

Do Women Politicians Face More Interruptions? An Analysis of Interjections in the Australian Parliamentary Debates (1998-2025)

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October 28, 2025

While interruptions are a natural component of parliamentary debate, they also reveal information about politicians’ behaviour and power dynamics within political institutions. In this paper, we use a dataset of digitized Australian Hansard transcripts from 1998 to 2025 to examine the content and nature of interruptions in parliamentary proceedings, with a focus on gender. Our exploratory analysis shows differences in the frequency of interruptions made towards men and women politicians, and how that has changed over time. This study contributes new empirical evidence to the study of gender and legislative speech, demonstrating the value of computational methods for uncovering how subtle forms of discursive inequality reinforce power dynamics.

Introduction

Women are increasingly being elected to parliaments around the world, including in Australia. Despite gains in numerical representation, women remain underrepresented in a substantive sense, because their ability to influence political debates and shape policy outcomes is often constrained. Pitkin (1967) distinguishes between these two forms of representation as *descriptive* and *substantive*. Descriptive representation refers to the presence of women in elected office, while substantive representation involves speaking and acting on behalf of women’s interests, including introducing legislation, engaging in debates, or undertaking advocacy efforts (Rayment and McCallion 2024).

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Increases in women’s descriptive representation do not automatically lead to stronger substantive representation. Feminist institutionalist scholars argue that political institutions are gendered in ways that constrain women’s political influence (Tremblay 2003; Sawer 2012; Kenny 2014). Formal and informal rules, norms, and hierarchies within institutions can subtly, yet powerfully limit women’s ability to engage in substantive representation. One such behaviour is the use of interruptions during parliamentary proceedings. Interruptions are defined as “intrusions into the current speaker’s turn” (Kollock, Blumstein, and Schwartz 1985, 38). Although interruptions are a routine and institutionally sanctioned feature of parliamentary debate, they can be employed particularly by men politicians to assert dominance, undermine, or silence women politicians (Vallejo Vera and Gómez Vidal 2022). As Och (2020) argues, such interruptions can be a form of resistance to women’s substantive representation, reinforcing gendered power dynamics within parliament.

Following calls by Celis et al. (2008, 99) to rethink substantive representation along the lines of “where, how, and why” does it occur, this paper emphasizes the “who” and “how.” Specifically, we examine who is interrupted, focusing on the gender and political party affiliation of the Members of Parliament (MPs) and how interruptions operate as a gendered constraint on substantive representation in the Australian House of Representatives. Our paper asks: do women MPs get interrupted more than men MPs? Does political party affiliation shape which MPs get interrupted the most?

To answer these questions, we analyze a dataset of digitized Hansard transcripts from the 38th to 47th parliaments (March 1998 to July 2025) (Katz and Alexander 2025). Through quantitative analysis of parliamentary debates and Question Time (QT), we examine the frequency and nature of interruptions along gendered and party lines. Our findings reveal that women MPs from centre and centre-left leaning political parties are interrupted more frequently than men MPs.

This paper contributes to a small, but growing body of quantitative research analyzing the substantive representation of women in Australian politics (Vacaflores and Stephenson 2025; Dijk and Poljak 2025). By combining feminist institutional analysis with quantitative methods, we show how institutional constraints like interruptions undermine women’s substantive representation.

This paper proceeds as follows. We begin by outlining our theoretical frameworks, including women’s substantive representation, feminist institutionalism, and gendered parliamentary discourse. We then discuss our data and methodology, followed by analysis of our results. Finally, we conclude by summarizing our main findings, highlighting our contributions, and suggesting areas for future research.

Literature review

Substantive representation

Substantive representation can be conceived as how elected representatives' actions align with the needs and wishes of their constituents (Pitkin 1967). Women politicians are often considered to be best positioned to represent the interests and needs of women, by raising policy issues of importance to women and/or by bringing women's perspectives to policy issues often considered more masculine, such as the economy. Krook and O'Brien (2012) define and categorize the gendered nature of cabinet positions, suggesting that policy issues such as healthcare, social welfare, and gender equality are "women's issues," while more masculine-coded policy issues include the economy, defence, and foreign affairs. Neutral issues could include the environment, public works, and the civil service (Krook and O'Brien 2012). These categorizations are useful for understanding substantive representation, but remain contested, given different parliamentary contexts and as understanding of gender moves beyond a binary framework.

Substantive representation in practice can take a number of forms in parliamentary contexts, including introducing legislation, engaging in debates, asking questions during QT, participating in committee meetings, or undertaking advocacy efforts (Rayment and McCallion 2024; Childs and Krook 2009). However, routine parliamentary rules and procedures, such as interruptions and adversarial behaviour, can be mobilized to either contribute to or undermine women's substantive representation (Vallejo Vera and Gómez Vidal 2022). For example, Vacaflores and Stephenson (2025) focuses on studying private members' bills in the Australian House of Representatives, where party discipline is less likely to permeate the nature of issues raised. They find that gender and legislators' individual backgrounds inform the types of issues addressed. In parliamentary speeches on bills, women politicians are more likely to speak to bills explicitly related to women's issues (Hargrave and Langengen 2021; Bäck and Debus 2019), or provide a gendered lens even if the legislation does not specifically address issues traditionally characterized as "women's issues" (Rayment 2024; Vacaflores and Stephenson 2025).

Defining "women's issues" remains a key concern to scholars studying substantive representation. "Women's issues" have never been fixed or universally agreed upon, especially as contemporary understandings of gender move beyond a binary framework. Vacaflores and Stephenson (2025) suggests a solution to this by viewing policy issues along a spectrum of "feminized" and "masculinized" issues. This approach allows for a more flexible understanding of what counts as "women's issues" and who can represent women. Men politicians can also undertake the substantive representation of women (Rayment and McCallion 2024) and issues not traditionally characterized as "women's issue" still hold gendered implications (Bird 2005). Nevertheless, issues such as gender-based violence, childcare, healthcare, social welfare, and education continue to be widely viewed as "women's issues" (Rayment 2024; Krook and O'Brien 2012).

Who raises these issues, and how they are framed in parliamentary speeches, is shaped by political party affiliation, ideology, and party discipline (Rayment 2024; Och 2020; Tremblay 2003). In the Canadian parliament, Rayment (2024) illustrates that Conservative women MPs are more likely than Liberal and New Democratic Party (NDP) MPs to speak about “women’s issues” between 1968 and 2015. However, Conservative MPs often focus on these issues through a traditional values lens, while Liberal and NDP MPs discuss these issues from a pro-gender equality perspective. This highlights that speaking and acting for women as part of substantive representation cannot be thought of in monolithic terms - party affiliation, ideology, and gender intersect, shaping how substantive representation occurs. Och (2020) illustrates that in the German Bundestag, men MPs from right-leaning political parties were more likely to interrupt women MPs from centre and centre-left political parties regardless of the policy issues being discussed. This behaviour acts as a form of backlash to both their numerical presence and substantive contributions in parliament.

In Australia, scholars have documented that progressive parties such as the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Greens have more consistently supported gender equity measures and addressed “women’s issues,” compared to right-leaning parties such as the Liberal Party of Australia (Vacaflares and Stephenson 2025). However, women politicians have also worked across party lines to advance “women’s issues,” such as the successful effort to lift the ministerial veto on the importation of the abortion pill RU486 (Sawer 2012). This example demonstrates that while party affiliation and ideology can shape how substantive representation occurs, gender can, at times, exert stronger influence. Responses to legislation on domestic violence, paid parental leave, and the gender pay gap further reveal how different parties and MPs conceptualize and engage with “women’s issues.” This engagement, however, does not take place in isolation, as broader institutional norms and rules shape how MPs can speak and act on behalf of women’s interests. These cultural and institutional conditions will be discussed further in the following section.

Parliamentary culture and gender

Parliamentary culture and broader institutional norms play a critical role in shaping the conditions under which women MPs can speak and act on behalf of women’s interests, despite being framed as “neutral” institutions (Collier and Raney 2018). This culture reflects and reproduces social hierarchies and power imbalances, rooted in gender, which intersect with race, sexuality, and class to shape political outcomes (Chappell and Waylen 2013). In Westminster parliaments, including the Australian House of Representatives, parliamentary culture has historically been shaped by masculine norms and values, while constraining marginalized voices (Mackay, Kenny, and Chappell 2010; Crawford and Pini 2011). Julia Gillard’s 2012 sexism and misogyny speech drew global attention to these dynamics, highlighting how women politicians face a double bind as they “...negotiate the demand to demonstrate masculine leadership attributes without tarnishing the feminine qualities expected of them (Wright and Holland 2014, 455; Sawer 2013). Underpinning parliamentary behaviour and interactions, this culture

shapes legislative debates, including interruptions, which can serve to reinforce gendered hierarchies and further marginalize women MPs. Understanding these gendered dimensions of parliamentary culture is important for understanding how interruptions can constrain women's substantive representation.

Feminist institutionalism provides a valuable framework for analyzing gendered dynamics within parliamentary settings, drawing attention to the interaction between formal rules such as the Standing Orders and parliamentary privilege and informal rules and cultural norms (Kenny 2014; Chappell and Waylen 2013; Mackay, Kenny, and Chappell 2010). While formal parliamentary rules are designed to guarantee equality, informal norms often shape behaviours differently. For example, Standing Orders are intended to give women and men politicians equal speaking time, but in practice, men are more likely to interrupt women politicians. Dowding, Leslie, and Taflaga (2021) highlights how in the Australian House of Representatives, speaking time is allocated by ministerial status, seniority, and gender, with women and less experienced MPs speaking less often despite the Standing Orders allocating equal floor time for all MPs. Consequently, women politicians may plan to give shorter speeches when they get floor time out of concern of being interrupted or abandon giving their speech entirely after being interrupted multiple times (Vallejo Vera and Gómez Vidal 2022).

Hames, Haugh, and Musgrave (2025) highlights that certain forms of unparliamentary language are enshrined in the Standing Orders, while other language around discussions of social issues like racism rely on case-by-case rulings by Speakers. This ambiguity and lack of codified rules could further undermine women and racialized politicians attempting to speak on behalf of marginalized groups. As Ilie (2010) argues, parliamentary discourse can be inherently strategic, structured by turn-taking, interruptions, and framing that reflect broader power hierarchies. These communicative practices are not neutral as they often amplify dominant voices and reinforce a speaker's power while aiming to undermine their opponent (Ilie 2013). Furthermore, mechanisms like parliamentary privilege, which protect MPs from the legal consequences of free speech in the chamber, can help them avoid accountability on incivility and harassment, which disproportionately affect women MPs (Collier and Raney 2018; Sawyer 2013). Feminist institutionalism therefore directs attention toward the "hidden" ways in which gender continues to shape participation, authority, and legitimacy within political institutions (Chappell and Waylen 2013).

Interruptions and gender

Prior studies analyzing the gendered nature of interruptions in parliamentary debates and committee meetings globally show mixed results. Interruptions can be understood as more than a procedural tactic, as they can also be a form of violence against women in politics (VAWIP). Krook (2022) considers this "semiotic violence," where language, symbols, interruptions, and other discursive strategies are mobilized to undermine women politicians' authority and presence. This highlights how interruptions are not always spontaneous and can be strategically employed to reproduce gendered hierarchies in parliament. At the same time, interruptions

can be shaped by institutional and strategic factors. Diener (2025) shows how high status, policy expertise, and whether MPs are in opposition shape how they use interruptions as a form of political communication to strategically discredit other members and raise their own profile.

Within this broader conceptualization, empirical findings vary across parliaments. In the German Bundestag, Och (2020) found that women MPs are more likely to be interrupted than men, but argues that these interruptions are not a form of semiotic VAWIP because women MPs learned to utilize interruptions to further their own goals. Similarly, Stopfner (2018) employed qualitative case studies to understand whether gendered heckling is shaped by specific parliamentary contexts or reflects broader parliamentary culture. She concludes that both institutional norms and transnational parliamentary cultures contribute to the gendered interruptions that undermine women’s process-oriented substantive representation (Rayment 2024).

In contrast, evidence from the Ecuadorian Congress presents a more nuanced picture. Vallejo Vera and Gómez Vidal (2022) found that while women Members of Congress (MCs) were less likely to be interrupted than men, interruptions silenced women at a higher rate. However, they found that higher status and promotion to more prominent legislative roles could reverse some of the most negative effects of interruptions for women MCs.

In the Canadian House of Commons, Whyte (2017) found that gendered interruptions sharply increased during the 1990s, coinciding with an increase in the descriptive representation of women. Yet, Dijk and Poljak (2025)’s analysis of parliamentary speeches in the UK, Australia, and Croatia finds no gender difference in whether individual politicians get interrupted and that all politicians are less likely to be interrupted when more women participate in debates. Notably, they find that in Australia, the number of interruptions declined as the number of women serving in parliament increased.

Research focused on committee meetings further illustrates the gendered nature of interruptions. In the Australian Senate Estimate hearings between 2006 and 2015, Richards (2016) finds that men senators used interruptions to block other speakers or assert control over the floor, with women senators and witnesses receiving the most negative interruptions. Likewise, in US state legislatures, Kathlene (1994) shows that as the number of women increases in committee hearings, men legislators responded with more interruptions and verbal aggression aimed at undermining women’s substantive participation in the policymaking process. Additionally, Miller and Sutherland found that women senators faced twice as many interruptions from male colleagues when speaking about “women’s issues,” with men senators employing an aggressive form of interruptions called “rapid-fire ‘interruption clusters’” to undermine and disrupt their speeches (2023, 103).

Taken together, these studies of both parliamentary debates and committee meetings emphasize that even as the number of women elected increases, women politicians are often interrupted more frequently by male colleagues. This pattern largely holds across nations and institutional contexts, highlighting that interruptions undermine women politicians’ abilities

to speak and act on behalf of women. By focusing on interruptions in the Australian House of Representatives from 1998 to 2025, our paper contributes to the literature by combining feminist institutionalism with quantitative methods to examine how interruptions function as a persistent, gendered constraint on women’s substantive representation in parliament.

Data and methods

Dataset overview

To perform this analysis, we use a subset of the digitized Australian Hansard corpus produced by Katz and Alexander (2023). This dataset captures parliamentary proceedings in the House of Representatives. It was generated using the XML transcripts available on the Parliament of Australia website. The parsed XML transcripts were reshaped, cleaned, enhanced, and validated using a combination of manual and automated tests, as well as external datasets available in the `AustralianPoliticians` and `ausPH` R packages (Alexander and Hodgetts 2021; Leslie 2024).

Our dataset contains a total of 535,961 rows, where each row represents an individual statement, with details on who is speaking. For completeness, we analyze complete parliamentary periods. As a result, the earliest date is the first sitting day of parliament number 39 (10 November 1998), and the latest date is the final sitting day of parliament number 47 (27 March 2025). The cutoff dates used for each parliamentary period are available in the Appendix, in Table 9.

The use of data spanning multiple parliamentary periods allows us to explore patterns over time, which is of particular interest as the descriptive representation of women in the House of Representatives increased from 22 per cent in 1998 to 45 per cent in 2022 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2025; International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 1998). This period also includes Julia Gillard’s tenure as Australia’s first woman prime minister (2010 to 2013).

Our dataset only includes Chamber proceedings (i.e. it does not contain either the Federation Chamber or the Senate). Choosing to exclude rows from the Federation Chamber is motivated largely by: 1) not every sitting day has Federation Chamber proceedings, 2) these proceedings are often significantly shorter than the Chamber proceedings, and 3) the topics discussed in the Federation Chamber are restricted (Representatives et al. 2018). As such, interjection data are far more sparse in the Federation Chamber proceedings, making it less suitable for this project.

As an example, Table 1 contains all rows of speech number 109 from the Hansard proceedings on 27 March 2025, followed by a list defining each variable as outlined in Katz and Alexander (2023). By looking at the first individual who makes a statement in that speech (i.e., the name associated with the minimum order number), we can identify the person whose turn it is to speak, which in Table 1 is Rob Mitchell. Therefore, any statements made by members within

| name | order | speech_no | partyName | body | gender | interject |
|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------|------------------------|--|--------|-----------|
| Mitchell, Rob | 230 | 109 | Australian Labor Party | It's been interesting to listen to the whingeing and the... | man | 0 |
| Conaghan, Pat | 231 | 109 | The Nationals | Mr Conaghan interjecting- | man | 1 |
| Claydon, Sharon (The DEPUTY SPEAKER) | 232 | 109 | Australian Labor Party | Okay, enough! Order! It is really disorderly to do that.... | woman | 0 |
| Mitchell, Rob | 233 | 109 | Australian Labor Party | It's disgusting to think that those opposite said to the... | man | 0 |
| McCormack, Michael | 234 | 109 | The Nationals | No, it was me. | man | 1 |
| Mitchell, Rob | 235 | 109 | Australian Labor Party | It was you? Well, that explains it-to actually go there,... | man | 0 |
| The DEPUTY SPEAKER | 236 | 109 | NA | Member for McEwen, I didn't understand the reference, but you... | NA | 0 |
| Mitchell, Rob | 237 | 109 | Australian Labor Party | The minister who was caught rorting was Bridget McKenzie, the... | man | 0 |
| The DEPUTY SPEAKER | 238 | 109 | NA | Member for McEwen, you need to withdraw the allegation. | NA | 0 |
| Mitchell, Rob | 239 | 109 | Australian Labor Party | I withdraw. It's quite simple. Those opposite cut funding to... | man | 0 |

Table 1: 10 rows of 27 March 2025 proceedings from the Hansard corpus published by Katz and Alexander (2025)

that speech that are not attributed to Rob Mitchell (the member whose turn it is to speak), the Speaker, or the Deputy Speaker, are flagged as interjections in the `interject` column (Katz and Alexander 2023).

The variables in Table 1 are:

- **name:** Name of the individual speaking as parsed from the Hansard XML.
- **order:** Row number
- **speech_no:** Index of each speech made on the given sitting day, which includes all statements and interruptions
- **partyName:** Speaking member's party name
- **body:** Statement text
- **gender:** Gender of the speaker
- **interject:** Interjection flag

The value for gender was assigned only for rows with an individual MP's name in the **name** column. Rows with body text containing a business start or stage direction are attributed as such, and cannot be assigned a gender. Also, there are over 18,000 rows in the corpus attributed to one or multiple opposition members, government members, or honourable members, where no gender can be assigned. Other examples of statements which cannot be assigned a gender include those made by The Speaker, The Deputy Speaker, or The Acting Speaker. In all of these cases, the gender value is left as missing.

Interjections within parliamentary proceedings can take different forms (Wissik 2021). They may be nonverbal in nature, such as laughter or applause, or they may be clearly spoken verbal interruptions. Further, interjections can be made by one specific individual, or they may be recorded more generally and attributed to a group such as government members. Interruptions may also be classified as either institutionalized or non-institutionalized. An

| Parliament Number | Count |
|-------------------|-------|
| 39 | 217 |
| 40 | 189 |
| 41 | 196 |
| 42 | 173 |
| 43 | 179 |
| 44 | 190 |
| 45 | 166 |
| 46 | 170 |
| 47 | 171 |

Table 2: Number of sitting days per parliament

example of an institutionalized interruption would be an announcement made by the elected Speaker, whereas a non-institutionalized interruption would be a comment made by an MP during someone else’s speech. While some parliamentary transcripts for other countries such as Sweden explicitly differentiate between types of interjections within the transcript’s encoding structure, this is not the case for the Australian Hansard XMLs (Wissik 2021). As such, all interjections were parsed and processed in the same way for the entire corpus. This means that verbal and non-verbal interjections are categorized the same way, as are interjections made by one person and those made by a group. However, the interjection flagging method used by Katz and Alexander (2023) described in the previous paragraph specifically re-codes interruptions made by the Speaker or the Deputy Speaker (i.e., institutionalized interjections) so that they are not flagged as interjections. As a result, this corpus focuses primarily on non-institutionalized interjections.

Summary statistics

In our dataset there are a total of 1,651 sitting days, with 391 unique speakers, 9 unique parties, and 170 unique electorates. A summary of the number of sitting days per parliament is provided in Table 2. On average, there are 183 sitting days per parliament.

The number of unique speakers per day ranges from 1 to 116, with a mean and standard deviation of about 76 and 13, respectively. The number of speakers per day disaggregated by gender is illustrated in Figure 1. Based on this plot it is clear that since 1998, the number of women speakers has overall been smaller than the number of men speakers. However, this gender gap appears to be narrowing over time, indicating an increase in the representation and inclusion of women politicians from 1998 to now.

Of the 535,961 rows in this dataset, 95,522 are flagged as interjections, which amounts to about 18 per cent of the total row count. The distribution of interjections by gender is summarized in Table 3. The proportion of interjections made by men speakers is 53 per cent




Figure 1: Number of unique speakers per day by gender

| Gender | Count | Proportion |
|--------|-------|------------|
| Women | 13332 | 13.96% |
| Men | 63891 | 66.89% |
| NA | 18299 | 19.16% |

Table 3: Count and proportion of interjections by gender. Note: statements that were not made by an individual MP such as ‘Government members interjecting-’ could not be assigned a value for gender, resulting in a value of NA.

higher than that of women speakers. Also, 19 per cent of flagged interjections are associated with speakers without a specified gender (NA), most frequently attributed to “Opposition members,” “Honourable members,” or “Government members.”

Figure 2 illustrates the daily number of flagged interjections per speaker in parliament, with separate smoothed trend lines for men and women, accounting for differences in the number of men and women speakers present each day. Based on the smoothed trend lines, it appears that the daily rate of interjections for women MPs is generally lower than that of men MPs across sitting days. Despite an increase in the number of women MPs present over time as depicted in Figure 1, the daily rate of interjections being made by women MPs does not appear to have increased as a result.

| Party Name | Women | Men |
|----------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Australian Greens | 7.33 (7.4%) | 55 (92.6%) |
| Australian Labor Party | 121.95 (21.3%) | 307.8 (78.7%) |
| Centre Alliance | 24 (100%) | 0 (0%) |
| Independent | 19.33 (24.4%) | 71.8 (75.6%) |
| Katters Australian Party | 0 (0%) | 347 (100%) |
| Liberal Party of Australia | 87.2 (12.5%) | 179.18 (87.5%) |
| Nick Xenophon Team | 11 (100%) | 0 (0%) |
| Palmer United Party | 0 (0%) | 1 (100%) |
| The Nationals | 41.25 (4.6%) | 94.44 (95.4%) |

Table 4: Rate of interjections per MP by gender and party, with share of total interjections in parentheses




Figure 2: Daily rate of interjections by gender

Table 4 provides an overview of the interjections flagged by gender and political party. The values in the table capture the rate of interjections per MP for each gender and party. This rate is equal to the total number of interjections divided by the total number of unique MPs for the given gender and party. The percentages in parentheses represent the total share of interjections by gender in that party. For all five parties with both men and women MPs, the rate and share of interjections for men is notably higher than those of women.

| Metric | Value |
|--------------------|--------|
| Average | 639 |
| Minimum | 1 |
| Maximum | 117296 |
| Standard Deviation | 1080 |

Table 5: Average, standard deviation, minimum and maximum number of words per speech

Finally, Table 5 contains key metrics relating to the length of speeches in the corpus. The range of speech length is quite large, spanning from 1 word to 117,296 words. Examples of speeches with very small word counts are stage directions such as “Bill presented by Mr Tollner.” (on 16 June 2003), or one-word answers to questions in writing such as “Yes” or “No.” The average word count per speech across the entire corpus is about 639, with a standard deviation of about 1,080 words.

Analysis dataset

To prepare the data for our purposes, some reshaping and filtering was necessary. Firstly, rows with a missing `speech_no` value were removed, since this variable is essential for preparing the data for modeling. We identified that the only rows which had a missing `speech_no` were stage directions, business starts, and questions in writing. There were no interjections associated with rows with a missing speech number, so filtering them out is unlikely to meaningfully affect the analysis. A new variable called `parliament_num` was then added to the corpus so that the correct parliament number associated with each sitting day was available, and could be used as a fixed effect in the model.

Based on the model design, detailed in the next section, the input data must have one row for every MP per parliament, with their party affiliation, gender, number of interruptions received (outcome), and the number of speaking turns (offset). For the offset, we count each row within a given speech separately as a speaking turn. For example, in Table 6, it is Craig Emerson’s turn to speak, and during this speech he was interrupted five times. After making his first statement, he was interrupted by both Bronwyn Bishop and Government members. Once the Speaker called “Order!” and he continued speaking, he was interrupted by Luke Simpkins. The Speaker spoke again, and then Craig Emerson spoke for the third time, after which he was interrupted by Opposition members, and finally the Speaker gave the floor to the Manager of Opposition Business to begin a new speech. Although this all happened within a single speech in which Craig Emerson had the floor, it contributes three units (i.e., speaking turns) to the offset because there were three separate instances in which Craig Emerson had a speaking turn and could be interrupted. This would also contribute five units (i.e., interjections) to the outcome count, because Craig Emerson was interrupted five times during this speech.

| name | order | speech_no | partyName | body | gender | interject |
|--------------------|-------|-----------|----------------------------|---|--------|-----------|
| Emerson, Craig | 155 | 74 | Australian Labor Party | I thank my friend the member for Moreton not only... | man | 0 |
| Bishop, Bronwyn | 156 | 74 | Liberal Party of Australia | Speaker, I rise on a point of order. Under the... | woman | 1 |
| Government members | 157 | 74 | NA | Government members interjecting- | NA | 1 |
| The SPEAKER | 158 | 74 | NA | Order! | NA | 0 |
| Bishop, Bronwyn | 159 | 74 | Liberal Party of Australia | when an answer only had to be relevant, that sort... | woman | 1 |
| The SPEAKER | 160 | 74 | NA | The minister has the call and should avoid debate in... | NA | 0 |
| Emerson, Craig | 161 | 74 | Australian Labor Party | Speaker, I was asked about alternative approaches to the responsible... | man | 0 |
| Simpkins, Luke | 162 | 74 | Liberal Party of Australia | Just pour another \$100 million in. | man | 1 |
| The SPEAKER | 163 | 74 | NA | The member for Cowan has been advised every day this... | NA | 0 |
| Emerson, Craig | 164 | 74 | Australian Labor Party | The dam heights, according to the coalition, should be high,... | man | 0 |
| Opposition members | 165 | 74 | NA | Opposition members interjecting- | NA | 1 |
| The SPEAKER | 166 | 74 | NA | Order! I am seeking quiet. The Manager of Opposition Business... | NA | 0 |

Table 6: All rows of speech number 74 from 12 February 2014

To prepare the model input data, the number of speaking turns was first computed using the logic described above. For each speech in the corpus, the MP whose turn it was to speak was identified as the individual with the smallest order number. Only rows corresponding to that MP were retained for each speech, and the total number of statements per MP, parliament, and party affiliation were then counted. This produced a dataframe with each MP’s name, parliament number, party affiliation, and number of speaking turns.

The number of interjections made towards each MP was calculated by first identifying the MP whose turn it was to speak for each speech, as previously described. Then, rows corresponding to statements made by other MPs that were flagged as interjections were retained. The remaining rows were then used to count the total number of interjections received per MP, parliament, and party. This data table was then merged with the table of speaking turns, and any MPs with no recorded interjections in the corpus were assigned a value of zero.

It is possible for an MP to change political parties within a single parliamentary period. In those cases, there is a separate row in the input data for each party affiliation. For example, Julia Banks quit the Liberal Party of Australia and became an independent on 27 November 2018, during the forty-fifth parliament (Parliament of Australia 2025). As such, the number of speaking turns and interjections received were counted separately for each combination of party and parliament number. Finally, the gender of each MP was added to the input table using the **gender** variable in the corpus. The first 15 rows of the resulting dataset are shown below in Table 7.

| name | parliament_num | partyAbbrev | n_statements | n_times_interjected | gender |
|-------------------|----------------|-------------|--------------|---------------------|--------|
| Abbott, Tony | 39 | LIB | 500 | 411 | male |
| Abbott, Tony | 40 | LIB | 1258 | 655 | male |
| Abbott, Tony | 41 | LIB | 918 | 519 | male |
| Abbott, Tony | 42 | LIB | 354 | 78 | male |
| Abbott, Tony | 43 | LIB | 963 | 225 | male |
| Abbott, Tony | 44 | LIB | 2761 | 1771 | male |
| Abbott, Tony | 45 | LIB | 19 | 2 | male |
| Adams, Dick | 39 | ALP | 107 | 20 | male |
| Adams, Dick | 40 | ALP | 69 | 30 | male |
| Adams, Dick | 41 | ALP | 79 | 16 | male |
| Adams, Dick | 42 | ALP | 70 | 11 | male |
| Adams, Dick | 43 | ALP | 103 | 3 | male |
| Albanese, Anthony | 39 | ALP | 220 | 63 | male |
| Albanese, Anthony | 40 | ALP | 194 | 49 | male |
| Albanese, Anthony | 41 | ALP | 451 | 146 | male |

Table 7: First 15 rows of the model input dataset

Statistical model

Model overview

The aim of this project is to explore how a given MP’s gender and political party impact the frequency of interruptions made toward them while it is their turn to speak. A Negative Binomial model will be used to perform this analysis, where the outcome μ_i represents the expected count of interruptions made toward an individual MP (i) within a given parliament.

This model was chosen largely because it is well suited for modeling count outcome variables, such as the number of interjections. While a Poisson model is also suitable for count outcomes, it assumes that all observations for a given set of predictors share one underlying rate, equal to both the mean and the variance, which does not hold in the data at hand. In this setting, the Poisson model assumes one rate of interruptions for all MPs with a given combination of values for parliament number, gender, and political party, and that any other variation observed is due solely to randomness. This assumption is not reasonable here because there are sources of variance that cannot be observed which influence the rate at which an MP is interrupted, such as speaking style or personality. For example, an MP who is aggressive or harsh would likely get interrupted more frequently than one who is not aggressive. Since these sources of heterogeneity cannot be observed, the amount of variation present in the data will be higher than what would be expected under the Poisson model, and the assumption of an equal mean and variance will be violated. This situation is referred to as overdispersion.

One way to check for overdispersion is by comparing the residual deviance of a model to its degrees of freedom. If the model and assumed variance structure are a good fit for the data, then these two values should be approximately equal (i.e., ratio of ≈ 1) (Roback and Legler

2021). To validate our choice to use a Negative Binomial model instead of a Poisson model, we compared the ratio of residual deviance and degrees of freedom in both models. Under the Poisson model, this value is ≈ 18.7 , indicating major overdispersion. In contrast, under the Negative Binomial model, this value is ≈ 1.01 , which is indicative of a better model fit. Over-dispersion is not an issue in the Negative Binomial case because the variance structure of the model accounts for it by including a dispersion parameter θ , which allows the variance to exceed the mean, thereby accounting for unobserved sources of variation. This leads to an improved model fit and more reliable estimates.

In line with Rayment (2024), the model will have fixed effects for parliament number to capture contextual changes between parliaments, as well as an offset for the number of times it was an MP's turn to speak, to account for the fact that an MP who gives more speeches has more opportunities to be interrupted. This model design allows us to predict the number of interruptions that will be directed towards an MP with a certain set of characteristics in a single parliament period.

Model notation

The model is denoted as follows:

$$y_i \sim \text{Negative Binomial}(\mu_i, \theta)$$

$$\log(\mu_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Woman}_i + \sum_{k=1}^8 \beta_k \text{Parliament}_{ki} + \sum_{j=1}^8 \beta_j \text{Party}_{ji} + \log(S_i)$$

where

- μ_i is a count of the expected number of interruptions for MP i
- θ is the dispersion parameter
- Woman_i is a dummy variable equal to 1 if MP i is a woman, and 0 otherwise
- Parliament_{ki} is a dummy variable equal to 1 if MP i is part of parliament k , and 0 otherwise. There are 9 unique parliamentary periods in the corpus, and the sum ranges from 1 to 8 because the 9th acts as the reference category
- Party_{ji} is a categorical variable that reflects the party j that MP i is a member of in the specified parliament. There are 9 unique party affiliations in the corpus, and the sum ranges from 1 to 8 because the 9th acts as the reference category
- $\log(S_i)$ is the offset term for the number of speaking turns had by MP i

Analysis and results

This analysis was performed using R Statistical Software, version 4.3.3 (R Core Team 2024). After preparing the model input data as described, the `glm.nb` function from the MASS package

| Term | Regression Coefficient | Rate Ratio | P-value |
|------------------|------------------------|------------|---------|
| (Intercept) | -1.612 | 0.199 | 0.000 |
| parliament_num39 | 0.401 | 1.494 | 0.000 |
| parliament_num40 | 0.370 | 1.448 | 0.000 |
| parliament_num41 | 0.233 | 1.263 | 0.003 |
| parliament_num42 | 0.183 | 1.200 | 0.019 |
| parliament_num43 | 0.001 | 1.001 | 0.987 |
| parliament_num44 | 0.138 | 1.148 | 0.073 |
| parliament_num45 | -0.041 | 0.959 | 0.591 |
| parliament_num46 | -0.392 | 0.676 | 0.000 |
| partyCA | -1.001 | 0.367 | 0.016 |
| partyGRN | -0.180 | 0.835 | 0.417 |
| partyIND | -0.448 | 0.639 | 0.000 |
| partyKAP | -0.115 | 0.891 | 0.696 |
| partyLIB | -0.068 | 0.934 | 0.084 |
| partyNP | -0.005 | 0.995 | 0.943 |
| partyNXT | -1.760 | 0.172 | 0.029 |
| partyPUP | 0.060 | 1.062 | 0.929 |
| genderWoman | -0.312 | 0.732 | 0.000 |

Table 8: Regression Results

was used to fit a Negative Binomial regression model with a log link function, as defined in the previous section (Venables and Ripley 2002). The parliament number, party abbreviation and gender variables were all coded as factors to ensure they were correctly interpreted as categorical variables in the model.

This model output has a total of 18 coefficients: 1 intercept coefficient, 8 parliament number coefficients where the reference category is parliament number 47, 8 party coefficients where the reference category is ALP (Australian Labor Party), and 1 coefficient for the woman variable. Since the outcome of the Negative Binomial model is on the log scale, exponentiating the coefficient values yields rate ratios which are easier to interpret. For categorical variables, rate ratios capture the multiplicative effect of a variable on the expected count of interjections, relative to its reference category. A rate ratio which is greater than 1 implies that the expected count of interjections is higher than the reference category, and a rate ratio less than 1 indicates that the expected count of interjections is lower than the reference category. This effect can also be expressed in terms of percentages. For instance, a rate ratio of 0.75 corresponds to a 25 per cent lower expected count compared to the reference category, while a rate ratio of 1.30 corresponds to a 30 per cent higher expected count compared to the reference category. The coefficients, exponentiated coefficients (i.e., rate ratios), and p-values are summarized in Table 8. Table 10 in the Appendix provides the full party name associated with each abbreviation.

The `parliament_num` coefficients capture how the expected number of interjections in one parliament compares to that in the 47th parliament (the reference category), holding gender and party constant. Since the rate ratio for the 39th parliament is ≈ 1.5 , this indicates that MPs in parliament 39 are expected to be interrupted 1.5 times (or 50%) more than MPs in parliament 47. In contrast, this output tells us that an MP in parliament 46 is expected to be interrupted about 32.4 per cent times less than an MP in parliament 47 (Rate Ratio = 0.676). Interestingly, the rate ratios for earlier parliaments (i.e., 39 through 44) are all greater than 1, while the rate ratios for later parliaments (i.e., 45 and 46) are less than 1. This suggests temporal changes in the frequency of being interrupted, holding gender and party constant. The p-value column indicates that the coefficients for parliaments 39, 40, 41, 42, and 46 are statistically significant at the level of 0.05.

The estimated rate ratios for `party` range from 0.172 for NXT to 1.062 for PUP. The only party with rate ratio greater than 1 is PUP, however this coefficient is not statistically significant ($p \approx 0.92$). This suggests that after controlling for gender and parliament, MPs from PUP are not significantly more likely to be interrupted than those from the reference category party (ALP).

For the other 7 parties, the rate ratios are below 1, indicating a lower expected number of interjections compared to MPs in ALP, holding gender and parliament constant. Among these, the coefficients for CA, IND, and NXT are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). For example, the estimated rate ratio for IND is 0.639, implying that an MP in the Independent party is expected to experience about 36 per cent fewer interruptions than an MP in the Australian Labor Party, controlling for gender and parliament.

Finally, the `gender` rate ratio indicates that a woman MP is expected to be interrupted about 26.8 per cent less than a man MP holding party and parliament constant. The associated p-value (≈ 0) implies that this effect is highly significant.

Conclusion

Acknowledgements

We thank Monica Alexander for helpful comments.

Appendix

| Parliament Number | First Sitting Day | Last Sitting Day |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| 39 | 10 November 1998 | 27 September 2001 |
| 40 | 12 February 2002 | 12 August 2004 |
| 41 | 16 November 2004 | 20 September 2007 |
| 42 | 12 February 2008 | 24 June 2010 |
| 43 | 28 September 2010 | 27 June 2013 |
| 44 | 12 November 2013 | 05 May 2016 |
| 45 | 30 August 2016 | 04 April 2019 |
| 46 | 02 July 2019 | 31 March 2022 |
| 47 | 26 July 2022 | 27 March 2025 |

Table 9: Earliest and latest sitting days in the corpus for each parliament

| Party Abbreviation | Party Name |
|--------------------|----------------------------|
| ALP | Australian Labor Party |
| CA | Centre Alliance |
| GRN | Australian Greens |
| IND | Independent |
| KAP | Katters Australian Party |
| LIB | Liberal Party of Australia |
| NP | The Nationals |
| NXT | Nick Xenophon Team |
| PUP | Palmer United Party |

Table 10: Abbreviations and full names of Australian political parties

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