# NGDP Targeting under Fiscal Leadership: A Framework for China's Monetary-Fiscal Interaction

Liming Lin

Sciences Po Paris

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#### Motivation

- **Stagnant demand**: GDP growth slowing, inflation near 0%, interest rate at 1.4%—close to ZLB
  - Demand-driven slowdown: Current weakness reflects demand shocks, not supply constraints
- No explicit policy rule: PBoC lacks a clear target but the State Council has annual GDP growth rate targets
- Weak coordination: PBoC has limited independence; MoF remains passive during downturns
- NGDP targeting as a solution: Provides a rule-based anchor and coordinates fiscal-monetary policy

### Potential Research Questions 1

- Does an NGDP Targeting policy rule explain PBoC behavior better than traditional inflation-targeting rules?
- Past papers (Burdekin & Siklos (2024), Girardin, Lunven & Ma (2017)) have shown that PBoC's policy rule is anti-inflation and follows both Taylor and McCallum rules to some extent.
- **Contribution**: Estimating a NGDP targeting rule using GMM or ? to see if it fits better than Taylor or McCallum rules. Maybe add a VAR model for impulse response analysis.

## Potential Research Questions 2

- Can NGDP targeting outperform inflation targeting and coordinate stabilization efforts between the PBoC and MoF in a setting where one or both face institutional or economic constraints?
- Beckworth & Hendrickson (2020) incoporated NGDP targeting into a New Keynesian model found that it creates lower volatility in inflation than Taylor-type rules.
- Contribution: RANK model with ZLB constraint using Chinese data
  - Monetary rule: Taylor vs. NGDP targeting
  - Fiscal rule: Exogenous (Simple AR(1)) vs. Output gap -reactive (like Taylor rule) vs. NGDP targeting

### Strategic Interactions between PBoC and MoF?

- Stage 2: Add policy interaction between PBoC and MoF (Stackelberg/Nash)
  - Monetary and fiscal authorities modeled with separate rules:
    - PBoC: interest rate responds to inflation/output gap/NGDP
    - MoF: government spending responds to debt/output gap/NGDP
  - Strategic setups:
    - Stackelberg: MoF leads, PBoC follows
    - Nash: Simultaneous policy moves
  - NGDP targeting tested as coordination anchor