

# Will Gemini Make Us Stupid?

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**Generative AI applications—especially those based around large language models like Gemini and ChatGPT—are now ubiquitous, and their adoption rate is increasing. They are potentially the most powerful piece of technology ever developed, matching or surpassing human performance in a number of complex tasks. As AI becomes embedded in our email clients, word processors, and smartphones; it becomes critically important to understand its effects on how we think. I aim to explore how AI influences our cognitive processing, specifically by encouraging System 1 thinking, which is fast, associative, automatic, and fluent, vs. System 2 thinking, which is slower, resource-intensive, and deliberative. I propose a series of experiments in which participants are randomly assigned to engage with AI or traditional web search in a research task, and evaluate the resulting changes in cognition from these interactions. I plan to (1) establish whether AI interactions prompts System 1 thinking or if these interactions free up resources, allowing for increased System 2 processing; (2) identify the key mediators that drive this effect; and (3) develop manipulations—targeting user interaction and interface design—that encourage more vs. less more System 2 thinking when engaging with AI. This research will contribute an understanding of the ways in which AI interactions shape our thinking, which will be useful to enable better alignment between LLMs and users.**

Fifteen years ago, The Atlantic published an essay that went viral. It was titled “Is Google making us stupid?” and it argued that the convenience of internet search was reducing people’s capacity for deep, critical thinking. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems clear that search engines did not spell the end of complex human thought, but just made information more easily accessible.

Today, not only is information at our fingertips, but we can generate a complete answer to any query in seconds. Soon, not only will AI answer our questions but will be able to act out our desires in the real world. The rise of generative artificial intelligence raises the question: “Is *ChatGPT* making us stupid?”

The idea that our environments, tools, and technologies shape the way we think is not a new one<sup>1</sup>. In Phaedrus, Plato recounts the debate between the god Theuth, inventor of writing and Thamus, king of Egypt. Theuth presents his creation, claiming it would enhance the Egyptians’ memory and wisdom. However, King Thamus disagrees, arguing that it will diminish memory and foster forgetfulness among learners. Academics today, agree that the advent of writing displaced aspects of the oral tradition<sup>2</sup>, but by slowing us down and allowing the iterative manipulation of symbols permitted more complex thinking to emerge.

The cognitive impacts of more recent technological innovations have been documented by psychological researchers. With long

term use, our tools can shape our brains, as shown by past research examining brain differences in cab drivers who use GPS vs. those that do not<sup>3</sup>. Our tools also shape our cognitive processes. In one experiment, participants using laptops to take notes used shallower cognitive processing strategies compared to those who took handwritten notes<sup>4</sup>. Similarly, the use of search engines has been shown to influence memory processes, for example, even when directed to remember facts, we are more likely to forget them if we know they will be accessible in a computer; and may better remember where to access information rather than the information itself<sup>5</sup>.

How will generative AI shape our minds? What will be the balance when the advantages and disadvantages are weighed against each other? In this proposal, I argue for the urgent need for research to address these issues, hypothesize on how these technologies may influence our capacity for deliberate thinking, and propose research to begin to shed some light on the cognitive consequences of using generative AI.

Generative AI tools are already being used at work, and have been shown to increase worker productivity<sup>6–8</sup>. These studies have sampled different kinds of work tasks, such as writing<sup>6</sup>, customer support<sup>7</sup>, and consulting-related tasks like idea generation and product innovation<sup>8</sup>. In studies where tasks were simpler (e.g., customer support calls<sup>7</sup>) using LLMs improves performance—especially for users at the bottom of the performance distribution. In more complex tasks, however LLM use led to higher error rates<sup>8</sup>. Similarly, an analysis of 150 million lines of code, shows that since the inception of AI coding assistants, written code is more likely to be repeated, violating principles of code maintainability<sup>9</sup>. This work illuminates the impacts of AI on productivity, but remains mostly silent on the psychological mechanisms behind these changes in performance.

I argue that the effects of generative AI on workers productivity and accuracy are—at least in part—caused by the influence these tools have on our thinking. There is some evidence that AI can produce changes in our cognitive processes. For example, AI messages can change people’s minds about political issues<sup>10</sup>; and can be used to help people engage in a more civil discourse, by suggesting revisions to chat messages<sup>11</sup>, changing cognitive processes in conversational dynamics. And yet, beyond some indirect documenting cognitive changes produced by engaging with AI, we know little about its effects on our thinking styles.

Dual-process theories of reasoning<sup>12–14</sup> provide a useful framework for analyzing the effects of LLMs on human cognition. These models posit that the mind has two ways of processing information. System 1, characterized by associative pattern matching, is fast, effortless, and intuitive, underpinning our unconscious, automatic processes. Conversely, System 2 is deliberative, embodying our conscious, slow, and effortful cognitive activities that are more critical and reflective in nature. While debate regarding the details on how these systems interact<sup>15–18</sup>, it is undeniable that there are meaningful and important individual differences on the depth of thinking that we might or might not engage in when encountering a problem. Dual-process theories of reasoning<sup>12–14</sup> provide a useful framework for analyzing the effects of LLMs on human cognition. These models posit that the mind has two ways of processing infor-




Fig. 1. Specific aims

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mation. System 1, characterized by associative pattern matching, is fast, effortless, and intuitive, underpinning our unconscious, automatic processes. Conversely, System 2 is deliberative, embodying our conscious, slow, and effortful cognitive activities that are more critical and reflective in nature. While the details on how these systems interact is debated<sup>15–18</sup>, it is undeniable that there are meaningful and important individual differences on the depth of thinking that we might or might not engage in when encountering a problem.

Current models<sup>19</sup> explain how System 2 thinking is triggered. They suggest that System 1 is always active, both producing intuitions, and monitoring the amount of uncertainty at any given point in time. System 2 will become activated if uncertainty exceeds a certain threshold. It will then engage in deliberative processing that will feed back to the activation of different intuitions and the uncertainty. A response will be effected, with or without System 2 involvement, depending on the level of uncertainty.

How does AI influence the extent of System 1 vs. System 2 thinking? I argue there are at least two ways in which LLMs might affect our thinking. On one hand, LLMs produce fluent, high certain, and affirming responses. This fluency may lead to lower feelings of uncertainty (i.e., higher *feelings of rightness*<sup>20,21</sup>), which may make it less likely that System 2 becomes activated. Research suggests that the more some content is more easily processed, we are more likely to engage in shallower processing and to unquestioningly accept that content as true—a phenomenon known as fluency bias<sup>22,23</sup>.

On the other hand, LLM interactions may have the opposite effect, by reducing cognitive load, and thereby freeing up cognitive resources that users can then allocate to more critical and reflective System 2 processing. There is evidence that people are able to more effectively engage in System 2 thinking when cognitive load is reduced<sup>24</sup>. Likewise, individuals with higher cognitive ability, are also more effective in using System 2<sup>25</sup>.

I make the prediction that LLMs will prompt less System 2 processing. The apparent contradiction in the role of cognitive load is resolved by the fact that reducing cognitive load is only helpful when what is being eliminated is not directly related with the task at hand (i.e., extraneous cognitive load<sup>26</sup>). When cognitive load is related to the main task (rather than a distractor task), higher amounts of cognitive load (i.e., deeper processing) often leads to increased performance<sup>22</sup>, even if we misperceive this effort as poor learning<sup>27</sup>.

While more deliberation may seem like desired outcome, there are many times when System 1 yields correct answers more efficiently than System 2. Take for instance chess masters, who are able to intuit the right move, even though they have no better general working memory and search for plays no more extensively than novices<sup>28</sup>. Despite this, there are plenty of times when our intuitions lead us astray, and more thinking would produce better results. For instance, if a decision is important, there is time available for deliberation, and we would not be better off outsourcing the task to another person, then more deliberation is likely going to produce better results.

I intend to perform research to clarify how LLMs change our thinking, relative to other kinds of interactions, such as traditional web search. Through experiments, natural language analysis, and interventions aimed at user behavior and interface design, I will investigate whether and why interacting with Large Language Models in a judgement task results in reduced deliberative thinking. This research will begin to uncover the cognitive consequences of our evolving AI landscape, and hopefully inform efforts at alignment of AI technologies with users most valued goals.




Fig. 2. Experimental task

## 1. Specific Aims

As shown in Figure 1, This proposal has three main objectives.

**Aim 1: How do LLMs change thinking? (Main effect).** I will conduct a series of experiments to evaluate the degree to which engaging with LLMs (as opposed to traditional web search) for a research task results in increased automatic thinking.

**Aim 2: What about LLMs explain this change? (Mediators).** Once the main effect is established, a second set of experiments will tease out the characteristics of LLM interaction which drive the effect observed in Aim 1.

**Aim 3: What manipulations can promote deliberation? (Manipulations).** Finally, I will test whether manipulating the identified mediators with manipulations targeting both user behavior and interface design can result in more deliberative thinking.

## 2. Research Strategy

**Aim 1: Main effect.** To establish whether interacting with LLMs prompts automatic (System 1) or deliberative (System 2) thinking, I will conduct an experiment where participants will be assigned to complete a task using either traditional web search (e.g., Google), or a LLM.

Our basic task procedure is shown in Figure 2. Participants will be asked to write a paragraph on a topic for which they might have strong priors (e.g., how much money should the U.S. allocate for foreign aid) but could benefit from learning additional information. They will then be randomized to learn more about the topic, either by using Google, or by interacting with a LLM. I will fully record their interactions with Google and the LLM. After up to 15 minutes, participants will be asked to re-write their views in the topic.

I plan to assess the extent of System 1 thinking by analyzing participants' perceived effort and confidence in their response, as well as the time spent researching and writing (which might be an indicator of the time spent thinking<sup>29</sup>), and the amount of work produced they produced (i.e., the total length of their response, after removing any amount of overlap with LLM or searched text<sup>29</sup>). I will also use natural language processing and human raters to evaluate the text for quality, complexity, and change from the original response to the revised one in order to assess the extent to which the participant revised their thoughts on the topic. I intend to use stimulus sampling<sup>29</sup> to make sure that results are not unique to a particular judgment task. See Table 1 for a potential list of tasks, spanning judgment, decision, and forecasts.

As shown in Figure 3, preliminary pilot data seems to support the hypothesis that interacting with LLMs prompts participants for automatic thinking, consistent with fluency bias<sup>22,23</sup>. In a pilot study of 178 people, I found that participants engaging in LLM

Task Type	Example Tasks
Judgment	How much money do you think the US should allocate for aid?
Forecast	How likely is it that the Russia-Ukraine conflict ends within the next year?
Decision	If you were buying a car, would you buy a Toyota Corolla or a Ford Focus?

Table 1. Some ideas for judgment tasks




Fig. 3. Differences in user perceptions and engagement time of Google Search vs. Chatbot users in a judgment task. Correlations between closure and liking and effort metrics.

interactions as opposed to traditional web search, spent 10 fewer seconds writing their revised response ( $d = 0.14$ ), and reported exerting about the same effort ( $d = 0.02$ ), despite having had done research for about four times as long ( $d = 0.71^{***}$ ). Participants liked using the chatbot for research more than they did Google Search ( $d = 0.13$ ), and they liked chatGPT more when they felt it produced more closure ( $r = .43^{***}$ ). In ChatGPT users, closure, in turn, predicted less self-reported effort ( $r = -.25^*$ ), less revision time ( $r = -.23^*$ ), and smaller changes to their answers ( $r = -.30^{**}$ ).

**Aim 2: Mediators.** The goal of Aim 2 is to pinpoint the specific characteristics of LLM interactions that mediate the cognitive shift towards the hypothesized increase in System 1 thinking, as observed in Aim 1. I hypothesize that processing AI responses will be less cognitively demanding than integrating information obtained through google search. This will trigger feelings of fluency and cognitive closure<sup>20</sup>, which will then explain the observed changes in cognitive style.

I will extend the methodology outlined in Aim 1, to measure these mediators by analyzing the content users engaged with in two ways.

- User Perceptions.** Users will report how they perceived their interaction with the AI and the search websites.
- Natural Language Processing.** I will use natural language processing to identify the stylistic features of AI responses that explain reduced deliberation.

The findings from this aim will provide crucial insights into how AI can be designed and used in a manner that promotes more deliberate cognitive processing. This understanding will be instrumental in developing manipulations (as outlined in Aim 3) to promote System 2 thinking when engaging with AI.

**Aim 3: Manipulations.** In the third phase of my research, I plan to develop dual-faceted manipulations aimed at increasing deliberative engagement with AI by targeting the mediators identified during

Aim 2. These interventions will target interface design, as well as user interaction.

- Interface design.** I plan to modifying the LLM interfaces to foster more reflective and analytical engagement. By manipulating prompts and features of the user interface, I plan to reduce feelings of fluency and confidence.
- User interaction.** I plan to provide users with strategies to encourage more System 2 thinking while interacting with AI. These interventions will put users in a more deliberative mindset that will counteract automatic thinking.

A  $2 \times 2$  factorial design will allow me to compare the effectiveness of strategies aimed at users as well as the interface design. I hypothesize that interventions aimed at the interface will be more effective, and will be perceived as less intrusive by users. This line of work will be useful for designers building AI applications for situations where more deliberation is effective.

### 3. Conclusion

This proposal will enable us to better understand how the rapidly changing landscape of artificial intelligence shapes human thought. From a **theoretical perspective**, it will help advance the cognitive science of technology, and might elucidate some mechanisms that—with or without AI—might prompt more automatic vs. more deliberative thinking. Additionally, it will hint at the cognitive mechanisms behind the mixed effects of AI-augmentation in workplace performance<sup>6–8</sup>. In more **practical terms**, it will inform the design of AI systems that better aligns to our goals and values.

If this proposal is successful, it would open new avenues for research.

**Short-term spillover effects.** First, future research should address whether cognitive changes persist on an unrelated task after the LLM interaction is over.

**Long-term effects on cognitive style.** Second, future research should address whether continued interaction with LLMs produces more enduring changes in cognitive style and learning motivation.

**Generalizability.** Third, this proposal focuses on a small number of tasks and compares chatbots to a single other information-seeking behavior. Future research should compare AI to other ways in which people get information, such as social media, or face-to-face human interaction. Likewise, future research should explore whether effects generalize over a wider range of tasks. Finally, while I focus on chatbots as the interface, future research should explore other alternatives such as autocomplete, email, and word processors.

**Developmental impacts.** I focus on the effects on adults who are transitioning to an AI world. Future research should address the effects of LLM interaction in development, in particular as it relates to the development of cognitive skills that might be replaced by large language models.

Artificial intelligence will no doubt have a significant impact on human thinking. The goal of my research is to begin to understand this unexplored phenomenon. Specifically, this research will illuminate the nuances of how engagement with AI can steer our thinking towards more automatic or deliberative processes. As AI continues to permeate various facets of human life, understanding its cognitive implications is paramount. My hope is that findings from this work will help align the evolution of artificial intelligence with the enhancement of the cognitive abilities that make us human, rather than inadvertently reducing them.

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