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Guest Editors: Anastassia Zabrodskaja and Martin Ehala

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Inter-ethnic processes in post-Soviet space: theoretical background

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This introductory article of a special issue outlines the general theoretical background, formulates principles for a continuum of hot and cold ethnicities, gives a brief characterisation of the interethnic developments after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and provides an overview of the papers. This collection of contributions deals with a variety of case studies with a particular focus on the strength of members' emotional attachment to their group. Such a division of ethnicities can be categorised into two prototypes: 'hot' and 'cold'. A 'hot' ethnic group is one whose members have a high emotional attachment to their group. 'Cold' ethnic groups are those whose members' emotional attachment to the groups is low, absent or latent.

Keywords: inter-ethnic processes; post-Soviet; collective identity; ethnolinguistic vitality; nation-building

Rationale for the current special issue

This special issue on 'Hot and cold ethnicities in post-Soviet space' is the outcome of an academic dialogue that began with a conference organised by Martin Ehala and Anastassia Zabrodskaja in Tallinn in 2011. The purposes of the conference were to explore the issues of hot and cold ethnicities (see Ehala 2011) and to examine the phenomenon of ethnic temperature as the key factor in group vitality, as well as the processes of 'temperature change' and their effects on inter-ethnic relations in society. This special issue synthesises the insights from the conference and offers proposals for further analysis.

The collapse of the Soviet Union created a number of new nation-states and a number of Russian-speaking minority communities within their borders. As compared to the Soviet time, the breakdown intensified inter-ethnic processes, which resulted in a discursive 'reinterpretation of the history of the Soviet Union' (Blommaert 2006, 151) and efforts to undo Russification (Pavlenko 2009). The everyday linguistic practices and the (re)negotiation of identities among new titular and minority groups during the transformation of the post-Soviet urban sociocultural-linguistic environment have attracted scholarly interest 'as a contested linguistic space, where emotional exchanges over language-related issues are fodder for the daily news' (Pavlenko 2008, 275).

There have been multiple social changes since the breakup of the USSR in 1991 related to the de facto and de jure status of the Russian language and the challenges faced by competing and coexisting national ideologies. Two main results have been the massive

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outflow of Russian-speakers from the new national republics during the 1990s and efforts to recognise, revitalise and institutionalise the new national languages in order to avoid the continued dominance of the formerly universal Russian language. A radical shift in language policy can provoke a clash of old and new language ideologies, resulting in the confrontation of 'the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests' (Irvine 1989, 255). Therefore, the post-Soviet interethnic space is an interesting site to study changes in interethnic relationships and their impact on ethnolinguistic vitality.

The shared historical experience makes the post-Soviet ethnicities easily comparable, although they also have important differences (for example, Estonia and Latvia and their national histories are not comparable to other Soviet Republics, such as Ukraine and Lithuania, which already had ancient traditions of statehood, while places like Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan only developed statehood with the help of the Soviets, or Belarus, which started its history as an independent state only after the collapse of the USSR). Both the similarities and differences make it possible to examine comparatively the factors that contribute to ethnic temperature change for a better understanding of the interaction of different causal forces in different combinations.

Conceptual background

Ethnolinguistic vitality

Traditionally, ethnolinguistic vitality is understood as a group's ability to act as a distinctive collective entity in intergroup settings (Giles, Bourhis, and Taylor 1977, 308). It is generally understood that the higher the vitality, the better the chances are for the maintenance of this group over time, and the lower the vitality, the more likely it is to cease to exist through assimilation. Thus, the maintenance or assimilation of a group is seen as dependent on its ability to function as a collective. Traditionally, vitality has been divided into objective (demographic, and macro-level structural factors) and subjective vitality (group members' attitudes), but it has been argued recently (see Ehala 2010) that a group's ability to act as a collective is entirely a social psychological phenomenon, which means that ethnolinguistic vitality is more or less what traditionally was called subjective vitality, and objective vitality is better understood as the strength of a group. If understood in this narrower social psychological sense, ethnolinguistic vitality is dependent on the closeness of the identification of the members to their ethnic group (Giles and Johnson 1987; Ehala 2011). In this understanding, a group's ability to act collectively depends on the strength of its members' identification with their in-group.

The theory of ethnolinguistic vitality is not the only theory that addresses the question of what helps groups to maintain their groupness and remain sustainable over time, and why some groups are durable while others lose members and dissolve. These or closely related questions are also explained in the theory of social identity (Brown 2000), collectivism–individualism (Triandis and Gelfand 1998), studies of nationalism (Bar-Tal 1993), etc. Different theories analyse the group identification issue quite differently. As Ashmore, Deaux and McLaughlin-Volpe (2004) show in their comprehensive meta-analysis of studies on collective identity, at least seven facets of collective identification (self-categorisation, evaluation, importance, attachment and sense of interdependence, social embeddedness, behavioural involvement, and content and meaning) have been repeatedly distinguished in research. On the other hand, Roccas et al. (2008) propose four modes of identification: importance, commitment, superiority and deference. As there is no consensus on the exact number and nature of different aspects of collective

identification, we, instead of trying to select, opt for a generalisation and group these facets into three broad types of factors: cognitive (self-categorisation, content and meaning, evaluation, importance and superiority), emotional (attachment and sense of interdependence, commitment and deference) and behavioural (social embeddedness, behavioural involvement, commitment and deference).

Based on the above tripartite division, it is likely that what manifests as ethnolinguistic vitality on the group level is mainly due to the behavioural facet of identification with the in-group on the individual level: the more the members are socially embedded, the more they defer to the group, and the more committedly they are involved in the group's actions, the more vital this group is. As an individual's decision behaviourally to contribute to the group could be motivated both by cognitive and emotional arguments, it is also likely that the behavioural facet of group identification is motivated by the cognitive and emotional side of identification, but for each individual, the combination of rational and emotional motivation could be different.

The rational and emotional motivation to commit to the group leads to different types of commitment. Rational motivation is based on the calculation of benefits and costs that are associated with commitment or with abstention from commitment. Therefore, in the case of rationally motivated commitment, the individual is motivated to contribute to the collective action to the extent that the possible benefit that comes from participation exceeds the risks and costs or, alternatively, to the extent that punishment from free-riding is more costly than the risks and costs associated with participation. This means that only groups that have a well-established benefit and sanction system can achieve ethnolinguistic vitality purely by relying on group members' rational motivation to cooperate and contribute to the group goals. Groups with scarce resources and limited ability to sanction free-riders have little chance rationally to motivate their members (except for promising prosperity in the case of victory: which is why the promise of land and/or equal opportunities has proven to be so effective in motivating oppressed ethnicities to demand freedom). In most cases, rational motivation is also supported by emotional factors that seem to be far more powerful than rational calculation: there have always been plenty of people willing to risk their lives for causes, groups, gods or leaders to whom they are emotionally strongly attached.

These considerations have led Ehala (2011) to propose that, based on the prevailing type of identification with the in-group, ethnicities can be grouped into two prototypes: 'hot' and 'cold'. Hot groups have a high share of members who have high emotional attachment to the group. Cold ethnicities are those whose members' emotional attachment to the group is absent, low or latent. These groups function as collective entities purely on rational grounds. Ehala (2011) hypothesised that for ethnicities of equal size, hot ones are more vital and sustainable than cold ones.

Cold ethnicities

Ethnicities whose members do not feel significant emotional attachment to their group can be considered cold. In general, there are two likely causes for the coldness. In one case, the group does not face internal or external threats; there are no prominent out-groups, the presence of which could strengthen self-categorisation on ethnic grounds. Due to the lack of a significant (and threatening) 'other', the ethnic collective identity has a very low salience – the members of these groups see themselves primarily as merely people, not representatives of an ethnicity. It does not matter whether the group is a large and wealthy monocultural nation living in peace with its neighbours or a small tribe

living in significant isolation: in both cases, the members do not have much reason to categorise themselves on ethnic grounds or to feel any particular emotional attachment to this identity. This type of cold group can operate on rational grounds because of the lack of prominent out-groups, there is no drag towards other possibly more rewarding group memberships.

In the other case, the group is cold because it is weak in comparison with the out-groups, often geographically dispersed within the majority out-group. Such groups are usually characterised by a lack of leadership, few cultural activities or little sense of a shared history, i.e. there is no significant 'nation-building' to increase the feeling of unity and emotional significance of this identity for the individuals who could claim it. Some of the threatened minority communities are cold for this reason.

The ethnolinguistic vitality of cold groups is sustained by social institutions, which provide resources and sanctions, and thus motivate the group members to contribute to the continued functioning of the groups. As a rule, the more economically, politically, culturally and militarily powerful the group is, the easier it is to motivate its members for collectively coordinated behaviour purely on rational grounds. For this reason, economically self-sustainable, non-threatened, broadly monocultural societies remain vital even without any need for strong emotional attachment of the members to the group identity. The situation is different in the case of weak ethnicities that do not have the means to provide a system of benefits and sanctions to their members. There is very little rational reason why the members of these groups should contribute to the group or even why they should be loyal to this low prestige identity if some alternative ethnic affiliation can provide better living conditions and higher collective self-esteem. So a weak ethnicity is threatened and may go through language and identity shift if it is operating only on rational motivation.

Hot ethnicities

In the hot mode of operation, the group members' emotional attachment to their group is high. Emotional attachment is created routinely through the socialisation of young generations in a family and educational system and discursively in the society by the alignment of collective emotions (see Thomas, McGarty, and Mavor 2009). The cultural material (narratives, stereotypes, etc.) that is used in this process depends on the specific sociohistorical factors of each particular case (see David and Bar-Tal 2009). In many cases, emotional attachment is achieved by appealing to interethnic threat, accompanied by exaggerating the perception of in-group weakness in comparison with threatening out-groups (see Ehala and Zabrodskaja 2011; Giles and Johnson 1987). The same goes for group distinctiveness. According to Barth (1969), group distinctiveness is not entirely based on empirical differences between the members of two different ethnic groups; rather, the differences are selected and used to make the groups appear distinctive. The same or even relatively larger differences may be unnoticed in a case where there is reason to be inclusive. Thus, the impact of ethnic temperature rise seems to be fairly uniform: emotional attachment, commitment and unity increase, the group boundaries become less permeable, and the group tries to appear more distinctive from out-groups. All this makes a group more vital: its members are more willing to contribute, and even if members do not contribute, the closed interethnic boundaries prevent them from leaving the group.

The transitional processes from a cold mode of operation to a hot mode form the crucial point of attention in language maintenance and ethnolinguistic vitality research

because they are the key to a successful maintenance of heritage ethnic identity and the linguistic and cultural practices characteristic of it. On the other hand, the transition to a hot state creates considerable instability because of increased intergroup hostility. In short, understanding the nature and mechanism of the transitional processes enables political practitioners and decision-makers to have more influence on interethnic processes in contemporary multiethnic societies.

Ethnic temperature of post-Soviet ethnicities

Two central issues that need to be resolved for the metaphor of hot and cold ethnicities to have explanatory value are to specify what factors influence ethnic temperature and how the temperature can be measured. A promising area to explore this is provided by the post-Soviet space. The following papers explore the theoretical issues outlined above from different viewpoints and in different settings. The main goal of all the analyses, both triangulated and comparative, presented in the present collection is to reveal the relationships between the processes of identity dynamics and collective emotional alignment.

The first paper, 'Russians in post-Soviet Central Asia: more "cold" than the others? Exploring (ethnic) identity under different socio-political settings', by Natalya Kosmarskaya, explores the identity and the social/political behaviour of Russians in post-Soviet Central Asia through a comparison with the Baltic countries, using the 'hot and cold ethnicity' paradigm. In terms of empirical findings, the paper is based on the author's extensive fieldwork among ethnic Russians and other Russophones of Kyrgyzstan (1996–2003) and Uzbekistan (2002, 2004), and their urban populations (five fieldwork trips between 2007 and 2012), which was conducted mainly using qualitative sociology in its methodological approach (in-depth interviewing in a life history and topic-guide format). The author suggests that Central Asian Russians can be characterised as located at the 'cold' end of the spectrum of 'ethnic temperatures'. The reasons include the salience of social and cultural boundaries versus ethnic ones, the nature of local political regimes, the role and status of the Russian language and culture, and official and popular interpretations of the Soviet past.

The second paper, 'Still warm but getting colder: changing ethnic identity of post-Soviet Jewry', by Elena Nosenko-Stein, is based on the author's fieldwork carried out in 1999–2009 in several urban centres of the European part of Russia (Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Penza, Krasnodar, Smolensk, Veliky Novgorod and several others). The data-set consists of 250 in-depth interviews. The author argues that, from the beginning of the Soviet era, the process of separating Jews from Judaism was very intensive; the notion of 'a Soviet Jew' was created based on new secular symbols and values that led to a cooling of the ethnic temperature of Russian Jews. In modern Russia, Jews do not have a common ethnic, national or confessional identity but do have several cultural self-identifications. The author distinguishes five types of Jewish identity in modern Russia: 'East Ashkenazi', 'Russian non-Jewish', 'Negative Jewish', 'Hybrid Jewish' and 'New Jewish' self-identification, all of which have different ethnic temperatures. The general tendency to a further ethnic cooling of the Jewish community is evident in Russia, but at the same time, the 'New Jews', who are attempting to rebuild Jewish life, maintain the Jewish ethnic temperature at the warm level.

The third paper, 'Ethnic identity in post-Soviet Belarus: ethnolinguistic survival as an argument in the political struggle', by Nelly Bekus, analyses the dynamics of an ideological confrontation between two subtypes of Belarusian identity: the hot, and

sometimes even 'boiling', temperature of the Belarusian ethnic idea in the environment of ethnopolitical activists and the rather cool feelings that the majority of Belarusians display towards their ethnic identity. The author argues that the recent dynamic of self-perception in Belarusian society can be interpreted as the beginning of a gradual 'heating' of the ethnocultural vitality of Belarusians, which is occurring under the impact of the agency of elites. Ethnolinguistic survival and vitality in this context can be viewed both as an argument in the political arena and a factor contributing to victory in the rivalry between political forces. And, inversely, the outcome of this struggle may have a crucial impact on the 'ethnic temperature' of Belarusians. In this context, the phenomenon of 'ethnic temperature' can be analysed not only from the perspective of its impact on group vitality and survival but also as a phenomenon dependent on various political, cultural and historical factors.

The fourth paper, 'Between "official" and "unofficial" temperatures: introducing a complication to the hot and cold ethnicity theory from Odessa', by Abel Polese, analyses the case of Odessa, a Russian-speaking city in southern Ukraine, to test the hot and cold ethnicity theory. The article is based on almost five years of fieldwork in Ukraine in the period 2003–2011, two of which were completely in Odessa. The author compares the official narrative on identity policies in the city with evidence collected through participant observation in several key areas (hospitals, schools, universities and churches), and this observation was complemented with research in six primary and secondary schools and 49 semi-structured interviews with two generation of Odessans. The author shows how the official narrative of the Ukrainian state has been received and renegotiated by the local population. While the local people have seemingly been complying with new state instructions about language use, in reality the practices have changed very little. Even though the political activism of Russian-speakers is low on the grass-roots level, they are effectively able to act in their collective interests. This raises the issue of how to measure the level of activeness of groups, and what actions should be considered as counting towards the definition of cold and hot.

The fifth paper, 'Hot and cold ethnicities in the Baltic states', by Martin Ehala and Anastassia Zabrodskaja, discusses the temperature of the main ethnic groups in the Baltic states: Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, the three Russian-speaking communities and the Latgalian and Polish minorities in Latvia and Lithuania, respectively. The study used a triangulated methodology that includes a survey questionnaire for quantitative study and an associated protocol for a semi-structured focus group interview. The qualitative focus group interviews provided more substantial information on how the respondents belonging to different 'ethnic' groups forecast their ethnic identity dynamics over time and how they saw interethnic relations developing in their country. The aim of the methodology was to make the notion of ethnic temperature quantitatively assessable while retaining the possibility of rich qualitative description to understand its nature. The quantitative analysis confirmed the wide divergence of subgroups within each ethnic group, each of which had a different ethnic temperature, as found in other studies in this special issue. The (intergroup) interaction of the members of these subgroups influenced both the average temperature of the in-group as well as the temperature of significant out-groups.

The concluding article, 'Formation of territorial collective identities: turning history into emotion', by Martin Ehala, analyses the theoretical implications of the case studies and further issues that need attention within the hot and cold paradigm.

Conclusion

To understand the phenomena of symbolic and discursive natures, one has to approach them from the internal perspective, based on the construction of reality (Flick 2002, 48). In addition, societal phenomena need to be analysed in a maximally multifaceted way. By combining different research methods and/or objects, it is possible to fit the different aspects of the problem into one coherent framework (see Flick 2002, 81). Therefore, triangulation plays an important role in the study of sociocultural phenomena (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009). The subjective point of view, which is unavoidable and essential in studying identity, is also a central part of qualitative studies (Flick 2002, 20). At the same time, the usage of qualitative methods requires the availability and understanding of basic information (Flick 2002, 73) – an opportunity for this can be provided by a theoretically based quantitative study (see Ehala and Zabrodskaja, this issue).

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Russians in post-Soviet Central Asia: more 'cold' than the others? Exploring (ethnic) identity under different sociopolitical settings

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This paper explores the identity and the social/political behaviour of Russians in post-Soviet Central Asia through a comparison with the Baltic countries via a 'hot and cold ethnicity' paradigm. Central Asian Russians are more likely, ceteris paribus, to be found at the 'cold' end of the spectrum of 'ethnic temperatures'. The article starts with outlining the historical roots of a specific Russians' self-designation in the 'imperial peripheries' – that is, a lowered attachment to their ethnic group as compared with loyalties towards the state. However, patterns of imperial penetration into different territories of the former USSR (FSU) were different, and so were the sociopolitical conditions under which Russians have found themselves after the collapse of the FSU. Due to this, patterns of Russians' self-designation turned out to be quite divergent: Central Asia represents a contrasting pattern in comparison with the Baltics. Subsequent parts of the paper contain a more detailed analysis of the reasons behind a relatively 'cold' ethnic stance of Russians in Central Asia. These reasons include the salience of sociocultural boundaries versus ethnic ones, the nature of local political regimes, the role of Russian language and culture, official and popular interpretation of the Soviet past and attitudes towards the present-day Russia.

Keywords: Russians in Central Asia and in the Baltic countries; ethnic and social identity; political consolidation; role and status of Russian language; memory about the Soviet past

Introduction

The goal of this paper is to explore identity and social/political behaviour of Russians in post-Soviet Central Asia within the paradigmatic framework of 'hot and cold ethnicity'. My point is that Russians in this region might be positioned closer to the 'cold' end of the spectrum – the fact that is even more evident if compared with the Russians' position in the Baltic countries.

By assuming this, I do not take Russians in both parts of the post-Soviet world as bounded, coherent groups more 'ethnically engaged' as a collective in the Baltic countries, compared to those of Central Asia. Being a proponent of a constructivist approach to ethnicity, I take it, paraphrasing Brubaker, not as a thing or a substance, but as 'an interpretative scheme, a way of making sense of the social world. And it is always only one among many interpretative schemes' (Brubaker et al. 2006, 15). Individuals, no matter where, may or may not use ethnicity in their everyday lives. By implying that somebody is

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more 'cold' ('hot'), it is meant that under specific historical and social settings people might be less (more) inclined, on average, to use an ethnically charged prism 'to make sense of problems or predicaments, to articulate affinities and affiliations, to identify commonalities and connections, to frame stories and self-understandings' (Brubaker et al. 2006, 12). Consequently, on the behavioural level, an individual might be less (more) inclined, voluntarily or pressed by social circumstances, to participate in any type of collective action on an ethnic basis.

I will start with a short historical excursus to outline the historical roots of a specific trait of Russians' self-designation in the 'imperial peripheries' – that is, a lowered attachment to their ethnic group compared with heavily ideologised loyalties towards the state. However, patterns of imperial penetration (Russian and/or Soviet) into different territories of the former USSR (FSU) were different and so were the sociopolitical conditions under which Russians and other Russophones have found themselves after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Due to this, patterns of Russians' self-designation turned out to be quite divergent, with Central Asia being a largely contrasting pattern in comparison with the Baltic region.

In the subsequent parts of the paper, proceeding from a historical/political background outlined earlier, I will present a more detailed analysis of reasons behind a relatively 'cold' ethnic stance of Russians in Central Asia. These reasons include the salience of social and cultural boundaries versus ethnic ones; the nature of local political regimes; the role and status of the Russian language and Russian culture; official and popular interpretations of the Soviet past and, through the lens of these views, attitudes towards the present-day Russia.

The last section is an attempt to throw light on a number of under-explored factors which could also make an impact on Russians' position on a scale of 'ethnic temperatures' and, in this capacity, serve as a guideline for further research.

The regional frame of the analysis deserves some specification. The region addressed as Central Asia is here inevitably limited to the three countries where the presence of Russians and other Russophones is still numerically significant. These countries are Kazakhstan (approx. 3.8 million Russians, according to the Second National Population Census of 2009 [Goskomstat Kazakhstana 2010]); Uzbekistan (an estimated one million as no census was conducted in the country since 1989 [Vozhdaeva 2008]); Kyrgyzstan (approx. 420,000, according to the Second National Population Census of 2009 [Polozheniye i statistika 2010]).

Out of the three Baltic states, Latvia and Estonia deserve the closest attention within the thematic frame of this paper. They possess Russophone communities numerically strong both in absolute and relative terms: according to the last population censuses, there were 676,000 Russian-speakers in Latvia (52%) (Population Census. Latvijas Statistika 2011) and 384,000 in Estonia (about 30%) (Population and Housing Census 2011). Lithuania stands apart not only because its Russian minority is quite small, being secondary to Poles (4.8% in 2010, about 160,000 people [Brazauskiene and Likhachiova 2011, 62]), but also because it maintained citizenship status since independence was proclaimed. More importantly, the majority of Lithuanian Russians have chosen a path of voluntary assimilationist integration (see, e.g. Brazauskiene and Likhachiova [2011] on this important subject).

Running slightly ahead, it could be suggested that if compared with the case under study (Russians in Central Asia), this option is another way of being relatively 'cold' on the scale of 'ethnic temperatures'. Interestingly, one more contextual frame for a potentially 'cold' stance of a non-titular ethnic group in a post-Soviet nationalising state is

analysed in this issue by Polese, with Russians in the Ukrainian city of Odessa as a case study. Through looking into the theory of 'hot and cold ethnicities' through the prism of informality, this author concludes that 'a group could appear not to be very active because it is already successful at asserting itself informally, in which case there is no real need to get asserted formally' (Polese forthcoming). The case dealing with the dynamics of ethnic 'temperatures' of a titular group is analysed in this issue by Bekus (forthcoming).

In terms of empirical findings, this article is based on the author's extensive fieldwork among ethnic Russians and other Russophones of Kyrgyzstan (1996–2003) and Uzbekistan (2002, 2004), and their urban populations (five trips to these countries between 2007 and 2012). A qualitative sociology (in-depth interviewing in a life history and topic-guide format) was mainly used. The second series of the fieldwork was conducted within the framework of the international research project 'Exploring Urban Identities and Community Relations in Post-Soviet Central Asia' funded by the Leverhulme Trust (the UK, 2007–2012). The research team includes, besides the author, Moya Flynn, Artyom Kosmarski and Gusel' Sabirova. However, responsibility for views and ideas presented in this article is solely mine.

Weighing the salience of an ethnic versus non-ethnic agenda for Russians

Looking historically at Russians' ethnic identity

A weakened sense of ethnic belonging was typical for Russians in the 'imperial peripheries'. The role they were supposed to play within the pre-revolutionary and Soviet 'imperial' order predetermined specific features of their language and culture which were largely deprived of ethnic connotations and intimate links with Russians as a specific ethnic group. The efforts of the pre-revolutionary state to Russify and acculturate non-Russians living in the colonised peripheries were not aimed at their ethnic assimilation proper but 'took the form of an attempt to foster an identification among the minority communities with the tsarist system' (Melvin 1998, 31).

Despite massively reshaping the previous sociopolitical order, Soviet rule brought some elements of continuity into this sphere. Heavily Sovietized Russian culture served as an ideological backbone for the regime and formed, together with the Russian language, the core element of Soviet self-consciousness. This has made a considerable impact on Russians' identity in the former republics: 'Ethnic identities were not primary in the settler-dominated areas. Russians formed the nucleus of highly sovietized, predominantly urban, and largely industrial settler communities… The identity of the settler communities was primarily defined in socio-cultural rather than ethnic terms' (Melvin 1998, 33; see also Björklund 2004, 118).

This role of Russians, in its turn, was predetermined by the fact that due to historical circumstances, the Russian Empire was not 'designed' as a national state of Russians. Kappeler, one of the most influential experts in the national/ethnic dimension of Russia's imperial development, states: 'Imperial patriotism, a basic factor of the country's integration, though it contained some elements linked with Russian ethnic consciousness (Orthodoxy, shared history and culture), supranational elements predominated in this mental complex' (Kappeler 1997, 177).

'Russian culture' in this context has been perceived by Russians themselves, in broad terms, as a Sovietized, urban way of life with relevant values and world-outlook, rather than a set of folklore-like stereotypical traits of 'Russians' as a distinct ethnic group. Respectively, Russian language and culture have never been only ethnic Russians' values

or their cherished legacy under threat, needing to be carefully preserved in some sort of 'sanctuaries'.

One expressive manifestation of these historically rooted trends is the fact that national movements in the (former) republics of the late Soviet period were most fiercely confronted by the so-called 'Inter-Fronts' striving to retain the Soviet regime rather than to protect the rights of Russian populations proper (Melvin 1998, 34).

Since 1991, Russians and other Russian-speakers in the former Soviet republics have lived under strikingly different sociocultural and political settings. However, in my view, within the paradigm of 'hot and cold ethnicity', in Central Asia, Russians might still be positioned closer to the 'cold' end of the spectrum. To throw light on the reasons behind this, one should start with a pattern of imperial penetration in the region.

First, the settler communities which sprang up over the Russian/Soviet state's centuries-long colonisation of its imperial peripheries now called 'Central Asia' were highly heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity. Many waves of forced, semi-voluntary (de-koulakization, political exiles, deportation, war evacuation, Virgin lands opening, etc.) and voluntary migration brought to the region millions of people of different social origin, religious affiliation and ethnicity (e.g. Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Byelorussians, Tatars, Jews, Poles, Armenians, Koreans, Chechens and many others). This 'melting pot' of many peoples with shared historical destinies, common social roles, interests and culture, all of whom could be metaphorically called 'children of the empire' and who have named themselves 'Europeans' (*evropeytsy*), added to a blurry character of ethnic identity of Russians themselves. Other inclusive terms – 'Russophones' and 'Russian-speakers' (*russkoyazychnye*), were born from official and academic discourse. These conditions of the 'melting pot' were created not only by many decades of 'mixing' in terms of residence, communication and professional affiliation patterns but also by frequency of the so-called third-republic intermarriages (when no partner is 'titular' in relation to the republic of residence) and mixed marriages within the Russian-speaking community.

Second, specifics of Central Asia and its people implied roles of Russian-speakers as *Kulturträgers* and motors of social/industrial development. Being within the empire produced a great incentive for further development of the region and its native populations, though the price of modernisation turned out to be very high. It is worth mentioning that due to a combination of subjective and objective reasons, Kyrgyz is one of the most Russified ethnic groups in the FSU and in Central Asia. The situation for Kazakhs turned out to be largely similar due to the nomadic way of life of the tribes now called Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, their low adherence to Islam and, in contrast with culturally rich farming civilizations on the territories now occupied by Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the absence of a written language and written culture. Under the Soviet rule, it was only in Kyrgyz and Kazakh Soviet republics where Russophones settled in large numbers not only in the cities but also in the rural areas (around 30% of 'Europeans' lived there). This has further contributed to a penetration of the Russian language into the depths of native communities (for a more detailed analysis, see Kosmarskaya 2006, 190–198).

Given the specificity of imperial contacts in Central Asia and the severe Russification of indigenes in the region, both titular elites and titular populations have retained if not emotional, but, at the very least, a steady pragmatic interest towards preserving the Russian linguistic and cultural milieu. In conjunction with the latter point, Soviet historical/cultural legacy has not served as a 'red rag' for the titular elites and titular populations whereby reinforcing (especially under economic and social turmoil of post-

Soviet years) their sense of having a common past and shared values (I will talk in more detail about perceptions of 'Soviet past' in the next section).

As a result, incentives for purely ethnic (or ethno-cultural) consolidation were undermined because the struggle for the preservation of the Russian cultural milieu has been off the agenda throughout the post-Soviet decades, in spite of all the innovations in this sphere introduced by nationalising states in the region.

Comparing the situation of Russian language and culture

In Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the Russian language has official status. In Kyrgyzstan it is recognised as an 'official' language (at the constitutional level), whereas Kyrgyz enjoys a status of a 'state language'; it is widely used in education and in administration (*deloproizvodstvo*) at all levels. In Kazakhstan, Russian is officially recognised as a 'language of interethnic communication'. In Uzbekistan, in formal terms, Russian is taken on a par with any other foreign language; however, it 'has no rights but is in high demand' ('*bespraven, no vostrebovan*') in this country due to its role in business, education, as an instrument for career-building and as a means of entering the globalised world (see Podporenko 2001).

Since the Soviet times and up to the present day, the big cities (capitals and industrial centres) have served as the principal territories in Central Asia where the Russian language is spoken on a large scale and used in many public spheres. Taking Kyrgyzstan as an example, before 1989, there was only one school with Kyrgyz as a language of instruction in the republic's capital, Frunze (now Bishkek). In the regions where Kyrgyz were dominating demographically, such schools were more numerous, but the so-called 'Russian schools' (with all subjects taught in Russian) were not at all scarce.

Importantly, in spite of the prevalence of 'Russian schools', especially in the cities, there was no separation of pupils according to ethnicity: the Kyrgyz studied in these schools together with the other Russophones. Although since independence, the ratio of 'Russian' to 'Kyrgyz' schools has obviously changed in favour of the latter, 'Russian' schools are still numerous and very popular among Kyrgyz families. According to estimates of numerous 'Russian' respondents, when they were pupils themselves, classes contained approximately 10–15% Kyrgyz students whereas their children are now studying in classes where, vice versa, there are 10–15% of Russophones.

In spite of nationalistic rhetoric and the slow but steady advancement of titular languages, both titular elites and ordinary members of titular groups clearly understand the importance of mastering Russian – not only for themselves but also for their children in order to further their social advancement. Here is a testimony of a respondent from Uzbekistan:

> Once I went to a ministry, and an official I addressed did not want to speak Russian with me; he said that I should use the state language in public communication. Some days later, on the 1st of September, when I brought my child to a neighboring school, I saw that very man who has also brought his child to this Russian school, but pretended not to recognize me. (male, Russian, 38 years old, researcher; Tashkent, October 2004)

During the Soviet times and the first years after independence, the choice of schools for urban Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs was largely predetermined by the indisputably high status of Russian and scarcity of schools with a titular language as a tool of instruction (especially in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan). At present, there are more options;

however, for a number of reasons, people continue sending their children to 'Russian' schools and kindergartens. Here is a typical argument for this choice:

> I: And your son, where will he go?
>
> R: To a Russian class. Yes, the process is going on [proliferation of titular language – NK], but still, you know, we are studying economics at the university using Russian textbooks… there are no other options… So I think, it will be easier for him if he graduates from a Russian-language school. As for the Kyrgyz, he will be fluent in it in any case as we speak Kyrgyz in the family. (male, Kyrgyz, 32 years old, bank office-worker; Bishkek, May 2011)

To add to the picture of the presence of Russian in the public space of Central Asian countries, according to the census of 2009 in Kyrgyzstan, Russian was called 'native' by 9% of the country's residents above 18 years old, whereas it was qualified as the 'second language' by 50%. These are, besides the non-Russian Russophones, those numerous Kyrgyz who usually claim in the interview that Kyrgyz is their mother-tongue (for considerations of civil loyalty, patriotism and the like) but later mention that they 'think in Russian', were 'socialised' in Russian, 'brought up in Russian', etc.

In Kazakhstan, about 85% of the population are fluent in Russian (Tsentral'naya Asiya 2012). Most universities in the three countries offer courses with Russian as a language of instruction (e.g. in Kyrgyzstan the only exceptions are in Kyrgyz language and literature departments). A great variety of printed and electronic media in Russian as well as books are available in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (both locally produced and imported from Russia), and Russian state TV channels can be officially watched everywhere in these countries.

It can be heard frequently that the Russian cultural and linguistic space (RCLS) in Central Asia has been gradually shrinking due to the outflow of Russophones from the region (though this process has substantially slowed down compared to the 1990s). This is all correct; however, a counter-tendency is in place, allowing to suggest that RCLS can be theoretically taken as a 'Cheshire cat smile', functioning without Russophones themselves and Russia's efforts (if any) to support it. A crucial factor contributing to the maintenance of this space since the early 2000s is the massive shuttle labour migration of titular groups to Russia (mainly from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). Field research in the South of Kyrgyzstan, the main supplier of labour migrants from this country, indicates that 'Russian-speaking schools have certainly become popular. Parents want their children to learn Russian because fluency in the language widens job prospects and options for labor migration … Increased levels of labor migration have created a demand for Russian language tuition beyond schools' (Kirmse 2011, 294). It is worth noting in this context that successful labour migrants, should they return to Kyrgyzstan, prefer to settle down in Bishkek, bringing to the city not only their money but also newly acquired cultural and linguistic competence.

It is interesting to compare the situation in Central Asia with that in the Baltic region, where the pattern of imperial penetration, for obvious reasons, was entirely different. People of the region have been living for centuries in a European environment, and all the fruits of their 'modernisation' under the Russian/Soviet rule cannot be as unambiguously estimated as in the Central Asian case. Correspondingly, what we have is a consolidated rejection, by both titular elites and titular populations, of the Russian/Soviet legacy (this point will be developed below), and for this reason, Russian language and culture have been viewed as symbols of a traumatic past (perceived overwhelmingly through the lens of an 'occupation' narrative) and have been largely ousted from the public to private

sphere. This background works to strengthen the ethnocultural dimension in the Baltic Russian identity, both in a broad sense (attracting Russians' attention to their mission of bearers of the Russian culture) and, in the narrow sense, arousing their concerns over maintenance of their 'uniqueness' as specifically Russian.

RCLS of the type analysed earlier does not exist in the Baltic states (see, e.g. a detailed analysis of language and school policy in post-Soviet Latvia in [Björklund 2004]). The author traces the historical roots of ethnicity as being a 'fundamental category' in local society and shows why and how 'ethnic arguments formulated as language requirements [forwarded to the Russian-speakers – NK] have certainly been political power measures in post-communist Latvia' (Björklund 2004, 108). Under these conditions, Russians and other Russophones have been obliged to close ranks under the banner of an ethnically charged political agenda. Not surprisingly, the only serious outbursts of sociopolitical tension in the independent Baltic states (which have generally been enjoying political stability) were related to unresolved tensions between the Russophone and titular populations over heated ethnopolitical issues (the so-called 'April events' of 2007 in Estonia, protests against reform of secondary education in Latvia [implying, for 'Russian' schools, gradual ousting of Russian as a language of instruction] and fierce debates on the February 2012 referendum in Latvia on the status of the Russian language).

My analysis of the status of the Russian language in Central Asia is mainly based on numerous interviews with the ordinary residents and experts in the two countries and on ethnographic observation, both enabling to look at RCLS through individual perceptions, linguistic-cultural preferences and language behaviour. Fierman, who has looked comparatively at the past and present role of Russian in Central Asia, the Baltic and South Caucasian states through analysis of expert opinion, public debate, available statistics and legislation, has arrived at similar conclusions. He points out that despite the fact that after 1991 Russian linguistic skills have tangibly declined in Central Asia among the titular populations, 'even in countries with minute Slavic minorities, Russian continues to be used for many different types of communication, and enjoys a high level of prestige, including in higher education and in top levels of professional, economic and political spheres. The use of Russian in elite domains and its association with high quality in Central Asia stands in contrast to the situation in the former Soviet republics of the Baltic and South Caucasus' (Fierman 2012, 1077; see also Faranda and Nolle 2011, 639). Extrapolating into the future some recent trends, the scholar suggests that 'Russian will continue to serve certain functions in Central Asia at least for decades to come, and very possibly much longer' (Fierman 2012, 1099).

Florin, describing some results of his recent qualitative study of various manifestations of Soviet identity in Kyrgyzstan, emphasises not on pragmatic, but rather emotional and cultural grounds for the preservation of RCLS in Central Asia. He refers to the famous writers Olzhas Suleymenov (Kazakhstan) and Chingiz Aitmatov (Kyrgyzstan) and concludes:

> In their view, prevalence of Russian in the region is not a colonial legacy to be rejected, but as something adding to the richness of their own culture. This is a lively reminder of the Soviet Union as an imagined community of Russian-speakers. (Florin 2011, 231)

An insightful paper of Mamedov might also be mentioned here. He points out that Russian language in Kyrgyzstan continues to serve as an inherent element of the local cultural landscape and a crucial means of communication and self-expression for a substantial part of the country population (Mamedov 2012).

Central Asia: grounds for consolidation above ethnic barriers

The weak ethnic stimuli of consolidation for Russians and other Russophones in Central Asia described earlier has combined with the growing strength of non-ethnic stimuli (poor economic performance, corruption, shrinking of social freedoms and explosive sociopolitical instability, mostly typical for Kyrgyzstan since 2005). This has resulted in the salience of social and cultural boundaries (rather than those dividing ethnic groups) and the consolidation of people irrespective of their ethnicity. I will specify this point briefly, taking Kyrgyzstan as an example.

Let us start with patterns of political/civil activism. Sustained efforts to consolidate Central Asian Russians as 'ethnic Russians' (around Russia-based structures of compatriots' support and local 'Russian diaspora' organisations) were far from successful (see Kosmarskaya 2006, 527–548; 2011, 66–68). These organisations are not popular among ordinary people, the majority of whom do not take them as a true representation of their interests. Moreover, Russians in post-Soviet Central Asia are quite sceptical towards the attempts of the 'Russian diaspora' activists who usually treat Russianness in a purely primordial sense, trying to unite local Russians culturally, under the aegis of symbols stereotypically associated with 'true Russianness' (*samovar*, *balalaika*, folk songs, etc.).

Some clues to the Russophones' stance towards 'official' Russian organisations may be derived from the following interview fragment:

> I: They have a special person in the Russian embassy responsible for 'work with the Russian-speaking population'. But what he is doing – that is the question… Organizing folk festivals, Cossack choir concerts…
>
> R: But this is merely an 'etnika'… Is this a person who controls local 'Russian' organizations sponsored by Russia? Here we have 27 of them. But almost all of them consist of four or five people, not more… You would be surprised: we have a Russian organization responsible for confronting the spread of AIDS in Kyrgyzstan! Can you imagine this? Why on earth have they organized this when there is a lack of Russian textbooks in our Russian-language schools? They should work on what is desperately needed, for all the people here… (female, Russian-Byelorussian, 37 years old, NGO activist; Bishkek, Aug. 2008)

Appeal to the needs 'of all the people here' made in relation to the 'lack of Russian textbooks' is very symptomatic for Central Asia, bearing in mind specificity of local Russian linguistic and cultural space. In contrast, in Estonia and Latvia, where pressures for Russophones' collective action are much stronger, Russian organisations, with all the obstacles to such activities, are more numerous, are more populous and are mainly centred around the issues of Russian language, culture and Russian-medium education (see, e.g. Gushchin 2010 about the situation in Latvia where school reform launched in 2004 has served as a fresh stimulus for Russians' consolidation).

In terms of political participation, Russophones in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan did engage in political life, not as specifically 'Russians' but as socially active citizens (under the Uzbekistani regime any political activity from below has been out of the question). In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, until the early 2000s, with a relatively mild authoritarian regime exerting weak control over social life, the main divisions were drawn along the lines of 'regime versus opposition' but not 'Russian-speakers versus titulars'. Be it parties, social support and human rights groups or mass media – almost all opposition groups were 'international', with Kyrgyz working hand in hand with Russians, Koreans, Uzbeks, Tatars, Ukrainians, etc.

Kyrgyzstan has gradually lost its well-deserved reputation as an 'island of democracy' in Central Asia: political freedoms have shrunk as the regime became overtly authoritarian during the later phase of Akayev's presidency (the first half of the 2000s) and more visibly after Bakiyev came to power in March 2005. The political apathy of the majority of the population, irrespective of nationality, has been typical of Kyrgyzstan in recent years, with a situation similar to that in Kazakhstan and some other post-Soviet states with established or rising authoritarianism:

> Actually, just as it has happened with the majority of former Soviet citizens, Russians have now turned away from politics, which they actively engaged in only during perestroika and the first post-independence years. The political sphere is taken as an alien one, usurped by the corrupted elites lining their pockets; as something beyond the people's everyday needs, whereas everybody is now striving for survival, for an adequate welfare level. (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2007, 95)

The non-ethnic character of the most salient social divisions in Central Asia, along with the political dimension as described earlier, also has a very important cultural dimension, not quite typical for the social configuration of Baltic societies. Centuries-long interaction of Russians and other 'Europeans' with the native populations, especially in urbanised territories, has brought about the formation of a Russified and modernised segment of Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Kazakhs, tangibly different from their rural coethnics in terms of lifestyle, values, linguistic and cultural orientations, etc. As a result, cultural barriers are sharply felt, contributing to the construction of solidarities above ethnic boundaries.

For a number of reasons, Kyrgyzstan provides the most expressive example of this type of sociocultural solidarity, with quite a long history. Russophones' cultural affinity with the so-called urban Kyrgyz (*gorodskiye kirgizy;* a similar label in Kazakhstan is 'asphalt Kazakhs' – *asfal'tovye kazakhi*) is at the core of this scheme. Importantly, this sense of cultural affinity is a mutually felt one: convincing evidence for this point through large-scale surveys can be found in Faranda and Nolle 2003, 2011.

During the Soviet period, the Kyrgyz population underwent a period of 'settlement' (*osedanie*) when they were integrated into the *kolkhoz/sovkhoz* system; at this time the majority still lived in rural areas. When the Kyrgyz moved to the cities, it was primarily to receive higher education. Young Kyrgyz graduates tended to enter the ranks of local bureaucracy and intelligentsia and formed the basis for the present-day Russified Kyrgyz urban population.

Migration waves in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought large amounts of marginalised young Kyrgyz to the cities, to Bishkek in the first instance (see Flynn and Kosmarskaya [2012, 455–458] for a more detailed analysis of internal migration in Kyrgyzstan and resulting intra-Kyrgyz divisions). Unsurprisingly, these young people appealed to Kyrgyz nationalists (under the banner of the 'national revival' of the early post-Soviet years). The resulting 'discomfort' felt by Russians began to be experienced by urban Kyrgyz as well. Friction between 'urban' and 'migrant' Kyrgyz started to emerge, further bringing about rapprochement between urban Kyrgyz and Russians. This was one of the main reasons for the reduction in levels of everyday nationalism by the mid-1990s. My research, conducted between 1994 and 1998, primarily points to the distinction being made between rural and urban Kyrgyz by Russians and other Russophones (Kosmarskaya 2006, 98–165). In his research, conducted a decade later, Schröder supports and develops these findings by showing how, despite ethnic and other differences, Kyrgyz and Russian 'long-term inhabitants' of Bishkek (in his case young

people) have moved to co-identify as 'urbans' in opposition to newly arrived Kyrgyz migrants (Schröder 2010). Florin has recently discovered similar relationships based on the 'Soviet cultural affinity' *(sovetskaya kul'turnost')* among older cohorts of Bishkek inhabitants (Florin 2011, 230–231).

During the last decade, another factor has appeared which will be addressed in the following section. This factor works for setting up an even broader platform for solidarity between the Russophones and urban 'titulars' in Central Asia.

Russians' ethnic and cultural affiliations through the lens of historical memory

View from the top

Let us first assess the nation-building projects in Central Asia in their conjunction with the perception of the imperial/Soviet past and Russia as political assignee of the Soviet Union. In Central Asia, official criticisms of various aspects of Soviet policy (but not an overall rejection, as in the Baltic states) are not usually extended to the present-day Russia, which is not viewed as a potential threat and/or very disturbing neighbour. It is worth noting in this respect that independence came very unexpectedly to the region and local elites retained loyalty to Moscow until the very last moment.

Moreover, dominant historical narratives do not serve, whether consciously or unconsciously, to link Russians with their 'ethnic homeland'.

Official 'nationalising' rhetoric of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has been rather balanced and inclusive since the break-up of the USSR. It has been centred, on a discursive level, around the build-up of a multinational state and, in spite of some ups and downs, on maintenance of good relations with Russia. This was mostly typical for Kyrgyzstan under the Akayev presidency; since he left office (in 2005), the rhetoric has gradually become more nationalistic (mainly on the part of oppositional figures), but it has not been specifically anti-Russian (*antipossiyskiy*). Instead, the goal of this discourse is to emphasise the distinctions between Kyrgyz as the 'main' group and all the other non-Kyrgyz groups.

National historiographies and official discourses of the two countries clearly recognise the numerous achievements of the Soviet period, viewing them positively as episodes of a shared past (e.g. the Great Patriotic War and preceding events – one of the most painful zones in relations between Russia and the Baltic states). Very illustrative in this respect is the fact that the main Soviet holidays have found their proper place in the calendar of state holidays in post-Soviet Kazakhstan (New Year; 9 May – Victory Day; International Women's Day – 8 March) and even more in Kyrgyzstan (those already mentioned as well as Orthodox Christmas, Army Day on the 23 February, analogous to Soviet Army Day; 1 May – Day of Labor and the 7 November – anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution). Toponymy changes have occurred in the two countries as well as symbolic and material reconfiguration of urban space. However, as my research testifies, these shifts were far less radical than those in the other post-Soviet countries.

Uzbekistan, in some sense, stands apart in its efforts to delegitimise the Soviet past. Thus, its Museum in Memory of the Victims of Repression sponsored and initiated by the Uzbekistani authorities is similar to museums in the Baltic states, Georgia and Ukraine (see Abashin 2009). However, 'creators of the museum tried their best to avoid any authentication of the empire with the Russian people… This caution might be explained by the fact that imperial and Soviet power had rather ambiguous linkage with "Russianness" in an ethnic sense [see the first section of this chapter – NK], and the

Russian-speaking community is still one of the most numerous and influential minorities in Uzbekistan' (Abashin 2009, 6).

View from the bottom

As far as ordinary people are concerned, titulars who lived under socialism are generally positive about recent history. For example, Kyrgyz people with strikingly different social/cultural background, life histories and ideological orientations produce, nevertheless, quite similar attitudes towards the Soviet past of their country. One of my respondents, a migrant to Frunze, born in a remote village, a native-speaker of Kyrgyz who has made a good career as an activist of the 'national revival' movement in Kyrgyzstan, was quite positive about the fact that the monument to Lenin in the main square of Bishkek was not destroyed but removed to another place, also in central part of the city: 'Thanks to Lenin we received education, we received our sovereignty … All that we have achieved is due to him. It was a good idea to remove the statue and still to have it in the city' (male, 43 years old, NGO activist; Bishkek, September 2008).

Here is an opinion of another type of Kyrgyz – a second-generation urban resident, from a family of middle-level Soviet *nomenclatura*, proponent of Western-like cosmopolitan values, a native Russian-speaker, who learnt the Kyrgyz language late in his student life. My question about a monument which, in his opinion the present-day Bishkek might be desperately lacking, served as a trigger to respondent's reflections about the Soviet past:

> It seems to me that some sort of a multinational idea should be expressed by this monument. Do you know how history of our republic is now being taught in our schools? Just two words are said about the Soviet times which cover a period starting from the 1920s and up to 1991. However, all infrastructure, all we are now sitting on, we are walking along – actually, all we are dealing with, all was built under the Soviets. And we need a monument which could say expressively about this fact! Without a Soviet time our republic would have never developed to the stage we have reached. All of us go on spending all created during more than seven decades of the Soviet time. (male, 58 years old, businessman; Bishkek, June 2011).

Younger people in Central Asia, rather, are linked with the past through their adherence to modern Russian culture, the role of which is difficult to overestimate even in the remote regions with a negligible presence of Russians. Kirmse, for example, in his excellent essay on cultural globalisation as experienced by Kyrgyz youth in Southern Kyrgyzstan, demonstrates that global cultural genres are used by locals in forms adopted and reinterpreted in Russia (Kirmse 2011).

Finally, as my recent research in Central Asia indicates, unifying memories may be evoked again and again under specific social and political settings. This, for example, took place in the capital city of Bishkek. Migrants brought there since mid-2000s are largely associated by old residents (*starozhily*), both Russians and urban Kyrgyz, with recent sociopolitical turmoil ('revolutions', self-seizures of land, social chaos, disorder and the general ruralisation of urban space and cultural/social atmosphere). Under these conditions, an appeal to the 'Soviet past' turns out to be an important resource of self-affirmation for the 'old residents'.

Interethnic tensions, a presumed companion of post-Soviet 'nationalisation', fade into the background as '*starozhily*' of all nationalities close ranks against rural migrants. The alternative images of Bishkek constructed by 'old residents' as a reaction to the harsh

realities allegedly brought by migrants, all appeal to the Soviet ideal of the city and urban organisation (although different connotations are attached to 'Soviet normalcy'). These references of ordinary Russian-speakers and Kyrgyz to the Soviet past give new and informative touches to the picture of a world where both groups feel they are in the same boat (see Flynn and Kosmarskaya 2012, 463–466).

Now let us consider briefly the situation in the Baltic region through the prism of historical memory. One 'big narrative' of the Soviet past produced by titular elites which dominated the public/political discourse has been a vivid manifestation of an ethnic split in these countries. This might contribute to the consolidation of local Russians and to the strengthening of a specifically ethnic affiliation among members of this community striving for a higher social status and higher self-esteem.

Commemorative practices in Latvia relating to the 'Baltic Way' ceremony of 1989 serve as a penetrating illustration of the irreconcilable and ethnically rooted character of basic politicised historical narratives engendered by an ambiguous past but which largely determine the present social climate (for in-depth analysis of politics of memory in relation to this event see Eglitis and Ardava 2012). As they point out:

> In Latvia, which has an ethnically heterogeneous population, there is a conflict of memory narratives between the titular nation, ethnic Latvians and at least a fraction of the Russian-speaking population, which is largely, but not exclusively, ethnically Russian. This conflict of memories is centered on narratives of World War II and, in particular, the Soviet 'occupation' or 'liberation' of Latvia. (Eglitis and Ardava 2012, 1038, see also 1056)

Importantly, memory split has made significant impact on political struggles and party system: parties in Latvia have been divided by ethnicity, and 'voting across ethnic lines has not been commonplace in national elections' (Eglitis and Ardava 2012, 1056).

Though some Russian-speakers were active supporters of independence of Latvia, their disappointment with subsequent developments (loss of status, citizenship rights, etc.) served as a factor in unifying the Russian-speaking community under the banner of an 'ethnic alienation narrative' (Eglitis and Ardava 2012, 1047) of 'liberation'.

It would be an oversimplification to suggest that since the late 1980s harmonious unanimity between titular elites and ordinary citizens has remained intact in the Baltic states concerning memorising patterns. Serious disillusionment provoked by hardships of socio-economic transformation has made people less receptive to a top-down historical narrative and more sensitive to positive aspects of the Soviet past. Eglitis and Ardava specifically emphasised this point, referring to some Latvian publications and to the research of Klumbytė (2010) about nostalgia of Lithuanian 'losers' for the social and economic security of late socialism. However, this narrative of 'political and economic alienation' has not challenged the fundamental character of ethnic societal divide in the sphere of memory (Eglitis and Ardava 2012, 1045, 1048, 1052).

Some implications for further research

In addition to the picture of the Russian position on a scale of 'ethnic temperatures' in two different parts of post-Soviet space – a picture painted with large brush strokes, in the concluding section, I will outline a number of factors which might also make an impact on Russophones' ethnic self-designation and which, in this capacity, need further investigation.

Intergenerational gap within Russian and Russophone populations

People younger than 25–30 years, who reached maturity after 'socialism', do not care as much about their ethnicity, *ceteris paribus*, as their elder co-ethnics might. They are relatively well integrated into the social landscape of their country, and their civil identity takes precedence. Their life trajectories are based on pragmatism and individualism, whereas their migration plans (if any) view Russia as the least preferable option. This phenomenon is most typical for post-Soviet countries with relatively good economic performances: the Baltic countries and, in Central Asia, Kazakhstan. Besides the above-mentioned traits, the Russophone youth of the Baltic region demonstrate proficiency in titular languages and interest in the Western (European) lifestyle. In this case, the weakening of a specifically Russian identity is largely due to the strengthening of their sense of belonging to the Western (European) world. That is why the term 'Euro-Russians' has proliferated to designate this segment of the local Russian-speakers (see, e.g. Novikova 2007, 348).

Possible shifts in Russians' identity provoked by linguistic-cultural integration of the other Russophones

Divergence between ethnic Russians and some other Russophones is at the core of this problem – divergence in terms of cultural integration and/or cultural demands. In Central Asia, this intriguing research topic, first, concerns the integration of Tatars and Koreans. The percentage of Tatars and Koreans mastering titular languages is on average higher than that of Russians. In Uzbekistan, as my field research testifies, Tatars serve in some sense as mediators in communication between Russians and Uzbeks at a micro-level. But this neither challenges the already established sociocultural status of the Russian language nor brings about any changes to the attitudes of Tatars or Koreans to the Russian linguistic and cultural space and to its functioning in Central Asia.

In the Baltic states, for instance, as research from Latvia testifies, some non-titular ethnic groups (Ukrainians, Poles and Jews) express great interest towards the revival of their own cultures on a par with linguistic integration. They are satisfied with their children studying not in Russian but in the titular language and, partly, in their native language, which is taken as good progress compared to the Soviet era (see, e.g. Volkov 2002, 75). Divergence of interests between Russians and some other Russophones, as Laitin suggested, might also be a result of the ruling elites' efforts to 'separate some non-Russian Russian-speakers from joining in a conglomerate Russian-speaking identity group' (Laitin 1998, 193). Importantly, the groups under consideration are mainly 'traditional minorities' (meaning autochthonous for the region) – the fact that makes their cultural and linguistic initiatives more palatable for the authorities (see, e.g. Björklund 2004, 129 about Jewish, Polish and Estonian schools in Latvia).

Under these conditions, struggles by the Baltic Russians for their basic ethnocultural rights (secondary and higher education in their native language, first of all) might turn into a private endeavour, in turn contributing to the strengthening of the ethnocultural component of their identity.

'Our' Russians – 'our own people'? Titular groups' perception of Russians' acculturation

Now I would like to draw attention to a specific ethnocultural identity of 'children of the empire' which can be defined as a sense of belonging to a local (territorial) ethnocultural

community – 'Central Asian Russians', 'Baltic Russians', etc. (see Kosmarskaya 2006, 388–406; Kosmarskaya 2011, 63–65).

What is most interesting here in relation to my topic is whether titulars take existing cultural commonalities positively, which encourages Russians' and Russophones' further efforts for cultural/linguistic integration, or, alternatively, they tend to take a more exclusive stance, giving way to an actualisation of the ethnic component of Russian identity. As existing research testifies, Central Asia embodies the first option, whereas the Baltic region the second.

According to a large-scale survey conducted in 1996 in Latvia and Kazakhstan by the international research team led by Kolstø, a tangible part of sampled titulars and Russians gave a positive response to the question: 'Do Russians in Kazakhstan/Latvia differ from Russians in Russia?' (see Malkova, Kolstø, and Melberg 1999, 258–261). However, when respondents (both titulars and Russian-speakers) were asked to express their attitudes towards a list of specific traits of Russians in respective countries in comparison with Russians in Russia ('perceived peculiarities of Russian culture in Kazakhstan/Latvia'), the results showed a tangible difference between the two states. The two lists, with Russian auto-stereotypes and Kazakh hetero-stereotypes of Russians in Kazakhstan, were 'more remarkable for their similarities than for their differences'. Through this, Kazakhs demonstrated some sort of enthusiasm for having 'good' acculturated Russians near them: '"our" Russians are better than the other Russians' (Malkova, Kolstø, and Melberg 1999, 264). In contrast, the discrepancy between similar lists of Latvian Russians' peculiarities was very marked: 'The Russians seem to be saying: "We are clearly different from our ethnic brethren in Russia, and the reason for this is that we are more like you Latvians … However, the Russians in Latvia are met with a rather terse retort from the ethnic Latvians: 'Certainly, you are different from Russians in Russia, but not in the ways you think. And don't think that we necessarily hold you in higher esteem for that reason'" (Malkova, Kolstø, and Melberg 1999, 265).

A representative large-scale survey conducted in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan almost a decade later (in 2005) confirmed, from another angle, the inclusive character of titulars' perception of Russians in their countries. Thus, 13.7% of Kazakhs agreed that they had 'a great deal in common with average Russian living in Kazakhstan'; 53.5% confirmed that they had 'a fair amount in common…' (Faranda and Nolle 2011, 626, 629). Corresponding figures for Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan were 24.1 and 40.6% (632). Importantly, both titulars showed that they had had far less commonalities with Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Kazakhstan (Kazakh respondents) and Kazakhs and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz respondents) than commonality with Russians in their states.

My own long-term qualitative research in Kyrgyzstan reveals clear distinctions made by Kyrgyz between local Russians and those in Russia – a fact that has usually been interpreted with positive overtones. Since recently this juxtaposition has been activated by growing xenophobia in Russia against labour migrants from Central Asia (according to many Kyrgyz respondents, 'our Russians – this is quite a different thing' (*sovsem drugoye delo*).

As for the Baltic countries, recent research suggests that in Estonia, for instance, younger titulars do not feel quite happy to see their Russian coevals moving along the road of cultural/linguistic integration and demonstrate unwillingness to take them as their 'own people' (*svoi lyudi*) on these grounds (Zabrodskaja forthcoming).

In fact, these exclusive attitudes of Baltic titulars seem to have much deeper foundations related to the quality and scale of 'Europeanness' of these nations. Platt suggests, taking Latvia as an example, that the interpretation of a Soviet presence as

'occupation', but not as 'colonisation' (which could imply that Latvians received 'a gift of modernity' from the coloniser) touches upon the most intimate and deep layers of Latvians' identity: their belonging to the 'European home', within a broad historical and cultural frame, is at stake (Platt 2010, 6, 7). One research in Lithuania shows how the distancing of young members of titular group from Russophones as imagined 'Eastern Barbarians' 'helps to legitimize the claim for recognition of Lithuania's Westernness' (see Repečkaitė 2011, 62).This linkage to history, taking us far beyond the temporal and spatial scope of the Russian imperial expansion, provides a new intriguing angle of approach to 'hot and cold ethnicity' in the post-Soviet context.

A lieu de conclusion

In this paper, I have sought to highlight various historical (embedded in the prevalent modes of imperial rule) and contemporary socio-economic and political contexts making an impact on Russians' positioning on the scale of 'ethnic temperatures' in the two largely different parts of post-Soviet space – Central Asia and the Baltic region. This analysis allows a conclusion that Central Asian Russians are more likely, *ceteris paribus*, to be found at the 'cold' end of the spectrum proposed by the 'hot and cold ethnicity paradigm'.

Moreover, this trend seems to be rather consistent over time. Thus, in my book published six years ago and devoted to the fortunes of Central Asian Russians and Russophones, I suggest different research agendas for Russians in Central Asia and those in the Baltic states (see Kosmarskaya 2006, 575–576). As far as the latter were concerned, there were tangible grounds for a selective approach – for taking Russians in Latvia and Estonia as a distinct group with their specific interests (largely linked with their ethnicity) and, correspondingly, with the specific agendas for political/social action. On the contrary, by the start of the second post-Soviet decade, the fortunes of Central Asian Russians, following the turbulent 1990s (with 'national revivalism', the reconfiguration of power hierarchies, massive out-migration of Russophones, etc.), should, as I have suggested, be inscribed into broader mechanisms of sociopolitical evolution of Central Asian societies. My most recent research in the region and the state of scholarship on the issues being studied confirm, in my mind, the relevance of that assumption. In relation to the latter point, it seems that since the late 1990s/early 2000s very few research papers on Russians in Central Asia have been published, whereas publications with a nuanced analysis of various aspects of Baltic Russians' position and their (ethnic) identity are still as numerous as they were 12–15 years ago (see, e.g. Björklund 2004; Brazauskiene and Likhachiova 2011; Cara 2010; Ehala 2009; Fein 2005; Novikova 2007; Pisarenko 2006; Vihalemm and Kalmus 2009; Vihalemm and Jakobson 2011; Zabrodskaja and Ehala 2010, and many others).

Two parts of post-Soviet space were analysed in this article with a focus on the divergence between them rather than any divergences within those regions. However, researchers of the future trends should be aware of possible intra-regional distinctions provoked by the specifics of country-level sociopolitical transformations and the stance of Russian communities. This might help to reveal an 'ethnic temperature change', if any, and its impact on social relations in the societies under study. In Central Asia, for instance, there is a growing gap between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – labour-sending countries, and Kazakhstan, second after Russia recipient of *gastarbeiters* in the post-Soviet space. Its obvious economic progress might work to refresh the topical agendas for the huge Kazakhstani Russophone community. In the Baltic region, in spite of many similarities between Estonia and Latvia and comparable number of Russians, as some recent research

testifies, Estonian Russians are subject to further segregation, whereas the fortunes of Latvian Russians who have been demonstrating higher levels of (political) consolidation, might lie within the options of further integration or autonomy (see Ehala and Zabrodskaja 2011, 54–55). However, it should be noted that the efficacy of collective political and social activism of Russians has been seriously restricted in both countries by the fact that sizeable parts of their Russian populations still retain non-citizen status.

Finally, in terms of future trends, the role of Russia as a formal kin-state of Russians should also be taken into account, not so much Russia's diaspora politics (a factor routinely mentioned in this context) but its internal discourse on nation and ethnicity. A quote from Tishkov might be relevant here:

> If official discourse in Russia is centered around Russian (*rossiyskiy*) people and Russian nation, in a broad sense, this means that status and significance of 'Russianness' is going down not only in Russia itself but also among Russians in the post-Soviet countries. (Tishkov 2003, 176)

It is still to be seen whether and when it might take place because the Russian concept of nation-building has been known for its ambivalence since the first post-Soviet years. This mirrors Russia's implicit wavering between the two competing versions of nation-building and national identity construction (namely, an ethnic nation *versus* a civil one based on the multiethnic character of the former USSR, with Russia as its political assignee).

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Still warm but getting colder: changing ethnic identity of post-Soviet Jewry

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For many centuries, 'being a Jew' was equivalent to 'performing the ceremonial laws of Judaism'. Thus, ethnic and confessional principles coincided and reinforced the cultural identity of Jewry as an entity. Strong self-identification and in-group solidarity supported the high 'ethnic temperature' of this group. The processes of secularisation, which first took place in modern Europe and then spread to other regions, led, therefore, to the 'cooling' of the Jewish ethnic temperature. This process has its roots in different periods of Russian history and resulted in deep changes in Jewish identity.

Keywords: ethnicity; Jewish self-identification; Soviet Jews; Judaism; post-Soviet Jewry

Introduction

Determining modes of ethnolinguistic vitality, Ehala (2011) contends that: 'Based on the strength of emotional attachment of members to their group, ethnic group can be categorised into two prototypes: "hot" and "cold"' (192). The 'ethnic temperature' of a group depends on the level of emotional ties of its members to this group. The temperature of the same group can also change depending upon the concrete situation.

For many centuries, Jews existed in the diaspora as an ethnic and confessional entity based mainly on religious principles – among them the Torah, fulfilment of Jewish ceremonial laws, the feeling of chosenness, collective responsibility for both collective and individual sins, etc. Their confessional rather than ethnic self-identification was strongly reinforced by the hostility of the cultural environment. This negative attitude, especially in the Christian world, was (and is) another 'pillar' of Jewishness (Ruderman 2010). As a result, Jews had very strong in-group solidarity and inner ties which helped them to survive as a dispersed entity in many countries. Moreover, their extremely tight affiliation to Judaism – an 'ethnic religion' *par excellence* – prevented this numerically small group from assimilating with various ethnicities. According to the theory of social identity (Taifel and Turner 1979), a social identity is 'that part of individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups), together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership' (Taifel 1978, 63). So, 'the more a person is emotionally attached to his/her ethnic group, the more likely that person is to participate in group actions' (Ehala 2011, 191). Thus, Jews could be defined as a group with a very hot ethnic temperature which persisted for 2000 years. Although the social and cultural situation and milieu in Russia is quite different

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now, in some aspects Russian Jews resemble ex-Soviet Russian speakers in many NIS who 'on the behavioral level, an individual might be less (more) inclined, voluntarily or pressed by social circumstances, to participate in any type of collective action on an ethnic basis' (Kosmarskaya forthcoming).

The acquisition of civil rights for Jews in Western Europe was accompanied by the secularisation of the Jewish population and the growth of political and racial anti-Semitism. The separation from Judaism – the main basis of Jewish culture, identity and in-group solidarity – led to the weakening of Jewish identity and a change in ethnic temperature. European Jews as an entity became much colder. In the Russian Empire, Jews were a confessional minority much discriminated against, suffering from many legal and economic restrictions (residence, education, employment, etc.). A profound social and cultural crisis in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries in the Russian Empire was accompanied by the secularisation of some sectors of Russian society including Jews (Frankel 1981; Zipperstein 1999; Gitelman 2001; Nathans 2002). Thus, the temperature of the Russian Jewry – the most substantial Jewish group at the time – also tended to be cooler at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries. This weak tendency was also strengthened by the rise of anti-Semitism in Russia. At a time when Jews were considered evil because of their 'race' (blood), this supported very emotional inner ties for most Jews as a group.

Here I illustrate the main trends in the formation or, more properly, the construction of cultural self-identifications among people of Jewish origin in modern Russia.

It is very important to take into account that when referring to Russian Jews, I mean people of Jewish origin, including the offspring of intermarriages – those who have one Jewish parent or even grandparent – i.e. the wider Jewish population which includes both Halakhic and non-Halakhic Jews,[1] some of whom consider themselves Jewish in concrete situations (situational identity).

Sources and methods

In conducting my research, I focused on using qualitative methods, such as oral and life histories, since they are more useful in anthropological studies. This article is mainly based on the results of my field research which I carried out in 1999–2009 in several urban centres of the European part of Russia (Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Penza, Krasnodar, Smolensk, Veliky Novgorod and several others). I undertook a total of 250 in-depth interviews. These interviews were informal and indirect, but I had a specially designed interview guide that included several 'blocks' of topics. The interviews lasted from 30 minutes to six hours, depending on the time offered freely by the informants. There is no single representative sampling in qualitative research. Nevertheless, I took into account the principle of 'theoretical fulfillment' (Bertaux 1981; Hammersley 1989). Of the 250 informants, 137 were women; the informants were aged between 17 and 88. Of all the informants, 221 had received a higher education or were university students at the time of the interview. I found the informants mostly through the use of the 'snowball principle'; my contacts with Jewish organisations also helped me in my search.

In addition, I carried out a survey in order to verify the results of the qualitative research. The general sample includes 300 respondents whom I found mainly in the Jewish organisations. Most informants were aged between 16 and 30 years old, or were over 60 years old. These age cohorts represent the age structure of visitors and clients of Jewish organisations. Therefore, the data in this survey are an additional and important source. At first, my respondents were predominantly visitors to Jewish philanthropic,

youth, cultural and other Jewish organisations and centres. Later, I carried out an additional poll among people who never visit such organisations or do that rarely. The age of respondents was between 16 and 96 (27.5% were over 70; 26.1% were aged between 55 and 69; 18.9% were aged between 35 and 54; 13% – between 25 and 34; 8.7% – between 20 and 24; 5.8% – between 16 and 19). Of the respondents, 65% were women. Sixty-nine per cent of respondents had a higher education or were students of universities and in addition 11.7% had academic degrees. A total of 37.7% of respondents have a regular job and 8.7% have a temporary job; 33% are pensioners and 3% are jobless. A total of 44.9% believe that their income is middle, 30.4% declare that their income is 'less than middle'; 14.5% and 1.5% think that their income is low and very low, respectively; 8.7% say that their income is 'more than middle'.

Thus, the qualitative and qualitative aspects of the research complement each other. In both cases there are two cohorts of respondents: those who regularly visit Jewish centres and programmes and those who are not their regular clients. The cultural self-identification, behaviour and values of these cohorts differ greatly (see, for example, Nosenko 2004; Nosenko-Stein 2010).

In some cases, I used the data from sociological polls conducted by other scholars (Gitelman, Chervyakov, and Shapiro 2000; Chervyakov, Gitelman, and Shapiro 2003; Ryvkina 2005; Shapiro et al. 2006a; Osovtsov and Yakovenko 2011).

An additional and very important source was participant observation. It was especially helpful in the Russian periphery as my field trips were not very long.

Also, in some cases, I used fiction by modern Russian-Jewish writers who touch upon problems of Jewish identity and other related issues.

A Soviet Jewish experience: further cooling

From the beginning of the Soviet era, the process of separating Jews from Judaism was very intensive; the notion of 'a Soviet Jew' was created based on new secular symbols and values (Altshuler 1998; Shneer 1994; Shternshis 2006).

The detachment of Jewishness from Judaism has often been considered in the context of Soviet anti-religious politics. However, this successful construction of the Soviet Jewish identity – at least partly – derived from the above-mentioned crisis of Russian imperial society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and of traditional Jewish culture based on Judaism. Moreover, Shternshis (2006), following Krupnik (1995), reminds us that Jews 'were probably the only group within the Soviet population that actually benefited from the October revolution as all tsarist restrictions (education, employment and places of residence) were no longer valid' (3). Thus, I can agree with scholars who believe that some Jews considered the rejection of Judaism as a 'price' of sorts for the acquisition of civil rights. And in this aspect, the situation very much differs, e.g. from the situation in Ukraine where Ukrainian nation-building was (and is) closely connected with problems of language, traditional culture and identity (see Polese forthcoming).

In the post-Second World War period, the anti-religious rhetoric in the USSR became less strident. However, the politics of Russification in many spheres of life and the anti-Semitic campaigns of the late Stalinist period led to some religious and cultural preferences (Altshuler 1987; Kostyrchenko 2005). The post-war politics of Russification led – like in some other cases – 'to the marginalisation of ethnic culture and language in public life' (Bekus forthcoming), i.e. to the marginalisation of Yiddish and Yiddish culture (which along with Yiddish-speakers – have been almost entirely exterminated in many areas of traditional Jewish settlement) as well as Judaism, As a result, there were

sources of information about Christianity (popular books and some scholarly research); in contrast there was an information vacuum regarding Judaism and Jewish tradition (Deutsch Kornblatt 2003; Nosenko-Stein 2009a). My research demonstrates that at present some people of Jewish origin in Russia, mostly the elderly (75 and over), still retain an East European Jewish (East Ashkenazi) self-identification. In early childhood they lived in a *shtetl* (a small town with a prevailing Jewish population) or in a traditional Jewish cultural environment. Many of them speak or understand Yiddish (48% of respondents in this group). The events of Second World War and the Holocaust are, however, crucial for forming their self-identification (Nosenko-Stein 2010). I call them 'Guardians' as they safeguard some elements of traditional Jewish culture (*Yiddishkeit*), but with one exception – Judaism. Only 4% of the respondents in this group say that they observe Jewish ceremonial laws; 18% state that they fulfil some of them. Some of them lost their faith as a result of tragic experiences during the Holocaust.

Maria G., a single survivor from a large religious Jewish family destroyed by the Nazis in the ghetto of Mir (East Poland), then a participant in the partisan movement, told me:

> I thought a lot about all that [tragedy of Holocaust and God – *E. N.-S.*]. If God exists – and He could permit all this horror – this means that He does not exist … No, I don't go to a synagogue, but when I was a girl all of us did that – sure. (Maria G., 84 years old, Veliky Novgorod, 2007)

More than 50% of informants in this group do not speak Yiddish; they have a Soviet secular variant of Jewish self-identification. The mass human losses and destruction of East European Jewish (East Ashkenazic) traditional culture in the Holocaust and Second World War resulted in a prevailing Russian-speaking secular variant of Jewish identity in the Former Soviet Union (Altshuler 1987; Ro'I and Beker 1991; Gitelman 2001; Gitelman and Ro'I 2007).

Thus, in the late Soviet period 'to be a Jew' no longer meant 'to perform the ceremonial laws of Judaism' and Jews became an ethnic group. Therefore, Jewishness was mainly perceived through the prism of ethnic origin. In addition, many Jews abandoned their traditional religion in favour of a so-called 'new life' which seemed to liberate them from the legal and economic restrictions they had suffered in the Russian Empire. For example, Rachel B. talked about her Jewish experience as follows:

> I was a single child in a big Jewish family and had a lot of relatives. … Our family was well-to-do and we observed all Jewish ceremonial laws. I can tell you everything – how my father conducted the *seder* [a Passover meal], what we ate and how we fasted during *Yom Kippur* [the Day of Atonement], and how they made a *kappores* [a popular Jewish redemption ritual] before that day. I remember everything. But when I grew older and went to the Russian school I quickly abandoned all these rules. I was even ashamed that my parents were so religious. … No, I don't go to a synagogue, I am non-believer, I was a secretary of our Youth Communist organisation, besides, there is no synagogue here. (Rachel B., 88 years old, Roslavl, the Smolensk region, 2007)

So, some Soviet Jews did not even want the Jewish status and tried to forget their traditional culture defining it as 'difficult', 'backward' and 'ridiculous'. Raisa B. is a typical example of this 'abdication':

> When I was born, my parents called me Rachel. I was raised in a very large and religious family, we observed all rules. This was very difficult – you see, I went to school where

> ordinary Russian children studied. But I could not do this or eat that. And I began to protest against all that – I don't want all these things! … I don't want this name – everybody has a normal name and I have a strange one – Rachel. I don't want to be Rachel – I said. And I became Raisa. (Raisa B., 89 years old, Penza, 2007)

This phenomenon was vividly described in the drama 'Berdichev' by Friedrich Gorenstein (1992) who ironically presented them as 'ordinary Soviet Jews'. They are no longer Jews but at the same time are not Russians, being an ugly phenomenon of the Soviet era. The grotesque Jewish family described by Gorenstein, especially its elder generation which took part in the October Revolution, spoke a broken Russian-Jewish dialect, supported the so-called 'anti-Zionist', i.e. anti-Israeli, campaigns of the Soviet authorities and did not explicitly protest about anti-Semitic statements made by their neighbours. The writer presents them as a kind of 'homo Sovieticus': they do not remember – and do not want to remember – Jewish cultural experience.

Therefore, Jewish self-identification was first of all based on the ethnic principle – belief in a common origin.

Another 'pillar' of Soviet Jewishness was state anti-Semitism which was of great importance for the mobilisation of Jewish identity. In many cases, this factor only preserved the very emotional attitudes of Jews towards their Jewishness. Many respondents, especially at those aged 40 and over, mainly 'feel Jewish' in situations of anti-Semitic manifestations. This is so-called 'negative' Jewish self-identification was very typical of many Soviet Jews. This variant was reflected in the novel 'Criminal' (*Prestupnitsa*) by the modern Russian writer, Yelena Chizhova (2005a, 2005b). Masha-Maria, the main character of this novel, is a young girl who has a Jewish father. She does not know anything about Jewish culture and does not want to know – whether history or tradition, or the Hebrew language. She dislikes her brother's plans to emigrate from the USSR and despises her Jewish relatives as 'weak' and 'cowardly', i.e. she shares some negative stereotypes regarding Jews widespread in the Russian mass consciousness. Just one thing connects her with Jews – anti-Semitism, both state and that experienced in daily life. So, Masha-Maria is a purely 'negative' type, i.e. she is Jewish because of anti-Semitism. Her Jewish experience is negative *par excellence*.

However, informants from this group – both 'full Jews' and 'half Jews' (i.e. those whose parents are either both Jewish or only one is) – often declare they are non-believers. Thus, Vladimir K., a pensioner, said:

> Of course, I am a Jew. Who else? My parents were Jews and I have been registered as a Jew in my passport. But there wasn't anything specifically Jewish in our family. Everything was common, like in all Soviet families… However, sometimes in different periods of my life I experienced the negative attitudes to Jews. And I never was silent and didn't keep my Jewishness in secret, although some people did so. (Vladimir K., 66 years old, Penza, 2007)

Both factors allowed Soviet Jewry to become a 'very warm' ethnicity. As to Judaism, it did not support Jewish ethnic temperature: according to a later survey, just 1% of post-Soviet Jews considered basic knowledge of Judaism an important aspect of being Jewish (Chervyakov, Gitelman, and Shapiro 2003, 52). Moreover, in the late Soviet era a new phenomenon emerged in that many Jewish intellectuals converted to Christianity considering baptism to be non-conformist, constituting inner emigration, and even a dissident act (Deutsch Kornblatt 2003; Nosenko-Stein 2010). However, baptism did not mean their detachment from Jewishness as earlier, but rather resulted in an emerging paradoxical Jewish Christian identity (Nosenko-Stein 2010, 35–37).

New expectations of the post-Soviet Era

In post-Soviet Russia, we could expect the further 'cooling' of the Jewish ethnic temperature as a result of disappearing state anti-Semitism and the elimination of the obligatory registration of ethnicity in official documents ('*natsionalnost*'), as well as growing numbers of mixed marriages and deepening assimilation. Cooling might be even more expected given that some Soviet Jews – as already mentioned – have tried to distance themselves from their Jewishness. Zalman L., a historian, is a typical example:

> I never felt Jewish – never. I knew that my parents were Jews – so, what? I don't know Yiddish, or Jewish customs, *their* songs, or anything else. My parents were Communists, me too. … Sometimes people ask me 'How can you be a non-Jew with such a face, such a name, father's name (Isaak) and surname?' And I always answer 'I know that my parents were Jewish but it doesn't matter'. Nobody offended me – never. Just once, when I worked at the KGB, I couldn't get a better position there *because I was a Jew* – they explained everything and it was unpleasant. But this was just once in my life. (Zalman L., 89 years old, Moscow, 2009)

The data from my survey confirm the detachment of post-Soviet Jewry from its traditions and culture. Most of them do not even guess that Judaism is the main basis of Jewish tradition, so we can see different figures regarding the knowledge of both of them (see Tables 1 and 2).

Although more than 70% of respondents state that knowledge of Jewish tradition is necessary or desirable, only 17.4% think that it is necessary to have knowledge of Judaism. These results suggest that many people of Jewish origin in Russia do not understand the crucial significance of Judaism for Jewish tradition.

The ethnic principle – the belief in common origin – and self-identification are therefore main 'pillars' of Jewishness for the Russian Jewry today: 84.1% of respondents say that being a part of Jewish people is most important for being Jewish; almost 45% believe that it is necessary to be a son/daughter of Jewish parents, 36.2% – to be a son/daughter of one

Table 1. Is it necessary to have a basic knowledge of Jewish tradition in order to be Jewish? ($N = 300$).

	%
Necessary	31.9
Desirable	39.1
No importance	11.6
I don't know	8.7
No answer	8.7
Total	100.0

Table 2. Is it necessary to have a basic knowledge of Judaism in order to be Jewish? ($N = 300$).

	%
Necessary	17.4
Desirable	36.2
No importance	33.3
I don't know	8.7
No answer	.3
Total	100.0

Jewish parent (7.2% think that it is necessary to have a Jewish mother) (Table 3). The role of Jewish history knowledge is also important (50.7%) while the fulfilment of Jewish ceremonial laws is less significant (15.9%).

But when respondents chose one option among 23 questions, the role of performing Jewish traditions decreases to 5.8% (Table 4). Nobody declares the knowledge of Jewish history as a most important thing for being Jewish, At the same time, Jewish self-identification (52.2%) and 'Jewish blood' (36.1% – both or one parent) are of great importance for most people of Jewish origin.

These results are similar to the data of V. Chervyakov and his colleagues who conducted a survey in Russia and Ukraine in late 1990s–early 2000s (Chervyakov, Gitelman, and Shapiro 2003, 71).

Moreover, there is a difference between declarations and real behaviour. Few respondents really perform Jewish ceremonial laws, albeit they say that it is necessary or at least desirable. Thus, 9% of respondents state that circumcision is a necessary part of being Jewish, but less than 3% practice it; 5.8% believe that it is necessary to observe *kashrut* (the dietary laws of Judaism) and 23.2% think it is desirable, but a mere 4.3% constantly observe it and 15.9% do so from time-to-time. In addition, the interviews demonstrate a profound ignorance on the part of many post-Soviet Jews regarding Jewish traditions (Table 5).

As can be seen, almost 45% of respondents declare that it is necessary to know and remember Jewish history and traditions and less than 16% think that Judaism is of great

Table 3. What does it mean 'to be a Jew'? (N = 300).

	%
To identify yourself as a part of the Jewish people	84.1
To know and remember a history of the Jewish people	50.7
To be perceived as a Jew by other people	44.9
To perform Jewish traditions and customs	44.9
To be a son/daughter of Jewish parents	44.9
To be proud of being Jewish	36.2
To be a son/daughter of one Jewish parent	36.2
To feel different from other people	20.3
To fulfill the ceremonial laws of Judaism	15.9
To be a son/daughter of Jewish mother	7.2
To feel hostility from other people, i.e. anti-Semitism	2.9

Note: (respondents could answer several questions)

Table 4. Please choose the main option from the following list (N = 300).

	%
To be a son/daughter of Jewish parents	24.6
To be a son/daughter of one Jewish parent	10.1
To be a son/daughter of a Jewish mother	1.4
To perform Jewish traditions and customs	5.8
To identify yourself as a part of the Jewish people	52.2
To be perceived as a Jew by other people	1.4
To be proud of being Jewish	2.9
I do not know	1.4
Total	100.0

Table 5. Is it important to know Jewish traditions? (N = 300).

	%
Necessary	31.9
Desirable	39.1
Does not matter	11.6
I do not know	8.7
No answer	8.7
Total	100.0

importance for being Jewish. However, less than 6% of respondents believe that performing Jewish traditions and customs is the main aspect for being Jewish and only 1% consider that Judaism is of great importance. Moreover, although 31.9% of respondents state that it is necessary to know Jewish traditions and customs (and 39.1% believe that it is desirable), we have already seen that few respondents actually perform the main Jewish rituals.

Nevertheless, a series of 'religious renaissances' and 'ethnic revivals' – real or imagined – which started in (post-)Soviet space after the collapse of the USSR, involved Russia's Jews, like other ethnic groups (see, for example, Kozlov 1999; Tabak 1999; Nosenko 2004). In any case, this resulted not only in the revival of interest in Judaism and Jewish culture, but also in a sudden transformation of Jewish self-identification, at least among some people of Jewish origin.

However, the results of my research and some sociological surveys show that most of Russia's Jews still believe in so-called 'Jewish blood', i.e. ethnicity as the main basis for 'being Jewish'. Abram P., a journalist, explained:

> I always felt that I was Jewish. But I was an atheist and I am an atheist now. I think that one has to adopt a religion with a mother's milk. Then it will be a natural religiosity, not demonstrative like we can often see now. What is important for being Jewish? Genes, genes, genes! Mother's and father's genes. (Abram P., 82 years old, Penza, 2007)

Yeva L., a pensioner, was very emotional:

> Of course, Jewishness is in the blood, in Jewish genes. Genes, genes, genes – do you understand me? Jewish mind, Jewish talents – all these are in Jewish genes and blood! (Yeva L., 56 years old, Penza, 2007)

Younger informants stress that only Jewish origin attaches them to Jews. They fear anti-Semitism less than elder people because of their age and short social experience. Thus, most young informants (68%) do not fear anti-Semitic manifestations as opposed to the attitude of elder informants for whom this factor is often the single impulse awakening their 'sleeping' Jewishness. According to Shapiro and colleagues, only one-sixth of respondents aged between 16 and 19 said that the fear of anti-Semitism had an impact on forming their Jewish consciousness (Shapiro et al. 2006b, 175).

The Jewish 'renaissance' in post-Soviet Russia also reinforced the Jewish component of hybrid self-identification that is very widespread among people of Jewish origin in Russia (29% of the general sample). This uncertain type – where people in some situations identified themselves with Russians and in others with Jews – existed in the USSR. These people were brought up in a Russian environment, but in recent years they

sometimes became interested in Jewish culture and tradition. Informants often call themselves 'Russian Jews'.

Many informants of this type are non-believers or agnostics, though some of them declare they are Russian Orthodox. In fact, they mostly believe in something – a higher being, fate, karma, etc. Sometimes they are interested in Judaism and its history, but they never convert. Alexander S., an artist who also attended some courses at the Jewish University, said of his family:

> My grandparents in both Russian and Jewish lines prayed and observed religious rites. But we were not brought up in any religion because our childhood coincided with the militant antireligious period in our state. (Alexander S., 37 years old, St Petersburg, 1999)

Then he asked me to switch the tape recorder off and said that he was Russian Orthodox but not observant.

After *perestroika*, those who come under this category became more interested in Judaism; although they very seldom convert, their unstable self-identification is much influenced by their involvement in Jewish life and by anti-Semitism. Andrey R., a student who came back to Russia from Israel, explained it thus:

> It is difficult to explain what a Jew is. To be a Jew – it does not mean to live in a concrete country but to affiliate to a culture. This is not a nationality… There are different opinions about Jews. One of them says that a Jew has to perform the ceremonial laws of Judaism. In the second opinion, a Jew has a specific Jewish mentality, i.e. a person knows that he or she is a Jew, that he or she has Jewish origins, that he or she feels Jewish. So, I am Russian citizen, but I have something Jewish in my mind. This 'something' is in my appearance, in my blood and so on. I consider myself a Jew but I am not an observant Jew. (Andrey R., 22 years old, Moscow, 1999)

However, my research demonstrates that most informants know very little about East Ashkenazi culture – traditional in Russia – including cuisine, music, literature, festivals, etc. Most respondents do not speak Yiddish (66.7%), and only 13% want their children to learn Yiddish. About 68% of respondents only remember the *gefilte fish* and *matza*; nobody younger than 50 knows what *tsimes* is (a traditional East Ashkenazi dish of stewed carrots with different components).

Nevertheless, the revival of Jewish communal life in contemporary Russia has resulted in the awakening of Jewish self-identification among young people of Jewish origin in a specific manner. We can even observe a tendency towards religious revival among these respondents whom I call 'new Jews'. Some of them even become observant Jews, i.e. they perform Jewish ceremonial laws. Denis O., a businessman, said:

> I always felt I was Jewish. It would be stupid to feel non-Jewish with such a face. But there were no observant Jews in our family, although I always thought that there was Something or Someone superior. … Several years ago I met an excellent rabbi and he helped me a lot with my problems. And I became an observant Jew – fulfill everything. However this was a shock for my family, my brother can't accept this even now. (Denis O., 33 years old, Krasnodar, 2007)

These informants have had no traditional Jewish education, but they know something of Jewish tradition and values from their older relatives. In recent years they have often tried to find their Jewish roots by studying Jewish history, Hebrew and taking part in Jewish life. Nevertheless, the percentage of observant 'new Jews' is only between 2% and 4%.

At the same time, we can observe a very specific phenomenon, the construction of a Russian-Jewish variant of 'civil religion' or, speaking more properly, 'civil Judaism' which has become popular among some parts of young people of Jewish origin.

Civil religion is described for many countries as a set of symbols and values both religious and secular, highly esteemed by community members and of great importance to the individual (Bellah 1967; Liebman and Don Yehiya 1983; Bellah 1991). This is, in a sense, a secular viewpoint and a substitute for traditional religion. Sometimes scholars also speak of the civil Judaism which is widespread in some countries as a form of quasi-religion and includes different symbols and practices (Woocher 1986). In Russia, the respondents in this study perform some ceremonial laws of Judaism which they consider important, as Matvey R., a student, explained in the following exchange:

> M: My religious principles largely coincide with Judaism but I am not observant. Partly observant.
> Res: What do you observe?
> M: Mostly the Sabbath, sometimes festivals and *kashrut* – in a specific manner – I try not to eat pork and mix milk and meat. (Matvey R., 20 years old, St Petersburg, 1999)

This selective fulfilment of Jewish ceremonial laws and rituals (the Sabbath, *kashrut*, some festivals) alongside the respect for some secular Jewish values (the State of Israel, readiness to marry a Jew, Jewish names) comprise a form of civil religion or civil Judaism amongst Russian Jews.

However, according to the estimation of some communal leaders, 'civil' Jews comprise between 5% and 10% of the Jewish population. Thus, a great majority of Russian Jews today are still secular or semi-secular (believing in some supernatural powers, such as a higher being, karma, UFO, etc.), or even Christian. The belief in common origin is still the main factor which supports their Jewishness.

Variable identities

As I have shown above, in modern Russia Jews do not have a common ethnic, national or confessional identity. Many scholars emphasise 'Jewish variability', saying that Jews are not an entity in any respect – linguistic, racial, cultural, or otherwise (Patai and Patai 1975) – and that there are different Jewish identities within the same country (Webber, 1994, 83–85). This variability was a cultural shock for ex-Soviet Jews in Israel who, for the first time, met 'non-Jewish Jews' who did not look like Jews, did not behave like Jews, etc. These impressions have been described by some scholars who had the experience of immigrating to Israel (Fialkova and Yelenevskaya 2007; Remennick 2007).

Thus, we can speak about various Jews who have different features in terms of appearance, language, behaviour, etc. This variability has also been reflected on by several novelists, for example, those who have tried to comprehend the 'Khazar issue' in the context of Jewish and anti-Jewish discourse. Analysing the Khazar myth and its connection with the Jewish identity in some *oeuvres* by ex-Soviet writers, Fialkova (2010, 338–339) speaks about various features of Jewish identity:

> Any criteria – both well-known for readers and absurdist ones – appearance, names and surnames, registration in passports, circumcision or no circumcision, poor Russian language, any religion, … Israeli citizenship and many others – all these are either reliable or not.

Therefore, it is possible to speak about several cultural self-identifications, which can be considered within a framework of multiple Russian Jewish identities:

(1) 'East Ashkenazi' self-identification in its Yiddish and Russian-speaking variants – typical mostly of elderly people who remember Jewish traditional culture. Yakov B., 73, a pensioner, explained his Jewish sentiments:

> Of course I am a Jew! All my relatives were Jews, my mother and father were Jews, they lived in Belarus'. … They spoke Yiddish, me too, I learned in the Jewish school and would like that young people speak Yiddish now. … I don't believe in God and don't visit a synagogue because there is no synagogue here. If there were a synagogue I wouldn't go there, besides I don't like our rabbi. … But sometimes I think that it is worth going to a synagogue in order to remember my parents and grandparents. They believed in God and observed everything. (Yakov B., 73 years old, Veliky Novgorod, 2007)

(2) Russian (or non-Jewish) self-identification is typical of informants who declare that they are Russians, although they do not deny their Jewish origin. Natalia A., who is a student and has a Jewish father, told me:

> I am Russian because I am Russian Orthodox. All my family is Russian Orthodox, we celebrate Russian Orthodox holidays. We never observed any Jewish holidays. (Natalia A., 19 years old, Moscow, 2000)

(3) 'Negative' Jewish self-identification that has very often been formed mainly in the context of anti-Semitism. For example, Tatiana K., a doctor, said:

> My father is a Jew. Who am I? I have been registered as a Jew in my passport. But I don't feel Jewish. You see, there wasn't anything specific Jewish in our family. We never paid attention to someone's ethnic origin. It didn't matter to us. … However, when I hear bad words about Jews or observe negative attitudes to Jews. I start to protest – loudly. And I am never silent in these cases and don't keep my Jewishness secret. (Tatiana K., 24 years old, Moscow, 2010)

(4) 'Dual' ('hybrid') self-identification is most widespread: persons of Jewish origin identify themselves as Russians or Jews depending on the situation. Igor B., a journalist, ironically observed:

> I know that I am a Jew. Why, it would be silly to deny that with such a face. But I am not crazy about my Jewishness. … I am not religious although it is fashionable now – to be Russian Orthodox. But I don't go either to a church or synagogue. That is not for me. … I love Russian literature. Russian poetry and am a person of Russian culture but with Jewish blood in my veins. I am convinced that I have some typical Jewish features but I am culturally Russian. (Igor B., 43 years old, Veliky Novgorod, 2007)

(5) 'New Jewish' self-identification is typical of young people who have in recent years become interested in Jewish culture and involved in Jewish life. Inna G., a psychologist, explained her interest in Jewish life thus:

> I came here [Jewish communal center] in a difficult period in my life. I was quite frustrated after the divorce and didn't know what to do. A friend of mine invited me here. … At first I didn't want to come as I never thought about my Jewishness.

> … Now this is a part of my life. It is so unusual and interesting – to take part in all these rites, holy days, Sabbaths. I feel that we both – my daughter and I – are members of a new family. (Inna G., 28 years old, Oryol, 2009)

It is important to remember, however, that a person, especially of mixed origin, can change his or her self-identification and often does so several times during their lifetime (for details, see Nosenko-Stein, 2011).

Is there anything common in these different groups? My research demonstrates that different types of Jewish identity in Russia are based mainly on the ethnic principle, i.e. belief in common origin – 'Jewish blood', 'Jewish genes', etc. We can see (Table 3) that almost 45% of respondents believe that it is necessary to have Jewish parents in order to be a Jew; 36.3% think that it is necessary to have at least one Jewish parent to be Jewish. These numbers correlate with the Jewish origins of the respondents (Table 6).

Many informants, as mentioned above, believe that Jewishness is in Jewish blood or the genes. Victoria I., a student, expanded on this:

> Many people now think that to be a Jew means to be talented, rich, and successful. … Some our acquaintances even look for any Jewish roots – they believe it will help. (Victoria I., 19 years old, Moscow, 2010)

We can observe this belief in the well-known story of Daniel Oswald Rufeysen (known as Brother Daniel), a Polish Jew who kept his Jewishness secret during the Second World War, served as a translator for the local police and then saved many Jews in the ghetto of Mir (Eastern Poland); afterwards he converted to Christianity and tried to gain Israeli citizenship. However, he was rejected as an apostate although he proved that he was 'Jewish born' and always 'felt Jewish'.[2]

This 'folk primordialism' is typical of mass consciousness, whether Jewish (in which case it sometimes becomes a feeling of 'Jewish superiority' or chosenness), or non-Jewish (racial anti-Semitism).

The belief in common origin seems to be partly confirmed by the genetic studies which prove an existence of specific 'Jewish genes'.[3] At the same time, this research just confirms the common origin of different Jewish groups which diversified in about the first century AD.

Nevertheless, the mythology of Jewish blood is deeply rooted in the mass consciousness – both in Jewish and non-Jewish (Patai and Patai 1975). The notions of 'Jewish race' and 'Jewish blood' remain issues for discussion in scholarly and pseudo-scholarly

Table 6. What can you say about your Jewish origins? (N = 300).

	%
I am fully Jewish (all my grandparents are Jews)	44.9
I am $^3/_4$ Jewish (three of my grandparents are Jewish)	2.9
I am half Jewish (my mother is a Jew)	17.4
I am half Jewish (my father if a Jew)	18.8
I am ¼ Jewish (both my parents are half Jewish)	2.9
I am ¼ Jewish (one of my parents is half Jewish)	8.8
I have more remote Jewish kinship	4.3
Total	100.0

(including anti-Semitic and racist) discourse (see, for example, Patai and Patai 1995; Shnirelnanan 2005; Fialkova 2010).

The Khazar issue is typical in this respect. Fialkova stresses that 'the interest in Khazars is connected with the crisis of Jewishness and its perception. This crisis is a result of the collapse of widespread schemes and many different factors – the collapse of the USSR, emigration, religious views, the political split in Israel, etc. – or a result of their combination. In this context 'Khazar roots' is not only to do with the emphasis of differences between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, an emphasis which has been observed before (Shnirelnanan 2005, 288–289). These roots are also an alternative in terms of perceiving Russian Jewry as free nomads of the steppes who are deeply rooted in Russia – their genuine historical homeland' (Fialkova, 2010; also see Sobolev, 2008). Some novelists ironically describe the 'racial characteristics' of Khazars – the Mongoloid coccyx and the Altaic type of pilosis (Yuriev 2004, 41) – as similar to the 'racial features of Jews' in anti-Semitic literature.

At the same time more than 80% of Russia's Jews think that it is necessary to 'feel Jewish' – i.e. to identify oneself with Jews in order to be a Jew. Thus, Jewish self-identification unites most people of Jewish origin in Russia. The main pillars of this variable Jewishness are belief in common origin as well as collective memory (Nosenko-Stein 2009b). Some scholars also contend that the collective memory – the memory of the common fate – is the significant factor in the identity of Soviet Jews (Remennick 2007, 28).

Conclusion

After *perestroika* and the collapse of the USSR, a religious renaissance – real or imagined – started in Russia and Russia's Jews, like non-Jews, were involved in this process. It resulted not only in the revival of interest in Judaism and Jewish culture, but also in a sudden transformation of Jewish self-identification among at least some people of Jewish origin.

I have already mentioned the variability of Jewish identities in modern Russia. However, in spite of all the differences, a belief in common origin unites most Russian Jews: 73–88% of respondents in various groups believe that in order to be Jewish it is necessary to have Jewish parents (or one of them). These results correlate with the data of another sociological poll in which 81% of respondents aged 70 and over who lived in St Petersburg also gave a positive answer to a similar question (Shapiro et al. 2006a, 116).

This factor, as well as fear of anti-Semitism, maintains the 'warm ethnic temperature' of Jews in post-Soviet Russia. So-called 'religious revival' involves a small segment of the Jewish population in Russia – not more than 10% of Jewish youth and 2–4% of older people. I can also predict the further 'cooling' of most parts of Russian Jewry, in spite of their temporary interest in Judaism. This cooling is likely to be reinforced by the low birth rates of modern Russian Jewry, its high death rate, the emigration of over a million Jews from the Former Soviet Union and a high percentage of intermarriage. Expanding globalisation and cosmopolitanism also promote further assimilation and a decrease in the ethnic temperature of Russian Jews.

However, it should be noted that ethnic temperature differs (and changes over time), not only at the group level but also individually. There are always those who are more involved in their ethnic group and those who have a weak ethnic identity and involvement. So to speak, there are more-Jewish and less-Jewish Jews in every Jewish population. The general tendency to cooling is evident in Russia, but at the same time

'new Jews', who are attempting to rebuild Jewish life, support the Jewish ethnic temperature at the warm level.

Notes

1. According to Halachah – the normative law in Judaism – a person born to a Jewish mother or a mother affiliated to Judaism can be considered Jewish. Thus, people who have a Jewish father or grandfather are sometimes defined as non-Halachic, or patrilineal Jews.
2. His life story is told by Amir Gera in four parts (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AZtHQ8gDIxY; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pvd2Blhze4g; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4xw8bPxwk54; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0YPoo9BgyeQ).
3. See, for example: http://www.mignews.com/news/technology/world/080512_64802_95059.html; http://top.rbc.ru/wildworld/30/05/2012/652907.shtml; http://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2012/05/30/n_2366461.shtml.

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Ethnic identity in post-Soviet Belarus: ethnolinguistic survival as an argument in the political struggle

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This article discusses the Belarusian case of post-communist development and the role and status of Belarusian ethnicity in Belarus' nation-formation process. 'Nationalizing nationalism' (Brubaker), as realised by the Belarusian state through various social and cultural practices, is aimed at the creation of a Belarusian national entity without reference to the ethnocultural core of Belarusians. As a result of the nationalising practices of the Belarusian state, most Belarusians identify with their nation-state while displaying weak identification with ethnicity. At the same time, the recent dynamic of patterns of self-perception in Belarusian society can be interpreted as the beginning of a gradual 'heating' of the ethnocultural vitality of Belarusians, which is occurring under the impact of the agency of elites. Ethnolinguistic survival and vitality in this context can be viewed both as an argument in the struggle between different forces on the political arena and a factor contributing to victory in the rivalry between them. In this context, the phenomenon of 'ethnic temperature' can be analysed not only from the perspective of its impact on group vitality and survival, but also as a phenomenon dependent on various political, cultural and historical factors.

Keywords: Belarus; ethnic identity; nation-building; ethnocultural vitality

Introduction: national revival in Belarus

During the period 1990–1994, the Republic of Belarus underwent a process of institutional and ideological shaping of a new state, similarly to other post-Soviet states. The core of this process was the nationalisation of the political, social and cultural spheres. Belarus was slower in implementing institutional and economic reforms than its post-Soviet neighbours; its political structure and bureaucracy were still dominated by members of the culturally assimilated nomenclature. Nevertheless, due to the activity of national activists in the Supreme Soviet (elected in 1990), the Belarusian state at that time implemented the policy of Belarusisation. This policy was viewed as historically justified after centuries of discrimination against the Belarusian language and culture under Russian imperial domination and Soviet rule. The first non-communist oppositional movement created in Belarus was the Belarusian People's Front (BPF), founded in 1988 and transformed into a political party in 1993, which formulated the idea of the Belarusian nation's revival in opposition to Soviet ideology. The oppositional coalition on the platform of BPF counted up to 40 members (out of 360) in the Supreme Soviet (Feduta, Bogutskij, and Martsinovitch 2003, 14). By the time when the election campaign

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started to the Supreme Soviet of Belarus in 1990 there were no political parties registered in Belarus. Legal basis for the registration of political parties in Belarus was created later, in October 1990. With the support of members of the Supreme Soviet elected from various registered non-governmental organisations (like the Belarusian Language Society, Belarusian Ecological Union, Workers' Union of Belarus), which represented the Democratic Bloc – the BPF managed to become the leading political force which defined the strategy for the country's development.

The introduction of the national dimension into the public life of Belarus was accompanied by symbolic changes (the Soviet Belarusian flag and emblem were replaced by historical national symbols referring to the pre-Soviet tradition of the Belarusian people) as well as new policies in the spheres of history, language, media and education. These changes were supposed to enable the creation of new historical, cultural and political narratives which would reconstruct Belarusian development from the standpoint of a national Belarusian logic. Belarusian history and tradition were positioned in these narratives as having their own inner dynamics and aspirations; the Belarusian people described therein was presented as being, if not independent, at least a separate ethnocultural entity in history, no matter how subordinate and politically oppressed it was.

One of the major obstacles on the way to implementation of the Belarusisation policy in early 1990s became the understanding of the Belarusian ethnocultural entity as closely related to and even inscribed into the Russian one. Being dependent politically on Russia for more than two centuries (since the first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772), Belarus as a linguistic, geographical and ethnographical idea was imagined under the strong influence of Russian political and cultural domination.

Historical frameworks of Russification policy: Russification as de-Polonisation

The roots of Russification in Belarus go back to the nationality policies of the Russian Empire, which aimed to weaken the Polish cultural and political influence on Belarusians. Russian power came to the Belarusian lands with a conviction that it should bring Belarusians 'back home', to their 'Russian roots'. This idea constituted the ideological background for the scientific study of Belarusian lands which began in the late eighteenth century. The Russian Academy of Sciences organised a series of scientific expeditions under the auspice of Western Russian ideology which paradoxically led to the crystallisation of the Belarusian cultural idea. Mikhail Dolbilov points out that the thesis about the 'closeness' of Belarusians and Ukrainians to Russia was a 'double-edged sword': 'Having postulated the existence of distinctive Ukrainian and Belarusian tribes with their own specific dialects, Russian ethnographers "threatened" the unity of these peoples with Russia' (2001, 230–231). According to Valer Bulhakau (2006, 156), these numerous studies on Belarusian folklore and language (defined as a dialect) filled the category of 'Belarus' with ethnographic content and prepared the ground for the articulation of a national idea. And this idea was formulated within the ideological framework of the conception of *Zapadnorusizm* (Western Russism), developed by Russian historians in the second half of the nineteenth century (M. Kaialovich, P. Bobrovskii).

Meanwhile, at the beginning of Russian rule the Tsarist authorities allowed the Belarusian gentry to continue to drift towards Polish language and culture. Polonisation affected mainly the higher strata of the population, and by the time of the Belarusian national revival in the late nineteenth century the Belarusian 'people' could only be distinguished on the basis of language they spoke and was almost entirely represented by the social stratum of the 'oppressed', living in rural areas (Vakar 1956, 34). Belarusian,

which once was the official language of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL), turned into an 'uncodified, low-status Slavic dialect located morphologically between Polish and Russian, whose speakers were located socially between Polish culture and Russia power' (Snyder 2003, 41). During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, education in Belarus was conducted in Polish, Latin or Russian, and the churches used Latin or Church Slavonic. The Belarusian language gradually lost its status as a 'language' and started to be viewed as a mere dialect. The official ban on the use of Belarusian language in print was lifted in 1905. A new version of the Belarusian language was created by national activists on the basis of the language spoken in rural areas.

The process of Belarusian national awakening in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was an almost classical example of small nation nationalism in Miroslav Hroch's (1985) terms. Belarusians were dominated by a ruling class of either Russian or Polish cultural orientation or identity, and throughout their history had lived in a state shared with other ethnic groups. Moreover, each of these ethnic groups had aspirations of seeing the Belarusian *ethnie* as part of their own cultural and political grand projects. Belarusian national awareness was supposed to be built in opposition to these conceptions of cultural and political unity. At the end of the nineteenth century, there was no even consensus as to the *proper* alphabet for the Belarusian language – Latin or Cyrillic. The Cyrillic script had been in use in the Belarusian lands since the arrival of Christianity in the tenth century. During the period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, however, the Belarusian nobility drifted towards Polish language. Latin script had a symbolic dimension of being an expression of an anti-Russian orientation among the Belarusian intelligentsia in the late nineteenth–early twentieth centuries. This uncertainty symbolically replicated the historical hesitation of Belarusians between self-definition via its cultural closeness to the East (ties with Russia) or to the West (political and historical commonness with Poland).

The issue of a distinct Belarusian identity did not become a major argument for the political mobilisation of Belarusians in the Russian Empire before the October Revolution. During the First World War, when Belarus became a military camp for four years (1914–1918), the territory inhabited by Belarusians was divided along a military front line. In March 1918, under the German occupation (1914–1918), Belarusian activists declared the creation of the Belarusian People's Republic (BPR). This Republic, however, ceased to exist when the Bolshevik power was established in the territory of Belarus. In its place, the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic was created in January 1919 and further development of the Belarusian ethnocultural project continued under the Bolshevik rule. By granting Belarusians their own national Republic, the Bolsheviks in fact agreed to recognise the Belarusian as a distinct ethnocultural unit with its own ethnic core and language. Nicholas Vakar states that the founding of this republic served a double purpose: firstly, to attract into and maintain within the Soviet system those elements of the population to whom the communist idea might not otherwise appeal, and secondly to integrate their nationalism with world revolutionary forces (1956, 139).

Soviet period of Belarusian history: nation-(de)formation

The development of the Belarusian ethnocultural project under the Bolshevik rule provides an illustrative case of nation-formation within the framework of a socialist system, during which a traditional, rural society was transformed through a process of industrialisation and modernisation in a socialist mode (Bekus 2010a, 829). Active

Russification in post-war Soviet Belarus led to the marginalisation of ethnic culture and language in public life. However, Russification, as the replacement of Belarusian ethnic culture with Russian one – was not a goal in itself for Soviet ideologists. It would be more accurate 'to speak about Sovietization – the formation of a specific Soviet culture, which the Russian language served, rather than Russification' (Yekadumau 2003, 186–187).

The Soviet Russification started under Stalin's rule in the late 1930s. However, this had been preceded by a decade of intense nationalisation of Belarusian life. This period was extremely important for the formation of Belarusian ethnolinguistic identity in modern terms. For the first time, the Belarusian language was supported by state policy and became the language of official public life. According to the declaration of the establishment of Soviet Socialist Belarusian Republic, 31 July 1920, there were four state languages in Belarus – Belarusian, Russian, Polish and Yiddish and they had equal status. In practice, however, there was regional differentiation in the use of languages and, at the same time, the policy of *korenizatsiia* proclaimed by the Bolshevik government was aimed at promoting the use of Belarusian, regarded as the native language of the indigenous nation (*korennaia natsiia*) in public institutions in the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR).

The Belarusian Government declared a hard line in the policy of the nationalisation of public life: the Belarusian nationality was declared predominant and Belarusian became the official language. A system of obligatory education in Belarusian was created. State policy led to impressive results achieved within several years: the BSSR reported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) Soviet of Nationalities in 1925 that in the central agencies of the Republic only 26.9% of the employees spoke Belarusian. In 1926 the number had risen to 54%, and to 80% by 1928. The press became almost exclusively Belarusian. In the education system, 28.4% of schools were Belarusian language schools in 1924–1925, rising to 93.8% in 1929–1930 (Martin 2001, 264). Due to the policy of Soviet state, the symbolic status and public meaning of Belarusian had changed: 'Belarusian was no longer a language of peasants but a language of the state' (Mironowicz 2004, 43).

The process of nation-building in the Soviet Republics at that time fit the scheme of nation-formation that was conducted by the state through top-down practices of standardisation, using the education system and other attributes of modernising practices, albeit in the socialist mode. 'It was the communist regime which deliberately set out to create ethnolinguistic territorial "national administrative units", i.e. "nations" in the modern sense, where none had previously existed or been thought of [among them were also Byelorussians]' (Hobsbawm 1990, 166).

By the end of 1920s, intensive nationalisation was replaced by the policy of 'Friendship of the Peoples'. One of the major features of this period was the rehabilitation of Russian culture and Russian nationalism as the foundation for Soviet unity (Martin 2001, Bremer 1993, Suny 2001). At the same time, the Soviet rulers never questioned the existence of the Belarusians (or other recognised groups) as a distinct nation although they tended to influence the way such 'nationhood' was understood. In Nicholas Vakar's words, 'the Soviets had been up against men, and not against symbols of Belorussianism' (Vakar 1956, 150). 'Stalinization of nationalism,' Nichlas Vakar writes, meant that 'the national framework of the Republic had been wisely left intact. … It had only to be furnished with new personnel, and Belorussian life and culture oriented in a new direction' (1956, 146).

The new policy of Russification and promotion of bilingualism gradually led to a change of status and public image for ethnically Belarusian culture and language. In fact,

Soviet ideology did not leave space for specifically Belarusian ethnocultural development, which would advocate Belarusian language and culture in opposition to Russian-speaking Soviet identity. Russian became not only the language of communication, but also the language of social promotion in Belarus. 'Belarussianness' gradually started to be associated with the Russian language and Soviet culture.

This policy had an impressive effect: by the middle of the 1970s not a single Belarusian language school remained in the republic's 95 cities. In 1984, only some 5% of journals in circulation were published in Belarusian. Only about one-third of the population spoke Belarusian in their daily life, and these were concentrated among rural inhabitants (Marples 1999, 50). In the context of the 'progressive' development of the Soviet Belarusian nation, the reference to Belarusian ethnic culture and language was often perceived as 'backward'. The Soviet state, which was undergoing a process of intense modernisation, fostered new means of creating nations' development within the framework of Soviet Republics. The Soviet state conducted the official, objectified codification of ethnic heterogeneity and granted them a status of national heterogeneity (Brubaker 1996, 27). The ethnolinguistic community of Belarusians was transformed – also in the perception of Belarusians themselves – into a 'nation'. On the one hand, the ethnolinguistic core of Soviet nations became both the reason and the leading principle of ethnoterritorial federalism developed by the Soviet state. On the other hand, it did not become the ideological basis for these nations' distinct sense of community. The post-Soviet Belarusian nation was in fact the product of socialist modernisation and nationalisation processes heavily influenced by Soviet ideology and realised through the medium of the Russian language. As a result, the initial idea of Belarus as a distinct ethnolinguistic entity was first supplemented and later replaced with the ideological project of the Soviet Belarusian nation. In Nikolas Vakar's (1956, 219) words, 'Belorussianism has been for years identified with the Soviet authority, and … it seems that it has become to the natives just another aspect of Communism'. 'Sovietness' became for Belarusians an organic expression of their 'ethnomarginality'.

The idea of belonging to the Belarusian ethnic group appeared as secondary and less essential than identification with the Soviet Belarusian nation, which became the dominant point of reference in the social identity construction of Belarusians. All of the social institutions and structures, which a group needs 'to create a psychological willingness for the group members to act as a distinctive collective entity' (Ehala 2011, 190) were created for Belarusians by the Soviet system. The ideology of this institutional infrastructure was not neutral in relation to the Belarusian ethnicity, but aimed at the suppression of the ethnolinguistic component of group identity. Ethnic culture and language had been used as a primary basis for creating a framework for the national republic of Belarusians and had a decisive meaning at the origins of Belarusian statehood within the USSR, but gradually lost its importance during the modernisation of the Belarusian idea within the Soviet community. The promotion of Russian culture and language as primary instruments of mobility made Belarusian less prestigious and useful, which led to a shift in the communicative competence and use of this language. At the same time, the ethnolinguistic identity had been preserved and maintained in the Soviet state, as Volodymyr Kulyk (2011, 632) writes, 'not only by cultural inertia but also by public discourses and practices supporting the existence of separate nations distinguishable primarily by their eponymous languages, and of these languages as the nations' most natural and valuable attributes'.

National independence: choosing the way to be a 'nation'

The revival of the national language became a central thesis of the nation-building programme formulated by nationalist forces, when the old sociopolitical order entered into a period of crisis and the Soviet system collapsed. The nationalist intelligentsia in Belarus acted as true 'ethnopolitical entrepreneurs' who 'by invoking groups, seek to evoke them, summon them, call them into being' (Brubaker 2002, 166). Belarusians, in fact, had never before existed as a self-sustaining ethnocultural and political entity. Their collective identity had never been based on their ethnolinguistic unity. And by speaking about the national revival of the Belarusian nation as an ethnocultural community, Belarusian ethnopolitical entrepreneurs effectively aimed to 'contribute to producing what they apparently describe or designate' (Bourdieu 2005, 220).

The revival of ethnic culture and language appeared at the time to be a natural consequence of Belarus' gaining independence as a sovereign state, and national independence seemed to guarantee the conditions for revitalisation of the ethnolinguistic identity of Belarusians. 'Nationalization' as the promotion of nationhood, understood as an 'ethnocultural unity', was supposed to supersede and replace the Soviet image of Belarusian nationhood shaped during the Soviet period.

In talking about 'nationalization' of Belarusians, adherents of the ethnolinguistic concept of Belarusian nation actually mean 'ethnicization' of Belarusian society, i.e. the infusing and intertwining of the social, political and cultural life of Belarusians with an ethnolinguistic basis of their identity. This meant a step-by-step deidentification of Belarusian identity and Soviet mass consciousness (and its Russian-language expression) and a simultaneous 'filling in' of alternative content – the idea of Belarusians as a self-sustaining cultural and ethnolinguistic community. The promotion and popularisation of these ideas in Belarusian society was hampered by numerous factors, among which were the inertia and conservatism of the old *nomenklatura* that had retained its commanding position in the administrative system of the new state, public discontent due to the catastrophic slump in standards of living, social disorientation and, paradoxically, positive experience of life in the Soviet Union, which many Belarusians remembered fondly. As Grigory Ioffe (2008, 106–107) writes, 'on the eve of the 1990s, Belarus had one of the better managed regional economies, with an unusually high share of export-oriented enterprises … All the impulses and driving forces of Belarus's achievements, as well as side effects, have been of Soviet vintage'.

These barriers on the way to a new type of Belarusian community could be overcome if the installation of the new idea of the nation as an ethnolinguistic entity would gain the support of the state.

In Belarus, however, the political turn which occurred after the presidential elections of 1994 resulted in a significant change in the ideological orientation of the state policy. Under Aliaksandr Lukashenka, democratisation stopped, economic reforms discontinued and the declared policy of nationalisation was cancelled. The regime established in 1994 paradoxically displayed itself as a 'revolutionary government seeking retrogressive solutions to Belarusian problems' (Marples 1999, 86). The list of 'retrospective solutions' included not only a return to a repressive political system, a conservative state ideology, and authoritarian rule, but also the way in which the community of Belarusians was perceived. Employing a populist approach to politics, Aliaksandr Lukashenka chose to support the idea of the Belarusian nation as a product of Sovietness: 'Today's Belarus has grown up not out of the ideas of nationalists-in-exile, but out of the truly brotherly family of the Soviet Republics, due to the common efforts of all the peoples, and, first of all, of

the Russian one' (Rubinau 2006). An intense institutionalisation of Belarusian nationhood during the first decades of independence was accompanied by promotion of the official concept of the Belarusian idea, which denied the importance of ethnolinguistic identity for the unity of Belarusians. 'Formation of the Belarusian nation is taking place now, … because the people who now live within the boundaries of the modern Belarusian state are beginning to form mutual interests whose realisation can be beneficial to all of them, irrespective of their ethnic identity or language they speak' (Zlotnikov 2001).

The Belarusian idea in the official interpretation is formulated within the Russian civilisational framework, inherited from Soviet times and supported by common religious tradition. It carries an appeal for Slavic unity, with reliance on Russian culture and language as an indivisible part of the Belarusian historical and cultural legacy. In this context, the idea of a political union with other states 'inside' this civilisation is not a contradiction, but develops Belarus' national independence (Melnik 2004, 147).

Comparison of data provided by studies of patterns of Belarusians self-designation in 1999 and 2009 show the changes in the perception of Belarusian independence and Belarusian nationhood. According to data from a survey carried out in 1999, 77% of Belarusians supported integration with Russia on the grounds that Russians and Belarusians are historically one people, that they are spiritually close, and have similar languages, cultures and traditions (Rontoyanni 2005, 134). Ten years later, in 2009, the survey conducted by Minsk-based sociological firm NOVAK jointly with the *Budz'ma Belarusami* cultural programme showed that 51.8% of respondents define Belarusians as an independent nation, while 41.9% believe that Belarusians are one of the branches of the triune nation (consisting of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians; Silicki 2009, 3). It should be stressed however, that behind the façade of general pro-Russian geopolitical sympathies dominating among Belarusians, the attitude towards political union with Russian is more differentiated and nuanced. As the results of surveys conducted by the Independent Institute for Social Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) sociologists show, while the general idea of union between Belarus is Russian was appreciated by more than half of respondents (51.7% in 2002 and 52.3% in 2005), the number of those who think that Belarus should become a single state with Russia (with a common president, government, etc.) decreased from 20% in 2002 to 12% in 2005. According to a recent survey, Belarus has been witnessing a gradual decrease in supporters of political integration with Russia over the last 10 years, from 57.4% in 2002 to 31.4% in 2011 (IISEPS News 2011, 38).

The definition of Belarusian identity via its closeness to Russia and Russian language was accompanied by the return of Orthodox Church to public life in post-Soviet Belarus. Religious revival constituted an integral part of post-communist transformation. In most of the new states, religion was a carrier of the national cultural tradition and the gaining of state independence provided the appropriate conditions for resuming its development. In Belarus, where the Orthodox Church is the main religious denomination, Orthodoxy acts as a factor uniting Belarusians with Russians, making them feel part of a greater, Russian-speaking cultural and religious universe. According to July 2010 data from the Office of the Plenipotentiary Representative for Religious and Nationality Affairs, approximately 58.9% of citizens consider themselves religious, of whom an estimated 82.5% belong to the Orthodox Church, 12% to the Roman Catholic Church, 4% to Eastern religious groups, and 2% to Protestant as well as Old Believers and Jehovah's Witnesses (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010).

Russian being the language associated with the Orthodox church to which Belarusians have belonged for centuries, it has never been perceived as absolutely alien; it has long been an integral part of Belarusian life.

The location of Russia and the Russian language within the space of Belarusian identity makes Belarus a unique nation-state, in which post-communist independence did not lead to a resurgence of the ethnolinguistic concept of national identity but, on the contrary, continued the realisation of the Soviet project of Belarusian nationhood. Such 'nationalization' of Soviet experience led to a recognition of Russian as a tool of Belarusian national development. As Natalya Kosmarskaya shows in her article in this issue, in some Central Asian states Russian also plays an important role in business, education and other spheres of public life, and in some cases it has been granted a particular status of 'official language' or a 'language of interethnic communication' (Kosmarskaya forthcoming). However, none of these republics has developed the rhetoric of Russian as a constituent element of their own national traditions as it happened in Belarus. Some Belarusian intellectuals have identified the historical roots for such a multilingual and multicultural idea of Belarus:

> While taking into account the dramatic character of Belarusian history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, associated with our Fatherland being torn between Warsaw and St. Petersburg, between Catholicism and the Orthodox faith, we should not abjure our ancestors' achievements. There is no sense in considering only texts written in Belarusian to be 'national'. There are no grounds for granting our neighbors or anyone else the Belarusian cultural values created in Polish, Russian, and Latin [languages]. In general, Belarus both today in the remote past has had a multiethnic and multilingual character. (Loika 2001, 162)

From such a historical perspective, Belarusian ethnicity with its cultural legacy and language are perceived as an integral component of Belarusian national identity, but it does not play a fundamental formative role for the Belarusians as a group. This idea is largely supported by those oppositional political and cultural forces, which support democratic pro-European reforms but do not formulate the idea of future Belarusian development in ethnocultural terms. The idea of Belarus as a 'nation in between', with a long tradition of being a multicultural and multilingual community represents an alternative to the ethnocultural project, which tends to attract the Russian-speaking democracy-minded part of society (Bekus 2010b, 204).

'**Cold**' **and** '**hot**' **mode of group operation: state against ethnopolitical entrepreneurs**

During the period 1990–1994, when the ethnolinguistic model of group identity became the basis for Belarusian national development, the emotional temperature of Belarusians as an ethnic group was raised, and ethnic identity underwent transformation into a leading point of reference for Belarusians as members of the same ethnic community, united by language and cultural tradition. This was a result of the activity of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, who initiated the process of revitalising Belarusian ethnolinguistic identity and between 1991 and 1994 had the political power to develop it at the level of state policy. The return to the Soviet pattern of national identity after 1994 led to a 're-cooling' of Belarusian ethnic temperature, and present condition of the Belarusian ethnicity fits the description of cold ethnic group, whose members 'categorise themselves cognitively as members of this particular group, but this fact does not hold emotional significance and is not important for their self-concept' (Ehala 2011, 192–193).

Today, in the independent Belarusian state the ethnolinguistic dimension of Belarusians' group identity coexists with the idea of community propagated by state nationalism as well as with the idea of democratic pro-European Belarus imagined as a multilingual and multiethnic community. In contrast to the polarised approach to ethnolinguistic identity of the 1990s, when there was a rigid division between pro-Soviet Russian-minded nomenklatura and the national democratic opposition who opted for a one-nation-one-language model, the current political understanding of language identity proves to be more nuanced. Today on the Belarusian political scene, only BPF unconditionally supports the idea of a one-language state model, while many other opposition leaders consider a two-language model as more relevant to both the current Belarusian situation and national traditions. Such a restrained relation to language identity among members of the political opposition derives from attitudes to actual language practice in society. Oleg Manaev (1998, 289) described a sociological portrait of the typical opponent to Lukashenka as 'a young educated Minsker, actively engaged in entrepreneurship, who speaks Russian, supports Belarus's independence and is West-oriented'.

Comparing the data of surveys which studied the patterns of self-perception in Belarusian society, one can observe the dynamic of popular definitions of Belarusian nation over the last several years. The results of a sociological study conducted by IISEPS in late 2006 show the different models of national unity operating in Belarusian society (Table 1). Respondents were asked to choose one definition of the Belarusian nation among several variants: the nation as a community of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, the nation as a community of ethnic Belarusians, and the nation as a community of people who live within the cultural Belarusian tradition (who speak Belarusian, observe Belarusian traditions and educate their children in this spirit).

The results of the opinion poll show that a relative majority adheres to the definition of nation as a community including all citizens of Belarus, regardless of their ethnic affiliation, the language they speak, and the national tradition they observe. This is the definition of the Belarusian nation embedded in the official discourse. At the same time, Belarusian society has numerous supporters of the idea of nation defined by ethnicity not joined with ethnic culture and language (26.8%), which can be accounted for by the legacy of the Soviet system, in which 'nationality' in the passport of each citizens was determined in this manner. Finally, only 25.6% of the respondents support the definition of the Belarusian nation based on ethnic language and cultural traditions. This number suggests that there is potential for enhancing the influence of ethnopolitical activists, who

Table 1. Responses to the question 'For you, what is the "Belarusian nation?"'.

	%
All citizens of Belarus, regardless of their ethnic affiliation, the language they use in communication, and the national tradition they observe	38.2
All ethnic Belarusians, regardless of where they live or the citizenship they possess	26.8
All citizens of Belarus who speak Belarusian, observe Belarusian tradition, and educate their children in these traditions	25.6
Not certain	9.4

Note: National opinion poll conducted in October–November 2006 by IISEPS sociologists by means of face-to-face interviews with 1,527 respondents.
Source: 'Chto takoe belorusskaia natsiia [What is the Belarusian nation]', Arkhiv analitiki IISEPS, November 2006, http://www.iiseps.org/11-06-6.html.

promote the ethnolinguistic project of Belarusian nation, but there are also obvious limits to how effective they can be. According to the same opinion poll, only 7.8% of respondents speak mainly Belarusian in their everyday life; however, the proportion of people who consider the cultural and linguistic core of the Belarusian community to be the most essential for group identity and a nation-formative one is over three times greater (25.6%). This suggests that these people could have a definite motivation, a desire to speak Belarusian under more favourable circumstances, which can come into being in case of a change in state ideology. This part of Belarusian society can be considered as a potential source of raising the emotional temperature of the Belarusian *ethnie* and ethnolinguistic vitality of Belarusians. They support the idea of Belarusians as an ethnolinguistic community despite the fact that this idea is marginalised in public space and has no access to education and media. Moreover, recent surveys of Belarusian identity conducted jointly by Novak and *Budz'ma Belarusami* in 2009 and 2012 display rising support for separate components of the ethnocultural project over the last five years. According to the results of the 2009 survey, among the different markers of Belarusian identity, such features as 'being brought up on Belarusian culture', 'the feeling of belonging, positive emotional perception', 'love of the country' and 'ethnic origins' were most often mentioned (Table 2).

The supporters of the idea of 'ethnic origins' being the most essential component of Belarusian identity (32.8%), follow the Soviet pattern of ethnic ('passport') nationality. Soviet nationality policy, as Dominique Arel pointed out, presumed that each nationality necessarily had a distinct language, while leaving open possibility of assigning a language-based nationality that was distinct from actual language use (Arel 2002, 104). It is noteworthy that the growing support for the ethnic cultural idea does not lead to any changes in the perception of the Belarusian language, which still appears to be among the least important markers of Belarusian identity (4.5%) while Belarusian citizenship has become essentially less important than culture (11.2%), but still more important than language. Buhr, Shadurski, and Hoffman (2011, 426), referring to their survey of Belarusian identity among students claim however, that 'contemporary Belarusian identity is developing more along civic rather than ethnic lines'. Seventy per cent of the respondents in their survey agreed that formal state citizenship was a key determinant of being truly Belarusian, while some 83% of the respondents felt that 'feeling Belarusian' was most adequate for being a Belarusian.

Table 2. Responses to the question 'Who above all can be considered to be Belarusian?'.

	%
Those who are brought on Belarusian culture and consider it to be his or her 'own'	42.7
Those 'whose parents are Belarusians'	32.8
Those who have positive emotions, above all, love for Belarus,	34.8
Those who consider themselves Belarusians.	31.0
Those having Belarusian citizenship	11.2
Those who live in Belarus	10.6
Those whose character is similar to Belarusian one	4.6
Those who speak in Belarusian	4.5
Those who look similar to Belarusian	0.8

Note: Survey conducted by a Minsk-based sociological firm Novak and cultural programme *Budz'ma Belarusami* in 2009.
Source: http://nn.by/index.php?c=ar&i=30440

Both the surveys conducted by Novak and the one cited by Buhr, Shadurski and Hoffman display a tendency whereby some components of ethnocultural identity penetrate the self-designation of Belarusians and mix with elements of the official identity project. Some elements of the ethnocultural project of Belarussianness, which used to be attributed to the 'oppositional' idea of Belarus, have gained greater support and come to be shared by a large part of Belarusian society. For example, according to the aforementioned 2009 survey conducted by Novak, the origin of Belarusian nationhood for a significant number of respondents was the Great Duchy of Lithuania (38.1%), while 17.7%, pointed to the Principalities of Polatsk and Turau, and only 12.4% considered the BSSR to have been the first Belarusian state (Silicki 2009). Similar signs of de-Sovetisation of Belarusians' understanding of their country appear in answers about the architectural symbols of Belarus (17.7% of Belarusians named the sixteenth-century castle at Mir, while only 9.5% chose Brest Fortress), the most popular historical figures (Frantsysk Skaryna for 24.9% of the population, Piotr Masherau for 12.7%, Kastus Kalinousky for 7.1% and Eufrasinnia of Polatsk for 4.1%).

These data show that the official idea of Belarus formulated on the basis of the Soviet legacy and imagined as a continuation of Soviet traditions, which was radically opposed to the ethnolinguistic conception of Belarusian nation in the middle of 1990s, is now losing its position. However, it has not been replaced by the ethnolinguistic project, as national activists would wish it to be. Some components of the official concept of Belarus which originated in Soviet past are being mixed and combined with elements of the alternative ethnocultural project. A partial de-Sovietisation of the historical outlook of Belarusians, as expressed in the acceptance of the GDL as the origin of Belarusian nationhood, is accompanied by the persistent presence of numerous symbolic 'brands' formed in Soviet times, which appear to be very stable and common (like Brest fortress, Piotr Masherau and others.) Partially such rebranding was initiated by the authorities themselves (like Mir Castle becoming an architectural symbol of Belarus). To some degree, however, certain oppositional ideas have also been accepted as important Belarusian symbols (like Kastus' Kalinouski, a leader of the anti-Russian Uprising of 1863–1864, who became the symbolic patron of a major protest in Minsk after the 2006 presidential elections).

While some components of the ethnocultural national project related to history and culture enjoy support in Belarusian society, the national language continues to be the least popular marker of identity. According to Volodymyr Kulik (2011, 644), this phenomenon of 'discrepancy' between language practices and identity constitutes a part of Soviet legacy. According to the result of a 2012 Novak survey devoted to the use of and mass attitudes to the Belarusian language in Belarus, only 23% of Belarusians are fluent in the Belarusian language. At the same time, only 3.9% of Belarusians use Belarusian all the time. Almost half of all respondents (46.5%) explained not using Belarusian by the fact that the Belarusian language milieu is non-existent, whereas almost one-third explained it by their own ignorance of Belarusian. More than half of Belarusians (52.4%) are against broadening the use of the Belarusian language in business, whereas only 33% are in favour of it. Slightly fewer than half of Belarusians (43.3%) are against the more active use of Belarusian in education, while 47.1% would welcome such a policy. When respondents were allowed to define more than one native language, 52.4% named Belarusian, and 78.7% named Russian. It appears, therefore, that 35% of Belarusians indicate to having two native languages ('*Budzma razam*'). The results of this survey prove that a large part of Belarusian society consider Belarusian language as a value, but at the same time, are not prepared to face a policy of forceful Belarusisation. Such a

configuration of language identity of Belarusians raises the question about the status of Russian language both in people's perception and in language policy. As Siargei Zaprudski (2007, 112) writes, 'Russian speakers who have such "symbolic capital" as the Russian language at their disposal are not inclined to relinquish it'.

The current language policy of the Belarusian authorities is not aimed explicitly at forced linguistic Russification, nor at de-Belarusication *per se*. From the very beginning, this policy has been a part of the general strategy of continuing Soviet national policy (Goujon 1999, 665). It implies a lack of any institutional and ideological support for the ethnolinguistic concept of the Belarusian nation and maintaining the *status quo*, inherited from the Soviet time. In practice, however, such a policy leads to a further strengthening of the position of Russian in Belarusian life. Comparing the results of censuses conducted in Belarus in 1999 and 2009 one can see that number of those who named Belarusian as their mother tongue decreased from 73.3% in 1999 to 50.1% in 2009. At the same time, the number of those who use Belarusian in their daily life changed correspondingly from 36.7% in 1999 to 21% in 2009.[1] Though, in the 2009 census, the term 'native language' was defined as 'the language learned first in early childhood', and this restriction in itself caused the decline in the number of people who consider Belarusian to be their native language.

According to information provided by the Ministry of Information, literature in the Belarusian language currently constitutes only 7% of the total publishing production.[2] The Deputy Minister for Information, Igor Laptenok, explained the gradual diminishing of the number of publications in Belarusian by citing objective reasons: namely, the market economy and low consumer demand. 'Those who buy books have the biggest impact on the decision of publishers what to publish', he said ('*V Belarusi umenshilsya tirazh knig na belorussom yazyke*'). The decreasing popularity of the Belarusian language, however, is the result of the language policy of the Belarusian government, which assumes both Russian and Belarusian can be instruments of Belarus' national development.

Ethnolinguistic survival as an argument and a factor in the political struggle

The struggle against Russification in Belarus became a synonym for the struggle against the idea of Belarus understood as a product of Soviet practices. Belarusian became not only the symbol of the ethnocultural concept of Belarusian nationhood, understood as a monoethnic and monolingual community, but also the symbol of political struggle with the authoritarian regime and state nationalism, leading to further de-ethnicisation of Belarusian society.

The politicisation of language, alongside the issue of ethnocultural identity in the context of the current political situation, leads to a paradox of the ethnic temperature of Belarusians: for part of Belarusian society the issue of ethnolinguistic vitality and the value of the cultural legacy of the Belarusian *ethnie* is a principal reason for their involvement in the political struggle with the regime. Besides, there is a cleavage between the adherents of the ethnolinguistic project and those oppositional players who fight for democracy without evolving arguments for the nation revival. In May 2001, Nasha Niva published an article entitled 'The Motivations of a Self-Murderer' which expressed serious concerns about the 'Russification' of the Belarusian opposition. According to the author, the appearance of Russian-language posters, stickers and labels with political messages showed the political deprivation of those who are struggling with the regime using Russian (Paulouski 2001). The full devotion of some political activists who opt for the ethnolinguistic model of Belarusian identity provides evidence of their strong

emotional attachment to the ethnocultural entity of Belarusians, its attributes and values. There is a growing number of activists who have been sentenced to prison for the public use of oppositional cultural symbols like the white-red-white flag. The white-red-white tricolour was the national flag of the Belarusian People's Republic of 1918, used in West Belarus until 1939, and in the years 1942–1944 during German occupation. In late 1980, the flag became a symbol of national revival and democratic change, and it was the Belarusian national flag in 1991–1995. The present state flag modelled on the flag of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic was introduced in 1995 as a result of a referendum initiated by the president. Since then, the white-red-white flag is viewed as a symbol of opposition. Among the most recent victims of the regime is Siarhei Kavalenka, who has been sentenced for three years in prison after putting a white-red-white flag on top of Vitsebsk's main Christmas tree in January 2010. The hot, and sometimes even 'boiling', temperature of the Belarusian ethnic idea in the environment of ethnopolitical activists is compensated by the rather cool feelings which the majority of Belarusians display towards their ethnic identity. In other words, both 'hot' and 'cold' modes of group operating coexist in Belarus within a single ethnic group of Belarusians.

The vitality of Belarusians as a community of Belarusian citizens propagated by the official ideology can be defined as a 'cold' one. According to Martin Ehala's (2011, 193) description of the cold mode of operation of an ethnic group, the relationships of the members to such a group 'are based on the rational calculation of costs and benefits for the self: if the group is able to provide access to resources for life and provide a positive social identity, the person is satisfied…'. Ehala regards this mode of ethnolinguistic vitality as being typical of developed, well-established nations, as it is in these states the ethnolinguistic vitality of the group 'is guaranteed by its social institutions, which provide goods and set sanctions for its members' (193). One can discover numerous manifestations of similar attitude and social behaviour in Belarusian society. The support for Lukashenka's policy among his core constituencies is primarily guaranteed by relatively generous welfare policies and the ideas of social stability and security, which are proclaimed to be his leading principles. The Belarusian welfare state is far from the western European 'model', but it is based on the idea of a socially oriented economy and state policies which ensure free education, healthcare and maintenance of social guarantees and payments. These policies attracted many Belarusians in 1994 and continue to keep them supporting the president. The pro-Russian geopolitical orientation of Lukashenka is also perceived as justified by his desire to maintain this strategy of state development. Meanwhile, oppositional politicians opting for the ethnocultural project of Belarusian development consider Russian subsidies and financial assistance to the Belarusian state as a 'threat' and a means which may result in further colonisation of Belarus. The majority of Belarusians, however, perceive Russia not in terms of its otherness, but in the perspective of cultural and historical commonality. However, the moment when Russia ceases to support the Belarusian economy may become the 'spark' which initiates the heating process of the ethnolinguistic vitality of Belarusians. When an energy dispute between Russia and Belarus began in 2006–2007, after the Russian state-owned pipeline company stopped oil exports to Belarus, one could observe an increase in anti-Russian sentiment in Belarusian society: according to an IISEPS survey, the number of supporters of integration with Russia dropped from 43.3% to 35.5% within one month (IISEPS News 2007).

The 'low temperature' of ethnolinguistic vitality of Belarusians has a historical explanation: throughout Belarusian history, the ethnolinguistic identity of Belarusians was subordinated to other aspects of their social identity entailed by their faith (Orthodox Church), state affiliation (GDL, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russian Empire and

Soviet Union), or dominating ideology (social liberation since late nineteenth century and Sovietness within the USSR). Belarusians, as Ioffe (2008, 162) writes,'both personally and as a group used to achieve success as part of a larger and mulitethnic polity, … they developed what is called *uniinost'*, that is, a proclivity to enter into alliances with outsiders to achieve their own goals without getting diluted by those alliances….' Emotional attachment to the *ethnie* has never become a leading form of identity defining the social, political and cultural life of Belarusians as a group.

Conclusion

The formation of an independent Belarusian state provided an opportunity for reformatting the character of the community of Belarusians, transforming ethnic affiliation into a real feeling of belonging to group, united by common ethnic origins and language. The political development in Belarus, however, hampered this process by returning to building the Belarusian nation on the basis of an alternative drive, where ethnic culture and tradition play a minimal role.

Belarus provides an example of ideological confrontation between two aspects of social identity – the ethnic identity represented and manifested by ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and the national one imposed by the state ideology. These different modes of group definition have become associated with the political confrontation between the democratic opposition and authoritarian regime. At the same time, the recent dynamic of patterns of self-perception in Belarusian society can be interpreted as the beginning of a gradual 'heating' of the ethnocultural vitality of Belarusians, which is occurring under the impact of the agency of elites. Ethnolinguistic survival and vitality in this context can be viewed both as an argument in the struggle between different forces on the political arena and a factor contributing to victory in the rivalry between them. And, inversely, the outcome of this struggle can have a crucial impact on the 'ethnic temperature' of Belarusians.

Notes

1. http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/indicators/pressrel/census.php (accessed January 22, 2013)
2. http://www.mininform.gov.by/rus/activity/book_trade/publisher/ (accessed January 22, 2013)

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Between 'official' and 'unofficial' temperatures: introducing a complication to the hot and cold ethnicity theory from Odessa

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The end of the cold war prompted most of the former Soviet republics to face ethnic issues that had remained latent or intangible for decades. Whilst some ethnic groups were actively campaigning for their rights, some others seemed uninterested in being represented politically. The recent theory of hot and cold ethnicity has been conceived to explain modalities of ethnolinguistic vitality so to identify a pattern and reasons behind activism of an ethnic group in contrast with another. This paper engages with the debate in two ways. First, it questions how to measure ethnolinguistic vitality in order to get a picture that reckons not only with official narratives of a state but also gives an idea of how things are happening in practice. Second, it tries to answer the question by presenting a case study based on the city of Odessa. It will be suggested that informal policies, and informal engagement with policies, may be as relevant as formal ones and have an equally important impact. This paper advocates for a broader, and more inclusive, approach to data collection and analysis. This, in the end, will contribute to a better understanding of what ethnolinguistic vitality of a group means.

Keywords: Odessa; Ukraine; identity policies; nation-building; informality

Introduction

The end of the cold war, and subsequent independence of a wide range of republics, also meant that these new republics had to face ethnic issues that had remained latent, or intangible, for decades. There are several accounts and theories on the end of the cold war but scholars tend to agree that the 'nationalities question' (Smith 1991) and nationalism (Beissinger 2002) played a major role in the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). As a result, ethnic and linguistic vitality in the nineties triggered a series of events that made the period extremely 'thick' (Beissinger 2002). Wars broke out, ethnic conflicts sprang and tensions (within groups, territories, as well as between states) multiplied. What is remarkable, however, is that whilst some ethnic groups were actively campaigning for their rights, some others seemed uninterested in being represented politically or bringing forward those claims for further autonomy or even independence that some neighbouring countries advocated for. The recent theory of hot and cold ethnicity has been conceived to explain modalities of ethnolinguistic vitality so to identify a pattern and reasons behind activism of an ethnic group in contrast with another (Ehala 2011, see also Ehala 2010; Ehala and Zabrodskaja 2011). The theory has been tested in various regions, from Central Asia (Ó Beacháin and Kevilhan, 2013; Kosmarskaya, forthcoming; Polese and Horak forthcoming) to Belarus (Bekus, forthcoming), and with

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ethnic groups within a state (Nosenko-Stein, forthcoming) and the approach tends to separate hot behaviours, allegedly leading to the survival of an ethnic or ethnolinguistic category, from cold ones, that eventually may lead to the disappearance of a group. This paper engages with the debate in two ways. First, it introduces a case study based on the city of Odessa; second, and even more important, it questions how to measure ethnolinguistic vitality.

The question on how to measure ethnolinguistic vitality can be deconstructed in two questions that I would call horizontal and vertical. The horizontal question is perhaps simpler and could be formulated as: once sets of data are available, which ones should be preferred to measure ethnolinguistic vitality? In such case, the choice is about sources and how to use them. The vertical one, possibly more relevant to the discourse I intend to develop in this paper, is broader in scope. In some cases it is possible to near it to the methodological dilemma: quantitative vs qualitative. But my point is that one could combine the two. The question here is whether tangible data are really sufficient to measure the significance of a phenomenon and my question springs from a methodological debate that has been going on for decades. I start in my argument from an old work by Hobsbawm and Rude (1969) suggesting that not only politicians, but even scholars, have the tendency to ignore what does not hit headlines. As an example one could take the recent outbreak of sexual violence in India (December 2012, January 2013) with several assaults reported in the space of few weeks. Are we witnessing a bewilderment of India or is this simply due to the fact that women have started speaking up and reporting what they were afraid or ashamed to report before? Would it be accurate to describe sexual crimes in India as growing in the past months, as it seems by the news?

A more convincing case, because it is based on systematic studies, is the dilemma of civil society in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. In the course of the nineties, there were a great deal of studies suggesting that civil society was absent, latent, asleep either in absolute terms or compared to the levels findable in Western Europe or the USA. It was all the more surprising when civil society turned out to be one of the main actors in the wave of colour revolutions that broke out throughout Eastern Europe and the former USSR (Ó Beacháin and Polese 2010a). How could accounts on dormient civil society overlap with the breakthrough civil society organisations were able to make from Slovakia to Kyrgyzstan, from Serbia to Georgia? Several scholars suggested that civil society was not absent, it simply had not been measured using an appropriate approach or appropriate instruments. Geography (as well as culture and history) matters and civil society organisations were active despite not being officially registered or keeping a low profile to avoid possible repression (Polese 2010; Ó Beacháin and Polese 2010b), a thing that had also been suggested by the introduction of the concept of 'informal social capital' (Pichler and Wallace 2007), i.e. even if social capital does not manifest itself in Eastern Europe (at least not in the ways we are used to seeing and measuring it) it does not mean that it is lower than elsewhere.

The starting question in this article is borrowed by Navaro-Yashin who, in her *Faces of the State* (2002) asks who is participating, not only narratively but also in practice, to the production of the political in a state or a community. Are all those groups protesting in the street, engaging in civic activism at a level lower than the decision-making, really excluded from the political processes? Are they really unable to 'make politics' and influence decision-makers? Anthropologists, or at least some of them, would say there are several ways for those formally excluded to participate, de facto rather than *de jure*, to the reshaping of policies (Gupta 1995; Scott 1987). Informal renegotiation of policy measures to which the 'weak' could not contribute to conceive is long acknowledged

in anthropology after the breakthrough of Scott's *Weapons of the Weak* and subsequent works documenting the way peasant resistance is organised around informal, everyday, Brechtian techniques that, adopted at micro level, contribute to reshape the macro context. Policies are not what they are when they are conceived at the top level but what they come to be once people have learned them, adapted and even renegotiated them (fully or partially). When Iran introduced the figure of the female traffic police officer and drivers massively ignored their instructions the only alternative to put every single driver in jail was to phase out female police officers, a thing that was promptly done by the government. People, and everyday actions, have the power of reshaping policies not only by massively protesting but also by performing a same action in an unorganised and apparently casual way, a thing we have been demonstrating also in the sphere of economic policies (Morris and Polese 2013a, 2013b).

Ukraine has been a particularly lucky fieldwork for a whole generation of scholars exploring inconsistencies between an official version of the state on national identity and the practice of everyday life by Ukrainian citizens, which was different from city to city (Polese and Wylegala 2008a; Richardson 2008; Rodgers 2007; Sapritsky 2012; Sovik 2006) and from layer to layer (Polese 2008).

This paper explores the theory of hot and cold ethnicities through the lenses of informality. The main goal is to advocate for a wider, and non-normative, approach to the collection and analysis of data that can demonstrate, or not, ethnolinguistic vitality of a group. The main argument is that a group could appear not to be very active because it is already successful at asserting itself informally, in which case there is no real need to get asserted formally. In other words, there are two ways of looking at things: in 2005, a law was passed that in courts Ukrainians could defend themselves in either Russian or Ukrainian, despite only Ukrainian being an official language. Some could see a desire of the Ukrainian state to be more conciliating towards non-Ukrainian speakers. An alternative version is that Ukrainians were already using whatever language they wanted and this law simply gave legal power to a tendency that was widespread in the country. Similarly, ethnolinguistic vitality or Russian speakers in Odessa is low not because they do not assert themselves but because, as the rest of the paper will show, they are so active informally that there is no real necessity to fight for such rights politically. I am not excluding that one day discontent of some Odessans might lead to the formalisation and politicisation of their linguistic or cultural claims, I am simply suggesting that one of the reasons why Odessa is not in the news is the high level of informal politics and policies in the city.

Methodologically, this article is constructed on the basis of two years of participant observation in the city of Odessa between 2003 and 2008. I had the chance to teach in several universities and select several observation points. These findings are complemented by a period of intensive observation in six schools (of which five had Ukrainian as language of education and one had Russian). Three were elite schools, thus more likely to adapt quickly to new government regulations in order to keep on receiving financial support, and three were 'normal' schools. A third set of data were gathered through 49 semi-structured interviews with two generations of Odessans. Informants were first identified during a relatively long interaction period and, after a trust relationship had been installed, asked to act as informants. At the end of the interview they were asked if some of their older (or younger) relatives would be willing to act as informants and, in case of positive answer, the other generation was approached.

Table 1. Results of the 1989 and 2001 census – national composition.

	2001	1989
Ukrainian	77.8	72.7
Russian	17.3	22.1
Belorussian	0.6	0.9
Moldovan	0.5	0.6
Crimean Tatar	0.5	0.0
Bulgarian	0.4	0.5
Hungarians	0.3	0.4
Romanians	0.3	0.3
Poles	0.3	0.4
Jews	0.2	0.9
Armenians	0.2	0.1
Greeks	0.2	0.2
Tatars	0.2	0.2
Gypses	0.1	0.1
Azerbaijanis	0.1	0.0
Georgians	0.1	0.0
Germans	0.1	0.1
Gagauzians	0.1	0.1
Others	0.4	0.4

Note: http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua

The context

Independence urged Ukraine to deal with questions that remained unsolved for decades. Whilst state and institution building progressed quickly, footing on already existing Soviet institutions (Kuzio 1998; Withmore 2005), Ukrainian national identity turned out to be a more complex issue. The existence of a Ukrainian nation and a national consciousness has been documented by scholars (Kravchenko 1985; Subtelny 1989), but the issue in 1991 (and after) was that a Ukrainian nation (be this conceived in ethnic or civic terms) did not overlap, or at least approximate, Ukrainian state borders. The composition of the Ukrainian population is subject to debates and results are considerably different depending on who carried out the study. As a starting point one could look at the results of the 1989 census, according to which Ukrainians made up only 72% of those living within Ukraine's borders. The 2001 census showed an increase by slightly more than 5%, with Ukrainians being 77.8% of the Ukrainian population (Table 1).

The results of the census have been criticised from many perspectives. Sociologists argued that the methodology of the survey was not sufficiently elaborated, that when an informant was missing the interviewer asked their proxy relative about the informant's identity so to void the self-identification principle on which the survey was based. Other criticisms arose from the study of how newborn children are registered (Ukrainian by default). A third set of criticisms arises from the fact that the census did not take into account the possibility of multiple identities (with a Russian father and a Ukrainian mother the person might feel both identities) and, perhaps more important, of multiple – and mixed – languages. The category 'native language' in the questionnaire did not allow a double language (for instance, in case of Russian-Ukrainian bilingualism) and, even more important, did not take into account the role of *surzhyk* (a mix of Russian and Ukrainian, spoken as first language by a measurable part of the population) has in the country (Bilaniuk 2005; Seriot 2005). Sociologists from the Kiev International Institute of Sociology pointed out, in addition, at a further methodological dilemma: in what language

one has to start an interview? Many Ukrainians, even if not perfectly bilingual, are capable of conducting interviews in either language and might choose the language according to their interlocutor. If the interviewer starts in Russian (or Ukrainian) the informant might reply in the same language as a matter of politeness. This might go as far as to declare the language of the interview their main language, regardless of whether it is or not. An accuracy used in some sociological surveys is to start the interview using words that are the same in Ukrainian or Russian so to let the informant choose the language, a thing that many interviewers might not be aware of. As a result, further studies on the ethnolinguistic composition of the country show significantly different results, a wider range of categories (bilingual, dual identity, Table 2) and a subjective section by the interviewer. A respondent might declare they are speaking a language but speak another (like in the case of people believing they are speaking Ukrainian/Russian but mixing them and giving a signal that their native language is *surzhyk* instead, Table 3).

Drawing from the official narrative of the Ukrainian state, a nation-building process could be defined as the set of policies and measures capable to increase the amount of Ukrainians from 72.7 to 77.8% in little more than 10 years. Studies on state narratives have shown that a nation-building discourse was extremely popular in the nineties in the country, with most – not to say all – political parties having a clear plan to implement it (without necessarily defining it first) (Shevel 2002). However, Ukrainian nation-building has been described as a sort of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde given that, under a facade of tolerance and permission, frequent attacks on non-Ukrainian speakers were recorded in the papers (Laitin 1998). Ukrainian nation-building was, in fact, much less civic that it claimed to be in many spheres of daily life (Polese 2011a, 2011b). Still, and interesting, ethnic vitality of Russians and Russian speakers was relatively low in Odessa as in other cities. Building of a nation entails destruction of others, Connor (1972) suggested. Notwithstanding this, no major clashes were recorded and the few political claims were expressed in a relatively quiet tone, as if the issue was not urgent. In the words of an informant, this depended on the fact that 'Russian can defend itself in Ukraine, but who is going to defend Ukrainian if there are no laws protecting it?'

The most visible aspect of Ukrainian nation-building is possibly the linguistic one. Ukraine, as a country, needed a language, and a language distinct from Russian. The first president Leonid Kravchuk played this card to secure his political survival and leading Ukraine to secession from the USSR (Kuzio 1998) whilst the second president Leonid Kuchma was put under pressure (if Ukraine has no language it has no reason to have a president) and did not modify the status of Ukrainian as sole national language introduced by Kravchuk (Kuzio 1998). Such attitude could not possibly keep the whole population happy but did not generate any major movements to assert Russian in the country. The reason could be, as this article suggests, that official narratives of the Ukrainian state and

Table 2. Ethnic structure of Ukraine in historical comparison.

Identity	1994–1999	2001–2003
Only Ukrainian	59.8	62.9
Russian and Ukrainian	24.4	22.5
Only Russian	11.3	10.0
Other	4.5	4.6
Total	100	100

Note: Khmelko 2004.

Table 3. Language spoken by the two main national groups.

Ukrainians	85.2% (Ukrainian speakers)	14.8% (Russian speakers)	0
Russians	95.9% (Russian speakers)	3.9% (Ukrainian speakers)	0.2% (speak another language)

Note: 2001 census, http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/.

official rules did not necessarily correspond to the practice of everyday life. The fact that Ukrainian had to be the mean of instruction in schools was often denied by practice; acceptance of a Russian-speaking Ukrainian as Ukrainian was possible – just subject to some rules (see Polese and Wylegala 2008a, 2008b) and Russian was broadly accepted as language of broadcast far more than official laws would allow. In the rest of this article, I will show how this was possible without Ukrainians complaining about the status of Russian and Russian speakers becoming concerned about policies and laws apparently favouring Ukrainian language in all spheres of life. The case study I have constructed is based on the findings in the city of Odessa, where the majority of the population prefers Russian but where ethnic Russians are not dominant (see Table 4). In other words, it is not possible, or at least it is difficult to agree upon, to tell the majority from the minority (Table 5).

Ukrainian nation-building

The nature of nation-building in Ukraine has been debated by two generations of scholars, who have alternatively emphasised its ethnic and civic components. What has been missing so far is a definition of nation-building that clearly sets the boundaries of a nation-building process. How deep into measures and policies shall we go to identify the benchmark of nation-building in Ukraine? Shall we look at the national laws or also how they are interpreted and implemented (or not) locally? Shall we consider a third layer and

Table 4. Linguistic structure of Ukraine in a historical comparison.

Linguistic groups	1991–1994	1995–1999	2000–2003
Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians	41.2	46.3	45.4
Russian-speaking Ukrainians	32.6	28.2	30.9
Russian-speaking Russians	19.7	17.0	16.5
Other	6.5	8.5	7.2
Total	100	100	100

Source: Khmelko 2004.

Table 5. Ethnic composition of Odessa in 1989 and 2001.

1989	(%)	2001	(%)
Ukrainians	48.9	Ukrainians	61.6
Russians	39.4	Russians	29.0
Bulgarians	5.9	Bulgarians	1.3
Jewish	1.5	Jewish	1.2

Source: Ukrainian census.

study the reaction and renegotiation of those supposed to implement the measures locally? For additional depth, we could study the reaction of the population in their daily life and how renegotiation takes place in different settings. The next sections are concerned with national laws adopted at centralised level and their attempted implementation locally followed by an attempt to show the attitude of policy-takers to these policies.

A first set of policies were conceived to identify, and officialise, the symbols the Ukrainian state should be based on. As a first step, in 1991, the 'nationality' category was removed from Ukrainian passports and a law on citizenship was passed, allowing every Soviet citizen living in Ukraine in 1991 to apply for naturalisation. Whilst welcoming everyone, regardless of their ethnic origins, dual citizenship was quickly forbidden in Ukraine, in an effort to increase loyalty to the country. The Ukrainian army adopted new uniforms, standards and Ukrainian language and the debate on national symbols started. While members of the Communist Party still endorsed Soviet ones, they were not supported by the majority of the population (Kuzio 1998) and other parties, whose position spanned between support to historical Ukrainian and Cossack symbols. (The Cossack symbol was crimson; some also proposed the black/red flag for Ukraine, representing Ukrainian blood poured in the independence struggle, on rich black Ukrainian soil.) The blue and yellow flag, recalling the rivers and crop fields that abound in Ukraine, was chosen in 1992, along with the historical trident that became symbol of the state. Attempts to radicalise state symbols and base them on a Cossack tradition (Cossacks deemed to be the ancestors of modern Ukrainians), such as renaming the president 'Hetman' (chief of Cossacks) and adopt the *bulava* (staff) as symbol of power, failed.

In 1992, old-new stamps were reintroduced, including those commemorating Cossacks, Mikhailo Khrushevski (president of the short-lived first Ukrainian Republic in 1917–1918) and other historical figures. In 1996, the *hryvnia*, first introduced in Ukraine in 1918 (when it had been printed in Berlin), replaced the *karbovanets* whose value had been destroyed by hyperinflation. Other measures included the creation of commemorating medals (with historical figures like Ivan Mazepa and Bogdan Khmelnitski), restoration of historical journals like *Viche* and *Kyivs'ka Starovyna* (both published in Ukrainian), attention to revitalisation of museums (from 202 in 1991 to 272 in 1995, see Kuzio 1998, 227), restoration of historical places like *Palats Ukraina* and the Philharmonic Hall in Kiev and the redrafting of the holiday calendar. Independence day (from the Soviet Union) was set on the 24 of August, and the day of Europe the 3 of May (adopted more recently, in 2003) but the victory of the Soviet Union in the Second World War is still celebrated (9 May) as well as the liberation of Kiev from Nazi troops (7 November).

An old national poem from the nineteenth century inspired the lyrics of the national anthem and new monuments were built, such as the statue of Prince the Mudry in Kiev. Streets were renamed, and this was intended to be a break from the Soviet past, but Lenin street is still present in many parts of the country, as well as in people's collective memory (Polese 2007). All those symbols were officialised in the 1996 Constitution that, as further symbols, indicates Ukrainian state borders (that the Russian Duma ratified only in 1998). Ukrainian language may also be seen as a symbol, since the constitution allows only one state language, whilst highlighting the non-ethnic nature of the Ukrainian nation by using the expression 'the people of Ukraine' instead of 'the Ukrainian people' to refer to those inhabiting the country. In spite of having no fewer than four main churches competing (the Ukrainian and Russian Orthodox Churches, the Russian Orthodox abroad,

the Uniate and the Catholic Churches), the project of a national religion seemed too complicated and no major attempts were made to create a state religion (Krindatch 2003).

Language and school policies

Ukrainian language was upgraded to national language in 1989 but further measures showed a desire to make it the dominant language of public life in the country (Janmaat 2000). For one thing, the mean of teaching became Ukrainian by default, except in areas where the Russian minority was so significant as to allow Russian; and study of Russian and Ukrainian was made compulsory according to the State Programme on the Development of the Ukrainian Language adopted in February 1991. Linguistic adjustments were slow in the beginning (Arel 1995) but it was a start. President Kravchuk lobbied for Ukrainian to become the official language of politics and introduced a Ukrainian language requirement for anyone willing to run for presidency. The first to comply was presidential candidate Leonud Kuchma, who started learning Ukrainian three months before the elections, did not revoke language regulations and even committed to use Ukrainian in official speeches. The 1996 Constitution gave legal force to all the above measures and Ukrainisation slowly started.

In 1991, only 51% of Ukrainian pre-schools and 49% of primary and secondary schools were officially using Ukrainian. These figures had grown to 76 and 70%, respectively, by 2001 with no region having less than 50% of its schools using Ukrainian. Southern and eastern Ukraine sheltered some exceptions: Odessa (47%), Zaporizhzhia (45%), Luhansk (17%), Donetsk (14%) and Republic of Crimea (0.8%) (UCEPS 2002). By 2002–2003, Oleksii (2004) reports that 74% of Ukrainian students used Ukrainian. The school policy also dictated that lyceum, gymnasium or college after which no exam was required to enter a university could only have Ukrainian as language of instruction.

Printing measures followed a similar direction. Priority in receiving textbooks was given to Ukrainian schools and Ukrainian publications were encouraged by applying tax cuts for publications in Ukraine, to counterbalance Russian removal of taxes on export of Russian language books (Shulman 2005). Once tax cuts were suspended by the parliament, the number of Ukrainian language newspapers fell from 68% in 1990 to 35% in 2000, with books from 90 to 12% (Shulman 2005, 43; Oleksii 2004, 119). Further laws confirmed Ukrainian as the sole language of public administration (1998), with an exception for Donetsk and Luhansk which reintroduced Russian in 2006, and the main language for national and regional broadcasting (2005).

Education and linguistic policies have received particular attention in domestic and international debates (Zhulynsky 1997). In particular, content analysis of Ukrainian textbooks has opened a debate on the ethnic and civic values to be taught to pupils (Janmaat 2005; Kuzio 2002, 2000, 2006) and the contradictions in the official discourse (Janmaat 2000; Popson 2001; Rodgers 2006; Wolczuk 2000) but a general tendency is visible. As early as 1997, Russian language and literature had been phased out of curricula for state-sponsored Ukrainian schools. In addition, new subjects were introduced to clearly indicate what the linguistic orientation of the country is, such as ‘We, the citizens of Ukraine’ or ‘Ukraine’s European Choice’. Ukrainian language subjects are named ‘*ridna mova*’ (native language, without specifying whose native language), a thing that emphasises the ‘common language’ all Ukrainians should have from their birth and highlights the role of language, in state’s narratives, as a marker of identity.

Ukrainian nation-building in Odessa

What is reported above are the official narratives and instructions deemed to give a direction to the identity construction of the country but not necessarily what has been received at the local level. The starting question of this section is why no clashes or political activism to oppose Ukrainisation have been registered in the country and in particular in the city of Odessa, despite a strong input by the state to give a clear direction to identity construction. Sociological surveys did not show any particular negative attitude towards Russia or Russian language (Paniotto 2006), which is interesting enough in the light of the fact that some aspects of Ukrainian identity seem constructed in opposition to a Russian one (Ryabchuk 2000).

In spite of this, Ukrainisation of Odessa is a discourse that has been put through the newspapers in several ways. In 2005, Prime Minister Tymoshenko was allegedly attacking Odessa, suggesting not only that *7-j kilometer*, its historical (black) market, should be closed; she also suggested that Odessans should understand they are part of Ukraine. In response to this, an informant reported: 'I am not against the use of Ukrainian. I am simply puzzled by the fact that, in a village where everybody speaks Russian, including the local administration, announcements on the mayor's board should be posted in Ukrainian'. It is true that official written communication is supposed to be in Ukrainian, but it is also true that rules are not enforced so strictly as it might seem. Administrative forms are in Ukrainian and reports from schools and courts were in Ukrainian even in Odessa. However, it is possible to fill forms in Russian and local administration would help with understanding Ukrainian if the person did not understand it.

The apparently strict position of the Ukrainian state on citizenship, not allowing holding two passports, is another case of how a rule might be enforced less strictly than it sounds. Given the current visa regulations, ethnic Romanians and Bulgarians – Ukrainian citizens – need to apply for a visa to visit their relatives outside Ukraine. In practice, many Ukrainians hold more than one passport. The important thing is not to produce both of them in front of an officer. The traveller can pass into Moldova on a Ukrainian passport and then use their Bulgarian or Romanian passport to leave Moldova, since in Moldova dual citizenship is allowed. Rules on reporting in Ukrainian follow a similar pattern. Schools might produce official reports in Ukrainian but this does not mean that the activities held, and described in the report, saw the use of Ukrainian, as the next sections will document.

Language and identity in schools

The official narrative on schools wants every teacher and pupil to work and study in the sole official state language (exceptions are Russian schools, minority schools or schools that specialise in Russian literature). This, in Odessa as elsewhere, is not an easy task. As an informant said once: 'Pupils are not Ukrainian speakers, neither I am, but we try our best'. This section is based on intensive observation in six schools in Odessa. Three of them were elite schools and three standard ones, of which one was officially a Russian school, which means it used Russian as medium of instruction. My bet was that elite schools, by virtue of receiving more support from the state, are also under pressure to comply with official regulations, whereas normal schools might be freer in their choices.

As a general rule, all official communication should happen in Ukrainian. Even in Russian schools there is an obligation to teach Ukrainian literature in Ukrainian. Official data, provided in the previous sections, show that Russian as language of instruction is nearly phased out throughout the country. However, my observations provided me with a

different picture and Russian is widely used. The peculiarity of this use of Russian lies in the official version on the use of language teachers and pupils seem willing to give. The most popular way of renegotiating official narratives on the use of Ukrainian is to create the impression that the use of Russian is an exception, something that is happening 'only here only this [one] time'. 'We are doing it only now, but normally we would be using Ukrainian' seemed many informants to imply whilst acknowledging the preferential status Russian enjoys in Odessa. 'Exceptions' to the rule (of using Ukrainian) may come in very different ways but they have in common that Ukrainian is used when starting and ending a conversation (but not in between). I once attended a mathematics class that was conducted fully in Russian and, when I spoke with the teacher, he maintained that he was using Russian only because of me. I was not convinced by his argument for two reasons: first, he did not ask me which language I preferred and, second, his informal communication (from which I could be excluded) with the pupils was happening in Russian and pupils did not seem to be surprised by the use of Russian during the class. This could have been an isolated case, but added to similar ones it gives a sense of continuity. If an exception happens every time it is the rule and as Herzfeld reminds us, 'if people declare that something do not exist, then it does not' (Herzfeld 2004, ix). By officially denying the role of Russian in education, the teachers are officially complying with nation-building measures, narratives and instructions, even if in reality they are not.

Ukrainian as a state and public administration language means that all communication with the ministry of education, curricula, and communication with external actors has to be in Ukrainian but this leaves a fair amount of discretion. During teacher–parent, school meetings, or even during classes, the use of Russian is largely tolerated. During classes or conversations on school-related issues, teachers might want to use Russian to be better understood by their pupils. However, as previous research has shown (Polese 2010), this might go as far as using Russian from the beginning to the end of a class. A history teacher said once that they were waiting for textbooks in Ukrainian but 'unfortunately' they only had Russian ones so she was 'compelled' to lead the class in Russian. Another history teacher had textbooks in Ukrainian but she thought the information inside was not sufficiently accurate and that is why she 'complemented' them with information from the internet (that was, incidentally, in Russian).

Teachers, administration, and in some cases parents and pupils, strive to create a façade of Ukrainianess in most – or even all – aspects of local life. When explaining something from textbooks, the teacher may often use Ukrainian but cross-check, in Russian, whether all pupils understood the concept. If a pupil talks a lot or the class gets noisy the teacher will possibly use Russian to ask for silence and respect. From their side, pupils tend to answer in Ukrainian only if they remember the answer from the textbook. In contrast, Russian will be used to give an answer that is based on an intuition or from the pupil's personal experience.

Often teachers integrate, or even replace, the information of official textbooks with their own knowledge, or information from other books (Richardson 2008; Rodgers 2007). Ukrainian and Russian languages come to distinguish the 'official time' from the unofficial one; or they even become the boundary between public spaces (where rituals of officiality needs to be performed) and private ones (where pupils and teachers can use the language they prefer). The particularity is that these two spaces coexist in the same building, and possibly at the same time, that is the part of the day devoted to education and work. An interesting tendency is visible during language classes, since translating from a foreign language into another foreign language (as Ukrainian is for most pupils) is too complicated an exercise and teachers might prefer to officially allow Russian. Many

teachers made clear that Ukrainian is the *derzhavna mova* (state language), the *ridna mova* (native language) of Ukraine, and that it should be used and that everybody should know it. In reality, this 'should' did not always – if ever – translate into a 'must' and many teachers seemed to know that what the government was demanding was not (yet) achievable. Notwithstanding this, the official façade of Ukrainianess may be very thin, but cannot be broken. Talking with a teacher, he mentioned that because his pupils tended to confuse Russian and Ukrainian, Russian was widely used in his classes. When I showed excessive interest in the issue he understood the danger of such a statement and renegotiated it. He first said that Russian, in reality, was the exception and then stated that, anyway, 90% of the classes in that school were held in Ukrainian (while listening to him I had also the chance to hear only Russian spoken around us).

In Ukrainian schools, pupils learn not only the language. They learn, even more importantly, to choose the right language for the right context. They learn that the *derzhavna mova* has to be used in occasions where the state is present or there is some sort of officialdom around them. They, together with the teacher, seem engaged in a large-scale project intended to ascertain Ukrainian as the official language of Ukraine. When this does not happen 'it's just an exception that can be tolerated'. As long as compliance with state guidelines is guaranteed, at least apparently, there is no reason to question.

The state has elevated the Ukrainian language to a major state symbol and quantitative indicators seem to show that this is complied with. Qualitative indicators show, in Odessa as elsewhere, that citizens renegotiate state policy – although informally, that is, without challenging the symbolic order of a state and the power relations that are the foundation of state-citizen relations. Political debates from the Rada (Ukrainian parliament) are regularly broadcast and are mostly in Ukrainian. A few steps away from the Rada things change substantially. An informant from the Odessa city administration reported that:

> All internal communication happens in Russian in my office. As soon as there is a fax to be sent to Kiev, people start panicking and the hunt for Ukrainian speakers begins. They will be asked to translate the content of the fax and send it. Kiev will receive a fax from Odessa [Russian speaking city] in Ukrainian and will be positively surprised. The national language is Ukrainian and Odessa speaks Ukrainian. (Maria, 23)

Knowledge of Ukrainian is considered by many as a business card, something you show when you have to introduce yourself (Sovik 2006). All advertisements for highly qualified jobs require knowledge of both Russian and Ukrainian (along with English, for international jobs) despite the fact that Russian is not a national language. Another informant reported:

> I use Ukrainian when I go to public officers because they respect you more. Even if my Ukrainian is not perfect, it is a general understanding that only high ranking people speak Ukrainian so when I use it people in the office take me for somebody more important than I am and serve me better. (Alexei, 40)

I once attended a conference, in the region of Odessa, to which the rector of the Odessa National University had been invited to deliver the keynote speech. A Russian speaker, in the course of his duties he went to the scene and addressed the public in Ukrainian, provoking a frustrated reaction of the locals, who asked him to switch to Russian. He did start the speech again but in Russian and apologised: 'I am sorry, I am so used to deliver all the speeches in Ukrainian that it did not come to my mind that here I could, and

should, use Russian'. In such contexts, the official and the unofficial, the formal and the informal overlap. No doubt in which language the conference report would be written, the important thing in this case was to find a compromise between what had to be done and what people were expecting.

Identities and ambiguities

Mykhajlo (24) is Ukrainian, but his brother (21) is not. Not 100%, at least. He moved to Kiev in 2005, got a job and lives there with his wife. The two brothers have a Russian father and a Ukrainian mother from Odessa (now in Sukhyj Liman). When Misha first told his father he felt Ukrainian his father was against it, he felt his son was betraying his origins, but now has accepted it. Misha's brother, when I inquired on his nationality, seemed confused. He admitted to feel somehow Ukrainian but also Soviet and Russian. Pavlo (44) is a Ukrainian, if you ask him. His father was a (Moldova-born) Russian and his mother is Russian. He was born in Moldova and then moved to Stavropol, in Russia, where his brother lives. When Ukraine became independent he was studying in Kiev and was offered a Ukrainian citizenship. He married a Ukrainian woman and has two children, who feel Ukrainian. Pavlo's brother has no doubt that he is Russian. They have the same mother, same father, used to eat the same soup, play with the same kids, and lived in the same places but the family has become multiethnic after 1991.

Olya (20) is Ukrainian, she says, but her mother is Bulgarian and her father is Ukrainian. Inquiring about her origins it turns out that her father is half Armenian but has some Ukrainian blood. Sasha (20) is Ukrainian but, until sixteen, she was convinced to be Russian. Her brother (26) is also Ukrainian but says that this was his parents' choice at first (when you are born you still have to declare a nationality). When I talked with their parents the mother, who is Ukrainian, did not seem much concerned whereas the father could not understand why the Soviet Union was over and they could not consider themselves just Soviet citizens.

Not all transformations are so smooth. Kolya (25) escaped the question on nationality declaring he is Polish (he has some Polish blood from some ancestors). His father is Russian and his mother Ukrainian. Later he admitted to feel somehow Ukrainian but, it seems, not to the degree that this is the first identity coming to his mind when asked. According to his father he is Russian, but citizen of Ukraine. Natalya is Russian, she says, her father is Belarusian and mother is Russian (with both parents Russian) and feels no reason to feel attachment to the Ukrainian soil. Pyotor is Gagauz, both parents are Gagauz and sees no reason to feel Ukrainian. 'I am Ukrainian because I like this place'. I have heard this sentence many times during my fieldwork and I have seen many emotional connections to the country forming evidence for plausible identities. Evidence can be constructed, and this is one of the main aims of nation-building, though constructing evidence does not guarantee a conversion. Most Soviet-born citizens have enough mixed blood, and lived in a sufficiently wide range of environments and countries, to be able to claim two or three identities (my father is, my mother is, I was born in, I grew up in, etc.) and to be able to declare a different identity depending on the context. Convincing a substantial amount of people that their first choice is to be Ukrainian may mean that the nation-building project is successful, a thing that is not always easy in Odessa.

Stanyslav (22) is a Belarusian, Russian, Moldovan, Ukrainian living in Odessa who received a Ukrainian passport after entering Ukraine as stateless person with his family. He says he is happy to be Ukrainian. Konstantyn (22) is an Armenian who first moved to St Petersburg and then, seven years ago, to Odessa. He has a Ukrainian passport and,

although he is not willing to forget his Armenian-ness, he has no problems in seeing himself as Ukrainian and in Odessa, conversely from other places (Polese and Wylegala 2008a, 2008b), such a diverse background does not constitute a hurdle to self-identification as Ukrainian. Being very rare to find someone with 'pure blood', diversity is accepted as the norm and identities are more mobile than in places ethnically more homogeneous. If knowing Ukrainian is a marker of identity, in Odessa it is not even necessary to know Ukrainian to feel Ukrainian. It is sufficient to believe that one knows Ukrainian. I was once in a small restaurant with a friend, an Odessa-born Russian Old Believer. He told us that once he was travelling abroad and in his train coach met some Ukrainians from Ivano-Frankivsk. To emphasise their common background he felt it was opportune to use Ukrainian to communicate with them and reported some extracts of the conversation. What was interesting for me was that, when reporting the conversation, he confused the name of the months in Ukrainian, so to make one doubt on how knowledgeable he was in the language. Still, he was acknowledging the language as a marker of identity and the capacity of Ukrainian language to establish connections between individuals. On the basis of this episode, and other observations, I would suggest that in some cases it is not important to be proficient in Ukrainian but simply to have a positive attitude towards the language like Volodymyr (38, businessman) did:

> I am Russian speaker but during the Orange Revolutions and the wave of nationalism that permeated the country I used to wake up in the morning and, while getting ready, tried to remember the words of our national anthem.

Another important element is the desire, and capacity, to make a decision about what one is not:

> What is the difference between Russia and Ukraine? Not too much, I see much difference with Moscow but then the countryside is almost the same. Still. I was surprised when I got off the train in the small village where my relatives live and, instead of the Ukrainian, I saw the Russian flag. Then I understood I was not in Ukraine anymore. (Sasha, 26. Ukrainian with Russian father)

> I am Ukrainian. I speak Russian but I am Ukrainian and I first understood this when I went to Russia. I was in St. Petersburg, I could understand the language, the local culture but I did not feel at home. (Eva 22, during a debate on identity)

Another informant reported: 'Once I was abroad and I had to present my national culture, after a reflection I understood that I was unable to present Russian culture because I was, and am, Ukrainian' (Svitlana, 56). One of my informants worked in the Odessa *mis'ka rada* (city council) and told that most of the communication happened in Russian and 'sometimes people get even scared by document in Ukrainian and the few people able to work in Ukrainian are most valued once it comes to translate something into the state language' (Mariya, 23). Documents going abroad may be in Russian because they will most likely be translated into English. However, when a document is to be sent to Kiev then the hunt for a Ukrainian speaker starts. The document will be diligently translated before being sent so to show that 'Odessa speaks Ukrainian'.

Most of my informants being Russian speakers, a question that emerged at some point during the interview was where the informant had learned Ukrainian. The responses were most diverse, some claimed to 'have read a lot in Ukrainian' and some others that they watched television but the general tendency was that people knew Ukrainian, or at least

some Ukrainian. Some claimed to use it often, some not, some said they were native or fluent, some not, some used it *pryntsypovo*, some did not use it *pryntsypovo*. People were in favour and people were against, everybody had an opinion so to prompt the question on how people tend to use Ukrainian in public and private moments of life. Ukrainian must, or rather should, be used on official occasions but in many cases switching to Russian is perfectly normal and accepted. One could summarise the attitude towards language by saying that Odessans speak Ukrainian but one Odessan speaks Russian. Odessans have clear in their mind what language should be used in which occasion and they may claim to comply with the official rules while using Russian 'only once'. The fact that this 'only once' happens constantly during the day, also on official occasions, allows anybody who prefers Russian to feel at ease as long as they can manage, from time to time, to prepare a document or hold a conversation in Ukrainian.

Conclusion

This paper has explored the gap between an official narrative (of the Ukrainian state), that sees Ukrainian dominating the public sphere, and the results of my observation, that point into a different direction. Such an approach could help looking at the hot and cold ethnicities theory in a different way. In particular, it is interesting to notice that the vitality of Russian and Ukrainian speaking groups in Ukraine after 1991 may differ in official and unofficial accounts. Starting from the question 'who participates in the processes of policy making and implementation' this paper has suggested the existence of an informal side of policies that allow renegotiation of official narratives of the Ukrainian state.

The research above has documented the gap between an official version of identity policies in Odessa, that see the Ukrainian ethnolinguistic group dominating the political sphere, and an account gathered through in-depth observations and interviews, transpiring from observation of daily life and interviews with common people. By comparing the official and unofficial versions, I suggest that it is possible to catch the essence of being Ukrainian in Odessa and maintain that the temperature of an ethnic group should not be measured through official data and narratives but also through an exploration of how such policies are received, and complied with, by the local population.

In this respect, two tendencies are visible. On the one hand there is an official narrative claiming that Ukrainian is used at all level of citizens' life. On the other hand it has been shown that participation in policy-making is not an exclusive feature of the policymakers and that the political arena is composed of formal and informal actions. To show this the paper has first analysed the nature and effects of the nation-building project carried out in Ukraine after 1991. The following sections have dealt with the adoption and implementation of identity measures, from the choice of national symbols to the national language and school policies. The above variables have already been a concern to many scholars but the innovative part of this paper has been the fact that the official narrative of the Ukrainian state has been compared with an unofficial version gathered through participant observation and interviews in the city of Odessa. The results of my fieldwork show that people only apparently have been complying with new state instructions. The language of instruction in Ukrainian schools is not necessarily Ukrainian (not always at least), as official narratives would claim; the official version of Ukrainian history is not necessarily the one taught to students; the discourse on Ukrainian identity is much more blurred in people's narratives and self-perception than the state would be ready to admit.

We are witnessing, in many respects, a massive informal renegotiation of identity policies by a substantial number of people in the same city. Such renegotiation may be considered contributing to the construction of the political as much as official policies do. Nation-building in Odessa has thus at least two versions, the one of the state and the one we are observing. Further research in this direction may be able to show to what extent these official and unofficial versions are likely to affect identity policies and group temperatures in the long term. However, for the moment it may be enough to suggest that the study of identity policies should at least ask the question as to whether measures adopted at the national level are then *de facto* implemented at the local level and to what extent.

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Hot and cold ethnicities in the Baltic states

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The article discusses the temperatures of the main ethnic groups in the Baltic states: Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and their three Russian-speaking communities, and the Latgalian and Polish minority groups in Latvia and Lithuania, respectively. The study uses a triangulated methodology that includes a survey questionnaire for quantitative study and an associated protocol for a semi-structured focus group interview. The aim of the methodology is to make the notion of ethnic temperature quantitatively assessable, while retaining the opportunity for a rich qualitative description to understand its nature. The quantitative analysis confirms the wide divergence of subgroups within each ethnic group, each of which has a different ethnic temperature. The (intergroup) interaction of the members of these subgroups influences both the average temperature of the in-group and the temperatures of significant out-groups. The findings are interpreted to forecast the nature of ethnic processes in the Baltic states.

Keywords: identity; ethnolinguistic vitality; titular; minority; Russian-speakers

Introduction

The recent history of the Baltic nations is a textbook example of changes in ethnic temperature. Before WWII, the Baltic states were very mono-ethnic, with minorities of less than 10% of the total populations. Lithuania had a territorial conflict with Poland in which the Polish minority played an active part, while the other two Baltic countries did not have significant minority–majority conflicts.

All three were annexed by the Soviet Union just before WWII and were incorporated into the Soviet Union. During the Soviet time, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians seemed relatively cold, there were no major revolts, life was organised along Soviet lines and Soviet ideology was propagated in education, media and culture. The Soviet power encouraged immigration from the other parts of the Soviet Union. As a result of this process, large Russian-speaking communities were formed in Latvia and Estonia, which amounted to 34% and 30% of the populations, respectively, at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

These Russian-speaking communities were multi-ethnic, Russians making up the largest share, but also including many Ukrainians, Belarusians and members of other ethnicities. Some of them were Russian-ethnic bilingual; some had already shifted to Russian prior to immigration to the Baltic states, while others shifted to Russian while in the Baltic states. The Russian-speaking population was a mobile, ethnically cold category

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of Soviet people, who did not integrate into the Baltic societies linguistically, but remained monolingual because of the high status of Russian in the Soviet Union. While in several parts of the Soviet Union ethnic minorities shifted to Russian, this did not happen in the Baltic states, where the oppositional identity of the titulars was very strong: Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians were very endogamic in their family patterns and Russian was learned reluctantly at schools.

The signs of passive resistance indicate that the Baltic nations, cold in appearance, were actually quite hot inside. The hot core could be felt during the large national choir song festivals that had been organised every fifth year since the 1860s and were not banned during the Soviet time. Even though the repertoire had communist content, the ritual was the same and the traditional final patriotic song was always felt as a collective affirmation of existence. This hot core is perhaps the best explanation for the very rapid national awakening in the middle of the 1980s, as soon as Gorbachev announced the politics of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. Although the West was frightened by the possible ethnic conflicts that this could lead to (the parallel with Yugoslavia was self-evident), the rise in the ethnic temperatures never escalated to violence in the Baltic states, even though the rise in the ethnic temperatures of the titular ethnicities caused the Russian-speaking communities to become hotter, too.

The regaining of independence and the harshness of *cowboy capitalism* caused the ethnic temperatures of the titular groups to lower in the 1990s as rapidly as they had risen about five years before. At the same time, the Russian-speaking communities suffered from low collective self-esteem, because of the bankruptcy of the Soviet world view and values, and so their temperature lowered, too. As the economic situation improved, consumerist identities gained prominence and the Baltic societies became more utilitarian than earlier. All this kept ethnic temperatures relatively low compared to the late 1980s.

The situation began to change gradually in the early twenty-first century as Vladimir Putin's presidential administration of Russia, in seeking a new unified collective identity, started to rebuild Russian national pride on the basis of victory in WWII. This had an uplifting effect on the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states, too, particularly in Latvia and Estonia. In response, the titulars' ethnic temperatures rose as well, particularly because of the conflicting interpretation of WWII events in the Baltic states. This was most marked in Estonia, where it culminated in the Bronze Soldier crisis in 2007 (see Ehala 2009a). The ethnic temperature in Latvia also increased due to the Latvian government's educational reform, which reduced the amount of Russian language education in secondary schools. In Lithuania, the ethnic temperature of Russians remained much lower, partly because the Russian-speaking community was considerably smaller, and partly because Lithuania seemed to have won the loyalty of the Russian-speakers by offering all of them citizenship right after Lithuania regained independence, while in Estonia and Latvia all incomers from the Soviet time had to apply for citizenship, and pass the state language exam and the exam on the constitution and the citizenship law (see more in Zabrodskaja 2009). Thus, despite their common recent history, the ethnic processes in the Baltic states have differed to some extent, which has resulted in different ethnic temperature dynamics.

Even though the notion of ethnic temperature is intuitively clear and can be used as a metaphor to characterise ethnic sentiments, it remains a mere metaphor unless it is possible to find a way to assess it in a more precise way, preferably so that it is possible to compare different settings and to predict at which level its further increase would start to cause inter-ethnic violence.

The goal of the current paper is to elaborate a method that will make it possible to assess ethnic temperature in a more precise manner. As proposed in Ehala (2011), the notion of ethnic temperature is closely related to the notion of ethnolinguistic vitality, although these two are not the same phenomenon. In the following pages, we aim to specify this relationship in more detail, to operationalise the concept of ethnic temperature and to test it in the case of Baltic ethnicities. In the next section, we outline the principles of ethnolinguistic vitality and their relations to ethnic temperature, based on Ehala (2011). This is followed by an overview of the research design: our analysis is based on data collected in a large-scale comparative study of the ethnolinguistic vitalities of eight Baltic ethnicities: Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, the Russian-speaking communities in each Baltic state, the Latgalian minority in Latvia and the Polish minority in Lithuania (see Ehala and Zabrodskaja 2013a, 2013b). The fourth section provides the results of the study across all these ethnicities comparatively. The fifth section focuses on intra-group differences within ethnicities by defining the hot and cold subgroups and characterising their language choice patterns, perceptions of legitimacy of the intergroup settings and the permeability of inter-ethnic boundaries. The quantitative results are triangulated with data from focus group interviews. In the final section, the results of the study are discussed theoretically and in the context of the Baltic states.

Ethnolinguistic vitality perceptions

Following the principles outlined by Giles and Johnson (1987), Thomas, McGarty, and Mavor (2009) and Ehala (2010), we consider ethnolinguistic vitality to be a social psychological disposition amongst the members of an ethnic group to act as a distinctive collective entity. In other words, we understand ethnolinguistic vitality as group members' willingness to engage in collective actions, such as expressing their will in manifestations or political action, and participating in rituals of fostering unity.

It is hypothesised (Ehala 2011) that ethnolinguistic vitality is related to ethnic temperature. A 'hot' ethnic group is one whose members have a high emotional attachment to their group. 'Cold' ethnic groups are those whose members' emotional attachments to their groups are low, absent or latent. As the hot members of an ethnicity are more likely than the cold members to participate in collective actions, a hot ethnicity has higher vitality than a cold ethnicity, if all other factors influencing vitality are kept constant.

We hypothesise that there are at least two social psychological parameters that influence the emotional attachment of members to their group. One of them is intergroup distrust (Dt), and the other is utilitarianism (U). We hypothesise that the higher the level of distrust towards a significant out-group, the more likely the individual is to be bonded to the in-group and predisposed to participate in collective actions. Similarly, the lower the level of utilitarianism and higher the level of traditionalism, the higher the respondent's emotional bond is to the in-group. We assume that those individuals who feel strongly committed to the traditions and values of their in-group are more likely to participate in collective actions in support of their in-group.

Following Ehala (2009b, 2010), we assume that ethnolinguistic vitality (V) is a complex phenomenon that depends crucially on four social psychological factors:

(1) perceived strength differential (PSD) between the in-group ('us') and the most prominent out-group ('them');
(2) the level of intergroup discordance (D);

(3) perceived intergroup distance (R)[1]; and
(4) the level of utilitarianism (U) in the value system of the group studied.

All of these factors are socio-psychological, and they reflect group members' perceptions, attitudes and beliefs about their own group and the inter-ethnic relations in the setting in which they live. PSD expresses the perception of how strong the in-group is in relation to a specific out-group. If the out-group is perceived as stronger, the PSD value is negative. If the in-group is perceived as stronger, the PSD has a positive value. The model assumes that low PSD perceptions decrease vitality and high values increase it, because the perception of weakness promotes emotional detachment from group membership and lessens the willingness to engage in collective action.

Discordance expresses the feeling of distrust towards the out-group and the perception of the illegitimacy of the intergroup power relations. The higher the levels of distrust and perceptions of illegitimacy, the more likely the members of the in-group are to engage in collective action to change the situation.

Intergroup distance expresses the nature of the individuals' network of linguistic contacts. The more the out-group language is used, the closer the individual is ethnolinguistically to the out-group. This variable also includes the perception of cultural, racial and religious similarity with the out-group. The closer the respondent is to the out-group, the lower the vitality, as the individual may already be undergoing language and identity shift.

Utilitarianism, as mentioned above, characterises the commitment to the traditions and values of the in-group vs. the detachment from those traditions and values and adherence to utilitarian values that stress personal needs and aspirations.

The interaction of these variables in defining vitality is expressed mathematically (outlined later); here we illustrate this relationship in a more informal way by five hypothetical vitality profiles:

(1) Large negative PSD and negative D, and small R and high U = lowest vitality
(2) Large negative PSD and high D, and/or large R and/or low U = medium vitality
(3) Small negative PSD and medium D, and medium R and medium U = medium vitality
(4) Small positive PSD and low D, and small R and high U = medium vitality
(5) Large positive PSD and high D, and/or large R and/or low U = highest vitality

Type (a) characterises a small minority that is culturally and linguistically very close to the majority, typically a regional variety of the standard, such as Low German or Latgalian, which is characterised by out-group favouritism (low discordance), and whose members are socially mobile. Type (b) minorities are small in number or weakly organised, but culturally very distinct communities, such as Berbers in the Netherlands, Roma in many central European countries and traditional ethno-religious communities, such as Russian Orthodox Old Believers, all of which are possibly stigmatised by the majority and/or have very traditional lifestyles. The stigma and/or traditionalism prevents them from identity shift, and thus they have medium vitality despite their low strength and status. Type (c) is characteristic of a strong, well-organised minority that has a lifestyle and values that are quite close to the majority, but because of strong collective self-esteem, they have secured sustainability; typical examples are the Québécois French and Russian-speakers in Latvia and Estonia. Type (d) characterises a relatively weak

majority community that is in a peaceful relationship with a large and culturally close minority. This is not a very common type; an example is the Czech majority in the former Czechoslovakia. This majority type is likely to agree peacefully to autonomy demands if the minority sets this as a goal. Type (e) is the profile of a typical hegemonic majority which could also feel threatened or has closed inter-ethnic boundaries, an example being Lithuanians or Estonians.

In this vitality model, distrust (Dt) and utilitarianism (U) contribute to the overall vitality scores; therefore, if our hypothesis about the relatedness of ethnic temperature to vitality is correct, the results of our survey should be in accordance with the observations that the major ethnic groups in Latvia and Estonia are relatively hotter than in Lithuania. By being able to measure the vitality we would be able to assess the ethnic temperature in a more precise and comparable manner than is possible by qualitative ethnographic means. This is not to underestimate the qualitative interpretation, which is also relevant in constructing the comprehensive account.

The design of the study

The theoretical model outlined in the previous section was operationalised in Ehala and Niglas (2007) in the form of a quantitative survey questionnaire which was further elaborated on the basis of its performance and for the requirements of the current study. In all, there are 60 statements in the questionnaire built on the Likert scale principle. The statements form 10-item sets that measure the underlying variables in the model, given briefly in the previous section and in detail by Ehala and Zabrodskaja (2013a, 2013b). By calculating the mean scores for each 10-item set, we were able to get pseudo-continuous variables which could, with a certain caution, be used in parametric statistical tests. In this manner, it became possible to assess the vitality of a given group. Provided that there was a link between vitality and ethnic temperature, it also became possible to compare ethnicities or their subgroups in relation to their relative hotness.

The quantitative data were triangulated with half-structured interviews having open-ended questions, which allowed for differentiated, individual and subjective opinions to be given, but also provided a set of responses that could be related to the quantitative data. The interview plan was drafted on the principles of the model and included the following topics: (1) self-categorisation, (2) perceived cultural distance between groups (factor R), (3) possible identity trajectory in the future, (4) appreciation of traditions vs. utilitarianism (factor U), (5) perception of ethnocultural symbolic capital (factor PSD) and (6) perception of inter-ethnic discordance (factor D). The goal of the protocol was to elucidate qualitative data that would lead to a deeper understanding of the discursive choices that underlie beliefs and attitudes studied by the quantitative survey. The full text of the survey questionnaire and the focus group interview protocol are presented in Appendixes I and II (available online at http://kodu.ut.ee/~ehalam/Appendices.pdf) to encourage their use in other social settings.

The samples of the surveys were composed using a stratified sampling method so as to reflect the inter-ethnic composition of the population in different regions (five in each case), and were compiled by a well-known professional polling company in each country. All samples were aimed at $N = 1000$: in Estonia, the sample consisted of 538 Estonians and 460 Russian-speakers, in Latvia, 419 Latvians, 406 Russian-speakers, and 200 Latgalian Latvians, and in Lithuania, 400 Lithuanians, 230 Russian-speakers, and 270 Poles.

The samples were structured by five strata (see Table 1): A – areas of overwhelmingly titular mono-ethnic populations, mostly rural and smaller settlements, but also the city of

Table 1. The composition of the samples and distribution of the respondents in strata.

Stratum	Percentage of titulars in the area	Estonia		Latvia			Lithuania		
		E[2]	R	La	R	Lg	Li	R	P
A	>90	147	50	118	103		110	60	
B	90–70	132	70	48	3	100	80	60	
C	70–50	126	70	150	152		110	60	130
D	50–20	82	120	50	50	100	50		140
E	<20	51	150	53	98		50	50	

Kaunas in Lithuania; B – areas of 70–90% of the titular population, mostly medium-sized towns, but also the city of Klaipeda in Lithuania and the Latgale rural area in Latvia; C – areas of 50–70% of titular populations, which included all three capital cities: Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius; D – areas of prominent minority population (50–80%), which included the Russian-dominant industrial towns, and the Polish-dominant rural area around Vilnius (Vilniaus rajonas); E – areas of overwhelming Russian majority, which included industrial towns from each Baltic state. The sample distribution by strata is presented in Table 1.

The qualitative research was carried out in 2008–2011 through 25 focus-group oral interviews. Each group comprised six respondents and was formed on the basis of the vitality differences among the subgroups, obtained from the analysis of the quantitative data. Each interview lasted approximately two and a half hours. The exact number of interviews and settings are given in Table 2. In Latvia, there was also one mixed-group interview conducted, where members of all three ethnic groups were present. All of the respondents were interviewed in cafes or university rooms by Anastassia Zabrodskaja or non-professional interviewers who were from the same nominal ethnic groups as the respondents.

The questionnaires were presented and interviews were conducted in the state language with Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, and in Russian with Russian-speakers and Poles. Latgalian Latvians could choose either the Latvian or Russian language for their questionnaires, but the language of the interviews was Russian.

The results by ethnicities

Detailed presentations of the results on the ethnolinguistic vitalities of the Baltic ethnicities can be found in Ehala and Zabrodskaja (2013a); here we give only the most important findings necessary for a better understanding of the discussion of ethnic temperature that follows in the next section.

Table 2. Interview statistics.

Country	Number of interviews with titulars	Number of interviews with Russian-speakers	Number of interviews with Latgalian Latvians in Latvia or Poles in Lithuania	Settings
Estonia	1	4		C, E, B
Latvia	4	3	2	C, A, B, D
Lithuania	4	3	3	C, E, A

The interaction principles of the vitality factors presented earlier are formalised in Equations (1) and (2):

$$V = U(\mathrm{PSD} + \mathrm{D})/R, \text{ if } (\mathrm{PSD} + \mathrm{D}) < 0 \quad (1)$$

$$V = R(\mathrm{PSD} + \mathrm{D})/U, \text{ if } (\mathrm{PSD} + \mathrm{D}) > 0 \quad (2)$$

The choice of equation depends on the (PSD + D) value, which could be a negative or positive figure, depending on the values of PSD and D. PSD is less than 0 for those respondents who assessed the in-group as weaker than the out-group. D is a negative value for those respondents who showed out-group favouritism (see Sachdev and Bourhis 1991). Thus, (PSD + D) is typically a negative value for respondents from minority groups, and positive for respondents from majority groups. However, in the case of large intergroup discordance (positive D), the value of (PSD + D) could become positive even for minority members who saw their in-group as weaker than the out-group. In this case, Equation (2) is used. These two equations are needed to express the impact of U and R correctly for minority and majority groups. Even though the impact of U and R for the minority and majority group vitality is similar (high U and low R lower the vitality), the different impacts of multiplication and division for negative and positive numbers requires the use of different equations depending on the (PSD + D) value.

The questionnaire was operationalised in a way that made it possible to measure all variables and to calculate the value of V. The vitality scores for the Baltic ethnicities are presented in Table 3.

As vitality is a relational concept characterising the perception of a certain inter-ethnic situation from the point of view of the in-group, the V score is different in different in-group–out-group axes. For example, Lithuanians show higher vitality in relation to the Polish (0.91) than to the Russian minority (0.65). Table 3 presents the vitalities of the majority and minority from the viewpoint of the respective in-group for all settings studied. For example, the vitality of Lithuanians in relation to Lithuanian Russian-speakers as perceived by Lithuanians is 0.65, and the vitality of Lithuanian Russian-speakers in relation to the Lithuanian majority as perceived by Russian-speakers is −0.22.

The V scores are to be interpreted using Table 4, which shows the range of V values. The calibration of the scale in Table 4 is based on the interpretation of the questionnaire scales, mathematical characteristics of the model and what is known about the vitalities of the Baltic ethnicities from numerous other studies on Baltic ethnicities. It is a rough guide that needs to be fine-tuned through further studies. In Table 4, low vitality scores are described using the degrees of language and identity shift that are hypothesised to accompany certain levels of vitality. The high scores are characterised using the notion of ethnocentrism. The higher the vitality score, the more ethnocentric the ethnicity. Usually

Table 3. Vitalities of Baltic ethnicities.

Country	Majority	Vitalities in comparison		Minority
Lithuania	Lithuanians	0.91	−0.24	Poles
	Lithuanians	0.65	−0.22	Russians
Estonia	Estonians	0.87	−0.08	Russians
Latvia	Latvians	0.55	0.06	Russians
	Latvians	0.42	−0.20	Latgalian Latvians

Table 4. Degrees of vitality (adapted from Ehala and Zabrodskaja 2013a, 79).

	Values of *V*	Description
High vitality	> 1.5	Extreme ethnocentrism
	0.6 … 1.5	Strong ethnocentrism
	0.3 … 0.6	Moderate ethnocentrism
	0.1 … 0.3	Weak ethnocentrism
	0 … 0.1	Stable vitality
	0 … −0.1	Stable vitality
	−0.1 … −0.2	Weakly shifting
	−0.2 … −0.3	Moderately shifting
	−0.3 … −0.4	Strongly shifting
Low vitality	< −0.4	Extremely shifting

ethnocentrism characterises majorities, but it can also characterise strong minority communities.

When we analyse the scores in Table 3, we can see that Lithuanians and Estonians have high vitality and are characterised by strong ethnocentrism, while the Latvians have a somewhat lower mean score. At the same time, the Latvian Russian-speakers have the highest score amongst minorities, followed by Estonian Russian-speakers. The Latvian-Russian intergroup setting is the closest to parity amongst the settings studied. This is partly explained by the large economically and culturally prominent Russian community in Latvia, and partly by the significant inter-ethnic discordance between the groups (the highest in the settings compared). The high D score is the main reason why the Russian-speakers in Latvia are the only minority community in the Baltic states that has a V score higher than 0. The Russian-speakers in Estonia have a slightly lower V score, but still high enough to be considered in the stable zone. The numerically small minorities (the Russian-speaking and the Polish minorities in Lithuania and Latgalian Latvians in Latvia) all have significantly lower V scores, and this also corresponds to their attested pattern of language and identity shift (see Geben and Ramonienė forthcoming; Stafecka 2006; Klavinska 2009). When we look at the overall trend, the V scores of the majority decline as the V scores of the minority rise, which was expected, because the V score incorporates the perception of in-group strength in comparison with the out-group.

Yet this trend is by no means absolute. For example, Lithuanians and Estonians are characterised by high vitality towards Poles and Russian-speakers, respectively. Yet the Russian-speaking minority is relatively much larger in Estonia than the Polish minority is in Lithuania, and their vitality is also higher. Interestingly, Lithuanians are significantly less closed and ethnocentric in relation to their Russian-speaking minority, which is about the same size as their Polish minority. Therefore, the perception does not always reflect the objective reality similarly, but is mediated by the discourses of inter-ethnic relations. These similarities and differences seem to stem from historical disputes between Lithuania and Poland over the Vilnius region and between Estonians and Russian-speakers over the official status of Russian, which is not an issue in Lithuania. We will characterise this in more detail in the next section when dealing with the results of the qualitative study.

The data in Table 3 also illustrate the intuitively plausible trend that the majorities are more open and inclusive for non-threatening minorities. For example, Lithuanians have lower V scores towards non-threatening Russian-speakers, and Latvians show lower V

scores towards Latgalian Latvians, which can be considered as a legitimate subgroup of Latvians.

Certainly, the factors responsible for ethnic temperature also play a role in the vitality score, but as they are embedded in the equation, their impact is not directly visible from the V score. When we look at the two factors associated with ethnic temperature – inter-ethnic distrust (Dt) and utilitarianism (U) – we can see that there are quite revealing differences between the mean scores of the ethnicities presented in Table 5.

The distrust scale ranges from 0 (maximum trust) to 1 (maximum distrust), with 0.5 being the neutral midpoint. As all mean scores are below the neutral midpoint, the average level of Dt is not high in absolute terms, but the differences are still large over the settings. For example, the highest level of distrust is shown by the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia (towards the Latvian majority), as well as Latvians towards their Russian-speaking minority. The Dt level of Lithuanians towards their small Polish minority is surprisingly high, but it is not countered by a similar distrust from Polish. As would be expected, the smallest Dt level is shown by Latvians towards Latgalian Latvians, but the latter have small reservations in replying in the same way. Looking at the whole range of mean scores, we can see that it is within the range of 20% of the scale, which is quite large considering that the Baltic states are all democratic Western-type well-functioning societies, and the inter-ethnic climates do not appear that different at first glance.

When we compare the mean values for U, there are also differences, but on a considerably lesser scale (see Table 6).

The scale ranges from 0 (maximum traditionalism) to 1 (maximum utilitarianism). 0.5 is the midpoint or balanced level of utilitarianism and traditionalism. As can be seen from Table 5, all ethnicities gravitate towards traditionalism, as the mean values for U are less than 0.5. The titular ethnicities are the most traditionalist, and the Latvian Russians – arguably the economically most advanced minority group in the Baltic states – show the highest level of utilitarianism. However the variability is only eight percentage points of the scale, which is fairly small: the standard deviations within each sample are about twice that large. The differences between subgroups within each ethnicity are about twice as large as the differences between the mean values of ethnicities.

To summarise, the mean values of V indicate some differences in ethnic temperatures amongst the Baltic ethnicities: the hottest is the situation in Latvia, with the large and prominent Russian minority there having both high vitality and a considerable level of distrust towards Latvians, reciprocated by the latter. The situation in Estonia is somewhat cooler on both the Estonian and Russian side. Lithuanians are considerably hotter towards the relatively small Polish minority than towards the Russian-speaking minority. The relatively low scores on the Utilitarianism scale indicate that traditional values and respect for cultural heritage have considerable value amongst all ethnicities. To gain a better

Table 5. Distrust between Baltic ethnicities.

Majority	Distrust scores in comparison		Minority
Lithuanians	0.46	0.40	Poles
Latvians	0.46	0.47	Russians
Estonians	0.41	0.43	Russians
Lithuanians	0.35	0.32	Russians
Latvians	0.24	0.35	Latgalian Latvians

Table 6. Utilitarianism in Baltic ethnicities.

	R(E)	R(La)	R(Li)	P	Lg	E	La	Li
U	0.42	0.46	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.39	0.42	0.41

understanding of the construction of ethnic temperature, we now turn to intra-group analysis.

The intra-group analysis

As Kosmarskaya (forthcoming) shows, the urban and modernised Kyrgyz and Kazakhs are cooler in ethnic terms than those from rural areas. Also, according to Nosenko-Stein (forthcoming), there are a number of different Jewish identities characterised by different ethnic temperature: while new Jews are relatively hot, other types seem to be cooling. Considerable intra-group variation is characteristic of the ethnicities in the Baltic states as well. Therefore, the group average values for vitality parameters reported above are fairly rough approximations over a wide range of variation.

In order to assess the scope of this variation and its influence on the perception of reality that influences intergroup relations, we categorised the respondents on the basis of their ethnic temperatures. An individual has theoretical model presented in Section 2, an individual has a hot attitude towards his/her ethnic affiliation if he/she has either a high level of distrust towards the important out-group (high Dt value) or a high level of emotional attachment to his/her in-group (low U value) or both. An individual has a cold attitude to his/her ethnic affiliation if he/she has both a low level of distrust and a low level of emotional attachment to his/her in-group (high U value).

Based on their scores on Dt and U scales, we grouped the respondents into five categories: DtHot includes individuals who scored more than 66% of the scale's range on the distrust dimension. These are the individuals who had the top 33% of the most distrustful responses. UHot includes the individuals who had the bottom 33% of the scores on the U scale. These individuals had the most traditional and least utilitarian value orientation. The category 2xHot includes the respondents who had the highest values on both the Dt and U scales (as Dt and U are not in correlation, 2xHot is a small category compared to the two other hot categories). The cold category includes individuals who had scores below the neutral midpoint on the Dt scale (i.e. they expressed trust in the out-group, not distrust) and had higher scores than the mean on the U level. The medium category includes the rest of the respondents.

The results of the comparison are presented in Figure 1. As can be seen, the highest share of hot respondents was found in Latvia, both amongst the Russian-speakers and amongst Latvians. These samples also had the smallest share of cold individuals. The ethnic temperature in Estonia is slightly lower. The third pair of ethnicities on the heat scale is Lithuanians and Poles, but here the share of cold individuals is considerably larger. The situation can be classified as cold between Lithuanians and Russians: there is very little distrust, and there is the highest level of cold individuals. This is in accordance with the observation that Lithuanian Russians have chosen a voluntary assimilation path (see Brazauskiene and Likhachiova 2011) and the Lithuanians are fairly relaxed in accepting the assimilating Russians. The coldest structure is shown by the Latvians towards Latgalian Latvians, but the latter have somewhat more hot individuals.



Figure 1. Hot and cold subgroups within Baltic ethnicities.

There are two general tendencies visible in Figure 1. First, the share of the DtHot subgroup is fairly similar in every majority–minority pair, but differs between the pairs. This points to strongly interactive causes for the distrust levels, that is, they are not simply discursively manipulated within two groups separately but are constructed in a dialogic manner. This gives empirical support to the Bourhis et al. (1997) interactive acculturation model, which claims that immigrants' acculturation orientation is shaped by the attitudes of the majority. Secondly, the level of ethnic temperature within a group can vary according to the out-group. For example, Latvians have a fairly large proportion of hot individuals with respect to Russian-speakers, but not at all with respect to Latgalian Latvians. This means that a hot ethnicity is not necessarily closed and antagonistic to all out-groups. It may be antagonistic to some out-groups while at the same time freely accepting new members from some other out-groups.

We also looked at the differences between hot and cold categories in regard to their networks of linguistic contacts and language choice patterns, as well as their perceptions about their in-group and out-groups. In terms of the network of linguistic contacts (items R01-10, Appendix I), there is a strong tendency within each ethnicity that subjects in the hot category use less out-group language than the subjects in the cold category. Using two-way ANOVA, the difference between the hot and cold groups emerged as statistically significant at a 0.05 level for six cases out of ten: R(E), R(La), P, E, La(R) and Li(R). For two cases – R(Li) and Li(P) – the tendency was not statistically significant. In the case of Lg and La(Lg), there was no consistent pattern. Although the causal direction between ethnic temperature and language cannot be stated with certainty, there are factors that indicate that ethnic temperature has an impact on language choice. For example, the Russian-speakers in Latvia use more Latvian language on average than do Russian-speakers in Estonia. If the linguistic network distance controlled the level of distrust and utilitarianism, one would expect that the R(La) would have lower scores on distrust and higher scores on utilitarianism than R(E). Actually, the pattern is the reverse: the hot group of R(La) has $U = 0.41$, Dt = 0.63, while the hot group of Rus(E) has $U = 0.36$; Dt = 0.57, that is the R(La) has a higher mean value for Dt, not lower. The same holds for Estonians and Latvians. The hot group of Estonians is marginally cooler than the Latvian hot group (Est U = 0.33, Dt = 0.55; La U = 0.32, Dt = 0.58) yet the Estonian group has less contact with Russians than Latvians do.

Therefore, while the linguistic network distance seems to depend largely on patterns of segregation, which are different in Latvia and Estonia, it is also clear that, at least

partly, the individuals who belong to the hot group try to reduce the amount of contact as compared to the cold individuals, irrespective of the inter-ethnic setting. The opposite is not true: more inter-ethnic contact does not result in consistently lower levels of Dt and higher levels of U.

When we looked at the differences in the perception of cultural distance (items R11-20 in Appendix I), there was a very consistent and statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) tendency in all 10 inter-ethnic settings, that is, the respondents who belonged to hot subgroups perceived the out-group members as more culturally distinct from themselves than the members of cold subgroups. Further analysis showed that this relationship was influenced mostly by the level of distrust, while the contribution of U was statistically insignificant. This means that the higher the absolute level of distrust, the higher also the perception of cultural distance, irrespective of the intergroup setting, that is irrespective of real cultural differences between the two groups.

This regularity emerged clearly in the case of Lithuanians towards local Poles and Russians. Objectively, one might assume that the cultural distance between Lithuanians and Poles would be less than between Lithuanians and Russians, since Poles are Roman Catholic, like Lithuanians, while Russians are Orthodox. Yet Lithuanians perceive the Russians to be closer than the Polish (0.46 vs. 0.49 points on a 1.0 scale). The main reason seems to be that the Lithuanians' mean level of distrust towards Poles is considerably higher (0.46) than towards Russian-speakers (0.35).

Ethnic temperature is also connected to the perception of the legitimacy of intergroup power relations (items D01-04, Appendix I). For minority ethnic groups, members of hot subgroups perceive the inter-ethnic situation as less legitimate than do the members of cold subgroups (the mean difference between H and C subgroups is statistically significant in all five minority cases, $p < 0.05$). For majority ethnic groups, the relationship is the reverse: the members of hot subgroups perceive the situation as more legitimate than do the members of cold subgroups. The mean difference between H and C subgroups is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) in four cases out of the five. Therefore, we can claim with high certainty that ethnic temperature is related to the perception of the legitimacy of the inter-ethnic situation in a manner that the pairs of majority–minority groups having higher inter-ethnic temperature have more conflicting perceptions about the legitimacy of the situation.

In our earlier study (Ehala and Zabrodskaja 2011), we found on the basis of the study of Russian-speakers in Estonia (the same data as used in this study) that there was a negative correlation between the level of discordance and perceived in-group strength: the stronger the level of distrust and feeling of illegitimacy, the weaker the in-group was perceived. The same relationship was also revealed in the case of R(La) and R(Li), but not in the case of Lg and P. In addition, in the case of R(E), R(La) and R(Li), there was a positive correlation between U and PSD: the more utilitarian the person, the stronger s/he perceived the in-group. Similar findings have been reported in earlier literature (Giles and Johnson 1987; Hogg and Rigoli 1996; Liebkind, Jasinskaja-Lahti, and Teräsaho 2007). However, in the case of majority ethnicities no difference in the perception of PSD was detected in relation to either Dt or U. Thus, it is only in the case of the three Russian minorities in the Baltic states that the perceived strength differential depends at a statistically significant level ($p < 0.05$) on the ethnic temperature: the hot subgroups perceive their ethnic in-group as relatively weaker than the cold subgroups do.

Based on the results of the quantitative analysis above, a social psychological profile can be drawn that characterises the typical members of hot and cold subgroups within an

ethnicity. A typical member of a hot subgroup has a high level of distrust towards the out-group, in extreme cases dehumanising the members of the out-group. He or she values the traditions and norms of her culture to the extent that this may become a significant factor constraining his/her own personal life choices. Because of intergroup distrust and/or traditionalism, a typical member of a hot subgroup tries to avoid contact with out-group members, and prefers not to use the out-group language. They also try to psychologically distance themselves from the out-group by perceiving the out-group as different in appearance and tastes, culturally alien, having an incompatible value system, and being hard to socialise with. The hot members of the minority ethnicity have a high perception of the illegitimacy of the intergroup setting, while the hot members of the majority group, in contrast, have a high perception of the legitimacy of the same intergroup setting. In some cases, this also leads to the perception of identity threat, which results in a lowered perception of in-group strength. This set of beliefs, if it becomes hegemonic in society, maintains strong inter-ethnic boundaries and may lead to intergroup conflict over legitimacy issues.

The views characteristic of the hot attitude were clearly shown in the focus group interviews. For example, the views of Alise, a 17-year-old Latvian girl from setting C speaking Latvian as her first language, matched very closely the profile drawn from the quantitative analysis. She was very strongly committed to her Latvian identity, and she would not change her citizenship under any circumstances, because 'taking another citizenship, it would be disrespectful to the Latvian nation; there are so few Latvians'. She was proud of her heritage and considered it to be her destiny: 'even if I were a Chukchy, I would say that I was a Chukchy, because that would be my identity'. If she were to live abroad, this would not affect her identity; 'if in the heart there are these feelings, then nothing changes'. She was quite exclusive in defining the in-group. Despite having relatives who were Latgalians and Russians, she claimed: 'I do not consider myself close to Latgalians or Russians'; furthermore, she doubted the possibility of marrying a non-Latvian as 'it is still another ethnicity. And my family would not be happy'; and finally she doubted the possibility that someone could become a Latvian: 'If you were born in Russia, you would be Russian. Well, you can come to Latvia, and take up the traditions, but you cannot become a Latvian'. When some focus-group members mentioned that Latvians had privileges that the minorities did not have, she replied by stressing the legitimacy of the situation: 'Russian-speakers do not have any problems in Latvia in finding jobs; considering, as we know, how many Russian-speakers do not speak Latvian, they feel fine here. Certainly, Latvians have their advantages, but in principle there is almost no difference'. She also made it clear that the rigid in-group boundaries were caused by distrust:

> I agree in the sense that you cannot really get close. While living side by side and doing the same things, people become alike, but Latvians have such, I do not know, good or bad property that they take offence for a very long time. And I think that Latvians will feel offended for quite some time, that is, Russia occupied Latvia, and Latvians will not be able to forgive that for quite some time.

Individuals who held comparable views were found in every focus group in every ethnicity studied. The hot Estonian discourse was very similar to that of the Latvian, and this, of course, was reflected dialogically in the hot discourse amongst the Russian-speakers of Latvia and Estonia. The following three excerpts are from three focus group

interviews with Russian-speakers in Estonian setting D, Latvian setting C and Estonian setting C:

Setting D, Estonia (Estonian Russian-speakers in their thirties):

Pavel: In fact, with the word 'Estonian' I have an association – the word 'offended'.
Andrei: Oh!
Pavel: Yes, and the word 'Estonian' is also associated with the word 'child'; yes 'offended child', such an association.
Andrei: This is about Estonian politicians. And in general, Estonian politicians evoke the feeling that they were deeply offended and they continue to take revenge for this…
…
Pavel: We are not fresh off the train.
Dmitri: Yes, this is a controversial question, who came here before.
Pavel: Yes, for sure, if you dig into it.
Interviewer: Andrei, could you please repeat once again, maybe we have not heard 'Yes, for sure, if you dig into history'.
Pavel: Yes, for sure, if you dig into history.
Interviewer: Andrei, you had a comment, (smiles) when Pavel was talking …
Andrei: Oh no, I just wanted to add something about all these muulased ['aliens', Estonian code switch], that all this was some time ago, that it is normal fascism, that type of principle completely, that is when there are Jews and there are humans, and here somehow we have the same thing, in my view, that is all; such [an idea] has appeared in the course of [an interview].

Setting C, Latvia (Latvian Russian-speaker in her thirties):

Inna: … you open a newspaper and read: occupiers, immigrants, on the front page of the newspaper. This is why there is no status of Russian as a second state language, though it is much talked about. So you have to fight for everything, with difficulty.

Setting C, Estonia (Estonian Russian-speakers in their twenties):

Mikhail: It is like the attitude of the indigenous Estonians, in relation to Estonian Russians. Well, it should change gradually; that is, in one generation it will not really happen … (pause) Well, can I ask a counter-question? Does anybody remember what happened in Macedonia several years ago?
Deniss: I have never been there. I do not know.
Interviewer: Let us not discuss the Macedonian case now.
Mikhail: No because …
Interviewer: What happened in Macedonia? Only quickly, in one sentence.
Mikhail: A third of the population are not Macedonians but Albanians. It is written in the constitution of the country: Macedonia is a country of Macedonians. After military clashes that lasted several months, sponsored by 'big brother', Albania in this case, legislative changes were adopted, that is President Trajkovski then ran to Ukraine, buying a lot of helicopters, MI-24s … And the situation ended with steps taken to raise the status of Albanians, not just as a national minority, but as a state-forming nation …

As the excerpts show, the feeling of resentment of Latvians and Estonians seemed to be perceived by the Russian-speaking out-groups, too, and they agreed that reconciliation might take a long time. Yet, the official discourse of occupation and immigration was clearly contested by hot Russian-speakers as the main ideological justification for their low status in Latvia and Estonia. While the hot Latvians and Estonians considered the ethnic status differences to be legitimate and not affecting opportunities for finding jobs,

etc., hot Russian-speakers compared the situation with that of Jews in Nazi Germany. The parallel with Macedonia is particularly telling as it offers a hint of the possibility of improving the status of the Russian-speakers by forced actions supported by Russia. But such an extreme view was not supported by the interlocutors during the interview.

In Lithuania, hotness was not constructed in the axis of Lithuanians–Russian-speakers, but towards local Poles. In one Lithuanian focus group (setting A), an aversive and distrustful attitude emerged as soon as the interviewer asked respondents to express opinions about Lithuanian Poles, which led to sounds expressing emotions (*Oooh … Mmmm*, etc.). An analysis of the whole interview makes it possible to argue that there were hot, medium and cold individuals amongst the participants of the focus group, but when it came to expressing opinions about Poles, all aligned with the hegemonic aversive stance. We present three statements from this part of the interview here. The first statement was from Rasa, a female over 50 years old. She was the first to reply to the interviewers' request and she did so in quite strong language. The fact that she was the first to reply and she did so bluntly indicated strong conviction and confidence that her opinion would be approved of. When the reviewer asked for other opinions, Rasa's opinion was countered by Elena, who had Polish heritage. She tried to point out some positive characteristics, but also tried to find excuses for her opinion. The third opinion from Snaigė was aired a few minutes later, after three more people had expressed their opinions. Snaigė positioned herself as neutral, and mentioned some positive characteristics, but at the end she also aligned herself with the hegemonic opinion, '*with regret*', as she repeated twice:

Interviewer: Now move on to another category – Poles.
All: Ooo … Mmm. Ooo [all express emotions]
Interviewer: What can you say? What are the first associations? What comes to mind?
Rasa: I can say that as a Russian has his own character, a Pole has his own character too, I would say, more distasteful. It is not acceptable to me. A Russian is more acceptable to me. A Pole is primarily a liar, that is, well, a dandy, well, not a dandy. I can not even think of this word at once. I just see a type who sucks up, a flatterer and, well, in one word, a sticky person. Well, taking into account all of the history, the policy of Lithuania towards Poles, it does not raise pleasant associations.
Interviewer: Others?
Elena: In general, I am an interesting case because my paternal grandmother was … in childhood she spoke Polish. A grandmother from … I have just recently learned … my maternal grandmother also spoke Polish. My son-in-law is now a Pole. My granddaughter, it turned out, is also registered as a Pole because it was necessary. In short, it is very interesting with Poles, but for me a Pole is very colourful, expressive and, in general, slippery. Not because … on the whole, it does not apply to my son-in-law. No … Well, maybe this is because of my family, from my grandparents, from Lithuania itself. But in order for this Pole to feel himself to be a Pole, I consider it necessary that there be this option – tuteišiai [self-identification of Lithuanian Poles that persist in Lithuania's Vilnius Region] – as they are now in the Trakų region.
[–]
Snaigė: Well, I do not know. I just did not have close contacts with Poles. Occasionally when there were groups from Poland before, sometimes I showed them the museum. They left with a very good impression, they were sincerely happy, and they thanked me – and it was truly very good with them, a great time. But I just do not know; we did not talk in our family, you know, against Poles, but somehow my attitude was shaped maybe from history textbooks or … But, well, I do not like them. Unfortunately, of course. I know that there are Chopin, Sienkiewicz, etc., but my personal opinion is like that. Unfortunately.

So we can see a strong group norm here in attitudes towards Poles, with clear signs of how hard it is for an individual to counter hegemonic views. A similar well-established

distrustful norm about the out-group was encountered in Latvian and Estonian discourses as well, but directed towards Russian-speakers. We saw above how the minority attitudes reflect the majority stance, but the impact is clearly dependent on whether the minority is strong or weak. While in Latvia and Estonia hot Russian-speakers contested the situation, the Lithuanian Poles did not contest the Lithuanians' stance, but rather just asked not to be categorised on ethnic grounds, as this excerpt from a focus group interview with young Poles from setting E indicates:

Interviewer: Well, how would you like to be considered by other people?
Beata: Who I am.
Interviewer: Who you consider yourself to be?
Beata: Yes, yes.
Robert: Well, I would also say that I'd like to be considered as who I am. So that they would not divide people by ethnicity etc. because often the division is that if you are a Lithuanian, then you are bad and if a Pole, then good. Or vice versa. I wish that it wasn't that way.
Viktor: You should be valued as a person and people shouldn't look at your name or family name which is not like others have. Like you are stupid or something. You should be treated simply as a person.
[–]
Interviewer: And now let us talk about such categories – what is your opinion about them. For example, the word Pole. What are the first associations that come to mind with this word? What kind of person is a Pole?
Andrey: I have no associations. The same as a Brazilian or a Frenchman or a Portuguese.
Interviewer: Simply ethnicity?
Andrey: Yes.
[–]
Robert: I think that a Pole is like all other ethnicities, a person; they all are the same. That is why a Pole is like all other ordinary people.
Interviewer: Don't you have any first association?
Robert: No.
Viktor: I think that for me a Pole is immediately associated with patriotism. He is like a patriot.
Alyona: And for me this is something native. Like our own.
[–]
Interviewer: And the expression Lithuanian Pole? Does that mean anything to you?
Andrey: Are there any?
Interviewer: Does this expression mean anything to you?
Viktor: Yes.
Interviewer: Viktor?
Viktor: For me, it is immediately associated with a person who is not liked, who is despised. My … Well, this is my opinion.
Interviewer: But for others?
Alyona: For me, the immediate association is with some kind of discrimination. Well, something bad.
Interviewer: But for others?
Romuald: For us, this is our own man, but for others it is an enemy of the nation.
Beata: The combinations 'Lithuanian Pole' itself somehow well …
Interviewer: Do you use it yourself?
All: No.
Interviewer: Have you ever heard that somebody from the outside would use the term?
All: Yes.
Interviewer: From who have you heard that the most?
All: From Lithu …
Romuald: From Delfi.lt. You hear such people who do not know … who only read newspapers. Yes? On the Internet, where everything is written. These are such

> people who are still young. They do not understand the meaning. Somebody says there – they go with the flow. The wind blows and they all go. Morons.

The levels of collective identity denial are quite telling here. Young Polish people would like the ethnic labelling removed altogether from their categorisation, as it is very directly associated with the perception of discrimination. They disassociate themselves from the general category Polish, too, by saying that this does not have any specific meaning for them, and when confronted with the term *Lithuanian Polish*, they ironically question the existence of this category at first. Only after considerable conversation do some positive self-associations start to emerge. So the self-denial of Polish identity is quite strong here, which is not surprising considering the prevalent anti-Polish sentiments in the Lithuanian discourse. Therefore, while Lithuanians show high ethnic temperature towards Poles, the latter do not contest it, but try to disassociate themselves from Polishness in public discourse. It seems that the Polish do not construct their ethnic temperature on the distrust scale as they do not feel they have the necessary collective strength to counter the majority, but instead opt for traditionalism.

Discussion and conclusions

To summarise the results, we could say that it is possible to operationalise the concepts of hot and cold ethnicities and to measure the ethnic temperature of different ethnicities in a fairly exact manner for meaningful comparative research.

In the case of Baltic ethnicities, we can see distinct types of vitality and ethnic temperature. All three titular ethnicities have fairly high vitality, supported by hotness towards significant minority out-groups: Russian-speakers in the case of Latvia and Estonia, and Polish in the case of Lithuania. Strong minority ethnicities (Russian-speakers in Latvia and Estonia) are also relatively hot and so the mutual ethnic heat helps to maintain a steady state which supports the language and identity maintenance of the Russian-speakers. A similar strategy is not available for weak ethnicities, such as Lithuanian Russian-speakers and Polish. Both of these minorities have quite large numbers of individuals who are hot regarding traditionalism, which means that they are trying to maintain their vitality by holding on to their traditions. This is undermined by significantly large numbers of cold individuals, particularly in the Russian case, which indicates clear language and identity shift.

All of these settings are connected with the case of cross-border minorities who are the majority population in the neighbouring country. All of them involve historical conflict situations between neighbouring nations: Russia vs. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and Poland vs. Lithuania. Therefore, attitudes towards minorities are shaped, to a large extent, by the memory of these historical events. The minorities suffer clearly because of the historical legacy, and while the strong Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia feel vital enough to imagine contesting their low status (with Russian support or not), the Polish minority has too low a vitality for this.

Latgalians form a case distinct from all of the others: because of the possible subgroup identification with the mainstream Latvian ethnicity, several general trends in attitudes characteristic of other settings studied do not hold here, and also no consistent pattern could be detected except that this setting is characterised by the lowest level of ethnic heat on the part of both the minority and the majority.

Theoretically, the results show that ethnic temperature contributes to ethnolinguistic vitality by reducing out-group contact, making the inter-ethnic boundaries appear more

rigid and cultural differences larger. Also, hot individuals see the legitimacy of the intergroup setting in a more conflictual way and may perceive their in-group as relatively weaker, as do cold individuals. In the case of minority groups, a large number of hot individuals are opposed to possible language and identity shift and, in the case of majorities, this strengthens ethnocentrism and alignment to group norms and values for individual members.

A significant finding of this study is the distinct difference in inter-ethnic attitudes towards different out-groups. The concept of hot and cold ethnicities was conceptualised as an absolute measure characterising an ethnicity (Ehala 2011), but the results of this comparative study indicate that an ethnicity can be hot in one inter-ethnic setting and cold in another setting. For example, Lithuanians are considerably hotter towards Poles than towards Russian-speakers, and Latvians hotter towards Russian-speakers than to Latgalians. This means that characteristics of hotness, such as closed inter-ethnic boundaries, avoidance of contact and the use of the out-group language, are not features characteristic of this ethnicity in general, but only for certain settings. So, for example, an ethnicity that is ethnocentric and closed in one setting (e.g. Estonians towards Russian-speakers) can be open and even show out-group favouritism in another setting (e.g. Estonians towards Western Europeans; see Tammemägi and Ehala 2012).

While the ethnolinguistic vitality questionnaire used in this study made it possible to address the phenomenon of ethnic temperature, the instrument was not designed particularly for this purpose. This sets some limitations on what conclusions can be drawn from its use. Theoretically, ethnic temperature is assumed to strengthen vitality, yet in the theoretical model of vitality, the temperature parameters (Dt and U) are taken as the defining parameters for vitality (amongst other parameters). Therefore, it is inevitable that vitality scores are higher for those ethnicities that have higher scores for Dt and U. In addition, the comparison of hot and cold subgroups revealed that Dt and U also affect some other parameters that are assumed to contribute to vitality. In short, the set of relevant inter-ethnic attitudes and perceptions form a complex and interrelated set. The analysis of these interrelations should lead to an improved model of vitality, as well as to a more precise conceptualisation of the factors that contribute to ethnic temperature (Dt, U and possibly others).

To conclude, the current paper tried to answer the question raised by Polese (forthcoming) about how to measure ethnic temperature. Using the survey questionnaire for ethnolinguistic vitality, we specified two parameters that we believed were major contributors to the ethnic temperature, and were able to show that individuals who scored high on these parameters perceived intergroup boundaries as more rigid, had fewer linguistic contacts with out-group members and saw the legitimacy of the inter-ethnic situation in more conflicting ways than individuals who could be characterised as ethnically cold. We were able to specify the relative heat of different ethnic communities in the Baltic setting and specify its nature by qualitative analysis, revealing that the core issues increasing ethnic temperature are grounded in historical memories involving inter-ethnic conflict, and that the ethnic temperatures are constructed dialogically in intergroup communication between majority and minority groups.

We acknowledge that the theoretical insights obtained from this study are far from conclusive. On the contrary, this is just one of the few large comparative studies that have tried to specify the complex set of factors that influence inter-ethnic attitudes and perceptions and how these relate to ethnolinguistic behaviour. It is very likely that there are other significant factors involved that were not included in our study.

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Notes

1. R comes from the notion of radius, from the metaphor of the gravity of ethnic groups that attract their members. The attraction decreases as the value of R grows.
2. The following abbreviations are used here and subsequently: E – Estonian, La – Latvian, Li – Lithuanian, R – Russian-speakers, R(E) – Russian-speakers in Estonia, R(La) – Russian-speakers in Latvia, R(Li) – Russian-speakers in Lithuania, Lg – Latgalian Latvian, and P – Polish.

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Formation of territorial collective identities: turning history into emotion

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This paper provides a broad comparative summary of all the cases addressed in the Special Issue 'Hot and cold ethnicities in post-Soviet space'. The aim of the summary is to pinpoint the major features that have an impact on the ethnic temperatures in the social settings studied. This paper argues that ethnic, national, civic and imperial groups are representatives of the same type (territorial groups) and the collective identity formation which for all of them is principally similar. As the case studies indicate historical narratives and collective memory are invariably used for the formation of the emotional attachment to collective identity. The case studies provide support to an understanding that any territorial group is a project rather than a thing and resulting groupness is a happening which needs continuous enactment to sustain its state.

Keywords: collective identity formation; emotional attachment; post-Soviet societies

Introduction

The goal of the current special issue (SI) has been to explore the concept of hot and cold ethnicities using cases from post-Soviet societies, the processes of ethnic temperature change and its effects on interethnic relations in the societies of newly emerged nation-states. While the research question was formulated in ethnic terms (Ehala 2011; Zabrodskaja and Ehala forthcoming), the papers in this SI have focused on very different groups and collective identities: ethnic minority (e.g. Polish, Latgalians), ethno-confessional minority (Jews), quasi-ethnic (the Russian speakers of Estonia and Latvia), ethnic national (Estonian, Lithuanian), civic national (Belarus), communitarian (urban Central Asians) and imperial (de-ethnicised Russians).

As people belong simultaneously to various groups, they do not have one exclusive collective identity, but rather a whole array of possible collective identities. These multiple identities are organised on various dimensions. Typical dimensions of collective identity are gender, race, ethnicity, age, language, religion, profession etc. Each of these dimensions allows a certain number of distinct categories. For example, gender identity usually has two categories, racial identity has considerably more and ethnicity even more. Prototypically, the identity which characterises a person on one particular dimension is exclusive, i.e. one is male or female, rarely both, black or white or something else, and so on.

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A comparative look at the cases in this SI reveals that all the collective identities discussed relate to each other as if they were alternatives on the same dimension: one could prefer either Belorussian civic or Belorussian ethnic collective identity (Bekus forthcoming), ethnic or urban Kyrgyz affiliation, ethnic Russian or de-ethnizised imperial affiliation (Kosmarskaya forthcoming), but rarely both. If these non-ethnic collective identities are alternative to each other and to ethnic identity, all of them are of the same type, and therefore a generalisation can be sought that could explain why these identities seem to be categories on the same dimension, and if this is so, what are the causes of their differences and how these differences relate to the sense of emotional attachment to the collective identity which underlies the metaphor of hot and cold ethnicities.

In this concluding paper, I will argue that all collective identities discussed in this SI are functionally equivalent and therefore representatives of one general type clearly distinguishable from all other types of social groups. I will call these groups territorial groups. This generalisation enables us to see that the differences of emotional attachment that they are able to induce from their members are partly due to the historical depth of their existence, and partly due to different perspectives on history.

Based on this hypothesis, this paper provides a broad comparative summary of all the cases addressed in the SI. The aim of the summary is to pinpoint the major features that have an impact on the ethnic temperatures in the social settings studied. One of the most frequent findings in the case studies has been the importance of historical background for the formation of hot ethnic attitudes. This implies the importance of collective memory for the formation of the emotional attachment to collective identity and its impact on the ethnic temperature.

Traditionally, the term *ethnolinguistic* has restricted the focus of the theory to linguistic and ethnic minority groups, the mainstream society is usually just viewed as the environment where the group whose vitality is addressed exists. Such an understanding forces a distinction between ethnolinguistic groups and groups and identities which are not strictly ethnic, for example, Belarusians, urbanised Central Asians and the ‘children of empire’. As I will argue, the theory of ethnolinguistic vitality would benefit if it could treat ethnic, national, civic and imperial groups as representatives of the same type and the collective identity formation for all of them as principally similar.

Territorial groups

The term *territorial groups* is borrowed from Guibernau (2004) who uses it in the definition of ‘nations without states’ which are ‘those territorial communities with their own identity and a desire for self-determination included within the boundaries of one or more states, with which, by and large, they do not identify’. The notion of a nation without a state makes the continuum from ethnic minorities, to ethnic and civic nations and even to imperial nations clearly visible, by specifying the central property that all these groups share – they all can function as human societies; and because of this property, they are functionally equivalent. The main functional goal for any society is to provide physical and cultural security (Berezin 2002).

Since territorial groups are functionally equivalent, they share other important features. First, territory is a necessary condition for every human society, and therefore every group of this type has an association with a territory where their members reside, and/or has a shared concept of (historic) homeland. Second, language is a necessary tool for any society to function, and thus it is not surprising that it becomes the main token of a territorial group. Even if the same language is also used by some other territorial

groups, dialectal differences emerge which correspond to territorial spread and function as indices to the territory where the group resides. Thus, a distinct language variety characterises first and foremost a territorial community. Third, the formation of territorial groups is universal. Living in a form of society is the basic way of operation of human species. Forming a society is a territorial phenomenon and as it involves interaction and temporal continuity, it will start to produce cultural material that can work as a basis of formation of a collective identity. Therefore, the emergence of territorial groups with their distinct collective identities is a universal property of social functioning, they are omnipresent, they are substances that the social world is made of and despite the fact that they are socially constructed, there is no way how they could be disposed in principle.

Certainly, some territorial groups are merged or dissolved in the continuous process of group (re)formation; and different territorial identities may involve different fractions of the society, so that sometimes there are several competing identities around. But if we see the emergence of territorial groups as ongoing process of identity formation that makes the society more coherent, nevertheless this process is functionally directed towards creation of a set of shared values and emotional attachment to the group affiliation. If it fails this, the identity project collapses by being broken down to these smaller territorial groups which it aims to incorporate, or losing its members to a more attractive territorial group. The hypothesis behind the concept of hot and cold ethnicities is that one of the most powerful social psychological factors affecting this process is the members' sense of emotional attachment to their collective identity. The cases in this SI clearly provide support to this view.

The role of history in collective identity formation

The comparative analysis of the cases presented in this SI points to recurrent patterns of intergroup attitudes correlating to different degrees of ethnic temperatures. These features are not fully independent on each other, but mutually reinforcing in several ways. As the analysis will show, the nature of historical narratives in the collective memory seems to be one of the main factors that affects the emotional attachment to collective identity and to the nature of intergroup relations in general.

This regularity is summarised in Figure 1. In the top row, the social settings studied are presented in an abbreviated way: R in the left side in the setting abbreviation stands for the Russian speaking minority, R in the right hand in *Jewish - R* setting represents the national majority in Russia. The rest of the abbreviations stand for Bel(arusian), Ukr (ainian), Cent(ral) Asian, Li(thuanian), Est(onian) and La(tvian) ethic/national groups. The dark grey indicates highest presence of the feature, light grey a partial presence and white the weakest presence or absence of the feature. The greyscale is relative, reflecting just the differences between the cases in this set, not absolute values.

The first three features in the figure follow from the principles of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979): the perceived stability expresses the general belief of whether there are realistic alternatives to the existing intergroup power relations; legitimacy expresses the consensus amongst the majority and minority group members whether the existing power and status differences between the groups are legitimate; and the boundary permeability indicates whether it is possible socially to move from one group to the other, mainly from the lower status group to the higher status group.

However, the status issue is not clear-cut for all cases studied. In all settings, the titular languages have official status in the setting and so, in principle the titular groups

	R - Bel	R - Ukr	R - CentAsian	R - Li	Po - Li	Jewish - R	R- Est	R- La
Perceived stability								
Legitimacy								
Boundary permeability								
Minority prestige								
Dialect continuum								
Conflicting memories								
Ethnic temperature								

Figure 1. Factors related to intergroup processes.

should be regarded as high status groups. Still, Russian language and culture enjoy a considerable prestige (feature *Minority prestige* in Figure 1) in Belarus, Ukraine and in Central Asian republics, and Russian language has some form of official recognition there, too. Therefore, it is not very clear that we have any significant status differences in these cases in regard to the titular and Russian-speaking groups.

This means that in Belarus, Ukraine and the Central Asian countries studied, boundary permeability might mean the possibility and at least some tendency to affiliate to the Russian-speaking community. In the case of Belarus and Ukraine, the picture is even further blurred by the linguistic and cultural closeness of these groups to the Russian language and culture (feature *Dialect continuum*), so that it is fairly effortless to switch from one to the other identity, as the interview data presented by Polese (forthcoming) indicate that members of the same family can easily chose different ethnolinguistic identities.

In the rest of the cases, the official mainstream identities have clearly higher status than the minorities, and thus, the boundary permeability would mean the possibility to move from the minority to the majority group. Even though the boundaries are in no cases so rigid as to prevent any shift of the group membership, as Ehala and Zabrodskaja (forthcoming) show, in Latvia and Estonia, there is little shift from the minority to the majority groups, and majorities are not eager to accept shifting minority members, either. In Lithuania, Russian speakers are shifting and being accepted easily, but not Polish speakers. According to Nosenko-Stein (forthcoming), banal anti-semitism makes it difficult to the Jewish, too, to assimilate to the mainstream which is particularly vividly expressed in the identity type of Negative Jew.

A strong recurring factor that influences the intergroup relations and the possible identity processes is the collective memory: as all papers in this volume indicate, the historical background is extremely important in understanding the character of the attitudes towards out-groups: where the historical narratives of the majority and minority are compatible, the interethnic processes are more or less harmonic, where the narratives contain conflicting interpretations and assessment of the same historic events, the intergroup relations are tenser. For example, in Belarus, Ukraine and Central Asian republics, the legacy of the Soviet period is assessed similarly by the minorities and majorities: Stalinist repressions are commemorated, the victory of the Great Patriotic War celebrated and the economic advancements of the soviet period positively recognised. These societies are characterised by less salient ethnic divisions.

Also in Lithuania, it seems that the soviet past is mainly seen in a positive nostalgic light, and identity building is not based on commemorations that strongly conflict with the identity narratives in Russia. At the same time, the situation is different with Poles – the long dispute with Poland over the Vilnius is clearly based on conflicting interpretations of history and so it makes it more difficult for Lithuanians to accept Poles as in-group members even if the local Poles seem to accept the Lithuanian viewpoint about history (see Ehala and Zabrodskaja forthcoming). Quite similar is the collective memory situation in the case of Russian Jews – the long-lasting suspicion from the side of the majority and the experience about being discriminated against is a factor that sustains the Jewish identity by making it harder to shift to the mainstream identity and to be accepted as a full member (Nosenko-Stein forthcoming).

In Estonia and Latvia, the identity work is based very clearly on conflicting interpretations of the twentieth-century history, particularly over the nature of the Second World War (see Brüggemann and Kasekamp 2008; Ehala 2009). The whole Soviet period is seen as a social rupture of the normal national development (Jõesalu and Kõresaar 2013), and similarly the breakup of the Soviet Union is perceived as rupture by the Russian-speaking communities. Both the titular and Russian-speaking ethnicities have a significant sense of existential threat, too. As identities are being built on conflicting historical narratives, these ethnic communities are hotter and have more rigid interethnic boundaries than the rest of the cases in the set.

Conflicting narratives are also the main source for the perception of illegitimacy of the current intergroup situations by the minorities. In this set, these perceptions are the strongest amongst the Russian-speaking communities in Latvia and Estonia, and may be present also amongst the Jews and Poles, but considerably lesser extent. In the rest of the cases, interethnic relations are broadly seen as legitimate: in Lithuania, there is no legitimacy issues between Russians and Lithuanians, one of the reasons being that all residents of Lithuania were granted Lithuanian citizenship automatically when the Soviet Union collapsed, unlike in Latvia and Estonia. In Belarus, Ukraine and the Central Asian countries studied, the high informal and official status of Russian language provides good grounds for the Russian speakers to consider the situation legitimate, and if there are perceptions of illegitimacy they may be present amongst the ethnically hot subgroups amongst the titular ethnicities (Kosmarskaya forthcoming; Bekus forthcoming).

Returning to the feature *perceived stability* in Figure 1, it expresses not only the perceived strength of the minority, but its combination with the perception of legitimacy – i.e. whether the minority feels strong enough to challenge the existing intergroup power relations, and has also a strong sense of injustice to feel motivated to change the situation (for discussion of the concept of perceived stability, see Ehala and Zabrodskaja 2011). As the studies in this volume indicate, there is no widely spread motivation to challenge the situation in Belarus, Ukraine, the Central Asian Republics studied, Lithuania, and in Russia in respect of Jews, either because the situation is perceived legitimate enough by minorities or the they are just too weak to be able to see a possibility for a change. The situation is different in Estonia and Latvia where the perception of illegitimacy, conflicting narratives of history and the relative perceived deprivation by the Russian speakers (Kus, Liu, and Ward 2013) in one hand, and the relative strength of the Russian-speaking communities on the other hand contribute towards the perception of instability.

The last row in the Figure 1 presents the assessment of ethnic temperature (white – cold, grey – hot). The row above the last one gives indication as about the possible causes of higher ethnic temperature. The strongest causal effect seems to come from the collective memory: in societies where the historical narratives are conflicting and contain

experiences of intergroup conflict, discrimination and distrust, the interethnic boundaries are less permeable, the status of minorities and the perceptions of legitimacy lower (Ehala and Zabrodskaja forthcoming). In societies where the collective memories of ethnicities are not directly conflicting to each other, ethnic temperatures are lower. Certainly, the content of historical memory is socially constructed and therefore only partly determined by actual historical events (Smith 1999). This means that the ethnic temperature differences in the societies studied are not predetermined or fully explainable by different historical fates, but require a more nuanced theoretical analysis. Explicating the mechanism how historic and cultural material is used to influence the ethnic temperature is an important precursor for understanding how ethnolinguistic vitality changes over time.

Turning history to emotional attachment

The role of emotions and cultural particulars associated with collective identity have been understudied in the framework of ethnolinguistic vitality, abut also in social psychology and political psychology. For example, the Social Identity Theory envisages that if the given social identity does not provide material for a positive self-esteem, individuals assess the situation and engage in one of three strategies: social mobility, social creativity or social competition. This process is overwhelmingly seen as a rational choice game, based on the assessment of the situation. The role of emotional attachment, though recognised, has not been studied much in the EVT or SIT in general.

As summarised in Figure 1, the single and most powerful factor that shapes ethnic temperatures and the emotional attachment is the content of collective memory. The material in the collective memory is formed in the course of history. Although real history is one and fixed, the course of events is perceived differently by different participants, and as there is no universal neutral observer, the descriptions of history are all partial, reflecting the viewpoint of the narrator. This fact has direct consequence to the formation of collective memory. Collective memory is not a whole that is formed uniformly in the group, but it takes place in different settings like families, school, work places etc., in different forms like literature, theatre, film, art, rituals; it can be forged by different types of institutions both bottom-up and top-down nature, and it is actively negotiated (see Misztal 2003).

Although the sense of common history is often coupled with a belief in common ancestry, this is not necessary. For example, the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia do not have a common ancestry, but still have a shared sense of history and collective memory. The latter draws its most powerful emotional forces from the period of the Soviet Union, not that much from the folkloristic material of ethnic Russianness. Still, these groups function in identity-wise similarly as ‘proper’ ethnic groups characterised by longer history, a common ancestry and heritage language.

Furthermore, even the collective identity of urban Central Asians that unites Russian speakers and Russian-oriented titulars with urban lifestyle (see Kosmarskaya forthcoming) is the identity of a territorial group that has some common cultural stuff that supports emotional attachment to this identity (connected to consumer values, Europeanness and again the historical material from the Soviet period). Even though this cultural material may be shallow in comparison with ‘proper’ ethnic identities due to a short period of its historical presence, it fulfils functionally the same purposes. In Belarus, we see the formation of a collective identity that aims to embrace all people living in Belarus notwithstanding their ethnic affiliations. Still, this identity, even though it is cold, has some cultural material, mainly drawn from the period of the Soviet Union that the members share and which can

be used for creating emotional attachment. This variant of Belarus identity is not ethnic, but it is aimed to achieve the same level of solidarity, cohesiveness and emotional significance as we see in the case of old type of ethnicities. Therefore, all these cases indicate the same processes of emergence of territorial groups and corresponding collective identities be they ethnic, national, civic or imperial.

Territorial group as a process

Analysing the cases in this SI, there are groups with different ethnic temperature present. Some of them are as hot as the main ethnicities in the Baltic countries, some are diffused and cold as in the case of Ukraine and Belarus, and may be in the early stages of emergence as the urban Central Asians. Kosmarskaya (forthcoming) also mentions the Russian-speaking 'children of the empire', who had a lower sense of ethnic affiliation and a broader affiliation to the state and modern lifestyles. Even the imperial identity is in its essence the collective identity of a territorial group, even if the territory is very large and the imperial group is a tiny yet powerful minority in this territory. Still the 'children of empire' had a sense of shared history, territory, values and other cultural particulars that create emotional attachment to a collective identity.

One may argue that such a small minority of the population cannot claim to represent a truly imperial nation in any way similar to that of ethnic groups or nation-state nations. This raises the famous question of 'When is a nation?' by Walker Connor (1994), i.e. at which point we can talk about a territorial group as a distinctive collective entity with its own collective identity. Surely, there is no answer to the question when a territorial group is formed and ready, they always face the challenge of incorporating new members, either newly arrived migrants or members of ethnic minorities who still have their heritage territorial identity prevailing over the larger one. This gives support to an understanding that any territorial group is a project rather than thing (Berezin 2002) and resulting groupness is an event, something that happens (Brubaker 2004) rather than a substance. In this perspective, even 'proper' ethnic groups are projects not entities, although some of them have been very successful and have managed emotionally to tie an overwhelming majority in a certain territory. But identity formation may also be less successful, like ethnic Belarusianness which is a project struggling over the loyalty of the population against the civic type of affiliation promoted by Belarusian authorities.

The conclusion here is that there are always different elites who act to call a territorial group to being and often these different group formation processes are in competition. Imperial elites work for creating emotional attachment to imperial identity, ethnic elites to national or ethnic identity urban elites for their urban identity and so on. Even though some of these projects seem to be overarching existing ethnic affiliations, what they are aiming at is a functionally similar project than ethnicity. They are just in a very beginning of this process. If they succeed, a group and corresponding collective identity emerges which is functionally similar to what we know as ethnic.

Therefore, one can say that the formation of a territorial group is a project that aims to align a concept of territory with that of corresponding identity and language, by creating necessary language competencies and emotional attachment. As emotional attachment is created communicatively it requires a shared language to emerge. Emotional attachment is created by using historical material that is associated with social values. In a given territory there could be several parallel projects of territorial group generation, some of which are not necessarily exclusive, if they can be conceptualised in a subgroup relationship. What is ultimately a matter of competition is the locus of the strongest

emotional attachment. This territorial group project that has the richest historical material that all of potential members can emotionally relate to and knows how to present this material in the public discourse attractively, succeeds to acquire the strongest emotional attachment amongst the largest segment of the population in a given territory.

Conclusion

The papers in this SI have described in detail several intergroup settings in the area of the former Soviet Union, focusing particularly to the sense of emotional attachment that could be conceptualised as ethnic temperature. The analysis reveals that the sense of emotional attachment is in a strong correlation with the type of historical narratives that are organised into a coherent ideological frame in the collective identity of the groups in contact. Where the historical narratives of groups in contact are compatible, ethnic temperature is low, where they are in contradiction to each other in assessing the historic legacy, ethnic temperatures are higher. The reliance on historical narratives in creating collective memory and its connectedness to emotional attachment seems to characterise all groups analysed in the papers, even if the common history for some groups do not exceed half a century.

This indicates that the mechanism of using history in collective identity development is not a particular that characterises only ethnic groups, but a general regularity common to all territorial groups. Therefore, all territorial groups are of the same type as ethnic groups, the greatest difference being that the historical process of their formation has been significantly shorter than that of the 'proper' ethnic groups. But if they turn up to be successful, they are likely to develop a similar depth of historic, linguistic and cultural embeddedness as ethnic groups.

The SI also gave evidence that in all of the cases, there are several territorial groups being forged and formed in the same territory. Most of these groups compete over the emotional attachment of the members of the same population – Belarus being perhaps the most vivid case of competing ethnic and civic identities. This yields to an understanding that any territorial group is at the same time an entity and the process of creating this entity. As the cases in this SI indicate, the ethnogenetic processes are omnipresent, and even if some ethnicities weaken, some other are being born at the same time. Therefore, while the collective identities are 'just constructed' and any of them can be in principle deconstructed or disposed, the result of such process is not a society without a collective identity, but just a different collective identity that is functionally similar to that which it has replaced.

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