

Hgame Week2 WP

Crypto

notRC4

萌新瑟瑟发抖.....先 rename 一下毒瘤变量名

```
class notRC4_class:
    def __init__(self):
        self.sBox = [0] * 256
        self.number_i = 0
        self.number_j = 0
        self.key_list_r32 = [0] * 256
        for i in range(256):
            self.sBox[i] = i

    def init_notRC4(self, key_list):
        l = len(key_list) # 8
        for i in range(256):
            self.key_list_r32[i] = key_list[i % l] # 32 个 arg_list
        for i in range(256): # 依据 key 打乱 S 盒
            self.number_j = (self.number_j + self.sBox[i] + self.key_list_r32[i]) % 256
            self.sBox[i], self.sBox[self.number_j] = self.sBox[self.number_j], \
                self.sBox[i]

        self.number_i = self.number_j = 0

    def notRC4encode(self, length):
        Output = []
        for _ in range(length):
            self.number_i = (self.number_i + 1) % 256
            self.number_j = (self.number_j + self.sBox[self.number_i]) % 256
            self.sBox[self.number_i], self.sBox[self.number_j] = self.sBox[
                self.number_j], \
                    self.sBox[
                        self.number_i]
            t = (self.sBox[self.number_i] + self.sBox[self.number_j]) % 256
            Output.append(self.sBox[t])
        print(self.sBox)
        return Output
```


问题的核心是恢复 S 盒和 Out，爆破最终指标 i 和 j 即可

```
def recover_out(sBox, number_i, number_j, length):
    Output = []
    for _ in range(length):
        t = (sBox[number_i] + sBox[number_j]) % 256
        Output.append(sBox[t])
        sBox[number_i], sBox[number_j] = sBox[
            number_j], \
            sBox[
                number_i]
        number_j = (number_j - sBox[number_i]) % 256
        number_i = (number_i - 1) % 256
    Output.reverse()
    return Output

for i in range(256):
    for j in range(256):
        InsBox = sBox.copy()
        ooo = recover_out(InsBox, i, j, len(eee))
        t = xor(eee, ooo)
        if b'hgame' in t:
            print(t)
```

Remainder

利用中国剩余定理求解三个线性同余方程联立成的方程组，考虑其通解形式，问题归结于模 pqr 最小非负完全剩余系上的离散对数问题。直接开高次模根计算上是不可行的，这是 RSA 加密算法的安全保障。依据欧拉定理，求幂指数模 $EularPhi(pqr)$ 的乘法逆元即可。



```
rsa.nb - Wolfram Mathematica 11.3
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399 010 492 125 383 322 922;

In[ ]:= y = ChineseRemainder[{mp, mq, mr}, {p, q, r}];

In[ ]:= m = p * q * r;
phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1) * (r - 1);

In[ ]:= e = 65537;
e1 = PowerMod[e, -1, phi];

In[ ]:= PowerMod[y, e1, m]

Out[ ]:= 3 529 625 944 445 188 930 295 247 898 806 897 330 825 694 728 438 702 437 748
```

Inv

这题一开始看见 sBox 以为是对称加密, 后来发现好像不是, 实在是不知道和什么密码有关系, 当成代数题来做了.....注意到 S 在运算 Mul 操作下总是 $S_e = (0, 1, 2, 3 \dots 255)$ 经过某个置换得到的, 我们猜测 S 和定义在 S 上的运算 Mul 构成有限群 S-Mul, 这里给出一个不严格的说明:

存在唯一单位元 $S_e = (0, 1, 2, 3 \dots 255)$ 有

$$\forall s \text{ Mul}(s, S_e) = \text{Mul}(S_e, s) = s$$

容易知道 Mul 运算满足结合律

$$\text{Mul}(\text{Mul}(a, b), c) = \text{Mul}(a, \text{Mul}(b, c))$$

可以用爆破的办法求逆元, 且逆元必定唯一

```
def cul_inv(e):  
    e_1 = []  
    for i in range(256):  
        for j in range(256):  
            if e[j] == i:  
                e_1.append(j)  
    return e_1
```

题中所给数据相当于给出了两个 sBox 的高次幂 s^{739} s^{595} 利用这两个值和他们的逆元进行变换即可得到初始的 s, 进而计算 flag

```
e_739_1 = cul_inv(e_739)  
e_595_1 = cul_inv(e_595)  
e_144 = Mul(e_739, e_595_1)  
e_144_1 = cul_inv(e_144)  
e_19 = Mul(e_595, e_144_1)  
for _ in range(3):  
    e_19 = Mul(e_19, e_144_1)  
  
e_19_1 = cul_inv(e_19)  
e_11 = Mul(e_144, e_19_1)  
for _ in range(6):  
    e_11 = Mul(e_11, e_19_1)  
  
e_11_1 = cul_inv(e_11)  
sBox0 = Mul(e_144, e_11_1)  
for _ in range(12):  
    sBox0 = Mul(sBox0, e_11_1)  
  
print(sBox0)
```

```
flagList = []

for i in range(len(list(e_flag))):
    for t in range(256):
        if list(sBox0)[t] == list(e_flag)[i]:
            flagList.append(t)
print(flagList)
print(bytes(flagList))
```