Confidential Cloud Services

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Abstract

Nowadays, many services are being outsourced to the cloud to achieve more flexibility and scalability. The problem is that cloud services are very unsecure and therefore not usable for applications with high security requirements. To provide more safety one solution is using Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). Therefore many services exist that integrate TEEs and other mechanisms to make the cloud environment confidential. These systems are called Confidential Cloud Services (CCS).

In this paper, I compare two of these services, the Confidential Consortium Framework (CCF) and Nimble. They both fulfill the requirements of the CIA triad which are confidentiality, integrity, and high availability. Especially when it comes to integrity, they both differ from each other. While CCF does not have protection against rollback attacks and is therefore vulnerable to them, Nimble specializes in detecting and protecting that kind of attack. Nimble also has the feature of keeping the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) as small as possible. This paper shows that both systems have strengths and weaknesses. Accordingly, both systems have good approaches in different subareas that are all very important for cloud computing, but nevertheless harbor high risks for applications with high requirements of security.

1 Introduction

Today's applications are increasingly hosted in the cloud for more flexibility and scalability. However, the environment cloud providers provide is not secure, due to it being vulnerable to attacks, where customers' data can be stolen. More detailed, reasons to consider the cloud as untrustworthy are (1) poor administration, (2) vulnerabilities of the software stack, or (3) missing encryption of the data. That is, finances and health applications that handle sensitive data cannot afford this risk by hosting their applications in the cloud. To make cloud infrastructure more reliable even for such fields with high security requirements, confidential computing has become a new trend.

A CCS is an additional service that can be applied on top of an existing cloud provider [11]. These confidential services are needed when services have high security requirements, which cannot be guaranteed by a normal cloud provider. As the cloud provider or its administration cannot be trusted either, the sensitive data must also be protected from this provider itself.

The three properties Data Confidentiality, Integrity Protection, and High Availability, short CIA, build a triad, shown in Figure 1, that describes the three important requirements of information security [1, 18]. Data confidentiality is keeping the data private, which is very important, especially from cloud providers. Challenges are encrypting the data and protecting the encryption keys.

Integrity protection is the insurance of complete and correct code that is not changed by a bad party. Accordingly, it can be considered a prerequisite for confidentiality. But these two characteristics are hard to implement although they are mandatory for cloud computing. Indeed, the cloud computing TCB is considered huge as it includes the cloud providers and their infrastructure, so applications in the field of finances, health, or governmental issues cannot afford to trust this whole TCB.



Figure 1: The CIA triad, consisting of the three properties Data Confidentiality, Integrity Protection, and High Availability, each represented as a circle. A Confidential Cloud Service (CCS) aims to realize all three CIA properties which is the intersection of all circles in the figure.

High availability is required by the fact that people rely on the systems that are on the cloud. Accordingly, they should work, even if failures occur.

Another problem CCSs should handle is every kind of attack. Especially in the cloud, where you cannot even trust the provider, many attacks can happen, above all on big cloud providers. Therefore it is mandatory to detect and protect against such attacks like forking attacks, physical attacks, or rollback attacks.

This paper introduces two different CCSs, CCF [12] and Nimble [2]. CCF is a framework for multiparty applications that provides confidential computing on the cloud. Nimble is a service that detects and prevents rollback attacks in addition to also providing confidentiality. I present the design of both systems and discuss their advantages and disadvantages.

2 Background

In this section, I will give the necessary definitions and background to understand the following parts.

2.1 Trusted Execution Environments

A TEE is a processor, e.g. Intel SGX [7], or VM-based, e.g. AMD SEV-SNP [16], component where critical code can be run inside a trusted part that is called an enclave. The code and data are confidentiality and integrity protected from malicious parties, hypervisors, and the cloud provider. But of course, it is not impossible to change code

inside a TEE [17]. Through the concept of remote attestation, it is possible to make sure that the correct code runs inside the TEE [3]. The basic concept is that an attestation key exists with which the TEE can sign its binary and remote entities with a so-called quote, which includes the hash of the initial code and data. A client can then verify this quote.
As Trusted Execution Environments provide confidentiality and integrity, they are mostly used as a base component of a CCS. Nevertheless, it is important to note that a TEE can also get compromised and therefore violates the CIA properties.

2.2 Distributed Ledger Technology

A ledger is a digital register that records transactions in blocks. The Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) contains multiple redundant digital ledgers that are decentralized and collect data about transactions in a network and sign them with a cryptographic signature [10]. A distributed ledger technology is used e.g. as the base technology for the Cryptocurrency Bitcoin.
However, DLTs are also used for CCSs, because they provide confidentiality. Therefore most ledgers are append-only to guarantee the properties of auditability and trustworthiness. This means that data can be written only once in the ledger, but read multiple times. In addition, entries in the ledger cannot be deleted.

2.3 Rollback Attacks

Cloud services are vulnerable to several attacks like forking attacks [5], side-channel attacks [6], or rollback attacks [8]. In essence, a CCS should protect against all of these attacks, but in the scope of this paper, I only focus on rollback attacks.
In this attack, malicious parties save an older version of the system, restart it, and apply this older version as a new state, rolling back the state of the system. Such an attack can lead to severe consequences. If a bank stores its transactions in a cloud storage, a compromised user can roll back whole transactions. Another example is breaking car keys [9]. Key fobs send unique signals to the car that unlocks when it gets the right signal. A hacker can block the signal, record it, and send it to the car again. Because the first signal did not reach the car, it can be unlocked with the recorded signal.
Of course, rollback attacks can also happen on a CCS and therefore it is mandatory to protect against this kind of attack. Otherwise, whole transactions or configurations can be undone which violates the integrity of the CCS.

3 Confidential Services

In this section, I present two CCSs. The first one is CCF [12] and the second one is Nimble [2]. They both provide a structure to guarantee the CIA properties, but have some differences in their design, especially when it comes to rollback attacks. Nimble allows the detection of rollback attacks while CCF is a whole framework that can also be used for secure multiparty applications. Multiparty computing happens when different independent parties work on the same computing space and have some own private processes to ensure privacy.



Figure 2: The untrusted host consists of the network, the storage, and multiple TEEs (in this figure only one TEE is shown as the inner green box) that can communicate with the outside via an interface. Inside each TEE that refers to one node in CCF, there is the Transaction Handler, the simple Key-Value Store, the individual Application Logic, and the Consensus.

3.1 CCF in a Nutshell

CCF consists of an untrusted host and users that can access the application via different replicated nodes that are responsible for the remaining communication. Application developers only need to implement their application logic and make sure to have all necessary endpoints, so that CCF can handle these. Users then only have to access the specific endpoints to use the application. As CCF is especially implemented for multiparty applications, it has a multiparty governance to guarantee confidentiality and integrity. Further details can be found in other sections, but it consists of a constitution with proposals and ballots that can be individually customized by the application. In Figure 2 the structure of one node is described. The application logic gets the data from the Key-Value-Store which gets the data from the Consensus which is an explicit layer that is responsible for coordinating CCF in tasks like replicating nodes or making election decisions. The Transaction Handler stores every signature transaction in an append-only ledger that is redundantly stored by one of the nodes, that is called primary node, in every other node and the persistent storage. Performing the application logic inside a TEE is fundamental for confidentiality and integrity, and replicating the transactions is necessary for high availability.
While the primary is responsible for handling the users' requests, the remaining nodes are there as a backup. Users can get connected to any node and the specific request is either being forwarded to the primary or handled by the node itself, which is only possible for read-only requests. Every other request has to be forwarded to the primary that executes it.
If a node in use fails, the user can be connected to another node, but if the primary fails there is a primary election that selects a new primary with certain voting criteria. Note that this paper focuses mostly on the functions and challenges of CCF and therefore does not go into detail about how the election works.
User requests are handled as transactions that have a unique transaction ID. The primary also periodically sends signature transactions



Figure 3: CCF's merkle tree - For every transaction a hash value is computed with the hash function H. Then building a new hash value from the two previous values is repeated until there is only one value left. This is called the merkle root. It is used for the signature transactions that are shown in red signed by the primary.

that verify all previous transactions as committed. To commit these signature transactions, the primary has to copy it onto at least $\lceil \frac{n-1}{2} \rceil$ nodes, where n is the number of all nodes.
Signature transactions can also confirm that there were no malicious changes to the code and thus guarantee the integrity of CCF via merkle proof [15]. Transactions are provided via a merkle tree, where each transaction is represented as a hash value. Every two nodes in the merkle tree are combined with a hash function to a new node. On top of the merkle tree is the merkle root, which is the value that is used for the signature transaction. This process is also shown in Figure 3.

Reconfiguration. Reconfiguration is the procedure when a node fails and is replaced by a new one. This is an important feature to guarantee high availability.
CCF therefore allows to add new or delete old nodes. Reconfiguration is implemented as a transaction. For reconfiguration, a node must request an election and win it. The election is done by a majority quorum. Since a reconfiguration is handled as a transaction, it can also be rolled back. In contrast to Nimble, CCF does not detect or protect such an attack on a reconfiguration.
In a disaster scenario, a majority of nodes fail and the system has to handle this. CCF has a disaster recovery protocol, in which the service is started with an older state. Therefore it cannot be guaranteed to be complete. If not all transactions are stored in the ledger before the disaster, it cannot be restored.
Although the integrity of CCF is protected by the signature transactions, the integrity can be violated via rollback attacks. While CCF avoids whole nodes being rolled back with the help of reconfiguration the ledger is stored outside the TEE and can be attacked this way. This is a huge risk for applications with high safety requirements because whole transactions could be undone. This also leads to certain problems in the reconfiguration that are also discussed later. Therefore I present another confidential cloud service, called Nimble, that has a rollback detection and protection mechanism and also supports reconfiguration to realize better integrity guarantees.

3.2 Nimble in a Nutshell

Nimble is a state machine replication protocol that also tries to ensure the requirement of the CIA triad, but has the focus of preventing rollback attacks. The correctness of Nimble can be proofed, details about this can be found in [2].
Nimble has three important goals, (1) to ensure linearizability, (2) to have a small TCB, and (3) to guarantee the liveness of the cloud service. For the aim to reduce the TCB, they try to use as many of the existing services the cloud provider already uses as possible. The existing cloud storage service that Nimble reuses only has the requirement to be crash fault-tolerant. Therefore they use state machine replication and differ between two main properties that come with this.
Safety means that it must be ensured that every data that can be accessed must be the current data and must not be an older version. This property is enabled via TEEs. In the CIA triad, this would be Confidentiality and Integrity.
Liveness is the High Availability property of the CIA triad. This has not to be ensured via a TEE, because liveness can be easily taken away even in a TEE, and can be handled outside which simultaneously makes the TCB smaller. To guarantee liveness Nimble stores the data redundantly via state machine replication. To guarantee safety the state of each replicated node is appended to a ledger, which is stored as a hash chain in an existing storage provider. Inside each TEE there is a trusted state machine that is called endorser. The endorser stores the tail of the hash chain for each ledger. As there are replicated endorsers in Nimble, it can still guarantee liveness, if endorsers fail, as long as there is a majority of working endorsers. To guarantee liveness even if a majority of endorsers fail, Nimble implements reconfiguration.

Reconfiguration. In Nimble it is possible to add new endorsers. This is also mandatory for the high availability of Nimble. It guarantees both safety and liveness as long as there is a majority of endorsers working. Therefore it is important to add new endorsers if some of them fail, because if a majority fails and no new ones are added, Nimble has to give up its liveness. Nimble has also the challenge of implementing the reconfiguration so that the TCB does not get much bigger, which is the case in other services like CCF. There nodes store their identity in each other node with the help of the state replication. This is not possible in Nimble. Therefore each set of working endorsers is stored as a configuration and new endorsers are stored in a new configuration. As a prerequisite for changing the configuration, a majority of endorsers in the previous configuration have to call their finalize method and to be finished. The identity of a new endorser is created by Nimble in the new configuration. The change of the reconfiguration is led by a coordinator in three phases where it (1) finalizes existing endorsers, (2) initializes new endorsers and (3) activates these new endorsers. While the endorsers can be trusted, the coordinators cannot.

4 Rollback Protection

As mentioned before, CCF only provides rollback protection for its nodes. They cannot be rolled back, because a node can never restart in CCF, but has to enter as a completely new node. That means a node can be killed, but never cause a rollback attack on the system. In contrast, the ledger can be rolled back, because it is stored in the

persistent storage outside the TEE and CCF does not provide an additional mechanism to detect rollback attacks. This makes CCF vulnerable and a risk for applications with high requirements of security.
Nimble also stores its state in an existing storage service outside the TEE to use its API, which also makes the TCB smaller. However, in contrast to CCF, it protects this state from being compromised. Nimble, on the other hand, has extended protection against these attacks. To protect rollback attacks they first must be detected. Therefore Nimble presents three categories of rollback attacks:

Stale responses: Stale responses happen when old data is given by the host although there is already newer data. This can easily happen due to the external storage service that cannot be trusted. To prevent stale responses, the state is stored twice. At first, it is encrypted and stored in an external storage service, then the state is also stored in the append-only ledger. When an application wants to read the state of the system, it reads both, the one from the storage service, and the one from the ledger, and can detect an attack, when they are not the same. To guarantee liveness a counter is also stored as well in the storage service as on the ledger. The counter on the storage service is always incremented by one and then copied by the ledger. If the system fails before the new state can be appended to the ledger, this can be recognized, as the counter of the ledger is one lower than the one of the storage service. Accordingly, the new state can be added to the ledger, when the system restarts. Nimble uses a linearizable append-only ledger. Linearizability is a criterion that provides strong consistency and is realized via the endorsers. Remember that an endorser only stores the tail of the ledger, so if data is read from the ledger it can be compared with the endorser. In case it is not the same, a rollback attack did happen or the system failed before the endorser could store the tail of the hash chain. Accordingly, the ledger cannot be rolled back, because the state is provided by the endorser, which does not have a previous state to roll back to.

Synthesized requests: Synthesized requests mean that the provider sends requests that are not sent by the application and stores them. This is handled via signing. The application signs the state and then appends it to the ledger. When the application reads a state from the ledger it then can recognize whether it is a real state with a signature or a synthesized request from a malicious provider.



Figure 4: Each node consists of a TEE. Inside the TEE there is the Endorser that saves the tail of the ledger.

Replay: When a provider applies older requests to the storage this is called replay. Therefore the position of the stored state in the ledger is also stored with a signature. Accordingly, the application can check if this signed position matches with the position it is currently stored in the ledger. So Nimble detects the rollback attack and prevents it. According to this, also a replay does not maliciously affect the system.

5 Discussion

In this section, I compare both systems and emphasize their advantages and disadvantages.
Both CCF and Nimble aim to guarantee the three CIA properties (1) Data Confidentiality, (2) Integrity Protection, and (3) High Availability. They also tried to guarantee (1) and (2) with the help of TEEs. The problem of both is assuming that TEEs always work correctly as intended. In reality, TEEs can also suffer from different attacks like side-channel attacks or physical attacks and therefore violate the two criteria of the CIA triad. However, TEEs are a relatively new technique and will hopefully be more secure in the future.
As mentioned before, CCF does not have a rollback detection, because its design ensures that when an attack happens to nodes it cannot affect the system. However, when a rollback attack happens to the distributed ledger, it can affect the system without being noticed. Accordingly, this violates the criteria of integrity, because malicious changes to the ledger can be made, which provides risks for applications running in CCF. As mentioned before, solutions for this integrity problem exist in Nimble. The problem here is that Nimble only focuses on rollback attacks while it completely ignores other kinds of attacks. Therefore also Nimble as an alone standing system would not be safe for applications.
Another challenge is the TCB. When comparing both systems, CCF contains about 55.5 thousand lines of code inside the TEE, while Nimble has only 2.3 thousand lines. With a bigger TCB, the code inside the TEE gets more vulnerable. On the other hand, CCF is much more powerful. While Nimble specialises in rollback attacks, CCF also provides the possibility to use it for multiparty applications. Despite it would be more efficient if CCSs do not try to put that much code in the TCB with their aim to not depend on other services, but reduce the TCB for their field of application.
Unfortunately, this leads to the problem of performance. Nimble's throughput is lower than the one of CCF.

6 Conclusion

Comparing both systems shows that both CCF and Nimble have good approaches to make cloud infrastructure more confidential. This is caused by the use of TEEs, DLT, reconfiguration, multiparty applications on CCF, and rollback detection and the small TCB of Nimble. However, both systems also have weaknesses. Both are vulnerable to certain attacks, whereby Nimble has, in contrast to CCF, a rollback detection mechanism, and rely on the integrity of TEEs that cannot be guaranteed for sure. All in all, there already exist

many different CCSs with as well some similar as some different approaches [4, 13, 14]. The challenge is, to pick the advantages of the existing services and try to create customized CCSs for different fields of applications. Some might accept a lower performance for the aspect of a smaller TCB, while others do not need that high integrity and therefore choose a better performance.
This work shows how important it is to apply certain CCS to protect applications from untrustworthy cloud infrastructure and create a trustworthy environment for applications with sensitive data or processes. Although there already exist many different CCSs, they all have strengths and weaknesses and there might be no general solution for all applications running in the cloud. Instead, individual services for certain fields of applications should be developed to focus on their special needs.

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