LI.FI Security Review

AllBridgeFacet.sol(v2.1.0)

Security Researcher

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Contents

1 About Researcher

Sujith Somraaj is a distinguished security researcher and protocol engineer with over eight years of comprehensive experience in the Web3 ecosystem.

In addition to working as a Security researcher at Spearbit, Sujith is also the security researcher and advisor for leading bridge protocol LI.FI and also is a former founding engineer and current CISO at Superform, a yield aggregator with over $170M in TVL.

Sujith has experience working with protocols / funds including Layerzero, Edge Capital, Berachain, Optimism, Sonic, Monad, Blast, ZkSync, Decent, Drips, SuperSushi Samurai, DistrictOne, Omni-X, Centrifuge, Superform-V2, Tea.xyz, Paintswap, Bitcorn, Sweep n' Flip, Byzantine Finance, Variational Finance, Satsbridge, Earthfast and Angles

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2 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release, and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues of that given smart contract(s) or blockchain software. i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee against a hack (or) the non existence of any further findings of security issues. As one audit-based assessment cannot be considered comprehensive, I always recommend proceeding with several audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contract(s). Lastly, the security audit is not an investment advice.

This review is done independently by the reviewer and is not entitled to any of the security agencies the researcher worked / may work with.

3 Scope

- src/Facets/AllBridgeFacet.sol(v2.1.0), src/Facets/ChainflipFacet.sol(v1.0.1), src/Facets/DeBridgeDlnFacet.sol(v1.0.1)
- src/Facets/MayanFacet.sol(v1.2.1), src/Facets/RelayFacet.sol(v1.0.1)
- src/Helpers/LiFiData.sol(v1.0.0), src/Helpers/SwapperV2.sol(v1.0.1)
- src/Interfaces/ILiFi.sol(v1.0.1), src/Libraries/LibAsset.sol(v2.1.1), src/Periphery/ReceiverChainflip.sol(v1.0.1)

4 Risk classification

Severity level	Impact: High	Impact: Medium	Impact: Low
Likelihood: high	Critical	High	Medium
Likelihood: medium	High	Medium	Low
Likelihood: low	Medium	Low	Low

4.1 Impact

High   leads to a loss of a significant portion (>10%) of assets in the protocol, or significant harm to a majority of users.

Medium   global losses <10% or losses to only a subset of users, but still unacceptable.

Low   losses will be annoying but bearable — applies to things like griefing attacks that can be easily repaired or even gas inefficiencies.

4.2 Likelihood

High   almost certain to happen, easy to perform, or not easy but highly incentivized

Medium   only conditionally possible or incentivized, but still relatively likely

Low   requires stars to align, or little-to-no incentive

4.3 Action required for severity levels

Critical   Must fix as soon as possible (if already deployed)

High   Must fix (before deployment if not already deployed)

Medium   Should fix

Low   Could fix

5 Executive Summary

Over the course of 3 hours in total, LI.FI engaged with the researcher to audit the contracts described in section 3 of this document ("scope").

In this period of time a total of 3 issues were found. This review focussed only on the changes made from the previous version, not the code on its entirety.

Project Summary	
Project Name	LI.FI
Repository	lifinance/contracts
Commit	30b38a1
Audit Timeline	July 17, 2025 - July 18, 2025
Methods	Manual Review
Documentation	High
Test Coverage	High

Issues Found	
Critical Risk	0
High Risk	0
Medium Risk	0
Low Risk	1
Gas Optimizations	0
Informational	2
Total Issues	**3**

6 Findings

6.1 Low Risk

6.1.1 Overpaid fees are lost

Context: AllBridgeFacet.sol#L172

Description: The `_allBridgeData.fees` parameter is not validated, so any excess fees paid are lost because the AllBridge router does not refund overpaid fees.

Recommendation: Consider implementing basic validations as follows:

```
uint256 fees = ALLBRIDGE.getTransactionCost(5) +
  ALLBRIDGE_ROUTER.getMessageCost(
    5,
    IAllBridge.MessengerProtocol.Allbridge
  );

if(_allBridgeData.fees > fees) _allBridgeData.fees = fees;
```

LI.FI: Acknowledged. Added more documentation around the behavior in d354cfa0129198d80d47f4ba6f70f05871a214a1

Researcher: Acknowledged.

6.2 Informational

6.2.1 Inconsistent type

Context: AllBridgeFacet.sol#L130-L133, AllBridgeFacet.sol#L191

Description: The function `_getAllBridgeChainId()` silently casts the **uint32** all bridge chain ids into **uint256** chain id exhibiting inconsistency.

Recommendation: Either declare all bridge chain IDs as uint256 instead of uint32 in the constants.

LI.FI: Fixed in be294328fb27a8abbe39dd04a13920ed2d413347

Researcher: Verified fix

6.2.2 Emit `BridgeToNonEVMChain` event

Context: AllBridgeFacet.sol#L125

Description: The `_startBridge()` function enables bridging to non-EVM chains but doesn't emit the `BridgeToNonEVMChain` event like other facets. This omission breaks composability.

Recommendation: Consider emitting `BridgeToNonEVMChain` event while bridging to non evm chains.

LI.FI: Fixed in 240e8072a23c400a7ca870b8500ed0fc61d2b0df

Researcher: Verified fix