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# Bribery Games – A meta-analysis


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# Motivation



**“(...) let's not mince words: we need to deal with the cancer of corruption.”**  
J.D. Wolfensohn (1996) *President of the World Bank Group*

Comment | Published: 12 January 2011

## Corruption kills

Nicholas Ambraseys & Roger Bilham

*Nature* 469, 153–155 (13 January 2011) | Download Citation ↓

On the anniversary of Haiti's devastating quake, Nicholas Ambraseys and Roger Bilham calculate that 83% of all deaths from building collapse in earthquakes over the past 30 years occurred in countries that are anomalously corrupt.

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**Corruption in EU costs '120bn euros' - EU Commission**

3 February 2014 Last updated at 16:32 GMT

The EU's Home Affairs Commissioner has warned of staggering levels of corruption in member countries.

# Corruption: One word, many meanings

- Loose use of the term in public parlour and media
- Can refer to anything that is rotten, a state going from good to bad
- Has a **long** history
- Widely used definition across academic fields:

**“abuse of entrusted power for private gains”**

# Types of corrupt behaviors

## Individual corruption

- Solitary act, No corrupt partner involved
- Examples: Embezzlement, Stealing time...




## Interpersonal corruption

- Corrupt collaboration, Multiple agents involved
- Examples: Bribery, Kick backs...



# How to measure corruption?

# Perception –based measures




# Behavioral measures

OECD Public Governance Reviews


# Behavioural Insights for Public Integrity

## Harnessing the Human Factor to Counter Corruption





# Methodology

Victim



# Bribery Games



## Individual cheating

- Preference for truth telling

(Abeler et al. 2019, *Econometrica*)

- More lying in die-roll tasks compared to matrix task

(Gerlach et al. 2019, *Psych Bull*)

- Intuitive dishonesty, when abstract victims get hurt

(Köbis et al., 2019 *Perspect. Psychol. Sci.*)

## Call via:

- *ESA, SJDM, EADM, AOM OB, SPPS, EASP, IAREP*

## Inclusion criteria::

- The study uses an **incentivized** (financial or non-financial incentives), **behavioral paradigm**, i.e., no hypothetical set-ups
- that entails a **transaction between at least two players** that is **mutually beneficial**
- in which **power asymmetry** exists between the agents
- and the successful transaction between agents creates **negative externalities** (that can be on other players or more general entities, e.g. deduction of a donation for a charitable cause)



## Online search:

- Boolean Operators:
  - *[“bribery game” OR “corruption game” OR “bribery experiment” OR “bribery paradigm”]*
- data bases:
  - *Web of Science, PsycINFO, GoogleScholar (using Publish or Perish), Econlit*



## PRISMA Chart

Call & database searching ( $k = 1,620$ )

Other sources ( $k = 20$ )

After duplicates removed ( $k = 1,149$ )


Exclusion based on abstracts ( $k = 526$ )

Exclusion based on full text ( $k = 520$ )

Exclusion based on language ( $k = 90$ )

Final sample:

**( $k = 102$ ; treatments: 438; total  $N = 19,149$ )**



Meta-Analysis Bribery Games

- k: 1-2
- k: 3-10
- k: 11-15
- k: 16-25
- k: >35

# Overall results

- Bribe offers:

# Overall results

- Bribe offers: 64.13%


# Overall results

- Bribe offers: 64.13%
- Bribe acceptance:


## Overall results

- Bribe offers: 64.13%
- Bribe acceptance: 71.23%
- $\text{Log}(OR) = -0.348$ ; 95%CI[-0.5585; -0.1375],  $Z=-3.24$ ,  $p= .0012$
  
- People accept bribes more than they offer
- Higher than individual tasks (see also Weisel & Shalvi, 2015)
- Less likely to resist temptation than instigating it


# Punishment




# Punishment




# Punishment




# Punishment



While stochastic,  
external  
punishment  
reduces bribery,  
Peer punishment  
slightly increases  
bribery




# Corruption Perception Index & Bribe Offers




# Corruption Perception Index & Bribe Offers

$B = 0.0028$ ,  
 $SE = 0.0074$ ,  
 $Z = 0.37$ ,  
 $p = .711$



# Corruption Perception Index & Bribe Acceptance

$B = 0.0213$ ,  
 $SE = 0.0079$ ,  
 $Z = 2.6926$ ,  
 $p = .0071$



# Explaining heterogeneity

Different types of bribery:

- Passive:
  - Extortive bribery (e.g. Banerjee, 2016; Banerjee et al. 2017)
- Active:
  - Competitive bribery (e.g. Gneezy et al., 2017; Köbis et al., 2015; 2017)
  - Collusive bribery (e.g. Abbink et al., 2001; 2018; Barr & Serra, 2008)

## Additional moderators

- Punishment regimes
- Size of incentives
- Size of externalities
- Sample composition
- Whistleblowing
- Framing
- Demographics (gender, age, education) ...

## 1. Offers < acceptance

- temptation vs. instigation

## 2. Stochastic punishment reduces bribery, peer punishment not


## 3. Behavior vs. perception

- No link of bribe bribery with CPI or GCB

--> Systematic distinction between bribery measures to enable theoretical advances

# Thank you!

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- <https://soundcloud.com/kickback-gap>

