ambitions appealing exclusively to some supposed immediate national interest? No State could be asked, or for a moment would consider, submitting its treatment of domestic interests to any sort of international arbitrament. It will decide for itself the questions within its own jurisdiction; that is the essence of sovereignty. But the case is not hopeless. What could be regarded as more essentially a matter of its own concern than the provision a State should make for its own defense, the arms it should provide, the number and armament of its battleships? Yet we have recently seen the great naval powers, obedient at last to the desire to end a ruinous competitive struggle in arms, voluntarily agree to reduce their fighting ships to agreed proportions. I believe that we

shall be able at no distant day to keep within reasonable limits some of our pressing economic rivalries by fair international agreements in which the self-interest of rivals will submit to mutual restrictions in the furtherance of friendly accord.

All things are possible if nations are willing to be just to each other. The fact that in the class of matters now under consideration there may be no possibility of arbitrament does not imply that we do not have any means at hand which are compatible with the recognition of sovereign rights. We have not only the possibilities of negotiating international agreements, but also of advising the legislatures of States as to the interests of other States affected by national legislation. A joint commission is a familiar agency which is distinct from that of arbitration for the reason that the States concerned in their creation have each an equal representation. In relation to domestic questions which have an international bearing, it would be quite possible to make more frequent use of this method, not to decide but to inform, not to arbitrate but to investigate, to find the facts and to report to the governments of the States represented the effect of measures and where injury would lie. We have at this time, under our treaty of 1909 relating to boundary waters and questions arising along the boundary between Canada and the United States, an International Joint Commission with powers of investigation and report within the scope of the treaty.

While I do not undertake to speak officially upon this subject, I may take the liberty of stating as my personal view that we should do much to foster our friendly relations and to remove sources of misunderstanding and possible irritation, if we were to have a permanent body of our most distinguished citizens acting as a commission, with equal representation of both the United States and Canada, to which automatically there would be referred, for examination and report as to the facts, questions arising as to the bearing of action by either Government upon the interests of the other, to the end that each reasonably protecting its own interests would be so advised that it would avoid action inflicting unnecessary injury upon its neighbor. We rejoice in our long friendship and in permanent peace, and it would be a short-sighted view that either of us has any real interest which is to be promoted without regard to the well-being of the other and the considerate treatment which conditions good will. I am saying this personal word as much to the people of the United States as to the people of Canada; it breathes neither complacency nor criticism, but a keen desire for the co-operation of the closest friends, each secure in independence and in the assurance of amity.

I recur to the main point, that the only real progress to abiding peace is found in the friendly disposition of peoples and that facilities for maintaining peace are useful only to the extent that this friendly disposition exists and finds expression. The means of waging war in its most horrible form are now apparently within the reach of all and are more easily contrived and concealed than ever. War is not only possible, but probable, where mistrust and hatred and desire for revenge are the dominant motives. Our first duty is at home with our own opinion, by education and unceasing effort

to bring to naught the mischievous exhortations of chauvinists; our next is to aid in every practicable way in promoting a better feeling among other peoples, the healing of wounds, and the just settlement of differences.

Our own relations furnish the happiest illustration and strengthen our faith. It is not that we began in friendship or had the advantage of a tradition of brotherly love. Quite the contrary. Our 100 years and more of peace were preceded by long periods of bitterness and of savage strife; the new world received as an unfortunate heritage the warring ambitions of the old. It is not that since the close of that era we have been without serious controversies. The peace of Ghent left us many questions of difficulty which apparently defied amicable settlement. But we now recall the serious disputes of the nineteenth century with mutual gratification at the conquests of peace and the arduous achievements of self-restraint. It is not that we have been lacking in national pride, in courage, or martial spirit. The long record of fortitude, of heroism, and military ardor and capacity in the Great War has no more inspiring chapter than that written by the sons of Canada who with eager swiftness rushed to the support of the motherland in the struggle to maintain the very essentials of liberty, and to the final success of that struggle the Dominion pledged all her resources of material and spiritual power. It was the privilege of our own people in that war, convinced of the vital character of the issue, to take our place at your side, and the friendship which had grown out of the unlikely soil, sown with the seeds of early differences, came to glorious fruition in the common sacrifices on the fields of France. It is pleasant to recall that it was Alexander Hamilton, the apostle both of national strength and of international peace, who first suggested, in his recommendation to President Washington in 1794, the limitation of armament on the Great Lakes, and our undefended line of 3,500 miles is at once a memorial and a prophecy—a memorial of the past triumphs of reasonableness and a prophecy that all future problems will be solved without breach of amity.

The reason for this happy condition points to the solution the world needs. We have formed the habit of peace; we think in terms of peace. Differences arise, but our confidence in each other's sense of justice and peaceful intent remains unshaken and dominates our purposes and plans. The only pathway of peace is that in which our peoples are walking together. In the depths of our grief at the loss of the great leader, whose every thought, whose constant endeavor, were directed to the establishment of peace, it is a precious memory that almost his last words were spoken on the soil of your country testifying to our abiding friendship, our mutual interests, our common aims. Let these words of the late President ever remain as the expression and assurance of abiding peace: "Our protection is in our fraternity, our armor is our faith; the tie that binds more firmly year by year is ever-increasing acquaintance and comradeship through interchange of citizens; and the compact is not of perishable parchment, but of fair and honorable dealing which, God grant, shall continue for all time."

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MIND

An Address Delivered Before the Academy of International Law, at The Hague, July 20, 1923

(Translation from the French)

By NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

IN 1912, AT the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, I offered a definition of the International Mind. Today I propose to return to that subject and to make some observations from a philosophical point of view.

One who accustoms himself to look beneath the surface of human history will find constantly at work there powerful and conflicting emotions and ideas. The happenings that one takes note of day by day are the result of these hidden and sometimes unsuspected causes. From the vast reservoir of the world's unconscious mental life, there flow those constant streams of tendency which produce the results that are visible to all men. Wars and migrations come and go, nations rise and fall, the center of gravity of human interest moves from one point to another far removed, and only those are mystified who seek the explanation solely on the surface of things. A deeper and more reflective examination of all that pertains to human life and conduct will often give the clue to an understanding of what is taking place.

From the break-up of the Roman Empire to the present day, a period of perhaps fifteen centuries, the most powerful moving force in the history of the Western World, although often unconsciously operating, has been the struggle for nationality, for national organization, for national independence, and for national expansion. The integration of separate States into empires, and then the break-up of these empires themselves, have been due to this cause. Religious zeal, economic pressure, and the thirst for novelty have been contributing causes—sometimes powerfully so—but the persistent struggle for nationality has dominated all these.

During the eighteenth century the civilized world witnessed with sympathy and regret the suppression of the nationality of Poland, which had existed for a thousand years, and the forcible division of its territory among the governments of three peoples other than its own. During the nineteenth century the world witnessed with sympathy, and indeed with enthusiasm, the steady expansion of the British Empire and the movement for the political unity of the Italian and the German States. Here were believed to be three powerful elements in the development of civilization and of enlightenment, of advance in science, in letters, and in the arts, in the spread of commerce and of industry, and in the upholding of sound principles of personal and national conduct to guide the life of men and nations. Partly for reasons that were psychological, partly for reasons that were economic, the movement toward nationality eventually became one of distinct menace to the people of the world and to the safety and independence of the smaller nations themselves. Finally, in 1914, the crash came, and the principle of nationality seemed for the moment to have exhausted its good ele-