

How does Raising Retake Costs Incentive Students?

2023/11/3

Higher education and subsidies

- **Higher education performance** matters for both economies and individuals: economic development, R&D, climate challenge, labor market outcomes,... (e.g., Hanushek and Woessman, 2015; Lovenheim and Smith, 2023)
- **Resource input** is large in Higher Education (UNESCO, 2022)
 - Per-student spending in HE tops the education system around the world
 - HE funding keeps rising faster than enrolment.
 - Public Investment in universities
- Subsidies to public universities ...
- The **efficiency** could improve, e.g., In OECD countries, only 39% HE students graduate on time and over 1/5 do not graduate after all (OECD, 2022)

Efficiency: student outcomes and incentives

- Incentivizing students to achieve better performance is a way to improve the efficiency of the use of HE resources and hence public financial investments in HE.
- Students' performance and hence outcomes are motivated through both financial and non-financial incentives, such as:
 - **Scholarships and grants:** need-based (Murphy and Wyness, 2023; Denning et al., 2019; Castleman and Long, 2016; Fryer, 2011); merit-based (Behrman et al., 2015; Fryer, 2011; Angrist and Lavy, 2009).
 - **Student loans:**
 - **Tuition Fees:** (Bietenbeck et al., 2023; Murphy et al., 2019; Beneito et al., 2018; Garibaldi et al., 2012)
 - Others, esp. non-financial incentives: grading systems, ranking, etc. (Fidjeland, 2023; Tan, 2023; Jalava et al., 2015; Grove and Wasserman, 2006; Oettinger, 2002)

Changes in tuition fees


- It is not uncommon to see changes in tuition fees, either over time or across groups.
- Introduction, Abolishment, and Exemption
 - England's ()
 - Germanys ()
- Modifications and ...
 - Italy ()
 - a similar context in Valencia, Spain: ()

What could come with tuition changes?

- On the positive side:
- On the negative side:
- **Can tuition fees adjustment be a tool to achieve efficiency?**
- Our main contribution:

Overview of our findings

The rise in Catalonia



与其他政策变化有何不同？（文献、贡献）

- 可有可无（前面已经综述过了）

Anticipation and Perception

● precio de la universidad
Search term



+ Compare


Spain ▼

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
All categories ▼

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Interest over time ?



Anticipation and Perception



Data Source: Administrative data from UB, 2007 to 2017.

- Whole Sample: students who enrolled from **2007 to 2017** in all **undergraduate programs** at UB.
- Information contained
 - **pre-enrolment characteristics:** entrance exam performance, districts(?), parental education and occupation, etc.
 - academic records: degree program, grades, retakes, subject selection, graduation dates, etc.
 - fees: total amounts (gross and net) each AY, total credit prices each AY, scholarship applied, scholarship status, etc.
- **Sample selection:** We (first) **limit our analysis sample to the cohorts of 2007 to 2009**, as cohort 2007 was not affected by the policy change during their first four years of study, and 2008 and 2009 cohorts were affected from their fourth and third years of study, respectively. We (plan to) include later cohorts in subsequent analysis.

Dataset: Student-year records

Student-Year Balance Panel: We keep the observations for students in the 1st to 4th years of study to construct a balanced panel of the student-year records (27,712 student-year pairs). In construction, we exclude recognized courses. For the first analysis, we include only three cohorts (8,776 student-year pairs)

ID_ALUM	COHORT	YS (Year of Study)	Calendar Year	Background Variables X	Outcome Variables Y
1000001	2007	1	2007	x_1	y_{11}
1000001	2007	2	2008	x_1	y_{12}
1000001	2007	3	2009	x_1	y_{13}
1000001	2007	4	2010	x_1	y_{14}
...
1000007	2009	1	2009	x_7	y_{71}
1000007	2009	2	2010	x_7	y_{72}

Dataset: Student-year records

We focus on the following student outcomes:

- **Passing rates:** Proportion of courses a student passes each year(out of all the courses enrolled & out of courses whose exams they attend).
- **Excellence rates:** Proportion of courses a student obtains a good grade (i.e. Excellent and Honor, out of all the courses enrolled & out of courses whose exams they attend) each year.
- **Exam absence:** Proportion of courses whose exams a student skips each year(out of all the courses).
- **Number of credits** enrolled each year (normalized to ECTS).
- **Retakes:** Proportion of courses enrolled for more than one time.
- **Persistence:** whether the student continues their study in uni.
- Graduation and duration of study.

Descriptive Statistics: Panel A background variables

- The pre-enrollment characteristics between the control cohort (2007) and the two treated cohorts (2008 and 2009) are largely **comparable**.

**Panel A:
background variables**

Variable (% of)	Control group Cohort 2007	Treatment group 1 Cohort 2008	Treatment group 2 Cohort 2009
foreigner	0.059 (0.236)	0.052 (0.223)	0.05 (0.218)
gender (female=0)	0.481 (0.5)	0.503 (0.5)	0.536** (0.499)
internet access	0.973 (0.162)	0.975 (0.156)	0.969 (0.174)
Economics major	0.4 (0.49)	0.361 (0.481)	0.408 (0.492)
Higher Education (father)	0.26 (0.439)	0.292 (0.455)	0.298 (0.458)
Higher Education (mother)	0.198 (0.399)	0.241** (0.428)	0.25** (0.433)
No Education(father)	0.02 (0.14)	0.018 (0.132)	0.014 (0.118)
No Education(mother)	0.024 (0.154)	0.017 (0.128)	0.017 (0.13)
Public sector (father)	0.328 (0.47)	0.366 (0.482)	0.347 (0.476)
Public sector (mother)	0.225 (0.418)	0.257 (0.437)	0.25 (0.433)
Unemployed (father)	0.005 (0.065)	0* (0)	0.003 (0.056)
Unemployed (mother)	0.014 (0.119)	0.022 (0.149)	0.022 (0.146)
Low skilled job (father)	0.033 (0.178)	0.02 (0.141)	0.036 (0.186)
Low skilled job (mother)	0.097 (0.296)	0.088 (0.283)	0.083 (0.276)
Students with parttime jobs	0.897 (0.303)	0.896 (0.306)	0.898 (0.303)
Number of students	713	841	640

Descriptive Statistics: Panel A by Year of Study (1)

- Here we compare the background characteristics among the three groups in the freshman & sophomore years.

Panel A:
background variables(YS==1)

Variable (% of)	Control group Cohort 2007	Treatment group 1 Cohort 2008	Treatment group 2 Cohort 2009
foreigner	0.059 (0.236)	0.052 (0.224)	0.049 (0.216)
gender (female=0)	0.481 (0.5)	0.504 (0.5)	0.535** (0.499)
internet access	0.973 (0.162)	0.975 (0.157)	0.969 (0.175)
Economics major	0.4 (0.49)	0.361 (0.481)	0.407 (0.492)
Higher Education (father)	0.26 (0.439)	0.29 (0.454)	0.297 (0.458)
Higher Education (mother)	0.198 (0.399)	0.24* (0.427)	0.247** (0.432)
No Education(father)	0.02 (0.14)	0.018 (0.133)	0.013 (0.112)
No Education(mother)	0.024 (0.154)	0.017 (0.128)	0.015 (0.125)
Public sector (father)	0.328 (0.47)	0.366 (0.482)	0.344 (0.475)
Public sector (mother)	0.225 (0.418)	0.255 (0.436)	0.251 (0.434)
Unemployed (father)	0.005 (0.065)	0* (0)	0.003 (0.056)
Unemployed (mother)	0.014 (0.119)	0.023 (0.149)	0.022 (0.147)
Low skilled job (father)	0.033 (0.178)	0.021 (0.141)	0.035 (0.183)
Low skilled job (mother)	0.097 (0.296)	0.088 (0.284)	0.082 (0.274)
Students with parttime jobs	0.897 (0.303)	0.895 (0.307)	0.899 (0.301)
Number of students	702	835	635

Panel A:
background variables(YS==2)

Variable (% of)	Control group Cohort 2007	Treatment group 1 Cohort 2008	Treatment group 2 Cohort 2009
foreigner	0.054 (0.226)	0.048 (0.213)	0.05 (0.218)
gender (female=0)	0.493 (0.5)	0.509 (0.5)	0.539 (0.499)
internet access	0.972 (0.166)	0.977 (0.15)	0.968 (0.176)
Economics major	0.422 (0.494)	0.375* (0.485)	0.406 (0.491)
Higher Education (father)	0.265 (0.441)	0.3 (0.459)	0.3 (0.459)
Higher Education (mother)	0.194 (0.396)	0.231 (0.422)	0.253** (0.435)
No Education(father)	0.019 (0.138)	0.013 (0.11)	0.014 (0.119)
No Education(mother)	0.026 (0.161)	0.015 (0.123)	0.018 (0.132)
Public sector (father)	0.33 (0.471)	0.372 (0.484)	0.344 (0.475)
Public sector (mother)	0.226 (0.418)	0.254 (0.436)	0.245 (0.431)
Unemployed (father)	0.002 (0.042)	0 (0)	0.002 (0.042)
Unemployed (mother)	0.016 (0.125)	0.018 (0.134)	0.022 (0.145)
Low skilled job (father)	0.036 (0.185)	0.018* (0.134)	0.037 (0.19)
Low skilled job (mother)	0.095 (0.294)	0.098 (0.298)	0.082 (0.274)
Students with parttime jobs	0.899 (0.301)	0.897 (0.304)	0.895 (0.307)
Number of students	576	653	562
	17.95%	21.80%	11.50%

Descriptive Statistics: Panel A by Year of Study (2)

- Here we compare the background characteristics among the three groups in the junior & senior years.

Panel A:
background variables(YS==3)

Variable (% of)	Control group Cohort 2007	Treatment group 1 Cohort 2008	Treatment group 2 Cohort 2009
foreigner	0.055 (0.228)	0.049 (0.216)	0.049 (0.216)
gender (female=0)	0.498 (0.5)	0.511 (0.5)	0.548 (0.498)
internet access	0.969 (0.173)	0.981 (0.139)	0.967 (0.179)
Economics major	0.418 (0.494)	0.373 (0.484)	0.415 (0.493)
Higher Education (father)	0.266 (0.442)	0.307 (0.462)	0.296 (0.457)
Higher Education (mother)	0.194 (0.396)	0.224 (0.417)	0.247** (0.432)
No Education(father)	0.021 (0.144)	0.011 (0.107)	0.013 (0.116)
No Education(mother)	0.027 (0.162)	0.015 (0.121)	0.018 (0.131)
Public sector (father)	0.335 (0.472)	0.373 (0.484)	0.343 (0.475)
Public sector (mother)	0.231 (0.422)	0.26 (0.439)	0.241 (0.429)
Unemployed (father)	0.002 (0.044)	0 (0)	0.002 (0.044)
Unemployed (mother)	0.018 (0.131)	0.018 (0.133)	0.019 (0.138)
Low skilled job (father)	0.038 (0.192)	0.018** (0.133)	0.035 (0.184)
Low skilled job (mother)	0.1 (0.3)	0.097 (0.296)	0.082 (0.274)
Students with parttime jobs	0.897 (0.303)	0.897 (0.304)	0.895 (0.307)
Number of students	520	611	513
	9.72%	6.43%	8.72%

Panel A:
background variables(YS==4)

Variable (% of)	Control group Cohort 2007	Treatment group 1 Cohort 2008	Treatment group 2 Cohort 2009
foreigner	0.052 (0.222)	0.048 (0.213)	0.05 (0.218)
gender (female=0)	0.496 (0.5)	0.502 (0.5)	0.552* (0.498)
internet access	0.972 (0.166)	0.978 (0.147)	0.966 (0.181)
Economics major	0.41 (0.492)	0.37 (0.483)	0.412 (0.493)
Higher Education (father)	0.269 (0.444)	0.313 (0.464)	0.302 (0.46)
Higher Education (mother)	0.199 (0.4)	0.229 (0.42)	0.254** (0.436)
No Education(father)	0.018 (0.134)	0.012 (0.109)	0.014 (0.118)
No Education(mother)	0.029 (0.166)	0.015 (0.123)	0.018 (0.133)
Public sector (father)	0.336 (0.473)	0.376 (0.485)	0.344 (0.476)
Public sector (mother)	0.226 (0.418)	0.263 (0.441)	0.244 (0.43)
Unemployed (father)	0.002 (0.045)	0 (0)	0.002 (0.045)
Unemployed (mother)	0.017 (0.127)	0.017 (0.13)	0.018 (0.133)
Low skilled job (father)	0.03 (0.172)	0.017 (0.13)	0.038 (0.191)
Low skilled job (mother)	0.098 (0.297)	0.094 (0.292)	0.084 (0.278)
Students with parttime jobs	0.898 (0.303)	0.898 (0.308)	0.892 (0.311)
Number of students	492	586	500
	5.38%	4.09%	2.53%
	29.91%	29.82%	21.26%

Descriptive Statistics: key outcomes

Panel B:
outcome variables

Variable name		Control group Cohort 2007	Treatment group 1 Cohort 2008	Treatment group 2 Cohort 2009
% of exams absent		0.215 (0.264)	0.172*** (0.239)	0.086*** (0.186)
	obs	2317	2685	2210
% of courses passed		0.574 (0.318)	0.61*** (0.315)	0.726*** (0.281)
	obs	2317	2685	2210
% of courses with good grades		0.056 (0.139)	0.056 (0.137)	0.061 (0.13)
	obs	2317	2685	2210
total credits taken		65.661 (14.78)	65.7 (14.137)	64.479*** (10.952)
	obs	2317	2685	2210
participation		0.813 (0.39)	0.8 (0.4)	0.865*** (0.342)
	obs	2852	3355	2555
graduation or not		0.371 (0.484)	0.499*** (0.5)	0.71*** (0.454)
	obs	713	841	640
duration of study		5.788 (1.873)	5.031*** (1.408)	4.392*** (1.514)
	obs	713	841	640

Identification strategy

Identification Strategy: the "student-year" specification (1)

$$y_{ics} = \alpha_c + \gamma_s + \beta D_{ics} + \theta X_i + \varepsilon_{ics}$$

- **Parallel trends** among cohorts across years of study (YS) in the absence of treatment
- α_c and γ_s : cohort (c , 2007 to 2017) and year-of-study (s , 1 to 4) FEs;
- y_{ics} : outcome of student i in the s -th year of study: exam passing rate, exam absence rate, persistence in college, etc;
- D_{ics} : treatment dummy taking 1 if i in c exposed to the rise in the s th YS.

Control group: 2007 cohort—not exposed to the fee rise until the 5th YS

Treated group 1: 2008 cohort—exposed to the first rise in 2011 (4th YS)

Treated group 2: 2009 cohort—exposed to the first rise in 2011 (3rd YS) and the second in 2012 (4th YS)

Identification strategy

Identification Strategy: the "student-year" specification (2)


To avoid the confoundedness of composition changes resulting from non-random attrition, we modify the specification to:

$$y_{is} = \alpha_i + \gamma_s + \beta D_{ics} + \varepsilon_{is}$$

- α_i and γ_s : individual (i) and year-of-study (s) FEs;
- y_{ics} : outcome of student i in the s -th year of study;
- D_{ics} : treatment dummy taking 1 if i exposed to the rise in the s -th YS.

Empirical results (1): “First Stage”: law \rightarrow fees


- It doesn't seem like the law significantly changed the final amount paid by students and the fees associated with credits taken, **except for** the 2009 cohort in their last year (2012, 2nd rise)



“First Stage”: most frequent retakers


We take the top 25% (**most frequent**) **retakers** in the second year of study. In terms of tuition fees, we find that:

1) Students from the 2009 cohort faced the first shock in their third year. The total credit fees of the most frequent retakers from the 2009 cohort **increase by 190.73 euros** compared to the most frequent retakers from the 2007 cohort. The actual fees paid by them increase by **157.56 euros**.



“First Stage”: most frequent retakers

2) In the fourth year, the credit fees of the most frequent retakers from the 2009 cohort increase by **707.63 euros** compared to those from the 2007 cohort, and the actual fees paid increase by **573.90 euros**.



We will see that these increases are a result of

- 1) a positive “price effect”, which outweighs
- 2) a negative “credit effect”.

Decomposing the “First Stage”: price effect


To make sense of these differences, below are the **per-credit fees** they face each YS:

YS	1st attempt	2nd attempt	3rd attempt	4th attempt	Curs
<i>Cohort 2007</i>					
1	12.93	18.10	21.33	21.33	2007
2	13.63	19.08	22.48	22.48	2008
3	13.75	19.25	22.69	22.69	2009
4	14.10	21.15	25.38	25.38	2010
<i>Cohort 2009</i>					
1	13.75	19.25	22.69	22.69	2009
2	14.10	21.15	25.38	25.38	2010
3	15.16	22.75	45.49	45.49	2011
4	25.28	30.33	65.71	90.99	2012

For example, in the 4th YS, students in the 2009 cohort pay about 10 euros more per credit for their 1st and 2nd attempts.

Decomposing the “First Stage”: credits effect

- Further analyzing the behavioral differences, in terms of the credits taken ("Ordinary" type):
 - Compared to the second YS, in the third YS, the most frequent retakers (as defined before) in the 2009 cohort take about **3 ECTS credits fewer** than the corresponding subsample from the 2007 cohort, although this difference is not statistically significant.
 - In their fourth year, they significantly take about **11 ECTS credits fewer** than the students from the 2007 cohort.
- Note: Students take around 50 to 70 ECTS credits (equivalent) in these years.




“First Stage”: least frequent retakers

I also take the bottom 25% (**least frequent**) **retakers** in the second year of study. In terms of tuition fees, we find that:


Compared to the difference between the most frequent retakers, here the magnitude of differences between the two cohorts:

- **drops by about a half**, in the 3th YS, with the actual paid fees being insignificant;
- **drops by about 200 euros**, in the 4th YS.



“First Stage”: least frequent retakers

- The least frequent retaker **exhibit a different behavioral pattern** in terms of credits taken
- In the first year of study, the 2009 cohort students already take about 15 ECTS credits more than the corresponding subsample from the 2007 cohort.
- In their **fourth year**, they significantly take about **5 ECTS credits fewer** than the students from the 2007 cohort, while this difference with the most frequent retakers is 11. This explains most of the variation in the fees pattern between the two sub-groups.



The base: what does the magnitude mean?

To make sense of these differences, we also provide some descriptive statistics for these two cohorts:

1) The credits they take (by YS)

YS	N	mean	sd
<i>Cohort 2007</i>			
1	713	59.29	9.86
2	576	66.70	15.03
3	528	65.55	14.93
4	500	71.49	18.25
<i>Cohort 2009</i>			
1	635	56.47	10.85
2	562	54.90	12.21
3	513	55.84	16.13
4	500	51.80	14.70

2) The actual tuition fees paid (by YS)

YS	N	mean	sd
<i>Cohort 2007</i>			
1	713	506.25	268.87
2	579	734.68	315.33
3	500	740.20	330.26
4	453	793.15	389.65
<i>Cohort 2009</i>			
1	634	631.18	343.05
2	435	739.42	442.34
3	380	881.54	470.68
4	360	1328.12	701.87

That is, the 2007 cohort students normally take 60+ credits, while the 2009 cohort students normally take 50+ credits.

The base: what does the magnitude mean?

To make sense of these differences, we also provide some descriptive statistics for these two most frequent retaker sub-samples:

1) The credits they take (by YS)




YS	N	mean	sd
<i>Cohort 2007</i>			
1	145	59.50	9.10
2	145	62.20	13.62
3	113	64.74	15.71
4	105	67.63	22.62
<i>Cohort 2009</i>			
1	142	51.96	8.35
2	142	56.47	16.06
3	108	56.20	20.35
4	103	51.45	17.38

2) The actual tuition fees paid (by YS)


YS	N	mean	sd
<i>Cohort 2007</i>			
1	145	519.2281	264.0623
2	145	825.253	245.1583
3	99	745.9799	287.6802
4	85	802.2388	356.4188
<i>Cohort 2009</i>			
1	142	677.8356	334.267
2	142	1019.295	351.3216
3	103	1079.213	433.9986
4	91	1573.071	677.5424

(preliminary) counts of attempts

- Cohort 2007 has more number of retakes than the other two cohorts from the second year of study.
- Very few students took the 3rd attempt (4.5% student-pairs for 2007 to 2009 cohorts), or even 4th or more attempts (1.4% student-pairs for 2007 to 2009 cohorts).




(Preliminary) density function: proportion of credits of 2nd attempt by YS



Graphs by YS

(Preliminary) density function: proportion of credits of 3rd attempt by YS





Graphs by YS

Empirical results (2): credits taken

- It is strange because 2008 people are taking more credits but paying less.
- **Maybe** there were **more failures**? Or maybe there is a mistake in the processing.

Still need to check...



Next steps

- More outcome? – figure out whether there is a way for students to choose “easier”/ “lower-level” options.
- Prepare a semester version of dataset #1 once we have the data with more sem info
- Start to explore dataset #2—filtering records of certain times of retaking and explore the effects.
- Heterogeneity:
 - Compulsory courses vs. all courses
 - Good students vs. bad students
 - Disciplines: Science, Engineering, Social Sciences, Humanities; or different experimentalidades