

## Status of this document

This draft version is open for feedback and discussion. It can be shared according to the license.

Date: 2020-09-02

Version: 0.1

## License

This work is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.

Summary: <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0</a>

License: <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode</a>

## **Contributors**

### **Author**

Sebastian Posth

Posth Werk BV

Email: sebastian@posth.me

Twitter: <a>@posth</a>

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/posth/

Sebastian Posth is an entrepreneur and consultant in the media industries with a focus on digital innovation and decentralized ledger technology.

Sebastian is Director of the ISCC Foundation, an independent international nonprofit organization that promotes the development and adoption of the International Standard Content Code.

## Co-Author

**Kevin Wittek** 

wittek.dev

Email: kevin@wittek.dev

Twitter: @kiview

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/kevin-wittek-098a84110/

Kevin Wittek is Head of the Blockchain Lab at the Institute for Internet Security, Westphalian University of Applied Sciences, member of the Sovrin Steward Council (Digital Identity and SSI) and bloxberg consortium (Trusted Research).

After many years working in the industry as a software engineer, Kevin is now doing his PhD in computer science in the field of distributed systems engineering and is an active member of the Open Source Software community.

# **Table of Content**

Status of this document	1
License	1
Contributors	2
Author	2
Co-Author	2
Table of Content	3
Terms and Definitions	5
Abstract	8
Motivation	9
Disinformation and Fake News	9
Missing Identifiers and Attribution	9
Missing Rights Information	10
EU Directive 2019/790	10
Digital Commerce	11
Approach	11
Addressees	12
International Standard Content Code (ISCC)	13
Content Certification Process	15
The ISCC Meta-Registry	16
Certification Transaction	18
Rightsholder Pseudonymity	18
Future Transactions	19
OCCP – Overview	20
Use Cases	20

Set-up	22
Creation of Certifier Wallet	22
Public Self-Verification of Certifier	22
Creation of Rightsholder Wallet	23
Rightsholder Identity Verification	23
Challenge	24
Verification of Content Certificates	25
OCCP – Process Overview	27
Further Discussion	28
Decentralised Identifiers (DIDs)	28
Verifiable Credentials	29
Governance	29
User Applications	30
Design Goals	30
References	31
FAQ	32
Certification of Rightsholder and Attestation	32
Chain of Title	33
Accountability and Personal Data	33
The Yeti Issue	34

## **Terms and Definitions**

#### **Actor**

individual or organisation, program or machine that performs an action

#### **Entity**

legal individual or organisation

#### User

individual or organisation that interacts with a software application, an online service or a platform

#### Consumer

individual that consumes digital media content

#### Registration

the act of registering an ISCC on a public blockchain network, which might represent or be connected to an assertion or declaration of an individual or organisation

#### **Assertion**

declaration of a positive statement without evidence or proof

#### Registrant

individual or organisation that registers an ISCC on a public blockchain network

#### **Registration address**

blockchain address that is generated and used by the registrant

#### Rightsholder

individual or organisation that holds rights to a specific digital media asset; licensor or licensee; a creator, a publisher, a record label, an intermediary or a retailer, even a consumer can be considered as a rightsholder

#### **Validation**

the act of validating a claim or a certificate

#### Verification

the act of verifying and confirming

#### **Falsification**

the act of falsifying and disproving

#### **Attestation**

the act of attesting; public acknowledgment, confirmation or affirmation

#### Identity

defined by characteristics or properties describing an individual or organisation

#### Identification

formal acknowledgment of the identity of an individual or organisation

#### **Authenticity**

quality of being genuine and not manipulated

#### **Attribution**

formal acknowledgment that a registrant of an ISCC is a rightsholder or has another defined relationship to the to the digital asset

#### **Certification address**

blockchain address that is generated and used by the certifier

#### Certifier

publicly known, legally established and registered organisation (e.g. in the local chamber of commerce) that is performing acts of certification

#### **Content certification**

act of attestation by a publicly known, legally established and registered organisation

#### **Content Certificate**

result of certification process, issued implicitly when a certification transaction is confirmed on a public blockchain network

## **Digital Asset**

file encoded in a specific format

#### Content

Substance of what is contained

#### **Content identification**

Generating an ISCC for the purpose of identification and verification of the identity of content

## **Abstract**

The Open Content Certification Protocol (OCCP) provides a description of the process and involved technologies that can be used by creative individuals, media organisations or consumers to generate or verify certificates for digital media content.

Content certificates allow creative individuals, media organisations and other rightsholders to inseparably and verifiably connect information, basic metadata, licensing terms and other rights management information to digital content.



Fig. 1: example for a content certificate; Image via pixabay.com

Organisations can act as certification authorities and formally attest the attribution of a rightsholder to the content and associated assertions or claims by means of only one blockchain transaction. With a simple blockchain transaction certifiers openly testify that they are aware of the identity of their creative clients and formally acknowledge them as rightsholders to the content.

It is the goal of the certification process to create trust in assertions, claims and the authenticity of the original content, and to ensure accountability of the rightsholder, even if he must or prefers to remain pseudonymous.

Content Certificates are the result of the certification process. They are issued implicitly when a certification transaction is confirmed on a public blockchain network. Thus, content certificates are open, discoverable and verifiable by anyone online and accessible for individuals or systems, using software applications or APIs.

Services and applications can process content certificates in an automated way so that their users can verify the authenticity of digital media content, the identity and attribution of rightsholders and their claims to the content **by having access to the digital assets, only**.

## **Motivation**

Why do we need content certification? What we are seeing at this moment is the convergence of a number of independent developments that will shape the future of digital media publishing and underscore the need for content certification:

## **Disinformation and Fake News**

Digital media content is ubiquitous, online. Songs, videos, texts and images are published and shared on websites, blogs or on social media, an ever increasing proportion of news and media consumption is moving online.

In this area of abundance of content, (intentional) misinformation and (unintentional) disinformation is becoming a problem for societies. How can consumers and online platforms evaluate content integrity and learn what information to trust or not? It requires efforts, knowledge and skills to verify the authenticity of original publications. And it requires simple and reliable methods and tools to check whether they have been manipulated or not.

Policy makers in all parts of the world are trying to tackle the current media crisis and fight misinformation and fake news by enforcing an increased transparency and greater accountability for content that is published online by users and rightsholders.<sup>1</sup>

## **Missing Identifiers and Attribution**

Proper content identification and attribution are fundamental prerequisites to tackle fake news and misinformation.

But how can consumers validate content when identifiers and basic metadata are often missing? Although some media industries use standard identifiers (such as ISBN, DOI, ISRC etc.), most of the existing content online does not have an open, standardised and reproducible identifier. Without digital content-derived identifiers, it is a time-consuming and difficult endeavour for consumers to unambiguously identify digital

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See also initiatives in the US, like the Deeptrust Alliance <u>www.deeptrustalliance.org</u> or the Content Authenticity Inivitative (CAI), led by Adobe, Twitter and the New York Times: <a href="https://content.authenticity.org">https://content.authenticity.org</a>.

content and understand, who originally created and published it. Also, we can also observe a political agenda for more transparency and accountability.

## **Missing Rights Information**

Creators demand respect, attribution and a fair remuneration for their creative work. But without basic metadata, licensing terms and other rights management information, inseparably connected to the content, it is simply impossible to properly credit a work or learn about the terms of use.<sup>2</sup>

Content creators and other rightsholders lack an easy way to provide such information. It often results in the misuse or abuse, when content is published in an inappropriate manner without attribution or available licensing terms.

Networked peer-to-peer transactions in the Web3.0 environment create a need for efficiency and automation of content licensing.

## **EU Directive 2019/790**

The new <u>European Directive 2019/790 on Copyright in the Digital Single Market</u>, which has to be implemented by the national parliaments by June 2021, will introduce new regulations to the content markets. E.g. article 17 requires online content-sharing service providers (OCSSP) to clear the rights of content that has been published on their platforms or uploaded by the users of their services. It is almost impossible that the requirements of the Directive can be implemented in national laws without technology for automated content identification and automated retrieval of basic and verifiable metadata and rights management information.

The Directive includes a clear recommendation for rightsholders to "provide the service providers with relevant and necessary information". This means that in order to benefit from the Directive and avoid misappropriation of content online, rightsholders need to verifiably publish reliable, accurate and comprehensive metadata in a timely manner,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Or as the working party on intellectual property (copyright) from the Finnish government writes in their stocktaking paper: "In general terms, the problems relating to licensing markets in Europe are caused by the fact that works and rightholders are often not being properly identified in the digital environment. This is due to missing or erroneous metadata. There are many International Standardisation Organisations (ISO) and industry-specific identifiers for works and rightholders, however they lack interoperability in a broader context. This results in high transaction costs for the industry and lost revenue for rightholders." Developing the Copyright Infrastructure - Stocktaking of work and progress under the Finnish Presidency, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 20 December 2019, document nr. 15016/19. <a href="https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15016-2019-INIT/en/pdf">https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15016-2019-INIT/en/pdf</a>

and make rights management information openly available and easily accessible for automated retrieval.<sup>3</sup> For rightsholders we conclude a legal necessity to act.

## **Digital Commerce**

Despite the fact that the internet itself is decentralised in its technical nature, only a limited number of popular applications benefit from the content generated by creative individuals and other users. It is the same with professional digital media content online – only a few centralised retailers and platforms control the terms, supply and demand, access to content, user accounts, data and communication.

Business models of media organisations are at stake due to this concentration of power and data by large intermediaries, retailers and platforms and the inefficiency of the markets which results from this situation.

Lack of trust creates oligopolies. Only when trust in content authenticity, attribution and licensing information will no longer be exclusively guaranteed by large and centralised organisations, competition will be re-introduced to the media markets. We observe a requirement for innovation in the digital media marketplaces.

## **Approach**

The lack of trust in the authenticity of online content, data and information can be addressed by using existing technology, open-source software as well as the suggested open, transparent standards for content identification and content certification.

The Open Content Certification Protocol (OCCP) suggests a process to create and verify content certificates by using open, content-derived, decentralised content identifier technology (ISCC) on public blockchain networks. It is based on two layers:

- 1) the International Standard Content Code (ISCC), maintained by the ISCC Foundation
- 2) the <u>decentralised cross-chain registry prototol</u>, developed by Titusz Pan.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Artikel 17 "An online content-sharing service provider shall ... obtain an authorisation from the rightholders, for instance by concluding a licensing agreement, in order to communicate to the public or make available to the public works or other subject matter. [...] For that purpose, rightholders should provide the service providers with relevant and necessary information ... ." (Directive 2019/790 on Copyright copyright in the Digital Single Market, <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oi">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oi</a>)




Fig. 2: layer model

Just like websites use SSL certificates (allowing the use of secure HTTPS connections) to create trust, security and provide relevant and reliable information to users online, trustable and verifiable content certificates can act as a building block to create trust in online publications, data and information, reduce illegitimate misappropriation of content, support a fair remuneration for creative individuals and media organisations, and reintroduce competition in the current media landscape.

## **Addressees**

Content certification will benefit content creators, media organisations and <u>all</u> <u>rightsholders in the value chain</u> of the cultural and creative industries who want to publish certified content and verifiably attach trustworthy information: basic metadata, copyright ownership, licensing terms, rights management information and other claims to digital media content.

<u>Platforms</u> (or online content-sharing service providers (OCSSP), according to the <u>Directive 2019/790</u>) will be able to identify digital content, verify the authenticity of the original content, receive ownership information, get access to trustworthy basic metadata, copyright ownership, licensing terms, rights management information and other claims to digital media content from certified rightsholders, and clear the rights of media assets and user generated content in an automated way.

<u>Consumers</u> will be empowered to conveniently identify original content and reliably verify its authenticity, to identify the rightsholder and the integrity of their claims to content and to express digital content ownership.

# International Standard Content Code (ISCC)

With the emergence of web 3.0 the Internet is moving towards a network of automated peer-to-peer transactions. An increasing amount of dynamic, short-lived and granular content need to be managed by a variety of entities with different interests and requirements. Digital content continuously re-encodes, resizes, and re-compresses, changing its underlying data as it travels through a complex network of actors and systems.

Identifiers are randomly and ambiguously applied to content files. Metadata or licensing terms are often incoherently and loosely attached to the content, distributed in separate files, or subject to individual legal negotiations – all of this is time-consuming and prone to errors and manual interventions. Distributing and licensing digital content on a global scale is often an all too complicated and inefficient process.

This situation requires new and innovative approaches, technologies and tools. Freely accessible standard identifiers, that are specifically designed to manage digital content, are a fundamental prerequisite for efficient transactions in a decentralised and increasingly heterogeneous media environment.

The International Standard Content Code (ISCC) is a new identifier for digital content. It helps creative individuals and media organisations to better manage their assets by using machine learning, fingerprinting and cryptographic technologies. The ISCC can be used to identify digital assets of all media-types like text, image, audio and video in all

granularities across all industry sectors alongside existing standard identifiers.

The ISCC supports versioning, deduplication, content clustering, timestamping, similarity detection and granular identifier assignment. It enables content transactions to operate faster and more efficiently in networked and increasingly decentralised media environments.

The ISCC is an <u>identifier that is created from the content file itself</u>. This means that an ISCC can be generated by anyone with access to the content, free of charge by using open-source software. By using ISCC, anyone with access to digital content – it could be the original creator, a publisher, an intermediary, an online platform (OCSSP) or a consumer – can decentrally generate the same identifier from the same digital asset. This allows anyone to unambiguously identify same or similar content independently of centralised organisations, registries or proprietary third-party services and software.



Fig. 3: step from OCCP - Process Overview

Processing the content with the algorithms defined by the <u>ISCC specification</u><sup>4</sup> creates a unique composite code, that consists of four major elements: the Meta-Code, Content-Code, Data-Code, and Instance-Code. Thus, the ISCC identifies and describes content across multiple layers: From the embedded or external metadata, the normalised content, the encoded file data down to the bitstream of an individual file. It can be used to automatically distinguish different versions of the same content, to ensure data integrity by recognising data manipulation, to de-duplicate, or to disambiguate content in a given content repository.

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> https://iscc.codes

The ISCC will be even more useful the more users agree on the suggested standard procedure of generating the ISCC. In 2019, the International Organisation for Standardisation ISO decided to accept the International Standard Content Code (ISCC) as a Preliminary Work Item (PWI) and to establish a working group ISO TC 46/SC 9/WG 18 called 'NP 24138 International Standard Content Code' to investigate the proposal.<sup>5</sup>

## **Content Certification Process**

Due to the fact that anyone can generate ISCCs from digital assets, anyone can at the same time publish the content codes on the internet or on blockchains for various reasons. Creative individuals, media organisations or other rightsholders may register and publish ISCCs in order to publish assertions, connect metadata, rights management information or other claims to the identifier. Other registrants may want to express ownership of a license or simply prove that they had access to a specific document or file by generating and publishing an ISCC.

It is important to highlight that assertions or claims to the content can be made – in principle – by anyone regardless of content ownership and without consent of the actual rightsholders. These claims may be justified, but they are not – per se – transparently verifiable for third parties.<sup>6</sup>

However, when an ISCC is registered on a public blockchain, this happens in the context of a transaction which is public, open and transparent. Public blockchain networks are based on public key cryptography. This means that transactions on these blockchains usually allow to infer the pseudonymous actor who triggered a transaction by means of his pseudonymous public address. This public address is derived from the public key of the actor. In order to perform a blockchain transaction, the actor needs to be in control of the corresponding private key; this allows him to cryptographically sign the blockchain transaction. The fact that there is always a pseudonymous actor that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> https://www.iso.org/committee/48836.html

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> For marketing purposes, a lot of startups present their content timestamping services as a meaningful way to protect the copyright of the rightsholder. But timestamping content identifiers or cryptographic hashes on public blockchains does not by itself express a copyright or the possession of any right to the content. Even less does it "protect" the copyright of rightsholders. In fact, it might not even represent a copyright claim at all, as content-derived identifiers or cryptographic hashes can be published by anyone for various other reasons. Timestamping merely proves access to a hash by the registrant, therefore the existence of this hash, and therefore access to the hash, at this point in time.

performs the transaction implies that there is always a potentially identifiable actor. This is the conceptual foundation for the OCCP.

## The ISCC Meta-Registry

In August 2020, Titusz Pan presented a technical proof of concept, based on the open, decentralised cross-blockchain registration protocol for the ISCC.<sup>7</sup> The architecture supports a service for the discovery of identical and similar content registered by different actors across different blockchains. This suggested second layer protocol for the ISCC will create a global and publicly auditable meta-registry for short and unique content identifiers that will bind digital content to actor identities. The meta-registry protocol is a response to the request for verifiable attribution. It addresses concerns that any actor can generate an ISCC from a digital asset, any actor can register an ISCC on a public blockchain network, and any actor can publish a claim associated to the ISCC.

According to the proposal for a decentralized cross-chain registry protocol for ISCCs, a registration of an ISCC on a public blockchain network will generate a unique and short ISCC-ID, that is 'owned' by the registrant in such a way as that it can be verified that the registration transaction for that specific ISCC has been cryptographically signed by the private key of the registrant. When analysing the registration process, the ISCC-ID will resolve into the complete ISCC and the registration address. In such a way, the ISCC-ID inseparably binds a registrant and actor of a blockchain transaction to a specific ISCC.

<sup>7</sup> See the technical specification on Github: <a href="https://github.com/titusz/iscc-registry/blob/master/README.md">https://github.com/titusz/iscc-registry/blob/master/README.md</a> and a short presentation of the ISCC meta-registry: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QZEXVAPTVuA">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QZEXVAPTVuA</a>. The concept will soon be published in a paper with the working title: "Decentralized Content Identifiers, a persistent global registry of content-aware binary codes"




Fig. 4: Overview of ISCC - Decentralized Cross-Chain Registry Protocol, by Titusz Pan via Github

It is important to mention that the ISCC-ID is permanently connected – or 'owned' – by any registrant with or without any certification. By design the registration transaction triggers the generation of the ISCC-ID. However, just like the registration of an ISCC on a public blockchain network does not prove legal ownership or a license to the content, being the original registrant – or 'owner' – of the ISCC-ID does not ensure that statements about the content are correct or valid.

This is where content certification comes into play.

## **Certification Transaction**

In a most basic definition, content certification is an act of attestation by a publicly known, legally established and registered organisation. By means of one single certification transaction, the certifier openly and transparently confirms that the identity of a registrant of an ISCC and that the attribution of the registrant as a rightsholder to the content have been verified. By signing a blockchain transaction that contains the ISCC-ID, according to the OCCP the certifier not only publicly acknowledges that the identity of a registrant of an ISCC is known to the certifier, the certifier also publicly acknowledges attribution and confirms that a registrant of an ISCC is a rightsholder to a specific digital asset or has another known and defined relationship to the digital asset. It could be the case that the registrant is the original creator or a licensor in the value chain, who owns specific rights to distribute content. Or it could be the case that an individual or organisation is otherwise entitled to provide authoritative metadata, licensing terms, rights management information or publish other assertions or claims to the content.

It is important to note that content certificates do not designate the specific details of the rights of an entity to the content. Content certificates only designate that the rightsholder is known to have the authority to provide valid and trustworthy metadata to that specific digital asset, which the certifier can declare due to the bilateral agreement concluded by the rightsholder and the certifier.

## **Rightsholder Pseudonymity**

It is the goal of the certification process to create trust in assertions, claims and the authenticity of the original content and to ensure accountability of the rightsholder, even if the rightsholder prefers to or must to remain pseudonymous.

In order to allow for even higher degrees of pseudonymity, the rightsholder can use the concept of Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets (as originally specified in Bitcoin as part of BIP-32<sup>8</sup>), to create a new public key for each ISCC registration transaction. This prohibits outside observers to correlate multiple transactions which could be misused as a heuristic to identify the rightsholder. The rightsholder only needs to share his public extended key with the certifier, which allows the certifier to correlate all derived public keys with the corresponding identity.

Whitepaper – Open Content Certification Protocol (OCCP) – v0.1, 2020-09-02

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See, https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki

While, according to the OCCP, a certifier is required to be publicly known and identifiable, a registrant of an ISCC and attested rightsholder may have a vital or legitimate interest in remaining pseudonymous and undisclosed to the general public. The certification of the ISCC-ID is a public acknowledgment of the certifier that he has verified the identity of the rightsholder and could provide his current contact information. In case of a legal dispute and if requested by court, the certifier might be obliged to reveal the identity of a rightsholder to proceed in trial and settle the case.

Note that a potential database containing the relationship between public keys and identities operated by the certifier for means of de-pseudonymization, is also an attack vector for cyber threat actors wishing to maliciously de-pseudonymize rightsholder addresses. Mitigations and protective countermeasures for this attack vector are out of scope of the OCCP.

## **Future Transactions**

Content certification will create trust in the individual or organisation that registered an ISCC and the metadata, licensing terms and rights management information or other assertions and claims which might be associated with a specific ISCC.

The certification of the ISCC-ID by the certifier also entails that a rightsholder will permanently 'own' this ISCC-ID in the sense that the ISCC-ID will remain connected to the registrant. In the future, metadata, licensing terms, rights management information and other claims may be connected to the ISCC-ID without the need to be certified again. With his public/private key pair the registrant can technically prove that any follow-up messages or data entries associated with the ISCC-ID are generated from the same credentials. For each subsequent transaction any third party can verify whether new information has been published by the same credentials as the ones that are associated with the ISCC-ID.

## **OCCP – Overview**




Fig. 5: OCCP - Overview

## **Use Cases**

The OCCP is designed to provide flexibility on whether parties can act as rightsholders or certifiers. This means that a rightsholder could, at the same time, be a certifier of the same content, depending on the contractual relationship between the rightsholder and the certifiers. The following paragraphs shall provide some examples:

1. Membership organisations, collective management organisations (CMO) or performance rights organisations (PRO) are representing creative individuals and media organisations in different industry sectors that own rights to content or performances. The organisations are acting on their behalf by collecting royalties or representing them in

regulatory decision making. CMO's, PRO's not only know their clients through the membership application. In many cases they are associated with the rightsholders through a long-standing collaboration and familiar with the specific works they represent on their behalf. Membership organisations, CMO's, PRO's are ideally suited to act as certifiers for the attribution of content to the rightsholders they represent.

- 2. A publisher might want to license digital content to a retailer. According to the licensing agreement, both parties hold rights to the content: the publisher acquired rights from the creators, the retailer acquired rights from the publisher. After the conclusion of the contract, the retailer has a stake in the content and may legitimately publish a claim, e.g. that he is entitled to sublicense content from the publisher's digital assortment to his customers. Both, the retailer and the publisher might have an interest to certify the retailer and his claims to the content to create trust in the platform and offerings. In this case the publisher could act as a certifier to the retailer.
- 3. A human rights activist in an authoritarian state captures a human rights violation by government authorities on video and anonymously publishes the scene on social media. Because he fears repression the activist does not want to associate his real name or other personal information with the video. On the other hand, the activist wants to make sure that the video will be recognised as uncompromised and the authenticity of the recording can be verified by anyone. By using ISCC and content certificates, the activist can pseudonymously publish the video and inseparably connect basic metadata or copyright or licensing information to the video, without revealing his real identity. A human rights organisation can act on behalf of the rightsholder as certifier of the attribution and testify the authenticity of the content and authority of the rightsholder to the connected information.

## Set-up

In order to start the certification process according to the OCCP, the rightsholder and the certifier need to set-up their wallets as well as their relationship by concluding a bilateral agreement.

## Creation of Certifier Wallet



Fig. 6: step from OCCP - Process Overview

The certifier can create a certification address for himself and independently of any organisation, registry or other centralised authority. The certification address is a public blockchain address that is generated from the public key of the certifier. Any blockchain wallet, that can create a private/public key pair for a blockchain network, can generate a certification address.

## **Public Self-Verification of Certifier**

While the registration address may remain pseudonymous, the OCCP requires that the identity of the organisation that is in control of the certification address is made public. This means that the certifier needs to prove in a transparent, verifiable and automated way to the public that he is in control of the certification address.

One possible and suggested way for the certifier to verify himself is through a process of online self-verification. This method assumes that, a) only the certifier has control of the web-hosting server that is used for the homepage of his organisation, and b) that actual contact information are publicly disclosed, e.g. on the imprint page, which is a common requirement for publishers of information or services on the internet in (trans-)national legislation.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> E.g. the Telemediengesetz (German meaning "Telemedia Act") requires that German websites disclose information about the publisher, including their name and address, telephone number or e-mail address, trade registry number, VAT number, and other information depending on the type of company. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impressum">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impressum</a>



Fig. 7: step from OCCP - Process Overview

Provided that these two conditions are met, after creation of the certification addresses this public address needs to be published on the websites of the certifier in such a way that is suitable for human interpretation and in such a format that supports automated, machine-readable verification by applications.

In a second step, the certifier needs to cryptographically sign a public blockchain transaction that includes the URI that links to the public certification address on the websites of the certifier. The fact that the public key that generated the certification address is generated from the same private key that signed the blockchain transaction that included the URI is proof that the certifier has control over the certification address.

Public key cryptography and the transparency and immutability of public blockchain networks create the trust in this self-verification of the certifier.

## **Creation of Rightsholder Wallet**



Fig. 8: step from OCCP - Process Overview

The rightsholder can create a registration address for himself and independently of any organisation, registry or other centralised authority. The registration address is a public blockchain address that is generated from the public key of the rightsholder. Any blockchain wallet, that can create a private/public key pair on a blockchain network, that will be used to register ISCC, can generate a registration address.

## **Rightsholder Identity Verification**

While, according to the OCCP, the certifier is required to be publicly known and identifiable, the registrant and rightsholder may have a vital and legitimate interest in remaining pseudonymous and undisclosed to the general public.

Nonetheless, the OCCP requires that at least the certifier knows the identity of the rightsholder and e.g. has access to his current contact information. To establish their relationship, the rightsholder and the certifier must conclude a contractual agreement that provides contact information, defines the nature of their relationship, the services, the liabilities of the certifier and the rightsholder, and regulates other matters. This agreement must be signed offline or offchain.




Fig. 9: step from OCCP - Process Overview

## Challenge

After signing the agreement, the rightsholder needs to provide to the certifier the public key (or the extended public key) that he intends to use as a registrant. This must be done in an undisclosed and secure channel, e.g offline, via an end-to-end encrypted messenger, by telefax or telephone.

The registration address can be verified by the certifier by means of a simple challenge-response-transaction, in which a secret message, encrypted with the rightsholders public key, is transmitted to the rightsholder. By decrypting the secret with his private key and disclosing the secret to the certifier, the challenge is solved. By means of this challenge, the certifier can verify that a registration address belongs to the rightsholder. This challenge needs to be executed in a channel that is secured from man-in-the-middle-attacks, such as end-to-end encrypted messengers.

## **Verification of Content Certificates**

Content certificates are easily discoverable and openly accessible through the blockchain by individual users, services or software.

User applications can process content certificates and verify the authenticity of original content, attribution of rightsholders and their claims to digital content in a decentralised and automated way with access to the digital content, only.




Fig. 10: mockup of possible software application

To resolve the requested metadata, licensing terms and other rights management information, verifiers can decentrally generate an ISCC from a digital asset using dedicated software applications.

Depending on how many rightsholders registered an ISCC, the software will associate one or potentially multiple different ISCC-IDs with the ISCC, each of them generated by a registration transaction published by a specific registration address. As mentioned above, an ISCC-ID does not necessarily mean that content has been certified. It could be that either all ISCC-IDs, some or none might have been certified by either multiple different certifiers, one or none.

If an ISCC-ID was certified and the certification transaction has been confirmed on a public blockchain network –, then a content certificate will have been implicitly issued for this ISCC-ID.

By having identified certified ISCC-IDs, users will be able to find trustworthy metadata, licensing terms or other rights management information which rightsholders might have attached to the content – and use the content according to the terms provided by the rightsholders. In case of a number of certified ISCC-IDs, verifiers can choose the certifiers they trust or the licensing terms that suit their individual needs.

This way, content certificates not only create trust in the authenticity and reliability of online content, data and information. They can also facilitate dispute resolution and significantly improve the digital content licensing for creative individuals, media organisations and other rightsholders of digital content.

## **OCCP – Process Overview**




Fig. 11: OCCP - Process Overview

## **Further Discussion**

The authors of this whitepaper explicitly acknowledge the work of the members of the internet community on the following standards:

- a) the W3C working draft for <u>Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0.</u>, its core architecture, <u>data model</u>, <u>and representations</u> in its current version of the working draft from 24 August 2020,
- b) the W3C recommendation for <u>Verifiable Credentials</u>, <u>data model 1.0</u>, <u>on expressing verifiable information on the web</u>, as published on 19 November 2019.
- c) the efforts of the DIF working groups, such as <u>DIDComm</u>.
- d) the digital trust concepts and interoperability goals of the Trust over IP Foundation, as outlined in the <u>Trust over IP whitepaper V1</u>, as published on 5 May 2020.

## **Decentralised Identifiers (DIDs)**

For the purpose of content certification it makes sense that registrants and certifiers use decentralised identifiers (DIDs).

"The Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) [...] are a new type of globally unique identifier designed to enable individuals and organizations to generate our own identifiers using systems we trust, and to prove control of those identifiers (authenticate) using cryptographic proofs (for example, digital signatures, privacy-preserving biometric protocols, and so on).

Because we control the generation and assertion of these identifiers, each of us can have as many DIDs as with need to respect our desired separation of identities, personas, and contexts (in the everyday sense of these words). We can scope the use of these identifiers to the most appropriate contexts. We can interact with other people, institutions or systems that require us to identify ourselves (or things we control) while maintaining control over how much personal or private data should be revealed, and without depending on a central authority to guarantee the continued existence of the identifier."<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/

For the OCCP it seems semantically justified to call the public blockchain addresses of the registrants and certifiers self-sovereign and decentralised identifiers. However, it is important to mention that in the current version of the OCCP, these decentralised identities are <u>not yet</u> DIDs according to the technical definitions in the W3C draft on Decentralised Identifiers.

#### Verifiable Credentials

After investigating the standard and terminology of the Verifiable Credentials Data Model 1.0, the applicability of the model for digital content certification as suggested by the OCCP needs to be further discussed.<sup>11</sup>

Content certification could be considered and described as a 'process that consist of a blockchain transaction performed by an issuer providing tamper-evident verifiable credentials to a verifier about a subject (content) and its relation to the holder (rightsholder) that can be cryptographically verified'.

On the other hand, there is a need to discuss whether content certificates as issued according to the suggested OCCP could be issued to the holder according to the Verifiable Credentials Data Model. However note, that the OCCP not only describes the process by which content certificates are issued, but also includes the process of publishing them in a public registry.

#### Governance

It is obvious that the governance model for content certification needs to be further elaborated. Because of the fact that the OCCP can be applied and technically implemented by organisations in principle without permission, it is nonetheless important that the OCCP provides clear guidelines on the fundamental principles and standards of content certification.

The governance of content certification needs to be maintained by a not-for-profit organisation. It will be the goal of this organisation to serve the global online and content community by maintaining the protocol and governance that support transparent and auditable content certification services, which includes offering

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> For a comprehensive introduction read Drummond Reed and Alexander Preukschat: The Basic Building Blocks of SSI, <a href="https://freecontent.manning.com/the-basic-building-blocks-of-ssi/">https://freecontent.manning.com/the-basic-building-blocks-of-ssi/</a>, and the preview from the forthcoming publication of the same authors: Self-Sovereign Identity – Decentralized Digital Identity and Verifiable Credentials, <a href="https://livebook.manning.com/book/self-sovereign-identity">https://livebook.manning.com/book/self-sovereign-identity</a>.

conceptional advice, coaching and ethical guidance as well as technical documentations.

# **User Applications**

User application that support the OCCP:

Licium - Licium.app

# **Design Goals**

The OCCP is based on the following design goals:

- Transparency
- Trust
- Security
- Openness
- Fairness
- Inclusiveness
- Simplicity
- Interoperability
- Discoverability

## References

[1] "BIP-0032 - Key derivation," GitHub. https://github.com/bitcoin/bips (accessed Sep. 02, 2020).

[2] "Content Authenticity Initiative," Content Authenticity Initiative. https://contentauthenticity.org (accessed Sep. 02, 2020).

[3]D. Reed, M. Sporny, and M. Sabadello, "Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0." https://w3c.github.io/did-core/ (accessed Sep. 02, 2020).

[4] "DEEPTRUST ALLIANCE," DEEPTRUST ALLIANCE. https://www.deeptrustalliance.org (accessed Sep. 02, 2020).

[5]Council of the European Union, "Developing the Copyright Infrastructure - Stocktaking of work and progress under the Finnish Presidency." Accessed: Sep. 02, 2020. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/">https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/</a> ST-15016-2019-INIT/en/pdf.

[6] "EUR-Lex - 32019L0790 - EN - EUR-Lex." https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj (accessed Sep. 02, 2020).

[7]"ISCC - Content Identifiers." https://iscc.codes/ (accessed Sep. 02, 2020).

[8]"ISO/TC 46/SC 9 - Identification and description," ISO. <a href="https://www.iso.org/cms/render/live/en/sites/isoorg/contents/data/committee/04/88/48836.html">https://www.iso.org/cms/render/live/en/sites/isoorg/contents/data/committee/04/88/48836.html</a> (accessed Sep. 02, 2020).

[9]A. Preukschat and D. Reed, Self-Sovereign Identity. Manning Publications, 2021.

[10]T. Pan, titusz/iscc-registry - HackFS- Decentralized Content Identifier Registry. 2020.

[11]M. Sporny, G. Noble, D. Longley, D. Burnett, and B. Zundel, "Verifiable Credentials Data Model 1.0." <a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model">https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model</a> (accessed Sep. 02, 2020).

## **FAQ**

## **Certification of Rightsholder and Attestation**

On <u>what grounds can a certifier verify</u> that a registrant is a rightsholder or has another defined relationship to a given asset?

It is the task and the service of the certifier to verify the relationship of the rightsholder to the content and attest attribution. This should be done on the basis of a bilateral service agreement between the rightsholder and the certifier. Best practice, recommendations or requirements for the regulatory content of the agreement need to be further discussed.

#### Is there a <u>legal risk involved</u> for a certifier to attest attribution?

A bilateral service agreement will be the foundation for a certifier to act and to limit or exempt himself from a potential risk of being misinformed by the rightsholder.

#### How can the certifier trust that a registrant is a rightsholder of a given asset?

The certifier needs to be in the position of trusting the rightsholder. It could be because both have a mutual agreement or a business relationship, like many membership organisations, CMOs, retailers, distributors etc. have with rightsholders. If the certifier and the rightsholder have a bilateral agreement, this agreement should be trusted until proven otherwise. The bilateral agreement could include liability of the rightsholder towards the certifier.

#### What does a <u>content certificate express</u>?

Content certificates do not designate the specific details of the rights of a rightsholder to the content.

Content certificates only designate that the rightsholder is known to have the authority to provide valid and trustworthy metadata to that specific digital asset, which the certifier can declare due to the bilateral agreement concluded by the rightsholder and the certifier.

The registrant neither has to be the primary or a canonical rightsholder nor would he have to have exclusive metadata authority.

If there is contradicting metadata from different sources with certified attribution users can decide which source to trust more or which source to choose for their own purposes. It might further be necessary to initiate a subsequent dispute resolution process.

#### How can a verifier trust the content certificates?

A verifier will not know the details of the bilateral agreement. However, a verifier will recognise the organisation that has certified the content. Certifiers are publicly known, legally established and registered organisations by authority or their social reputation.

## Chain of Title

### Does certification need to start from or refer to the original creator?

Content certification is not about the certification of the whole value chain and the whole history of rights and rights transactions. A history might be emergent via the transaction history, however this would be coincidental.

## **Accountability and Personal Data**

# Does the certifier have to <u>keep access to personally identifiable information (PII)</u> of the rightsholder?

Yes, the certifier has to keep the information in case of a dispute or a legal requirement to disclose the identity of the rightsholder. This requirement could be limited in time.

# What if <u>personal data and public keys of the rightsholders are leaked</u> from the certifier's database?

It is the main responsibility of the certifier to take the necessary protective cyber security measures to keep the association of public keys and personal data of the rightsholders safe. There is no way to remove the rightsholder/content-associations from immutable public blockchains.

In case of data leak, address data could be de-pseudonymized. This might be a problem with regards to GDPR for the network operators. However, there are no clear and modern legal guidelines on this topic yet.

#### How to avoid unwanted clustering of content to one rightsholder?

For each transaction, a new public/private key pair can be generated as part of a hierarchical deterministic wallet, which will make content clustering much more difficult.

## The Yeti Issue

Does a content certificate say anything about the <u>quality of the content</u> of a media asset?

No, it does not. The certifier is indifferent to the content. He will not rate, judge or validate the content from the rightsholder.

Not all content will be certified by the certifier. The certification is an assignment from the rightsholder. It is not up to the certifier to make a claim or judgement about the digital asset.

If the certifier is attesting improperly manipulated content, this will cause disputes and a social reputation model will kick in.