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Author(s): Benjamin E. Lauderdale and Alexander Herzog

Source: *Political Analysis*, Summer 2016, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer 2016), pp. 374-394

Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.com/stable/26349743>

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Measuring Political Positions from Legislative Speech

Benjamin E. Lauderdale

*Department of Methodology, London School of Economics, Houghton Street,
London WC2A 2AE, UK
e-mail: b.e.lauderdale@lse.ac.uk (corresponding author)*

Alexander Herzog

*School of Computing, Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634, USA
e-mail: aherzog@clemson.edu*

Edited by Jonathan Katz

Existing approaches to measuring political disagreement from text data perform poorly except when applied to narrowly selected texts discussing the same issues and written in the same style. We demonstrate the first viable approach for estimating legislator-specific scores from the entire speech corpus of a legislature, while also producing extensive information about the evolution of speech polarization and politically loaded language. In the Irish Dáil, we show that the dominant dimension of speech variation is government–opposition, with ministers more extreme on this dimension than backbenchers, and a second dimension distinguishing between the establishment and anti-establishment opposition parties. In the U.S. Senate, we estimate a dimension that has moderate within-party correlations with scales based on roll-call votes and campaign donation patterns; however, we observe greater overlap across parties in speech positions than roll-call positions and partisan polarization in speeches varies more clearly in response to major political events.

1 Introduction

Measuring the policy positions that parties and politicians take is a key requirement for building and testing theories of intra-party politics, polarization, representation, and policy making. Traditionally, political scientists have used roll-call votes to estimate the positions of individual legislators (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2005). Yet, in most political systems, legislative votes are either not recorded or individual members seldom deviate from party-line voting because of strong party discipline (Hug 2010). Thus, if one seeks to estimate the diversity of positions taken by legislators both within and across parties, roll-call analysis is of limited use (VanDoren 1990; Carrubba et al. 2006; Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug 2008; Proksch and Slapin 2010; Proksch and Slapin 2015).

In this article, we propose a new strategy for estimating spatial measures of *expressed disagreement* from legislative speech. We argue that just as the natural unit for legislative voting data is the roll call, the natural unit for legislative speech is the debate on a given bill. We capture this intuition with a hierarchical factor model for word usage in legislative debates, which we refer to as *Wordshoal* and estimate in two stages.¹ The first stage uses the existing text-scaling model “Wordfish” (Slapin and Proksch 2008) to scale word use variation in each debate separately. In the second stage, we use Bayesian factor analysis to construct a common scale from the debate-specific positions estimated in the first stage.

Authors' note: Replication materials are available online as Lauderdale and Herzog (2016). We thank Ken Benoit, Royce Carroll, Justin Grimmer, Paul Kellstedt, Lanny Martin, Scott Moser, Adam Ramey, Randy Stevenson, Georg Vanberg, two anonymous reviewers, and the editor of this journal for their comments and feedback. Supplementary materials for this article are available on the *Political Analysis* Web site.

¹A “shoal” is a group of fish, not traveling in the same direction.

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Our method presents the first viable approach to scaling the entire speech corpus of a legislature, producing valid legislator-specific scores on one (or more) underlying general dimension(s) that can be used to study legislative behavior, intra-party politics, and polarization. One of its key innovations is that it allows the meaning and discriminatory power of a given word to vary from debate to debate. For example, the word “debt” may be important to discriminate speakers in a debate on extending health care, while the same word may have little discriminatory power in a debate on the budget deficit, where it will be used heavily by most speakers. The strategy of within-debate scaling addresses a fundamental problem in the analysis of legislative speech, namely that variation in word usage between speeches is both a function of the topic of a debate and the position a legislator takes. Further, our method provides meaningful uncertainty estimates of legislators’ aggregated positions, taking into account how often legislators spoke and how consistent they were in expressing their positions across debates.

Like any unsupervised scaling method, the substantive meaning of the legislator-specific scores needs to be determined *ex post* and will depend on the institutional context. We present two applications to demonstrate our approach and how it contributes to our understanding of legislative politics. In the first application, we use speeches from the Irish Dáil as an example of a multiparty parliamentary system. We show that estimated speech scores in this context strongly reflect government–opposition dynamics, but also reveal significant intra-party variation in support versus opposition toward the government between cabinet members and government backbenchers. As such, our method provides a novel way for testing theories of intra-party conflict (Giannetti and Benoit 2009), coalition governance (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008; Martin and Vanberg 2011), and the way government parties communicate their actions to their supporters and constituents (Martin and Vanberg 2008). When we move to a 2D aggregation model, we find a second dimension dividing the opposition between establishment and anti-establishment parties.

In our second application, we compare the estimates from our model to existing scaling methods for U.S. Senators based on roll-call votes (Poole and Rosenthal 1985; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004) and campaign donations (Bonica 2014). While estimates from all three methods are positively and similarly correlated within as well as across parties, we find a much larger increase in speech polarization compared to (already high) roll-call polarization. This increase in the extent to which Senators speak in increasingly different ways by party sheds some light on perceptions that polarization has become particularly pronounced in recent years, even though roll-call polarization has been high for much longer.

2 Measuring Preference Variation from Text Data

The fundamental difficulty in trying to estimate political positions from variation in the words used in political texts is that there are several more predictive sources of variation in word use. In roughly descending order of importance, these are: (1) language, (2) style, (3) topic, and only then (4) position, preference, or sentiment. Sources of variation higher on the list tend to overwhelm those lower on the list. If you have a text in German and a text in English, the variation in the frequency of different words is driven almost entirely by language. Once language is held constant, style (or dialect) is very important: the words used in legal documents, in political speeches, and in tweets vary enormously. Similarly, variation in word use due to topic is substantial (this is why topic models work) and is comparable to differences due to dialect and style. The relative ordering of these is not important for present purposes, as the variation of interest here is that due to differences in the arguments being offered or the sentiments expressed toward a proposal, which we will refer to as *expressed preferences* or *stated positions*. This variation tends to be subtle in terms of relative word use, and therefore difficult to detect unless the more powerful sources of variation are held constant.²

²Analogously, scaling models applied to roll-call voting data only recover plausible measure of legislator preferences when those preferences are the dominant influence on voting behavior. This is not always the case. In the UK House of Commons, almost all voting behaviors are explained by whether an MP’s party is in government (Spirling and McLean

Political scientists have followed one of the two approaches when attempting to recover preferences from legislative speeches. One approach has been to confine the analysis to speeches on a single legislative act, such as a motion of confidence (Laver and Benoit 2002), contributions to the government's annual budget debate (Herzog and Benoit 2015), or speeches on a particular bill (Schwarz, Traber, and Benoit forthcoming). While this approach (by assumption) holds topical variation constant, the resulting estimates are confined to the set of legislators who spoke and the topic on which they spoke. The opposite approach has been to combine many speeches over many legislative acts into a single document for each legislator (Giannetti and Laver 2005) or party (Proksch and Slapin 2010). Proksch and Slapin (2010), for example, scale speeches from the European Parliament by aggregating contributions across many topics by national parties. By pooling speeches across many topics, these authors have implicitly hoped that different parties would each discuss a similar mixture of topics, and therefore topical variation would cancel out. While this can work at the party level, topical mixes vary enormously at the level of individual speakers, and in Section 4, we demonstrate the failure of this strategy for the Irish Dáil.

Our method combines these two approaches into a single estimation strategy. Similar to Laver and Benoit (2002), Herzog and Benoit (2015), and Schwarz, Traber, and Benoit (forthcoming), we use the structure of legislative debates to hold constant topic-driven word use variation.³ If fifteen speakers make statements about a single legislative proposal, the relative word counts across these texts are much more likely to vary as a function of preference variation than would be the case if one sampled fifteen speeches from across all debates. Speakers may still not all talk about exactly the same aspects of that bill; some may wander off topic, or use metaphors that introduce nuisance word use variation. But using the debate structure is nonetheless a powerful form of conditioning: probably the most powerful form available in the legislative context.

Having estimated expressed positions for all speakers in a given debate, we must aggregate debate-specific dimensions that involve variable subsets of legislators into a smaller number of dimensions that include all legislators. This needs to be done in a way that is robust to the possibility that some of the debate-specific dimensions of word use variation will have no relationship with one another, either due to contamination from other sources of word use variation or due to idiosyncratic political features of the debates. In many legislatures, only a subset of "debates" are really debates, in the sense that they reveal political disagreement. For example, as Quinn et al. (2010) document, a nontrivial fraction of speech in the U.S. Senate consists of procedural statements or symbolic statements about notable constituents, the military, and sports. To extract the politically relevant variation, we scale the debate-specific scales, treating these debate-specific dimensions as noisy manifestations of one (or more) underlying general dimension(s).

Because this approach does not rely on word use variation in any single debate to estimate positions on a latent dimension of disagreement, it gains additional robustness against other sources of variation in word usage. All we need to discover this latent dimension is for that dimension to have general predictive power for word use variation across the set of observed debates. Crucially, the exact nature of that word use variation can be different in different debates. A word that implies a left position in one debate may imply a right position in another debate, or may imply no particular position at all. And if certain debates have speech variation that seems unrelated to other debates, the model will simply estimate that those debates fail to load strongly on the general dimension.

Like all measurement strategies, ours has no guarantees that the assumptions will hold, and so sanity checks and other forms of validation are still needed. But this is just as true in roll-call analysis, where estimated ideal points may variously reflect legislator preferences, constituency preferences, party inducements, government-opposition incentives, and other factors. Our methodological argument is fundamentally based on an empirical assumption: that political

2007). In the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, voting behavior reflects a mixture of legislator ideology and membership in the governing coalition (Zucco and Lauderdale 2011).

³Laver and Benoit (2002) and Herzog and Benoit (2015) use the supervised scaling method "Wordscores" (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003) to estimate positions, while we use an unsupervised scaling method, but our identification strategy shares the idea of comparing speeches only within the context of a given debate to hold topical variation constant.

disagreement is more clearly and consistently reflected in within-debate variation in word use than it is in across-debate variation in word use. We think this is a better assumption than those explicitly or implicitly used in previous studies, and so it is on this basis that we proceed to specify an estimation procedure.

3 Scaling Texts from Sets of Political Debates

3.1 *Scaling Individual Debates*

Preference scaling of political texts projects highly multidimensional variation in word usage rates onto one (or more) continuous latent dimension(s). We begin by considering the unidimensional Poisson scaling model “Wordfish” (Slapin and Proksch 2008), as applied to a set of texts within a single political debate.

For all the following discussions, we index individuals $i \in 1, 2, \dots, N$, index debates $j \in 1, 2, \dots, M$, and index words $k \in 1, 2, \dots, K$.

$$w_{ijk} \sim \mathcal{P}(\mu_{ijk}) \quad (1)$$

$$\mu_{ijk} = \exp(v_{ij} + \lambda_{jk} + \kappa_{jk}\psi_{ij}) \quad (2)$$

That is, the frequency that legislator i will use word k in debate j depends on a general rate parameter v_{ij} for individual i 's word usage in debate j , word-debate usage parameters λ_{jk} , κ_{jk} and the individual's debate-specific position ψ_{ij} . The v_{ij} parameters capture the baseline rate of word usage in a given speech, which is simply a function of the length of the speech. The λ_{jk} capture variation in the rate at which certain words are used. The κ_{jk} capture how word usage is correlated with the individual's debate-specific position ψ_{ij} . This describes a standard text-scaling model, which could be applied to: (1) all speeches given in a legislative session, (2) the aggregated speeches of each legislator, or (3) the speeches in a specific debate. Lowe (2008) shows that correspondence analysis provides an approximation to a Poisson ideal point model for text data. Lowe (2013) argues that in most applications it does not make much difference which model is used; however, we have found that the Poisson scaling model is more robust when a single legislator gives a speech that is very different than his/her colleagues, which happens not infrequently in the legislatures we examine. Therefore, in the analysis that follows, we use the Poisson scaling model as our debate-level scaling model.⁴

3.2 *Aggregating Debate-Level Scales*

The Poisson scaling model (Wordfish) applied to each debate results in a debate-specific estimate, ψ_{ij} , of each speakers' relative position. In the second stage, we treat these estimates as data and use factor analysis to aggregate them into one (or more) general latent position θ_i for each legislator. Because not all legislators speak in each debate, the legislator-debate matrix containing all ψ_{ij} will have a large number of “missing observations,” which means the simplest factor analysis methods do not apply. We therefore adopt a fully Bayesian treatment of the linear factor model to recover θ_i , treating the ψ_{ij} as data and the missing ψ_{ij} as missing at random.

This assumption about the missing ψ_{ij} implies that the positions that legislators express are unrelated to their decisions to participate in a debate.⁵ Because of this assumption, the measures we recover should be interpreted as summaries of the positions actually taken by legislators, relative to their peers, in the debates they participated in. These may be unrepresentative of their broader positions, if we could observe them in all debates. We discuss what is known about selection into

⁴Our identification and estimation strategies are slightly different than those used by Slapin and Proksch (2008) or by Lowe (2015) in the R package “austin.” We place normal priors with mean 0 on all of the sets of the parameters in the model, with standard deviation 1 for the debate-specific positions ψ_{ij} and 5 for the other model parameters.

⁵Like the assumptions that make up the Wordfish model itself, this is an obviously wrong, but nonetheless useful, assumption.

legislative speech in several institutional contexts, and what that implies about extending our approach to model selection in Section 6.

The above assumptions imply a model for the debate-specific estimates ψ_{ij} that is linear as a function of a single latent dimension θ_i , with a normally distributed error.

$$\psi_{ij} \sim \mathcal{N}(\alpha_j + \beta_j \theta_i, \tau_i) \tag{3}$$

$$\theta_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1) \tag{4}$$

$$\alpha_j, \beta_j \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^2\right) \tag{5}$$

$$\tau_i \sim \mathcal{G}(1, 1) \tag{6}$$

This specification means that the primary dimension of word usage variation in individual debates ψ can be more or less strongly associated with the aggregate latent dimension θ being estimated across all debates, with either positive or negative polarity for any particular debate. Essentially, this allows the model to select out those debate-specific dimensions that reflect a common dimension (large estimated values of β_j), while down-weighting the contribution of debates where the word usage variation across individuals seems to be idiosyncratic ($\beta_j \approx 0$). The priors on θ_i and β_j allow the model to remain agnostic about the relative polarity of individual debate dimensions, while constraining the common latent dimension of interest to a standard normal scale. This 1D aggregation model can be extended to 2D by replacing $\alpha_j + \beta_j \theta_i$ with $\alpha_j + \beta_{1j} \theta_{1i} + \beta_{2j} \theta_{2i}$ in the above equations, adding corresponding priors for the additional parameters, and fixing the orientation of the latent space through appropriate constraints on parties or individual legislators (Rivers 2003).

A large number of quantities of interest can be calculated from the parameters of this model, some of which are summarized in Table 1. Most of these are functions of parameters of the second-level model; however, the debate-level parameter estimates can also be revealing, particularly when used in combination with the second-level parameters. For example, we can leverage the fact that a given word can have different political alignments in different debates to track how word use varies over time or as a function of some other feature of debates (see Section 5.3).

3.3 Implementation

In this article, we present results based on estimating the Wordfish model for each debate, and then using those estimates as data for the second-stage aggregation model. The central benefit of

Table 1 Quantities of interest that can be calculated from the debate-level and aggregate-level model parameters

Quantity	Unit	Statistic	Description
Position on general scale	Speaker	θ_i	Speech position of legislator i on general scale (can be averaged over parties or other legislator characteristics)
Debate-specific position	Speaker	$\psi_{ij} \cdot \beta_j$	Speech position of legislator i on debate j (calibrated to the general scale)
Debate loading	Set of debates	$\sqrt{\frac{\sum_j n_j \beta_j^2}{\sum_j n_j}}$	Strength of association of debate-scales with general scale across debates (root mean square, weighted by number of speeches n_j in each debate j)
Word loading	Word	$\frac{\sum_j n_{kj} \kappa_k \beta_j}{\sum_j n_{kj}}$	Association of word with general scale across debates (mean, weighted by frequency of word appearance n_{kj} in each debate).

breaking the estimation problem into two stages is computation speed, enabling us to quickly estimate the model on the word frequency matrices for each of the hundreds or thousands of debates that occur in a legislative term. For example, we are able to estimate the model on recent sittings of the Irish Dáil, with about 1000 debates, 10,000 speeches, and 40,000 unique words, in a few minutes. The Wordfish first-stage model is estimated using an EM estimation procedure with Newtonian optimization steps based on the derived gradient and hessian of the log-posterior. This is implemented in C++ to speed estimation (Eddelbuettel and François 2011), and is 20–40 times faster than the fastest previous implementation in the R package “austin” (Lowe 2015). The second-stage factor analysis can be similarly estimated using an EM algorithm taking the first-stage estimates as data, however, in this article, we present results based on full Bayesian posteriors for the second-stage model estimated using JAGS (Plummer 2014). Our implementation of the Wordfish model is now available in the text analysis package “quanteda” (Benoit et al. 2016), and the two-stage implementation of the Wordshoal model will be available upon publication.

An alternative estimation strategy would be to estimate a fully hierarchical model in which the Wordfish parameters across debates are modeled as random coefficients. This approach would impose significant computational difficulties with very little estimation efficiency gain. While we further discuss the costs and benefits of combining the two estimation stages into a single model in Section 6, here we simply note that given the model we are fitting, the two-stage estimation approach will yield approximately the same point and uncertainty estimates as the hierarchical approach. The reason for this is that the Wordfish likelihood leads to very precise point estimates for the debate-specific position (document) parameters (see Section 4.3, as well as Lowe and Benoit 2011). This means that, even under the hierarchical approach, the debate-level positions are effective data because their uncertainty is very small compared to the variation in the relative debate-specific positions for a given legislator across debates.

For the same reason, the two-stage approach also does not meaningfully understate estimation uncertainty versus the hierarchical model because nearly all of the uncertainty is in the second-stage, not the debate-level scalings. Confidence in the estimated positions θ_i on the general scale(s) increases with the number of debates, with the extent to which sets of speakers overlap in different debates, and with the extent to which legislators are consistent in the positions they express in their speeches across debates. This is as it should be: these features of the data are the most meaningful ones if one is trying to assess whether a speaker is *generally* to the right or left of another speaker across a set of debates on heterogeneous topics.

3.4 Data

The substantive meaning of the dimension that our method recovers will depend on political context because the structure of legislators’ preferences and their motivations to speak vary by political context. To illustrate this, we examine speech data from two very different institutional contexts: the Irish Dáil as an example of a multiparty parliamentary system with strong voting unity (Hansen 2009), and the U.S. Senate as an example of a two-party system with weaker voting unity. The U.S. Senate example also enables comparisons to spatial measures based on roll-call votes (Poole and Rosenthal 1985; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004) and campaign donations (Bonica 2014).⁶

The Irish data includes two complete legislative sessions, the 29th Dáil (2002–07) and the 30th Dáil (2007–11). Data for the U.S. Senate includes all speeches from the 104th to the 113th Senate, which covers almost 20 years of legislative debates (January 1995 to November 2014). We collected all speeches from existing databases of legislative debates or from official parliamentary records (see the Supplementary Appendix for further details). Before we scaled speeches and debates, we removed contributions from the person officially presiding over the chamber. In Ireland, this is either the Ceann Comhairle (speaker) or Leas-Cheann Comhairle (deputy speaker). In the U.S. Senate, we removed speeches from the Presiding Officer. We further removed procedural debates,

⁶Replication materials are available online as Lauderdale and Herzog (2016).

such as the discussion of the meeting agenda, prayers, tributes, elections of the speaker, points of order, and any other discussions concerning the rules of parliamentary procedure. Finally, we removed punctuation, numbers, and stop words, and reduced words to their stem.

A key step in organizing the data was to identify speeches that belong to the same debate. We defined a debate as a set of speeches with the same title (as reported in the official parliamentary records) and that were held on the same day and included at least five speakers. Of course, legislative debate on a single question can sometimes span multiple days or even weeks. However, even setting aside the relative difficulty of operationalizing this kind of broader definition, we nevertheless think it is preferable to limit the definition of a debate to a single day because the content and context of a debate can change from one day to the next. Within each debate, we combined all contributions of a legislator into a single composite speech, excluding contributions with less than fifty words because they are usually interruptions. For further details on the numbers of debates, speakers, speeches, and unique words, see the Supplementary Appendix.

4 Irish Dáil

In this section, we use legislative debates from the 29th and 30th Irish Dáil (Ireland's lower house) as an example of a multiparty parliamentary system with strong party discipline to demonstrate the usefulness of our approach in estimating individual TDs (*Teachta Dála*, an Irish member of parliament) expressed preferences. We first demonstrate that our approach outperforms an alternative strategy for scaling speeches from a legislative session: applying Wordfish to speeches aggregated across all debates in the entire legislative session into a single text for each of the 165 members. We further demonstrate that the primary dimension we recover with our method represents TDs' relative levels of support and opposition to the government rather than left–right ideological positions, with a second dimension distinguishing between the establishment and anti-establishment opposition parties. This result is hardly surprising, given the weakness of ideology in Irish politics and the fact that in a coalition system like Ireland the fate of the government depends on acting unified. Nevertheless, there is substantial and meaningful *intra-party* variation along the government–opposition dimension. We illustrate this finding with an analysis of preference divergence between cabinet ministers and government backbenchers, and discuss opportunities for future research to use our estimates to study the tensions and conflicts that parties and coalition members face in policy making.

During both legislative sessions included in our analysis, a coalition government led by Fianna Fáil (FF)—the largest party at that time—was in office. During the 29th Dáil, it was joined by the Progressive Democrats (PD), a small center-right/liberal party that formed in 1985 and dissolved in 2009, with its remaining members joining FF. The 30th Dáil added the Green Party to the coalition. The largest opposition party in both parliaments was Fine Gael (FG), the second largest party after FF at that time. Both FF and FG are centrist parties with similar policy positions that have historically been divided over Ireland's relationship with the United Kingdom (Benoit and Laver 2006; Weeks 2010). The other main opposition party was the Labour Party (LAB), a social-democratic party that has frequently formed coalitions with FG. The remaining opposition parties included Sinn Féin (SF), an anti-establishment party with the primary goal to unify Ireland, and the Socialist Party that was represented by a single TD in the 29th Dáil.

4.1 Party Locations on the Primary and Secondary Dimension

What are the primary factors that explain what positions legislators take in their speeches? In the absence of alternative preference estimates for Irish TDs, we first aggregate the legislator-specific estimates by parties and compare mean party positions to two benchmarks: whether the parties are in the governing coalition, and the left–right location of the parties as estimated from expert surveys (Benoit and Laver 2006).

The top row in Figure 1 shows mean party positions estimated from our approach against these two benchmarks. Based on these results, it appears that in the Irish data our approach is primarily recovering government versus opposition conflict, rather than left–right ideology. There are two




Fig. 1 The top row shows the association between party average 1D Wordshoal scores and expert assessed left–right position (left) and coalition status (right). The middle two rows show the corresponding relationships for Wordfish scores. The final two rows show party average 2D Wordshoal scores for the 29th and 30th Dáil.

ways to see this. First, while the largest parties FF and FG are generally viewed to be ideologically moderate in left–right terms, we estimate them at or near the extremes of our dimensions. Note, in particular, the fact that the Labour Party is estimated to be more centrist than FG, which only makes sense if we think of this as government–opposition. Second, when the Green Party joins the coalition in the 30th Dáil, it moves from having a similar average position to FG to having nearly the same position as FF.

In contrast, Wordfish estimates do not seem to consistently reflect the coalition structure of the Dáil, as is evident from the two scatterplots in the middle row in Figure. 1. The Green Party has a similar estimated position to FF, both when they are in coalition and when they are not. The Progressive Democrats are at one extreme of the dimension in the 29th Dáil and the other in the 30th, despite no change in coalition status. Neither do these estimates seem to reflect the ideological

cleavages of the Dáil as assessed by expert surveys. In particular, experts do not place the Labour Party between FG and FF, but Wordfish does in both the 29th and 30th Dáil. In general, the associations between the party locations from Wordfish and from the expert surveys are very weak.

When we extend the Wordshoal debate score aggregation model to 2D, we are able to recover a more nuanced map of the positions of the Irish parties in these two Dáils. In order to orient the 2D space, we adopt a party-level normal prior that the average TDs from FF and FG are at 1 and -1 in the first dimension, respectively, and both at 0 in the second dimension. In the final two panels of Figure. 1, we show estimates of the average 2D party positions in the 29th and 30th Dáil. We see that the second dimension distinguishes between the establishment and anti-establishment opposition parties, with FG at the former end of the second dimension and SF at the latter. The single Socialist TD in the 29th, Joe Higgins, is even further out on this dimension, while the Green Party is the next most anti-establishment after SF. In the 30th, when the Green Party joins a government for the first time in its history, it not only moves toward FF on the government–opposition first dimension, but also on this establishment dimension: it is difficult to maintain anti-establishment rhetoric from within a governing coalition.

4.2 Legislator-Specific Positions

When we look at the 1D estimates for individual TDs, rather than the party means, we can see the association between our estimates and coalition status even more clearly. Figure 2 shows the relationship between the estimated legislator positions and the coalitions under both Wordfish and our




Fig. 2 The association between the estimated positions of each legislator and their status as members of the coalition versus opposition, with correlation and local linear smooth, under Wordfish (left) and our approach (right), for the 30th Dáil. In the bottom row, we show the 95% intervals associated with the estimates for each legislator under Wordfish (left) and Wordshoal (right).

estimates in the 30th Dáil (the very similar plots for the 29th are included in the Supplementary Appendix). In the 30th Dáil, the (Pearson) correlation between being in the coalition government and Wordshoal score is 0.94, versus a correlation of 0.31 with Wordfish.

Figure 2 also shows that Wordfish gives implausibly narrow uncertainty intervals. The uncertainty estimates for TDs from Wordfish reflect the relative fit of different positions in predicting *words* across all texts, given the Poisson functional form and word-level independence assumptions of that model.⁷ This uncertainty measure is substantively uninteresting, because resampling individual words does not capture a meaningful counterfactual sample of legislative speech. Any such counterfactual sample would involve resampling at the levels of speeches and debates, not words. The uncertainty intervals for the Wordshoal model reflect the number of debates each legislator speaks in, the extent of overlap between speakers in different debates, and the extent to which legislators are consistently ordered (by debate-level Wordfish) across the debates they speak in. This is the relevant kind of uncertainty for assessing if we have enough data to say that a particular legislator takes different positions from another legislator across a legislative session.

In sum, Wordshoal recovers point estimates that measure a meaningful quantity and provide uncertainty intervals that reflect realistic uncertainty about that quantity. Applied in the manner of previous studies, Wordfish recovers neither plausible measures of policy preferences nor plausible measures of government–opposition disagreement. Wordshoal very clearly recovers the government–opposition dimension of disagreement in Ireland. Recalling the identification strategy underlying Wordshoal, and thinking about the Irish context, this is not surprising. Our approach aims to recover the dimension that best explains within-debate variation in word use, across all debates. In a parliamentary system with strong party discipline like Ireland’s, it is hardly surprising that the single factor that most consistently shapes speech behavior across every debate is whether a legislator’s party is in government or opposition.

4.3 *Intra-Party Variation in Government Support and Opposition*

Having validated the estimates as reflecting a government–opposition dimension in speech, we can begin to explore how TDs vary in position along this dimension. There is a voluminous body of research on multiparty governments, with recent work looking at the challenges that coalition partners and legislators face in day-to-day policy making (Thies 2001; Strøm, Müller and Bergman 2008; Martin and Vanberg 2008; Giannetti and Benoit 2009; Martin and Vanberg 2011; Carroll and Cox 2012). One challenge for individual TDs is to balance the policy interests of their constituents against party demands (Kam 2009). This is particularly true in the Irish case, where the single transferable vote (STV) electoral system gives TDs an incentive to cultivate a personal vote (Marsh 2007; Gallagher and Komito 2009). The intensity of this incentive will vary with electoral safety, constituency composition, and a member’s position within his or her party, among other things (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005).

Legislative speeches provide one opportunity for legislators to justify and explain their positions to supporters and party colleagues. Our legislator-specific estimates, therefore, provide a novel way to study what factors explain how legislators position themselves in support or opposition to the government. We here look at one potential factor that explains within-party variation in expressed positions: whether or not a legislator is a member of the cabinet. Bound by the doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility (Laver and Shepsle 1996; O’Malley and Martin 2010), cabinet members are required to publicly support decisions made by the cabinet even if they privately disagree. We hence expect ministers to more reliably defend the government position than government backbenchers. We can assess whether this is the case in our data by comparing the average locations of TDs inside and outside the cabinet.

⁷Wordfish, like Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) and other multinomial and Poisson text models, is overconfident in its estimates for similar reasons as to why Poisson regression coefficient estimates are overconfident when data are overdispersed.




Fig. 3 Mean positions of cabinet ministers, junior ministers, government backbench TDs, and opposition speakers for the 29th and 30th Dáil, with corresponding posterior intervals.

Figure 3 shows the average Wordshoal positions for cabinet ministers, junior ministers, government backbench TDs, and opposition members.⁸ Consistent with the expectation of collective responsibility, we find that cabinet members are the most pro-government speakers. In the 29th Dáil, the average cabinet minister position is 1.52, versus the average position of backbench TDs at 0.98. In the 30th Dáil, the difference is slightly smaller, with positions at 1.23 and 0.95, respectively. The posterior probabilities of these differences having these signs are both greater than 0.99. The average position of junior ministers is slightly, but less significantly, more moderate than the average minister position, indicating that junior ministers speak similarly to cabinet ministers, either because of collective responsibility, career concerns, or some other factor.

The measured difference between ministers and backbench speakers is just one example of how our estimates can be used in secondary analysis to study within-party variation in expressed positions. The next step in analyzing these data would be to explore other factors that potentially explain when legislators strategically deviate from the government line or the position of their party, such as long-term promotion prospects, promoting the particularistic interests of constituencies, or other factors that might motivate dissent.

This kind of legislator-specific estimate on a government–opposition dimension can be used to inform research on coalition governance and political communication. A key challenge for coalition parties is the need to compromise on policies while maintaining support from rank-and-file members, activists, and interest groups. As Martin and Vanberg (2008, 503) argue, “participation in coalition has the potential to undermine a party’s carefully established profile and to erode support among constituents with a particular concern for the party’s traditional goals.” Legislative debates allow government members to justify and explain their positions on controversial policy decisions that potentially damage their reputation among core supporters. Martin and Vanberg (2008) offer the first empirical test of this type of political communication by looking at the *length* of legislative debates as a proxy for position-taking of government members. Our estimates, which are based on the content of legislative debates, would enable further assessment of the degree to which coalition members spoke consistently in favor of a bill in the parliament. Such analysis is further enabled by another quantity of interests that can be calculated from our approach and that we illustrate in the next section: the strength of association of each debate with the general scale, which is a measure of the debate-specific degree of polarization on the primary speech dimension.

4.4 Identifying High- and Low-Polarizing Debates

The second stage in the Wordshoal algorithm uses a Bayesian factor analysis to recover the primary dimension of word usage variation from the debate-specific positions estimated in the first stage. This factor analysis estimates β_j , which is the strength of association of each debate with the general

⁸If a member had multiple positions or is transferred from one position to another during the legislative term, we counted the position with the longest duration.

Table 2 The five debates with the highest and lowest loadings on the government versus opposition dimension, as measured by the absolute value of β_j ranging from 0 to 1

	<i>Abs. β_j</i>
<i>High government–opposition polarization</i>	
Social Welfare and Pensions (No. 2) Bill 2009 (Second Stage)	0.942
Early Childhood Care and Education (Motion)	0.887
Private Members’ Business—Vaccination Programme (Motion)	0.824
Capitation Grants (Motion)	0.819
Confidence in Government (Motion)	0.814
<i>Low government–opposition polarization</i>	
Cancer Services Reports (Motion)	0.003
Finance (No. 2) Bill 2007 (Committee and Remaining Stages)	0.002
Finance Bill 2011 (Report and Final Stages)	0.002
Private Members’ Business—Mortgage Arrears (Motion)	0.002
Wildlife (Amendment) Bill 2010 (Committee and Remaining Stages)	0.001

scale. We can use these estimates to answer the question: During which kinds of debates are TDs more polarized along government–opposition lines in what they say?

Table 2 shows the titles of the five most and least polarizing debates from the 30th Dáil, as indicated by the absolute value of β_j . The most polarizing debate is from the second reading of a bill, which is the most important legislative stage after which the principle of a bill is formally accepted or rejected. We also find high polarization between government and opposition members during the 2009 confidence in the government motion, which Prime Minister Brian Cowen put forward to affirm his position as cabinet leader following poor results in local and European elections. Debates with low degrees of polarization are from committee stages and final readings at which point the outcome of a bill has usually been decided.

In the Supplementary Appendix, we explore variation along this government–opposition dimension more systematically. There, we find an increase in government–opposition polarization with the onset of the economic and financial crisis in 2008, followed by a sharp decrease in the observable government–opposition divide in 2010 before the collapse of the FF–Green coalition in the following year. This type of analysis illustrates how our method can be used to examine under what conditions and types of bills coalition partners are internally divided. Previous work in this area has relied on measures such as the length of debates (Martin and Vanberg 2008) or the duration of parliamentary scrutiny (Martin and Vanberg 2004) to assess party behavior on internally divisive issues. Our approach enables a much more direct assessment of the extent to which legislators are divided over an issue.

5 U.S. Senate

In our analysis of the U.S. Senate, we use all debates from January 1995 to the end of October 2014, covering the 104th to the 113th Senate. We fit a model where Senators are assumed to have constant positions. An analysis using the constant position assumption enables a comparison of the degree to which polarization over this period has occurred due to Senator replacement versus the same Senators having more partisan debates.⁹

Figure 4 shows the Wordshoal scores and 95% intervals of the Senators serving in the 105th Senate (1997–98) and the 112th Senate (2011–12).¹⁰ The partisan polarization of Senators due to replacement is visually apparent from the increased degree to which the scores correlate with party. In the 105th, Democratic Senators Ford (KY), Hollings (SC), Breaux (LA), Conrad (ND), Bumpers (AR), Reid (NV), Baucus (MT), Biden (DE), Bryan (NV), and Dorgan (ND) spoke like Republicans. This list

⁹This model cannot, however, identify whether these more partisan debates are occurring because these individuals’ views have become more extreme or because they are more consistently debating on the issues that divide them.

¹⁰Similar plots for all the Senates from the 104th to the 113th are shown in the Supplementary Appendix.




Fig. 4 Wordshoal estimates for the 105th and 112th U.S. Senates. Republican senators names are to the right of the estimates, Democrats and Independents are to the left.

includes nearly all of the Democrats from the South as well as several from states like Montana, Nevada, and North Dakota that typically voted Republican in Presidential elections and Democratic in Congressional elections in the preceding decades. The Republicans interspersed among the Democrats on the left side of the estimated dimension—Snowe (ME), Jeffords (VT), Collins (ME), DeWine (OH), Roth (DE), D’Amato (NY), and Chafee (RI)—mostly come from the Northeast. In contrast, in the 112th, there is much cleaner separation between the parties: all five of the overlapping Senators are long-serving members of the chamber, three of whom have retired since the end of the 112th Senate.

5.1 *Speeches, Roll Calls, and Donations*

How do our measures of U.S. Senators' relative positions compare to other scales of the same legislators based on different kinds of data? For roll-call votes, we fit a standard Bayesian Item Response Theory (IRT) model to all votes over the same period as our speeches.¹¹ For campaign donations, we use career CFscores (Bonica 2014) for each Senator.¹²

In essence, a comparison of these three measures is a comparison of roll-call behavior, speech behavior, and donor behavior, each modeled in terms of a single spatial dimension. If we calculate correlations between within-party variation in these three scores, we find that roll-call scores are correlated with speech scores at $\rho = 0.46$, while donor scores are correlated with roll-call scores at $\rho = 0.57$ and with speech scores at $\rho = 0.55$.¹³

One could make the argument that there is only a single meaningful latent political dimension, and that the three measures differ only because of measurement uncertainty. The relatively high correlations with donor behavior might simply indicate less measurement error in those scores than the other two.¹⁴ If this was the case, it would strongly indicate the value of having all three of these measures: forming a joint scale based on all three that would then improve measurement of this "one true" latent dimension. In fact, though we think this is a relatively implausible account for the differences between these measures, speech, roll call, and donor behavior are distinct political behaviors subject to distinct political forces, which becomes clearer when we examine the ways in which they differ.

5.2 *Positions and Polarization in Speeches versus Roll Calls*

Figure 5 shows the increasing polarization due to replacement by showing Senators' Wordshoal speech positions (top panel) as well as the equivalent analysis for roll-call scores (bottom panel) from 1995 to 2014. A striking difference is that the gap between the average party positions in speeches has doubled, a far larger increase than for roll-call voting. New Republicans and Democrats have voted similarly on average to those same-party Senators whom they have replaced; however, newly elected Senators speak in more partisan ways than those they replace. Whereas Republican and Democratic Senators used to substantially overlap in how they spoke on the floor, this has mostly disappeared over the last two decades due to turnover.

Turnover is not the sole cause of increasing speech polarization. The parameter β_j describes how each debate relates to the general dimension. We can use this measure to capture how *strongly* the average debate tracks the primary dimension we recover. We do this by calculating the speech-weighted root mean square of β_j and comparing its value over time (see quantity "Debate loading" in Table 1). The top panel of Figure 6 shows this quantity within 8-month periods running from January to August in the year after an election, from that September to April of the following year, and from May through December in the year of the next election. In general, polarization of debates, holding fixed the composition of the Senate, held steady during the Clinton administration, rose during the Bush administration, and has held steady at a higher level under Obama. As we saw earlier, increasing polarization due to Senator turnover was occurring during all three periods.

Some 8-month periods deviate from this overall trend in the sense of being outliers from the spline regression fit depicted in the figure. The period from September 2001 to April 2002, which began with the terrorist attacks on September 11 and included the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan,

¹¹Like the debate-score aggregation model, this is a heteroskedastic-by-legislator scaling model (Lauderdale 2010) and treats Senators' ideal points as constant over time in order to isolate the effects of legislator replacement and avoid difficulties with intertemporal identification.

¹²These career averages are for 1979–2012. We drop appointed Senators who never ran a campaign, for whom CFscores are not available, and for whom roll-call and speech scores are very imprecisely estimated.

¹³Under bootstrap resampling of Senators, the differences in these correlations are plausibly attributable to unsystematic variation in legislators' scores. The largest difference (between the 0.46 correlation of roll-call and speech scores and the 0.57 correlation between roll-call and donor scores) has $p = .05$, ignoring the multiple comparisons. In the Supplementary Appendix, we report linear regressions predicting standardized within-party variation in average donor positions using standardized within-party variation in roll-call scores and speech scores.

¹⁴CFscores lack measures of uncertainty, so we cannot check this.




Fig. 5 Average party positions in speeches (top panel) and in roll-call votes (bottom) from the 104th Senate (1995–96) to the 113th Senate (2013–14).

had speech polarization below the trend, reflecting a (brief) period of political unity after the attacks. The period with the highest polarization of debates, by far, is the period from September 2009 to April 2010 that included the Senate debates on health care legislation introduced by President Obama.

The bottom panel of the same figure shows the equivalent trajectory for roll calls, which shows different patterns.¹⁵ The health care debates, which occupied so much Senate time in 2009–10, fail to register because they involved relatively few roll-call votes, even as they occupied a great deal of political attention. The highest point in roll-call polarization instead comes from September 2011 to April 2012, a period generating little major legislation, but occurring immediately after the debt-ceiling crisis of July–August 2011. There is some general upward trend over the period, but there is more substantial variation within Congresses.

5.3 *Evolving Patterns of Partisan Discourse*

Because our scores are based on word usage, we can examine how political language evolves in its usage over time. The first-stage scaling model estimates word-specific parameters, κ_{jk} , that capture

¹⁵The magnitudes of the debate loadings and bill loadings are not directly comparable, as the former are for a linear model and the latter for a binary choice model.




Fig. 6 Average debate loadings (top panel) and average roll-call vote loadings (bottom) from the 104th Senate (1995–96) to the 113th Senate (2013–14), with spline smooth.

the association of a word with a legislator’s debate-specific position. Because we estimate these word-specific parameters for each debate separately, we can track whether particular words tend to signify being on the left or the right, and how that evolves across debates. Previous approaches that combine speeches into a single text assume that the association between words and positions are constant across topics and over time. Figure 7 shows how five word stems—health, constitut(ion), tax, deficit, and preexist—load on the general dimension over time, averaging across debates weighted by the frequency that the word appears (see quantity “Word Loading” in Table 1).

These four words were all especially relevant to the discussion of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2009–10; however, their evolution also reflects their broader usage and the longer term development of the health care issue in U.S. politics. We see that throughout the period from 1995, the word “health” tended to be mentioned more by individuals on the left, across all debates. Interestingly, this fades after the passage of the ACA, perhaps reflecting the accomplishment of this long-standing Democratic policy goal. The stem “preexist” appears very suddenly as a highly left-leaning word in 2009–10, when Obama took office. The need to provide a mechanism for individuals with preexisting conditions to secure health insurance was a central component of the Democratic argument for the ACA, and it was emphasized by Democrats both before and during the debates over the ACA itself. Once the legislation passed, the Democratic loading of the word stem faded, as Republicans began to acknowledge that they also supported enabling individuals with preexisting conditions to have insurance, even as they continued to oppose the ACA.




Fig. 7 Average loading of the word stems health, constitut(ion), tax, deficit, and preexist(ing) across debates, weighted by frequency of appearance.

The Republican objections to the ACA centrally involved arguments that the bill was unconstitutional, that it was actually increasing taxes, and that it would increase the deficit and debt. All of these words reflect broader themes of Republican argumentation across a range of issues, and so they have tended to lean to the right in debates from 1995 onward; however, all became particularly loaded language during the first two years of the Obama administration as the ACA was being debated and passed. Interestingly, in the most recent Congress, the 113th, occurring after Obama’s reelection, the political loading of all of these words has decayed. This reflects the fact that the Senate had essentially no debates about health care at all in that Congress, and indeed very few debates at all. With the House in Republican control, but passing very little legislation, Senate business was consumed primarily by other issues, such as executive and judicial branch confirmations.

6 Limitations and Extensions

6.1 Sparsity and Speaker Selection

Only a few legislators speak in a given debate: on average, about twelve in the two legislatures we examine in this article (see Table A1 in the Supplementary Appendix). As a result, the matrix of debate-specific Wordfish scores is sparse. The degree of sparsity will depend on the legislature, with larger legislatures (e.g., the US House, the UK House of Commons, the EU Parliament) having more severe sparsity than the smaller legislatures that we examined in this article. Sparsity can make it difficult to measure the preferences of legislators who speak rarely, and it increases the importance of assumptions about the process by which legislators choose to speak in a given debate.

Political scientists have only recently started to examine what factors explain speaker selection in legislative debates (Proksch and Slapin 2012, 2015; Herzog and Benoit 2015). Proksch and Slapin (2015) have shown that the degree to which party leaders exercise control over who speaks and what legislators say depends on the electoral system. In systems with strong personal vote incentives, such as Ireland’s STV system, legislators speak more freely because parties recognize the need for personal name recognition. In systems such as closed-list PR, in contrast, party leaders tend to exercise greater control over the party message on the floor in order to protect the party label. Proksch and Slapin’s (2015) findings imply that the legislator-specific measures produced by our method will be more accurate predictors of intra-party cohesion and dissident behavior in countries where the electoral systems provides strong personal vote incentives. In systems with weak personal vote incentives, our legislator scores potentially underestimate true levels of intra-party variation depending on the extent to which party leaders control speaking time across all debates included in

the analysis. Proksch and Slapin (2015) show that party leaders are still more likely to allow dissenting speeches than dissenting votes, meaning that legislative speech holds valuable information that cannot be recovered from voting data alone.

In general, researchers need to be aware of the strategic incentives behind speech-making when applying our method and using the quantities it produces in secondary analysis. Like any content analysis method, our approach can at best recover the “intended message” (Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov 2009) of a speech and not a legislator’s “true” position, which is fundamentally unobservable. Of course, strategic missingness can also be a problem in roll-call data (VanDoren 1990; Carrubba et al. 2006; Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug 2008), but missingness is far rarer in those data than in speeches. Following recent work on jointly modeling missingness and voting in roll calls (Rosas, Shomer, and Haptonstahl 2014), one could use measurable variables that predict the decision to speak to jointly model the presence and position of speeches (Herzog and Benoit 2015). Extending our method in this direction would be a promising avenue for future research, but requires the collection of context-specific, theoretically motivated variables that explain the strategic selection of speakers.

Even without such a selection model, the approach followed in this article still yields valuable summaries of behavior. What we recover is a summary of the speeches that were actually given. For example, the fact that Senator Snowe (R-Maine) is estimated far from her co-partisans, in the middle of the Democrats, does not mean she is “really” a Democrat, nor does it mean that our estimates are wrong. What it does mean is that when Snowe chose to speak in a Senate debate, she used similar language to Democrats who spoke in the same debates. Even if she was choosing those debates highly strategically, this is still an important fact about the speeches she actually delivered.

6.2 Hierarchical Estimation

This article argues that the political association of particular words depends on the debate in which those words were used. Conditioning on debate allows us to control for topic to a far greater extent than is otherwise possible. However, the two-stage procedure followed in this article might take this logic too far. As we show in Section 5.3, some words are used similarly to denote position across many debates, and the presented approach does not take advantage of the estimation efficiencies that using this information could provide. One solution would be to estimate a full hierarchical model in which the Wordfish parameters across debates are modeled as random coefficients. Such an approach could, in principle, form a compromise between the assumption that the political associations of words in each debate are uninformative about other debates and the assumption that the political associations of words are identical across every debate.

As noted earlier, our main reason for not estimating the full hierarchical model is because of the additional computational burden and negligible consequences. Any efficiency gains from a full hierarchical model would stem from shrinking the Wordfish coefficients toward their population means, but almost no shrinkage could occur given the very precise estimates that result from the Wordfish first stage. To gain significant efficiency from a full hierarchical model, we would have to replace the Wordfish model with an alternative model which yielded substantially more uncertain estimates of document positions. The problem is not merely an issue of overdispersion yielding overly confident estimates from Wordfish’s Poisson likelihood function; rather, the problem is that Wordfish, like nearly all text models, uses a bag-of-words assumption that each word is independently generated from some underlying distribution. This independence assumption, combined with the fact that speeches and other texts typically have a large number of words that are not actually independently generated, yields problematic likelihood-based uncertainty estimates in text analysis models more generally. There has been recent research exploring alternative simulation-based strategies for estimating uncertainty in text-scaling models (Lowe and Benoit 2011); however, for the hierarchical model to work in our application, a likelihood function that yielded weaker inferences would be needed. There is important work to be done in this area, but it is well beyond the scope of this article.

6.3 Multidimensionality and Dynamics

In this article, we have presented models that reduce variation in word use within debates to debate-specific dimensions, and that summarize variation in those debate-specific dimensions using one or two general dimensions. However, just as we extended the second-level model to have a second dimension in the Irish example, it is also straightforward to fit multidimensional scaling models for words at the debate level (Lowe 2013). Classic multidimensional models such as the one we presented for Ireland require identifying assumptions that have the effect of fixing the rotation and labeling of the dimensions. Because we only use the within-debate variation in word usage to estimate positions, one could use the across-debate variation in word usage to estimate which debates give us information about positions on which latent dimensions. Thus, given sufficiently rich data, we could measure how legislators' positions vary by topic, and recover multidimensional preference estimates with topic labels, following recent work on roll-call analysis (Lauderdale and Clark 2014). As with disaggregating by topic, estimation of dynamic positions can also be achieved from a closely related model that does not change the lower-level model for the texts. To model dynamics, one could apply one of the existing techniques for modeling dynamics (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Martin and Quinn 2002) to θ_i , allowing those parameters to vary over time.

7 Conclusion

It is appropriate to be skeptical about unsupervised estimators like ours that purport to turn word counts into estimates of “expressed preferences” or “stated positions.” This is partly because of the black-box process by which such models sometimes assume—rather than demonstrate—that preferences are a major source of variation in word usage. But it is also because the longer experience of scaling roll-call voting data in political science has given us a sense of the various ways that measurement models can fail to measure what we would like them to measure. Demonstrating that text scaling is a useful measurement strategy requires validation of the types provided in this article.

The validation we have done suggests that—at least in the legislatures we examined—the primary dimension of *political disagreement*, rather than the primary dimension of *policy preferences*, is what we can measure using our speech-scaling strategy. This makes sense given the way that our estimation procedure is constructed. The many debate-specific scales will reflect features of particular debates and the idiosyncratic contributions of particular legislators to those debates. However, the scaling of these scales will select out the common dimension of variation across speakers that most consistently shapes word usage across all spoken debates. It is perhaps not surprising that this tends to be the government–opposition cleavage in the Westminster-style system of the Irish Dáil. In the United States, where a different constitutional structure and a two-party system create different incentives for legislative speech, we see patterns of speech behavior that, while different from roll-call and donor-based measures of Senator positions, have a strong association with those measures both across and within parties. But there are also important differences which reflect the different processes that generate speeches, roll calls, and donations. We find that party polarization of speeches is more responsive to political events than is roll-call behavior, and that recent increases in rhetorical polarization are heavily the result of senatorial turnover.

Whereas both computer scientists and political scientists have made enormous progress in recent years in developing and refining tools for recovering topics from texts, progress on the problem of recovering continuous measures of disagreement has advanced more slowly and is more peculiar to political science. Recovering measures of relative disagreement is a more difficult problem because of the nature of word usage, and there are fewer researchers working on this problem actively. As the preceding section indicates, there are several potential avenues for further methodological development. Legislative speech is both interesting as a proxy for more general conceptions of political position-taking as well as in its own right: it is a core component of the strategies adopted by legislators in response to the political and electoral environments that they face.

Conflict of interest statement. None declared.

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