



**UNODC**

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime



Global Resource for Anti-Corruption  
Education and Youth Empowerment



A large, semi-transparent background image shows a close-up of a person's hand with their fingers spread. Below the hand is a dark banner with white text that reads "LA LUTTE CONTRE LA CORRUPTION". The overall background is a dark red color.

Knowledge tools for academics  
and professionals

## **Module Series on Anti-Corruption**

# Module 11

# Corruption, Peace and Security



## **Knowledge tools for academics and professionals**

UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption

### **MODULE 11**

**CORRUPTION, PEACE AND SECURITY**

### **Background information**

The UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption offers 14 Modules focusing on a range of core anti-corruption issues. This includes corruption's varied definitions and devastating effects, responses to corruption, and linkages between corruption and different topics such as good governance, comparative politics, whistle-blowing, justice systems, human rights, gender, education, citizen participation, peace and security.

The Modules are designed for use by both academic institutions and professional academies across the world. They are built to help lecturers and trainers deliver anti-corruption education, including those who are not dedicated anti-corruption lecturers and trainers but would like to incorporate these components into their courses. Lecturers are encouraged to customize the Modules before integrating them into their classes and courses. The Modules include discussions of relevant issues, suggestions for class activities and exercises, recommended class structures, student assessments, reading lists (with an emphasis on open access materials), PowerPoint slides, video materials and other teaching tools. Each Module provides an outline for a three-hour class, as well as includes guidelines on how to develop it into a full course.

The Modules focus on universal values and problems and can easily be adapted to different local and cultural contexts, including a variety of degree programmes as they are multi-disciplinary. The Modules seek to enhance trainees and students' ethical awareness and commitment to acting with integrity and equip them with the necessary skills to apply and spread these norms in life, work and society. To increase their effectiveness, the Modules cover both theoretical and practical perspectives, and use interactive teaching methods such as experiential learning and group-based work. These methods keep students and trainees engaged and help them develop critical thinking, problem solving, and communication skills, all of which are important for ethics education.

The topics of the Modules were chosen following consultations with academics who participated in a meeting of experts convened by UNODC, in Vienna in March 2017. The experts emphasized the need for increased anti-corruption education globally and advised on core areas to be addressed through the Modules. They considered it paramount that the Modules prepare university students and trainees for value driven effective action, keep students engaged, lend themselves to adaptation to different regional and disciplinary contexts, and allow lecturers to incorporate them as anti-corruption components within existing university courses and disciplines.

To achieve these objectives, the experts recommended that the Modules have a range of characteristics, ultimately being able to:

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» Connect theory to practice</li> <li>» Emphasize the importance of integrity and ethics to everyday life</li> <li>» Encourage critical thinking</li> <li>» Stress not only the importance of making ethical decisions but also demonstrate how to implement the decisions</li> <li>» Use innovative interactive teaching methods</li> <li>» Balance general ethics with applied ethics</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» Draw on good practices from practitioners</li> <li>» Link integrity and ethics to other global issues and the SDGs</li> <li>» Adopt a multi-disciplinary and multi-level approach</li> <li>» Focus on global ethics and universal values while leaving room for diverse regional and cultural perspectives</li> <li>» Employ non-technical and clear terminology</li> <li>» Be user-friendly</li> </ul> |
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Drawing on these recommendations, UNODC worked for over a year with more than 70+ academic experts from over 30 countries to develop the 14 University Modules on Anti-Corruption. Each Module was drafted by a core team of academics and UNODC experts, and then peer-reviewed by a larger group of academics from different disciplines and regions to ensure a multi-disciplinary and universal coverage. The Modules passed through a meticulous clearance process at the UNODC headquarters before finally being edited and published on its website as open-source materials. In addition, it was agreed that the content of the Modules would be regularly updated to ensure that they are in line with contemporary studies and correspond to current needs of educators.

The present knowledge tool has been developed by the UNODC Corruption and Economic Crime Branch (CEB), as part of the Education for Justice initiative under the Global Programme for the Implementation of the Doha Declaration.

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# Introduction

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Through its detrimental impact on State institutions, economic development and the rule of law, corruption undermines peace and security. Corruption can be especially destabilizing if it permeates the defence sector, affecting the security forces, peace operations, and defence procurement. In countries attempting to emerge from conflict, corruption may slow down progress towards peace and post-conflict reconstruction. Corruption can lead to State fragility, as it depletes national resources and weakens institutional capacity to a level from which it is hard to recover. Corruption also jeopardizes security by enabling and fuelling violent extremism and terrorism. This Module explores these and additional links between corruption, peace and security. It asks how corruption triggers instability, what are the manifestations and effects of corruption during conflict, and why anti-corruption measures are important for post-conflict peacebuilding. Since research in this area is young and emerging, the Module supplements the findings of academic studies by drawing on reports of international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In doing so, the Module will help lecturers introduce the topic to students while considering different perspectives and disciplines.

# Learning outcomes

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- Understand corruption as a driver of instability and conflict, and an obstacle to peace, security, rule of law and human rights
- Assess the importance of anti-corruption measures for peacebuilding and provide examples of such measures
- Identify challenges of fighting corruption in conflict and post-conflict settings and ways to overcome them
- Analyse the links between corruption, on the one hand, and violent extremism and terrorism on the other hand
- Discuss cases where corruption was officially recognized as a root cause of conflict, including where it was addressed by transitional justice processes

# Key issues

According to a report by the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace<sup>1</sup>, a comparison of “well-known indices tracking corruption on the one hand and violence or instability on the other reveals a visible correspondence: countries characterized by severe corruption also tend to suffer conflict or state failure.” For example, Timisina and Okeke (2018) observe correlation between corruption and conflict when looking at the national experiences in Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. Correlation between corruption and conflict can be observed when looking at selected national experiences. Other academic research has also noted this correlation and has confirmed that widespread corruption is “deeply woven into the narrative of many modern conflicts, as both driver and sustainer” (Sharp, 2014, p. 79). Going beyond mere perceptions and correlation, in a report of the Secretary-General it is recognized that corruption is one of the “underlying factors that drive conflict” (S/2020/167, para. 51)<sup>2</sup>. At the same time, the mechanisms and dynamics of the conflict–corruption nexus are still underresearched (Cheng and Zaum, 2011; MacLachlan, 2018; Wenar, 2016).

This Module includes four parts that explore the links between corruption, peace and security from different perspectives. The first part of the Module examines how corruption can lead to conflict by enabling and fuelling “drivers of conflict” and by weakening governance and the rule of law. This will help students to appreciate the importance of anti-corruption measures for conflict prevention. The second part of the Module discusses corruption during conflict, including its adverse effects on the defence sector and peace operations, shedding light on the ways in which corruption sustains and aggravates instability. In the third part, the Module moves to the post-conflict stage and asks how corruption and anti-corruption affect conflict-resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. Here the emphasis is on the importance of anti-corruption measures for building effective and sustainable institutions that consolidate peace and prevent the recurrence of conflict. This part also considers the challenges involved in promoting transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction when institutions are weak, the capacity of the State is diminished and leaders are corrupt. The fourth and last part of the Module considers how corruption relates to terrorism and violent extremism, security threats that may or may not be contemporaneous to conflict situations. Before delving into these discussions, the Module briefly defines the relevant core concepts.

## › Core terms: corruption, peace and security

Corruption is a complex phenomenon, without a uniform definition. An overview of the different forms and definitions of corruption, as well as its harmful effects across the globe, is available in Module 1 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption. For present purposes, it should be noted that the United Nations Convention against Corruption refrains from providing one overarching definition of corruption. Rather, it defines various acts of corruption and classifies them as criminal offences, including bribery and embezzlement (in both the public and private sectors), trading in influence, abuse of functions and illicit enrichment (articles 15 to 22). With 189 States parties (as of August 2022), the Convention against Corruption has achieved nearly universal adherence and the different acts of corruption as defined by the Convention can be considered internationally accepted. Module 4

<sup>1</sup> Available at [https://carnegieendowment.org/files/corruption\\_and\\_security.pdf](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/corruption_and_security.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> Available at <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/055/28/PDF/N2005528.pdf?OpenElement>.

and Module 5 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption include more detailed discussions on how these various acts of corruption manifest in the public and private sectors, respectively.

Peace can be understood as “positive peace”, which is associated with dignity and well-being for all, or “negative peace”, which refers to the absence of war (UN News, 2014). The Module relates not only to negative peace but also to positive peace, the lack of which very often creates conditions for conflict and corruption in general. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (2015), the pillars of positive peace include high levels of human capital, low levels of corruption, well-functioning government and equitable distribution of resources. Positive peace has also been associated with the notion of “quality peace” (Wallensteen, 2015). The term peacebuilding is used in the Module to refer to efforts to transition from war to peace and to reduce a country’s risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities for conflict management and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development (United Nations, 2010).

Security in this Module is understood both in terms of national security and human security. The latter is a concept that partly emerged from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 1994<sup>3</sup> and refers to seven types of security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political. With the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals<sup>4</sup> (SDGs) in 2015, the General Assembly has reaffirmed the importance of human security. The concept of human security shifts the focus from a state-centred to a people-centred approach to security. The concept and its applications are discussed in depth in the United Nations report on Human Security in Theory and Practice<sup>5</sup> from 2009. Security policies that have adopted this holistic approach, such as the European Union Agenda on Security<sup>6</sup> from 2015 and the National Security Strategy of the United States<sup>7</sup> from 2017, have emphasized the relevance of the fight against corruption.

## › Corruption as a cause of conflict

Corruption weakens state capacity both in terms of state effectiveness (the ability to govern) and state legitimacy (the recognition of the right to govern). The diminished state capacity and lack of development brought about by corruption can lead to insecurity and even armed conflict (see, e.g., United States Institute for Peace, 2010, p. 7; Chayes, 2016; World Bank, 2011; World Bank and United Nations, 2018). Transitional justice mechanisms around the world have identified corruption as a root cause of armed conflicts (and possibly war crimes and crimes against humanity, even if the causal link between corruption and such atrocities is hard to prove). For example, in investigating the causes of the civil war in Sierra Leone in the 1990s, the national Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that “the central cause of the war was endemic greed, corruption and nepotism that deprived the nation of its dignity and reduced most people to a state of poverty” (see the report of the Sierra

<sup>3</sup> Available at <https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-development-report-1994>.

<sup>4</sup> For more information about the Goals see <https://sdgs.un.org/goals>.

<sup>5</sup> Available at [www.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/Publications%20and%20Products/Human%20Security%20Tools/Human%20Security%20in%20Theory%20and%20Practice%20English.pdf](http://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/Publications%20and%20Products/Human%20Security%20Tools/Human%20Security%20in%20Theory%20and%20Practice%20English.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> Available at [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/organised-crime-and-human-trafficking/together-against-trafficking-human-beings\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/organised-crime-and-human-trafficking/together-against-trafficking-human-beings_en).

<sup>7</sup> Available at <https://ge.usembassy.gov/2017-national-security-strategy-united-states-america-president/>.

Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission<sup>8</sup>, volume 2, 2004, chapter 2, paragraph 13). Similarly, the national Truth and Reconciliation Commission that operated in Liberia found that a root cause of the Liberian civil war was the “entrenched political and social system founded on privilege, patronage, politicization of the military and endemic corruption which created limited access to education and justice, economic and social opportunities and amenities” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, 2009). Corruption was also recognized as a root cause of the Arab Spring-related conflict in Tunisia. This led to the creation, in 2013, of the Truth and Dignity Commission, with a mandate to address the country’s legacy of corruption at the highest level of political leadership.

Even if not leading to conflict directly, corruption reduces human security by weakening State institutions and deepening economic inequality and poverty. Corruption diverts State funding away from education, health care, poverty relief and other services for the purposes of personal enrichment of party officials, bureaucrats and contractors, at the ultimate expense of the general public. When corruption depletes a substantial portion of national resources, it may threaten political stability and economic development. This issue was discussed in two expert meetings organized by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2018 and 2019, resulting in the explicit recognition that corruption involving vast quantities of assets is “a threat to global peace and security, the enjoyment of human rights, a liveable climate and biodiversity” (UNODC, 2018). The experts also recommended that more research be conducted on the destabilizing impact of corruption (UNODC, 2019). The discussions and outcomes of these meetings are summarized in an official report<sup>9</sup> issued in 2019 by the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption. To remedy the depletion of resources caused by corruption, the international community adopted a framework for asset recovery enshrined in the Convention against Corruption. The relevant provisions require States parties to return assets obtained through corruption to the country from which they were stolen. To support their efforts towards this goal, UNODC and the World Bank established the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative<sup>10</sup>.

Corruption can be especially destabilizing in fragile States and in conflict and post-conflict situations, where institutions are already weak and populations suffer from extreme poverty, violence and political arbitrariness (Chayes, 2016; Galtung and Tisné, 2009; United States Institute of Peace, 2010). In such cases, as governmental structures break down, there is a high risk that corrupt practices will become entrenched, further aggravating the security situation and impeding the end of conflict and fragility. In this context, O’Donnell notes (2014) that “even the risk of conflict and perceptions of growing insecurity can undermine accountability and create a permissive environment for state impunity both for human rights abuses and corruption.” The effects of corruption on post-conflict States is discussed in more detail elsewhere in this Module.

But corruption can also have a destabilizing effect in the less extreme conditions of developing countries and countries in political transition, where institutions are in a political, economic and social state of flux. One form of corruption in such cases is State capture, i.e., when powerful individuals or business elites use corruption to influence and shape the policies, laws or institutions of a country (for a more detailed discussion, see Module 1 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption).

<sup>8</sup> Available at [www.sierraleonetc.org/index.php/view-the-final-report/table-of-contents](http://www.sierraleonetc.org/index.php/view-the-final-report/table-of-contents).

<sup>9</sup> Available at [www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session8/CAC\\_COSP\\_2019\\_13\\_E.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session8/CAC_COSP_2019_13_E.pdf).

<sup>10</sup> For more information about the StAR initiative see <https://star.worldbank.org/>.

Weak governments often lack the power, resources and strategies to fight corruption within and outside their institutions. Corruption can therefore become the norm, leading to a depletion of the resources needed to strengthen the State. Citizens are unlikely to trust institutions they perceive as corrupt and may even question their legitimacy. Such a lack of social and institutional trust may further undermine attempts to establish the rule of law (Rothstein, 2013; Schwickerath, 2018, pp. 277–278).

The detrimental effect of corruption on developing countries is emphasized by the heads of UNODC and the World Bank in the preface to the Asset Recovery Handbook (2011, p. xi):

Developing countries lose between US\$20 to US\$40 billion each year through bribery, misappropriation of funds, and other corrupt practices. Much of the proceeds of corruption find “safe haven” in the world’s financial centers. These criminal flows are a drain on social services and economic development programs, contributing to the further impoverishment of the world’s poorest countries. The victims include children in need of education, patients in need of treatment, and all members of society who contribute their fair share and deserve assurance that public funds are being used to improve their lives.

It is therefore clear that corruption impedes the attainment the Sustainable Development Goals, many of which are directly related to peace and security (the impact of corruption on the Goals is addressed in further detail in the appendix of Module 1 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption). Through its impact on all areas of life, corruption helps to maintain and multiply poverty, inequality and injustice, ultimately fostering more corruption and undermining citizens’ sense of moral responsibility to follow the rules in the interests of wider society (Hoffmann and Patel, 2017). When it affects the very core of political and social life in these ways, corruption is a root cause of instability and insecurity.

The realities discussed so far led the Security Council, in 2018, to hold its first-ever meeting to discuss the links between corruption and conflict. During the meeting, the Secretary-General stressed that “corruption breeds disillusion with government and governance and is often at the root of political dysfunction and social disunity”<sup>11</sup>. As already noted, the Secretary-General more directly recognized corruption as an underlying factor that drives conflict in a report from 2020 (S/2020/167, para. 51). The World Bank also confirmed that corruption “has doubly pernicious impacts on the risks of violence, by fuelling grievances and by undermining the effectiveness of national institutions and social norms” (World Bank, 2011). These insights are furthermore echoed in the words of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and former President of Timor-Leste, José Ramos-Horta from 2015: “Corruption and ostentation are causes of inequality and tension; the more a country is free from corruption, the more leaders show humility and integrity, the more they are respected and are followed, the better the chances for peace to gain roots.”

Before moving on to the next discussion, it is worth noting that corruption can lead to insecurity through enabling and fuelling violent extremism and terrorism, and by facilitating organized crime (including trafficking in persons, illegal exploitation of natural resources and drug trafficking). The effects of corruption on violent extremism and terrorism are discussed elsewhere in this Module.

<sup>11</sup> United Nations, “Global Cost of Corruption at Least 5 Per Cent of World Gross Domestic Product, Secretary-General Tells Security Council, Citing World Economic Forum Data”, press release, September 2018. Available at <https://press.un.org/en/2018/sc13493.doc.htm>.

## › Corruption in conflict: defence sector and peace operations

Once violent conflict has erupted, corruption can play a role in sustaining and further aggravating the violence, through the very same effects discussed above. In addition, corruption can derail international economic and humanitarian initiatives, as funds disbursed from loans and aid can be embezzled or handed out to inferior contractors who have won their bids through corrupt means (for further discussion on the effects of corruption on humanitarian aid, see Hees and others, 2014). Insecurity grows further when corruption affects the defence sector and peace operations, for example, through kickbacks, bribes, collusion, extortion, awarding of non-competitive contracts, disadvantageous offset agreements, use of military resources to generate off-budget profits, and manipulations of soldier payroll. Two major reports in this area were published in 2018 and 2019 by the Defence and Security Programme of Transparency International UK (see Dixon and others, 2018; Robinson and others, 2019). Drawing on these reports and additional sources, the discussion below focuses on several examples and manifestations of corruption that clearly undermine chances to end conflict and establish peace and security.

### **Corruption in the defence sector**

Corruption in the defence sector affects the military and other security forces, international peacekeeping operations and the interaction with the private sector through government contracts. The defence sector is vulnerable to corruption for several reasons. First, matters involving defence are usually closely related to national security and thus require increased secrecy when conducting business. Many countries do not publish their defence budget or provide only very limited aggregate information (Dixon and others, 2018). Such secrecy facilitates corruption and obstructs accountability. Second, defence contracts are usually high in value, which often pushes the contractors into the “high risk, high reward” mode of substantial bribery offers and schemes. Third, defence contracts are usually technically complex and may take years to negotiate, and contracts may involve joint ventures, extensive supply chains, agents and offset obligations, which create endless entry points for corrupt practices.

The use of offset agreements, described as a type of side deal or “sweetener”, complicates the matter even further, as such agreements make it hard to assess whether the money paid represents the value obtained. Therefore, corruption risks in the defence industry are particularly high in the procurement of defence and security equipment and services. These risks are even higher when services are provided in a conflict zone where accountability and transparency is perceived as less important than military expediency. For example, the United States Congress found that kickbacks paid by trucking contractors to protect supply convoys financed warlords in Afghanistan. These same warlords were the targets of the United States military in that conflict (Tierney, 2010). In effect, the United States of America funded their enemy through these corrupt practices. For an in-depth discussion on the risk of corruption in the process of purchasing defence equipment and arms, see Cover and Mustafa (2014).

Corruption in the defence sector could easily escalate security threats and potentially lead to conflict. This could happen, for example, when senior military positions are filled based on favouritism rather than merit, or when soldiers are ill-prepared as funds for arms and training were misallocated because of corruption. In such situations, the underperforming military may not be able to defend the population against security threats (for a related discussion and examples, see Allen, 2017).

Corruption in the defence sector can also divert funds away from soldiers' salaries and essential needs (food, shelter, etc.), leading soldiers to steal from (and potentially abuse in other ways) the people they are supposed to protect (MacLachlan, 2018). When low- and middle-level servicemen are unable to satisfy their basic social needs with their low salaries, there is a high risk that they will steal money and food from the population. This need-driven corruption is different from greed-driven corruption, which involves high-ranking military or government officials, as well as private companies and middlemen or agents. The distinction is important because each type of corruption requires a different type of response. At the same time, there are linkages between the two types: so-called "pyramidal corruption" often connects high-ranking government and military officials with low- and middle-level servicemen through redistribution of illegal income and a flow of corrupt money from the bottom up (Tagarev, 2010).

It is noted that although corruption in the defence sector is discussed here in the context of conflict, it can also exist during times of peace. Defence sector corruption can have a detrimental effect on stability and the rule of law in both war and peace times, especially considering the role of this sector in ensuring long-term peace and security, nationally and internationally. It is therefore important to implement anti-corruption measures in the defence sector at all times and in every country.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a key international political and military alliance, plays an important role in the fight against corruption in the defence sector. It sets integrity standards and provides practical integrity guidance to military officers who rotate through the different countries of the NATO system. The alliance also made anti-corruption a formal NATO certification requirement. Moreover, NATO Summit declarations adopted in 2012<sup>12</sup>, 2016<sup>13</sup> and 2018<sup>14</sup> contain references to corruption and its relationship to security challenges. Significantly, NATO norms and practices on building integrity and reducing corruption were adopted by national defence institutions of NATO members (see NATO, 2013). At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, a new NATO Building Integrity Policy was introduced that reaffirmed the conviction of NATO that "transparent and accountable defence institutions under democratic control are fundamental to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and essential for international security cooperation" (NATO, 2016, para. 130).

### **Corruption and peace operations**

Corruption seriously threatens the success of peace operations and other conflict-related missions, such as United Nations peacekeeping missions. Conflict environments combined with weak and unstable institutions complicate the work of the United Nations and other international organizations drastically. Although powerful stakeholders may be corrupt, they must sometimes be included in the work of peacekeepers and policymakers. Moreover, there is a risk that peacekeepers themselves may engage in corrupt acts and become part of the problem. In his study on peacekeeping and corruption, Philip (2018, p. 322) notes:

Peacebuilding creates its own temptations, opportunities and vulnerabilities among those who lead the process; and those who are chosen to lead their country to peace, even if they are committed to that process, may find that the sheer weight of expectations, and the accompanying

<sup>12</sup> Available at [www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_87593.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87593.htm?selectedLocale=en)

<sup>13</sup> Available at [www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm).

<sup>14</sup> Available at [www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_156624.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm).

access to financial resources, borrowing rights and national resources that they are accorded, can make it difficult for them to do business with their countrymen or with foreign companies, international organizations or governments in ways that do not proliferate corruption.

Therefore, while it is important to remove corrupt officials and stakeholders, it is equally important to offer anti-corruption training to those that continue to be involved in the peacebuilding process. Despite this reality, peacekeeping mandates rarely refer to corruption and anti-corruption training is often not offered by peacekeeping training centres. There are, however, some soft law regulations that address the behaviour of peacekeepers, such as The Ten Rules Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets<sup>15</sup>. This code includes principles such as “have pride in your position as a peacekeeper and do not abuse or misuse your authority” and “neither solicit nor accept any material reward, honour or gift” (Schwickerath, 2018).

Furthermore, the presence of international peacekeeping missions can have a destabilizing impact on the social, political and economic dynamics in a country. In some cases, peacekeeping operations have broader mandates, including the delivery of State functions, such as border protection and law enforcement. Some peacekeeping operations have even become part of the administration, such as in East Timor<sup>16</sup>. Such activities can be vulnerable to corruption, for example in connection with procurement contracts for goods and services used by peacekeeping missions to perform their functions. The large amounts of funds required for deploying peace operations and their quick disbursement can also increase corruption risks. Another problem that may trigger corruption in peacekeeping is that some States contribute military and police troops to international peace operations because of financial incentives, which can lead to risks of unethical and corrupt practices. Furthermore, the financial advantage of working for international organizations in conflict and post-conflict settings can weaken the national institutions of the host country, ultimately decreasing their resilience to corruption. Therefore, it is important to carry out a country-specific corruption risk assessment prior to engaging foreign troops as part of the administration. Such risks can exist at various levels of analysis, from policymaking and legislative processes to the everyday management of public budgets, finance and procurement (see above discussion on corruption in defence procurement).

One serious form of corruption involving peace operations is so-called “sexual corruption”, where the sexual favour is the “currency” of corruption. Sexual corruption is discussed in detail in Module 8 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption. In the context of peacekeeping, such acts occurred, for example, in the “sex-for-food” scandals where peacekeepers and aid workers have provided (or promised to provide) food, water, money or security on condition of receiving sexual favours from women and children (Hossain, Musembi and Hughes, 2010; see also General Assembly, 2017). Given the coercive nature of these types of abuse of power, they are sometimes called “sextortion”. In the 1990s, reports of human rights (including sexual) abuses committed by peacekeepers damaged the reputation of peace operations (Westendorf and Searle, 2017). In particular, women subject to sexual violence in conflict (of which men are victims too) were vulnerable to exploitation by peacekeeping missions because of their poverty and diminished status. Following such reports of sexual abuse by peacekeepers in the Balkans and the Democratic Republic of Congo, an investigation was carried out and legal measures were recommended to address and prevent such violations<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> Available at <https://police.un.org/en/ten-rules-code-of-personal-conduct-blue-helmets-1999>

<sup>16</sup> For more information see <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unmit/background.shtml>.

<sup>17</sup> For more information see <https://press.un.org/en/2005/sgsm9778.doc.htm>.

In response, national forces, regional bodies and international training centres invested in raising professional standards and producing manuals and codes of conduct. The United Nations has introduced a zero-tolerance policy to sexual exploitation and abuse and as of January 2021, more than 100 countries had signed voluntary compacts with the United Nations on preventing such acts (Guterres, 2019). In addition, in November 2006, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (currently called the Department of Peace Operations) sent Conduct and Discipline Units to the largest United Nations operations to instil high standards of ethical behaviour. These measures were not aimed at fighting corruption; however, by targeting the problem of sexual abuse they reduced sextortion cases. In addition, by generally improving the ethical conduct of peacekeepers, the above measures may have indirectly contributed to reducing corruption and strengthening integrity in peacekeeping operations.

A related issue is Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), on women and peace and security<sup>18</sup>, in which the Council stressed the importance of the participation of women in peacebuilding processes. Certain studies have identified a correlation between more women in decision-making roles and low levels of corruption (see Dollar, Fisman and Gatti, 1999). The literature on the gender-corruption correlation is summarized and discussed in Module 8 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption (especially see the part entitled “The state of research on the link between gender and corruption”).

United Nations peacekeeping operations could be more effective if integrity-building and anti-corruption enforcement efforts become a permanent element of the broader peacekeeping agenda within the United Nations system. A good example of this is the above-mentioned approach taken by NATO to tackle corruption and promote integrity, including in peace and stabilization operations. Improving the integrity of peacekeeping should be, by its very essence, a collective endeavour. In addition, the need for effective oversight and accountability mechanisms cannot be stressed enough. Importantly, the United Nations leadership and troop-contributing countries need to implement greater transparency in reporting, introduce expanded vetting of personnel, improve investigation quality and timelines, and encourage increased responsiveness by all States. These and other measures would help to address misconduct of peacekeepers, including corruption and sexual abuse. For a further discussion on corruption in the context of peace operations, see Robinson (2019) and Berman and others (2017).

## › Corruption and anti-corruption in post-conflict reconstruction

Once a conflict has ended, preventing and fighting corruption in the context of peacebuilding can be crucial for attaining positive (i.e., long term and sustainable) peace. Post-conflict anti-corruption measures can even be crucial for reaching a state of sustainable peace, as corruption may trigger, in some cases, the renewal of violence after a cease-fire. Given the political and social dynamics in post-conflict situations, there will usually be a need to fight corruption holistically and simultaneously at the policy, legal and institutional levels while also working on the societal, cultural and behavioural levels. These and related issues are discussed in the following paragraphs.

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<sup>18</sup> Available at <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/105>

### **Post-conflict corruption as an impediment to peacebuilding**

States emerging from conflict often suffer from dysfunctional institutions and high levels of corruption. Although there are wide variations across post-conflict States in terms of levels and patterns of corruption, they consistently show high levels of corruption indices because of poor legal conditions, weak, underfunded and inefficient institutions, and security challenges (O'Donnell, 2014; Haass and Ottmann, 2017). Against this background, Chêne (2012) stresses that corruption in post-conflict societies seriously undermines security, rule of law and peacebuilding processes. Furthermore, when post-conflict justice systems are associated with corruption and discriminatory practices, there is a high risk that violence and conflict will resume.

Rose-Ackerman (2008) points out that the weak institutions and influx of outside funds that characterize post-conflict States create favourable conditions for some officials to abuse their power and influence for personal gain. She adds that the judiciary, prosecutorial bodies and police forces may be often part of the problem in such settings, as the culture of lawlessness and impunity that existed in these systems before and during war supports and sustains corruption going forward. This culture of secrecy and impunity may even cause outsiders, who monitor and manage the post-conflict transition, to become corrupt because their corrupt dealings are easy to conceal. Thus, the post-conflict political system may have a “corruption trap” where payoffs create expectations of future payoffs, which, in turn, result in a vicious spiral. In particular, enhanced trade, international investment and foreign aid can create new risks of systematic corruption, especially if no anti-corruption policies and laws are in place.

Post-conflict corruption can be a serious impediment to peacebuilding and reconstruction (Shelley 2014). For example, the United States Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) (2018) emphasizes that corruption in the Afghan National Security Forces has been one of the main challenges that the United States Mission faced in supporting the Afghan military and security forces against the Taliban. It is stressed in the 2018 SIGAR report that corruption cuts across all aspects of the reconstruction effort, endangering the progress made in security, rule of law, governance and economic growth. The report further states that some of the most common acts of corruption have been “associated with fuel, food, ‘ghost’ or non-existent soldiers, extortion, narcotics, illicit mining, bribery and the misuse, theft, or illegal sale of Afghan government property” (SIGAR, 2018). The United States Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (2019) also stresses the detrimental impact of corruption on post-conflict reconstruction.

Haass and Ottmann (2017) argue that one of the main factors for systematic post-conflict corruption is the existence of political power-sharing institutions in a country. According to them, in any post-conflict situation, government elites act as “individual rent-seeking agents that need to ensure the support of their key constituencies to remain in power.” Power-sharing cabinets, which have direct access to State resources, are often dominated by small circles of political and rebel elites who have low levels of loyalty toward the formal State institutions (Bueno de Mesquita and others, 2003). In addition, “the provisional nature of many power-sharing institutions increases rent-seeking incentives: facing a limited time horizon in office, their members tend to capture as many rents as possible before they have to leave office” (Haass and Ottmann, 2017). Therefore, post-conflict States with power-sharing institutions are often associated with higher levels of corruption. Their corruption levels may increase further if the power-sharing institutions have access to vast and easy-to-capture resources, such as natural resources or foreign aid.

### Anti-corruption efforts in the post-conflict context

To counter the above-mentioned trends, there is a need to implement anti-corruption measures as soon as possible in the post-conflict stage. In line with the concepts of human security and positive peace, addressing corruption in the context of peacebuilding is consistent with promoting sustainable development in post-conflict countries. National strategy planning that incorporates coordinated anti-corruption, sustainable development and peacebuilding efforts has the potential to create more effective policies that help prevent the recurrence of conflicts. These efforts may include institutional reform and capacity-building of judicial, law enforcement and financial oversight institutions as well as the strengthening of civil society organizations and the independent media. To work towards these objectives, donors may need to make the provision of aid conditional to host government performance and continually insist on moving the anti-corruption agenda forward. Importantly, there remains little doubt that unless corruption is addressed as part of peacebuilding, violence and hostilities may reignite. It is also noted that a proper anti-corruption approach after a conflict could reinforce efforts to promote post-conflict justice and international humanitarian law obligations (see discussion on transitional justice below).

There is no one-size-fits-all anti-corruption approach when it comes to peacebuilding. Useful insights are presented in a 2010 report by UNDP entitled Fighting Corruption in Post-Conflict and Recovery Situations: Learning from the Past<sup>19</sup>. The report discusses findings from empirical research in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, which suggest that effective approaches include mainstreaming anti-corruption into post-conflict state building interventions, and embedding micro-measures as early as possible after the conflict ends. According to the report (p. xiii):

Examples of micro-measures include inserting a clause in the criminal code, carrying out a national survey or training community health workers to facilitate the formation of self-help groups that organize to access existing government services. And 'embedding' the changes refers to strategically placing them in government initiatives where they will enjoy some relative sustainability and potentially create multiplier effects as they interact with other elements of reform. If successful, micro-measures will potentially result in significant change over time. If unsuccessful, the failures are relatively low profile and should allow other anti-corruption programming to continue.

Another important attribute is an "expectations trap", in which citizens expect very little of their government and the other way around. In these situations, fragility can become a persistent condition and corruption remains in the system. Based on a stresses-capabilities-expectations framework, Johnston (2011) argues that reformers in fragile country contexts "should be aware of contrasts among the kinds of corruption problems and the potential benefits of 'halfway' reform outcomes." He suggests two essential consecutive imperatives: the first is "Do no harm", which includes the avoidance of premature or "poorly-thought-out reforms" that do more harm than good. Mostly, these are reforms that undermine a society's capacity to use aid effectively and create opportunities for specific kinds of corruption that are severely disruptive. The second imperative is "Build trust", which is crucial if complex collective action problems are to be reduced and if reforms require the support of a large part of the society. A first step toward greater trust is the provision of basic services to society.

<sup>19</sup> Available at [www.undp.org/publications/fighting-corruption-post-conflict-recovery-situations](http://www.undp.org/publications/fighting-corruption-post-conflict-recovery-situations).

Then, in a climate of growing trust, gradual but balanced enhancement of citizen participation in strengthening institutions can build opposition to corruption (see also Module 2 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption). In the end, reforms are aimed at changing expectations in a positive way by involving the rebalancing of stresses and capabilities. The best way to demonstrate and assess anti-corruption progress is to analyse the kinds of behaviour in civil society, politics and the economy that reflect improving the climate of expectations and trust (Johnston, 2011). Relatedly, when assessing corruption risks, it is crucial to take into consideration the role of social norms and political culture (Scharbatke-Church and Chigas, 2016; and Module 3 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption).

Following Galtung and Tisné (2009, p. 102), anti-corruption approaches in post-conflict situations should “aim to stem corruption in areas that matter most to communities, stabilize the reconstruction process, provide significant revenue to the state, and prevent leakage.” Ideally, these approaches should be combined with community-driven accountability. Citizen-based monitoring showed success in countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Uganda, but they have been applied only in a few countries recovering from war. Galtung and Tisné suggest that a focus on local accountability and monitoring from below helps to rebuild the trust of citizens in the recovery process and to root out localized corruption. This is also in line with Johnston’s slogan, “First, do no harm – then, build trust”, discussed in the previous paragraph.

The World Bank has published many studies on conflict, security and governance. Analysing the experience of different countries and institutions, the World Bank (2018) stresses that efforts to establish peace and security must include addressing “grievances around exclusion from access to power, opportunity and security.” However, this is especially problematic in post-conflict countries where women lack access to the job market and are left out of economic activities. It is recognized in Security Council resolution 2122 (2013) that the economic empowerment of women greatly contributes to the stabilization of societies emerging from armed conflict. In the resolution, the Council welcomed the declaration of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission on Women’s economic empowerment for peacebuilding<sup>20</sup>, adopted on 26 September 2013.

### **Anti-corruption and transitional justice**

In some cases, peacebuilding efforts combine forward-looking reforms (whether political-institutional, legal, economic or social) with backward-looking accountability measures that address root causes of the conflict. This combined focus is often associated with transitional justice approaches, which are designed to help societies come to terms with a legacy of injustice and human rights abuses, while also contributing towards strengthening peace and the rule of law (Laplante, 2008; United Nations, 2010). Transitional justice mechanisms include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparation programmes and various kinds of institutional reforms. Addressing corruption in post-conflict countries could build on transitional justice approaches, especially where corruption can ostensibly be linked to human rights violations and atrocity crimes (for a discussion on the corruption–human rights nexus see Module 7 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption).

There are a few cases where transitional justice mechanisms directly addressed corruption. One such case was the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was established in 2005 and was mandated to examine the corruption and economic injustice committed in the context of the civil war

<sup>20</sup> Available at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/758029?ln=en>

in Liberia. Consequently, the transitional justice mechanism investigated allegations of corruption, including large-scale embezzlement of State funds and abuse of power for economic gain. Another example relates to Tunisia, where one of the goals of the post-Arab Spring Truth and Dignity Commission was to address the country's legacy of massive corruption at the highest level of political leadership. The transitional justice process in Tunisia was considered essential for re-establishing citizens' trust in State institutions and promoting the rule of law, equitable development and reconciliation. Another relevant example relates to Croatia, where a constitutional amendment from 2010 provided that statutes of limitation shall not apply to economic crimes committed in the context of the conflict and post-conflict transition in Croatia (i.e., between 1990 and 1998). This amounted to an official acknowledgement of the grave impact of corruption on the conflict and subsequent transition to peace, and opened the door to prosecuting conflict-related corruption crimes as these were no longer time-barred (for a further exploration of this topic, see Roksandić Vidlička, 2014). As these examples demonstrate, the transitional justice discourse is evolving from being predominantly concerned with violations of civil and political rights towards also addressing conflict-related violations of economic, social and cultural rights.

### Holistic and comprehensive approaches

A final point worth noting is that anti-corruption efforts anywhere, but especially in countries emerging from conflict and instability, must tackle the challenges at different levels simultaneously, through top-down approaches at the policy, institutional and legal levels, as well as bottom-up approaches at the societal, cultural and behavioural levels. The Tufts University offers an interesting discussion on the role of social norms in endemic corruption in fragile States, and the need and ways to address these norms when fighting corruption<sup>21</sup>. Khan, Andreoni and Roy (2019) also explore approaches for tackling corruption at the cultural and behavioural levels, especially in countries with weak institutions and inadequate law enforcement capacity. For a related discussion on the need for anti-corruption efforts to address social norms and informal institutions, see Module 3 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption.

## › Corruption, violent extremism and terrorism

Violent extremism and terrorism cause insecurity across the globe. They exacerbate humanitarian crises and armed conflicts, often crossing national boundaries and threatening international security. In many cases, violent extremism and terrorism are enabled and fuelled by corruption. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy<sup>22</sup>, and the follow-up, the United Nations Action Plan on the Prevention of Violent Extremism<sup>23</sup>, identified corruption as one of a multifaceted set of drivers of violent extremism and terrorism. Corruption is both a cause and consequence of governance deficits and, as such, it may create or sustain conditions that can fuel violent extremism and terrorism. For a further discussion of corruption and governance deficits, see Module 2 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption.

<sup>21</sup> For more information see [https://sites.tufts.edu/ihc/files/2019/10/SN\\_CorruptionRefGuide\\_AUG2019-linked.MR\\_.pdf](https://sites.tufts.edu/ihc/files/2019/10/SN_CorruptionRefGuide_AUG2019-linked.MR_.pdf).

<sup>22</sup> Available at [www.un.org/counterterrorism/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy](http://www.un.org/counterterrorism/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy).

<sup>23</sup> Available at [www.un.org/counterterrorism/plan-of-action-to-prevent-violent-extremism](http://www.un.org/counterterrorism/plan-of-action-to-prevent-violent-extremism).

Violent extremism and terrorism are generally recognized to thrive in an environment characterized by poor governance, democracy deficits and a culture of impunity for unlawful behaviour. Distrust in Government and sentiments about injustice and inequality often contribute to the enabling environment for violent extremism. Extremist groups speak out about injustice and exploit society's frustration with rampant corruption to gain legitimacy and support. They use populist rhetoric to recruit support from people whose daily lives are plagued by corruption. Chayes (2015) highlights how groups, such as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Boko Haram, have used anti-corruption slogans in their propaganda, promising to fight injustice, tyranny and corruption, all of which they claim to be free of. In several hundreds of interviews conducted with former Al-Qaeda fighters, "injustice" and "corruption" were invariably mentioned as the key motivating factors for joining the terrorist organization (Chayes, 2015).

Distrust between a Government and its citizens can drive radicalization. Corruption (particularly in State–citizen interactions) undermines the relationship between citizen and Government, bringing more recruits, funding and ideological support for terrorist groups. Abuse of power, the arbitrary arrest of "terrorist suspects" and unjustified pre-trial detention of "terrorist suspects" in overcrowded prisons also fuel radicalization (Chayes, 2015).

Corruption within State institutions, particularly security agencies (e.g., military and law enforcement), mean that not only are these bodies unable to properly prevent or combat violent extremism, but they can also provide vital resources to violent extremist and terrorist groups, such as access to weapons. Terrorists are known to have purchased weapons and equipment from corrupt law enforcement and military personnel. For instance, in the case of Iraq, Amnesty International (2018) reported that the failure to properly control arms trading and to secure stockpiles, not least due to endemic corruption in the Government of Iraq, allowed Da'esh to procure lethal weapons, which they later used to commit atrocious abuses, killings, rape, torture and abduction, forcing thousands of people to flee their homes. In this context, it is noted that stockpile mismanagement and corruption is a prevalent problem. Several explosions at munitions sites have been linked to officials seeking to cover up sales and transfers that were not authorized. An in-depth analysis of this issue is available in the study Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites<sup>24</sup> published by the non-governmental organization Small Arms Survey.

In Security Council resolution 2195 (2014), the Council reaffirmed the importance of preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorist acts, not least by means of economic crimes. Violent extremist and terrorist organizations have benefited from bribing public officials and politicians to open doors to profit-driven criminal activities, including the "trafficking of arms, persons, drugs and artefacts; and from illicit trade in natural resources, including gold and other precious metals and stones, minerals, wildlife, coal and oil, as well as kidnapping for ransom and other crimes including extortion and bank robbery" (S/RES/2195 (2014)). Terrorists pay bribes to move goods and people through borders, obtain identification documents, licences and permits (e.g., licences to carry arms or residency permits), gain access to sensitive information (e.g., on the movement of army patrols), and pervert the course of justice (e.g., upon arrest of suspects or during the investigation of major attacks) (Allen, 2017). UNODC (2017) notes that profits from drug trafficking were used by the Taliban in Afghanistan for bribing government officials, further weakening the trust of the population in the Government and increasing the propensity of the population to engage in the illegal economy.

<sup>24</sup> Available at [www.smallarmssurvey.org/database/unplanned-explosions-munitions-sites-uems](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/database/unplanned-explosions-munitions-sites-uems).

## › Conclusion

Understanding the adverse effects of corruption on peace and security equips lecturers and students with a more comprehensive appreciation of this complex phenomenon, its corrosive impact on society and the urgency of addressing it. This Module explores in detail the relevant factors and multiple ways in which corruption undermines stability before, during and after conflict, and its impact on violent extremism and terrorism. In doing so, the Module relies on an emerging body of academic research and on the practical experience of relevant experts and organizations.

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## Exercises

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This section contains suggestions for pre-class and in-class educational exercises, while a post-class assignment for assessing student understanding of the Module is suggested in a separate section.

The exercises in this section are most appropriate for classes of up to 50 students, where students can easily be organized into small groups in which they discuss cases or conduct activities before group representatives provide feedback to the entire class. Although it is possible to have the same small group structure in large classes comprising a few hundred students, this becomes more challenging with large numbers and the lecturer might need to adapt facilitation techniques to ensure sufficient time for group discussions and feedback sessions to the entire class. The easiest way to deal with the requirement of small group discussion in a large class is to ask students to discuss the issues with the four or five students sitting closest to them. Given time limitations, not all groups will be able to provide feedback in each exercise. It is recommended that the lecturer makes random selections and tries to ensure that all groups get the opportunity to provide feedback at least once during the session. If time permits, the lecturer could facilitate a discussion in plenary after each group has provided feedback.

All exercises in this section are appropriate for both graduate and undergraduate students. However, as students' prior knowledge and exposure to these issues vary widely, decisions about appropriateness of exercises should be based on their educational and social context. The lecturer is encouraged to relate and connect each exercise to the key issues of the Module.

It is recommended that lecturers begin building a conducive and friendly environment at the start of class and before conducting the very first exercise. This can be done by breaking the ice in a supportive way, by respectfully examining students' starting orientations to corruption, and by demonstrating genuine interest in their perspectives. Once students come to see the lecturer as respectful, genuinely interested in their orientation to the material, and consistent in policing any snide or unsupportive comments by class members, this safe space will enable effective learning and development.

## › Exercise 1: United Nations Security Council briefing

Either in or before class, have students watch one of the two videos from the 2018 UN Security Council Briefing on Corruption and Conflict<sup>25</sup>.

### Lecturer guidelines:

Divide the class into small groups. Ask the students to discuss the video and create a conceptual map of the relationship between corruption, peace and security. Ask a representative of each group to reproduce the outcome of the group discussion on a flipchart or white/blackboard, and present it to the larger class.

## › Exercise 2: Corruption in the defence sector

Show a short video by Al Jazeera (2:44 mins) about corruption and peacebuilding in Afghanistan<sup>26</sup>. The film explores how corruption in Afghanistan has weakened the security forces and the steps taken by NATO and the United States to bring peace to the country.

### Lecturer guidelines:

Facilitate a class discussion around the following points:

- What acts of corruption are discussed in the video? On what level and in which areas do they take place? Are some acts of corruption more harmful than others?
- How can Afghanistan progress in the fight against corruption? Consider all potential actors, such as the government, civic society organizations and external forces (e.g. NATO). Outline potential solutions.

## › Exercise 3: Role play: Corruption in a post-conflict country

Divide the class into three groups (A, B, C). Group A consists of a head of State (e.g. the president) of a post-conflict country and his/her followers (e.g. cabinet ministers). The students decide on their own roles within the group. Group B consists of external actors (e.g. United Nations peacekeeper, other international organization, NGO member) who try to support the country to achieve sustainable peace, in particular by reducing the level of corruption. The third group, Group C, consists of the citizens of the country, who are interested in living in a stable, just, fair, inclusive and peaceful society.

The country has suffered long-lasting violence and pervasive corruption. The next steps are to build up new democratic institutions. While Group A is in favour of using corruption here and there, Group B is vehemently against it. They start a discussion on how to build up new institutions. The members of Group C observe the debate and decide, in the end, whether they are in favour of the arguments of Group A or of Group B, and then justify their decision.

<sup>25</sup> Available at [www.youtube.com/watch?v=UfQpk1OQK9E](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UfQpk1OQK9E) and [www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZeQdKdqB9w](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZeQdKdqB9w).

<sup>26</sup> Available at [www.youtube.com/watch?v=oWfLzIL6j3g](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oWfLzIL6j3g).

**Lecturer guidelines:**

Role-playing for education is highly effective. However, some scenarios may trigger adverse reaction, especially in students that come from post-conflict zones, and the lecturer should try to mitigate such reactions while benefiting from the educational effects of the exercise. If the lecturer considers that the current exercise could make some students feel uncomfortable, before conducting the exercise, the lecturer should provide some commentary around issues that may trigger adverse reactions. In any case, the lecturer should remain alert to students' sensitivities and intervene in the role play if required.

To enrich the present exercise, the lecturer may wish to provide an overview of the collective action theory and collective action approaches to anti-corruption discussed in Module 4 and Module 5 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption. This could help the students better understand their respective roles in the suggested scenario.

### › **Exercise 4: Women in peacekeeping**

Have the students watch the short video (1:35 mins) titled "Why do women in peacekeeping matter?"<sup>27</sup> The video does not refer to the fight against corruption directly. However, showing it to students can spark a discussion about the particular vulnerability of women in respect of corruption, on the one hand, and the different effects that gender equality in peacekeeping can generate in the fight against corruption, on the other hand. For further discussion on corruption and gender, see Module 8 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption.

**Lecturer guidelines:**

Have students divide themselves into small groups and discuss the role of women in peacekeeping operations. Ask them to consider (1) how women might be exposed to different forms of corruption (e.g. sexual corruption); and (2) what impact women peacekeepers can have on corruption. Describe and explain the challenges women are faced with and suggest potential solutions. Provide specific examples.

### › **Exercise 5: "Criminalized peace"**

Depending on the size of the group, divide the students in half or into smaller groups. The assignment for each group is to read the following scenario and present points either in support of the "include" or "exclude" position offered in the question below.

**Scenario:**

International mediators and donors often face a difficult choice when they facilitate peace agreements in conflict-torn countries. Some challenges are posed by the so-called peace spoilers – i.e. popular leaders and parties of insurgent and rebel forces without whom reaching a peace deal would not be possible, but who are known for committing serious crimes, such as corruption.

<sup>27</sup> Available at [www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAoRC0IYdKE](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAoRC0IYdKE).

On the one hand, it is important for international mediators and donors to achieve a “strategic trade-off” with the spoilers because a peace deal with them could bring at least short-term stability and cessation of armed hostilities. On the other hand, including leaders of armed groups with a criminal reputation in negotiations may be counterproductive. If they are admitted to public office, they could undermine the integrity of new government institutions through criminal infiltration and corruption. They may only want the peace process to continue as long as it promises to strengthen their position against their adversaries and allows them to run criminal organizations.

### Lecturer guidelines

Assign one of the following strategies to each group:

1. Inducement: give the spoilers what they want. This strategy attempts to induce the spoilers to join a peace process or to help them fulfil their obligations to an existing agreement by meeting the spoilers’ demands, yet trying to reduce the capacity of the spoilers to destroy the peace process.
2. Socialization: change the behaviour of the spoilers by establishing a set of norms for acceptable behaviour for political leaders and parties.
3. Coercion: create a threat of punishment to deter or alter unacceptable spoiler behaviour or reduce the spoilers’ ability to disrupt the peace process.

Ask the students to discuss the assigned strategy and develop an action plan for an international mediator or donor. Ask them to draft at least four concrete steps which would help to achieve sustainable peace but neutralize the negative impact of spoilers on the peace process aligned with each specific strategy. Each group chooses a representative who presents the actionable points to the class.

The exercise should help lecturers to convey to the students the complexity of peace processes and emphasize how corruption could undermine these processes.

# Possible class structure

This section contains recommendations for a teaching sequence and timing intended to achieve learning outcomes through a three-hour class. The lecturer may wish to disregard or shorten some of the segments below to give more time to other elements, including introduction, icebreakers, conclusion or short breaks. The structure could also be adapted for shorter or longer classes, given that the class durations vary across countries.

## Introduction and ice breaker (20 min)

- Briefly introduce the Module, learning outcomes and class structure.
- Conduct Exercise 1 (United Nations Security Council briefing) as an icebreaker. This activity is intended to enable students to check the understanding of the key terms before they have been introduced to the topic.

## Corruption, conflict and peacebuilding (40 min)

- Drawing on the discussions in the key issues section, present and discuss with the students the concept of human security, and the relationship between corruption, conflict and peacebuilding.
- Conduct Exercise 3 (Corruption in a post-conflict country) or Exercise 5 (Criminalized peace).

## Corruption and peace operations (25 min)

- Discuss the topic, drawing on the key issues section.
- Conduct Exercise 4 (Women in peacekeeping), or alternatively assign it as homework.

## Corruption in the defence sector (25 min)

- Discuss the topic, drawing on the key issues section.
- Conduct Exercise 2 (Corruption in the defence sector).

## Corruption and anti-corruption in post-conflict reconstruction (30 min)

- Discuss the topic, drawing on the key issues section.
- Corruption, violent extremism and terrorism (30 min)
- Discuss the topic of corruption, violent extremism and terrorism, drawing on the key issues section.

## Concluding remarks (10 min)

- Summarize the main messages regarding the impact of corruption on peace, and the importance of anti-corruption efforts for peacebuilding.
- If appropriate, introduce the assessment questions with relevant grading criteria. If suitable, assign homework. For example, the lecturer can assign Exercise 4 (Women in peacekeeping) as part of the homework.



## Core reading

This section provides a list of (mostly) open access materials that the lecturer could ask the students to read before taking a class based on this Module.

Chêne, Marie (2012). *Lessons Learned in Fighting Corruption in Post-Conflict Countries*. Bergen, Norway: U4 Anti-corruption Resource Center, Chr. Michelsen Institute.

» Available from: [www.u4.no/publications/lessons-learned-in-fighting-corruption-in-post-conflict-countries](http://www.u4.no/publications/lessons-learned-in-fighting-corruption-in-post-conflict-countries).

Cheng, Christine, and Dominik Zaum (2011). Selling the peace? Corruption and post-conflict peacebuilding. In *Corruption and Post-conflict Peacebuilding: Selling the peace?* C. Cheng and D. Zaum, eds. Cass Series on Peacekeeping. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 1–25.

Galtung, Fredrik, and Martin Tisne (2009). A New Approach to Postwar Reconstruction. *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 20, issue 4 (October), pp. 93–107.

» Available from: [www.journalofdemocracy.org/new-approach-postwar-reconstruction](http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/new-approach-postwar-reconstruction)

Haass, Felix, and Martin Ottmann (2017). Profits from Peace: The Political Economy of Power-Sharing and Corruption. *World Development*, vol. 99 (November), pp. 60–74.

Le Billon, Philippe (2008). Corrupting Peace? Peacebuilding and Post-conflict Corruption. *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 3, pp. 344–361.

Levallois, Agnès, Jean-Claude Cousseran, and Lionel Kerrello (2017). European Union Directorate-General for External Policies (2017). The financing of the 'Islamic State' in Iraq and Syria. Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies.

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Lindberg, Jonas, and Camilla Orjuela (2014). Corruption in the Aftermath of War: An Introduction. *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 35, No. 5, pp. 723–736.

Philp, Mark (2008). Peacebuilding and Corruption. *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 310–327.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2017). *World Drug Report. Booklet 5: The Drug Problem and Organized Crime, Illicit Financial Flows, Corruption and Terrorism*. Vienna.

» Available from: [www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/Booklet\\_5\\_NEXUS.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/Booklet_5_NEXUS.pdf).

## Advanced reading

The following readings are recommended for students interested in exploring the topics of this Module in more detail, and for lecturers teaching the Module:

Allen, Dave, and others (2017). *The Big Spin: Corruption and the Growth of Violent Extremism*. London: Transparency International UK.

» Available from: <https://ti-defence.org/publications/the-big-spin/>.

Anderson, Royce (2004). A definition of peace. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, vol. 10, no. 2 (November), pp. 101–116.

Carranza, Ruben (2008). Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic Crimes? *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, vol. 2, pp. 310–330.

» Available from: [www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/IJTJ-Global-Justice-Corruption-2008-English.pdf](http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/IJTJ-Global-Justice-Corruption-2008-English.pdf).

Chayes, Sarah (2015). *Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security*. W.W. Norton.

Cover, Oliver, and Saad Mustafa (2014). Identifying Corruption Risks in the Defense and Security Sector: Empirical Evidence Using the Government Defense Anti-Corruption Index. *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal*, vol. 9, no. 2 (October), pp. 27–33.

D'Agostino, G., J.P. Dunne and L. Pieroni (2012). Corruption, military spending and growth. *Defence and Peace Economics*, vol. 23, no. 6 (June), pp. 591–604.

Davenport, Christian, Erik Melander and Patrick Regan (2018). *The Peace Continuum. What it is and how to study it*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

European Union (2016). *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*. Brussels.

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Pesek, Sanja (2014). Combating Impunity: Transitional Justice and Anti-Corruption. Conclusions from Practitioners' Dialogues on Transitional Justice. Freedom House.

» Available from: <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Combating%20Impunity%20-%20Transitional%20Justice%20and%20Anti-Corruption.pdf>.

Gallmetzer, Reinhold (2010). Prosecuting Persons Doing Business with Armed Groups in Conflict Areas. The Strategy of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, vol. 8, issue 3 (July), pp. 947–956.

Gemperle, S.M. (2018). Improving state legitimacy? The role of anti-corruption agencies in fragile and conflict-affected states. *Global Crime*, vol. 19, issue 1, pp. 22–41.

Gloppen, Siri (2014). Courts, Corruption and Judicial Independence. In: Corruption, Grabbing and Development: Real World Challenges, Tina Søreide, Aled Williams, eds. Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Hudson, Barbara (2012). Who Needs Justice? Who Needs Security? In Justice and Security in the 21st Century: Risks, Rights and the Rule of Law, B. Hudson and S. Ugelvik, eds. New York, NY: Abingdon.

Kofele-Kale, Ndiva (2000). The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime under International Law. *The International Lawyer*, vol. 34, pp. 149–178.

Lambourne, Wendy (2009) Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence. *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, vol. 3, issue 1 (March), pp. 28–48.

Le Billon, P. (2014). Natural resources and corruption in post-war transitions: matters of trust. *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 35, no. 5 (July), pp. 770–786.

Lindberg, Jonas, and Camilla Orjuela (2014). Corruption in the Aftermath of War: An Introduction. *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 35, no. 5 (July), pp. 723–736.

Moran, Joe (2001). Democratic Transitions and Forms of Corruption. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, vol. 36, pp. 379–393.

Pugh, Michael. (2008). Peace Operations. In *Security Studies*. An Introduction, Paul D. Williams, ed. London: Routledge.

Pouliquen, Béatrice (2006). *Peace Operations Seen From Below: UN Missions and Local People*. London: Hurst Publishers.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan (2008). Corruption and Post-Conflict Peace Building. Faculty Scholarship Series, 593. New Haven: Yale Law School.

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Stephenson, Matthew C. (2016). Specialised Anti-Corruption Courts: Slovakia. Bergen, Norway: U4 Anti-corruption Resource Center, Chr. Michelsen Institute.

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## Student assessment

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This section provides a suggestion for a post-class assignment for the purpose of assessing student understanding of the Module. Suggestions for pre-class or in-class assignments are provided in the Exercises section.

One of the following assignments is proposed to be completed within two weeks after the Module:

Ask the students to write a research essay of 2,500 words addressing a real case related to corruption, peace and security. The essay should focus on one of the following questions: How do corruption, conflict and peace relate to each other? How are they related to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)? How can corruption be addressed as a part of peacebuilding in post-conflict countries? How does corruption lead to backsliding into violence and at what stage is the risk the highest? The students may select a case from a media article or from the suggested materials in the advanced reading section of the Module.

# Additional teaching tools

This section includes links to relevant teaching aides such as PowerPoint slides, video material and case studies, that could help the lecturer teach the issues covered by the Module. Lecturers can adapt the slides and other resources to their needs.

## › PowerPoint presentation

Presentation on Module 11 (forthcoming)

## › Video material

**Afghanistan: Corruption ‘weakening’ security forces (2017).** Al Jazeera (2:44 min). This short video explores how corruption in Afghanistan has weakened the security forces and the steps taken by NATO and the United States to bring peace to the country.

» Available from: [www.youtube.com/watch?v=oWfLzIL6j3g](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oWfLzIL6j3g).

**The Story of Resolution 1325: Women, Peace and Security (2015).** UN Women (3:12 min). When United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) was passed, it changed history. Never before had world leaders formally recognized the key contributions of women in conflict and post-conflict interventions, including their role in brokering peace, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

» Available from: [www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZH5hIOyU4Y](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZH5hIOyU4Y).

## › Movies

**The Whistleblower (2010).** Samuel Goldwyn Films (1h 52 min). This movie is based on the story of Kathryn Bolkovac, a police officer who served as a peacekeeper in post-war Bosnia and outed the UN for covering up a sex trafficking scandal.

**Lord of War (2005).** Entertainment Manufacturing Company (2h 2 min). This movie is officially endorsed by the human rights group Amnesty International for highlighting the arms trafficking by the international arms industry.

## › Case studies, news reports and blogs

**Grewal, Shabnam (2007).** All Female UN Squad a Success. BBC, 21 June.

» Available from: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this\\_world/6223246.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/6223246.stm).

# Guidelines to develop a stand-alone course

This Module provides an outline for a three-hour class, but there is potential to develop its topics further into a stand-alone course. The scope and structure of such a course will be determined by the specific needs of each context, but a possible structure is presented here as a suggestion.

<b>Session</b>	<b>Topic</b>	<b>Brief description</b>
1	Introduction	Introduction to the scope and key topics covered in the course (corruption, peace and security)
2	Corruption, conflict and peacebuilding	Explanation of the mechanisms between these three issues, in particular during and after conflicts
3	Corruption and peace operations	Discussion of the benefits and negative consequences of peacekeeping operations related to corruption, with a special focus on women in peacebuilding
4	Corruption in the defence sector, arms trade and arms trafficking to conflict zones	Description of corruption in the defence sector and reasons for and potential solutions to this problem
5	United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)	Interconnectivity between the crimes dealt with in UNCAC and peace and security. Highlight the importance of existing legal tools in peace and security.
6	Corruption, violent extremism and terrorism	Corruption as a cause of violent extremism and terrorism, and as a facilitator that empowers violent extremist and terrorist organizations
7	Transitional justice and anti-corruption	The emergence, development and goals of transitional justice in peacebuilding, with an emphasis on the need to address corruption
8	Student presentations	Students present on different aspect of corruption, peace and security
9	Conclusion and critical reflection	Bringing together the themes covered in the course, including a critical reflection of the topics



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