

Knowledge tools for academics
and professionals

Module Series on Anti-Corruption

Module 3
Corruption and Comparative
Politics

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UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption

MODULE 3

CORRUPTION AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Background information

The UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption offers 14 Modules focusing on a range of core anti-corruption issues. This includes corruption's varied definitions and devastating effects, responses to corruption, and linkages between corruption and different topics such as good governance, comparative politics, whistle-blowing, justice systems, human rights, gender, education, citizen participation, peace and security.

The Modules are designed for use by both academic institutions and professional academies across the world. They are built to help lecturers and trainers deliver anti-corruption education, including those who are not dedicated anti-corruption lecturers and trainers but would like to incorporate these components into their courses. Lecturers are encouraged to customize the Modules before integrating them into their classes and courses. The Modules include discussions of relevant issues, suggestions for class activities and exercises, recommended class structures, student assessments, reading lists (with an emphasis on open access materials), PowerPoint slides, video materials and other teaching tools. Each Module provides an outline for a three-hour class, as well as includes guidelines on how to develop it into a full course.

The Modules focus on universal values and problems and can easily be adapted to different local and cultural contexts, including a variety of degree programmes as they are multi-disciplinary. The Modules seek to enhance trainees and students' ethical awareness and commitment to acting with integrity and equip them with the necessary skills to apply and spread these norms in life, work and society. To increase their effectiveness, the Modules cover both theoretical and practical perspectives, and use interactive teaching methods such as experiential learning and group-based work. These methods keep students and trainees engaged and help them develop critical thinking, problem solving, and communication skills, all of which are important for ethics education.

The topics of the Modules were chosen following consultations with academics who participated in a meeting of experts convened by UNODC, in Vienna in March 2017. The experts emphasized the need for increased anti-corruption education globally and advised on core areas to be addressed through the Modules. They considered it paramount that the Modules prepare university students and trainees for value driven effective action, keep students engaged, lend themselves to adaptation to different regional and disciplinary contexts, and allow lecturers to incorporate them as anti-corruption components within existing university courses and disciplines.

To achieve these objectives, the experts recommended that the Modules have a range of characteristics, ultimately being able to:

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Connect theory to practice » Emphasize the importance of integrity and ethics to everyday life » Encourage critical thinking » Stress not only the importance of making ethical decisions but also demonstrate how to implement the decisions » Use innovative interactive teaching methods » Balance general ethics with applied ethics | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Draw on good practices from practitioners » Link integrity and ethics to other global issues and the SDGs » Adopt a multi-disciplinary and multi-level approach » Focus on global ethics and universal values while leaving room for diverse regional and cultural perspectives » Employ non-technical and clear terminology » Be user-friendly |
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Drawing on these recommendations, UNODC worked for over a year with more than 70+ academic experts from over 30 countries to develop the 14 University Modules on Anti-Corruption. Each Module was drafted by a core team of academics and UNODC experts, and then peer-reviewed by a larger group of academics from different disciplines and regions to ensure a multi-disciplinary and universal coverage. The Modules passed through a meticulous clearance process at the UNODC headquarters before finally being edited and published on its website as open-source materials. In addition, it was agreed that the content of the Modules would be regularly updated to ensure that they are in line with contemporary studies and correspond to current needs of educators.

The present knowledge tool has been developed by the UNODC Corruption and Economic Crime Branch (CEB), as part of the Education for Justice initiative under the Global Programme for the Implementation of the Doha Declaration.

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Introduction

Module 3 explores how corruption manifests in different types of political systems (democratic, hybrid and authoritarian) and how political parties and political financing are affected by corruption. Furthermore, the Module discusses political institution-building as a means of preventing and combating corruption. The core messages of the Module are that: i) corruption looks different depending on the nature and structure of the political system and the context in which it occurs; and ii) corruption can be fought through institutional design. The Module considers manifestations of corruption in various political structures in governments around the world, and in competitive versus non-competitive electoral processes. Furthermore, it discusses public participation in elections and voting behaviour, referring to the prevailing explanations of why voters sometimes re-elect corrupt politicians or oust non-corrupt politicians owing to corrupt influences. The Module also addresses conceptual issues such as the role of the State and the difference between democracy and authoritarianism. It considers practical aspects of how corruption relates to these discussions from a comparative perspective and develops some of the issues raised in Module 2 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption, delving deeper into the different political systems and their relationship with corruption.

Learning outcomes

- Explain the relationship between different political systems and corruption, and why certain political structures can be more vulnerable to corruption
- Describe different patterns of corruption in different political systems
- Discuss how institutional design can be used to fight corruption
- Provide examples of anti-corruption measures in democratic, hybrid and authoritarian systems
- Assess the role of political parties and party financing from a corruption perspective

Key issues

Corruption affects every society and appears in multiple forms, such as electoral fraud, illegal voter manipulation, influence peddling, patronage, nepotism, embezzlement and kickbacks. Corruption is a complex phenomenon, without a uniform definition. An overview of the different forms and definitions of corruption, as well as its harmful effects across the globe, is available in Module 1 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption. For present purposes, it should be noted that the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)¹ refrains from providing one overarching definition of "corruption". Rather, it defines and classifies various acts of corruption as criminal offences, such as bribery and embezzlement (in both the public and private sectors); abuse of functions (i.e. when those performing public functions misuse their power to obtain a benefit); trading in influence; illicit enrichment; and money-laundering. With 189 States parties (as of November 2021), UNCAC is approaching universal adherence, and the different acts of corruption defined by the Convention can be considered internationally accepted. Module 4 and 5 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption include more detailed discussions on how these various acts of corruption manifest in the public and private sectors, respectively.

In the context of Module 3, it is important to distinguish three main types of political systems or regimes (these terms are used interchangeably in this Module): democratic, hybrid and authoritarian. While these categories are by no means exhaustive, they provide a helpful framework for discussing the causes and effects of corruption in different political structures. The Module provides a brief overview of these three types of political systems, before delving deeper into how corruption can manifest itself differently depending on the political system. When discussing corruption and democracy, the issues of horizontal and vertical accountability as well as voter behaviour are addressed. The Module also discusses the "deep democratization" approach, political parties and political finance. Finally, the Module examines how political institution-building (the strengthening of political institutions) can help to counter corruption, focusing especially on the executive, the legislature, electoral rules and the territorial organization of the State.

› Types of political systems

Democratic systems are characterized by governments that are voted for by the people (who must have a meaningful choice) and are meant to serve the interests of the public. In democracies, citizens hold the power which they exercise by voting and other forms of political participation. Core values underpinning democracy include promoting and upholding basic human rights. It is useful to distinguish between democratic ideals and how democratic governments function in practice. Simply put, not all democracies are equally effective at protecting and promoting democratic ideals. Although that is not the focus of this Module, it is important for students to engage critically with the concepts in this Module. This means avoiding assumptions such as that all democracies are consistent with "democratic" principles, that democratic institutions necessarily promote public goods, and that all democratic governments are created equal. Rather, the point here is that democracies are a type of political system in which power is ideally held by the people.

¹ Available from the corruption section of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website (www.unodc.org).

By contrast, the power in authoritarian systems lies in the hands of the ruling minority (autocracies are an example of an authoritarian system with power in the hands of one person). Authoritarian systems are usually not constrained by the views and opinions of the public, even if they permit a system of voting. The values on which they are based are limited to the shared values of the minority in power which could be at odds with the overall interest of the public. There are distinct types of authoritarian systems, some of which are discussed later in this Module, and corruption may function and manifest differently relative to the nature of the political systems in question.

Hybrid systems, as the name implies, involve a combination of democratic (e.g. regular elections) and authoritarian features (e.g. political repression). The degree to which a hybrid political system shares features with either democracy or authoritarianism varies. It is important to note that corruption adversely affects all types of political systems: it appears in young and well-established democracies, in hybrid regimes, and in authoritarian or autocratic systems. In this way, corruption is an example and perhaps even a symptom of the erosion of public integrity and ethics and the loss of public trust in governance systems. For related discussions on the ethical dimensions of society and on public integrity and ethics see Module 3 and 13 of the UNODC Module Series on Integrity and Ethics, respectively.

While corruption affects all societies, scholars argue that the public acceptance of corruption varies across societies and contexts (Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2002; Kubbe and Engelbert, 2018). This implies that what is considered as a bribe in one country might be considered a gift in another. Yet, some corrupt activities take place in both developed and developing countries as well as in democratic and non-democratic systems alike, such as corruption in the education and defence sectors (see Module 9 and 11 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption, respectively), corruption in the police (O'Hara and Sainato, 2015) and corruption in the area of sport (Hough and Heaston, 2018). According to Alatas (1990, p. 304) corruption is a "trans-systemic issue" that affects all societies, classes, age groups and sexes, regardless political regimes and state organizations, based on specific traditions, values, norms, and institutions.

To theorize and understand corruption in a political context, Johnston (2005) reclassifies the three main political systems (i.e. democratic, hybrid and authoritarian) into four regime types: a) developed liberal democracies; b) new or reforming democracies; c) weak transitional regimes; and d) authoritarian rule. Thus, in Johnston's classification there are two types of hybrid systems within the range between democracy and authoritarianism. Through statistical analyses and case studies, Johnston shows that each of the four regime types is associated with a corresponding "syndrome" of corruption that is based on the way people pursue, use and exchange wealth and power: 1) Influence Markets – these involve advantages generated by decision makers within the institutions; 2) Elite Cartels – these involve interconnected networks of political heads, business leaders, members of the military and so on, who tend to exploit institutions and systems for their own power and gain; 3) Oligarchs and Clans – these involve monopolies and power struggles between ruling elites; 4) Official Mogul – these involve individuals with power engaging in corruption with very little, if any, competition.

While Johnston's different syndromes of corruption are conceptual categories based on archetypes, they are useful as a point of departure for discussing how corruption can manifest itself in different political systems. They reflect different combinations of influences and power relations within countries, and accordingly shed light on the different anti-corruption strategies and reforms that are required in each case (Johnston, 2014, p. 246–248). The four syndromes are discussed in further detail below.

› **Corruption and democracy**

Generally speaking, well-established democracies have lower levels of corruption compared to authoritarian regimes or young democracies (Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Warren, 2004). However, if a regime is democratic, this alone does not guarantee a lack of corruption (Kramer, 2018; Kube, 2017; Seldadyo and De Haan, 2011; Uslaner and Rothstein, 2016). For instance, democracies may experience corruption when they lack transparency in political and campaign financing, have outdated laws on freedom of information, provide insufficient protection to whistle-blowers or have unreliable media. Furthermore, corruption – or at least the perception thereof – tends to increase as countries begin to develop democratic processes. As explained by Pring and Vrushi (2019), "countries which recently transitioned to democratic governance often did not develop effective anti-corruption and integrity mechanisms, and now find themselves stuck in a cycle of high corruption and low-performing democratic institutions".

Using a panel of 103 countries over five years, Sung (2004) found that as countries become more democratic, levels of corruption first decrease, then increase, then decrease again. This is a combination of rising economic opportunities in the form of rents to be captured (Menes, 2006) and the inability of government institutions to establish appropriate control and oversight mechanisms over these new opportunities (Schneider, 2007). Andvig (2006) further explains that corruption grows in places experiencing "fast change", as in rapidly developing economies, post-communist countries, or those transitioning from authoritarian to democratic government – where institutional needs are changing rapidly and situation-specific incentives include increased uncertainty. Over time, as governments develop their institutions and capacities, corruption tends to diminish. However, this is not inevitable and studies show that corruption exists even in the most stable and successful democracies (Pring and Vushi, 2019; for a critical reflection see Stephenson, 2019).

Thus, even if democracy is viewed as a preferable system for tackling corruption, it is not democracy in general, but rather specific political institutions, actors and processes that have an anti-corruption effect by serving as checks and balances, including the role played by different political parties. Furthermore, when discussing corruption and democracy, we must be aware that there are various types of democratic systems across the world, from liberal democracy to democratic socialism as well as direct and indirect democracy. The different democratic systems could experience different forms and levels of corruption. Nevertheless, as discussed in further detail below, corruption risks are generally higher in authoritarian systems (or autocracies), which tend to be characterized by informally defined executive power, limited political pluralism, media control, human rights violations and military reinforcement of the regime. These features of autocracies make social mobilization – a key aspect of the fight against corruption – more challenging. For a related discussion on citizen participation in anti-corruption efforts, see Module 10 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption.

Horizontal and vertical accountability

According to institutionalism (the study of politics through a focus on formal institutions of government), the factors that have the strongest inhibiting effect on a country's level of corruption are the character, design and transparency of the political system and its institutions. To better understand this, a distinction is made between horizontal and vertical accountability. Horizontal accountability is associated with the formal mechanisms that are installed within the government to monitor sound governance and provide checks and balances. These mechanisms are often appointed or funded by the government and, as such, they may not provide the best incentives or build the best capacity for addressing corruption in the government.

Vertical accountability refers to the accountability of governments towards their citizens, which is mostly achieved through elections. Since democracies and hybrid regimes give their citizens a role in choosing their political leaders, elected officials who have been proven to be corrupt can be "punished" for their actions by being voted out of office in the next election (Abed and Gupta, 2002; Bågenholm and Charron, 2015). However, we must not overlook the fact that "democratic" elections can be rigged or adversely affected by oppressive regimes. In addition, there are a variety of subtler forms of influencing democratic elections (for a study of these forms of corruption see Stockemer, 2018).

Bringing all this together is the notion of separation of powers, which includes checks and balances, electoral competition, free and fair elections and judicial control – all of which limit and decrease the opportunities for people to engage in dishonest actions (Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell, 2012; Holmberg and Rothstein, 2015). At the same time, in keeping with the discussion of institutionalism, it should be mentioned that the relationship between corruption, institutions, political systems, culture and gender is highly complex (Debski and others, 2018; Stensöta, Wängnerud and Svensson, 2015). Some of the research illustrating this complexity is discussed in Module 8 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption.

Voters: ignorance, inconsistency, and trade-offs

Despite the safeguards that democratic and hybrid systems provide against corruption, citizens often do not fully exploit their rights, and do not use elections to express general discontent and "punish" corrupt politicians at the poll (Johnston 2013). "Punish" in this context is distinct from legal, administrative and civil consequences associated with criminalizing corruption². Rather, it can be taken to imply "seek to actively vote out or remove from office". On the one hand, citizens mostly express a clear rejection of corruption and negatively evaluate politicians involved in corruption. On the other hand, there is some evidence that citizens tend to prioritize competent representatives that "get the job done" and "deliver the goods" over honest representatives (Pattie and Johnston, 2012; Allen, Birch and Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2018). As such, the electoral ability to vote out corrupt politicians is limited and contingent on many factors.

²For more information about the use of civil and administrative proceedings in corruption cases, see www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup2/2015-September-3-4/V1506218e.pdf

Empirical research offers different explanations for voters' ignorance, apathy and decisions not to actively vote out a corrupt politician or party. These explanations range from low levels of citizens' political awareness, to lack of transparency and information about wrongdoings, as well as partisanship, weak institutions, voters' inability to effectively monitor and question politicians' actions, and the emerging problems of information saturation or overload (Vivyan, Wagner and Tarlov, 2012; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013). The following paragraphs discuss different hypotheses that attempt to explain voter behaviour in electing corruption officials. The discussion is informed by empirical findings that tend to be general in nature. Therefore, students should be advised to exercise caution in how they apply the findings and to avoid generalizations about voters and corruption.

Besides the inconsistency hypothesis, which implies that citizens are not always consistent in their voting patterns at different levels of elections, the information hypothesis is one of the main explanations why voters do not necessarily vote out corrupt politicians. It suggests that when voters lack information about a candidate's involvement in corruption, they support corrupt politicians. This is also in line with the research of Klašnja (2017), showing that over the past several decades, more than 60% of the members of the United States Congress who have been involved in a corruption scandal have been re-elected. His findings indicate that the more politically aware the voters are, the less likely they are to support corrupt politicians. At the same time, partisanship could mitigate the difference between the low- and high-awareness voters, as the highly aware tend to be more partisan and, as such, they may be more willing to forgive corrupt politicians. This phenomenon is also in line with the parties-candidates hypothesis which suggests that voters usually differentiate between parties and candidates. It means that they do not only consider candidates' individual skills and performances, but that the party for which the candidates are running might be the more important consideration for their voting decision (Anduiza Gallego and Muñoz, 2013; Cobb and Taylor, 2015).

Furthermore, the trade-off hypothesis implies that voters expect that the overall benefits from a politician's actions in government will outweigh the costs associated with the politician's corruption and other illegal activities. The idea here is that (notwithstanding individual differences between people) citizens may be more likely to vote for a politician that is corrupt but otherwise perceived as competent than for an honest but incompetent politician. In other words, citizens perceive a "trade-off" between anti-corruption reforms and other desirable goals, such as increasing local welfare or attracting local investment or security (Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá and Rivero, 2016; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013). Another explanation for voters' ignorance is the loyalty hypothesis, which is associated with the finding that "right-wing voters are more loyal and faithful than left-wing voters" (Jiménez and García, 2018). Finally, it is worth considering in this context how corruption is being exploited as a theme to win elections, including by corrupt leaders who get elected by promising to fight corruption. Voters feel they are voting out a corrupt government, when in fact the new government is corrupt. For related discussions of the ways in which psychological mechanisms, contexts and situations can adversely impact on people's ability to be ethical and, for example, resist corruption, see Module 6, 7 and 8 of the UNODC Module Series on Integrity and Ethics.

› Corruption and authoritarian systems

Although there are more authoritarian than democratic systems in the world³, corruption in non-democratic systems has received considerably less attention from the scholarly community than corruption in democratic ones (Hollyer and Wantchekon, 2011). Owing to restrictions on freedom of information and media, it is generally difficult to collect data on rule of law issues in non-democratic systems, and it is particularly difficult to accurately capture something as concealed as the level of corruption across autocracies. In hybrid and authoritarian regimes, corruption can be both a cause and effect of the authoritarian leader's power (Yadav and Mukherjee, 2015).

Authoritarian regimes are extremely varied and diverse in their systems, policies and ideologies. They include monarchies, military systems, clergy-dominated systems, and communist regimes. Their aims and methods range from seeking a totalitarian control of thought through indoctrination to seeking recognition as a multiparty democracy through using semi-competitive elections (Brooker, 2014).

Studies show that the control over the generation and distribution of rents based on corrupt transactions is one of the most important instruments autocratic leaders use to attain and consolidate their power among key elites and constituents (Alon and others, 2016). The low public accountability in autocratic regimes creates high incentives to build coalitions to distribute rents to cronies, and autocratic rulers have strong incentives to engage in corruption (Bueno de Mesquita and others, 2003; Yadav and Mukherjee, 2015).

Yet, the level and dynamics of corruption vary substantially across authoritarian regimes, and depend on complex domestic politics (Zaloznaya, 2015). While there are democracies with high levels of corruption, there are also non-democracies with relatively low levels of corruption. Ruling elites in many authoritarian regimes, including single-party authoritarian States and military dictatorships, have taken concrete anti-corruption measures that were publicly lauded by the World Bank (Kukutschka, 2018). Some authoritarian countries have been successful in fighting corruption (examples are discussed in Kukutschka, 2018). Key determinants for success in anti-corruption efforts are political will and sustainability of the efforts. Political will is mostly expressed by introducing and implementing relevant reforms in areas such as public financial management, and by establishing independent anti-corruption agencies or launching "zero tolerance" policies.

Kukutschka (2018, pp. 6-7) examines in detail the various reasons for the engagement of authoritarian rulers in anti-corruption strategies. What follows is a summary of his discussion. The two main variables that determine whether authoritarian rulers engage in anti-corruption reforms: 1) the need to ensure the survival of the regime; and 2) the nature of the ruling coalition. For example, Chang and Golden (2010) demonstrate that the time horizon of the autocratic leader (i.e. the ruler's expectation to remain in power for a shorter or longer period of time) and the nature of the ruling coalition explain the different levels of corruption across autocracies. In general, short-lived regimes tend to be more corrupt, although there are some notable exceptions. Regarding the nature of the ruling coalition, Chang and Golden show that personalistic regimes (e.g. hereditary or family dictatorships) and personalistic-hybrid regimes tend to be more corrupt than single party and military regimes.

³ For more information, see <https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores>.

Similarly, Fisman and Golden (2017) argue that single-party regimes are slightly less corrupt than military personalistic regimes. Among the different types of non-democratic regimes, however, monarchies are seen as the least corrupt (Kukutschka, 2018). It is supposed that monarchs might have more incentives to keep corruption in check to maintain a good reputation and ensure the survival of the regime for their descendants (Fisman and Golden, 2017). The discussion here illustrates some of the ways in which corruption manifests and how its effects vary relative to political regime and context.

Many autocratic countries that control corruption to a satisfactory degree share high levels of human development and efficient State control (Pring and Vrushi, 2019; Kukutschka, 2018). Furthermore, this progress depends entirely on the continued goodwill of a small circle of senior decision makers, rather than on the features of the political system (Sutton, 2017). Still, ordinary citizens in these States lack resources, channels and institutions such as a free media and impartial judicial systems, that can enable them to participate in the fight against corruption and to ensure that anti-corruption measures are applied fairly and effectively. Owing to weak legal systems or lack of independent media and oversight bodies, citizens may have no one to protect their interests and advocate for them (Yadav and Mukherjee, 2015). For a more detailed discussion about the risks and limitations of citizen and media participation in anti-corruption efforts in non-democratic regimes, see Module 10 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption and Module 10 of the UNODC Module Series on Integrity and Ethics. For a related discussion on the role of the media in shaping narratives about corruption see Cheng (2017).

It should be noted, however, that even when anti-corruption measures are implemented in non-democratic systems, this does not necessarily mean that corruption will be eliminated (as in the case of democracy or hybrid regimes). While some autocracies have managed to control petty and bureaucratic corruption, the forms of corruption that benefit the ruling elite tend to remain unchanged (Kukutschka, 2018). At the same time, political scientists still have an incomplete understanding of the extent, dynamics, policy performance and policymaking in authoritarian systems. In the end, it depends on political, economic and societal conditions as well as anti-corruption demands that are raised by key societal actors and institutions that incentivize authoritarian leaders to be responsive to these demands that will lead to lower corruption levels in these countries (Yadav and Mukherjee, 2015).

› Hybrid systems and syndromes of corruption

As discussed above, Johnston (2005) groups States into four regime types and shows that each regime type is associated with a corresponding syndrome of corruption: Influence Market corruption, Elite Cartel corruption, Oligarch and Clan corruption, and Official Moguls corruption.

Influence Market corruption often occurs in developed liberal democracies with open markets and strong political and economic institutions. These institutions sustain and restrain participation and are solid and legitimate. Corruption certainly exists, but is of a different nature than in authoritarian regimes or hybrid types. Corrupt exchanges between businessmen, lobbyists and wealthy citizens, on the one hand, and politicians, bureaucrats and party leaders, on the other, are commonplace in democracies. Where economic institutions are strong and political and social capacity is robust, corruption mostly occurs through influence peddling, as private interests seek specific benefits (e.g. obtaining a contract, modification of a regulation) via informal networks of political intermediaries such as lobbyists and legislative staff.

Alternatively, elected officials trade access and influence for political funding. Much of this influence trading takes place through fully legal, publicly disclosed political contributions, and not outright bribery (Johnston, 2017). Other examples include political party funding, patronage, revolving doors of post-ministerial appointments and misuse of corporate hospitality.

Elite Cartel corruption primarily develops in new or reforming democracies with liberalizing markets and only moderately strong institutions. Both economic and political institutions are moderately strong. Corruption is fairly widespread but tightly controlled by elites in business, politics, the military and the media. Although the economy might be liberalized, there is resistance to new participants and the sharing of influence and wealth. The elites seek to check rising political and economic competitors from powerful coalitions unified by corruption (large family-owned business conglomerates fund political campaigns and deploy cash and gifts in exchange for favourable financing and regulation). In particular, economic elites misuse their power to strengthen their positions and control most of the country's economic power. Similar to influence markets, the rule of law is relatively strong, but influence trading via lobbying and political contributions often enjoys legal or constitutional protections. Elite Cartel corruption can coexist with significant economic growth, as the elite coalitions underwritten by corruption provide de facto predictability that partially compensates for institutional weaknesses. Electoral competition may well take place, but, in the light of behind-the-scenes linkages among elites, can be more apparent than real. Party leaders share corrupt benefits and manipulate election results. Many parties are extended personal followings of specific elites, lacking a real base in society (Johnston, 2017).

Oligarch and Clan corruption commonly dominates weak transitional regimes undergoing liberalization, where governance processes and official markets operate poorly. These are often post-conflict or post-dictatorship societies with weak political and economic institutions. The rule of law and property rights are weak, and confronting corruption can be risky. Formal democratic procedures offer little accountability. Mutual trust and official credibility are low, and the day-to-day authority of government may be in question in some areas. Unlike Official Mogul corruption, it can be unclear whether anyone is actually in charge. With major political and economic stakes out on the table and few effective restraints, political and economic competition can be intense as oligarchs and their clans (sometimes political factions, sometimes families) plunder both public and private sectors, often using violence to enforce contracts, collect debts, and protect assets. Thus, State mechanisms of control are weak or ineffectual and corruption thrives and disrupts the economy and investments. A climate of impunity, insecurity and unpredictability enhances oligarchs' incentives to move quickly to protect corrupt gains and enforce deals through violence, while weakening social and political opposition. Civil society tends to be weak, as are public-private boundaries. Elections may be routine, but the most important competition is outside the system, among oligarchs and their followings who influence both the government and the economy (Johnston, 2017).

Official Moguls corruption can be found in settings of authoritarian rule, dysfunctional markets, and weak official institutions. Political and economic institutions are weak, and numerous examples of the unjust enrichment of family and friends of the leaders exist, as well as pervasive bribery and extortion at all levels. In contrast to Oligarch and Clan situations where it can be unclear whether anyone is in charge, in the case of Official Moguls power is monopolized by a dictator, family or junta controlling political and economic opportunities for themselves and their cronies. Such leaders manipulate the economy and influence investments and aid flows.

While these economies have typically opened up somewhat, they are poor, strikingly unequal societies. Economic institutions are weak, although if regime changes occur frequently, such countries and patterns often change. Economic opportunities are often monopolized by the regime and used as patronage for figures personally connected to those in charge (Johnston, 2017). Corruption-related violence is less common because there is no doubt who is in charge, but unlike Influence Markets or Elite Cartels, power and corruption are based on personal loyalties, not official roles and duties. Where Moguls operate with impunity, or where Oligarchs and Clans contend in a climate of insecurity, the new legislation and transparency provisions central to most anti-corruption scenarios will likely accomplish little. Opposition groups are weak, compromised, clandestine, or non-existent. Civil society and the rule of law may have little day-to-day meaning (Johnston, 2017). The regime suppresses critics through intimidation or torture. Official powers, roles, duties, and loyalties are less important than personal ones, and often protect corrupt schemes. In such situations, corruption is not deviance but rather is the system itself. Johnston (2014) shows that in the case of weak undemocratic States, there is little or no societal protection against corruption, and kleptocracy (rule of thieves), intimidation and patronage prevail. For a related discussion on the interplay between integrity, ethics and law that can supplement the concepts explored above, see Module 12 of the UNODC Module Series on Integrity and Ethics.

› The deep democratization approach

Transformation from the four corruption syndromes described above towards building social foundations for reform involve long-term, indirect ways of empowering and supporting political opposition to corruption. Johnston (2014) suggests that, in the long run, one of the most important anti-corruption approaches is "deep democratization", which enables people to defend their interests by political means. This overarching approach has the potential to revive long-term conflicts and political developments in societies where corruption has been brought within workable limits. In contrast to other reform strategies, deep democratization conceives better government in terms of justice and fairness and not as more efficient administration. Reaching that goal involves the improvement of the quality of institutions, laws, and enforcement measures which, in turn, require sustained political, economic and social demand that reforms and controls be implemented effectively.

Yet, the relationship between anti-corruption efforts and democratization must always be considered and understood within localized contexts – both in understanding how corruption is fostered and in developing ways to eradicate it. It also calls for embracing the complexity of cultural and political diversity, despite broad agreement with respect to universal values (for more information about universal values and political diversity see Module 2 and 5 of the UNODC Module Series on Integrity and Ethics). Thus, the association of democracy with honest and clean governments depends very much on a country's broader political environment and other local circumstances (Kramer, 2018). For example, in Oligarch and Clan situations, reform priorities should revolve around creating a safe and valued political and economic space within which citizens and businesses can articulate, discuss and defend their interests and needs. Basic law enforcement and security of legal rights should be of high priority; so, too, should be sound currency and banking, and building an independent and accessible justice system. Here, too, corruption is most likely to be only one of many issues to drive contention and debate, but underlying most such issues will be questions of accountability and fairness (Johnston, 2014; 2017).

In Official Moguls situations that are characterized by an authoritarian inner circle, anti-corruption strategies might start with attempts to secure even modest civil liberties. This could, for example, contribute to better implementation of development aid projects even in undemocratic environments; reducing police and military oppression of citizen groups; increasing interest in political life; and raising corruption as an issue in an indirect way. That is not to say that such attempts will necessarily have such positive influences, rather the idea is that they could.

Curbing corruption is complex and requires a multi-pronged approach that continues over a long period of time – irrespective of whether the regime is democratic, hybrid or authoritarian. In the end, "the key is gradual and indirect change making way for such contention to emerge within society, driven by issues and grievances people care about" (Johnston, 2017, p. 7). The idea here is that curbing corruption is a dynamic process that takes place over time and involves a suite of administrative and procedural interventions and reforms to improve transparency, accountability, fairness and equality. As noted in Kubbe (2017):

by providing the institutional component of people power, democracy leads to higher levels of transparency and enables the ... social engagement of groups including non-governmental organizations, media and the press, to call attention to corruption, sensitize the population and act as watch-dogs. As studies have indicated, in mature democracies these social organizations and movements have become a constant source of influence on government, keeping elected officials under permanent pressure in terms of accountability and responsiveness.

This kind of vertical accountability, which is also referred to as social accountability, is associated with democracies. In hybrid and authoritarian regimes, civil society movements and individual citizens must be empowered to demand better government and effective corruption control in the long term. In this context, Collier (2002, p. 27) argues that "an empowered civil society playing a vital role in elite accountability emerges as the foundation for building commitment rules". Thus, the deep democratization approach is linked to both social accountability and social empowerment, two factors that are essential for the fight against corruption. These and related issues are discussed further in Module 10 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption.

› Political parties and political finance

Political parties are ubiquitous in political systems and are among the central institutions of modern democracy. They are the foundation of a pluralist political society and ensure an informed and participatory electorate. Parties also serve as a bridge between the executive and legislative branches and can push the governments to prioritize the legislative agenda. In both democratic and authoritarian regimes, several types of parties and models of party organization exist, such as mass parties, cadre or elite parties, catch-all parties, cartel parties, anti-cartel parties and business-firm parties (see Caramani, 2017). Their specific definitions centre on their objectives and methods, and emphasize their role in political competition. Particularly in modern democratic systems, political parties fulfil several functions that are central to the performance of States. There is also the rise of ad hoc parties created or driven by social media. These ad hoc parties often do not see or describe themselves as political parties, but their social conduct, goals and actions often achieve political results in a non-traditional way. Examples include the movements associated with the Arab Spring, the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine, and the "yellow vest" movement in France. However spontaneously these actions arise, they quickly take on a political nature and are as susceptible to corruption as any other political group.

The first function of political parties, historically, and one of their most important functions to date, is the coordination between public officials and citizens with common political preferences, and thus, in real terms, between the government and society at large. A second major defining function of political parties is the conduct of electoral campaigns, and political competition more generally. Parties are the central participants in elections, responsible for both the candidates and the issues among which voters will choose. A third major function of parties is recruiting and selecting personnel for both elected and appointed public office. The balance between recruitment (finding someone willing to do the job) and selection (choosing among multiple aspirants) depends both on the party and the nature of the positions to be filled. Furthermore, parties perform a variety of functions that may be classified as representation of social groups and ideological positions. Parties speak and act for their supporters, in electoral campaigns, the corridors of power and the media, and on other public forums of discussion (Scarrows, Webb and Poguntke, 2017). Finally, in democratic contexts, political parties are also responsible for protecting the democracies by restraining the access of non-democratic actors to the political system. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) argue that most of the recent democratic breakdowns were caused by elected governments and not by military coups or revolutions. Therefore, in order to keep democracies alive, political parties should refrain from nominating election candidates or getting into coalitions with other parties that are likely to capture the democratic institutions and abuse them in authoritarian ways.

Political parties are central actors in many authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Yet, in these systems, parties are the means of governing and not a source of power or a channel through which elections are contested. Studies have demonstrated that political parties in non-democratic systems tend to be organizationally weak, lacking financial and grassroots support, as well as the organizational capability to provide the mobilizational structures necessary for creating social movements against the regime (Yadav and Mukherjee, 2015). Given the weak ability of opposition parties to mobilize public opinion and action against the rulers, incumbent autocrats may not feel threatened by such opposition parties in the legislature in a way that may make them change their rule. As such, even if opposition parties articulate the public demand for actions to curb corruption and demand that the regime act accordingly, incumbent regimes may not feel compelled to make costly concessions on corruption. Thus, the successful articulation of demands to reduce corruption may not result in serious policy changes. Opposition parties with strong preferences to act on sensitive issues such as corruption may fear repression by the regime, and attempts could be made to reduce their political space. A less effective and confrontational opposition will, in turn, reduce the pressure on the regime to act on corruption, thus leading to less genuine anti-corruption efforts (Yadav and Mukherjee, 2015).

To fulfil their core functions, political parties need appropriate funding and access to media. They need financial means to support their campaigns during the election process (campaign finance) and to carry out their routine activities between elections (routine party funding) (Fischer and Eisenstadt, 2004; Caramani, 2017). Both campaign finance and routine party funding should be regulated to ensure a transparent and fair political financing system; promote accountability; preserve the responsiveness of political parties and candidates; ensure that all parties have the opportunity to compete in accordance with the principle of equal opportunity; guarantee the independence of parties from undue influence of donors; and minimize the danger of corruption, in particular, state capture and influence peddling. In this regard, article 7(3) of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) requires States parties to enhance transparency in the funding of political parties and public office candidates. Yet, there is no consistent practice in this area. While some countries adopt international standards to regulate and promote transparency of political finance, others do not (Smirnova, 2018).

A growing number of countries subsidize political parties, for example, through their tax systems or direct provision of goods and services. This is primarily meant to help the parties perform their functions of policy formulation, public education, and linkage between society and the government. Such State support for political parties is almost universal in liberal democracies (Caramani, 2017). It is generally considered to reduce opportunities for corruption, as parties are not forced to succumb to the interests of private donors in return for funding. Yet, public financing can at times reduce a party's incentive to attract members and also reinforces the status quo because it favours large established parties. It can also be a form of creeping nationalization, creating parties that serve the State, rather than the society. In these ways it can increase the opportunities for corruption, for instance state capture and favouritism. Furthermore, established parties are at a financial advantage over small parties with regard to access to public funding, which can increase the likelihood of the development of cartel parties. Cartel parties develop when "colluding parties become agents of the State and employ its resources to ensure their own collective survival" (Katz and Mair, 1995, p. 5). They can become part of the political establishment, weaken the traditional role as agents of specific groups, and prevent the development and growth of new, young parties (Kuhner, 2016).

Some of the risks mentioned above can be mitigated through regulating political parties in terms of their disclosure obligations, spending limits and impartial enforcement. In 2010, two influential European organizations – the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR) and the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) – adopted the Guidelines on Political Party Regulation⁴. This document recognizes the important role of political parties and seeks to reduce the undue reliance of parties on private donors, prevent corruption, and ensure that all parties are able to compete in elections in accordance with the principle of equal opportunity. The document articulates a set of principles that can guide States when regulating political parties, and that ultimately aim at promoting a balance between public and private political party funding, encouraging moderate contributions over unduly large contributions, and allocating public funding in a manner that neither limits nor interferes with political party independence. To illustrate this, below are the specific guidelines for political finance systems that States are encouraged to adopt (as listed in paragraph 160 of the Guidelines):

- Restrictions and limits on private contributions
- Balance between private and public funding
- Restrictions on the use of state resources
- Fair criteria for the allocation of public financial support
- Spending limits for campaigns
- Requirements that increase transparency of party funding and credibility of financial reporting
- Independent regulatory mechanisms and appropriate sanctions for legal violations.

⁴ Available at [www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2010\)024-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2010)024-e).

› Political institution-building as a means to counter corruption

North (1990) defines political institutions as "the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, ... humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction". Overtime, the term political institutions has come to include a variety of different entities including "voters, political parties, parliament, popularly elected authorities at a regional and local level, administration in a broader sense, supranational political and administrative organizations, courts of law, the ombudsman, the state auditor, interest groups and the media" (Goldmann, Pedersen and Østerud, 1997).

If defined in accordance with North, political institution-building can be an important tool in the fight against corruption. This is due to the fact that political institutions "define the participants in different political processes, and the rules and procedures according to which these processes are carried out", providing pointers as to what is feasible and allowed (Groop, 2013). This said, political institution-building should not be regarded as a panacea against corruption. Instead, institution-building, in most cases, needs to be complemented by other kinds of anti-corruption measures to be effective (for a more detailed discussion on national anti-corruption measures, see Module 13 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption).

A fair amount of research has focused on the linkages between political institutions and both prevalence and levels of corruption. The main focus of researchers has been on political institutions such as the executive, the legislature, electoral rules and the territorial organization of the State. This research is discussed in detail in Groop (2013). A summary of this discussion is provided below.

Executives

With regard to executives, research points to a linkage between parliamentarism (characterized, among other things, by government as a rule being elected from within parliament and being dependent on parliamentary confidence) and the lesser prevalence of corruption. Shugart (1999) explains this by the fact that parliamentary systems engender strong parties, which force politicians to "subordinate their pursuits to the party's broader interests". Politicians in such systems are thus, according to Shugart, more likely to "provide policies aimed at broad national constituencies rather than at particularistic sectoral or regional constituencies", which reduces tendencies towards pork-barrelling (i.e. the appropriations of public funds for projects that serve local rather than general interests⁵).

Legislatures

Swamy and others (2001) have studied the relationship between female parliamentarians and levels of corruption. They find that levels of corruption are lower in countries with a higher percentage of female members of parliament. The authors speculate that the relationship may be linked to differences in terms of socialization and access to networks (for a more detailed discussion on the links between sex, gender and corruption see Module 8 of the UNODC Module Series on Anti-Corruption).

⁵ For US-based legal definitions, see <http://definitions.uslegal.com/p/pork-barrel-legislation/>.

Electoral systems

A lot of research has been conducted on the linkages between electoral systems and rules and the prevalence of corruption. Findings, however, are far from unequivocal. Chang (2005), to take one example, has studied electoral systems with open-list proportional representation, arguing that candidates in these systems face greater uncertainty with regard to the electoral outcome as well as increased pressure to amass personal votes owing to intra-party competition. As a result, Chang theorizes that candidates are in dire need of resources to finance their campaigns, which in turn forces many of them to engage in corrupt activities.

The territorial organization of the State

Researchers have also taken an interest in the linkages between corruption and institutions such as unitarism (characterized by a strong centre) and federalism (characterized by a greater division of power between the centre and, for instance, provinces or States).

Gerring and Thacker (2004) find that federal States (especially presidential ones) are more susceptible to corruption than States with a different institutional set-up. They attribute this to a fragmented elective branch and public service, something that leads to divided authority, mixed messages, overlapping jurisdictions, red tape and overall chaos. Gerring and Thacker argue that "malfeasance is easily buried in [this] chaos". They also regard federalism as more prone to intimate contacts and personalized relations, which contributes towards increased levels of corruption.

> Conclusion

The study of corruption in relation to political systems and institutions is a new and evolving field of inquiry. The insights so far, as discussed in this Module, are exciting for students around the world to explore. Understanding the different risks and manifestations of corruption in different political systems equips students with a more concrete appreciation of this complex phenomenon, its impacts and ways to tackle it.

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Exercises

This section contains suggestions for in-class and pre-class educational exercises, while a post-class assignment for assessing student understanding of the Module is suggested in a separate section.

The exercises in this section are most appropriate for classes of up to 50 students, where students can be easily organized into small groups in which they discuss cases or conduct activities before group representatives provide feedback to the entire class. Although it is possible to have the same small group structure in large classes comprising a few hundred students, it is more challenging and the lecturer might wish to adapt facilitation techniques to ensure sufficient time for group discussions as well as providing feedback to the entire class. The easiest way to deal with the requirement for small group discussions in a large class is to ask students to discuss the issues with the four or five students sitting closest to them. Given time limitations, not all groups will be able to provide feedback in each exercise. It is recommended that the lecturer makes random selections and tries to ensure that all groups get the opportunity to provide feedback at least once during the session. If time permits, the lecturer could facilitate a discussion in plenary after each group has provided feedback.

All exercises in this section are appropriate for both graduate and undergraduate students. However, as students' prior knowledge and exposure to these issues vary widely, decisions about the appropriateness of exercises should be based on their educational and social context. The lecturer is encouraged to relate and connect each exercise to the Key issues of the Module.

It is recommended that lecturers begin building a conducive and sympathetic environment at the start of class and before conducting the very first exercise. This can be done by breaking the ice in a supportive way, by respectfully examining students' starting orientations to corruption, and by demonstrating genuine interest in their perspectives. Once students come to see the lecturer as respectful, genuinely interested in their orientation to the material, and consistent in policing any snide or unsupportive comments by class members, that safe environment will enable effective learning and development.

› Exercise 1: Why are corrupt leaders re-elected?

Before they come to class, ask students to research possible explanations for why voters (re)elect corrupt leaders. In class, divide them into groups and ask them to discuss within their group the explanations they identified, including whether - and if so how - the reasons they identified apply in their own country. Subsequently, ask a representative from each group to present to the larger class the results of their group discussion.

Lecturer guidelines

To guide the students' pre-class research, the lecturer can ask them to answer the following questions:

- Why are corrupt leaders re-elected?
- Is voting for a political party you do not endorse, even worth it just to get rid of an existing corrupt regime? If so, why / why not?
- Have you ever re-elected a corrupt politician? Provide reasons for your answer.
- What are the main reasons voters elect corrupt leaders?
- Does it matter that a politician is corrupt if they "get the job done"? Provide reasons for your answer.
- Why might ethical opposition parties / candidates fail to be elected even in a corrupt regime?

During the small group discussions, if the students are "stuck", the lecturer could stimulate the discussion by offering some of the following explanations for voters' ignorance or forgiveness (discussed in the Key Issues section):

Inconsistency-hypothesis: citizens are not always consistent in their voting patterns at different levels of elections

Information hypothesis: voters support corrupt politicians when they lack information about a candidate's involvement in corruption upon which they could have acted at the polling booth

Parties-candidates hypothesis: differentiation between parties and candidates; voters do not only consider candidates' individual skills and performances but that the party for which they are running might be more important for their voting decision (party loyalty)

Trade-off hypothesis: voters expect that in/direct benefits from a politician's actions will be greater than the costs associated with corruption and other illegal activities; citizens would vote for a corrupt but competent politician, rather than for an honest but incompetent politician; perceive a "trade-off" between anti-corruption reforms and other desirable goals, such as increasing local welfare or attracting local investment

Loyalty hypothesis: right-wing voters are more loyal and faithful than left-wing voters (e.g. in Spain, France, Hungary)

Overall time: 45-60 minutes

› Exercise 2: Debating public funding for political parties

In this exercise, the students have to analyse the different ways of political party financing, to debate their pros and cons, and to convince the audience which is the most preferable way to fund political parties within the context of their own country. This exercise will help the students to develop a critical thinking about the issue of party financing.

Lecturer guidelines

The class should be divided into two groups: A and B. While group A finds arguments for why political parties should receive public funding, group B formulates arguments against this position. The arguments of both groups should refer to the role and functions of political parties in relation to issues of corruption. Both groups have 15 minutes to prepare, and afterwards have 20 minutes to discuss the pro and cons of public funding for political parties. In the remaining time, both groups should also discuss and evaluate the alternative of party financing through private donations.

If time allows, the lecturer may divide the class into three groups. While groups A and B debate on the different ways for political party financing, the students in group C play the role of legislators who have to decide which alternative to apply in their country based on the arguments presented by the other two groups.

The lecturer facilitates the debate by asking the following question:

- Do parties receive public funding in the country?
- What are the advantages of political party financing through public funding?
- Should the country change its rules for political party financing? Why?
- What are the alternative ways for political party financing?
- Are they better than receiving public funding? Why?
- Should private companies and foreign foundations be allowed to donate money to political parties?
- What are the risks of abuse in each of the alternatives presented by the groups?

Overall time: 50 minutes

› **Exercise 3: Establishing an “anti-corruption party”**

Ask the students to discuss and decide how to establish an anti-corruption party in a democratic and/or an authoritarian regime.

Lecturer guidelines

The lecturer divides the class into groups (the group number depends on the class size and available time). Then, each group shall develop a concept for an anti-corruption party.

The lecturer asks each group to:

- discuss the ideology of their party
- define the aims and goals of their party
- suggest strategies of how to curb corruption in their country
- discuss the party's organization and funding structures
- outline how their party is a viable alternative to opposing parties

All groups present their concepts for a new anti-corruption party before the class and determine which “party” gains the most votes from the class as a whole.

Overall time: 50 minutes

Possible class structure

This section contains recommendations for a teaching sequence and timing intended to achieve learning outcomes through a three-hour class. The lecturer may wish to disregard or shorten some of the segments below to give more time to other elements, including introduction, icebreakers, conclusion or short breaks. The structure could also be adapted for shorter or longer classes, given that the class durations vary across countries.

Introduction (10 minutes)

- Briefly introduce the definition of corruption as well as the concepts discussed in this Module 3, such as political systems and Johnston's four ideal syndromes.

Characteristics and differences of certain political systems and specific anti-corruption strategies (40 minutes)

- Drawing on the Key Issues section, discuss the characteristics of democratic, hybrid and authoritarian systems, briefly explain the differences between them and highlight some of the anti-corruption strategies employed in these systems.

Why is there still corruption in democracies? (10 minutes)

- Discuss with the students the various explanations for voter's ignorance, trade-offs and likelihood not to act in response to corrupt politicians / regimes.

Syndromes of corruption (30 minutes)

- Introduce the main characteristics of Johnston's syndromes of corruption (10 min)
- The students should give examples for each of these syndromes (10 min)

The politics of corruption and funding options (60 minutes)

- Explain how parties are or can be financed as well as political party regulations and what impact this can have on corruption (15 minutes)
- Conduct Exercise 2 or Exercise 3 (45 minutes).

Case studies from a comparative perspective (30 minutes)

- Watch one of the videos listed in the Additional teaching tools section of the module. For example, Corruption is Legal in America (6 minutes) or Does South Africa have a corruption problem? (9 minutes)
- Students should assess anti-corruption mechanisms of democratic or authoritarian systems; they should also consider the potential benefits of corruption in both systems (15 minutes)
- Optional: They can write a short essay (see Student assessment) or present their thoughts in class



Core reading

Amundsen, Inge (2006). Political Corruption. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.

» Available from www.u4.no/publications/political-corruption.

Brooker, Paul (2014). Non-Democratic Regimes. Comparative Government and Politics. Palgrave Macmillan.

Johnston, Michael (2014). Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization. Cambridge University Press.

Kukutschka, Roberto (2018). Anti-corruption strategies for authoritarian states. U4 Expert Answers. Bergen, Norway: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute.

» Available from www.u4.no/publications/anti-corruption-strategies-for-authoritarian-states.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1999). Political Corruption and Democracy. Faculty Scholarship Series 592. New Haven: Yale Law School.

» Available from https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/592/.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan, and Bonnie J. Palifka (2016). Corruption and Government. Causes, Consequences, and Reform. Cambridge University Press.

Pring, Coralie, and John Vrushi (2019). Tackling the crisis of democracy, promoting rule of law and fighting corruption. Berlin: Transparency International.

» Available from www.transparency.org/news/feature/tackling_crisis_of_democracy_promoting_rule_of_law_and_fighting_corruption.

Yadav, Vineeta (2011). Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries. Oxford University Press.

Advanced reading

Ademmer, Esther, Julia Langbein, and Tanja A. Börzel (2018). Varieties of Social Orders: The Political and Economic Fundamentals of Hybrid (in)Stability in the Post-Soviet Space. EU-STRAT Working Paper Series. Berlin: EU-STRAT Project.

» Available from <http://eu-strat.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/EU-STRAT-Working-Paper-No.11.pdf>.

Bauhr, Monika, and Marcia Grimes (2017). Transparency to Curb Corruption? Concepts, Measures and Empirical Merit. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, vol. 68, issue 4 (November), pp. 431-458. Springer Netherlands.

Caramani, Daniele (2017). Comparative Politics. Oxford University Press.

Chayes, Sarah (2016). The Structure of Corruption: A Systemic Analysis Using Eurasian Cases. Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

» Available from <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/structure-of-corruption-systemic-analysis-using-eurasian-cases-pub-63991>.

Hale, Henry E. (2015). Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. *Problems of International Politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Johnston, Michael (2005). Syndromes of Corruption. Cambridge University Press.

Johnston, Michael (2013). How Do I Vote the Scoundrels Out? Why Voters Might Not Punish Corrupt Politicians at the Polls. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, vol. 60, issue 5, pp. 503-514. Springer Netherlands

Lessig, Lawrence (2013). Institutional Corruption Defined. *Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics*, vol. 41, issue 3 (October), pp. 553-555. Wiley

Thompson, Dennis (2018). Theories of Institutional Corruption. *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 21, pp. 495-513. Annual Reviews.

Lindberg, Staffan I. (2013). Mapping Accountability: Core Concept and Subtypes. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, vol. 79, issue 2 (June), pp. 202-226. SAGE Publications

Mendel, Toby, and others (2014). International Standards on Transparency and Accountability. Briefing Paper 47. Berlin: Democracy reporting international.

Mendilow, Johnathan, and Eric Phélieppeau, eds. (2018). *Handbook of Political Party Funding*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina (2015). The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption. Cambridge University Press.

North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast (2009). Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge University Press.

Smilov, Daniel, and Jurij Toplal, eds. (2008). Political Finance and Corruption in Eastern Europe: The Transition Period. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

Philp, Mark, and Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett. (2015). Realism about Political Corruption. Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 18, issue 1, pp. 387-402. Annual Reviews.

Philp, Mark (2013). The Definition of Political Corruption. In: Paul M. Heywood, ed. The Routledge International Handbook of Political Corruption, London: Routledge.

Warren, Mark (2013). The Meaning of Corruption in Democracies. In: Paul M. Heywood, ed. The Routledge International Handbook of Political Corruption, London: Routledge.

Case studies that focus on the corruption-politics nexus from a comparative perspective:

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010). Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims. Vienna.

» Available from www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/Afghanistan-corruption-survey2010-Eng.pdf.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2011). Corruption in Croatia: Bribery as experienced by the population. Vienna.

» Available from www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Croatia_corruption_report_web_version.pdf

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2011). Corruption in Serbia: Bribery as experienced by the population. Vienna.

» Available from www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/Serbia_corruption_report_web.pdf.



Student assessment

This section provides a suggestion for a post-class assignment for the purpose of assessing student understanding of the Module. Suggestions for in-class assignments are provided in the Exercises section.

The following assignment is proposed to be completed within two weeks after the Module:

Write a follow-up essay of approximately 2,500 words based on a media article that you selected that addresses a corruption scandal. Critically analyse the scandal and explain the causes as well as potential strategies to prevent this kind of scandal in the future. In your discussion, be sure to identify and evaluate the relationship between the scandal and the country's political system. Make sure that you justify your view and provide reasons for your analysis of the case you selected.

Additional teaching tools

This section includes links to relevant teaching aides such as video material and case studies, that could help the lecturer teach the issues covered by the Module. Lecturers can adapt the slides and other resources to their needs.

› Video material:

The biggest corruption scandal in Latin America's history (2018). Vox (9 min). This short documentary is about the Petrobras and Car Wash scandals in Brazil. The two scandals involved bribes between Petrobras, the largest state-owned oil company on the continent, and dozens of engineering firms, including Odebrecht, the largest construction company in Latin America. It also involved politicians and high-level representatives of the Brazilian government, including three Brazilian presidents.

» Available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=uMXumMJZYYI.

South Africa's 'state capture' scandal widens (2017). Al Jazeera English (3 min). This video shows protests of people in South Africa against big corruption scandals in the country.

» Available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=J2jRuvxNBn0.

1MDB scandal: the Malaysian fraud explained (2018). Financial Times (5 min). The Financial Times' journalist Stefania Palma explains the infamous case of 1MDB – a Malaysian state investment fund. This case is considered as one of the biggest financial frauds in the history as \$4.5 bn was misappropriated through corruption and money laundering.

» Available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=2WV3sIcWNxE.

Corruption is Legal in America (2015). RepresentUS (6 min). Mansur Gidfar, communications director of RepresentUS, talks about the impact of corruption on decision-making and policy-building of governments in the United States.

» Available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tu32CCA_lg.

› Other material:

KickBack: The Global Anti-Corruption Podcast. This podcast features regular interviews with leading experts in the anti-corruption field, from academia, politics, activism, journalism, etc. The podcast aims to enhance serious debate and discussion about important issues in the field from a variety of different perspectives. Given the length of each episode (average: 45 min), the lecturer may use it as a pre-class assignment.

Guidelines to develop a stand-alone course

This Module provides an outline for a three-hour class, however, there is potential to develop its topics further into a stand-alone course. The scope and structure of such a course will be determined by the specific needs of each context, but a possible structure is presented here as a suggestion.

Session	Topic	Brief description
1	Module introduction	Introduce Module themes and assessment methodology. Explore student's familiarity with specific terms and terminology such as definitions and forms of corruption and explain and clarify them in more detail; relevance of comparative politics related to anti-corruption mechanisms.
2	Democratic systems	Provide an overview of the characteristics of democratic systems; description of differences and variances across them related to the democracy-corruption link.
3	Authoritarian regimes	Give an overview of the characteristics of authoritarian systems and the relationship between authoritarianism and corruption. Provide a description of differences and variances between regimes.
4	Comparison of political systems related to anti-corruption mechanisms	Compare democratic, hybrid and authoritarian systems related to anti-corruption mechanisms; select specific criteria for the comparison and develop a table together with the students.
5	Syndromes of corruption	Introduce students to Johnston's syndromes of corruption and identify examples of these patterns.
6	State capture	What is state capture? Why is this form of corruption a risk for democratic, hybrid and authoritarian systems? How can it be mitigated?
7	Country cases and deep democratization	Watch one of the YouTube videos (see Additional teaching tools) and ask students if and where exactly they see a solution to curb corruption in these specific cases. Include a discussion on the "Deep Democratization Approach".

Session	Topic	Brief description
8	Anti-corruption strategies	The students should describe potential strategies to fight corruption in an authoritarian as well as hybrid and democratic states. Which forms of corruption might appear and how can they be mitigated? Use specific country examples.
9	The politics of parties and funding options	What role do political parties play in authoritarian systems? How are political parties financed in democracies? Students can try to answer these questions in groups and present their results in the class. Alternatively use Exercise 3: Establish an anti-corruption party
10	Summary and critical reflection	Students should assess anti-corruption mechanisms of different political systems. They should also consider the potential benefits of corruption in those systems. They can write a short essay or present their thoughts in class.



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