

# Market Structure and Market Power

# Introduction

- Industries have very different structures
  - numbers and size distributions of firms
    - ready-to-eat breakfast cereals: high concentration
    - newspapers: low concentration
- How best to measure market structure
  - summary measure
  - concentration curve is possible
  - preference is for a *single number*
  - concentration ratio or Herfindahl-Hirschman index

How best to measure  
market structure

# Measure of concentration

- Compare two different measures of concentration:

Firm Rank Market	Market Share (%)	Squared Share
1	25	625
2	25	625
3	25	625
4	5	25
5	5	25
6	5	25
7	5	25
8	5	25
Concentration Index	$CR_4 = 80$	$H = 2,000$



## Concentration index is affected by, e.g. merger

Firm Rank	Market Share (%)	Squared Market Share
1	25	625
2	25	625
3	25	625
4	5	25
5	5	25
6	5	25
7	5	25
8	5	25
Concentration Index		CR <sub>4</sub> = 80
		85
		H = 2,000
		2,050

Assume that firms 4 and 5 decide to merge

Market shares change

The Concentration Index changes

concentration  
by 10/100 = 10%  
to 10/90 = 11.11%  
H = 2,000  
H = 2,050

# What is a market?

- **No clear consensus**
  - the market for automobiles
    - *should we include light trucks; pick-ups SUVs?*
  - the market for soft drinks
    - *what are the competitors for Coca Cola and Pepsi?*
  - With whom do McDonalds and Burger King compete?
- **Presumably define a market by *closeness* in substitutability of the commodities involved**
  - how close is close?
  - how homogeneous do commodities have to be?
    - *Does wood compete with plastic? Rayon with wool?*



# Market definition 2

- **Definition is important**
  - without consistency concept of a market is meaningless
  - need indication of competitiveness of a market: affected by definition
  - public policy: decisions on mergers can turn on market definition
    - *Staples/Office Depot* merger rejected on market definition
    - *Coca Cola* expansion turned on market definition
- **Standard approach has some consistency**
  - based upon industrial data
  - substitutability in production not consumption (ease of data collection)

# Market definition 3

- **Government statistical sources**
  - FedStats
  - Naics
- **The measure of concentration varies across countries**
- **Use of production-based statistics has limitations:**
  - can put in different industries products that are in the same market
- **The international dimension is important**
  - Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger
  - relevant market for automobiles, oil, hairdressing

# Market definition 4

- **Geography is important**
  - barrier to entry if the product is expensive to transport
  - *but* customers can move
    - what is the relevant market for a beach resort or ski-slope?
- **Vertical relations between firms are important**
  - most firms make *intermediate* rather than *final* goods
  - firm has to make a series of make-or-buy choices
  - upstream and downstream production
  - measures of concentration may assign firms at different stages to the same industry
    - do vertical relations affect underlying structure?



# Market definition 5

- Firms at different stages may also be assigned to *different industries*
  - bottlers of soft drinks: low concentration
  - suppliers of soft drinks: high concentration
  - the bottling sector is probably not competitive.
- In sum: market definition poses real problems
  - existing methods represent a reasonable compromise

# The Role of Policy

- Government can directly affect market structure
  - by limiting entry
    - taxi medallions in Boston and New York
    - airline regulation
  - through the patent system
  - by protecting *competition* e.g. through the Robinson-Patman Act

# Measuring Market Power/Performance

- **Market structure is often a guide to market performance**
- **But this is not a perfect measure**
  - can have near competitive prices even with “few” firms
- **Measure market performance using the *Lerner Index***

$$LI = \frac{P - MC}{P} \quad \text{💬}$$

## Market Performance 2

- **Perfect competition:  $LI = 0$  since  $P = MC$**  *no mark up over MC*
- **Monopoly:  $LI = 1/\eta$  – inverse of elasticity of demand**
- **With more than one but not “many” firms, the Lerner Index is more complicated: need to average.**
  - suppose the goods are homogeneous so all firms sell at the same price

$$LI = \frac{P - \sum s_i MC_i}{P}$$

# Lerner Index: Limitations

- **LI has limitations**
  - **measurement: as with “measuring” a market**
  - **meaning: measures outcome but not necessarily performance**
  - **misspecification:**
    - **if there are sunk entry costs that need to be covered by positive price-cost margin**
    - **low price by a high-cost incumbent to protect its market**

## Empirical Application: How Bad is Market Power Really?

- Harberger (1954) exercise: Welfare Loss (WL) is:

$$WL = \frac{1}{2} (P - MC)(Q^C - Q)$$

- Welfare Loss in relation to sales:

$$\frac{WL}{PQ} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{(P - MC)}{P} \frac{(Q^C - Q)}{Q}$$

- This can be expressed as:

$$\frac{WL}{PQ} = \frac{1}{2} \epsilon_D (LI)^2$$

## How Bad is Market Power Really? 2

- Because most industries are not perfect monopolies, Harberger (1954) calculates

$$\frac{WL}{PQ} = \frac{1}{2} \epsilon_D (L)^2$$

- For 73 manufacturing industries assuming  $\epsilon_D=1$ . Multiplying the result by each industry's output and summing over all industries he estimates a total welfare loss from monopoly power of about two-tenths of one percent of gdp

## How Bad is Market Power Really? 3


- One problem is cost, possibly due to how advertising is treated

$$\frac{WL}{PQ} = \frac{1}{2} \epsilon_D \left[ \frac{(P - MC)}{P} \right]^2$$

- Under imperfect competition, MC may not be minimized, so  $P - MC$  may be artificially low.
- Corrections by Cowling and Mueller (1978) and Aiginger and Pfaffermayr (1997) raise total cost substantially to between 4 and 11 percent of gdp



# Fast-Food Outlets



● McDonald's    ▲ Burger King    ■ Wendy's

