# COMPX508 – Malware Analysis

Week 10

Lecture 2: Code Injection - 2

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#### **DLLs**

```
void func1(param1, param2)
      return value;
bool func2(param1, param2, ...., paramN)
      return value;
DWORD func3(param1)
      return value;
```

### **Exports**

Any function that is created needs to be exported

#### DIIMain

- Optionally you can add a DllMain function in your library
- If defined this becomes the entry point of DLL and is executed when the library is loaded.
  - Any code in DllMain will be executed when the library is loaded
  - Malware authors often put code in DllMain and then get the library loaded, to execute the code.
    - But this is not necessary, they can also just write code in a function and then call the function
- Should be kept small as any execution here will mean the rest of the code waits for this
  execution to finish
  - You can create a thread so the execution takes place in a separate thread.

```
BOOL APIENTRY DllMain( HANDLE hModule, DWORD ul_reason_for_call, LPVOID lpReserved )
{
     ....Your code here....
     return TRUE;
}
```

### Testing DLLs with rundll32


- A DLL file cannot be directly executed
- It needs to be loaded by an existing program that can call the functions in the library

- Rundll32.exe is a program on Windows that can help with dll testing
- It can load a given dll and call a given function

```
rundll32.exe HelloDll.dll, func1
```

### Overview of Code Injection in a process

- 1. Locate the target process
- 2. Allocate memory in the target process
- 3. Write into the allocated memory
- 4. Execute the code



### Locate the target process

- Malware would usually know the name of the process they are targeting but in order to programmatically access the process they need its PID.
- On Windows CreateTool32HelpSnapshot () function in the Win32 API is often used to get an object containing a list of all the current processes with their PIDs

```
std::vector<DWORD> find_pids_by_name(const std::wstring& target_name) {
   std::vector<DWORD> pids;
   HANDLE snap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
   if (snap == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return pids;
    PROCESSENTRY32W pe;
   pe.dwSize = sizeof(pe);
   std::wstring target_lc = to_lower(target_name);
   if (Process32FirstW(snap, &pe)) {
       do {
            std::wstring exe = pe.szExeFile;
           if (to_lower(exe) == target_lc) {
                pids.push_back(pe.th32ProcessID);
       } while (Process32NextW(snap, &pe));
   CloseHandle(snap);
   return pids;
```

### Locate the target process

• Once the malware knows the PID, it will use the OpenProcess () function to get a handle for that process using the PID.

```
//Get a handle on the process
HANDLE hProcess = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, pid);
if (!hProcess) {
    std::cerr << "OpenProcess failed. Error: " << GetLastError() << "\n";
    return 1;
}</pre>
```

### Locate the target process: Detection

• Usage of CreateTool32HelpSnapshot() and OpenProcess() functions is an indication that a process is trying to get a handle on another process.

• You might also see Process32First() and Process32Next() functions that are used to iterate over the object returned by CreateTool32HelpSnapshot()

# Allocating memory and writing to it, in the target process

- Malware would use memory allocation functions to allocate memory of a specific size, usually with read, write execute permissions.
- In the Windows API VirtualAllocEx() function is used for memory allocation within a remote process. The function requires the handle obtained from OpenProcess()

```
SIZE_T allocSize = (dll_to_inject.size() + 1);
LPVOID remoteMem = VirtualAllocEx(
    hProcess,
    NULL,
    allocSize,
    MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE,
    PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
);
std::cout << "Allocated " << allocSize
    << " bytes in process " << pid
    << " at address " << remoteMem << "\n";
```

# Allocating memory and writing to it, in the target process


• In this next step the malicious code is actually written in the benign process's memory. The Win32 API function used for this is WriteProcessMemory()

## Allocating memory and writing to it, in the target process: Detection

• Usage of VirtualAllocEx() and WriteProcessMemory() functions is an indication that a process is allocating memory in the virtual address space of another process.

Additionally functions such as LookupPrivilegeValue()
 AdjustTokenPrivileges() and OpenProcessToken()
 are used to set the right privilege level for the malware process.

### Process Memory




### DLL Injection


• Once the dll path has been added in the target process' memory, the next task is to use this path and load the dll in the memory.

- Explicit Linking
  - LoadLibrary → loads the dll in the memory
  - GetProcAddress  $\rightarrow$  gets the pointer to the desired function
- But if we use these functions directly then we will load the library and the function in the memory of the local process
  - We need to do this in the target process

### Process Memory



### Process Memory



#### CreateRemoteThread


- Creates a thread that runs in the virtual address space of another process
- Call the CreateRemoteThread function to create a thread that
  - will run the LoadLibrary function
  - Pass the address to dllpath as a parameter to the LoadLibrary function

### DLL injection process

- The local process gets the handle of the target process.
- The local process first allocates memory in the target process, with the size of memory allocation, which is equal to the length of the path of the malicious DLL file.
  - For example, if the path of the DLL file on the disk is C:\Malware.dll, the size it allocates is 15 characters (including the trailing NULL character in the string).

• It then writes the path of the DLL file (i.e., C:\Malware.dll) to the

memory allocated in the target process



### DLL injection process

- The local process needs to somehow force the target process to invoke LoadLibrary() while passing to it the path of the DLL so that the DLL is loaded into its address space.
- Because kernel32.dll is always loaded at the same address in every Virtual Address Space, the address of the LoadLibrary() function can be found by looking for it in one's own Virtual Address Space.
- Once the local has the address of LoadLibrary() it can use CreateRemoteThread() to force the target process to run LoadLibrary() and use the path in the memory to load the malicious dll.

### Methods to execute code in a target process

- CreateRemoteThread
- Using APC Injection
- SetWindowsHookEx
- Using Application Compatibility Shim
- Shellcode injection

### Other Code Injection techniques

- Process Hollowing
- Hooking