

第三届 eBPF开发者大会

www.ebpftravel.com

主机安全领域 eBPF的探索与实践


巫强 – 字节跳动终端安全


中国-西安 2025/04/19



ByteHIDS Elkeid CWPP/主机入侵检测

字节跳动终端安全团队开发的主机入侵检测系统,驱动组件的目标是跟踪和审计所有高危操作,如进程创建、文件创建、网络连接和权限提升等





ByteHIDS: https://github.com/bytedance/elkeid



为什么用 eBPF


- 高可用场景,低侵入性
- 用户需求以及对LKM的忧虑
- Linux发行版及众多内核版本的适配

为什么 不得不用 eBPF

- 模块签名校验: Secure Boot、可信计算环境、云主机证书链管理
- 用户自定义内核: 缺失头文件, 模块支持 (CONFIG_MODULES)
- 权限限制:禁止root权限(CAP_SYS_MODULE), SECCOMP

为什么 不用 eBPF

- 内核版本: 支持与否/支持程度, 如tail call可用性 4.2->5.10
- 特殊场景及性能要求: lockdown模式 (v5.4), 架构/硬件相关



图片来源: https://sysdig.com/blog/sysdig-and-falco-now-powered-by-ebpf/

eBPF ≠ 高枕无忧




eBPF常用监控机制:

- Kprobe (v4.1)
- Kretprobe X
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 - sys_enter_xxx
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- Raw-tracepoint (v4.17)
 - sys_enter
 - sys_exit
- Fprobe (x86: v5.5 arm64: 6.0)
 - > fentry
 - > fexit
- BPF LSM (v5.7: Kernel Runtime Security Instrumentation)

主要考量因素:


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




为什么 不用 kretprobe

性能问题 - 可扩展性 (v6.7通过objpool解决):





死锁风险 (5.12移除hash lock后才解决):

```
* This kprobe pre handler is registered with every kretprobe. When probe
2853
        * hits it will set up the return probe.
2055
       static int pre handler kretprobe(struct kprobe *p, struct pt regs *regs)
2856
2857
               struct kretprobe *rp = container of(p, struct kretprobe, kp);
               unsigned long hash, flags = 0;
2058
2059
               struct kretprobe_instance =ri;
2060
               /* TODO: consider to only swap the RA after the last pre handler fired */
2862
                hash = hash ptr(current, KPROBE HASH BITS):
2863
                * Nested is a worksround that will soon not be needed.
2864
2865
                * There's other protections that make sure the same lock
2866
                * is not taken on the same CPU that lockdep is unaware of.
2867
2068
               raw_spin_lock_irqsave_nested(&rp->lock, flags, 1);
               11 (!htist_empty(orp->free_instances)) (
2869
2078
                       ri = hlist_entry(rp->free_instances.first,
                                        struct kretprobe_instance, hlist);
2871
2072
                       hlist del(&ri->hlist);
2873
                       raw_spin_unlock_irgrestore(&rp->lock, flags);
2074
2075
                       ri->rp = rp;
2876
                       ri->task = current;
2077
                        if (rp->entry handler && rp->entry handler(ri, regs))
2878
                                raw spin lock irgsave nested(brp->lock, flags, 1);
2879
20.00
                                hlist add head(&ri->hlist, &rp->free instances);
2081
                                raw_spin_unlock_irgrestore(&rp->lock, flags);
                                return 0;
 2883
 2884
                       arch_prepare_kretprobe(ri, regs);
2865
                       /* XXX(hch): why is there no hlist move head? */
                       INIT_HLIST_NODE(&ri->hlist);
                       kretprobe table lock(hash, &flags);
                       hlist_add_head(&ri->hlist, &kretprobe_inst_table[hash]);
2090
                       kretprobe table unlock(hash, &flags);
2892
                } else {
2093
                       raw_spin_unlock_irgrestore(&rp->lock, flags);
2894
2895
2096
               return 0:
2097
       NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(pre_handler_kretprobe);
```




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Tracepoint: 32位程序的syscall?

```
/ kernel / trace / trace_syscalls.c
       static void perf syscall enter(void *ignore, struct pt regs *regs, long id)
588
589
                struct syscall metadata *sys data;
590
                struct syscall trace enter *rec;
591
                struct pt_regs *fake_regs;
592
                struct hlist head *head;
593
                unsigned long args[6];
594
                bool valid prog array;
595
                int syscall_nr;
596
                int rctx:
597
                int size;
598
599
                syscall_nr = trace_get_syscall_nr(current, regs);
600
                if (syscall nr < 0 || syscall nr >= NR syscalls)
601
                         return:
602
                if (!test bit(syscall nr, enabled perf enter syscalls))
603
                         return;
              rec->nr = syscall nr:
524
              syscall_get_arguments(current, regs, args);
625
626
              memcpy(Grec->args, args, sizeof(unsigned long) * sys data->nb args);
527
              if ((valid_prog_array &&
528
                   !perf_call_bpf_enter(sys_data->enter_event, fake_regs, sys_data, rec)) ||
629
                  hlist empty(head))
630
                     perf_swevent_put_recursion_context(rctx);
                     return;
633
634
              perf_trace_buf_submit(rec, size, rctx,
                                   sys_data->enter_event->event.type, 1, regs,
635
                                   head, NULL):
```

```
/ kernel / trace / trace syscalls.c
     #ifdef ARCH TRACE IGNORE COMPAT SYSCALLS
51
52
      * Some architectures that allow for 32bit applications
53
      * to run on a 64bit kernel, do not map the syscalls for
54
      * the 32bit tasks the same as they do for 64bit tasks.
55
56
            *cough*x86*cough*
57
58
      * In such a case, instead of reporting the wrong syscalls,
59
      * simply ignore them.
60
61
      * For an arch to ignore the compat syscalls it needs to
      * define ARCH_TRACE_IGNORE_COMPAT_SYSCALLS as well as
62
      * define the function arch trace is compat syscall() to let
      * the tracing system know that it should ignore it.
64
65
66
     static int
67
     trace get_syscall_nr(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
68
69
             if (unlikely(arch_trace_is_compat_syscall(regs)))
70
                     return -1;
71
72
             return syscall get nr(task, regs);
73
```

root@P22:/BUILD/linux-6.6-op# grep -rn IGNORE_COMPAT_SYSCALLS *
arch/x86/include/asm/ftrace.h:144:#define ARCH_TRACE_IGNORE_COM
arch/riscv/include/asm/ftrace.h:37:#define ARCH_TRACE_IGNORE_COM
arch/arm64/include/asm/ftrace.h:175:#define ARCH_TRACE_IGNORE_COM
arch/s390/include/asm/ftrace.h:122:#define ARCH_TRACE_IGNORE_COM
arch/s390/include/asm/ftrac




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问题: 架构无关的悖论

底层设计:

ISA: eBPF 字节码、 Just-In-Time编译器、虚拟机 (BPF VM)

细节依赖:

Tracepoint是对Raw Tracepoint的封装,前者禁止了对pt_regs的访问,牺牲灵便性的代价来换取跨架构的兼容性

实际需求:

- 1. 64位系统下32位进程的判断(ARM64/X86_64/X64_32)
- 2. Rootkit检测需要对IDT表/CRx寄存器的审计(X86: SMEP/SMAP ARM64: PAN/PXN)

```
struct pt_regs -
                                                      union {
      * C ABI says these regs are ca
                                                              struct user_pt_regs use
      * unless syscall needs a compl
                                       181
63
                                       182
                                                                      u64 regs [31];
              unsigned long r15;
             unsigned long r14;
                                       183
                                                                      u64 sp;
             unsigned long r13;
                                                                      u64 pc;
                                       184
             unsigned long r12;
                                       185
                                                                      u64 pstate;
              unsigned long bp;
                                       186
              unsigned long bx;
     /* These regs are callee-clobbe
                                       187
              unsigned long r11;
                                       188
                                                      u64 orig_x0;
             unsigned long r10;
                                       189
                                                     AARCH64EB
             unsigned long r9;
                                                      u32 unused2:
                                       190
              unsigned long r8;
             unsigned long ax;
                                                      s32 syscallno;
                                       191
76
              unsigned long cx:
                                       192
            un ged long dx;
      X86 un lighted long ux;
                                                      s32 syscallno; ARM64
                                       193
                                                      u32 unused2;
79
             unsigned long di:
                                       194
80
                                       195
                                              #endif
81
      * On syscall entry, this is sy
                                       196
                                                      u64 sdei_ttbr1;
      * On hw interrupt, it's IRO nu
                                                      /* Only valid when ARM64_HAS_G.
                                       197
              unsigned long orig_ax;
                                       198
                                                      u64 pmr save:
      /* Return frame for iretg */
                                       199
                                                      u64 stackframe[2];
              unsigned long ip;
                                       200
              unsigned long cs;
                                       201
                                                      /* Only valid for some EL1 exce
             unsigned long flags;
89
             unsigned long sp;
                                       202
                                                      u64 lockdep_hardirgs;
90
              unsigned long ss;
                                       203
                                                      u64 exit rcu;
91
      /* top of stack page */
                                       204
```

```
asmlinkage void noinstr el0t 32 sync handler(struct pt regs +regs)
823
824
             unsigned long esr = read_sysreg(esr_el1);
825
             switch (ESR ELx EC(esr)) (
             case ESR ELX EC SVC32:
                     el@_svc_compat(regs)
                     break;
830
             case ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW
                                         ARM64: 32b or 64b ELF
B31
                     el0 da(regs, esr);
832
                     break:
833
             case ESR ELX EC IABT LOW
834
                    el0_ia(regs, esr);
835
                    break;
             case ESR_ELX_EC_FP_ASIMD
```



问题: 性能与评估 (以raw-tracepoint为例)

LKM模块中rawtp框架对syscall的整体影响:

Syscall性能评估	3.10.0	6.9.3
原生系统 (Native)	1905008.6	2516184.7
Rawtp sys_exit (NUL)	1056719.0 55.5%	2354557.7 93.6%
启用 HIDS (elkeid.ko)	1011095.1 53.1%	2330793.3 92.6%

eBPF中rawtp对syscall的整体影响:

Syscall性能评估	5.4.0-48	5.15.152	6.9.3
原生系统 (Native)	5246526.3	4515345.0	4212502.0
Rawtp sys_exit (NUL)	4690607.8	4256811.0	3850585.3
	89.4%	94.3%	91.4%
Rawtp sys_exit (NUL) + BPF_CORE_READ	3425319.7	3935889.2	3669082.2
	65.3%	87.2%	87.1%

序号	名称	id	监控点	注意事项	
1	prctl	157	kprobe:security_task_prctl	改变comm名称: PRCTL_SET_NAME	
2	execve	59	raw-tracepoint:sched_process_exec	ARM64系统缺失sys_exit的execve事件(于5.20修复) ,x86系统无此问题 sched_process_exec:只有成功的情况下才会有回调	
3	connect	42		aa於現實。	
4	bind	49	raw-tracepoint:sys_exit	32位程序syscall入口 (socketcall), ipv4及ipv6地址处理	
5	accept	43	raw-tracepoint.sys_exit		
6	dns	601		recvdat/recvmsg	
7	create	602	kprobe:security_inode_create rename及hardlink可以使用raw		
8	rename	82	kprobe:security_inode_rename	tracepoint实现,但新文件创建没有相对应的syscall	
9	hardlink	86	kprobe:security_inode_link		
10	call_usermodeh	607	kprobe: call_usermodehelper_exec		
11	init_module finit_module	603	kprobe:do_init_module	可选raw tracepoint: finit_module及init_module的差异	
12	mount	165			
13	memfd_create	356			
14	ptrace	101	I raw-tracepoint:sys_exit Elkeid 驱动监控点列表		
15	setsid	112		5	
16	chmod	90			
17	update cred	604	kprobe: commit_creds	改变当前进程的cred权限信息	
18	提权检测	611	嵌入至其它监控点处理中	非set_euid/uid//等syscall但导致了uid、euid、gid等 权限信息结果上的更改	
19	落盘扫描	613	kprobe:filp_close	文件新建旦有数据写入	



问题: 两种ringbuf类型的选择

BPF ringbuf:

5.8及之后的内核才支持,此外bpf_ringbuf_reserve的输入size只能为常量,不支持动态长度

Perf ringbuf:

通用性强,但需要先将数据准备好且需要整体做一次内存拷贝

```
SEC("raw_tracepoint/sys_enter")
      int bpf progl(void *ctx)
59
60
              int max_len, max_buildid_len, total_size;
              struct stack trace t *data;
              long usize, ksize;
63
              void *raw_data;
              _{u32} \text{ key} = 0;
65
              data = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&stackdata_map, &key);
              if (!data)
                      return 0;
69
70
              max_len = MAX_STACK_RAWTP * sizeof(__u64);
71
              max_buildid_len = MAX_STACK_RAWTP * sizeof(struct bpf_stack_build_id);
72
              data->pid = bpf get current pid tgid();
              data->kern_stack_size = bpf_get_stack(ctx, data->kern_stack,
73
74
                                                     max len, 0);
75
              data->user_stack_size = bpf_get_stack(ctx, data->user_stack, max_len,
                                                   BPF F USER STACK);
              data->user_stack_buildid_size = bpf_get_stack(
78
                      ctx, data->user stack buildid, max buildid len,
79
                      BPF_F_USER_STACK | BPF_F_USER_BUILD_ID);
80
              bpf_perf_event_output(ctx, &perfmap, 0, data, sizeof(*data));
```



问题: map动态调整及内存占用

不可动态调整:

只允许在map创建前调整map大小,针对不同规模的系统需要在eBPF加载前进行max entries的调整

内存占用 (过大?):

在开启CGROUP KMEM (CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM=y) 的情况下eBPF程序的内存占用会被统计至加载器所在的CGROUP

性能问题 (过小?):

Hash table类型的map底层用到了pcpu_freelist (基于spinlock分锁), 在数组设置过小的情况下会导致性能问题

```
int bpf mem alloc init(struct bpf mem alloc *ma, int size, bool percou
        struct bpf nes_caches +cc, __percpu +pcc;
       struct bof men cache *c, _percpu *pc;
       struct obj_cgroup *objcg = MULL;
       int cpu, i, unit_size, percpu_size = 0;
       1f (percpu && size == 8)
               return -EINVAL:
       /* room for llist_node and per-cpu pointer */
               percpu_size = LLIST_NODE_SZ + sizeof(void =);
        ma-»percpu = percpu;
       if (size) (
                pc = __alloc_percpu_gfp(sizeof(*pc), 8, GFP_KERNEL);
                       size += LLIST_NODE_SZ; /# room for llist_node #/
                unit size = size;
Wilder CONFIG MERCG KNEW
               if (mencg_bpf_enabled())
                        objcg = get_obj_cgroup_from_current();
#endif
                ma->objcg = objcg;
                for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
                       c = per_cpu_ptr(pc, cpu)
                        c-unit size - unit size;
                        c-objcg = objcg;
                        c--percpu_size = percpu_size;
                        c->tqt = c:
                        init_refill_work(c);
                        prefill mem cache(c, cpu);
                na -- cache -- pc;
                return 0;
```



问题: 部署与内核适配

支持BTF的内核版本的适配:

尽可能复用同一个eBPF二进制程序,比如只为 5.4.x、5.10.x内核编译两个不同的eBPF目标文件,不同的发行版及架构间不通用

不支持BTF的内核版本适配:

利用bpftool/btfge具定制生成裁剪版本的BTF文件,同时保持eBPF 程序的可复用性



图片来源: https://inspektor-gadget.io/blog/2022/03/btfgen-one-step-closer-to-truly-portable-ebpf-programs/



THANKS



附录: tracepoint: sys enter xxx

调用栈:

```
owndbq> bt
#0 0xffffffffc001c050 in ?? ()
#1 0xffffffff81256c7b in bpf_dispatcher_nop_func (bpf_func=0xfffffff6001c050, insnsi=0xffffc90000e3d048, ctx=0xffffc90000833e10) at ./include/linux/bpf.h:1181
#2 __bpf_prog_run (dfunc=<optimized out>, ctx=0xffffc90000833e10, prog=0xffffc90000e3d000) at ./include/linux/filter.h:609
#3 bpf_prog_run (ctx=0xffffc90000833e10, prog=0xffffc90000e3d000) at ./include/linux/filter.h:616
   bpf_prog_run_array (run_prog=optimized out>, ctx=0xffffc90000833e10, array=optimized out>) at ./include/linux/bpf.h:1926
   trace_call_bpf (call=call@entry=0xfffffff831e8160 <event_enter.openat>, ctx=ctx@entry=0xffffc90000833e10) at kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:140
                                             (call=0xfffffff831e8160 ⊲event_enter.openat>, regs=regs@entry=0xffffc90000833f58, rec=rec@entry=0xffffe8ffffd7a9b8, sys_data=0xfffffff831e81e0 <__syscal
#6 0xfffffffff8123a9aa in
l_meta__openat>)    at kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c:571
#7  0xffffffff8123ab29 in perf_syscall_enter (ignore=<optimized out>, regs=0xffffc90000833f58, id=<optimized out>) at kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c:614
#8 0xffffffff81187ecf in trace_sys_enter (id=257, regs=0xffffc90000833f58) at ./include/trace/events/syscalls.h:18
#9 syscall_trace_enter (regs=0xffffc90000833f58, work=⊲optimized out>, syscall=257) at kernel/entry/common.c:81
#10 0xffffffff81f325bc in __syscall_enter_from_user_work (syscall=∞ptimized out>, regs=0xffffc90000833f58) at kernel/entry/common.c:94
#11 syscall_enter_from_user_mode (regs=regs@entry=0xffffc90000833f58, syscall=optimized out>) at kernel/entry/common.c:112
#12 0xffffffff81f2af05 in do_syscall_64 (regs=0xffffc90000833f58, nr=<optimized out>) at arch/x86/entry/common.c:76
#13 0xffffffff820000e6 in entry_SYSCALL_64 () at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120
#14 0x00007ff14ab5a6b8 in ?? ()
#15 0x00007ff14ab59020 in ?? ()
#16 0x000000000000000001 in fixed_percpu_data ()
#17_0xfffffffffffffff in ?? ()
#18 0x00007ff14ab5a1f8 in ??
#19 0x000055b379e2d582 in ??
#20 0x00000000000000287 in ??
#21 0x00000000000000000 in ?? (̈)
```

参数:

struct syscall_tp_t *args; 前8字节 (struct trace_entry) 实际存放的是pt_regs,但ebpf程序不可访问



tracepoint: sys_exit_xxx

调用栈:

```
[pwndbg> bt
#0 0xffffffffc001c054 in ?? ()
#1 0xffffffff81256c7b in bpf_dispatcher_nop_func (bpf_func=0xfffffffc001c054, insnsi=0xffffc90000911048, ctx=0xfffffc90000cfbe88) at ./include/linux/bpf.h:1181
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#3 bpf_prog_run (ctx=0xffffc90000cfbe88, prog=0xffffc90000911000) at ./include/linux/filter.h:616
#4 bpf_prog_run_array (run_prog=optimized out>, ctx=0xffffc90000cfbe88, array=optimized out>) at ./include/linux/bpf.h:1926
#5 trace_call_bpf (call=optimized out>, ctx=ctx@entry=0xffffc90000cfbe88) at kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:140
#6 0xffffffff8123a8ae in perf_call_bpf_exit (rec=0xffffe8ffffdba9b0, regs=0xffffc90000cfbf58, call=optimized out>) at kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c:672
#7 perf_syscall_exit (ignore=optimized out>, regs=0xffffc90000cfbf58, ret=optimized out>) at kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c:712
#8 0xffffffff81187a03 in __traceiter_sys_exit (__data=0xffffc90000cfbe88, regs=0xffffc90000cfbf58, ret=9) at ./include/trace/events/syscalls.h:44
#9 0xffffffff8118823d in trace_sys_exit (ret=<optimized out>, regs=0xffffc90000cfbf58) at ./include/trace/events/syscalls.h:44
#10 syscall_exit_work (reqs=reqs@entry=0xffffc90000cfbf58, work=18) at kernel/entry/common.c:247
#11 0xfffffff81f32673 in syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare (regs=regs@entry=0xffffc90000cfbf58) at kernel/entry/common.c:278
#12 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work (regs=regs@entry=0xfffffc90000cfbf58) at kernel/entry/common.c:283
#13 syscall_exit_to_user_mode (regs=regs@entry=0xffffc90000cfbf58) at kernel/entry/common.c:296
#14 0xfffffff81f2af36 in do_syscall_64 (regs=0xffffc90000cfbf58, nr=optimized out>) at arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
#15 0xffffffff820000e6 in entry_SYSCALL_64 () at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120
#16 0x00000000000000000 in ?? ()
```

参数:

struct syscall_tp_t *args; 前8字节实际存放的是pt_regs, 但ebpf程序不可访问



kprobe hook

调用栈:

```
pwndbq> bt
#0 0xffffffffc0020a20 in ?? ()
#1 0xffffffff81256c7b in bpf_dispatcher_nop_func (bpf_func=0xffffffc0020a20, insnsi=0xffffc90000bf3048, ctx=0xffffc90007be7c48) at ./include/linux/bpf.h:1181
#2 __bpf_prog_run (dfunc=coptimized out>, ctx=0xffffc90007be7c48, prog=0xffffc90000bf3000) at ./include/linux/filter.h:609
#3 bpf_prog_run (ctx=0xffffc90007be7c48, prog=0xffffc90000bf3000) at ./include/linux/filter.h:616
#4 bpf_prog_run_array (run_prog=optimized out>, ctx=0xffffc90007be7c48, array=optimized out>) at ./include/linux/bpf.h:1926
#5 ftrace_call_bpf (call=call@entry=0xffff8881071ca250, ctx=ctx@entry=0xffffc90007be7c48) at kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:140
#6 @xffffffff8125a6ff in kprobe_perf_func (tk=tk@entry=0xffff8881071cbf00, regs=regs@entry=0xffffc90007be7c48) at kernel/trace/trace/trace_kprobe.c:1478
#7 - 0xffffffff8125a991 in kprobe_dispatcher (kp=0xffff8881071cbf18, reqs=0xffffc90007be7c48) at kernel/trace/trace/trace_kprobe.c:1616
#8 0xffffffff810900aa in kprobe_ftrace_handler (ip=18446744071579872624, parent_ip=optimized out>, ops=optimized out>, freqs=optimized out>) at arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/ftrace.c:42
#10 0xffff88817d010000 in ?? ()
#11 0xfffff88810308c200 in ?? ()
#12-0xfffff888103328029 in ?? ()
#13 0xffff688817d010000 in ?? ()
#14 0xffffc90007be7d70 in ?? ()
#15 0xffff888108a17800 in ?? ()
#16 0xfefefefefefefeff in ?? ()
#17 0xfffff88817d010b53 in ?? ()
#18 0x00000000000000000000003 in fixed_percpu_data ()
#19 0x000000000000000005 in fixed_percpu_data ()
#20 0xffff8881020410a0 in ?? ()
#21 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
```

参数:

struct pt_regs *regs;



raw-tracepoint: sys_enter/sys_exit

调用栈:

```
pwndbq> bt
#0 0xffffffffc00138ac in ?? ()
#1 0xffffffff81254bd1 in bpf_dispatcher_nop_func (bpf_func=0xfffffff600138ac, insnsi=0xffffc900019b1048, ctx=0xffffc90000d33e90) at ./include/linux/bpf.h:1181
#2 __bpf_prog_run (dfunc=<potimized out>, ctx=0xffffc90000d33e90, prog=0xffffc900019b1000) at ./include/linux/filter.h:609
#3 bpf_prog_run (ctx=0xffffc90000d33e90, prog=0xffffc900019b1000) at ./include/linux/filter.h:616
#4 __bpf_trace_run (args=0xffffc90000d33e90, prog=0xffffc900019b1000) at kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2306
#5 bpf_trace_run2 (prog=0xffffc900019b1000, arg0=cptimized out>, arg1=cptimized out>) at kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2345
#6 0xffffffff81187d29 in __bpf_trace_sys_exit () at ./include/trace/events/syscalls.h:44
#7 0xffffffff81187a03 in __traceiter_sys_exit (__data=0xffffc90000d33e90, regs=0xffffc90000d33f58, ret=-110) at ./include/trace/events/syscalls.h:44
#8 0xffffffff8118823d in trace_sys_exit (ret=<optimized out>, regs=0xffffc90000d33f58) at ./include/trace/events/syscalls.h:44
#9 syscall_exit_work (reqs=reqs@entry=0xffffc90000d33f58, work=18) at kernel/entry/common.c:247
#10 0xffffffff81f32673 in syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare (regs=regs@entry=0xffffc90000d33f58) at kernel/entry/common.c:278
#11 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work (regs=regs@entry=0xffffc90000d33f58) at kernel/entry/common.c:283
#12 syscall_exit_to_user_mode (regs=regs@entry=0xffffc90000d33f58) at kernel/entry/common.c:296
#13 0xffffffff81f2af36 in do_syscall_64 (reqs=0xffffc90000d33f58, nr=⊲optimized out>) at arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
#14 0xffffffff820000e6 in entry_SYSCALL_64 () at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120
#15 0x00007ff4307ed000 in ?? ()
#16 0x00007fffdccd0da0 in ?? ()
#17 0x000000000000000016 in fixed_percpu_data ()
#18 0xffffffffffffff78 in ?? ()
#19 0x00007ff430fecd50 in ?? ()
#20 0x000000c00005c400 in ??
#21 0x00000000000000202 in ??
#22 0x00007ff430fecd40 in ?? (`
#23 0x00000000000000000 in ?? (`
```

参数:

```
struct bpf_raw_tracepoint_args *ctx;
其中ctx->args[0]为pt regs指针, sys exit的情况下ctx->args[1]为syscall返回值
```