

# Statistical Arbitrage Mining for Display Advertising

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
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
11 Aug 2015, KDD

# Survey

- If you have two potential deals, which one will you choose?
  - Deal A: You will surely earn 2 million dollars.
  - Deal B: By 50% chance you will earn **5** million dollars, by 50% chance you will earn nothing.




# Display Advertising Intermediaries




This work: Intermediary arbitrage algorithms in RTB display advertising.

# Intermediary's Statistical Arbitrage via RTB



- Statistical arbitrage opportunity occurs, e.g., when  
 (CPM) cost per conversion < (CPA) payoff per conversion  
 $1000 \text{ impressions} * 5 \text{ cent} < 8000 \text{ cent for 1 conversion}$

# Bidding Strategy: Commoditising each ad display opportunity



# Statistical Arbitrage Mining

- Expected utility (net profit) and cost on multiple campaigns

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathbb{E}[R(\mathbf{v}, b(\theta, r))] &= T \sum_{i=1}^M v_i \int_{\theta} \left( \overset{\text{Est. payoff}}{\theta} r_i - \underset{\substack{\text{winning function} \\ \text{bidding function}}}{b(\theta, r_i)} \right) \overset{\text{CVR estimation}}{p_{\theta}^i(\theta)} d\theta \\
 \mathbb{E}[C(\mathbf{v}, b(\theta, r))] &= T \sum_{i=1}^M v_i \int_{\theta} \underset{\substack{\text{Prob. of selecting} \\ \text{Campaign } i}}{b(\theta, r_i)} \overset{\text{Cost upper bound}}{w(b(\theta, r_i))} p_{\theta}^i(\theta) d\theta
 \end{aligned}$$

# Statistical Arbitrage Mining

- Optimising net profit by tuning bidding function and campaign volume allocation

$$\begin{aligned}
 & b_{\text{SAM}}(), \mathbf{v}^* = \underset{b(), \mathbf{v}}{\operatorname{argmax}} \quad \mathbb{E}[R] \quad \leftarrow \text{Total arbitrage net profit} \\
 & \text{s.t.} \quad \mathbb{E}[C] \leq B \quad \leftarrow \text{Total cost constraint} \\
 & \quad \quad \quad \text{Var}[R] \leq h \quad \leftarrow \text{Risk control} \\
 & \quad \quad \quad \mathbf{0} \leq \mathbf{v} \leq \mathbf{1} \\
 & \quad \quad \quad \mathbf{v}^T \mathbf{1} = 1
 \end{aligned}$$

Diagram illustrating the optimization problem structure:

- M-Step** (blue arrows) points to the objective function  $\mathbb{E}[R]$  and the constraint  $\mathbb{E}[C] \leq B$ .
- E-Step** (red arrows) points to the constraints  $\text{Var}[R] \leq h$ ,  $\mathbf{0} \leq \mathbf{v} \leq \mathbf{1}$ , and  $\mathbf{v}^T \mathbf{1} = 1$ .

- Solve it in an EM fashion

# M-Step: Bidding function optimisation

- Fix  $v$  and tune  $b()$

$$\max_{b()} T \sum_{i=1}^M v_i \int_{\theta} \left( \theta r_i - b(\theta, r_i) \right) w(b(\theta, r_i)) p_{\theta}^i(\theta) d\theta$$

$$\text{s.t. } T \sum_{i=1}^M v_i \int_{\theta} b(\theta, r_i) w(b(\theta, r_i)) p_{\theta}^i(\theta) d\theta \leq B.$$

$$\frac{\mathcal{L}(b(), \mathbf{v})}{b()} = 0 \Rightarrow \left( \frac{\theta r_i}{1 + \lambda} - b(\theta, r_i) \right) \frac{\partial w(b(\theta, r_i))}{\partial b(\theta, r_i)} = w(b(\theta, r_i))$$



$$w(b(\theta, r)) = \frac{b(\theta, r)}{l} \Rightarrow b_{\text{sam1}}(\theta, r) = \frac{r\theta}{2(1 + \lambda)}$$

$$w(b(\theta, r)) = \frac{b(\theta, r)}{b(\theta, r) + l} \Rightarrow b_{\text{sam2}}(\theta, r) = \sqrt{\frac{rl\theta}{1 + \lambda} + l^2} - l$$



# E-Step: Campaign volume allocation

- Multi-campaign portfolio optimisation

Portfolio margin

mean

Portfolio margin

variance

$$\max_{\mathbf{v}} \quad \boxed{\mathbf{v}^T \boldsymbol{\mu}(b)} - \alpha \boxed{\mathbf{v}^T \boldsymbol{\Sigma}(b) \mathbf{v}},$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \mathbf{v}^T \mathbf{1} = 1, \quad \mathbf{0} \leq \mathbf{v} \leq \mathbf{1}$$

where

$$\boldsymbol{\mu}(b) = (\mu_1(b), \mu_2(b), \dots, \mu_M(b))^T$$


$$\boldsymbol{\Sigma}(b) = \{\sigma_{i,j}(b)\}_{i=1\dots M, j=1\dots M}$$

Net profit margin  
on each campaign

$$\mu_i(b) = \mathbb{E}[\gamma_i] = \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{R_i(\mathbf{v}_{i=1}, b)}{C_i(\mathbf{v}_{i=1}, b)}\right], \quad \sigma_i^2(b) = \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{R_i(\mathbf{v}_{i=1}, b)^2}{C_i(\mathbf{v}_{i=1}, b)^2}\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{R_i(\mathbf{v}_{i=1}, b)}{C_i(\mathbf{v}_{i=1}, b)}\right]^2$$


# Campaign Portfolio Optimisation Results

strategies		easy payoff		hard payoff	
bid. algo.	cam. select.	profit (CNY)	margin	profit (CNY)	margin
lin	greedy	501.12	6.63	68.59	0.91
lin	portfolio	925.45	13.11	181.54	2.50
lin	uniform	747.00	9.53	127.14	1.62
ortb	greedy	517.02	6.65	70.96	0.91
ortb	portfolio	802.15	10.32	146.13	1.88
ortb	uniform	765.12	9.89	133.16	1.72
sam1	greedy	966.02	20.81	230.38	11.13
sam1	portfolio	<b>1,037.98</b>	15.84	240.63	7.96
sam1	uniform	768.38	9.78	172.43	7.57
sam2	greedy	961.68	28.73	235.31	24.00
sam2	portfolio	983.01	17.21	<b>248.65</b>	13.61
sam2	uniform	774.09	10.32	168.15	5.16
truth	greedy	787.10	14.69	227.86	29.05
truth	portfolio	787.10	14.69	242.07	18.34
truth	uniform	326.57	4.14	101.12	5.36




$$\begin{aligned} \max_v \quad & \mathbf{v}^T \boldsymbol{\mu}(b) - \alpha \mathbf{v}^T \boldsymbol{\Sigma}(b) \mathbf{v}, \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \mathbf{v}^T \mathbf{1} = 1, \quad \mathbf{0} \leq \mathbf{v} \leq \mathbf{1} \end{aligned}$$

# Dynamic Portfolio Optimisation




# Online A/B Test on BigTree™ DSP



- 23 hours, 13-14 Feb. 2015, with \$60 budget each


# Summary



- Statistical arbitrage mining algorithm
  - E-step: campaign portfolio optimisation
  - M-step: bidding function optimisation
- Dynamic arbitrage is more effective in practice

# Thank You!

## Questions?



OpenBidder Project: [www.openbidder.com](http://www.openbidder.com)