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game theory

- classically, searching involves one agent trying to reach its objective
- games involve searching in the presence of an opponent
- games are represented like search problems:
 - o states: game board configurations
 - o operators/actions: allowed moves
 - o initial state: current game state
 - o end state: winning game state

sequential games

- players move one at a time
- have an heuristic \$h(S)\$ for how good a state is
- assuming a zero-sum game, we can use a single evaluation function for both players: \$f\$
 - the higher, the more advantageous to the computer
 - o the lower (negative!), the more advantageous to the player
 - this evaluation function can be tricky to find

minimax

- a minimax tree involves nodes in a tree where MIN and MAX levels alternate
- computer tries to maximize MAX levels, opponent tries to minimize MIN levels
- select a depth limit and an eval function, and generate the tree up to \$n\$ deep
- evaluate the leaves, propagate their value up
 - select minimum value for MIN
 - select maximum value for MAX
- for trees with chance-nodes (e.g.: dice throws), use the expected values for the chance-nodes
 - chance nodes before a MIN layer \$\$expectimin(A) = \sum_i(P(d_i) * minvalue(i))\$\$
 - chance nodes before a MAX layer \$\$expectimax(A) = \sum_i(P(d_i) * maxvalue(i))\$\$
 - o basically, weighted sums

alpha-beta pruning

- an optimization for minimax
- cancel generation for parts of the tree that aren't needed
- the idea is to keep an estimate for each node based on the currently explored nodes below
 - \$\alpha\$ for MAX nodes, updated as descendants are explored
 - \$\beta\$ for MIN nodes, updated as descendants are explored
 - o if parent.alpha >= self.beta, stop exploring self, since self.beta only goes down
 - o if parent.beta <= self.alpha, stop exploring self, since self.alpha only goes up
- for trees deeper than 4 levels, alpha-beta pruning applies to deeper levels too
 - look up the alpha or beta of not only the node above, but the nodes 3, 5, etc. above too all of the alphas or betas on the way to the root
- other optimizations include:
 - o forward-pruning ignore sub-trees if they don't make sense to explore

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- too similar to ones encountered before?
- have seemingly irrational moves?
- only recommended at big depths, not near the root
- searching with a time limit: return the best move so far when the time runs out

monte carlo tree search

• apply the following algorithm:

1. selection:

- all nodes have a value: the ratio of wins passing through that node vs. total times passed through that node (\$wins / passes\$)
- select the max ratio on each level to reach a node where statistics don't exist for all children
- o upper confidence bound (UCB1) selection maximizes the following expression instead: $n_i + \sqrt{n_i} + \sqrt{n_i}$ = passes for child; $n_i = passes for child$; $n_i = passes for child$; $n_i = passes for self$
- selection can pick a node that's already a terminal state
 - if it's a loss, give it a very small value to prevent its choice next time
 - if it's a win, give it a very large value, and give its parent a very small value

2. expansion:

- applied when selection cannot continue
- o select a random unvisited leaf node and add a new record for each of its sons (0/0)
- o nodes with 0/0 will be selected first every time using UCB1, as they have infinite value

3. simulation:

- o after expansion, start simulation
- o do random moves until you get to a terminal state (win/loss)
- this kind of simulation is also called *rollout* or *playout*
- sometimes, instead of a completely random search, you can use weighting heuristics to choose
 "better" moves

4. **actualization** (or retro-propagation)

- o after simulation, increment passes (and wins) for all visited nodes
- o a win is incremented only on the nodes corresponding to the winning player
- o don't update down, just up from the node added in the expansion step to the root
- after repatedly applying the above algorithm, choose the move with the most passes, as its value is the best estimated
 - o since it was explored most, its value must be great too
- after the computer and the opponent move, the corresponding sub-tree can be reused as initial values for the next iteration

MCTS vs minimax

- MCTS doesn't need heuristics
- MCTS is asymmetrical: exploration converges towards better moves

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• MCTS is anytime: it can produce an estimate of the best move at any time

strategy games

- different from sequential games
- these games represent strategic, simultaneous interactions between rational agents
 - these agents are assumed to pick their actions to maximize their winnings
- elements:
 - o at least 2 players or agents
 - o each agent has a number of different strategies to use
 - the chosen strategies of each agent determine the **outcome** of the game
 - o for every outcome, there is a numeric payoff for each player
- these elements can be represented by a payoff matrix, as seen below

famous example: prisonier's dillema

- 2 agents: 2 detained people
- both have the same strategies: confess to the crime, or deny involvement
- the agents choose their actions simultaneously, without knowing what the other agent is going to choose
- outcome: years of prison time
- payoff: less years \$\rightarrow\$ bigger payoff
- example payoff matrix:

| | deny | confess |
|---------|--------|---------|
| deny | -1, -1 | -5, 0 |
| confess | 0, -5 | -3, -3 |


• the first payoff in each cell is for agent 1 (blue) and the second is for agent 2 (red)

zero-sum games

• for any result of the game, the sum of agent payouts will be 0. example:

| | С | D |
|---|-------|-------|
| Α | 2, -2 | -1, 1 |
| В | 1, -1 | -3, 3 |

• two-player zero-sum games can be represented by a simplified payout matrix:



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|-----------|
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• the represented winnings are for the first agent (blue), and they are reversed for the second one

domination

• a strategy \$S\$ dominates a strategy \$T\$ of the same agent if any result of \$S\$ is at least as good as the corresponding result in \$T\$

- a rational agent should never play a dominated strategy
- if every agent has a dominating strategy and plays it, their combination and the respective payoffs is called the game's **dominant strategy equilibrium**
- example:

| | C | D |
|---|------|------|
| Α | 1, 3 | 4, 2 |
| В | 2, 4 | 7, 1 |

- \$B\$ dominates \$A\$ for agent 1, and \$C\$ dominates \$D\$ for agent 2
- this means that \$(B, C)\$ will be the dominant strategy equilibrium
- not all dominations will be apparent at first
 - the principle of higher order dominance
 - cross out the dominated strategies
 - excluding the crossed-out strategies, more dominations will appear
 - o repeat until equilibrium found
 - o example:
 - \$D\$ dominates \$E\$, cross out \$E\$
 - \$B\$ now dominates \$A\$, cross out \$A\$
 - \$D\$ now dominates \$C\$, cross out \$C\$
 - what's left is the equilibrium, \$(B, D)\$

| | U | D | Е |
|---|------|------|-------|
| Α | 1, 1 | 2, 0 | 3, -1 |
| В | 2, 1 | 4, 3 | 2, 0 |

pure Nash equilibrium

- a combination of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if each player maximizes their winnings, given other player's strategies
- it identifies stable strategy combinations, in the sense that switching strategies will not yield better results unless the other agents do the same
- idk what the $u_i(s_i^*, s_{-i}^*) \neq u_i(s_i, s_{-i}^*)$ stuff is about but thats a nash equilibrium
 - it's strict if \$\qt\$ instead
- to find pure nash equilibriums:
 - write \${\$ before the payoff for the first player if it's the best on the column
 - write \$}\$ after the payoff for the second player if it's the best on the line

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o pure nash equilibriums will be between curly braces

o example:

| | deny | confess |
|---------|---------|------------|
| deny | -1, -1 | -5, 0 } |
| confess | { 0, -5 | { -3, -3 } |