

Week 8: Modern Asymmetric Ciphers

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Outline

- Why asymmetric cryptography?
- Factoring Based Cryptography (P1)
- Logarithm Based Cryptography (P2)
 - ElGamal cipher;
 - Diffie-Hellman key exchange;
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (P3)
- Some advanced cryptography system (quantum resistance)

Why Public-Key Cryptosystems?

To overcome two of the most difficult problems associated with symmetric encryption:

- **Key distribution (key for symmetric encryption)**
 - How to have secure communications in general without having to trust a KDC with your key
- **Digital signatures**
 - How to verify that a message comes intact from the claimed sender

Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman: proposed a method that addressed both problems (1976)

Modern Asymmetric ciphers

Symmetric cipher vs Asymmetric cipher


Homomorphic, Searchable encryption, ..

$ID_A(attributes)$ $ID_B(attributes)$


$(PK_A, \{SK_A, SK_B, \dots\})$

ID
 (PK_A, SK_A)

(PK_A, SK_A)



RSA: Confidentiality



A

$d_A / n_A, e_A$

$$e_A \cdot d_A = 1 \bmod \phi(n_A)$$

$$C = m^{e_B} \bmod n_B$$




B

$d_B / n_B, e_B$

$$e_B \cdot d_B = 1 \bmod \phi(n_B)$$

$$\begin{aligned} C^{d_B} \bmod n_B &= (m^{e_B})^{d_B} \bmod n_B \\ &= m \end{aligned}$$

- Protect secret key?
- Distribute public keys?



RSA: Authentication



$d_A / n_A, e_A$

$d_B / n_B, e_B$

$$S = m^{d_A} \bmod n_A \quad (m, S)$$




Verify message m

$$S^{e_A} \bmod n_A = (m^{d_A})^{e_A} \bmod n_A$$

$$= m'$$


$$? = m$$



- Protect secret key?
- Distribute public keys?

• Sent by A

• Original (integrity)



RSA: Authentication and Secrecy



A




B

$$d_A / n_A, e_A$$

$$d_B / n_B, e_B$$

$$S = k^{d_A} \bmod n_A$$

$$(C_1 = k^{e_B}, S_1 = S^{e_B})$$



Limitation? 


Decrypt and verify the secret key k

$$C_1^{d_B} \bmod n_B = (k^{e_B})^{n_B} \bmod n_B = k;$$

$$S_1^{d_B} \bmod n_B = (S^{e_B})^{n_B} \bmod n_B = S;$$

$$S^{e_A} \bmod n_A = (k^{d_A})^{e_A} \bmod n_A = k' = ? k$$

Encryption Using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP)



Outline

- Why asymmetric cryptography?
- Factoring Based Cryptography (P1,2)
- **Logarithm Based Cryptography (P3)**
 - ElGamal cipher;
 - Diffie-Hellman key exchange;
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (P4)
- Some advanced cryptography system (quantum resistance)

Discrete Logarithm problem

Finite multiplicative group $(G, \cdot) = \langle g \rangle = \{g^n : n \in \mathbb{Z}\}$

Example: $G = \mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \{0\} = \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\} = \langle g \rangle$

g, n $\xrightarrow{\text{Easy to compute}}$ $y_0 = g^n \bmod p$

$g^n = y_0 \bmod p$ $\xleftarrow{\text{Hard to solve } n}$ g, y_0, p

Hard to solve equation $g^x = a \bmod p$ in finite field!

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ElGamal cipher

ElGamal parameters

Large prime number: p

Multiplicative group

$$G = \langle g \rangle = \mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \{0\} = \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$$

Key generation (


Secret key: $x \in_R [1, p-1]$

Public key: $h = g^x \bmod p \in \mathbb{Z}_p$

ElGamal cipher

- **Encryption** message $m < p - 1$ (using public key $h = g^x$)
 - Choose a random number: $r \in_R [1, p - 1]$
 - Compute $C_1 = g^r \bmod p$;
 - Compute $C_2 = m \cdot h^r \bmod p$
 - Output cipher message (C_1, C_2)
- **Decryption** (C_1, C_2) (using secret key x)
 - Compute $(C_1)^x \bmod p = g^{r \cdot x} \bmod p$;
 - Compute $\frac{C_2}{(C_1)^x} \bmod p = \frac{m \cdot g^{x \cdot r}}{g^{r \cdot x}} \bmod p = m$
 - Output message m

ElGamal cipher



Input: $M < p$

Select a random number: $r < p - 1$

Compute: $C_1 = g^r \bmod p$
 $C_2 = m \cdot h_B^r \bmod p$

(C_1, C_2)

Compute:


$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{C_2}{(C_1)^{x_B}} \bmod p \\ &= \frac{m \cdot g^{x_B \cdot r}}{g^{r \cdot x_B}} \bmod p = m \end{aligned}$$

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Diffie-Hellman key exchange

- A and B never met and share no secrets;
- Public info: the prime number p and g
 - p is a large prime number, g is a generator of Z_p^*
 - $Z_p^* = \{1, 2 \dots p-1: \forall a \in Z_p^* \exists i \text{ such that } a = g^i \bmod p\}$



Diffie-Hellman exchange Protocol (DHE)

$p = 1606938044258990275541962092341162602522202993782792835301301$

$g = 123456789$



$g^a \bmod p =$

78467374529422653579754596319852702575499692980085777948593



$g^b \bmod p =$

560048104293218128667441021342483133802626271394299410128798

$a =$

685408003627063
761059275919665
781694368639459
527871881531452

$(g^b)^a \bmod p$

$b =$

362059131912941
987637880257325
269696682836735
524942246807440

$(g^a)^b \bmod p$

$g^{ab} \bmod p =$

437452857085801785219961443000
845969831329749878767465041215


Why Is Diffie-Hellman Secure?

- Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem:
given $g^x \bmod p$, it's hard to extract x
 - There is no known efficient algorithm for doing this
 - This is not enough for Diffie-Hellman to be secure!
- Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem:
given g^x and g^y , it's hard to compute $g^{xy} \bmod p$
 - ... unless you know x or y , in which case it's easy
- Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem:
given g^x and g^y , it's hard to tell the difference between $g^{xy} \bmod p$ and $g^r \bmod p$ where r is random


Properties of Diffie-Hellman

- Assuming DDH problem is hard, Diffie-Hellman protocol is a secure key establishment protocol against passive attackers
 - Eavesdropper can't tell the difference between the established key and a random value
 - Can use the new key for symmetric cryptography
- Basic Diffie-Hellman protocol does not provide authentication
 - IPsec combines Diffie-Hellman with signatures, anti-DoS cookies, etc.

Man-in-the middle attacks the DHE



man-in-the-middle attack!



Advantages of Public-Key Crypto

- Confidentiality without shared secrets
 - Very useful in open environments
 - Can use this for key establishment, avoiding the “chicken-or-egg” problem
 - With symmetric crypto, two parties must share a secret before they can exchange secret messages
- Authentication without shared secrets
- Encryption keys are public, but must be sure that Alice’s public key is really her public key
 - This is a hard problem... Often solved using public-key certificates

Disadvantages of Public-Key Crypto

- Calculations are 2-3 orders of magnitude slower
 - Modular exponentiation is an expensive computation
 - Typical usage: use public-key cryptography to establish a shared secret, then switch to symmetric crypto
 - SSL, IPsec, most other systems based on public crypto
- Keys are longer
 - 3072 bits (RSA) rather than 128 bits (AES)
- Relies on unproven number-theoretic assumptions
 - Factoring, RSA problem, discrete logarithm problem, decisional Diffie-Hellman problem...