

Malware Unpacking Workshop



Lilly Chalupowski
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Table: *who.is* results

| | |
|------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Name | Lilly Chalupowski |
| Status | Employed |
| Creation Date | 1986 |
| Expiry | A Long Time from Now (Hopefully) |
| Registrant Name | GoSecure |
| Administrative Contact | Travis Barlow |
| Job | TITAN Malware Research Lead |

Agenda

What will we cover?

- Disclaimer
- Reverse Engineering
 - Registers
 - Stack
 - Heap
 - Assembly
 - Calling Conventions
- Tools
 - x64dbg
 - Cutter
 - Radare2
 - Detect it Easy
 - HxD
- Injection Techniques
 - DLL Injection
 - PE Injection
 - Process Hollowing
 - Atom Bombing
- Workshop

Disclaimer

Don't be a Criminal

disclaimer.log


The tools and techniques covered in this presentation can be dangerous and are being shown for educational purposes.

It is a violation of Federal laws to attempt gaining unauthorized access to information, assets or systems belonging to others, or to exceed authorization on systems for which you have not been granted.

Only use these tools with/on systems you own or have written permission from the owner. I (the speaker) do not assume any responsibility and shall not be held liable for any illegal use of these tools.

Reverse Engineering

It's easy don't worry!



Registers


Not this one!



Registers

Not the kind with money in them


- EAX - Return Value of Functions
- EBX - Base Index (for use with arrays)
- ECX - Counter in Loops
- EDI - Destination Memory Operations
- ESI - Source Memory Operations
- ESP - Stack Pointer
- EBP - Base Frame Pointer



Did You Know: In computer architecture, a processor register is a quickly accessible location available to a computer's central processing unit (CPU).


The Stack

- Last-In First-Out
- Downward Growth
- Function Local Variables
- ESP
- Increment / Decrement = 4
 - Double-Word Aligned



Stack

The stack



Control Flow

Keeping it under control

- Conditionals
 - CMP
 - TEST
 - JMP
 - JCC
- EFLAGS
 - ZF / Zero Flag
 - SF / Sign Flag
 - CF / Carry Flag
 - OF/Overflow Flag



Calling Conventions

Subtitle goes here


- CDECL
 - Arguments Right-to-Left
 - Return Values in EAX
 - Calling Function Cleans the Stack
- STDCALL
 - Used in Windows Win32API
 - Arguments Right-to-Left
 - Return Values in EAX
 - The called function cleans the stack, unlike CDECL
 - Does not support variable arguments
- FASTCALL
 - Uses registers as arguments
 - Useful for shellcode



Windows Memory Structure

subtitle


- Stack - Grows up to lower addresses
- Heap - Grows down to higher addresses
- Program Image
- TEB - Thread Environment Block
 - GetLastError()
 - GetVersion()
 - Pointer to the PEB
- PEB - Process Environment Block
 - Image Name
 - Global Context
 - Startup Parameters
 - Image Base Address
 - IAT (Import Address Table)



IAT (Import Address Table) and IDT (Import Lookup Table)

subtitle

- Identical to the IDT (Import Directory Table)
- Binding - The process of where functions are mapped to their virtual addresses overwriting the IAT
- Often the IDT and IAT must be rebuilt when packing and unpacking malware



Assembly

Instructions

- Common Instructions
 - MOV
 - XOR
 - PUSH
 - POP



Assembly CDECL (Linux)

subtitle

cdecl.c

```
__cdecl int add_cdecl(int a, int b){  
    return a + b;  
}  
int x = add_cdecl(2, 3);
```

Assembly CDECL (Linux)

subtitle

cdecl.asm

```
_add_cdecl:
    push ebp
    mov ebp, esp
    mov eax, [ebp + 8] ; get 3 from the stack
    mov edx, [ebp + 12] ; get 2 from the stack
    add eax, edx ; add values to eax
    pop ebp
    ret

_start:
    push 3 ; second argument
    push 2 ; first argument
    call _add_cdecl
    add esp, 8
```


Assembly STDCALL (Windows)

subtitle

stdcall.c

```
__stdcall int add_stdcall(int a, int b){  
    return a + b;  
}  
int x = add_stdcall(2, 3);
```

Assembly STDCALL (Windows)

subtitle

stdcall.asm

```
_add_stdcall:
    push ebp
    mov ebp, esp
    mov eax, [ebp + 8] ; set eax to 3
    mov edx, [ebp + 12] ; set edx to 2
    add eax, edx
    pop ebp
    ret 8 ; how many bytes to pop
_start: ; main function
    push 3 ; second argument
    push 2 ; first argument
    call _add_stdcall
```

Assembly FASTCALL

subtitle

cdecl.c

```
__fastcall int add_fastcall(int a, int b){  
    return a + b;  
}  
int x = add_fastcall(2, 3);
```

Assembly FASTCALL

subtitle

fastcall.asm

```
_add_fastcall:
    push ebp
    mov ebp, esp
    add eax, edx        ; add and save result in eax
    pop ebp
    ret

_start:
    mov eax, 2          ; first argument
    mov edx, 3          ; second argument
    call _add_fastcall
```

Guess the Calling Convention

Hello World Intel Syntax

hello.asm

```
section      .text                ; the code section
global      _start                ; tell linker entrypoint
_start:
    mov     edx,len                ; message length
    mov     ecx,msg                ; message to write
    mov     ebx,1                  ; file descriptor stdout
    mov     eax,4                  ; syscall number for write
    int     0x80                  ; linux x86 interrupt
    mov     eax,1                  ; syscall number for exit
    int     0x80                  ; linux x86 interrupt
section      .data                ; the data section
    msg     db 'Hello, world!',0x0 ; null terminated string
    len     equ $ - msg           ; message length
```

Assembler and Linking

subtitle

terminal

```
malware@work ~$ nasm -f elf32 -o hello.o hello.asm
```

```
malware@work ~$ ld -m elf_i386 -o hello hello.o
```


```
malware@work ~$ ./hello
```

Hello, World!


```
malware@work ~$
```

Assembly Flavors

I know you were thinking it!




Tools of the Trade




VirtualBox

Purpose


- Snapshots
- Security Layer
- Multiple Systems




- Resolving APIs
- Dumping Memory
- Modify Control Flow
- Identify Key Behaviors




x64dbg Overview






x64dbg Context Menus



Cutter


Purpose


- Markup Reverse Engineered Code
- Control Flow Navigation
- Pseudo Code



Cutter

Graph View





Radare2


Backend of Cutter

```
[0x0003960]> !screenfetch
-./oyddmdhs+:+
-odNNNNNNNNNNNNmhs+/-
-yNNNNNNNNNNNNNNmdhy+-
+oeNNNNNNNNNNNNNadnnnddhhyy/-
+omNNNNNNNNNNNNNNhyyyohndddhhhd+
-ydNNNNNNNNNNNNNNdhs+so/-mddhhhhhd+
+cyhdNNNNNNNNNNNNNNdmdddhhhhhyhWd
:cyhhdNNNNNNNNNNNNNNdmdddhhhhhyh
+sydNNNNNNNNNNNNNNdmdddhhhhhhmMay
/+NNNNNNNNNNNNNNdmdddhhhhhhmMhs+
+NNNNNNNNNNNNNNdmddddhdmMhs+
+NNNNNNNNNNNNNNdmdddddmMhs+/-
/NNNNNNNNNNNNNNdmdddmMhds+
+NNNNNNNNNNNNNNmdsdmMhds+/-
+NNNNNNNNNNNNNNmdsdmMhs+/-
/NNNNNNNNNNNNNNmdhs+/-
/NNNNNNNNNNNNNNmdhs+/-
/ohdmddhs+++/-
-./!!!!/:-
[0x0003960]> pd 16
;-- section..text:
(fcn) main 678
int main (int argc, char **argv, char **envp);
bp: 0 (vars 0, args 0)
sp: 9 (vars 9, args 0)
rg: 2 (vars 0, args 2)
; DATA XREF from entry0 (0x530d)
0x0003960 4157      push r15
0x0003962 4156      push r14
0x0003964 4155      push r13
0x0003966 4154      push r12
0x0003968 55        push rbp
0x0003969 53        push rbx
0x000396a 89fd      mov ebp, edi
0x000396c 4889f3    mov rbx, rsi
0x000396f 4883ec48  sub rsp, 0x48
0x0003973 488b3e    mov rdi, qword [rsi]
0x0003976 e875dc0800 call fcn.000115f0
0x000397b 488d35603301 lea rsi, [0x00016ce2]
0x0003982 bf06000000 mov edi, 6
0x0003987 e824feffff call sym.imp.setlocale
0x000398c 488d35903401 lea rsi, str_usr_share_locale
0x0003993 488d3d6f3401 lea rdi, [0x00016e09]
; [13] -r-x section size 72107 named .text
; argc
; argv
; "H"
; argv
; const char *locale
; int category
; char *setlocale(int category, const char *locale)
; 0x16e23; "/usr/share/locale"; char *dirname
; "coreutils"; char *domainname
[0x0003960]> px 32
- offset - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF
0x0003960 4157 4156 4155 4154 5553 89fd 4889 f348 AMAVAUATUS..H..H
0x0003970 83ec 4848 8b3e e875 dc08 0048 8d35 6033 ..HH.>.u..H.5`3
[0x0003960]> !scrt
```

Detect it Easy

Purpose


- Type
- Packer
- Linker
- Entropy




HxD

Purpose

- Modify Dumps
- Read Memory
- Determine File Type



- Code View
- Debugging
- Unpacking



Useful Linux Commads

subtitle

terminal

```
malware@work ~$ file sample.bin
```

```
sample.bin: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
```

```
malware@work ~$ exiftool sample.bin > metadata.log
```

```
malware@work ~$ hexdump -C -n 128 sample.bin | less
```

```
malware@work ~$ VBoxManage list vms
```

```
"win10" {53014b4f-4c94-49b0-9036-818b84a192c9}
```

```
"win7" {942cde2e-6a84-4edc-b98a-d7326b4662ee}
```

```
malware@work ~$ VBoxManage startvm win7
```

```
malware@work ~$
```

When you're afraid
of **Injection** 😬



But your **crush** is
watching 😂


That relatable moment when
your crush comes to watch your
doctor's appointment 😂😂😂😂



DLL Injection

Test

- Get Handle to Target Process
- Allocate Memory
- Write Memory
- Execute by use of Remote Thread



PE (Portable Executable) Injection

Placeholder