Online Appendix

(for online publication)

A Experimental Instructions

In the following, we translate the original instructions in Chinese into English for each treatment.

A.1 Instructions for the PW-Baseline treatment

General Information

You are participating in a decision-making experiment. The instructions for the experiment are the same for everyone, please read them carefully. Communication among participants is prohibited during the experiment, please set your mobile phone to silent mode or turn it off. If you have any questions, please raise your hand at any time, and the experiment staff will come to assist you.

For your punctual attendance, you have already received a reward of 15 RMB. You can earn more rewards through the decisions you make in the experiment. The points you earn will depend on both your own decisions and the decisions of other participants. At the end of the experiment, your total points will be converted into RMB: 6 points = 1 RMB. The final reward will be deposited into your bank card within 5 working days. The decisions made by participants in the experiment are completely anonymous; that is, your name will be kept strictly confidential in the study, and other participants will not know your total experiment reward for today.

Experiment Overview

This experiment consists of 30 rounds. Before each round begins, you will be randomly paired with another participant, and you will randomly play the role of either A or B. If you are role A (or B), then the other participant will be role B (or A). In each round of the experiment, both the participant you are paired with and the roles you play will change randomly.

Before each round begins, participants will first receive a starting income of 5 points. Each round includes two decision-making stages. In each stage, role A and role B will decide how to split 10 points. In the following, we will explain their respective decisions in detail.

Stage One Decision-making

Role A will first decide how to allocate 10 points between himself and role B.

After observing A's choice in Stage One, B will then choose to "Accept" or "Reject".

- If B chooses "Accept". she will receive the number of points allocated to her by A. Once B has made her choice for Stage One, A will be informed of B's decision. A and B will then proceed to Stage Two decision-making.

- If B chooses "Reject", the computer will decide who gets 20 points. **A has a 20% chance of winning these 20 points, while B has an 80% chance of winning.** In addition, regardless of the outcome, both parties must pay a cost of 4 points (this cost is not incurred if B chooses "Accept"). At this point, the round will end after Stage One and will not proceed to Stage Two.

Stage Two Decision-making

Similar to Stage One, A will first decide how to allocate 10 points between himself and role B. B will then choose to "Accept" or "Reject".

- If B chooses "Accept", she will receive the number of points allocated to her by A.

- If B chooses "Reject", **the decision from Stage One is nullified**, and the computer will decide who gets 20 points. **A has a 70% chance of winning, while B has a 30% chance of winning.** In addition, regardless of the outcome, both parties must each pay a cost of 4 points (this cost is not incurred if B chooses "Accept").

Summary of the Two Stages of Decision-making

1. Stage One: First, A decides how to allocate 10 points, then B decides to "Accept" or "Reject".

2. Stage Two: If B decides to "Accept" in Stage One, they proceed to Stage Two. First, A decides how to allocate 10 points, then B decides to "Accept" or "Reject".

Earnings per Round

- If B chooses "Accept" in both stages, then the total number of points she earns in that round (besides the 5 points starting income) is equal to the sum of the points allocated to B by A in both stages. A's total number of points is equal to the sum of the points allocated to himself in both stages.

- If B chooses "Reject" at any stage, then the earnings for that round are unrelated to any of A's decisions in either stage, and will only depend on whether they win 20 points at a cost of 4 points in the stage where B chose "Reject". **It is important to note that although B has a higher chance of winning in the first stage (80%), A has a higher chance of winning in the second stage (70%).**

Your total earnings in this experiment will be the sum of earnings from each round. These experimental points will be converted into RMB at the end of the entire experiment.

This concludes all the experiment instructions. To ensure that all participants are fully aware of these instructions, please complete the following practice questions to help everyone understand. If you have any doubts, please raise your hand. Once all participants have correctly answered the practice questions, we will begin the experiment.

A.2 Instructions for the RS-Contain treatment

General Information

You are participating in a decision-making experiment. The instructions for the experiment are the same for everyone, please read them carefully. Communication among participants is prohibited during the experiment, please set your mobile phone to silent mode or turn it off. If you have any questions, please raise your hand at any time, and the experiment staff will come to assist you.

For your punctual attendance, you have already received a reward of 15 RMB. You can earn more rewards through the decisions you make in the experiment. The points you earn will depend on both your own decisions and the decisions of other participants. At the end of the experiment, your total points will be converted into RMB: 6 points = 1 RMB. The final reward will be deposited into your bank card within 5 working days. The decisions made by participants in the experiment are completely anonymous; that is, your name will be kept strictly confidential in the study, and other participants will not know your total experiment reward for today.

Experiment Overview

This experiment consists of 30 rounds. Before each round begins, you will be randomly paired with another participant, and you will randomly play the role of either A or B. If you are role A (or B), then the other participant will be role B (or A). In each round of the experiment, both the participant you are paired with and the roles you play will change randomly.

Before each round begins, participants will first receive a starting income of 5 points. Each round includes three decision-making stages. For ease of explanation, we will first describe the decision-making in the second and third stages, and then explain the first stage. In each of the second and third stages, role A and role B will decide how to split 10 points. In the following, we will explain their respective decisions in detail.

Stage Two Decision-making

Role A will first decide how to allocate 10 points between himself and role B.

After observing A's choice in Stage Two, B will then choose to "Accept" or "Reject".

- If B chooses "Accept", she will receive the number of points allocated to her by A. Once B has made her choice for Stage Two, A will be informed of B's decision. A and B will then proceed to Stage Three decision-making.

- If B chooses "Reject", the computer will decide who gets 20 points. **A has a 20% chance of winning these 20 points, while B has an 80% chance of winning.** In addition, regardless of the outcome, both parties must pay a cost of 4 points (this cost is not incurred if B chooses "Accept"). At this point, the round will end after Stage Two and will not proceed to Stage Three.

Stage Three Decision-making

Similar to Stage Two, A will first decide how to allocate 10 points between himself and role B. B will then choose to "Accept" or "Reject".

- If B chooses "Accept", she will receive the number of points allocated to her by A.

- If B chooses "Reject", **the decision from Stage Two is nullified**, and the computer will decide who gets 20 points. **A has a 70% chance of winning, while B has a 30% chance of winning.** In addition, regardless of the outcome, both parties must each pay a cost of 4 points (this cost is not incurred if B chooses "Accept").

Stage One Decision-making

Now we return to Stage One, where role A will decide whether to adjust the probability of winning in Stage Three to be the same as in Stage Two.

- If A chooses to "Adjust", then when B chooses "Reject" in Stage Three, **A has a 20% chance of winning, while B has an 80% chance of winning**.

- If A chooses "Not to Adjust", then **A has a 70% chance of winning, while B has a 30% chance of winning**.

Before the start of Stage Two, B will be informed of A's choice.

Summary of the Three Stages of Decision-making

1. Stage One: A decides whether to adjust the probability of winning for Stage Three.

2. Stage Two: First, A decides how to allocate 10 points, then B decides to "Accept" or "Reject".

3. Stage Three: If B decides to "Accept" in Stage Two, they proceed to Stage Three. First, A decides how to allocate 10 points, then B decides to "Accept" or "Reject".

Earnings per Round

- If B chooses "Accept" in both Stage Two and Stage Three, then the total number of points she earns in that round (besides the 5 points starting income) is equal to the sum of the points allocated to B by A in these two stages. A's total number of points is equal to the sum of the points allocated to himself in these two stages.

- If B chooses "Reject" at any stage, then the earnings for that round are unrelated to any of A's decisions in either stage, and will only depend on whether they win 20 points at a cost of 4 points in the stage where B chose "Reject". **It is important to note that although B has a higher chance of winning in the second stage (80%), if A does not "Adjust", then A will have a higher chance of winning in the third stage (70%).**

Your total earnings in this experiment will be the sum of earnings from each round. These experimental points will be converted into RMB at the end of the entire experiment.

This concludes all the experiment instructions. To ensure that all participants are fully aware of these instructions, please complete the following practice questions to help everyone understand. If you have any doubts, please raise your hand. Once all participants have correctly answered the practice questions, we will begin the experiment.

A.3   Instructions for the RS-Commit treatment

General Information

You are participating in a decision-making experiment. The instructions for the experiment are the same for everyone, please read them carefully. Communication among participants is prohibited during the experiment, please set your mobile phone to silent mode or turn it off. If you have any questions, please raise your hand at any time, and the experiment staff will come to assist you.

For your punctual attendance, you have already received a reward of 15 RMB. You can earn more rewards through the decisions you make in the experiment. The points you earn will depend on both your own decisions and the decisions of other participants. At the end of the experiment, your total points will be converted into RMB: 6 points = 1 RMB. The final reward will be deposited into your bank card within 5 working days. The decisions made by participants in the experiment are completely anonymous; that is, your name will be kept strictly confidential in the study, and other participants will not know your total experiment reward for today.

Experiment Overview

This experiment consists of 30 rounds. Before each round begins, you will be randomly paired with another participant, and you will randomly play the role of either A or B. If you are role A (or B), then the other participant will be role B (or A). In each round of the experiment, both the participant you are paired with and the roles you play will change randomly.

Before each round begins, participants will first receive a starting income of 5 points. Each round includes two decision-making stages. In each stage, role A and role B will decide how to split 10 points. In the following, we will explain their respective decisions in detail.

Stage One Decision-making

Role A will first decide how to allocate 10 points between himself and role B. **Additionally, A will choose how many points, from another set of 10 points to be allocated in Stage Two, to allocate in advance to B.** If A decides to allocate X points (where X can be any integer between 0 to 10) from Stage Two to B in advance during Stage One, then the points available for allocation in Stage Two will be reduced to $10 - X$ points.

After observing A's choice in Stage One, B will then choose to "Accept" or "Reject".

- If B chooses "Accept", she will receive the points allocated to her by A (including any points allocated in advance from Stage Two). Once B has made her choice for Stage One, A will be informed of B's decision. A and B will then proceed to Stage Two decision-making.

- If B chooses "Reject", the computer will decide who gets 20 points. **A has a 20% chance of winning these 20 points, while B has an 80% chance of winning.** In addition, regardless of the outcome, both parties must pay a cost of 4 points (this cost is not incurred if B chooses "Accept"). At this point, the round will end after Stage One and will not proceed to Stage Two.

Stage Two Decision-making

Similar to Stage One, A will first decide how to allocate $10 - X$ points between himself and role B (where X is the number of points already allocated in advance to B in Stage One). B will then choose to "Accept" or "Reject".

- If B chooses "Accept", she will receive the points allocated to them by A.

- If B chooses "Reject", **the decision from Stage One is nullified**, and the computer will decide who gets 20 points. **A has a 70% chance of winning, while B has a 30% chance of winning.** In addition, regardless of the outcome, both parties must each pay a cost of 4 points (this cost is not incurred if B chooses "Accept").

Summary of the Two Stages of Decision-making

1. Stage One: First, A decides how to allocate the 10 points of Stage One and how many points from Stage Two to allocate in advance to B, then B decides to "Accept" or "Reject".

2. Stage Two: If B decides to "Accept" in Stage One, they proceed to Stage Two. First, A decides how to allocate the $10 - X$ points, then B decides to "Accept" or "Reject".

Earnings per Round

- If B chooses "Accept" in both stages, then the total number of points she earns in that round (besides the 5 points starting income) equals the sum of the points allocated to B by A in both stages. The total number of points A earns is equal to the sum of the points allocated to themselves in both stages.

- If B chooses "Reject" at any stage, then the earnings for that round are unrelated to any of A's decisions in either stage, and will only depend on whether they win 20 points at a cost of 4 points in the stage where B chose "Reject". **It is important to note that while B has a higher chance of winning in the first stage (80%), A has a higher chance of winning in the second stage (70%).**

Your total earnings in this experiment will be the sum of earnings from each round. These experimental points will be converted into RMB at the end of the entire experiment.

This concludes all the experiment instructions. To ensure that all participants are fully aware of these instructions, please complete the following practice questions to help everyone understand. If you have any doubts, please raise your hand. Once all participants have correctly answered the practice questions, we will begin the experiment.

A.4 Instructions for the RS-Choice treatment

General Information

You are participating in a decision-making experiment. The instructions for the experiment are the same for everyone, please read them carefully. Communication among participants is prohibited during the experiment, please set your mobile phone to silent mode or turn it off. If you have any questions, please raise your hand at any time, and the experiment staff will come to assist you.

For your punctual attendance, you have already received a reward of 15 RMB. You can earn more rewards through the decisions you make in the experiment. The points you earn will depend on both your own decisions and the decisions of other participants. At the end of the experiment, your total points will be converted into RMB: 6 points = 1 RMB. The final reward will be deposited into

your bank card within 5 working days. The decisions made by participants in the experiment are completely anonymous; that is, your name will be kept strictly confidential in the study, and other participants will not know your total experiment reward for today.

Experiment Overview

This experiment consists of 30 rounds. Before each round begins, you will be randomly paired with another participant, and you will randomly play the role of either A or B. If you are role A (or B), then the other participant will be role B (or A). In each round of the experiment, both the participant you are paired with and the roles you play will change randomly.

Before each round begins, participants will first receive a starting income of 5 points. Each round includes three decision-making stages. For ease of explanation, we will first describe the decision-making in the second and third stages, and then explain the first stage. In each of the second and third stages, role A and role B will decide how to split 10 points. In the following, we will explain their respective decisions in detail.

Stage Two Decision-making

Role A will first decide how to allocate 10 points between himself and role B.

After observing A's choice in Stage Two, B will then choose to "Accept" or "Reject".

- If B chooses "Accept", she will receive the number of points allocated to her by A. Once B has made her choice for Stage Two, A will be informed of B's decision. A and B will then proceed to Stage Three decision-making.

- If B chooses "Reject", the computer will decide who gets 20 points. **A has a 20% chance of winning these 20 points, while B has an 80% chance of winning.** In addition, regardless of the outcome, both parties must pay a cost of 4 points (this cost is not incurred if B chooses "Accept"). At this point, the round will end after Stage Two and will not proceed to Stage Three.

Stage Three Decision-making

Similar to Stage Two, A will first decide how to allocate 10 points between himself and role B. B will then choose to "Accept" or "Reject".

- If B chooses "Accept", she will receive the number of points allocated to her by A.

- If B chooses "Reject", **the decision from Stage Two is nullified**, and the computer will decide who gets 20 points. **A has a 70% chance of winning, while B has a 30% chance of winning.** In addition, regardless of the outcome, both parties must each pay a cost of 4

points (this cost is not incurred if B chooses "Accept").

Stage One Decision-making

Now we return to Stage One, where role A will choose one of the following three strategies:

- Adjust Winning Probability: Decide whether to adjust the probability of winning in Stage Three to be the same as in Stage Two. That is, if A chooses to "Adjust", then when B chooses "Reject" in Stage Three, **A has a 20% chance of winning, while B has an 80% chance of winning.**

- Advance Allocation: Decide how many points, from another set of 10 points to be allocated in Stage Three, to be allocated in advance to B. If A decides to allocate X points (where X can be any integer from 0 to 10) in advance to B in Stage Two, then the points available for allocation in Stage Three will be reduced to $10 - X$ points.

- Neither Adjust Winning Probability nor Advance Allocation: That is, the points available for allocation in Stage Three remain at 10, and in Stage Three, **A has a 70% chance of winning, while B has a 30% chance of winning**.

Before Stage Two begins, B will be informed of A's choice.

Summary of the Three Stages of Decision-making

1. Stage One: A decides whether to adjust the winning probability for Stage Three, advance allocate points from Stage Three, or neither.

2. Stage Two: First, A decides how to allocate 10 points. If A has chosen to advance allocate in Stage One, he will also decide how many points to allocate in advance to B from Stage Three. Then B decides to "Accept" or "Reject".

3. Stage Three: If B decides to "Accept" in Stage Two, they proceed to Stage Three. First, A decides how to allocate 10 points (or $10 - X$ points, if advance allocation was chosen), then B decides to "Accept" or "Reject".

Earnings per Round

- If B chooses "Accept" in both Stage Two and Stage Three, then the total number of points she earns in that round (besides the 5 points starting income) equals the sum of the points allocated to B by A in these two stages. The total number of points A earns is equal to the sum of the points allocated to themselves in these two stages.

- If B chooses "Reject" at any stage, then the earnings for that round are unrelated to any of A's decisions in either stage, and will only depend on whether they win 20 points at a cost of

4 points in the stage where B chose "Reject". **It is important to note that although B has a higher chance of winning in the second stage (80%), if A does not "Adjust" the winning probability, then A will have a higher chance of winning in the third stage (70%).**

Your total earnings in this experiment will be the sum of earnings from each round. These experimental points will be converted into RMB at the end of the entire experiment.

This concludes all the experiment instructions. To ensure that all participants are fully aware of these instructions, please complete the following practice questions to help everyone understand. If you have any doubts, please raise your hand. Once all participants have correctly answered the practice questions, we will begin the experiment.

A.5 Instructions for the DS-Contain treatment

General Information

You are participating in a decision-making experiment. The instructions for the experiment are the same for everyone, please read them carefully. Communication among participants is prohibited during the experiment, please set your mobile phone to silent mode or turn it off. If you have any questions, please raise your hand at any time, and the experiment staff will come to assist you.

For your punctual attendance, you have already received a reward of 15 RMB. You can earn more rewards through the decisions you make in the experiment. The points you earn will depend on both your own decisions and the decisions of other participants. At the end of the experiment, your total points will be converted into RMB: 6 points = 1 RMB. The final reward will be deposited into your bank card within 5 working days. The decisions made by participants in the experiment are completely anonymous; that is, your name will be kept strictly confidential in the study, and other participants will not know your total experiment reward for today.

Experiment Overview

This experiment consists of 30 rounds. Before each round begins, you will be randomly paired with another participant, and you will randomly play the role of either A or B. If you are role A (or B), then the other participant will be role B (or A). In each round of the experiment, both the participant you are paired with and the roles you play will change randomly.

Before each round begins, participants will first receive a starting income of 5 points. Each round includes three decision-making stages. For ease of explanation, we will first describe the decision-making in the second and third stages, and then explain the first stage. In each of the second and third stages, role A and role B will decide how to split 10 points. In the following, we will explain their respective decisions in detail.

Stage Two Decision-making

Role A will first decide how to allocate 10 points between himself and role B.

After observing A's choice in Stage Two, B will then choose to "Accept" or "Reject".

- If B chooses "Accept", she will receive the number of points allocated to her by A. Once B has made her choice for Stage Two, A will be informed of B's decision. A and B will then proceed to Stage Three decision-making.

- If B chooses "Reject", the computer will decide who gets 20 points. **A has a 20% chance of winning these 20 points, while B has an 80% chance of winning.** In addition, regardless of the outcome, both parties must pay a cost of 4 points (this cost is not incurred if B chooses "Accept"). At this point, the round will end after Stage Two and will not proceed to Stage Three.

Stage Three Decision-making

Similar to Stage Two, A will first decide how to allocate 10 points between himself and role B. B will then choose to "Accept" or "Reject".

- If B chooses "Accept", she will receive the number of points allocated to her by A.

- If B chooses "Reject", **the decision from Stage Two is nullified**, and the computer will decide who gets 20 points. **A has a 70% chance of winning, while B has a 30% chance of winning.** In addition, regardless of the outcome, both parties must each pay a cost of 4 points (this cost is not incurred if B chooses "Accept").

Stage One Decision-making

Now we return to Stage One, where role B will decide whether to adjust the probability of winning in Stage Three to be the same as in Stage Two.

- If B chooses "Adjust", then when B chooses "Reject" in Stage Three, **A has a 20% chance of winning, while B has an 80% chance of winning**.

- If B chooses "Not to Adjust", then **A has a 70% chance of winning, while B has a 30% chance of winning**.

Note: If B chooses "Adjust", then B will incur an additional cost of 1 point.

After B has made her decision, if B has chosen "Not to Adjust", then A will also have the opportunity to decide whether to adjust the probability of winning in Stage Three to be the same as in Stage Two (with no additional cost).

- If A chooses "Adjust", then when B chooses "Reject" in Stage Three, **A has a 20% chance of winning, while B has an 80% chance of winning**.

- If A chooses "Not to Adjust", then **A has a 70% chance of winning, while B has a 30% chance of winning**.

Before Stage Two begins, B will be informed of A's choice, and the final outcome of Stage One will be determined by A's decision.

Summary of the Three Stages of Decision-making

1. Stage One: First, B decides whether to adjust the winning probability for Stage Three. If B chooses not to adjust, then A has the opportunity to decide whether to adjust the winning probability for Stage Three.

2. Stage Two: First, A decides how to allocate 10 points, then B decides to "Accept" or "Reject".

3. Stage Three: If B decides to "Accept" in Stage Two, they proceed to Stage Three. First, A decides how to allocate 10 points, then B decides to "Accept" or "Reject".

Earnings per Round

- If B chooses "Accept" in both Stage Two and Stage Three, then the total number of points she earns in that round (besides the 5 points starting income) equals the sum of the points allocated to B by A in these two stages. The total number of points A earns is equal to the sum of the points allocated to themselves in these two stages.

- If B chooses "Reject" at any stage, then the earnings for that round are unrelated to any of A's decisions in either stage, and will only depend on whether they win 20 points at a cost of 4 points in the stage where B chose "Reject". **It is important to note that although B has a higher chance of winning in the second stage (80%), if neither B nor A chooses to "Adjust" the winning probability, then A will have a higher chance of winning in the third stage (70%).**

Your total earnings in this experiment will be the sum of earnings from each round. These experimental points will be converted into RMB at the end of the entire experiment.

This concludes all the experiment instructions. To ensure that all participants are fully aware of these instructions, please complete the following practice questions to help everyone understand. If you have any doubts, please raise your hand. Once all participants have correctly answered the practice questions, we will begin the experiment.

B   Full Questionnaire

1. What is your gender?

    - Male

    - Female

    - Other-binary / third gender

    - Prefer not to say

2. What is your age range?

    - under 18

    - 18 - 24

    - 25 - 34

    - 35 - 44

    - 45 - 54

    - 55 - 64

    - 65 - 74

    - 75 - 84

    - 85 or older

3. What is your highest level of education obtained?

    - Less than high school

    - High school graduates

    - Some college

    - 4 year college degree

    - Professional degree

    - Doctorate

4. What of the following describes your current situation most accurately?

    - Employed full time

    - Employed part time

- Unemployed looking for work

- Unemployed not looking for work

- Retired

- Student

- Other

5. In your main job, are you employed by public institution (such as federal, state and local government, government agencies, or public schools and hospitals) or by a private firm, or by another institution (such as a foundation, an association, or a non-profit organization)?

  - Public institution

  - Private firm

  - Other institution

6. What is your approximate yearly income level, before taxes?

  - Less than $10,000

  - $10,000 to $19,999

  - $20,000 to $29,999

  - $30,000 to $39,999

  - $40,000 to $49,999

  - $50,000 to $59,999

  - $60,000 to $69,999

  - $70,000 to $79,999

  - $80,000 to $89,999

  - $90,000 to $99,999

  - $100,000 to $149,999

  - More than $150,000

7. How would you describe your ethnicity/race?

  - European American/White

- African American/Black

- Hispanic/Latino

- Asian/Asian American

- Other

8. What is your marital status?

    - Never married

    - Married

    - Legally separated or divorced

    - Widowed

9. How many children do you have?

    - I don't have any children

    - 1

    - 2

    - 3

    - 4

    - 5 or more

10. Which state do you currently reside in?

11. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?

    - Republican

    - Democrat

    - Independent

    - Other

12. Which of the following best describes your political views?

    - Very Liberal

    - Liberal

- Neither liberal nor conservative

- Conservative

- Very conservative

13. Before proceeding to the next set of questions, we want to ask for your feedback about the responses you provided so far. It is vital to our study that we only include responses from people who devoted their full attention to this study. This will not affect in any way the payment you will receive for taking this survey. In your honest opinion, should we use your responses, or should we discard your responses since you did not devote your full attention to the questions so far?

  - Yes, I have devoted full attention to the questions so far and I think you should use my responses for your study.

  - No, I have not devoted full attention to the questions so far and I think you should not use my responses for your study.

Probabilities

In some of the following questions, we will ask you to think about the probability (in %) of a particular event occurring. Your answers can range from 0 to 100, where 0 means there is absolutely no chance, and 100 means that it is absolutely certain. For example, numbers like:

- 2 or 5 percent may indicate "almost no chance".

- 18 percent or so may mean "not much chance".

- 47 or 52 percent may be a "pretty even chance".

- 83 percent or so may mean a "very good chance".

- 95 or 98 percent may be "almost certain".

International Relations Block (26 questions)

Background information about U.S.-China relationships

We now would like you to read the following paragraphs.

During the past four decades, China's economy has been growing rapidly. According to estimates by World Bank, on an exchange rate basis (i.e., by dollar value), China's economy was approximately 11% of the US in 1960, but in 2022 it is 71%. In 2016, China's economy already surpassed that of the U.S. on purchasing power parity basis (i.e., adjusted for local prices of the same prod-

ucts). As per estimates by IMF for 2023, the economy of China is 1.22 times larger than that of the U.S. on purchasing power parity basis.

The rapid growth and modernization of China's military have sparked concerns in the U.S. According to estimates by World Bank, the defense budget of the U.S. is $320 billion in 2000, compared with $22 billion of China. In 2022, the U.S. still spends more on defense than the next 10 countries combined — $877 billion, compared with $292 billion in reported spending by China. But the gap in military expenditure is much narrower than in the past.

We now would like to ask you some questions about your expectations regarding the U.S.-China relationships.

14. What do you think is the probability (in %) of war between the U.S. and China over the next decade? Please enter a number (0 - 100) in the box below.

15. Your answer to the previous question indicates that you believe there is a X% chance that war between the U.S. and China would occur during the next decade. How certain are you the optimal guess is somewhere between (X-1)% and (X+1)%?

16. Under the U.S. persistent economic and military pressure, what do you think is the probability (in %) that China will take each of the following actions at some time during the next decade? Please enter a number (0 - 100) in each box below.

   - China will slow or stall its military buildup to the point that its military strength can never compete with the U.S. in battles occurring in the Pacific theater.

   - China will make economic concessions via a series of enforceable trade agreements that requires structural reforms and other changes to China's economic and trade regime in the areas of intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, and currency and foreign exchange.

17. Your answer to a previous question indicates that you believe there is a X% chance that war between the U.S. and China would occur during the next decade. For each of the following hypothetical actions taken, what do you think would happen to the probability (in %) of war between the U.S. and China over the next decade?

   - Action 1: China decides to slow or stall its military buildup to the point that its military strength can never compete with the U.S. in battles occurring in the Pacific theater.

     – The probability of war will decrease

     – The probability of war will increase

- – The probability of war will not be affected by China's action

- If you are to give one number as your prediction of the probability of war between the U.S. and China given that Action 1 has been taken, what would it be?

- Action 2: China decides to make economic concessions via a series of enforceable trade agreements that requires structural reforms and other changes to China's economic and trade regime in the areas of intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, and currency and foreign exchange.

  - – The probability of war will decrease

  - – The probability of war will increase

  - – The probability of war will not be affected by China's action

- If you are to give one number as your prediction of the probability of war between the U.S. and China given that Action 2 has been taken, what would it be?

- Action 3: The U.S. decides to contain China's economic and military growth by imposing a series of tariffs, sanctions, and other coercive economic measures toward China (e.g., most notably China's semiconductor industry).

  - – The probability of war will decrease

  - – The probability of war will increase

  - – The probability of war will not be affected by China's action

- If you are to give one number as your prediction of the probability of war between the U.S. and China given that Action 3 has been taken, what would it be?

18. What kind of foreign policy strategies or actions do you think could most effectively reduce the probability of war between the U.S. and China?

19. Now try to imagine you were one of the top leaders of the U.S. How much would you approve of each of the following actions?

- China slows or stalls its military buildup to the point that its military strength can never compete with the U.S. in battles occurring in the Pacific theater.

  - – Approve strongly

  - – Approve

  - – Approve slightly

- Neither approve or disapprove

- Disapprove slightly

- Disapprove

- Disapprove strongly

- China makes economic concessions via a series of enforceable trade agreements that requires structural reforms and other changes to China's economic and trade regime in the areas of intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, and currency and foreign exchange.

- The U.S. contains China's economic and military growth by imposing a series of tariffs, sanctions, and other coercive economic measures toward China (e.g., most notably China's semiconductor industry).

20. Now try to imagine you were one of the top leaders of China. How much would you approve of each of the following actions?

- China slows or stalls its military buildup to the point that its military strength can never compete with the U.S. in battles occurring in the Pacific theater.

- China makes economic concessions via a series of enforceable trade agreements that requires structural reforms and other changes to China's economic and trade regime in the areas of intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, and currency and foreign exchange.

- The U.S. contains China's economic and military growth by imposing a series of tariffs, sanctions, and other coercive economic measures toward China (e.g., most notably China's semiconductor industry).

Now please tell us about your opinions on the following statements.

21. Do you think China is an adversary, a serious problem but not an adversary, or not an adversary for the U.S.?

- An adversary

- A serious problem but not an adversary

- Not an adversary

- Don't know

22. Do you think the U.S. should pursue friendly cooperation with China or actively work to limit China's power?

   - The U.S. should pursue friendly cooperation with China

   - The U.S. should actively work to limit China's power

   - Don't know

23. Do you think that China is trying to pursue friendly cooperation with the U.S. or working to undermine U.S. power and influence?

   - China is trying to pursue friendly cooperation with the U.S.

   - China is trying to undermine U.S. power and influence

   - Don't know

Now please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.

24. The world would be a more secure place if China replaced the United States as the hegemon in East Asia.

   - Strongly agree

   - Somewhat agree

   - Neither agree nor disagree

   - Somewhat disagree

   - Strongly disagree

25. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans.

   - Strongly agree

   - Somewhat agree

   - Neither agree nor disagree

   - Somewhat disagree

   - Strongly disagree

26. I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world.

   - Strongly agree

   - Somewhat agree

- Neither agree nor disagree

- Somewhat disagree

- Strongly disagree

27. I usually follow news on the international relations regarding U.S.-China.

- Strongly agree

- Somewhat agree

- Neither agree nor disagree

- Somewhat disagree

- Strongly disagree

28. What do you think is the probability (in %) that 12 months from now the military spending by the U.S. will be higher than it is now? Please enter a number (0 - 100) in the box below.

29. What do you think is the probability (in %) that 12 months from now the military spending by China will be higher than it is now? Please enter a number (0 - 100) in the box below.

Macroeconomics Block (20 questions)

This block contains 20 questions asking respondents about their expectations about macroeconomics, as well as their own saving, investment, and spending behavior. The questions are omitted here as they are irrelevant to the present study.

C Additional Figures and Tables

(a) PW-Baseline

Rising State

$x_1 \in [0,1]$

Declining State

Fight · Accept

$2(1 - P_1^{DS}) - C, \ 2P_1^{DS} - C$

Rising State

$x_2 \in [0,1]$

Declining State

Fight · Accept

$2(1 - P_2^{DS}) - C, \ 2P_2^{DS} - C \quad 2 - x_1 - x_2, \ x_1 + x_2$

(b) RS-Commit

Rising State

$x_1 \in [0,1]; \ \textit{advance allocation} \ (a) \in [0,1]$

Declining State

Fight · Accept

$2(1 - P_1^{DS}) - C, \ 2P_1^{DS} - C$

Rising State

$x_2 \in [0, 1 - a]$

Declining State

Fight · Accept

$2(1 - P_2^{DS}) - C, \ 2P_2^{DS} - C \quad 2 - x_1 - a - x_2, \ x_1 + a + x_2$

(c) RS-Contain

Rising State

$s^{RS} \in [\textit{no action} \ (P_2^{DS*} = P_2^{DS}), \\ \textit{contain} \ (P_2^{DS*} = P_1^{DS})]$

Rising State

$x_1 \in [0,1]$

Declining State

Fight · Accept

$2(1 - P_1^{DS}) - C, \ 2P_1^{DS} - C$

Rising State

$x_2 \in [0,1]$

Declining State

Fight · Accept

$2(1 - P_2^{DS*}) - C, \ 2P_2^{DS*} - C \quad 2 - x_1 - x_2, \ x_1 + x_2$

(d) DS-Contain

Declining State

no action

Rising State

$s^{RS} \in [\textit{no action} \ (P_2^{DS*} = P_2^{DS}), \\ \textit{contain} \ (P_2^{DS*} = P_1^{DS})]$

$\textit{contain} \ (P_2^{DS*} = P_1^{DS})$

Rising State

$x_1 \in [0,1]$

Declining State

Fight · Accept

$2(1 - P_1^{DS}) - C, \ 2P_1^{DS} - C$

Rising State

$x_2 \in [0,1]$

Declining State

Fight · Accept

$2(1 - P_2^{DS*}) - C, \ 2P_2^{DS*} - C \quad 2 - x_1 - x_2, \ x_1 + x_2$

(e) RS-Choice

$s^{RS} \in [\textit{no action} \ (P_2^{DS*} = P_2^{DS}), \\ \textit{contain} \ (P_2^{DS*} = P_1^{DS})]$

Rising State

Commit (advance allocation)

Rising State

$x_1 \in [0,1]$

Declining State

Fight · Accept

$2(1 - P_1^{DS}) - C, \ 2P_1^{DS} - C$

Rising State

$x_2 \in [0,1]$

Declining State

Fight · Accept

$2(1 - P_2^{DS*}) - C, \ 2P_2^{DS*} - C \quad 2 - x_1 - x_2, \ x_1 + x_2$

Rising State

$x_1 \in [0,1]; \ a \in [0,1]$

Declining State

Fight · Accept

$2(1 - P_1^{DS}) - C, \ 2P_1^{DS} - C$

Rising State

$x_2 \in [0, 1 - a]$

Declining State

Fight · Accept

$2(1 - P_2^{DS}) - C, \ 2P_2^{DS} - C \quad 2 - x_1 - a - x_2, \ x_1 + a + x_2$

Figure C1: The game tree for each treatment

Notes: The chosen parameters are: $P_1^{DS} = 0.8, P_2^{DS} = 0.3, C = 0.4$. All values (except for parameters for probability of winning) in the figure need to be scaled up by a factor of 10 to equate with the actual values in the experiment.

Figure C2: The frequency of preventive wars over time in RS-Contain

Figure C3: The frequency of preventive wars over time in RS-Commit

Figure C4: The frequency of preventive wars by policy choices during the last 10 rounds

Figure C5: Rising state's offers in both stages over time in RS-Contain

Figure C6: The frequency of preventive wars conditional on the rising state's stage 1 offer in PW-Baseline and RS-Contain


Figure C7: Rising state's offers in both stages over time in RS-Commit

Figure C8: The frequency of preventive wars conditional on the rising state's stage 1 offer in RS-Commit

Frequency of stage 1 offer (including advance allocation)

Frequency of fighting (preventive war)

Figure C9: The rising state's and declining state's average payoffs (excluding 5 points endowment) in the last 10 rounds

Notes: Error bars represent one standard error of means clustered at the session level. In RS-Commit and RS-Choice, we define that the commitment policy is adopted when the combined Stage 1 offer exceeds 11 points. In RS-Commit, "no action" indicates that the combined Stage 1 offer must not exceed 10 points, while in RS-Choice, it indicates that the rising state explicitly chooses to take no action.

Figure C10: The frequency of preventive wars over time in RS-Choice

Notes: In RS-Choice, we define that the commitment policy is adopted when the combined Stage 1 offer exceeds 11 points. "No action" indicates that the rising state explicitly chooses to take no action.

Figure C11: Rising state's offers in both stages over time in RS-Choice

Notes: In RS-Choice, "commit" indicates that RS has chosen to allocate advance payment, but they are free to choose any level of the combined Stage 1 offer. "No action" indicates that the rising state explicitly chooses to take no action.

Figure C12: The frequency of preventive wars conditional on the rising state's stage 1 offer in RS-Choice

Frequency of stage 1 offer (including advance allocation)

Frequency of fighting (preventive war)

Notes: "Commitment" indicates that RS has chosen to allocate advance payment, but they are free to choose any level of the combined Stage 1 offer. "No action" indicates that the rising state explicitly chooses to take no action.

Figure C13: The frequency of preventive wars over time in DS-Contain

Figure C14: Rising state's offers in both stages over time in DS-Contain

Figure C15: The frequency of preventive wars conditional on the rising state's stage 1 offer in DS-Contain

Figure C16: The distribution of approval of each policy from the U.S. or China perspective

(a) U.S.

(b) China

Notes: Respondents were asked to imagine themselves as one of the top leaders of the U.S. or China and to assess how much they would approve of each foreign policy adopted by either country. Their answers were based on a 7-point scale from "approve strongly" to "disapprove strongly".

Table C1: Random effects probit regressions on the frequency of preventive wars conditional on Stage 1 offer in RS-Contain

	All rounds	Last 10 rounds
	(1)	(2)
RS-Contain	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.060)	(0.097)
Contain	-0.356***	-0.499***
	(0.042)	(0.150)
$\mathbb{1}$[Offer=10]	-0.238***	-0.181
	(0.031)	(0.132)
Contain$\times\mathbb{1}$[Offer=10]	-0.005	0.035
	(0.064)	(0.099)
Clusters	12	12
N	1800	600

Notes: This table reports the average marginal effects on the declining state's decision of launching preventive war conditional on the rising state's Stage 1 offer. Standard errors clustered at the session level are in parentheses. The variable "Contain" indicates that the containment policy is adopted. The PW-Baseline treatment serves as the benchmark in all regressions. *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C2: Random effects regressions on payoff in RS-Contain

	All rounds	Last 10 rounds
	(1)	(2)
RS-Contain	-0.244	0.164
	(0.745)	(1.240)
Contain	-0.823***	-0.199
	(0.276)	(1.022)
DS	8.296***	9.620***
	(0.895)	(0.967)
RS-Contain×DS	0.097	-0.261
	(1.132)	(1.915)
Contain×DS	3.605***	2.926*
	(0.363)	(1.558)
Constant	8.061***	7.123***
	(0.606)	(0.635)
Clusters	12	12
N	3600	1200
H0: RS-Contain + RS-Contain×DS = 0	$p = 0.714$	$p = 0.897$
H0: Contain + Contain×DS = 0	$p < 0.001$	$p < 0.001$

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the session level are in parentheses. The variable "Contain" indicates that the containment policy is adopted. RS's payoff in the PW-Baseline treatment serves as the benchmark in all regressions. *** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table C3: Random effects regressions on payoff in RS-Commit

	All rounds	Last 10 rounds
	(1)	(2)
RS-Commit	0.382	1.366
	(0.893)	(0.692)
Commit	0.275	0.287
	(0.501)	(0.913)
DS	8.300***	9.620***
	(0.898)	(0.967)
RS-Commit×DS	-0.319	-2.109
	(1.385)	(1.283)
Commit×DS	2.007	2.270
	(1.159)	(1.983)
Constant	8.059***	7.123***
	(0.608)	(0.635)
Clusters	12	12
N	3600	1200
H0: RS-Commit + RS-Commit×DS = 0	$p = 0.902$	$p = 0.284$
H0: Commit + Commit×DS = 0	$p < 0.001$	$p = 0.021$

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the session level are in parentheses. The variable "Commit" indicates that the commitment policy is adopted. We define that the commitment policy is adopted when the combined Stage 1 offer exceeds 11 points. RS's payoff in the PW-Baseline treatment serves as the benchmark in all regressions. *** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table C4: Random effects probit regressions on the frequency of preventive wars conditional on Stage 1 offer in RS-Choice

	All rounds	Last 10 rounds
	(1)	(2)
RS-Choice	-0.041	0.077
	(0.072)	(0.084)
Insufficient Commit	0.045	-0.205***
	(0.054)	(0.044)
$\mathbb{1}$[Offer>11]	-0.413***	-0.372***
	(0.065)	(0.076)
Clusters	12	12
N	1777	599

Notes: This table reports the average marginal effects on the declining state's decision of launching preventive war conditional on the rising state's (combined) Stage 1 offer. Standard errors clustered at the session level are in parentheses. The variable "Insufficient Commit" indicates that the commitment policy is adopted but the combined offer is no higher than 11 points. The PW-Baseline treatment serves as the benchmark in all regressions. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$.

Table C5: Random effects regressions on payoff in RS-Choice

	All rounds	Last 10 rounds
	(1)	(2)
RS-Choice	0.924	0.972
	(0.763)	(1.149)
Contain	-2.473	4.599***
	(2.542)	(0.945)
Commit	0.034	0.866
	(0.468)	(0.997)
DS	8.302***	9.617***
	(0.898)	(0.961)
RS-Choice×DS	-1.377	-1.250
	(1.029)	(1.931)
Contain×DS	5.519	-4.050**
	(3.427)	(1.663)
Commit×DS	3.123***	1.662
	(0.913)	(1.875)
Constant	8.059***	7.125***
	(0.608)	(0.632)
Clusters	12	12
N	3600	1200
H0: RS-Choice + RS-Choice×DS = 0	$p = 0.177$	$p = 0.750$
H0: Contain + Contain×DS = 0	$p < 0.001$	$p = 0.497$
H0: Commit + Commit×DS = 0	$p < 0.001$	$p = 0.009$

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the session level are in parentheses. The variables 'Contain" and "Commit" indicate that the containment and commitment policies are adopted, respectively. We define that the commitment policy is adopted when the combined Stage 1 offer exceeds 11 points. RS's payoff in the PW-Baseline treatment serves as the benchmark in all regressions. *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C6: Random effects regressions on payoff in DS-Contain

	All rounds	Last 10 rounds
	(1)	(2)
DS-Contain	-1.448*	0.331
	(0.750)	(1.346)
Self-contain	1.028	-0.219
	(0.901)	(1.717)
Contain-by-DS	1.202*	0.713
	(0.644)	(1.330)
DS	8.299***	9.612***
	(0.897)	(0.949)
DS-Contain×DS	1.604	-1.434
	(1.166)	(2.553)
Self-contain×DS	1.457	3.506
	(1.963)	(3.228)
Contain-by-DS×DS	0.233	2.431
	(1.066)	(2.650)
Constant	8.059***	7.127***
	(0.607)	(0.626)
Clusters	12	12
N	3600	1200
H0: DS-Contain + DS-Contain×DS = 0	$p = 0.731$	$p = 0.385$
H0: Self-contain + Self-contain×DS = 0	$p = 0.025$	$p = 0.041$
H0: Contain by DS + Contain-by-DS×DS = 0	$p = 0.006$	$p = 0.022$

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the session level are in parentheses. The variables "Self-contain" and "Contain by DS" indicate that the containment policy is adopted by RS and DS, respectively. RS's payoff in the PW-Baseline treatment serves as the benchmark in all regressions. *** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table C7: Definitions of respondent characteristics variables

Variable	Definition
Male	Respondent is male
Age 18-34	Respondent's age is between 18 and 34 years (omitted category in regressions)
Age 35-44	Respondent's age is between 35 and 44 years
Age 45-64	Respondent's age is between 45 and 64 years
Age 65-84	Respondent's age is between 65 and 84 years
Low income	Respondent's annual personal income is below $39,999 (omitted category)
Lower-middle income	Respondent's annual personal income is between $40,000 and $69,999
Upper-middle income	Respondent's annual personal income is between $70,000 and $99,999
High income	Respondent's annual personal income is above $100,000
College	Respondent has at least a 4-year college degree
Student or other	Respondent is student or other (omitted category in regressions)
Working	Respondent is employed full time or part time
Non-working	Respondent is unemployed whether or not looking for work
Retiree	Respondent is retiree
Married	Respondent is married
Has children	Respondent has children
White	Respondent's ethnicity is European American/White (omitted category)
Black	Respondent's ethnicity is African American/Black
Hispanic	Respondent's ethnicity is Hispanic/Latino
Asian or other races	Respondent's ethnicity is Asian/Asian American or Other
Republican	Respondent's political affiliation is Republican
Democrat	Respondent's political affiliation is Democrat (omitted category)
Independent or other	Respondent's political affiliation is independent or other
Adversary	Respondent believes China is an adversary to U.S.
Serious problem	Respondent believes China is a serious problem but not an adversary to U.S.
Not adversary	Respondent believes China is not an adversary or a serious problem to U.S. (omitted category)
US aggression	Respondent thinks the U.S. should actively work to limit China's power
China aggression	Respondent thinks China is trying to undermine U.S. power and influence
China not replace US	Respondent chooses Somewhat or Strongly disagree to the statement "The world would be a more secure place if China replaced the United States as the hegemon in East Asia".
High nationalism	Respondent chooses Somewhat or Strongly agree to both statements: "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans" and "I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world."
Follow news	Respondent chooses Somewhat or Strongly disagree to the statement "I usually follow news on the international relations regarding U.S.-China"
U.S. military spending	Respondent predicts the probability of U.S. increasing its military spending
China military spending	Respondent predicts the probability of China increasing its military spending

Table C8: Definitions of outcome variables

Variable	Type	Definition
Containment	Continuous	Respondent predicts the probability of China adopting the containment policy (0-100)
Commitment	Continuous	Respondent predicts the probability of China adopting the commitment policy (0-100)
Benchmark war	Continuous	Respondent predicts the probability of war (0-100)
Self-containment war	Continuous	Respondent predicts the probability of war given China adopts the self-containment policy (0-100)
Commitment war	Continuous	Respondent predicts the probability of war given China adopts the commitment policy (0-100)
U.S. containment war	Continuous	Respondent predicts the probability of war given U.S. decides to contain China (0-100)
Self-containment war decrease	Categorical	Respondent predicts the probability of war would decrease given China adopts the self-containment policy (with increase or unchanged as omitted category)
Commitment war decrease	Categorical	Respondent predicts the probability of war would decrease given China adopts the commitment policy (with increase or unchanged as omitted category)
U.S. containment war decrease	Categorical	Respondent predicts the probability of war would decrease given U.S. decides to contain China (with increase or unchanged as omitted category)
China approve self-containment	Categorical	Respondent thinks Chinese elites would approve of the self-containment policy (with neutral or disapprove as omitted category)
China approve commitment	Categorical	Respondent thinks Chinese elites would approve of the commitment policy (with neutral or disapprove as omitted category)
China approve U.S. containment	Categorical	Respondent thinks Chinese elites would approve of U.S. adopting the containment policy (with neutral or disapprove as omitted category)
U.S. approve self-containment	Categorical	Respondent thinks U.S. elites would approve of China adopting the self-containment policy (with neutral or disapprove as omitted category)
U.S. approve commitment	Categorical	Respondent thinks U.S. elites would approve of China adopting the commitment policy (with neutral or disapprove as omitted category)
U.S. approve U.S. containment	Categorical	Respondent thinks U.S. elites would approve of the U.S. containment policy (with neutral or disapprove as omitted category)

Table C9: Regressions of the probability of war on the discrepancy between U.S. and Chinese elites' perceived attitudes toward each policy

	Benchmark	Self-containment	Difference	Benchmark	Commitment	Difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Elites' attitude gap in self-containment	0.936*	1.478***	-0.542			
	(0.479)	(0.467)	(0.475)			
Elites' attitude gap in commitment				1.424***	1.569***	-0.145
				(0.494)	(0.500)	(0.502)
Constant	33.69***	27.32***	6.365***	33.60***	29.52***	4.083***
	(1.423)	(1.388)	(1.414)	(1.254)	(1.267)	(1.273)
Observations	541	541	541	541	541	541

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable of the regression (3) is the difference between the probability of war when self-containment is adopted and the benchmark probability. The dependent variable of the regression (6) is the difference between the probability of war when commitment is adopted and the benchmark probability. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

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Table C10: Regressions of the probability of China adopting each policy

	Containment	Commitment	Difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age 35-44	-10.28***	-3.514	6.768**
	(3.286)	(3.306)	(3.171)
Age 45-64	-7.095**	-6.113*	0.982
	(3.260)	(3.279)	(3.145)
Black	8.588**	7.465**	-1.122
	(3.690)	(3.712)	(3.560)
Republican	-3.289	2.852	6.140**
	(2.799)	(2.816)	(2.701)
High nationalism	10.14***	3.271	-6.872***
	(2.475)	(2.490)	(2.388)
U.S. military spending	0.130***	0.132***	0.00202
	(0.0496)	(0.0499)	(0.0478)
China military spending	-0.0596	0.0878*	0.147***
	(0.0522)	(0.0525)	(0.0503)
Constant	21.50***	25.91***	4.406
	(5.874)	(5.910)	(5.668)
Observations	541	541	541

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable of the regression (3) is the difference between the probability of China adopting the commitment policy relative to the containment policy. The regressions control the full array of respondent characteristics defined in Table C7. For clarity, only those variables showing large and significant heterogeneity are reported in the table. The omitted categories are Age 18-34, White, and Democrat. All outcome variables are defined in Table C8. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C11: Regressions of the probability of war given conditional on adopted policy

	Benchmark	Self-containment	Commitment	U.S. containment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age 35-44	-7.823**	-1.340	-3.987	-4.483
	(3.155)	(3.240)	(3.253)	(3.336)
Age 45-64	-6.331**	1.862	-2.310	-0.0831
	(3.130)	(3.214)	(3.226)	(3.309)
Married	-1.793	-4.769*	-5.138**	-7.459***
	(2.449)	(2.515)	(2.525)	(2.589)
Black	8.371**	9.180**	11.63***	7.436**
	(3.543)	(3.638)	(3.652)	(3.745)
Adversary	12.15***	3.123	6.267*	7.603**
	(3.393)	(3.484)	(3.498)	(3.587)
China not replace U.S.	-7.554***	-7.642***	-7.212***	-5.532**
	(2.506)	(2.573)	(2.583)	(2.649)
U.S. military spending	0.0567	0.0656	0.0844*	0.186***
	(0.0476)	(0.0489)	(0.0491)	(0.0503)
China military spending	0.156***	0.0889*	0.135***	0.143***
	(0.0501)	(0.0514)	(0.0516)	(0.0529)
Constant	20.96***	19.18***	21.09***	19.54***
	(5.640)	(5.791)	(5.814)	(5.963)
Observations	541	541	541	541

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions control the full array of respondent characteristics defined in Table C7. For clarity, only those variables showing large and significant heterogeneity are reported in the table. The omitted categories are Age 18-34, White, and considering China as neither an adversary nor a serious problem. All outcome variables are defined in Table C8. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C12: Regressions of predicted changes to the probability of war conditional on adopted policy

| | Continuous: Change relative to benchmark | | | Categorical: Probability of war decreases | | |
| | Self-containment | Commitment | U.S. containment | Self-containment | Commitment | U.S. containment |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age 35-44	-6.483*	-3.836	-3.340	-0.0752	-0.0345	-0.108**
	(3.335)	(3.432)	(3.447)	(0.0629)	(0.0621)	(0.0522)
Age 45-64	-8.193**	-4.021	-6.248*	-0.0931	0.0169	-0.0730
	(3.307)	(3.404)	(3.419)	(0.0624)	(0.0616)	(0.0517)
Married	2.976	3.345	5.666**	-0.0534	0.0726	0.0896**
	(2.588)	(2.663)	(2.676)	(0.0488)	(0.0482)	(0.0405)
Republican	5.058*	3.361	3.340	0.0240	-0.00261	0.0282
	(2.840)	(2.923)	(2.936)	(0.0536)	(0.0529)	(0.0444)
Independent	6.156**	5.265*	6.362**	0.0332	0.0175	0.0562
	(2.677)	(2.755)	(2.768)	(0.0505)	(0.0498)	(0.0419)
Adversary	9.026**	5.883	4.546	0.124*	0.0252	-0.00242
	(3.585)	(3.690)	(3.706)	(0.0676)	(0.0667)	(0.0561)
China not replace U.S.	0.0874	-0.343	-2.022	0.145***	0.0934*	-0.0266
	(2.648)	(2.725)	(2.737)	(0.0499)	(0.0493)	(0.0414)
High nationalism	1.005	4.102	6.053**	-0.0758	-0.0162	0.0920**
	(2.512)	(2.585)	(2.597)	(0.0474)	(0.0468)	(0.0393)
Follow news	4.486*	4.947*	2.492	0.0526	0.140***	0.0536
	(2.484)	(2.556)	(2.568)	(0.0468)	(0.0462)	(0.0389)
U.S. military spending	-0.00893	-0.0277	-0.130**	0.00197**	0.000978	-0.000516
	(0.0503)	(0.0518)	(0.0520)	(0.000948)	(0.000937)	(0.000787)
Constant	1.781	-0.135	1.421	0.388***	0.267**	0.147
	(5.960)	(6.134)	(6.162)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.0932)
Observations	541	541	541	541	541	541

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions control the full array of respondent characteristics defined in Table C7. For clarity, only those variables showing large and significant heterogeneity are reported in the table. The omitted categories are Age 18-34, White, Democrat, and considering China as neither an adversary nor a serious problem. All outcome variables are defined in Table C8. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.