


STSCI 4780: Probability theory as logic

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Recap & motivation

Modes of Data Analysis



Data analysis

Building and appraising data-based arguments about science/engineering models

Statistical inference

Quantifying uncertainty in measurement-based arguments about mathematical models

Arguments

Argument \equiv Collection of statements comprising an act of reasoning from *premises* to a *conclusion*

- All humans are mortal.
 - Socrates is a human.
- \therefore Socrates is mortal.

- Today is Monday or Tuesday.
 - Today is not Tuesday.
- \therefore Today is Monday.

- The NWS predicts sunshine tomorrow.
- \therefore Tomorrow will be sunny.

- Globally averaged atmospheric temperature measurements show a recent strong warming trend.
 - Average ocean temperatures show a similar trend.
 - Indirect measurements show no similar trends for centuries into the past.
 - Polar ice is melting at unprecedented rates.
 - Measurements of human-produced CO₂ show increases at times coinciding with changes in temperature trends.
 - ...
- ∴ There is significant anthropogenic global warming likely to harm ecosystems and human civilization.



- There is significant anthropogenic global warming likely to harm ecosystems and human civilization.
 - The costs of damages X , Y , Z would be $\$A$, $\$B$, $\$C$.
 - The costs of remediations would be...
 - ...
- ∴ We should undertake the following remediations...

Propositional logic—propositions

“Logic can be defined as *the analysis and appraisal of arguments*”
—Gensler, *Intro to Logic*

Propositions

Proposition \equiv Statement that may be true or false

\mathcal{C} : Universe can be modeled with Λ CDM

A : $\Omega_{\text{tot}} \in [0.9, 1.1]$ (space-time is nearly flat)

B : Ω_{Λ} is not 0 (cosmic expansion is accelerating)

Language vs. meaning

These express the same proposition:

- It is snowing.
- There is snow falling.
- Está nevando.

Building complex statements

Build complex statements with simple propositions and logical operators/connectives:

Unary operation

\mathcal{C} : Universe can be modeled with Λ CDM

B : Ω_Λ is not 0

\overline{B} : “not B ,” i.e., $\Omega_\Lambda = 0$ (called *denial*)

Binary operations: connectives & compound statements

$A \wedge B$: A and B are both true; *conjunction*

$A \vee B$: A or B is true, or both are; *disjunction*

Logical and/or often may differ from *colloquial* and/or

E.g., inclusive vs. exclusive or

Note: Symbols are not universal!

Truth values, truth tables

Truth value: Indicates whether a statement is true (T or 1) or false (F or 0)

Truth-functional statement: *Compound* statement whose truth is entirely determined by the truth values of its components

Truth-functional: $A \wedge B$

Non-truth-functional:

I am sad because it is raining.

Truth-functional statements have truth values determined entirely by their form

Not all connectives are truth-functional

\mathcal{A}	\mathcal{B}	$\mathcal{A} \wedge \mathcal{B}$
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	F

\mathcal{A}	\wedge	\mathcal{B}
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	F	T
F	F	F

\wedge	T	F
T	T	F
F	F	F

a	b	$a \times b$
1	1	1
1	0	0
0	1	0
0	0	0

a	\times	b
1	1	1
1	0	0
0	0	1
0	0	0

\times	1	0
1	1	0
0	0	0

\mathcal{A}	\mathcal{B}	$\mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{B}$
T	T	T
T	F	T
F	T	T
F	F	F

\mathcal{A}	\vee	\mathcal{B}
T	T	T
T	T	F
F	T	T
F	F	F

\vee	T	F
T	T	T
F	T	F

Non-truth-functional:

I am sad because it is raining.

S	R	S because R	R because S
T	T	?	?
T	F	F	F
F	T	F	F
F	F	F	F

Arguments

Argument: Assertion that an *hypothesized conclusion*, H , follows from *premises*, $\mathcal{P} = \{A, B, C, \dots\}$ (take “,” = “and”)

Notation:

$\mathcal{P} \vdash H$,

$H|\mathcal{P}$: Premises \mathcal{P} imply H
 H may be deduced from \mathcal{P}
 H follows from \mathcal{P}
 H is true given that \mathcal{P} is true

Arguments are (compound) propositions

Central role of arguments \rightarrow special terminology for true/false:

- A true argument is *valid*
- A false argument is *invalid* or *fallacious*

Valid vs. sound arguments

Content vs. form

- An argument is *factually correct* iff all of its *premises are true* (it has “good content”)
- An argument is *valid* iff its conclusion *follows from* its premises (it has “good form”)
- An argument is *sound* iff it is both *factually correct and valid* (it has good form and content)

Deductive logic (and probability theory) addresses *validity*

We want to make *sound* arguments. There is no formal approach for addressing factual correctness → there is always a subjective element to an argument.

Factual correctness

Passing the buck

Although logic can teach us something about validity and invalidity, it can teach us very little about factual correctness. The question of the truth or falsity of individual statements is primarily the subject matter of the sciences.

— Hardegree, *Symbolic Logic*

An open issue

To test the truth or falsehood of premises is the task of science. . . . But as a matter of fact we are interested in, and must often depend upon, the correctness of arguments whose premises are not known to be true.

— Copi, *Introduction to Logic*

Premises

- *Facts* — Things known to be true, e.g. *observed data*
- *“Obvious” assumptions* — Axioms, postulates, e.g., Euclid's first 4 postulates (line segment b/t 2 points; congruency of right angles . . .)
- *“Reasonable” or “working” assumptions* — E.g., Euclid's fifth postulate (parallel lines)
- *Desperate presumption!*
- *Conclusions from other arguments* → chains of discovery

Every argument has a set of premises defining a *fixed context* in which the argument is assessed

Premises are considered “given”—if only for the sake of the argument!

Deductive and inductive inference

Deduction—Syllogism as prototype

Premise 1: A implies H

Premise 2: A is true

Deduction: $\therefore H$ is true

$H|\mathcal{P}$ is valid

Induction—Analogy as prototype

Premise 1: A, B, C, D, E all share properties x, y, z

Premise 2: F has properties x, y

Induction: F has property z

$"F \text{ has } z"|\mathcal{P}$ is not strictly valid, but may still be rational (likely, plausible, probable); some such arguments are stronger than others

Boolean algebra (and/or/not over $\{0, 1\}$) quantifies deduction

Bayesian probability theory (and/or/not over $[0, 1]$) generalizes this to quantify the strength of inductive arguments

Deductive Logic

Assess arguments by decomposing them into parts via connectives, and assessing the parts:

Validity of $A \wedge B | \mathcal{P}$

	$A \mathcal{P}$	$\bar{A} \mathcal{P}$
$B \mathcal{P}$	valid	invalid
$\bar{B} \mathcal{P}$	invalid	invalid

Validity of $A \vee B | \mathcal{P}$

	$A \mathcal{P}$	$\bar{A} \mathcal{P}$
$B \mathcal{P}$	valid	valid
$\bar{B} \mathcal{P}$	valid	invalid

Representing Deduction With $\{0, 1\}$ Algebra

$V(H|\mathcal{P}) \equiv$ Validity of argument $H|\mathcal{P}$:

$$\begin{aligned} V &= 0 \rightarrow \text{Argument is } \textit{invalid} \\ &= 1 \rightarrow \text{Argument is } \textit{valid} \end{aligned}$$

Then deduction can be reduced to integer multiplication and addition over $\{0, 1\}$ (as in a computer):

$$\begin{aligned} V(A \wedge B|\mathcal{P}) &= V(A|\mathcal{P}) V(B|\mathcal{P}) \\ V(A \vee B|\mathcal{P}) &= V(A|\mathcal{P}) + V(B|\mathcal{P}) - V(A \wedge B|\mathcal{P}) \\ V(\bar{A}|\mathcal{P}) &= 1 - V(A|\mathcal{P}) \end{aligned}$$

This is a *Boolean algebra* (with a specific interpretation)

Representing Induction With $[0, 1]$ Algebra

$P(H|\mathcal{P}) \equiv$ strength of argument $H|\mathcal{P}$

$P = 0 \rightarrow$ Argument is *invalid*; premises imply \bar{H}

$= 1 \rightarrow$ Argument is *valid*

$\in (0, 1) \rightarrow$ Degree of deducibility

Mathematical model for induction

$$\begin{aligned}\text{'AND' (product rule): } P(A \wedge B|\mathcal{P}) &= P(A|\mathcal{P}) P(B|A \wedge \mathcal{P}) \\ &= P(B|\mathcal{P}) P(A|B \wedge \mathcal{P})\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{'OR' (sum rule): } P(A \vee B|\mathcal{P}) &= P(A|\mathcal{P}) + P(B|\mathcal{P}) \\ &\quad - P(A \wedge B|\mathcal{P})\end{aligned}$$

$$\text{'NOT': } P(\bar{A}|\mathcal{P}) = 1 - P(A|\mathcal{P})$$

The Product Rule

We simply promoted the V algebra to real numbers; the only thing changed is part of the product rule:

$$\begin{aligned}V(A \wedge B|\mathcal{P}) &= V(A|\mathcal{P}) V(B|\mathcal{P}) \\P(A \wedge B|\mathcal{P}) &= P(A|\mathcal{P}) P(B|A \wedge \mathcal{P})\end{aligned}$$

Suppose A implies B (i.e., $B|A \wedge \mathcal{P}$ is valid). Then we don't expect $P(A \wedge B|\mathcal{P})$ to differ from $P(A|\mathcal{P})$.

In particular, $P(A \wedge A|\mathcal{P})$ must equal $P(A|\mathcal{P})$!

Such qualitative reasoning satisfied early probabilists that the sum and product rules were worth considering as axioms for a theory of quantified induction. But Boole and Venn criticized them in the late 1800s; this partly motivated early 20th century focus on frequency-based interpretations of probability.

Firm foundations

Starting ca. 1950, many different formal lines of argument have been devised that *derive* induction-as-probability from various simple and appealing requirements:

- Consistency with logic + internal consistency (Cox; Jaynes)
- “Coherence” /optimal betting (Ramsey; de Finetti; Savage; Lindley)
- Complete class theorems in decision theory (Wald)
- Algorithmic information theory (Rissanen; Wallace & Freeman)
- Optimal information processing (Zellner)
- Avoiding problems with frequentist methods:
 - ▶ Avoiding recognizable subsets (Cornfield)
 - ▶ Avoiding stopping rule problems → likelihood principle (Birnbaum; Berger & Wolpert)

Pierre Simon Laplace (1819)

Probability theory is nothing but *common sense reduced to calculation*.

James Clerk Maxwell (1850)

They say that Understanding ought to work by the rules of right reason. These rules are, or ought to be, contained in Logic, but the actual science of *Logic is conversant at present only with things either certain, impossible, or entirely doubtful*, none of which (fortunately) we have to reason on. Therefore *the true logic of this world is the calculus of Probabilities*, which takes account of the magnitude of the probability which is, or ought to be, in a reasonable man's mind.

Harold Jeffreys (1931)

If we like there is no harm in saying that a probability expresses a degree of reasonable belief. . . . 'Degree of confirmation' has been used by Carnap, and possibly avoids some confusion. But whatever verbal expression we use to try to convey the primitive idea, this expression cannot amount to a definition. *Essentially the notion can only be described by reference to instances where it is used*. It is intended to express *a kind of relation between data and consequence* that habitually arises in science and in everyday life, and the reader should be able to recognize the relation from examples of the circumstances when it arises.