

# A Simple Bayesian Model of Hiring Signals via Top-Coauthor and Publication Count

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## 1 Timing, information, and payoffs

We consider a simple two-step process:

1. **Application.** A candidate applies for the job.
2. **Hiring decision.** The employer observes signals about the candidate and decides whether to hire.

### Key variables and parameters.

- $T \in \{G, B\}$ : candidate type (good  $G$  or bad  $B$ ), with  $\Pr(T = G) = p$ .
- $A \in \{0, 1\}$ : indicator for having published/worked with a high-rank (top) researcher ( $A = 1$  yes,  $A = 0$  no).
- $N \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$ : general quality signal given by the number of papers.
- $w > 0$ : applicant payoff if hired.
- $B$  (if  $T = G$ ) and  $b$  (if  $T = B$ ): employer payoff from hiring; typically  $B > b$ .

The employer observes two pieces of information:

- A **general signal of quality** given by the publication count  $N \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$  (the number of papers).
- Whether the candidate **published/worked with a high-rank (top) researcher**, represented by  $A \in \{0, 1\}$ .

Payoffs are as follows:

- The applicant receives a positive payoff  $w > 0$  if hired (and 0 otherwise).
- The employer receives  $B$  if the hired candidate is good, and  $b$  if the hired candidate is bad (typically  $B > b$ ).

Given the observed signals (paper count and whether there is a top coauthor), the employer forms a posterior belief about the probability that the candidate is good. Call this probability  $P_{\text{good}}$ .

If the employer hires, their expected (future) payoff is simply:

$$\text{Expected employer payoff} = B \cdot P_{\text{good}} + b \cdot (1 - P_{\text{good}}) = b + (B - b) P_{\text{good}}.$$

## 2 Setup

We now formalize the probabilistic model. The latent type  $T \in \{G, B\}$  and the observed signals  $(A, N)$  are as defined in Section 1, with prior  $\Pr(T = G) = p$ .

## 3 Likelihood model

### 3.1 Top-researcher signal

Let

$$\Pr(A = 1 | T = G) = q_a, \quad \Pr(A = 1 | T = B) = q_b,$$

with  $q_a > q_b$ . Equivalently,

$$\Pr(A = 0 | T = G) = 1 - q_a, \quad \Pr(A = 0 | T = B) = 1 - q_b.$$

### 3.2 Publication count (Poisson)

We model the paper count using Poisson distributions:

$$N | (T = G) \sim \text{Poisson}(\lambda_a), \quad N | (T = B) \sim \text{Poisson}(\lambda_b).$$

Thus for  $n \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$ ,

$$\Pr(N = n | T = G) = e^{-\lambda_a} \frac{\lambda_a^n}{n!}, \quad \Pr(N = n | T = B) = e^{-\lambda_b} \frac{\lambda_b^n}{n!}.$$

### 3.3 Conditional independence

We assume that, conditional on type, the two signals are independent:

$$(A \perp N) | T.$$

Hence

$$\Pr(A, N = n | T) = \Pr(A | T) \Pr(N = n | T).$$

## 4 Posterior probability of being good

Given an observation  $(A = a, N = n)$ , Bayes' rule gives

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(T = G | A = a, N = n) &= \frac{\Pr(A = a, N = n | T = G) \Pr(T = G)}{\Pr(A = a, N = n | T = G) \Pr(T = G) + \Pr(A = a, N = n | T = B) \Pr(T = B)} \\ &= \frac{p \Pr(A = a | G) \Pr(N = n | G)}{p \Pr(A = a | G) \Pr(N = n | G) + (1 - p) \Pr(A = a | B) \Pr(N = n | B)}. \end{aligned}$$

With the Poisson likelihoods, the factor  $n!$  cancels, yielding the closed form

$$\Pr(T = G | A = a, N = n) = \frac{p \Pr(A = a | G) e^{-\lambda_a} \lambda_a^n}{p \Pr(A = a | G) e^{-\lambda_a} \lambda_a^n + (1 - p) \Pr(A = a | B) e^{-\lambda_b} \lambda_b^n}.$$

For convenience, define

$$\Pr(A = a | G) = \begin{cases} q_a & a = 1 \\ 1 - q_a & a = 0 \end{cases} \quad \Pr(A = a | B) = \begin{cases} q_b & a = 1 \\ 1 - q_b & a = 0 \end{cases}.$$