

## Mitsubishi UFJ Lease & Finance (8593 JP)

Target Price **¥580.0**  
 Current Price **¥465.0**  
 % Upside **25%**

### Global and Diversified Portfolio Should Cushion NIRP Yield Squeeze


#### Diversified Financials

#### Japan

07 Apr 2016

**BUY**


Target: ¥580.0  
 % Upside: 25%



#### Basic Share Information

Market cap ¥416.6b / US\$3.77b  
 Daily volume (3mth) US\$11.89m  
 Shares outstanding 895.8m  
 Free float 40%  
 Net debt-to-equity 608.9%  
 1 yr high ¥695.0  
 1 yr low ¥439.0  
 Foreign shareholding 22%  
 Last HTI contact w/ Co 22 Mar 16

#### Price/Volume



Source: Bloomberg

	1mth	3mth	12mth
Absolute	-9.9%	-20.0%	-25.6%
Absolute USD	-6.9%	-14.2%	-19.7%
Relative to NKY	-2.8%	-8.4%	-5.6%



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#### Awaiting Normalization of Sentiment toward Financials

**Summary:** We initiate coverage of Mitsubishi UFJ Lease & Finance (MULF) with a BUY rating as we think its globalized asset portfolio, diversified financing model, and recovering (albeit slowly) domestic capex environment should slightly improve ROA in the near term to 1.0%, compared to the squeeze on profitability we anticipate for banks, life insurers, and peers with assets heavily concentrated in Japan. We expect MULF's leverage to decline over our forecast period and stabilize thereafter. Due to bull-flattening of the yield curve, we expect pressure on MULF's customer finance yield, which consists of capital-lease and loan assets, but expect this to be offset by lower JPY funding costs and an increased contribution from asset finance, which consists of aircraft and other operating leases. While we acknowledge MULF is not immune to margin pressure, we think its valuation is attractive on an absolute basis and its PBR should outperform its sector peers and banks.

**Target Price and Catalyst:** Our target price is set at ¥580. Key catalysts include stable near-term yield, a healthy capex environment, accelerated expansion of its overseas portfolio, and increased dividend payout ratio.

**Earnings:** For FY3/16, management guides revenue of ¥800bn, GP of ¥154bn, OP of ¥82bn, and NP of ¥50bn, while we estimate ¥812bn, ¥154bn, ¥83bn, and ¥51bn, respectively. Following a series of overseas M&A in recent years, we expect organic asset growth to drive performance over our forecast period, leading to moderating growth in its asset finance segment. For FY3/17, we estimate revenue of ¥822bn, comprised of customer finance revenue of ¥568bn and asset finance revenue of ¥243bn, pre-funding GP of ¥192bn and post-funding GP of ¥155bn, and OP of ¥85bn. Over our projection period, we assume the asset finance yield to be stable at 4.50% and the customer finance yield to slightly decline from 3.50% in FY3/16 to 3.45% in FY3/18.


**Valuation:** We set our target price of ¥580 by applying a target PBR of 0.80x to our estimated FY3/16 BPS of ¥719. The target PBR of 0.80x is based on our estimated medium-term ROA of 1.0%, leverage of 7.3x, growth rate of 2.5%, and discount rate of 8.5%. We think our target PBR is reasonable, considering its one-year average of 0.86x and the pre-NIRP (negative interest rate policy) level of 0.79x.

	Mar-14A	Mar-15A	Mar-16E	Mar-17E	Mar-18E	Trend
Total turnover (¥m)	717,759	742,451	812,157	821,657	834,750	— — ■ ■ ■ ■
Operating profit (¥m)	65,279	70,239	83,364	84,712	87,494	— — ■ ■ ■ ■
Pre-tax profit (¥m)	66,894	76,446	86,485	86,625	89,277	— — ■ ■ ■ ■
Net income to ord equity (¥m)	37,675	44,070	50,553	50,638	52,256	— — ■ ■ ■ ■
Net profit growth	0.0%	17.0%	14.7%	0.2%	3.2%	■ ■ ■ —
P/E (x)	10.97	9.38	8.18	8.16	7.91	■ ■ — —
Adj EV/EBITDA (x)	47.76	50.89	45.38	45.51	45.02	■ ■ — —
P/B (x)	0.81	0.69	0.65	0.61	0.57	— — ■ ■ — —
ROE	7.8%	7.9%	8.2%	7.7%	7.5%	■ ■ ■ ■ —
Dividend yield	1.7%	2.0%	2.4%	3.1%	3.5%	— — ■ ■ ■ ■
EPS HTI New (¥)	42.39	49.58	56.86	56.96	58.78	— — ■ ■ ■ ■
Consensus EPS (¥)	40.39	46.76	58.48	60.54	65.16	— — ■ ■ ■ ■
HTI EPS vs Consensus	5.0%	6.0%	(2.8%)	(5.9%)	(9.8%)	— — — — ■


Source: Company data, Bloomberg, HTI estimates

Click [here](#) to download the working model



## Valuation




## Earnings Trends



## Earnings: HTI vs Consensus




## FY3/15 Revenue Breakdown (¥mn)



■ Customer finance ■ Asset finance

Source: Company data

## FY3/15 OP Breakdown (¥mn)



■ Customer finance ■ Asset finance

Source: Company data

## Investment Thesis

## BUY

- MULF is one of the largest lessors, with a global portfolio and diversified asset mix. With its affiliation with the Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group and an “A” rating from S&P, we think it has access to a stable and competitive source of funding in JPY and USD.
- In terms of the size and value of fleet, MULF is the second-largest aircraft lessor in Japan, with a portfolio of 145 aircraft, valued at US\$5.5bn. It also owns Engine Lease Finance, the largest independent aircraft engine lessor in the world.
- With its increasingly diversified asset mix, we think MULF should see a stable yield compared with falling interest rate margins for banks. MULF’s annualized yield rose to 4.8% in Q3 FY3/16, compared with 4.5% in Q2 FY3/16 and 3.8% in Q3 FY3/15.
- We think lessors are less exposed to NIRP than banks and insurers.
- Since the Bank of Japan’s announcement of NIRP, MULF shares have declined 19%, compared to 10%, 32%, and 27% for lessor, bank, and life insurance peers. Over this period, Orix’s PBR fell from 0.88x to 0.86x (an 2.3% decline) while MULF’s fell from 0.79x to 0.65x (a 17.7% decline). MULF’s PBR premium over Mitsubishi UFJ Financial fell from 0.24x to 0.19x. We think MULF’s multiple contraction has become excessive. We think lessors should outperform banks and lifers, and MULF should outperform its peers.
- After a sustained decline post-Lehman, domestic capex has been steadily recovering. Non-residential capex was ¥68trn in 2015, compared with ¥61trn in 2009. Domestic machinery orders and forward-looking statistics indicate a favorable capex trend.

## Company Snapshot

MULF is a diversified general leasing company in Japan, providing capital leases, operating leases, installment sales, corporate loans, mezzanine loans, and other financing services. The company was created from a merger between Diamond Lease and UFJ Central Leasing in 2007. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (MUFG) and Mitsubishi Corporation (8058 JP) are its major shareholders, making MULF the leasing arm of the Mitsubishi Group. MULF has the largest overseas proportion of assets of Japan’s listed lessors due to recent acquisitions of overseas assets. MULF engages in aircraft leasing and aircraft spare engine leasing through its wholly owned subsidiaries Jackson Square Aviation and Engine Lease Finance, respectively. MULF classifies its businesses into two segments: customer finance and asset finance. Customer finance primarily provides long-term financing such as capital leases, installment sales, and loans; asset finance mainly provides operating leases (including aircraft and spare engines) and short-term financing (such as factoring).

## Key Investment Metrics

### Revenue Growth

Low Medium High

We expect customer finance revenue and asset finance revenue to grow 2.6% YoY and 21% YoY in FY3/16. While we expect asset finance yield to be stable at 4.50%, we expect the customer finance yield to decline to 3.45% in FY3/17 from 3.50% in FY3/16. For FY3/17, we estimate customer finance revenue and asset finance revenue grow 0.6% to ¥568bn and 4.9% to ¥243bn, respectively.

### Profit Margins

Low Medium High

Considering the increased revenue contribution from asset finance, which has a higher GPM than customer finance, we expect GPM (pre-funding) and GPM (post-funding) to hit 23.6% and 19.0% in FY3/16. We expect slight scale economy and estimate OPM of 10.3% in FY3/16 versus 9.5% in FY3/15.

### Shareholder Returns

Low Medium High

We estimate ROAA of 1.02% and 0.99% in FY3/16 and FY3/17, up from 0.97% in FY3/15. Because we expect only slow organic growth and no M&A over our forecast period, we see leverage declining to 7.9x, 7.6x, and 7.4x in FY3/16, FY3/17, and FY3/18, respectively, from 8.1x in FY3/15. Thus, we estimate ROE to decline to 7.7% and 7.5% in FY3/17 and FY3/18.

### Balance Sheet Risks

High Medium Low

MULF is subject to credit risks for its customers, interest risks for its funding, and market risks for its operating leases. We believe MULF has satisfactory credit review and treasury operations to manage these risks.

## Barriers to Entry

Low Medium High

Although there is no licensing requirement to operate a leasing business and there are more than 200 leasing companies in Japan, establishing a sizeable operation requires substantial capital investment, strong funding capability, and risk-management expertise.

## Export Exposure/Breakdown

Low Medium High

MULF has exposure to global assets, such as aircraft, spare engines, and marine cargo containers, but is not involved in exporting.

## FX Exposure

Low Medium High

With its large global asset portfolio, MULF receives its revenue, and funds its assets, in non-JPY currencies. It raised US\$500mn and IDR300bn in 2015. We think its treasury department adequately manages its FX and interest rate exposure.

## Corporate Governance

Low Medium High

MULF is an affiliate of Mitsubishi UFJ Financial and Mitsubishi Corporation. We find its governance to be adequate and its IR team to be helpful.

## Our Model Assumptions

We assume total yield of 4.1% and an asset portfolio of ¥4.8trn for FY3/16

Within cost of revenue, we estimate funding cost of ¥37bn for FY3/16

We estimate the credit cost ratio is 0.15% of the asset balance in FY3/16

Profit & Loss (¥m)	Mar-14A	Mar-15A	Mar-16E	Mar-17E	Mar-18E
Total turnover	717,759	742,451	812,157	821,657	834,750
Cost of sales	(589,085)	(609,170)	(658,085)	(666,743)	(676,300)
<b>Gross profit</b>	<b>128,674</b>	<b>133,281</b>	<b>154,073</b>	<b>154,914</b>	<b>158,450</b>
Total operating costs	(63,395)	(63,042)	(70,709)	(70,202)	(70,956)
<b>Operating profit</b>	<b>65,279</b>	<b>70,239</b>	<b>83,364</b>	<b>84,712</b>	<b>87,494</b>
Operating EBITDA	74,547	79,455	92,510	93,309	95,628
<b>Depreciation and amortisation</b>	<b>(9,268)</b>	<b>(9,216)</b>	<b>(9,146)</b>	<b>(8,597)</b>	<b>(8,134)</b>
<b>Operating EBIT</b>	<b>65,279</b>	<b>70,239</b>	<b>83,364</b>	<b>84,712</b>	<b>87,494</b>
Other recurring income	3,154	3,740	2,200	2,000	2,000
Interest income	4,437	4,722	4,684	3,844	3,762
Interest expense	(3,050)	(3,320)	(3,783)	(3,931)	(3,980)
Exceptional income - net	(2,926)	1,065	20	-	-
<b>Pre-tax profit</b>	<b>66,894</b>	<b>76,446</b>	<b>86,485</b>	<b>86,625</b>	<b>89,277</b>
Taxation	(27,208)	(30,173)	(33,729)	(33,784)	(34,818)
Minority interests	(2,011)	(2,203)	(2,203)	(2,203)	(2,203)
<b>Net income to ord equity</b>	<b>37,675</b>	<b>44,070</b>	<b>50,553</b>	<b>50,638</b>	<b>52,256</b>

Source: Company, HTI estimates

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## Key P/L Takeaway

We expect the asset finance portfolio to drive organic asset growth over our forecast period

MULF's asset finance balance grew significantly, to ¥1.9trn in FY3/15 from ¥1.1trn in FY3/12, led by the acquisitions of Jackson Square Aviation, ELF, and other assets. Asset finance tends to have a higher yield than customer finance, so this portfolio asset shift has helped increase the total yield. We expect asset expansion to be purely organic in the next few years. On the cost side, we expect funding costs to trend down and credit costs to normalize.

## Our Model Assumptions

We assume accounts receivable to be 2.5% of total revenue

We assume short-term borrowings account for 43% of total borrowings

We assume long-term borrowings account for 57% of total borrowings

Balance Sheet (¥m)	Mar-14A	Mar-15A	Mar-16E	Mar-17E	Mar-18E
Total cash and equivalents	154,324	127,110	140,342	152,202	160,405
Accounts receivable	15,750	20,250	20,304	20,541	20,869
Other current assets	3,015,861	3,042,599	3,126,752	3,144,661	3,173,470
<b>Total current assets</b>	<b>3,185,935</b>	<b>3,189,959</b>	<b>3,287,398</b>	<b>3,317,405</b>	<b>3,354,744</b>
Tangible fixed assets	967,737	1,497,549	1,634,479	1,713,392	1,792,389
Intangible assets	95,186	102,137	96,009	90,248	84,833
Total investments	248,638	246,025	244,077	239,837	237,927
<b>Total non-current assets</b>	<b>1,311,561</b>	<b>1,845,711</b>	<b>1,974,565</b>	<b>2,043,478</b>	<b>2,115,150</b>
<b>Total assets</b>	<b>4,497,496</b>	<b>5,035,670</b>	<b>5,261,963</b>	<b>5,360,883</b>	<b>5,469,893</b>
Short-term debt	1,496,132	1,687,036	1,748,740	1,770,013	1,795,279
Accounts payable	129,319	91,954	103,044	104,553	106,140
Other current liabilities	54,509	71,332	71,348	72,641	74,114
<b>Total current liabilities</b>	<b>1,679,960</b>	<b>1,850,322</b>	<b>1,923,132</b>	<b>1,947,207</b>	<b>1,975,533</b>
Total long-term debt	1,988,345	2,223,284	2,318,097	2,346,296	2,379,789
Other liabilities	294,942	340,722	356,747	363,211	370,575
<b>Total non-current liabilities</b>	<b>2,283,287</b>	<b>2,564,006</b>	<b>2,674,844</b>	<b>2,709,507</b>	<b>2,750,364</b>
<b>Total liabilities</b>	<b>3,963,247</b>	<b>4,414,328</b>	<b>4,597,975</b>	<b>4,656,714</b>	<b>4,725,897</b>
Common stocks	33,196	33,196	33,196	33,196	33,196
Retained earnings reserve	269,506	308,882	351,528	391,709	431,536
Other reserves	210,023	254,469	254,469	254,469	254,469
<b>Shareholders' equity</b>	<b>512,725</b>	<b>596,547</b>	<b>639,193</b>	<b>679,374</b>	<b>719,201</b>
Minority interests	21,524	24,795	24,795	24,795	24,795
<b>Total equity</b>	<b>534,249</b>	<b>621,342</b>	<b>663,988</b>	<b>704,169</b>	<b>743,996</b>
<b>Total liabilities &amp; shareholders' equity</b>	<b>4,497,496</b>	<b>5,035,670</b>	<b>5,261,963</b>	<b>5,360,883</b>	<b>5,469,893</b>

Source: Company, HTI estimates

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## Key B/S Takeaway

We think dividend policy and capital structure could be revised in order to sustain ROE if, as we expect, balance sheet growth slows in the near term

We expect no M&A over our forecast period, resulting in moderation of balance sheet expansion. We expect leverage to decline, resulting in falling ROE. We assume the dividend payout ratio increases to 20% in FY3/16, to 25% in FY3/17, and to 28% in FY3/18 since organic asset growth (as we forecast) makes no claims on retained earnings. We do not anticipate any change in credit rating.

## Our Model Assumptions

We assume amortization to be 6% of intangible assets

We assume a dividend payout ratio of 20% in FY3/16, 25% in FY3/17, and 28% in FY3/18

Cash Flow (¥m)	Mar-14A	Mar-15A	Mar-16E	Mar-17E	Mar-18E
<b>Operating profit</b>	<b>65,279</b>	<b>70,239</b>	<b>83,364</b>	<b>84,712</b>	<b>87,494</b>
Depreciation and amortisation	9,268	9,216	9,146	8,597	8,134
Changes in working capital	(242,753)	(522,425)	(192,538)	(86,909)	(96,829)
<b>Operating cash flow</b>	<b>(168,206)</b>	<b>(442,970)</b>	<b>(100,028)</b>	<b>6,400</b>	<b>(1,201)</b>
Interest received	4,437	4,722	4,684	3,844	3,762
Interest paid	(3,050)	(3,320)	(3,783)	(3,931)	(3,980)
Tax paid		(30,173)	(33,729)	(33,784)	(34,818)
<b>Cash flow from operations</b>	<b>(166,819)</b>	<b>(471,741)</b>	<b>(132,856)</b>	<b>(27,471)</b>	<b>(36,236)</b>
Capex	(2,654)	(2,536)	(2,500)	(2,500)	(2,500)
Other new investments	55,807	2,613	1,948	4,240	1,910
<b>Cash flow from investing activities</b>	<b>53,153</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>(552)</b>	<b>1,740</b>	<b>(590)</b>
Dividends paid to ordinary shareholders		(7,109)	(8,443)	(10,111)	(12,660)
Proceeds from issue of shares		48,195	-	-	-
Other financing cash flow	169,185	425,843	156,516	49,473	58,759
<b>Cash flow from financing activities</b>	<b>169,185</b>	<b>466,929</b>	<b>148,073</b>	<b>39,362</b>	<b>46,100</b>
Cash at beginning of period		127,535	112,908	128,126	141,207
<b>Total cash generated</b>	<b>55,519</b>	<b>(4,735)</b>	<b>14,665</b>	<b>13,631</b>	<b>9,274</b>
<b>Implied cash at end of period</b>	<b>55,519</b>	<b>122,800</b>	<b>127,573</b>	<b>141,756</b>	<b>150,481</b>
<b>Free cash flow</b>	<b>(169,473)</b>	<b>(474,277)</b>	<b>(135,356)</b>	<b>(29,971)</b>	<b>(38,736)</b>

Source: Company, HTI estimates

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## Key Cash Flow Takeaway

We expect MULF's debt funding to decline in line with slower growth of its asset portfolio

We think MULF has sufficient debt capacity to fund M&A transactions of a reasonable size.

## Our Model Assumptions

MULF's PBR is close to its three-year low while consensus ROE is largely unchanged

✓ **Key Driver Takeaway**  
We expect MULF's ROA gap with peers to narrow, but we expect the ROE gap to persist

Per Share Data	Mar-14A	Mar-15A	Mar-16E	Mar-17E	Mar-18E
EPS (¥)	42.39	49.58	56.86	56.96	58.78
FDEPS (¥)	42.39	49.58	56.86	56.96	58.78
Revenue per share (¥)	807.6	835.3	913.5	924.2	938.9
Operating EBITDA per share (¥)	83.9	89.4	104.1	104.9	107.6
BVPS (¥)	576.9	671.1	718.9	764.1	808.9
DPS (¥)	8.00	9.50	11.37	14.24	16.46
Recurrent cash flow per share (¥)	(187.7)	(530.7)	(149.4)	(30.9)	(40.8)
Shares in issue (million)	895.8	895.8	895.8	895.8	895.8
Year end adjusted shares in issue (m)	888.7	888.9	889.1	889.1	889.1
Key Ratios	Mar-14A	Mar-15A	Mar-16E	Mar-17E	Mar-18E
<b>Valuation Measures</b>					
P/Sales (x)	0.58	0.56	0.51	0.50	0.50
P/E (x)	10.97	9.38	8.18	8.16	7.91
P/CF (x)	na	na	na	na	na
P/B (x)	0.81	0.69	0.65	0.61	0.57
Adj EV/EBITDA (x)	47.76	50.89	45.38	45.51	45.02
Dividend yield	1.7%	2.0%	2.4%	3.1%	3.5%
<b>Growth</b>					
Revenue growth	0.0%	3.4%	9.4%	1.2%	1.6%
Operating profit growth	0.0%	7.6%	18.7%	1.6%	3.3%
Net profit growth	0.0%	17.0%	14.7%	0.2%	3.2%
<b>Margins</b>					
Gross margin	17.9%	18.0%	19.0%	18.9%	19.0%
Operating EBITDA margin	10.4%	10.7%	11.4%	11.4%	11.5%
Operating margin	9.1%	9.5%	10.3%	10.3%	10.5%
Pretax profit margin	9.3%	10.3%	10.6%	10.5%	10.7%
Tax rate	40.7%	39.5%	39.0%	39.0%	39.0%
Net profit margin	5.2%	5.9%	6.2%	6.2%	6.3%
<b>Key Ratios</b>					
ROE	7.8%	7.9%	8.2%	7.7%	7.5%
ROA	0.9%	0.9%	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%
Capex/revenue	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
Current ratio (x)	1.90	1.72	1.71	1.70	1.70
Creditor days	79.91	55.10	57.31	57.24	57.28
Debtor days	7.99	9.96	9.15	9.13	9.13
Sales/avg assets	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.15
<b>Credit analysis</b>					
EBITDA/interest paid (x)	24.44	23.93	24.46	23.74	24.03
OCF/interest paid (x)	(54.7)	(142.1)	(35.1)	(7.0)	(9.1)
Debt/EBITDA (x)	46.74	49.21	43.96	44.11	43.66
Debt/equity	652.2%	629.3%	612.5%	584.6%	561.2%
Net debt to equity	623.3%	608.9%	591.4%	562.9%	539.6%

Source: Company, HTI estimates

[Click For Interactive Model](#)


We think lessors are more insulated from NIRP than banks or life insurers, and MULF's global assets should help it to deliver stable ROA over our projection period. MULF's conservative capital structure should result in declines in leverage and ROE, but this should help counter the increased risks of its global asset base, in our view.



MULF's major shareholders include Mitsubishi Corporation (20.0%), MUFG (13.4%), Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ (6.1%), and Mitsubishi UFJ Trust Bank (3.2%), as of 31 March 2015

Diamond Lease, UFJ Central Leasing, and BOT Lease were affiliated with the former Mitsubishi Bank, UFJ Bank, and Bank of Tokyo prior to their mergers to create the MUFG

MULF Asset Balance Market Share



Source: MULF, Japan Leasing Association, HTI estimates

The recent rapid build-up of its asset finance balance is driven by overseas M&A

## Company Outline and Operational Review


MULF is a diversified financial company in Japan, providing capital leases, operating leases, sale-and-leasebacks, auto leases, aircraft/engine/container leases, real estate financing, installment sales, corporate loans, and factoring services. We think MULF has strategically shifted its business model from being a traditional leasing company to being a general financing provider similar to Orix (8591 JP), in order to diversify its revenue sources away from the competitive equipment leasing market.

MULF was established by merging Diamond Lease and UFJ Central Leasing in 2007 and is now the leasing arm of the MUFG. MUFG also owns 100% of BOT Lease, which we estimate to be about 10–15% the size of MULF.

We see MULF as one of the largest and most global lessors in Japan. As of December 2015, MULF reported an asset balance of ¥4,553bn, comprised of ¥1,459bn capital leases, ¥1,514bn operating leases, and ¥1,580bn installment and other loans.


The company categorizes its financing services into two segments: customer finance and asset finance. Customer finance includes capital leases, installment sales, and other long-term corporate loans, whereas asset finance includes operating leases, real estate project finance, property leases, and asset management.

MULF New Lease Assets (Flow) and Total Asset Balance (Stock)




Source: Company data, Bloomberg

MULF Asset Balance by Type



Source: Company data, HTI estimates

MULF Asset Balance by Business Segment



Source: Company data, HTI estimates




Strong lease asset additions in FY3/14 could be attributable to the consumption tax hike

One downside of an Orix-like model is its complexity and obscurity

JSA focuses on narrow-body aircrafts, which have a more liquid secondary market and lower transition cost than wide-body models


We are aware that some data in the *Airfinance Journal* article appear incorrect, such as those for Orix (which owned about 40 aircraft) and CDB Financial Leasing (which owned more than 120 aircraft), but nevertheless reference it due to the lack of available alternative data

**MULF Annual Addition to Asset Balance**



Source: Company data

**MULF Overseas Balance and Overseas Leases**



Source: Company data, HTI estimates

### Company Characteristics


We think MULF has strategically expanded into alternative financing, global assets, and principal investments in order to grow its asset base and to diversify away from low-margin leasing. As a result, we see MULF becoming increasingly similar to Orix, with lending and loans representing a high proportion of its asset balance (about 27% in FY3/15) relative to its peers. Also, due to its relationships with Mitsubishi Corporation, we think MULF shares a trading company culture and is an opportunistic investor. MULF frequently trades its operating assets, such as aircraft and properties, which results in disposal gains and losses. We estimate such gains amounted to about ¥13bn for Q1–Q3 FY3/16. We hear some analysts view this negatively as it produces non-recurring gains as opposed to typical stock-based revenue; however, we view this positively because we see such trading activities as a part of its portfolio optimization and risk management.

### Operating Lease Assets – From Spare Engines to Solar Power Plants

MULF has expanded its global assets substantially through M&A and alliances. It acquired Jackson Square Aviation (JSA) in 2012, Engine Lease Finance (ELF), and Beacon Intermodal in 2015. It also entered into an alliance with Greenbrier Leasing (GBX US) in 2014.

JSA is a major aircraft lessor globally, with about 145 owned and committed aircraft, mostly narrow-body. As a result of recent portfolio adjustments, JSA owns one of the newest fleets in the industry, at an average age of 2.9 years. JSA leases to about 42 airlines.

**MULF Transportation-Related Lease Assets**



Source: Company data

**Global Aircraft Lessor Ranking**

Rank	Lessor	Total fleet
1	GECAS	1,608
2	AerCap	1,279
3	BBAM	413
4	SMBC Aviation Capital	393
5	CIT Aerospace	313
⋮	⋮	⋮
8	BOC Aviation	256
12	ICBC Leasing	173
14	Orix Aviation	148
17	CDB Financial Leasing	120
⋮	⋮	⋮
19	JSA	110
20	MC Aviation Partners	92

Source: *Airfinance Journal* September 2015

BOC Aviation and CDB Financial Leasing aim to grow their aircraft assets significantly, according to their listing documents

Engines typically account for 20–35% of the value of an aircraft

The spare engine leasing market is dominated by GE, Rolls-Royce, Pratt & Whitney, ELF, Willies, and GA Telesis

We include CFM (unlisted) and Shannon Engine Support (unlisted) as parts of GE

Auto leases are provided by Mitsubishi Auto Leasing, a 50/50 joint venture between MULF and Mitsubishi Corporation


Century Tokyo, Fuyo, and IBJ are all affiliated with Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP)

The International Air Transport Association, Boeing (BA US), and Airbus (AIR FP) all forecast global passenger traffic to grow at more than 5% CAGR until 2020, implying strong demand for aircraft leases from airlines. We expect aircraft lease yields to remain healthy, but see potential pricing competition from well-funded Chinese lessors, such as BOC Aviation (unlisted), ICBC Leasing (unlisted), and CDB Financial Leasing (unlisted).

ELF is a leading spare engine lessor globally, with a sizeable engine portfolio. We find ELF to be a particularly attractive asset to complement MULF's global portfolio as engine leasing requires substantial technical, financial, tax, legal, and risk expertise. Engine lessors can be broadly classified into OEM lessors, independent lessors and MROs, and financial investors such as private equity funds. The majority of narrow-body engines are manufactured by GE (GE US) and wide-body engines are by GE and Rolls-Royce (RR LN), which naturally resulted in GE Engine Leasing (unlisted) and Rolls-Royce Partners Finance (unlisted) being the largest OEM engine lessors. ELF is one of the largest independent engine lessors, along with Willies Lease Finance (WLFC US) and GA Telesis (unlisted). Given the buoyant aircraft order backlogs, we expect strong demand for spare engines and ELF to experience healthy asset growth in the medium term.


MULF is also involved in real estate leasing (where it rents land from landowners and constructs properties for its lessee), infrastructure financing (public-private partnerships), energy conservation planning, auto leasing, and solar power plant financing.

**Real Estate Lease Asset Balance**



Source: Company data

**Number of Auto Lease Vehicles**




Source: Company data

### Industry Position

Independent lessors, bank-affiliated lessors, and vendor lessors are the major types of lessors. We see MULF as one of the leading bank-affiliated lessors, with an opportunistic culture similar to Orix and Mitsubishi Corporation. Orix is the largest independent lessor. Bank-affiliated lessors include MULF, Sumitomo Mitsui Finance and Leasing (SMFL; unlisted), Century Tokyo Leasing (8439 JP), Fuyo General Lease (8424 JP), and IBJ Leasing (8425 JP); vendor lessors include Hitachi Capital (8586 JP) and Ricoh Leasing (8566 JP).

Orix was founded as a leasing company, but has since diversified into a comprehensive financial company with businesses in life insurance, consumer credit, property development, and private equity. SMFL has grown its assets rapidly in recent years as it acquired RBS Aviation, GE Capital's Japan portfolio, and other assets. Century Tokyo has a strong presence in auto leasing in Japan and has expanded its overseas assets, such as partnering with CIT Group (CIT US) in aircraft leasing. Fuyo and IBJ are relatively concentrated in general leasing in Japan.

## Q3 FY3/16 Installment Sales Balance




Source: Individual company data

We exclude Orix's principal investment and retail finance (i.e., bank and insurance) segments in our asset balance calculation

MULF acquired ELF and Beacon Intermodal from MUFG in 2015; we think MULF is at an advantage in acquiring MUFG's leasing assets


Mizuho Financial Group still has three separate leasing affiliates, whose affiliations trace back to Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank, and the Industrial Bank of Japan

## Q3 FY3/16 Capital Lease Balance




Source: Individual company data

## Q3 FY3/16 Operating Lease Balance




Source: Individual company data

## Q3 FY3/16 Asset Balance



Source: Individual company data

## FY3/15 Domestic Lease Balance Market Share




Source: Individual company data, Japan Leasing Association

## A Comment on Acquisition Candidates

Considering MULF's debt capacity, strong credit rating, low funding costs, and diversified funding sources, we think most debt-funded M&A should be EPS-accretive as long as the targets have reasonable ROA and MULF does not overpay. We expect MULF to actively seek M&A opportunities to expand its asset portfolio. While we are not able to project any M&A deals, we comment on a few likely candidates within the Mitsubishi Group.


BOT Lease, the leasing arm of the former Bank of Tokyo, is owned by MUFG as a separate company from MULF. We see merging BOT Lease into MULF to be logical, which should consolidate MUFG's leasing businesses into MULF and help expand MULF's overseas portfolio. Mitsubishi Corporation, a key shareholder and business partner of MULF, wholly owns MC Aviation Partners. MC Aviation Partners has a substantial portfolio, owning and managing over 120 aircraft. We think a combination of JSA and MC Aviation Partners would result in a sizeable force in the market of similar scale to SMBC Aviation Capital, the wholly owned aircraft lessor which the Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (8316 JP) established by acquiring RBS Aviation Capital.

FY3/15 Yield Comparison



Source: Individual company data

FY3/15 Net Yield Comparison




Source: Individual company data

**NIRP impacts on financial stocks:****High:** Banks; Life insurers**Medium:** Non-life insurers**Low:** Lessors; Retail finance; Brokers**MULF's Asset Yield: No News Is Good News**


In a low interest rate environment with a flat yield curve, most financial companies should face profitability pressure. Computer and office equipment leases typically account for 40–50% of total leasing in Japan, but only 15–25% for MULF, indicating that MULF is strategically shifting its asset mix away from the mass market to specialized niche markets. We expect MULF's net yield to be largely stable amid an environment of falling spreads, because we see a decline in domestic yield to be partially offset by lower funding costs and global asset yields offsetting the remaining domestic margin pressure.

MULF Annualized Quarterly Yield




Source: Company data, HTI calculation

MULF Asset Yields




Source: Company data, HTI calculation

MULF Funding Costs



Source: Company data, HTI calculation

MULF Net Yields



Source: Company data, HTI calculation

**NIRP and Its Likely Impacts on Lessors—Finding the Losers and Relative Winners**

Since the Bank of Japan surprisingly announced its NIRP, financial shares have come under significant pressure. Due to the intermediary roles of financial companies, we see NIRP having a negative impact across sub-sectors, but to significantly different degrees. We think the most visible losers include postal banks, banks (particularly regional banks), and life insurers. In comparison to life insurers, we believe non-life insurers are materially less exposed to NIRP due to their higher overseas contributions, lack of return guarantee in product design, and lower allocation to government bonds. Consumer finance companies should benefit from lower funding costs, but should also face potential competition from banks entering into lower credit-quality borrowers, in our view.


We think the yield curve is likely to continue bull-flattening if Japan fails to generate inflation expectations

Leasing stocks include MULF, Orix, Century Tokyo, Hitachi Capital, Fuyo, Ricoh Leasing, and IBJ Leasing. Life insurer stocks include Sony Financial, Dai-ichi Life, and T&D. Bank stocks include Mitsubishi UFJ, Sumitomo Mitsui, Mizuho, Resona, and Shinsei

MULF's competitor SMFL (rated AA- by JCR) raised financing at a negative rate in March 2016


Similar to banks, lessors borrow short (floating rate) and lend long (fixed rate), so a bull-flattening of the yield curve should result in more yield compression than funding-cost benefit

JGB Yields since NIRP Announcement (28-Jan-16)




Source: Bloomberg

Yield Curve Slope and Financial Share Performance



Source: Bloomberg

Stock Performance since NIRP Announcement



Source: Bloomberg


Stock Performance since Market Crash (2-Feb-16)



Source: Bloomberg

Lessors primarily fund their operations using the debt capital market and bank loans, so should benefit from lower funding costs. Compared to independent lessors and vendor lessors, bank-affiliated lessors tend to use more bank borrowings, resulting in lower liability durations (less than two years), so they should be able to refinance at lower rates in the near term. Although we think lease yields are less sensitive to spread compression than the more transparent interest rate margins of banks, we still expect domestic capital lease yields and lending yields to face downward pressure due to intensifying competition among lessors and from other financing providers. Due to the sharp bull flattening of the yield curve, we think yield compression for lessors (despite being less than banks) should outweigh any potential benefits from lower funding costs, resulting in net yield compression. In the likely scenario of continued bull flattening in the next few years, we think net interest spreads for lessors should outperform that for banks because lease yields are bundled with equipment costs and other value-added services (such as maintenance) and leases are mostly financed at fixed rates compared to floating rates for bank loans. To avoid over-generalization, we emphasize that Japan's lessors have become increasingly diverse, with varying degrees of asset specialization, capital intensity, overseas exposure, currency/interest rate exposure, and liability structures. We think investors should pick lessors with diversified and stable funding sources, strong overseas exposure, expertise in capital-intensive and growth assets (such as aircraft), and trading at attractive valuations. We think MULF fits these criteria.


## Overseas Asset Proportion of Portfolios



Source: Individual company data


We assume securitization and bond financing are of long duration and others (including long-term loans) are of short duration

## Bank Corporate Loan Rate and MULF Yield




Source: Bank of Japan, company data

## BTMU Corporate Loan Rate and MULF Yield




Source: Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ, company data

## Liability Structure Comparison



Source: Individual company data

## Estimated Liability Duration Split




Source: Individual company data

## Domestic Capex Environment


Domestic capex contracted significantly from 2007 to 2010, but has begun a steady recovery since 2012. We believe this trend is likely to continue, providing a favorable backdrop for lease financing.

## Seasonally Adjusted Capex




Source: Cabinet Office

## Non-Residential Investments




Source: Cabinet Office

Bank of Japan Tankan Survey DI




Source: Bank of Japan

Domestic Machinery Orders (Seasonally Adjusted)



Source: Cabinet Office

DBJ Capex Survey Diffusion Index (DI)




Source: Cabinet Office

The accounting revision eliminated off-balance-sheet financing and certain tax benefits

### Japan's Leasing Industry


Japan's lease volume peaked at ¥7.9trn in 2007 and has since declined significantly to only ¥4.8trn in 2015. The major reasons for this decline include (1) an unfavorable capex environment, (2) revised accounting and taxation rules in 2008 resulting in a lower lease ratio, (3) an increasing corporate savings rate, resulting in decreased demand for external financing, and (4) prolonged deflation in computer and communication products, which account for a large proportion of leased assets.

Lease Ratio



Source: Japan Leasing Industry Association

Leasing Transactions



Source: Japan Leasing Industry Association


We expect the lease ratio to stabilize at 6.5–7.0%

Lease statistics do not include global and overseas assets, such as aircraft, which represent growth pockets for Japanese lessors


Computer and office equipment, which primarily consists of computer hardware and software, telecommunication systems, and office equipment, is the largest component of lease financing in Japan. However, demand for lease financing in this segment has been stagnant since 2010 and we only expect it to be flat, due to deflation, productivity gains, and cloud-based technologies. As a result, we expect growth for domestic lease financing to be driven mostly by industrial, machinery, construction, and transportation (i.e., auto) capex demand. We expect lessors to grow by expanding global assets (particularly aircraft) and overseas assets (particularly in Southeast Asia).

Moreover, since the accounting rule revision in 2008, lease financing by large corporates has diminished, which previously accounted for sizeable lease transactions.






Lease Transaction Breakdown by Asset



Source: Japan Leasing Industry Association

Lease Transaction Breakdown by Lessee




Source: Japan Leasing Industry Association

We consider our of 1.0% ROA assumption conservative, considering it was 0.97% for FY3/15

We see that MULF's business model is becoming increasingly diversified, global, and similar to Orix; we are concerned that this conglomerate model might create Orix-like complexity and valuation discount

We believe IBJ Leasing is heavily exposed to the competitive office equipment leasing market, which is a reason for its low ROA among peers

#### Asset/Equity Ratio Comparison



Source: Individual company data

## Valuation

We set our target price at ¥580 using a fair PBR of 0.80x our FY3/16 BPS estimate of ¥719. The target price implies a PER of 10.2x our FY3/16 EPS estimate of ¥56.9. We view these multiples as reasonable, compared to its one-year average PBR and PER of 0.86x and 10.9x and its PBR and PER of 0.79x and 9.8x on 28 January 2016, when the NIRP was announced.

Our estimated fair PBR is derived using a ROA of 1.0%, leverage of 7.3x, growth rate of 2.5%, and discount rate of 8.5%. While we view lessors as being better positioned than banks and lifers in a NIRP environment, we think there are heightened uncertainties, yield pressures, and increased probability of negative news flow, which we try to reflect using a discount rate of 8.5%, compared to the 7.5% we would deem appropriate in the pre-NIRP period.

Considering MULF's below-peer leverage and rising ROA, we estimate that its current valuation implies a discount rate above 8.5%, the level we assume in our fair PBR estimate. We observe similarly elevated equity costs across financial sub-sectors and think investors are leery of industry profitability under NIRP. We believe risk appetite should gradually normalize, absent an additional rate cut by the Bank of Japan. Near-term company-specific catalysts include MULF increasing its dividend payout ratio above 20%, continued stable yield despite the NIRP, and asset balance growth faster than consensus expectations.

#### Valuation Multiples (as of 7 April 2016)

Company	Market Cap (mn)	Valuation Multiples				Growth		Returns			
		Price / Earnings		Price / Book		2yr CAGR		ROA		ROE	
		FY16	FY17	FY16	FY17	OP	EPS	FY15	FY16	FY15	FY16
MULF	416,563	8.0x	7.7x	0.65x	0.61x	4.8%	5.6%	0.9%	1.2%	7.9%	8.4%
Orix	2,025,810	7.5x	7.5x	0.86x	0.79x	7.6%	3.7%	2.3%	2.3%	11.5%	11.8%
Century Tokyo Leasing	418,502	10.3x	9.1x	1.27x	1.15x	10.0%	11.2%	1.1%	1.2%	12.5%	12.9%
Hitachi Capital	279,861	7.9x	7.3x	0.75x	0.70x	10.0%	8.8%	0.9%	1.2%	7.7%	9.8%
Fuyo General Lease	136,749	7.5x	7.1x	0.63x	0.59x	8.6%	6.9%	0.7%	0.9%	7.4%	8.8%
Ricoh Leasing	95,917	8.6x	7.9x	0.66x	0.62x	9.3%	9.5%	1.3%	1.3%	7.7%	7.9%
IBJ Leasing	76,555	6.7x	6.3x	0.61x	0.57x	-0.3%	4.2%	0.7%	0.7%	10.0%	9.3%
Mean		8.1x	7.6x	0.78x	0.72x	7.2%	7.1%	1.14%	1.26%	9.27%	9.84%
Median		7.9x	7.5x	0.66x	0.62x	8.6%	6.9%	0.92%	1.23%	7.95%	9.30%


Source: Bloomberg

#### PBR-ROE Comparison

We acknowledge that many financial stocks trade at low valuations and look attractive in comparison to their consensus ROE. We think the main reason is that this is a reflection of investors' views of deteriorated profitability for financial companies due to the NIRP (including potential future rate cuts) in advance of consensus ROE downward revisions. We think this PBR de-rating relative to the historical PBR-ROE relationship can be justifiable for certain banks and lessors with heavy exposure to undifferentiated markets such as office equipment. We believe MULF's ROE should be on the defensive side among lessors due to its high exposure to global markets and specialized areas such as real estate lending, so we expect a PBR re-rating to drive MULF's shares towards our target price when there is more clarity on the NIRP's impact on financial sector profitability and MULF showing stable ROA.


In comparison to its listed peers, MULF has one of the lowest ROEs. We think reasons include its large balance sheet, less diversification than Orix, and less exposure to auto and specialty assets than Century Tokyo. On the other hand, MULF's returns appear much better if we look at ROA instead of ROE, which implies that MULF has more conservative leverage. MULF has received strong credit ratings (A by the S&P, and A+ by R&I). We think MULF's conservative leverage and debt capacity should translate into lower distress risk in case of sudden macro-outlook deterioration as well as more attractive funding alternatives to expand its global portfolio, which is largely (and inappropriately) ignored by investors, in our view.

MUFG PBR versus Consensus ROE




Source: Bloomberg

MULF PBR versus Consensus ROE



Source: Bloomberg

FY16 PBR – FY16 ROE




Source: Bloomberg

MULF's PBR looks more attractive if compared to ROA instead of ROE


It is worth noting that Orix possesses significant non-lease-related operations, such as life insurance

FY16 PBR – FY16 ROA



Source: Bloomberg

FY16 PBR – FY16 ROA (Excluding Century Tokyo)




Source: Bloomberg

We believe that lessors should trade at a larger premium to banks and life insurers, and that MULF's underperformance against its peers should correct


Relative Performance of Leasing Shares

Leasing Share Performance since NIRP



Source: Bloomberg


PBR Comparison



Source: Bloomberg


MULF's PBR premium over MUFG has been largely flat post-NIRP, but we think it should expand

PBR Premium to Banks and Life Insurers



Source: Bloomberg

PBR Premium over Mitsubishi UFJ Financial



Source: Bloomberg

### Financial Projections

We think the key drivers for financials include asset accumulation, asset mix, asset yield, and funding costs. Our estimates are shown below.

#### MULF: Revenue, GP, and Driver Projections


¥mn	FY3/14A	FY3/15A	FY3/16E	FY3/17E	FY3/18E
Customer finance assets	2,543,359	2,621,928	2,707,868	2,729,019	2,758,146
Asset finance assets	1,474,059	1,918,991	2,048,666	2,113,697	2,182,763
Total assets	4,017,300	4,540,700	4,756,534	4,842,716	4,940,909
Customer finance sales	550,795	550,814	565,281	568,402	573,658
Asset finance sales	166,964	191,637	231,876	243,255	251,092
Total sales	717,759	742,451	812,157	821,657	834,750
Customer finance GP	76,265	77,124	78,614	80,194	81,484
Asset finance GP	52,409	56,157	66,458	69,720	71,966
Total GP	128,674	133,281	154,073	154,914	158,450
Customer finance yield	3.66%	3.45%	3.50%	3.45%	3.45%
Asset finance yield	4.58%	4.27%	4.50%	4.50%	4.50%
Total yield	4.00%	3.78%	4.12%	4.01%	4.01%
Customer finance funding	0.55%	0.47%	0.55%	0.50%	0.48%
Asset finance funding	0.87%	0.96%	1.15%	1.15%	1.15%
Total funding rate	0.67%	0.66%	0.81%	0.78%	0.77%
Credit cost (%)	17bps	8bps	15bps	12bps	12bps

Source: Company data, HTI estimates


### Risks to Our Rating and the Attainment of Our Target Price

Key risks to our recommendation and target price include continued stock market weakness for the financial sector, increased expectation of a further rate cut by the Bank of Japan, investors trading lessors relative to banks, lessors reporting larger yield compression than we expect, deteriorating capex statistics, and MULF failing to raise its dividend payout ratio to 20%.


P/E (x) vs EPS Growth (%)




P/B (x) vs ROE




PSR (x) vs OPM (%)




Turnover and Growth - (¥m)




Gross Profit and Margin - (¥m)




Operating Profit and OP Growth - (¥m)




CF from operations vs Capex - (¥m)




Dividend Payout and Yield - (¥)




Debt to Equity (%) and Interest Cover (x)




ROA (%) and Asset Turnover (x)



Cash Operating Cycle



Current Ratio (x) vs Quick Ratio (x)



### Revenue Growth

We expect customer finance revenue and asset finance revenue to grow 2.6% YoY and 21% YoY in FY3/16. While we expect asset finance yield to be stable at 4.50%, we expect the customer finance yield to decline to 3.45% in FY3/17 from 3.50% in FY3/16. For FY3/17, we estimate customer finance revenue and asset finance revenue grow 0.6% to ¥568bn and 4.9% to ¥243bn, respectively.

### Profit Margins

Considering the increased revenue contribution from asset finance, which has a higher GPM than customer finance, we expect GPM (pre-funding) and GPM (post-funding) to hit 23.6% and 19.0% in FY3/16. We expect slight scale economy and estimate OPM of 10.3% in FY3/16 versus 9.5% in FY3/15.

### Shareholder Returns

We estimate ROAA of 1.02% and 0.99% in FY3/16 and FY3/17, up from 0.97% in FY3/15. Because we expect only slow organic growth and no M&A over our forecast period, we see leverage declining to 7.9x, 7.6x, and 7.4x in FY3/16, FY3/17, and FY3/18, respectively, from 8.1x in FY3/15. Thus, we estimate ROE to decline to 7.7% and 7.5% in FY3/17 and FY3/18.

### Balance Sheet Risks

MULF is subject to credit risks for its customers, interest risks for its funding, and market risks for its operating leases. We believe MULF has satisfactory credit review and treasury operations to manage these risks.



#### Key Takeaway

We view MULF as a defensive leasing stock under NIRP and think its PBR de-rating has become excessive

### Investment Thesis – Target Price – Share Price Catalysts

We think the negative impacts of NIRP vary across financial companies and that MULF should face less margin compression than its peers. Yield curve flattening could impact its domestic general lease margins, but we think specialized lease margins should face minimal pressure and continued accumulation of global assets should help to stabilize the overall yield. In our base scenario, we think MULF's ROA should not face compression, so view the PBR de-rating post-NIRP as overdone and as presenting an attractive entry point. We expect multiple expansion to drive the share price towards our target price of ¥580. Key catalysts include a normalization of risk appetite toward the financial sector, increased differentiation between financial sub-sectors, MULF showing healthy asset accumulation with stable yield, and an increased dividend payout ratio.

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
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BUY> 15% absolute upside performance expected within the next 12 months

SELL> 15% absolute downside performance expected within the next 12 months

NEUTRAL: A stock under coverage with insufficient upside or downside to justify a BUY or SELL rating. For purposes only of FINRA/NYSE ratings distribution rules, our Neutral rating falls into a hold rating category.

#### Rating Distribution



**Change in Ratings Definitions:** Until end-May 2015, Haitong International Research Limited (“HTIRL”) had the following investment rating system based on the analyst’s best estimate of the fundamental value of the stock on a 9-12 month forward basis:

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IB clients*	2%	2%	3%

\*Percentage of investment banking clients in each rating category.

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
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Recommendation Chart



Date	Recommendation	Target (JPY)	Price (JPY)
2014-02-21	Not rated	-	548.0
2013-09-10	Buy	580.0	502.0
2012-11-01	Buy	541.0	349.0
2012-04-27	Buy	480.0	333.0
2011-07-14	Buy	460.0	317.0
2010-07-13	Buy	377.0	-
2009-07-10	Buy	312.0	-

Source: Company data Bloomberg, HTI estimates

Definitions for Key Investment Metrics

Business Growth

This is the metric which matches the top line in our report.

Business profit

This is the metric which best represents operating profit in our report

Shareholder Returns

Return on Equity

Balance Sheet Risk

Net Debt to Equity

## Haitong International Coverage as of 1 Apr 2016

<i>Pan Asia Resources</i>	
Core Coverage Universe	Non-Coverage Universe
<b>Sam Thawley (Team Leader)</b>	CGN New Energy Holdings (1811 HK)
Angang Steel (347 HK)	Dowa Holdings (5714 JP)
China Petroleum & Chemical (386 HK)	GCL New Energy Holdings (451 HK)
China Shenhua Energy (1088 HK)	Iino Kaiun Kaisha (9119 JP)
CNOOC (883 HK)	Maruichi Steel Tube (5463 JP)
Daido Steel (5471 JP)	Mie Holdings (1555 HK)
Daikin Industries (6367 JP)	Nippon Coke & Engineering (3315 JP)
Fuji Seal International (7864 JP)	NS United Kaiun Kaisha (9110 JP)
Fujitsu General (6755 JP)	Osaka Steel (5449 JP)
Hanwa (8078 JP)	Sino Oil and Gas Holdings (702 HK)
Hitachi Construction Machinery (6305 JP)	
IHI (7013 JP)	
Kawasaki Heavy Industries (7012 JP)	
Kawasaki Kisen (9107 JP)	
Komatsu (6301 JP)	
Kubota (6326 JP)	
KYB (7242 JP)	
Kyoei Steel (5440 JP)	
Makita (6586 JP)	
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (7011 JP)	
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (9104 JP)	
Nippon Steel & Sumikin Bussan (9810 JP)	
PetroChina (857 HK)	
Riso Kagaku (6413 JP)	
Sanyo Special Steel (5481 JP)	
SMC (6273 JP)	
THK (6481 JP)	
Tokyo Steel Mfg. (5423 JP)	
<b>Fook Tat Cho</b>	
Anton Oilfield Services (3337 HK)	
China Datang (1798 HK)	
China Longyuan Power (916 HK)	
China Singyes (750 HK)	
China Suntien (956 HK)	
CIMC Enric (3899 HK)	
CLP Holdings (2 HK)	
GCL-Poly (3800 HK)	
Hilong (1623 HK)	
Honghua Group (196 HK)	
Hong Kong and China Gas (3 HK)	
Huadian Fuxin Energy (816 HK)	
Huaneng Renewables (958 HK)	
Xinjiang Goldwind (2208 HK)	

<i>Pan Asia TMT</i>	
Core Coverage Universe	Non-Coverage Universe
<b>Neil Juggins (Team Leader)</b>	China Fiber Optic Network System (3777 HK)
Alibaba Group Holdings (BABA US)	ChipMOS Technologies (8150 TT)
China Mobile (941 HK)	DTS (9682 JP)
China Telecom (728 HK)	Eva Precision Industrial Holdings (838 HK)
China Unicom Hong Kong (762 HK)	Ferrotec (6890 JP)
Chunghwa Telecom (2412 TT)	GMO Internet (9449 JP)
Ctrip.com International (CTRP US)	Hikari Tsushin (9435 JP)
Far EastTone Telecommunications (4904 TT)	Internet Initiative Japan (3774 JP)
KDDI (9433 JP)	Itochu Techno-Solutions (4739 JP)
NetEase (NTES US)	Megachips (6875 JP)
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone (9432 JP)	Micro-Star International (2377 TT)
NTT DoCoMo (9437 JP)	Shindengen Electric Mfg. (6844 JP)
Softbank (9984 JP)	Taiwan Cheliic (4555 TT)
Taiwan Mobile (3045 TT)	Trigiant Group (1300 HK)
Tencent Holdings (700 HK)	Truly International Holdings (732 HK)
Yahoo Japan (4689 JP)	Unity Opto Technology (2499 TT)
<b>Steve Myers</b>	Yangtze Optical Fibre & Cable (6869 HK)
Canon (7751 JP)	
Fujitsu (6702 JP)	
Hon Hai Precision Industry (2317 TT)	
Keyence (6861 JP)	
Konica Minolta Holdings (4902 JP)	
LG Electronics (066570 KS)	
Mediatek (2454 TT)	
Nikon (7731 JP)	
Samsung Electronics (005930 KS)	
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. (2330 TT)	
Toshiba (6502 JP)	

<b>Jones Ku</b>
AAC Technologies (2018 HK)
BYD Electronic (285 HK)
China Communications (552 HK)
Coolpad Group (2369 HK)
Kingsoft (3888 HK)
Sunny Optical (2382 HK)
TCL Communication (2618 HK)
Tongda Group (698 HK)
ZTE (763 HK)
<b>Jean-Louis Lafayeedney</b>
Advanced Semiconductor Engineering (2311 TT)
ASM Pacific Technology (522 HK)
Asustek Computer (2357 TT)
Casetek Holdings (5264 TT)
Largan Precision (3008 TT)
Lenovo (992 HK)
Nidec (6594 JP)
Siliconware Precision Industries (2325 TT)
Skyworth Digital Holdings (751 HK)
<b>Yushi Kawamoto</b>
Cookpad (2193 JP)
Monotaro (3064 JP)

<i>Pan Asia Autos, Machinery &amp; Industrial</i>	
Core Coverage Universe	Non-Coverage Universe
<b>Ole Hui (Team Leader)</b>	BeijingWest Industries International (2339 HK)
China Communications Construction (1800 HK)	Calsonic Kasei (7248 JP)
China Railway Construction (1186 HK)	China Harmony New Energy Auto (3836 HK)
China Railway Group (390 HK)	China Yongda Automobiles Services (2558 HK)
China Railway Signal & Communication (3969 HK)	DMG Mori (6141 JP)
China State Construction Engineering (601688 CH)	Eagle Industry (6486 JP)
CRRC (1766 HK)	Frontier Services Group (500 HK)
Dongfeng Motor (489 HK)	Kato Works (6390 JP)
Guangzhou Automobile (2238 HK)	Keihin (7251 JP)
Shenzhen International (152 HK)	Makino Milling Maching (6135 JP)
Zhuzhou CRRC Times Electric (3898 HK)	Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding (7003 JP)
<b>Tony Moyer</b>	Nachi-Fujikoshi (6474 JP)
Amada (6113 JP)	Nishio Rent All (9609 JP)
Azbil (6845 JP)	Press Kogyo (7246 JP)
Chiyoda (6366 JP)	Shanghai Prime Machinery (2345 HK)
Daifuku (6383 JP)	Takeuchi Mfg. (6432 JP)
Fanuc (6954 JP)	TPR (6463 JP)
JGC (1963 JP)	TS Tech (7313 JP)
Nabtesco (6268 JP)	West China Cement (2233 HK)
Tsugami (6101 JP)	Xingda International Holdings (1899 HK)
Yaskawa Electric (6506 JP)	
Yokogawa Electric (6841 JP)	
<b>Steve Usher</b>	
Brilliance China (1114 HK)	
BYD (1211 HK)	
Geely Automobile (175 HK)	
Great Wall Motor (2333 HK)	
Honda Motor (7267 JP)	
Hyundai Mobis (012330 KS)	
Hyundai Motor (005380 KS)	
Kia Motors (000270 KS)	
Nissan Motor (7201 JP)	
Toyota Motor (7203 JP)	
Yamaha Motor (7272 JP)	
<b>Gary Cheung</b>	
Advantech (2395 TT)	
Airtac International Group (1590 TT)	
Delta Electronics (2308 TT)	
First Tractor (38 HK)	
Giant Manufacturing (9921 TT)	
Hiwin Technologies (2049 TT)	
Merida (9914 TT)	
Techntron Industries (669 HK)	
Teco Electric and Machinery (1504 TT)	
Weichai Power (2338 HK)	
<b>Kosuke Matsuda</b>	
Aisin Seiki (7259 JP)	
Bridgestone (5108 JP)	
Denso (6902 JP) — Kosuke Matsuda	
Fuji Heavy Industries (7270 HK)	
Isuzu Motors (7202 JP)	
Mazda (7261 JP)	
Mitsubishi Motors (7211 JP)	
Nesteer (1316 HK)	
Suzuki Motor (7269 JP)	
<b>Lily Li</b>	
Mintch (425 HK)	

<i>Japan Real Estate</i>	
Core Coverage Universe	Non-Coverage Universe
<b>Mark Brown (Team Leader)</b>	Daibiru (8806 JP)
Daito Trust Construction (1878 JP)	Daikyo (8840 JP)
Daiwa House Industry (1925 JP)	Haseko (1808 JP)
Lixil Group (5938 JP)	Hulic (3003 JP)
Mitsubishi Estate (8802 JP)	Kenedix (4321 JP)
Mitsui Fudosan (8801 JP)	Leopapace21 (8848 JP)
Noritz (5943 JP)	Sanwa Holdings (5929 JP)
Obayashi (1802 JP)	Sumitomo Real Estate Sales (8870 JP)
Sekisui House (1928 JP)	
Sumitomo Realty & Development (8830 JP)	
Taisei (1801 JP)	
Tokyo Tatemono (8804 JP)	

<i>China Real Estate</i>	
Core Coverage Universe	Non-Coverage Universe
<b>Andy So (Team Leader)</b>	Times Property Holdings (1233 HK)
Agile Property (3383 HK)	Yuzhou Properties (1628 HK)
China Overseas Land & Investment (688 HK)	
China Resources Land (1109 HK)	
China Vanke (2202 HK)	
CIFI Holdings Group (884 HK)	
Country Garden Holdings (2007 HK)	
Dalian Wanda Commercial Properties (3699 HK)	
Greentown China Holdings (3900 HK)	
Guangzhou R&F Properties (2777 HK)	
KWG Property Holding (1813 HK)	
Nanjing Gaoke (600064 CH)	
Shimao Property Holdings (813 HK)	
Longfor Properties (960 HK)	
<b>Peter Yang</b>	
Greenland Hong Kong Holdings (337 HK)	
Shenzhen Investment (604 HK)	

## Haitong International Coverage as of 1 Apr 2016

**China Consumer****Core Coverage Universe****Nicolas Wang (Team Leader)**

China Medical System (867 HK)  
 China Mengniu Dairy (2319 HK)  
 China Resources Enterprise (291 HK)  
 China Traditional Chinese Medicine (570 HK)  
 CSPC Pharmaceutical Group (1093 HK)  
 Hengan International (1044 HK)  
 Kweichow Moutai (600519 CH)  
 Luye Pharma Group (2186 HK)  
 Shanghai Pharmaceuticals (2607 HK)  
 Sinopharm Group (1099 HK)  
 Tingyi Cayman Islands Holding (322 HK)  
 Tsingtao Brewery (168 HK)  
 Uni-President China (220 HK)  
 Want Want China Holdings (151 HK)  
 Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical (600521 CH)

**Jessica Hong**

L'Occitane International (973 HK)  
 Prada SpA (1913 HK)  
 Samsonite International (1910 HK)

**Donald Cheng**

Galaxy Entertainment (27 HK)  
 MGM China (2282 HK)  
 Sands China (1928 HK)  
 SIM Holdings (880 HK)  
 Wynn Macau (1128 HK)

**Non-Coverage Universe**

China Huiyuan Juice Group (1886 HK)  
 China LotSynergy Holdings (1371 HK)  
 China Shineway Pharmaceutical Group (2877 HK)  
 Dynam Japan Holdings (6889 HK)  
 Shanghai Fudan-Zhangliang Bio-Pharm (1349 HK)  
 Tenwow International (1219 HK)

**Japan Consumer****Core Coverage Universe****James Moon (Team Leader)**

Ayama Trading (8219 JP)  
 Asics (7936 JP)  
 FamilyMart (8028 JP)  
 Fast Retailing (9983 JP)  
 Japan Tobacco (2914 JP)  
 Laox (8202 JP)  
 Oriental Land (4661 JP)  
 Rakuten (4755 JP)  
 Seven & I Holdings (3382 JP)  
 Start Today (3092 JP)  
 Unicharm (8113 JP)

**Non-Coverage Universe**

Aeon Mall (8905 JP)  
 Avex Group Holdings (7860 JP)  
 DCM Holdings (3050 JP)  
 H2O Retailing (8242 JP)  
 Honeys (2792 JP)  
 Parco (8251 JP)

**Latest Additions to Coverage**

Aisin Seiki (7259 JP)—Kosuke Matsuda  
 China State Construction Engineering (601688 CH)—Ole Hui  
 China Vanke (2202 HK)—Andy So  
 Cookpad (2193 JP)—Yushi Kawamoto  
 Dexter (206560 KS)—Justin Kim  
 Fuyo General Lease (8424 JP)—Tony Tanaka  
 Monotaro (3064 JP)—Yushi Kawamoto  
 Travelsky Technology (696 HK)—Yuanyuan Ji  
 Virscend Education (1565 HK)—Yuanyuan Ji  
 Yonwoo (115960 KS)—Jaesong Woo

**Latest Drops from Coverage**

Century Sage Scientific Holdings (1450 HK)

**Latest Transfers of Coverage**

Glory 6457 JP from Sam Thawley to Tony Tanaka

**Asia ex Small Cap****Core Coverage Universe****Yuanyuan Ji (Team Leader)**

Best Pacific International (2111 HK)  
 China Aircraft Leasing Group (1848 HK)  
 Pacific Textiles Holdings (1382 HK)  
 Pax Global Technology (327 HK)  
 Sa Sa International Holdings (178 HK)  
 Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics (1385 HK)  
 Shenzhen International Group (2313 HK)  
 SITC International Holdings (1308 HK)  
 TAL Education Group (XRS US)  
 Travelsky Technology (696 HK)  
 Virscend Education (1565 HK)  
 Wasion Group Holdings (3393 HK)  
**Walden Shing**  
 APT Satellite (1045 HK)  
 Fu Shou Yuan International (1448 HK)  
 Man Wah Holdings (1999 HK)  
 Vitasoy International Holdings (345 HK)  
 Xinyi Glass Holdings (868 HK)

**Justin Kim**

Aerospace Technology of Korea (067390 KS)  
 Cuckoo Electronics (192400 KS)  
 Dexter (206560 KS)  
 Duzonbizon (012510 KS) — Justin Kim  
 Fila Korea (081660 KS)  
 Kepco Plant Service (051600 KS)  
 Vieworks (100120 KS)

**Jaesong Woo**

Hansae (105630 KS)

Hy-Lok (013030 KS)  
 Inbody 041830 KS)  
 Korea Kolmar (161890 KS)  
 Osstem Implant (048260 KS)  
 Yonwoo (115960 KS)  
 Youngone (111770 KS)

**Jessica Ye**

Anta Sports Products (2020 HK)  
 Li Ning (2331 HK)

**Non-Coverage Universe**

Bonjour Holdings (653 HK)  
 C.banner International Holdings (1028 HK)  
 China Maple Leaf Educational Sys. (1317 HK)  
 Cuchen (225650 KS)  
 Goldpac Group (3315 HK)  
 Hotel Shilla (008770 KS)  
 Maoye International Holdings (848 HK)  
 Modetour Network (080160 KS)  
 Orange Sky Golden Harvest (1132 HK)  
 Orbitech (046120 KS)

Pou Sheng International Holdings (3813 HK)  
 PS TEC (002230 KS)  
 Samchully Bicycle (024950 KS)  
 Sinosoft Technology Group (1297 HK)  
 Texhong Textile Group (2678 HK)  
 TK Group Holdings (2283 HK)  
 Tsui Wah Holdings (1314 HK)  
 Value Added Technologies (043150 KS)  
 VST Holdings (856 HK)  
 Xia Nan Guo Restaurants Holdings (3666 HK)

**Japan Small Cap****Core Coverage Universe****Hiroyuki Terada (Team Leader)**

Accordia Golf (2131 JP)  
 Accretive (8423 JP)  
 Dentsu (4324 JP)  
 Gulliver International (7599 JP)  
 Kameda Seika (2220 JP)  
 Mandom (4917 JP)  
 Pigeon (7956 JP)  
 Pola Orbis (4927 JP)  
 Recruit Holdings (6098 JP)  
 Sanrio (8136 JP)  
 Shiseido (4911 JP)  
 Sohgo Security Services (2331 JP)  
 Technopro Holdings (6028 JP)  
 Yamato Holdings (9064 JP)  
 Yumeshin Holdings (2362 JP)

**Yusuke Suzuki**

Ain Pharmaciez (9627 JP)  
 Doutor Nichires Holdings (3087 JP)  
 FP (7947 JP)  
 Nihon Nohyaku (4997 JP)  
 Nihon Parkerizing (4095 JP)  
 Optex (6914 JP)  
 Sky Perfect JSAT Holdings (9412 JP)  
 Sun Frontier Fudousan (8934 JP)  
 Takara Leben (8897 JP)  
 Tosei (8923 JP)  
 Wowow (4839 JP)

**Tony Tanaka**

China Galaxy Securities (6881 HK)  
 Digital Garage (4819 JP)  
 Fuyo General Lease (8424 JP)  
 GCA Savian (2174 JP)  
 GF Securities (1776 HK)  
 Glory (6457 JP)  
 GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP)  
 Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing (388 HK)  
 Huatai Securities (6886 HK)  
 Nihon M&A Center (2127 JP)  
 Zenkoku Hoshu (7164 JP)