



LITMUN'19

AUGUST
24th & 25th

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HISTORIC CRISIS COMMITTEE

Background Guide

Agenda: The 1984 Anti- Sikh riots and the aftermath

The Historic Crisis Committee is a special and unique committee of LITMUN'19 which stimulates the situation of a historic crisis and allows the delegates to discuss and come out with new solutions on the past events. 1984 anti Sikh riots also known as the Sikh Massacre was a series of organized pogroms against Sikhs in India in response to the assassination of Indira Gandhi. Many Congress leaders were believed to be behind the 1984 massacre.

Letter from the Office of the Speaker,

Dear Delegates,

This guide has been made with the purpose of guiding you in your understanding of the agenda and should not be used as the sole reference for research. We realize that the topic at hand is both vast and complex and it's an advice for all of you to look at the agenda with a multi-dimensional approach in order to allow the debate to be more holistic and substantially fulfilling. With few days left for the conference, we are really hopeful that you have already begun with your research and are leaving no stone unturned in contributing to the committee to the best of your ability. While this guide seeks to analyze certain issues which you could use as a medium of directing your research, we would appreciate you to go beyond this piece of work and come up with innovate discussions in committee. For those who shall be beginning their debating journey with this conference, it's our duty to inform you that we shall be following a set of rules of procedure, which we will walk you through on the first day itself, and you don't have to worry on that regard at all.

Having said that, we are open to queries at all times which could be sent to us via mail. We firmly believe that together we could make this conference a memorable experience which shall prove to be highly enriching in terms of your intellectual and spiritual enlightenment.

Sincere Regards

Executive Board Member

Historic Crisis Committee

LITMUN

Note:

1. This Background guide is a study guide for further research work and it is not made for hurting or disrespecting any person his or her religious sentiment, caste and community.
2. Chits written prior to the commencement of this committee aren't allowed and only chits provided by the Organizing Team will be considered.
3. This background guide should be used as an introductory guide only, no reference to be made from the same. Also it is made by referring various websites and public data. Neither this BG should be used as a source to prove statistical data.

Committee background

Delegates let's time travel back to the year 1984 (31st October to 3rd November of 1984)

During 1984 it was become a matter of public debate, the whole world is making assumption upon us that a sacred country like India is dishonoring Sikh Religion & Community. This Historic Crisis Committee was formed for prohibiting riots and getting instant solution of it happening throughout the nation, At that time India was burning with massive religious ignition, major parts like Delhi Punjab, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar also other region were badly affected due to it.

The assassination of Late PM Indira Gandhi done by her bodyguards belonging to SIKH community painted the whole Sikh community as offenders. There is curfew like situation in every public places, pogrom, mass murder, arson, abduction, rape, acid throwing, immolation mob attacks are very common method of attack. The whole community is suffering also others civilians, school, universities, Hospitals, economic crisis were the immediate effect of riots. As at time 8% of the people in military consist of Sikh's there was also a mutiny like situation in Indian Military. Many political faces were involved for warming and funding.

During 31st October to 3rd November of 1984 our country has witnessed many civilian death, official figures states that 3,350 lives met to death but as per independent estimate 8000-17000 lives has been suffered specifically from Sikh Community.

As this massacre riots destroyed many lives, losses in terms of economic, social anger, temporary as well as future pain. The Committee will be discussing firstly for safeguarding life of the people specially belonging to the Sikh community, Disadvantaged class such as disabled, women and children were given special protection, investigation and inspection upon political contribution and illegal funding for warming the heat of riots also research work is welcomed consisting of allegations on political parties for heating up the debate. There is urgent need of Refugee camps, Medical-Aid, food courts and Relief measures. This committee's resolution will be seeding a new plant of peace, re-ensuring that the country is still Sovereign, Secular, Democratic, Social welfare of the people also having legislative power for preparing a legal framework having prospective effect for prohibiting the methods used in the riot of 1984 i.e. mob attack, acid attack, inciting public for wagging riots, spreading rumors etc

It is expected from the Executive board that HCC delegates should to use their political strategy in reformatory approach in making a conclusion for prosperous future of India.

INTRODUCTION

Our country is a multi religious nation, our culture is diverse in nature but we all are united and that's our strength. India is a secular state with no state religion. The Indian subcontinent is the birthplace of four of the world's major religions; namely Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. Islam is also one of the important religion through it is not originated from India.

During the Partition of India Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru following Mahatma Gandhiji's ideology wanted a united India but Mohd. Ali Jinnah wanted a separate Islamic state and attracted Khalistan ideologies to join Pakistan and make an independent dominion. Due to which there was a massive human migration from India to Pakistan and vice versa based on religion. Many get transferred many opted India by proud and by choice as a motherland.

After the Independence we officially became one of the biggest multi religious countries. The framers of the constitution shown their intent that every person has a right to preach his or her religion as enshrined in Article 25 to Article 28 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of religion to all the citizens residing within the territorial boundaries of the country.


1. Freedom of conscience and free profession of religion. (Article 25)
2. Freedom to manage religious affairs (Article 26)
3. Freedom from payment of taxes for promotion of any particular religion (Article 27)
4. Freedom to attend religious instructions (Article 28)

Also, Article 19(1) (a) of Indian Constitution says that all citizens have the right to freedom of speech and expression. Freedom of Speech and expression means the right to express one's own convictions and opinions freely by words of mouth, writing, printing, pictures or any other mode.

Overall our Democratic basic structure gives us freedom to challenge the union or the state for fulfilling their economic, social and religious wants subject to public, health and morality. Taking this right in positive manner led to prosperous growth of nation but if it used in contrary way then resulted unwanted destruction.

HISTORY OF KHALISTAN

The **Khalistan movement** is a Sikh separatist movement, which seeks to create a separate country called **Khalistān** ("The Land of the Khalsa") in the Punjab region to serve as a homeland for Sikhs. The territorial definition of the proposed country Khalistan consists of both the Punjab, India along with Punjab, Pakistan and includes parts of Khyber



Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh in Pakistan, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, and Rajasthan.

The declaration of the Khālsā by Guru Gobind Singh in 1699 and the religio-political vision that came with it fired the Sikh imagination with the belief that it was their God-given right to rule the Punjab. In 1710, under the leadership of Bandā Singh Bahādur (d. 1716), Sikh forces captured Sirhind, the most powerful Mughal administrative center between Delhi and Lahore, and established a capital in nearby Mukhlispur ("City of the Purified"). They struck coins, designed an official seal, and issued letters of command invoking the authority of God and of the Gurus. The belief that "the Khālsā shall rule" (*raj karegā Khālsā*) was formally added to Sikh liturgical prayer at the time, and it remains an indivisible part of it. Although the Khālsā Raj under Bandā Singh was short-lived, the idea found its realization in the early 19th century in the form of the kingdom of Maharaja Ranjīt Singh (1780–1839). Though the subsequent rapid decline of the Khālsā Rāj and its final loss to the British (1849) was a painful experience, it failed to extinguish many Sikhs' hope that the Khālsā Raj would yet return in some form. In the protracted negotiations that preceded the partition of the Punjab in 1947 the idea of an independent Sikh state figured prominently. The Sikh population's lack of numerical strength in relation to other residents of the Punjab made this an unviable proposition, but it has resurfaced in various forms since. In the 1970s and '80s a violent secessionist movement to create Khalistan paralyzed the Punjab for a decade. It received support from the All India Sikh Students' Federation and was led most effectively by Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. The movement failed for a complex set of reasons, but the idea of a state of the Khālsā continues to be invoked twice a day in gurdwaras (temples), as Sikhs mention in prayer their responsibility to rule

With the rise of Sikh nationalism in British India, the idea of a separate Sikh state first came up in the early 20th century. As a result of the British policy of divide and rule many religious nationalist movement emerged among the Hindus, Muslims and the Sikhs. The process involved differentiating the religions and creating communal boundaries.

PARTITION OF INDIA, 1947

Before the partition of India in 1947, Sikhs were not in majority in any of the districts of pre-partition British Punjab Province other than Ludhiana. The districts in the region had a majority of either the Hindus or Muslims depending on its location in the British province. Among the three major religions (Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism), Sikhs formed the largest group (41.6%) only in the Ludhiana district. When the Muslims proposed the creation of an Islamic-majority Pakistan, many Sikhs staunchly opposed the concept.

In late 1930s and 1940s the Sikh leaders realized that Muslim Pakistan and a Hindu India were imminent. To make a case for a separate Sikh state within the Punjab, Sikh leaders started mobilizing meta-commentaries and signs to argue that Punjab belonged to Sikhs and Sikhs belong to Punjab. This began the terrorization of the Sikh community. The Muslim League's Lahore Resolution demanded a separate country for Muslims. A section of Sikh leaders grew concerned that their community would be left without any homeland following the partition of India between the Hindus and the Muslims. They put forward the idea of Sikhistan, envisaging it as a theocratic state covering a small part of the greater Punjab region. The country which he proposed would include parts of present-day Indian Punjab, Pakistani Punjab (including Lahore), and the Simla Hill States. It was imagined as a theocratic state led by the Maharaja of Patiala with the aid of a cabinet consisting of the representatives of other units. The idea was unviable due to lack of sufficient Sikh population as compared to other religions in Punjab.

According to Oberoi, the terrorization of the Sikh community was formalized when Sikh political party Akali Dal in March 1946, passed a resolution proclaiming the natural association of Punjab and Sikh religious community.

British India was partitioned on a religious basis in 1947 and Punjab province was divided between India and newly created Pakistan. A majority of the Sikhs along with the Hindus migrated from the Pakistani province of Punjab to the Indian province of Punjab, which then included present-day Haryana and Himachal Pradesh. The Sikh population that in 1941 was as high as 19.8% in some districts of Pakistan, dropped to 0.1% in all of them, and it rose sharply in the districts assigned to India. They were still a minority in the Punjab province of India, which remained a Hindu-majority province.

ROLE OF INDIRA GANDHI IN INDIA'S POLITICS

Indira Gandhi was the daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of the independent Republic of India. She became a national political figure in 1955, when she was elected to the executive body of the Congress Party. In 1959, she served as president of the party and in 1964 was appointed to an important post in Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's ruling government. In January 1966, Lal Bahadur Shastri died, and Gandhi became head of the Congress Party and thus prime minister of India. Soon after becoming India's first female head of government, Gandhi was challenged by the right wing of the Congress Party, and in the 1967 election she won only a narrow victory and thus had to rule with a deputy prime minister¹.

In 1971, she won a resounding re-election victory over the opposition and became the undisputed leader of India. That year, she ordered India's invasion of Pakistan in support of the creation of Bangladesh, which won her greater popularity and led her New Congress Party to a landslide victory in national elections in 1972.

During the next few years, she presided over increasing civil unrest brought on by food shortages, inflation, and regional disputes. Her administration was criticized for its strong-arm tactics in dealing with these problems. Meanwhile, charges by the Socialist Party that she had defrauded the 1971 election led to a national scandal. In 1975, the High Court in Allahabad convicted her of a minor election infraction and banned her from politics for six years. In response, she declared a state of emergency throughout India, imprisoned thousands of political opponents, and restricted personal freedoms in the country. Among several controversial programs during this period was the forced sterilization of men and women as a means of controlling population growth.

In 1977, long-postponed national elections were held, and Gandhi and her party were swept from office. The next year, Gandhi's supporters broke from the Congress Party and formed the Congress (I) Party, with the "I" standing for "Indira." Later in 1978, she was briefly imprisoned for official corruption. In 1979, divisions with the ruling Janata Party led to the collapse of its government. New elections were held in January 1980, and the Congress (I) Party, with Indira as its head, won back the lower Indian parliament in a stunning reversal of its political fortunes. Gandhi, embraced by Indians who valued her strong leadership, was again prime minister. During the campaign of the election she made a door to door campaign policy, she also apologized in public for emergency proclamation this led to win the hearts of the people and the 7th general elections gave her a great response.

Morari ji desai served as 4th Prime Minister of India between 1977 and 1979 as the 4th Prime Minister of India and led the government formed by the Janata Party.

¹ www.history.com/this-day-in-history/indira-gandhi-convicted-of-election-fraud

Congress lobbied with Choudhary Charan Singh at that time he was Minority minister for attracting minority vote bank. Later, He was sworn in as the Prime Minister on 28 July 1979. During his term as Prime Minister the Lok Sabha never met. The day before the Lok Sabha was due to meet for the first time the Indian National Congress withdrew their support from his Bharatiya Lok Dal Government. Choudhary Charan Singh resigned and fresh elections were held six months later.²

7TH GENERAL ELECTIONS - JAN 1980

7th General Elections were held on 3rd and 6th Jan 1980. 59.6% of the voters participated in the General Elections³.

Since the Janata party got split into various factions due to their internal fight and political ambition, people got frustrated with the instability of the Government. Notwithstanding the emergency excesses and agonies, people voted Indira Gandhi back to power. Congress and her alliance parties won 374 seats. Congress alone got 353 seats (42.7% vote share), as against 189 seats (41% vote share) in 1977. Though the vote share of Congress has marginally increased only by 1.7%, because of the split of opposition parties, Congress could bag 353 seats.

Janata Party and its allies got only 34 seats. Janata party individually got only 31 seats (19% vote share), as against 295 seats (41.3% vote share) in 1977. The reduction of vote share has happened due to the split of Janata Party into various factions. Left parties bagged 53 seats.

Interestingly, DMK who was with Janata Party, because of the sufferings of Emergency, shifted its support to Indira Gandhi in 1980. AIADMK led by MG Ramachandran, who was earlier with Indira Gandhi, shifted his support to Janata Party.

With the sweeping majority of 353 seats, Indira Gandhi became the 8th Prime Minister of India on 14th January 1980.

P V Narasimha Rao (who became PM later), R Venkatraman (who became President of India later) and Zail Singh (who became President of India later) were the cabinet ministers in the Indira Gandhi cabinet.

DHARAM YUDH MORCHA

² www.indiainfoline.com/prime-ministers-of-india/charan-singh

³ www.primepoint.in/2013/09/rise-and-fall-of-indira-gandhi-general.html

The Akali Dal was initially opposed to Bhindranwale, and even accused him of being a Congress agent. However, as Bhindranwale became increasingly influential, the party decided to join forces with him. In August 1982, under the leadership of Harcharan Singh Longowal, the Akali Dal launched the *Dharam Yudh Morcha* ("Group for the Religious fight") in collaboration with Bhindranwale to win more autonomy for Punjab. The movement was hijacked by Bhindranwale who declared that it will continue until all the demands in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution were fulfilled.

Indira Gandhi considered the Anandpur Resolution as a secessionist document and evidence of an attempt to secede from the Union of India. The Akali Dal officially stated that Sikhs were Indians, and the Anandpur Sahib resolution did not envisage an autonomous Sikh State of Khalistan. The resolution was made fundamental to Bhindranwale's cause as the demand for autonomy was phrased such a way that would have given more authority to the Sikhs than Hindus in Punjab. Thousands of people joined the movement as they felt that it represented a real solution to their demands, such as a larger share of water for irrigation, and return of Chandigarh to Punjab.

After the launch of the Morcha, Sikh extremists began committing acts of political violence. Assassination of Chief Minister of Punjab Darabara Singh was attempted and two Indian Airlines flights were hijacked by the terrorists. By early October, more than 25,000 Akali workers courted arrest in Punjab in support of the agitation.

To restart the talks with the Akali leadership, Gandhi ordered the release of all Akali workers in mid October and sent Swaran Singh as her emissary. Bhindranwale who was then regarded as "*single most important Akali leader*" announced that nothing less than full implementation of the Anandpur resolution was acceptable to them. Other Akali leaders agreed to join the negotiations which ended with a compromised settlement with the governments team. The settlement was then presented in the parliament but certain parts of the agreement were changed unilaterally due to advice from Haryana and Rajasthan CMs.

THREATS OF DISRUPTION OF DELHI ASIAN GAMES

The Akali leaders, who were planning to announce a victory of Dharam Yudh morcha, were outraged by the change in the proposed settlement. In November 1982, Akali leader Longowal announced that the Akali Dal would disrupt the Asian Games that as to be held in Delhi by sending teams of Akali workers to Delhi to court arrest. Negotiations between the Akali Dal and the government followed but failed at the last moment due to the disagreement in the transfer of areas between Punjab and Haryana.

Akali leaders vowed to overwhelm Delhi with a flood of protestors with an aim to highlight the perceived "plight" of Sikhs in front of the international media covering the games.

A week before the Asian games, Haryana CM from Congress Bhajan Lal sealed the border between Delhi and Punjab. Frisking of all the Sikh visitors travelling from Punjab to Delhi was ordered. The security measures proved effective and Akali Dal could only organize small and scattered protests in Delhi. This frisking was seen as discriminatory and humiliating by the Sikhs. Many Sikhs who did not support Akalis and Bhindranwale began sympathizing with the Akali morcha.

After the conclusion of the games, the Akali leader Longowal organized a convention of Sikh ex-servicemen at the Darbar Sahib. It was attended by a large number of Sikh ex-servicemen including ret. Major General Shabeg Singh who subsequently became Bhindranwale's military advisor.

MILITANT ACTIVITIES

There were widespread murders in Punjab by followers of Bhindrawale. In the two-year period between 4 August 1982 and 3 June 1984 there were more than 1200 violent incidents in which 410 persons were killed and 1180 injured. Out of which in the year 1984 itself between 1 January and 3 June 775 violent incidents happened killing 298 and injuring 525. One such murder was that of DIG Avtar Singh Atwal, who was killed on 25 April 1983 at the gate of the Darbar Sahib. His corpse remained there for 2 hours as even police officers were afraid to touch the body without permission from Bhindranwale. This showed the power and influence that Bhindranwale had over the region.

It was common knowledge that the militants responsible for bombings and murders were taking shelter in some gurdwaras. However, the Congress-led government declared that it could not enter the gurdwaras for the fear of hurting Sikh sentiments. Detailed reports on the open shipping of arms-laden trucks were sent to the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi; however, the Government did not take any action to stop these. Finally, after the murder of six Hindu bus passengers in October 1983, emergency rule was imposed in Punjab, which continued for more than a decade.

Armed Khalistani militants of this period described themselves as "Kharku".

RELIGIOUS AMBIGUITY

During this incident, the Akali Dal began more agitation in February 1984, protesting against clause (2)(b) of Article 25 of the Indian constitution, which ambiguously states "the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina, or Buddhist religion", though it also implicitly recognises Sikhism as a separate religion with the words "the wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion." This clause is still deemed offensive by many minority religions in India even today, because of the failure to recognise these religions under the constitution separately.

The Akali Dal members demanded that the constitution remove any ambiguous statements that use the word Hindu to refer to Sikhs. For instance, a Sikh couple who married in accordance to the rites of the Sikh religion had to register their marriage either under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, or the Hindu Marriage Act – the Akalis demanded replacement of such rules with Sikhism-specific laws.

OPERATION BLUE STAR

Operation Blue Star was a military operation which was ordered by Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, to remove Sikh militants who were amassing weapons in the Harmandir Sahib Complex (Golden Temple) in Amritsar, in order to establish control over it. The operation was launched in response to a deterioration of law and order in Punjab.

The roots of Operation Blue Star can be traced from the Khalistan Movement. The Khalistan Movement was a political Sikh nationalist movement that wanted to create an independent state for Sikh people, inside the current North-Western Republic of India.

The Khalistan Movement originally started in the early 1940's and 50's, but the movement was most popular in the 1970s and 1980s. Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, who was the leader of the Damdami Taksal, was another important factor which led towards Operation Blue Star. Bhindranwale had a heavy influence on the Sikh youth in Punjab during this time as the leader of the Taksal. Bhindranwale propagated original values of Sikhism and persuaded people, both young and old to follow the rules and tenets of the religion. Bhindranwale is noted for his involvement in Operation Bluestar, in which he and Khalistan supporters occupied the Akal Takht complex, including the Golden Temple, in Amritsar. Bhindranwale was widely perceived to be a supporter for the creation of a proposed Sikhism-based theocratic state of Khalistan. The main motive of Operation Blue Star was to eliminate Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, along with other Sikh militants and regain control over the Harmandir Sahib in Amritsar.

Operation Blue Star had two components to it. The first one was Operation Metal, which was confined to the Harmandir Sahib (the Golden Temple) complex. Operation Metal was followed by Operation Shop. It raided the Punjab countryside, in order to capture any suspects. In the violent events leading up to Operation Blue Star since the inception of Akali Dharm Yudh Morcha, the militants had killed 165 Hindus and Nirankaris, and 39 Sikhs opposed to Bhindranwale. The total number of deaths was 410 in violent incidents and riots while 1,180 people were injured.⁴

⁴ Mark Tully, Satish Jacob (1985). "deaths+in+violent" *Amritsar; Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle* (e-book ed.). London. p. 147, Ch. 11.

Following it, Operation Woodrose, the second component, was launched throughout Punjab. The operation was carried out by Indian Army, using tanks, artillery, helicopters and armored vehicles. Operation Blue Star was launched to eliminate Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and other sikh militants who had taken cover in the Amritsar Harmandir Sahib Complex. Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and former Major General Shabeg Singh led the armed Sikhs within the Harmandir Sahib. The entire operation lasted for ten days. It started on June 1, 1984 and ended on June 10, 1984. Timeline of important dates:

June 1, 1984: 'Guru Ram Das Langar' building inside the Golden Temple was attacked by the Indian Army. In that attack, around 8-10 people died.

June 2, 1984: Approximate seven divisions of army were deployed Punjab. Media faced a blackout and transportation also suffered a major setback during that time. Outsiders were denied entry. In many parts of Amritsar, water and electricity supply was cut off.

June 3, 1984: Punjab faced a complete curfew as the army and para-military were patrolling around. Harmandir Sahib's entries and exits were completely sealed.

June 4, 1984: Ramgarhia Bungas, inside the Harmandir Sahib Complex was bombed. Ordnance QF 25 pounder was used to attack the Sikh militants. Gurcharan Singh Tohra, former head of SGPC, was appointed to negotiate with Bindrawale. However, the negotiations had failed.

June 5, 1984: Hotel Temple View and Brahm Boota Akhara, on the southwest fringes of the complex was attacked by BSF and CRPF.

June 6, 1984: Army used tanks to destroy the Akal Takhat.

June 7, 1984: Indian army had gained control over Harmandir Sahib complex.

Media Blackout: During the Operation Blue Star, the media in Punjab faced a blackout. Journalists were reportedly put in a military bus and abandoned at border of Haryana. In that period, Punjab faced a curfew and there was no transportation across the state. Journalists who tried to enter Punjab were denied entry. Indian nationals, who were working for foreign media were also denied entry into Punjab. All these incidents led to heavy criticism towards the government.

Bombing of Ari India Flight 182: On June 23, 1985, Air India Flight 182 which was operating on the Montreal–London–Delhi route, was blown up by a bomb at an altitude of 31,000 feet (9,400 m). The plane crashed into the Atlantic Ocean. A total of 329 people were killed, in which 268 were Canadians, 27 British citizens and 24 Indians. The majority of the victims who died were Indo-Canadians. The incident was the largest

mass murder in Canadian history. The attack is considered to be a retaliation against India for the Operation Blue Star, which carried out by the Indian Army to flush out several Sikh militants who had captured the Golden temple. Inderjit Singh Reyat, a Canadian national, is the only person legally convicted of involvement in the bombing.

Operation Black Thunder: India saw a repeat of Operation Blue Star a few years later. Operation Black Thunder was the name given to two operations that took place in India in the late 1980s, to flush out remaining Sikh activists from the Golden Temple. 'Black Cat' commandos of the National Security Guards were used in this operation. Similar to Operation Blue Star, these attacks were towards Khalistani militants who were using the Golden Temple in as a base. The first Operation Black Thunder took place on April 30, 1986. The second Operation Black Thunder began on May 9, 1988. The operation was headed by Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, who was the DGP of Punjab Police. Little damage was inflicted on the Golden Temple, compared to Operation Blue Star. It is known for the free access the media, unlike during Operation Blue Star. Operation Black Thunder was far more successful, compared to Operation Blue Star.

ASSASSINATION OF INDIRA GANDHI

On 31 October 1984, Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, was killed by her bodyguards belonging to SIKH community. The assassination sparked four days of riots that left more than 8,000 Indian Sikhs dead in revenge attacks. Professor Swaran Singh, Warwick Medical School, was a trainee surgeon in Delhi at the time. Ahead of a BBC Radio 4 documentary to mark the thirtieth anniversary of Indira Gandhi's death, in which Swaran revisits India with the BBC's Bobby Friction, Swaran shares his first-hand experience and photos from this tragic moment in India's history.

It was informed to Late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by the intelligence that her bodyguard were suspected as threat & to change them for safety reason but Indira strongly refused that it will spread a a wrong message for the whole community but Iron Lady's trusted bodyguards turned assailants

Her trusted bodyguards, Beant Singh and Satwant Singh were waiting for her at the gate. As soon as she crossed the gate, her trusted guards open fired at her. Sub-inspector Beant Singh fired three rounds into her abdomen from his .38 revolver. Satwant Singh then fired 30 rounds from his Sterling sub-machine gun into her after she had fallen to the ground.

RK Dhawan and a police officer, Dinesh Bhatt carried Indira Gandhi to her Ambassador car. Her political secretary Makhanlal Fotedar was also there. As they started for AIIMS hospital, Sonia Gandhi came running shouting mummy,

mummy. They all took Indira Gandhi to AIIMS, which was not yet informed about the incident and hence, there was no preparation to deal with the emergency⁵.

At around 9:30 am, Indira Gandhi was rushed to All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) in a white ambassador. Her daughter-in-law accompanied her. The doctors decided to operate on her. At the time, her son Rajiv Gandhi, who later succeeded her as the Prime Minister, was not in the capital. He was campaigning in Bengal for the elections that were upon them. Soon, Rajiv was informed that his mother is critical and he had to rush back to the capital.

Meanwhile, at the Prime Minister's house within six minutes of opening firing on the Prime Minister, Beant Singh and Satwant Singh were nabbed by Indo-Tibetan Border Police and Gandhi's other bodyguards respectively as both of them threw their weapons and stood their ground.

At AIIMS, team of doctors was operating on Indira Gandhi. Of the 33 bullets that were fired at Gandhi 30 had hit; 23 had passed through her body while seven were trapped inside. Dr Tirath Das Dogra extricated bullets to establish the identity of the weapons and to correlate each weapon with the bullets recovered by ballistic examination.

Beant Singh captured by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police was shot dead within minutes after the assassination. According to the reports circulated by media later, Beant Singh allegedly initiated the firing resulting in his death. Satwant Singh was arrested and prosecuted.

At 2: 20 p.m, the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had succumbed to her injuries, but the news of her assassination was announced almost 10 hours later on Doordarshan's evening news show.

Following the assassination of Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984, by her bodyguards at her New Delhi residence, Rajiv Gandhi was sworn as the 6th Prime Minister⁶ of the country at 6:45 pm, without needing an interim government. At 8:00 pm, news reader Salma Sultan announced the death of the Prime Minister to the nation on Doordarshan. Soon after that, Rajiv Gandhi addressed the nation.

By midnight, the rumours and the news of riots throughout the country had started coming in. Satwant Singh and conspirator Kehar Singh were sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out on January 6, 1989.

⁵ <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/the-last-day-of-indira-gandhi-1379440-2018-10-31>

⁶ <https://www.culturalindia.net/leaders/rajiv-gandhi.html>

ANTI SIKH RIOTS 1984

Assassination Of Indira Gandhi led to the Anti-Sikh Riots across India. After the assassination of Indira Gandhi on October 31 1984, anti-Sikh riots took place on 1 November 1984. It continued for a few days, which killed more than 3,000 Sikhs.

The worst affected areas were Sultanpuri, Mangolpuri, Trilokpuri, and other Trans-Yamuna areas of Delhi. Mobs made use of iron rods, knives, and combustible material such as kerosene and petrol. The mob attacked Sikh neighbourhoods, brutally killing any Sikh men or women they could find. Their shops and houses were destroyed and burned. In other incidents, armed mobs also stopped buses and trains, in and around Delhi. They pulled out Sikh passengers, who were doused with kerosene and burnt alive. Others were dragged out from their homes and attacked with bladed weapons.

Throughout the night of October 31 and morning of November 1, Congress leaders met the local supporters to distribute money and weapons. 100 rupee notes and bottles of liquor were handed out to the mob. It is also said that Delhi police kept its 'eyes closed' during the riot as it was pre-planned. On October 31, Congress party officials provided the mob with voter lists and ration lists. The lists were used to find the location of Sikh homes and business, Without the lists, it would have been an impossible task to locate the Sikhs.

A fact-finding team jointly organised by the People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) and People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) in the course of investigations from November 1 to November 10, has come to the conclusion that the attacks on members of the Sikh Community in Delhi and its suburbs during the period, far from being a spontaneous expression of "madness" and of popular "grief and anger" at Indira Gandhi's assassination as made out to be by the authorities, were the out-come of a well-organised plan marked by acts of both deliberate commission and omission by important politicians of the Congress(I) at the top and by authorities in the administration. Although there was indeed popular shock, grief and anger, the violence that followed was the handiwork of a determined group which was inspired by different sentiments altogether. Experiences of individual members of the fact-finding team as well as their extensive interviews with the

- (i) victims of the riots;
- (ii) police officers who were expected to suppress the riots;
- (iii) neighbors of the victims who tried to protect them;
- (iv) army personnel; and

- (v) political leaders, suggest that the attacks on the Sikhs followed a common pattern, whether they took place in Munirka in the south or Mangolpuri in the west, or Trilokpuri in the east.

The uniformity in the sequence of events at every spot in such far-flung places proves beyond doubt that the attacks were master-minded by some powerful organised groups. As a senior army officer deployed in Delhi during the recent riots said: This arson is the work of an expert." Newspaper reports suggest that this pattern is similar in all Congress (I) ruled states.

There was also a definite pattern discernible in the choice of the victims made by the assailants. According to the 1971 Census figures Sikh males in the age group 20-50 in Delhi number approximately 100,000. The Sikhs who were killed in the recent riots largely belonged to this age group. The official estimate of only 325 killed (including 46 Hindus) till November 7 (Hindustan Times, November 11) sounds ridiculously low compared to the magnitude of arson, lynching and burning alive of people in the resettlement colonies alone. On the basis of information gathered from various sources, including eye-witnesses, survivors and relatives of the dead, the team estimates that the number of those killed is more than a thousand.

From the team's talks with the victims and their neighbors in almost every riot-hit spot, it could reconstruct the sequence of events, which followed a stereotyped pattern everywhere. The first phase was marked by the floating of a set of rumors on the evening of October 31, following the announcement of Indira Gandhi's death.

The rumors were three. First, Sikhs were distributing sweets and lighting lamps to celebrate Indira Gandhi's death. (Later during the team's investigations when it asked the residents of the affected localities whether anyone from among them had actually seen such things, almost everyone admitted that they had not personally witnessed them), but had heard from someone else. It did however come across a few people who while expressing revulsion at the incidents of assaults on the Sikhs, added that they had seen in some places some Sikhs expressing their glee at Indira Gandhi's death by demonstrative gestures. It has reports that some isolated groups of non-Sikhs also exhibited similar behavior. From the information that it has gathered from various sources, the team's impression is that such cases were few and isolated. The second rumor was that train-loads of hundreds of Hindu dead bodies had arrived at Old Delhi Station from Punjab. Third, that water was poisoned by the Sikhs. As for the two latter rumours, the team came across evidence of policemen in vans touring certain localities and announcing through loudspeakers the arrival of the train and the poisoning of water. In certain areas, it heard that police officials had rung up residents advising them not to drink water. These rumours (the last two were officially repudiated later) contributed to the shaping of a public mind that acquiesced in the attacks and murders that took place soon after.

The second phase began with the arrival of groups of armed young people in tempo vans, scooters, motorcycles or trucks from the night of October 31 and morning of November 1 at various places like Munirka, Saket, South Extension, Lajpat Nagar, Bhogal, Jangpura and Ashram in the south and south-east; the Con-naught Circus shopping area in the centre and later the trans-Jamuna colonies and resettlement colonies in other areas in the north. With cans of petrol they went around the localities and systematically set fire to Sikh houses, shops and gurudwaras. The team was told by the local eye-witnesses in all the areas it visited, that well known Congress(I) leaders and workers (their names are to be found in the Annexure to the team's report) led and directed the arsonists and that local cadres of the Congress(I) identified the Sikh houses and shops. A senior police official who for understandable reasons does not want to be named, pointed out: The shop signs are either in Hindi or English. How do you expect the illiterate arsonists to know whether these shops belonged to Hindus or Sikhs, unless they were identified to them by someone, who is either educated or a local person?" In some areas, like Trilokpuri, Mangolpuri. and the trans-Jamuna colonies, the arsonists consisted of Gujjar or Jat farmers from neighboring villages, and were accompanied by local residents, some of whom again were Congress(I) activists. In these areas, the team was told, Congress (I) followers of the Bhangi caste (belonging to the scheduled caste community) took part in the looting. In South Delhi, buses of the Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) were used by the miscreants to move from place to place in their murderous journey. How could the DTC allow its buses to be used by criminals?

The attacks in the resettlement colonies (e g, Trilokpuri in the trans-Jamuna area and Mangolpuri in the west) where the maximum number of murders took place again displayed the same pattern. The targets were primarily young Sikhs. They were dragged out, beaten up and then burnt alive. While old men, women and children were generally allowed to escape, their houses were set on fire after the looting of valuables. Documents pertaining to their legal possession of the houses were also burnt. In some areas of Mangolpuri the team heard from the survivors that even children were not spared. The team also came across reports of gang-rape of women. The orgy of destruction embraced a variety of property ranging from shops, factories, houses to gurudwaras and schools belonging to the Sikhs, In all the affected spots, a calculated attempt to terrorize the people was evident in the common tendency among the assailants to burn alive the Sikhs on public roads. Even five days after the incidents, on November 6, in the course of one of its regular visit to Mangolpuri the team found that although the ashes had been cleared, the pavement in front of the Congress(I) office was still blotched with burnt patches, which the local people had earlier pointed out as spots where four Sikhs were burnt alive.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF ASSAILANTS

The team members on the basis of extensive interviews in different parts of the city were able to piece together the characteristics of the mobs that were responsible for the looting, arson and killings.

In some cases the mobs were brought from outside the locality (where they were set loose by local political leaders) and Jats and Gujjars from neighboring villages. They were transported in vehicles. A large number of Scheduled Caste people were also a part of the mob.

More important, in the areas which were most affected, such as Trilokpuri, Mangolpuri and Sultanpuri, the mobs were led by local Congress(I) politicians and hoodlums of that locality. These areas, it will be recalled, were set up in the urban resettlement drive initiated by the Congress(I), and have since been active support bases of the Congress(I). These areas have also in the recent past provided the Congress(I) rallies in the city substantial numerical support. In other words, there exists in such areas an established organizational network through which masses are mobilized for demonstration of Congress(I)'s ostensible popular support. A veteran politician based in Delhi put it very crisply when he said that these resettlement colonies "are they kept [rakhel] of the Congress(I)".

The participation of the Jats and Gujjars from the so-called "urban villages" of Delhi played a very strong role in adding to the numbers of rioters and in aiding the riots, murders and looting. They were particularly dominant in west and south Delhi. Most of these villagers who once owned land in Ber Sarai, Munirka, and Mohammadpur, for instance made a tidy sum of money after their land was taken away for the urban expansion of New Delhi. The land owned by these villagers was generally of a very poor quality with no irrigational facilities. For this reason the villagers in these areas had to augment their resources through non-agricultural means, not least of them being brigandage. After their lands were acquired by the government they suddenly became prosperous and began to exert themselves politically as well. It is a known fact that if one is to make any headway in an election the Gujjars and Jats of these areas have to be one's side. Unfortunately, much of the police force which is stationed in this area and around is drawn from these communities. For this reason, on various occasions there has been a noticeable complicity in these areas between the criminals and the police. This truth was brought home starkly during the recent riots.

As for the Scheduled Caste communities who were displaced due to the acquisition of land for urban expansion those from the Valmiki community utilized the benefits of the reservation policy and came into the city where they found jobs in the police, UPSC, etc. The Bhangis went into the corporation, while the third major group, the Dhanaks, considered the lowest caste, is engaged in a variety of odd jobs. Among the Scheduled Caste communities living in the resettlement colonies, the Valmikis are predominantly supporters of Jagjivan Ram, while the Bhangis are solid supporters of Congress (I).

Information gathered by the team from the trouble spots in these areas suggests that the Bhangis—many of them working as sweepers in the corporation—comprised the bulk of the local miscreants who attacked the Sikhs.

A few words on the composition of Delhi's population may be relevant at this point. Hindus comprise 83 per cent of Delhi's population. The present Sikh population is around 7.5 per cent (an estimated 500,000 people). A majority of them settled in Delhi after the partition, before which their population was only 1.2 per cent of the total population of the city.

ROLE OF POLICE

All through the period from October 31 to November 4—the height of the riots—the police all over the city uniformly betrayed a common behavioral pattern, marked by (i) total absence from the scene; or (ii) a role of passive spectators; or (iii) direct participation or abetment in the orgy of violence against the Sikhs. On November 1, when the team toured the Lajpat Nagar area it found the police conspicuous by its absence while Sikhs' shops were being set on fire and looted. Young people armed with swords, daggers, spears, steel tri-shuls, and iron rods were ruling the roads. The only sign of police presence was a police jeep, which obstructed a peace procession brought out by a few concerned citizens (who later organised themselves into the Nagarik Ekta Manch) on the evening of November 1. When the procession was on its way to the Lajpat Nagar' main market, a police inspector from the van stopped the procession, warned it not to proceed reminding its members that the city was under curfew and Section 144. When leaders of the procession wanted to know from the police inspector why the arsonists and rioters were not being dispersed if curfew was on, he gave no reply and warned instead that the pro-cessionists could go to the Lajpat Nagar market at their own risk. At the Lajpat Nagar market, leaders of the procession sought to pacify the mob by pointing out that innocent Sikhs were not responsible for Indira Gandhi's assassination and should be protected from the Attacks. They raised the slogan: "Hindu-Sikh bhai bhai!" As the crowd began to listen to the speeches made by the procession leaders, organised attempts were made by certain groups from among them to shout down the speakers, by raising the slogan: "Indira Gandhi zindabad! Hindu-Hindu bhai bhai". It is significant that wherever the team went, it did not find any sign of mourning or grief on the faces of those who were participating in the looting and burning. Attempts to pacify them by the peace marchers were met with derisive laughter. Listening to their raucous exultation and looking at their gleeful faces, one would have thought it was a festival, but for the arson and loot that was going on.

In the resettlement colonies, the police came out from their passive role and directly participated in the violence against the Sikhs. The team was told by survivors that at the first signs of tension those who felt threatened personally went to the nearby police stations to seek their intervention. But the police did not respond. In Trilokpuri, the

police reportedly accompanied the arsonists and provided them with diesel from their jeeps. The Station House Officer (SHO) of Kalyanpuri police station, under which Trilokpuri falls, withdrew the constables who were on duty there when Sikh girls were being raped. Much later, the higher authorities took action against the SHO and his two colleagues by suspending and arresting them for criminal negligence of duties. In Sultanpuri, the SHO, one Bhatti, is alleged to have killed two Sikhs and helped the mob in disarming those Sikhs who tried to resist the mob.

Several residents of Loni Road in the trans-Jamuna area, who were camping at Shakarpur when the team interviewed them on November 7, said that the police announced on loud-speakers two or three times at night on November that they would not be responsible for the safety of the Sikhs and that the latter must look after themselves. One woman from the same area said she had seen a police jeep full of men and that the stoning of Sikh shops was conducted from the jeep. Another resident from the same road said that the police had incited the looting of a watch shop before it was burnt.

In Kotla Mubarakpur, a domestic worker told the team members that the police had encouraged the looting. Later they were reported to have said to the looters; "We gave you 36 hours. Had we given the Sikhs that amount of time, they would have killed every Hindu."

In the Kingsway Camp, residents claimed that 70 per cent of the loot was to be found in the police lines, suggesting that the police took a leading role in the plundering.

When after the destruction and murders, people went to complain and file FIRs, the police in many areas refused to record their complaints, according to information gathered from the Hindu neighbours of the victims. A respected Sikh professional whose house was burned on 1st November was not able to register an FIR despite all efforts. In Mangolpuri the team was told that a police officer asked the Hindu complainants why they were protecting Sikhs and advised them to look after the safety of Hindus. Typical was the experience of Dharam Raj Pawar and Rajvir Pawar, two residents of Ber Sarai, who on November 1, went to Sector IV, R K Puram police station to ask for protection of a Sikh family (which till then was being sheltered by Hindu neighbors from impending attacks by a mob led by a Congress(I) man, Jagdish Tokas). The officer in charge of the police station reportedly told them that he could not offer any help. Two constables later said to them: "You being Jats should have killed those Sikhs. What are you doing here? Don't you know a train has arrived from Punjab carrying bodies of massacred Hindus?"

A few individual police officials who did try to intervene and stop the riots found their efforts frustrated primarily through lack of co-operation from the top. One senior officer told the team that when on October 31 and November 1 he received reports about

some 2,000 to 3,000 people moving around the city in scooters and motorcycles without helmets, he contacted the CID seeking information from them regarding the identity of these people. Till November 7, when we met him, he had not received any report from the CID.

While analyzing the role of the police during the crucial period, the responsibility of those in position of authority at the top, namely the Home Ministry, cannot be ignored. The Home Minister, Narasimha Rao, who was inducted into the new Cabinet by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi soon after Indira Gandhi's death, was empowered in his capacity as Home Minister, to deploy the para-military forces (if the Delhi police force was found to be inadequate or inefficient) to quell the violence. Rao is not a new incumbent who is unaware of the procedural technicalities. Why did Rao, with his past experience as a Home Minister in the previous cabinet, fail to take the necessary steps and summon the forces available to him to nip in bud the communal elements that organised the riots?

ROLE OF ADMINISTRATION

Men at the top in the administration and the ruling party displayed repeatedly a Curious lack of concern often bordering on deliberate negligence of duty and responsibility through-out the period October 31 to November 4. From the team's talks with various opposition party leaders and prominent citizens it found that many among them had got in touch with senior Ministers as well as people in the Delhi administration on October 31 itself, warning of impending trouble following the announcement of Indira Gandhi's assassination. The newly sworn in Home Minister Narasimha Rao was said to have assured BJP leader Atal Behari Vajpayee on October 31 evening that "every-thing would be brought under control within a couple of hours" (The Statesman, November 10). Yet, at the same time on the same day, Gautam Kaul, Additional Commissioner of Police in front of the All India Medical Institute, referring to the disturbances which were just breaking out, said: "We cannot deal with the situation of this nature" (Indian Express, November 1). Strangely enough, even after this, Kaul has been made Additional Commissioner, Security. In spite of such warnings given well in advance, those in positions of authority did not seem to bother to take any firm step.

Soon after the assassination, the team heard from a reliable source, a meeting was held at 1, Safdarjung Road, the Prime Minister's official residence in which the Lt Governor P G Gavai, a Congress(I) leader M L Fotedar and the Police Commissioner, among others took part. A senior police officer present at this meeting expressed the view that the army should be called as otherwise there would be a holocaust. No attention was paid to the view.

On November 1, when almost all of Delhi was aflame, an opposition MP rang up Shiv Shankar, a Minister in Rajiv Gandhi's new cabinet, and the Home Minister, Narasimha Rao, to inform them about the situation in the city and the need for army action. The

Ministers were reported to have assured him that army was about to be called and curfew would be imposed. (Several citizens including some senior governmental Officials went to the President of India on the afternoon of November 1, and they were told that the government was still considering whether to call out the army.) But the team's experience on November 1 tells a different story. As already mentioned earlier, till late night there were no signs of either curfew or army, while miscreants were on the rampage in front of the police. In the heart of the city, Connaught Circus, Sikh-owned shops were being set on fire right under the nose of heavy paramilitary and police pickets. The team later heard that the DC of Faridabad had asked for army on November 1, but troops arrived only on November 3.

On November 2, although the newspapers that day announced three official measures: (i) clamping of an indefinite curfew; (ii) shoot at sight orders; and (iii) deployment of army since 2 pm the previous day, when the team went around South Delhi in the afternoon of November 2, it found that the miscreants were not only at large, but had swelled in numbers and had become more defiant. In the Lajpat Nagar market, while police pickets sat by idly, hundreds of young men, armed with swords, trishuls and iron rods, blocked the main road. Around 2 pm an army convoy passed through the road. The miscreants did not scamper or panic. They merely made way for the convoy to pass by temporarily retreating to the by-lanes, and regrouped themselves as soon as the convoy left and began intimidating a peace march that had arrived on the spot.

On the morning of November 2, 8.30 am on-wards, two opposition MPs repeatedly requested both Narasimha Rao and Shiv Shankar to provide army protection to trains carrying sikh passengers arriving from Punjab. No troops were sent, with the result that every train was left at the mercy of gangsters who dragged out Sikhs from the incoming train compartments, lynched them, threw their bodies on the platforms or the railway tracks and set on fire many. Newspapers report that 43 persons were killed. This was denied by Dordarshan in the evening. Visiting the Tughlakabad station around 3.30 pm the Statesman reporter saw "two bodies still smoldering on the platforms, right in front of the armed force standing on the opposite platform across the tracks" (November 3). The troops had either arrived after the incident or the incident took place in front of the troops who did not intervene. While analyzing the role of the administration, it is not enough to blame the Delhi ad-ministration and the bureaucrats only. The Lt Governor, Gavai, who was in charge of ad-ministration of Delhi during the period under review and who has been replaced now, could not have acted on his own—whether in regard to acts of commission or omission. Both the Delhi administration and the Union Cabinet Ministers, including the Home Minister, were well-informed of the sequence of events beginning from the evening of October 31 (as is evident from the report of communication between the opposition leaders and the Cabinet Ministers as recorded earlier). The team is left wondering whether the Union Ministers failed to direct the Lt Governor to take action, or did the Ministers direct and the Lt Governor refuse to abide

by their directives? In that case, should not the Union government punish the Lt Governor? But the team was merely told on November 4 that Gavai had "proceeded on leave" and that M M K Wali had taken over. What is further intriguing is the appointment of Wali as the Lt Governor. Wali was the Home Secretary before his new appointment.

The record of what happened in Delhi from October 31 to November 3 (the eve of Wali's appointment) is sufficient to prove the failure of the Home Ministry administrative machinery in suppressing the riots. The team wonders why the former Home Secretary, in spite of the proven failure of an administration of which he was a leading component, has been appointed the Lt Governor. As evident from its review of official relief operations (see below), Wali's administration seems to continue the same policy of callousness and inefficiency towards the refugees as was demonstrated past towards the Sikh victims during the riots.

ROLE OF ARMY

Enquiries made by the team at various quarters ranging from the affected localities to army sources led it to two questions. First, why was there a delay in calling out the troops? Second, even when the army was called in, why were they not effective in imposing a curfew and curbing the violence?

The authorities at the top, including the four Ministers and senior officials of the Delhi administration, were repeatedly informed about the exact situation in the city and its outskirts from the evening of October 31. Prominent citizens, VIPs and members of the opposition parties and people from affected localities both phoned and personally went and informed these authorities. Yet during the seven valuable hours, between the time of the assassination and the time of the news of the death was made public, no security measures were taken.

As a senior government servant put it, there are standing instructions on dealing with such situations. The SP and DCs have powers under the Criminal Procedure Code (Sections 130-131) to call in the armed forces in aid to civil powers. Further, the paramilitary troops, including the Delhi Armed Police, CRPF are always available for such a situation. According to the team's information, one brigade was available at Delhi which could have been requisitioned immediately.

The troops were alerted on the afternoon of the 31st. This means that within a few hours brigades from Meerut and Agra could have arrived at Delhi by the night of the 31st. As senior army officers put it, it is not the numerical strength of troops that is the crucial factor for imposing curfew. The crucial factor is clarity of intent and firm and clear instructions.

Despite announcements in the papers, the AIR and Doordarshan about shoot at sight orders and imposition of curfew the troops were left without specific information from the

police on the exact locations of the riots. No joint control room was set up. In contrast, only a few days later, the authorities did not find any difficulty in moving a full brigade to the Indian Army consisting of 3,000 men and another 1,000 personnel from the navy and the air force to line up the route of Indira Gandhi's funeral.

The procedure to call in troops is simple; The Lt Governor has to inform the Home Minister of the law and order situation and the latter informs the Defence Minister (Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was holding this portfolio) who gets in touch with the army to call in the troops.

An essential ingredient for successful joint army-civilian administration operation is the setting up of a joint control room. During 1947 riots, when Lord Mountbatten was requested by Jawaharlal Nehru to control the communal situation, the former set up a joint control room at Rashtrapati Bhavan in order to co-ordinate the efforts of the, civil administration and the armed forces. This precedent was quoted to Narasimha. Rao by an elderly resident of Delhi, who is well-versed in army operations. Yet, from October 31 to November 4 (the peak period of the riots which according to old-timers were reminiscent of the 1947 riots in Delhi) no effort was made to set up a joint control room. The Commissioner of Police was operating from his office at ITO Police head-quarters. The Army area commander was at the Dhaula Kuan cantonment, and the Lt Governor was at Raj Nivas. As a result, even after the deployment of troops, army people constant-ly complained about lack of information and co-operation from the police regarding the areas of tension. Even with the imposition of curfew, there were no authorities to implement it. An army major complained to a Delhi news reporter on November 4 that his men were not only getting no co-operation from the Shakarpur police station, but were often being deliberately misled by the police. The same reporter during a tour of the city on November 2, came across army personnel ranging from JCOs to majors, roaming around pathetically after having lost touch either with headquarters or with their formations.

Army officers complained that they were not provided with scouts by the police to lead them to the trouble spots. In one instance a major who was asking for directions was carrying a map dated 1974, where the resettlement colonies (where the violence reached its peak during the period under survey) did not figure.

One army source told the team members that the deployment of troops followed a strange pattern. They were deployed by the civil authorities in stages, and in almost every case they were deployed after houses in the trouble spots had been burnt to cinders and the massacre was over. This explains the limited number of army firings (12) and the casualties from army firings (2 deaths and 4 injured) during the entire period (Major-Gen J S Jamwal's statement of November 7, Indian Express, November 8). The deployment reached full strength only after the 3,000 troops and vehicles reserved for the funeral were made available to curb the violence. The entire nature of

using the army as revealed from the above sequence of events compels the team to suspect whether there was not a deliberate design to keep the army ineffective even after it was called in—and that too following a long interval during which the arson, looting and massacre were allowed to continue, sometimes with the direct connivance of the local police force.

Whatever might have been the motive for such a curious manner of utilizing the army and whoever might have been responsible for reducing it to an impotent observer, the effects of such a policy have been quite disastrous for the morale of the army. Every army person the team talked to expressed anguish over the way that the army's authority was being undermined. The 6th report of the National Police Commission has stated: "We note with concern the growing tendency on the part of the district authorities to seek instructors from higher quarters where none are necessary.' It appears that the civilian administrators in Delhi although armed adequately with powers under the law to use the army to suppress disturbances, did not care to use those powers.

The question that needs to be probed is: why did the civil administration betray a set pattern of acts of omission, marked by a consistent failure to take steps against erring policemen and a stubborn refusal to deploy the army properly? Further, an analysis of the role of the army during the period under survey leaves a few questions that need to be answered by the people in positions of authority. According to the procedure laid down under the law, the Lt Governor can request the Home Minister who in turn can ask the Defense Minister for army deployment. On October 31, the new cabinet had already been sworn in with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi himself in charge of Defense and Narasimha Rao as the Home Minister. With the growing deterioration in the law and order situation in Delhi, when by November 1 the local police machinery had proved its failure to control the situation— either through negligence or connivance with the rioters—did the Lt Governor request the Home Ministry for army aid? Even if he did not, was it not the responsibility of the Home Minister to deploy the army? Since the Prime Minister had taken over the Defence portfolio, was it not his responsibility to deploy the army as soon as he realised that the police had failed (which was quite evident by November 1)? By removing a few civilian administrators (like Gavai) or police officers (like the Delhi Police Commissioner, Subhash Tandon) how can the government at the Centre absolve itself of the blame of neglecting its obligations to the citizens and its responsibility to maintain law and order—and this in spite of several warnings to the effect that Hindu-Sikh riot was bound to take place?

The experience of the team members gives rise to the suspicion that both the administration and the Cabinet might have abdicated their responsibility and that extra-administrative forces were sterling the deployment and operation of troops. On November 3, a group of concerned citizens visited Trilokpuri where they were requested by panic-stricken survivors of a widespread holocaust (described later) to intervene on

their behalf and seek army protection. They tried, to get in touch with various people both in the administration and the Cabinet to convey to them the request of the Trilokpuri victims. No one was available, either in their offices or homes.

Hoping that opposition MPs might have a better access to the authorities the group approached Biju Patnaik, George Fernandes, Chandra Sekhar and Madhu Dandavate among others—all of whom told the group that their repeated attempts to contact Ministers and officials had yielded no results. In a final desperate move, accompanied by Dandavate, they went to 1, Safdarjung Road, the Prime Minister's official residence, and managed to meet a Congress(I) MP, Arun Nehru. When the group conveyed to him the request of the Trilokpuri residents, he said that he would send a "wireless-message" for army deployment. Only after this, were troops sent to Trilokpuri—but that also again merely for patrolling.

ROLE OF CONGRESS (I)

The surmise that during the period under survey the legitimate authorities were superseded and decision-making powers were assumed by a few individual Congress(I) leaders is confirmed not only by the above mentioned incident, but also the experience of residents in the riot-hit areas. The team was told both by Hindus and Sikhs—many among the latter Congress(I) supporters—that certain Congress (I) leaders played a decisive role in organising the riots. Residents of Mangolpuri told the team that they saw Ishwar Singh, a Congress(I) cooperator among many others (their names are given as annexure to the team's report) actively participating in the orgy of violence. All these people were described by the local residents as lieutenants of the Congress(I) MP from the area, Sajjan Kumar. Similarly in Anand Parbat, Congress(I) councilors like Bhairava, Mahendra and Mangat Ram, considered to be loyal followers of the Congress(I) MP Dharamdas Shastri, were named as the main culprits. In Prakash Nagar, Congress(I) people were found carrying voters' lists to identify Sikh households. In the Gandhi agar area again, a local Congress(I) councillor Sukhanlal was identified by the victims as the main leader of the assailants. Escapees from the area whom the team met at the Shakarpur relief camp on November 6 blamed the Congress(I) MP from the area, K H L Bhagat, for having master-minded the riots. On November 1, Satbir Singh (Jat) a Youth Congress(I) leader brought buses filled with people from Ber Sarai to the Sri Guru Harkishan Public School at Munirka and burnt the school building and buses and continued looting and assaults on Sikhs the whole night. Another group of miscreants led by Jagdish Tokas, a Congress(I) corporator joined the above group in looting and assaults. In the Safdurjung-Kidwai Nagar area of south Delhi, eyewitness accounts by those who stood in front of All India Medical Institute from where Indira Gandhi's body was taken out in procession on the evening of October 31, confirmed the presence of the Congress(I) councilor of the area, Arjan Dass, at the time when attacks on Sikh pedestrians, bus drivers and conductors began.

The allegations against these individuals repeatedly voiced by the residents of the respective localities which the team visited, cannot be dismissed as politically motivated propaganda, since many among the Sikhs who accused them of complicity in the riots, had been traditionally Congress(I) voters. Sufferers from Trilokpuri and Mangolpuri resettlement colonies whom the team met looked dazed and uncomprehending when they said: "We were allotted these houses here by Indiraji. We have always voted for her party. Why were we attacked?"

Additional indications of the involvement of the above-mentioned Congress(I) leaders in the riots was provided later when the team heard that the Congress(I) MPs from the respective areas were putting pressure on the local police station to release the culprits who had been rounded up on November 3/4. On November 5, Dharmadas Shastri went to the Karol Bagh police station to protest against police "misbehaviour" with those who were found in possession of looted property (Indian Express, November 6), Shastri however dismissed the report as false. At about the same time, H K L Bhagat, another Congress(I) MP, was reported to be trying to secure the release of several criminals who had been arrested by the Gandhinagar police station. Describing the dilemma before the police, a senior police official said to the team members: "Sher pinjre se nikal diya: phir kahte hain pakad ke le ao!" (First the tigers are let loose from their cages and then we are ordered to round them up.) When asked who was releasing them, he gave a knowing smile.

The same official told the team that when some Congress(I) leaders came to a police station seeking the release of their followers, they were asked to accompany a police party in a raid on some houses for recovery of looted property. But these leaders refused when they were told that they would have to be "witnesses."

The team also heard of cases where even Sikhs close to the Congress(I) leaders were not spared. In Sajjan Kumar's house at Paschimpuri on November 6, the "team members were introduced to an elderly Sikh gentleman who claimed to be an old Congressman whose shop was burnt by miscreants. He said that he knew who the culprits were. When the team members asked him why he did not file a complaint with the police, he said he would do it at the right time. Sajjan Kumar's secretary drew the team members aside and dropped a hint that the RSS workers had been behind the arson. He however could not name any particular RSS leader or activist. Charanjit Singh, a Sikh Congress(I) MP from Delhi, suffered a loss of Rs 10 crore when his Pure Drinks factories were burnt down. Narrating his experience Singh said: "I telephoned the Lt Governor and the police several times, telling them that mobs were burn-ing our factories. I was told that the force would be arriving but that never happened." He added that he had been a "failure" to his constituents, since all assistance "was denied to him" (Statesman, November 10)

The administration appears to have been persuaded by the decision-makers at the top to treat the alleged criminals with kid gloves. Inquiries at some of the police stations in the affected areas revealed that the police had announced that those in possession of looted property should submit them within a stipulated time period and that they would be let off if they did so. A Senior Police Officer simply described this to us as a "Voluntary Disclosure Scheme". This is a strange way of dispensing justice. Restoration of the booty by the looters is no substitute for their punishment. In the absence of any convincing explanation on the part of the authorities for this extraordinarily queer way of dealing with criminals, the team is left with the suspicion that there is a calculated design by some influential forces to protect them.

The Congress(I) High Command's reluctance to probe into the allegations against their own councillors and other leaders further lends credence to the suspicions voiced above. Even Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi seems to dismiss the serious charges being levelled against his party men. On November 6, when Charan Singh, who accompanied a team of opposition leaders in a deputation to Gandhi, drew his attention to the reports of Congress(I) men pressurising the police to get their followers released, which had appeared in the Indian Ex-press some days back, Gandhi said that he had heard about it and then retorted that the Indian Express was the opposition's paper just as the National Herald was Congress(I)'s. The next day the AICC(I) headquarters came out with a statement saying that the allegations were utterly malicious. On November 8 however, Gandhi asked his senior party colleagues to probe into every allegation of Congress(I) workers' involvement in the violent incidents. But till today, no one knows what will be the nature of the "probe".

In fact G K Moopanar, who is in charge of the organization in the AICC(I), told newsmen on November 9 that he had not received any intimation for any such inquiry so far.

It is difficult to believe that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, was unaware of the activities of important and well known members of his party for full five days (from October 31 to November 5). Gandhi had been the General Secretary of AICC(I) since 1982 and in charge of reorganising his party. He had been presiding over training camps for Congress(I)'workers at various places. The team wonders how after all these training programmes the cadres of Indira Gandhi's party could go on such a murderous rampage.

ROLE OF MEDIA AND OPPOSITION

Although the team does not intend at this stage to go into the role of the media during the riots, a few words in this connection may not be out of place. The first day's evening bulletins (October 31) brought out by different newspaper establishments stated that there were "two Sikhs and one clean shaven Sikh" among the assailants. The reporters did not clarify whether the news was from official or unofficial sources. Nor was it clear

how a "clean shaven Sikh" could be identified as a Sikh. In later reports the next day and the following days, we were told that only two assailants, both Sikhs, were involved. What happened, to the earlier reported third one? No newspaper has yet followed up the discrepancy.

But what is of immediate relevance is the question: should the media have described the assailants immediately as Sikhs? Given the background of the Punjab situation, such mentioning of a community by name was bound to excite communal passions and inflame communal hatred. It may be worthwhile in this con-text to refer to a recommendation made at a seminar on communal writings held in New Delhi in November 1970 under the joint auspices of the Press Institute of India and the Press Information Bureau of the Government of India. It was suggested that certain facts which may aggravate the situation if publish-ed straight away should be printed after a stipulated period.

The team is also intrigued to find Doordarshan allowing the recording of highly provocative slogans like 'khoon ka badla khoon' (blood for blood) by some members from the mourning crowd at Teen Murti. There was a tendency among many reporters to concentrate on the names of important politicians instead of on earnest efforts made by individuals or groups. Thus, when a peace march was organised by a group of concerned citizens in South Delhi on November 2, which was joined by the Janata leader Chandrasekhar and some of his followers, some newspapers the next day described it as a Janata Party march. This created temporary misunderstandings and hampered the efforts of the non-party group to bring together all citizens, many of whom did not want to identify themselves with any particular political party. The need to keep party politics out of ventures like peace marches to put down riots is yet to be recognised by media people who seem to remain obsessed with names of political personalities.

Coming to the role of Opposition political leaders, the team regrets that by and large they failed to rise to the occasion during the crucial days of October 31 to November 5. Although news of arson and carnage was pouring into the offices of the political parties every hour, they hardly made any effort to rush to the spot with their cadres, stop the violence and organise peace committees in the localities, and remained content with issuing a joint statement with the Prime Minister on November 1 pleading for peace and amity.

On November 3, when following the carnage at Trilokpuri, the group of concerned citizens went to the opposition party leaders (referred to earlier), some among the former appealed, to the Janata Party leader Chandrasekhar to lead them in a deputation to Teen Murti and appeal to the Prime Minister. Chandrasekhar rose, folded his hands and pleaded: "I cannot do it. I don't want to be accused of ruining the late Prime Minister's funeral"

ROLE OF PUBLIC

While the disturbances that shook Delhi from October 31 to November 5 could be described as an 'organised disorder' with signs of meticulous planning by certain groups in some areas, deliberate laxity on the part of the administration in other areas and willful relinquishment of responsibility of senior ministers as well as opposition parties on a wider scale, at the same time the existence of hostility and suspicion among large sections of the Hindu population against the Sikhs because of the happenings in Punjab during the last two years cannot be ruled out. By not solving the out-standing economic and political issues in Punjab, by allowing Sikh extremism and Hindu communalism to feed on each other leading to the army raid on the Golden Temple and antagonizing thereby large sections of the Sikh community, the ruling party at the Centre had sown the seeds of communal division between Hindus and Sikhs.

As a result, when from October 31, organized assaults on the Sikhs began (as distinct from a spontaneous mass upsurge against Sikhs which some observers are trying to make it out to be), the Hindu public by and large appeared to be in a mood that sanctioned such assaults. Comments by responsible Hindu citizens in Delhi indicate to some extent the popular psyche. An officer belonging to IPS was heard to comment that the government was not preventing the violence so that people could let off steam and the Sikhs in Punjab would be taught a lesson'. An Indian who works for the UN in Geneva and who flew to Delhi for Indira Gandhi's funeral, told a member of the team that the orgy of violence had been allowed to 'teach the Sikhs a lesson'. When asked about the suffering that this was causing the common people, he said: 'Who is suffering?' The long record of uninterrupted depredations by the Sikh extremists in Punjab had possibly created a desire for retaliation that blinded even those who are regarded as responsible people among the Hindus.

How did the Sikh victims view this attitude of their Hindu neighbors? Victims in Gurgaon said: "People stood on their rooftops watching our houses burning, just as they do when observing the Republic Day Parade."

It was this mood again that allowed the Hindu public to believe all sorts of rumours ranging from the story of poisoning drinking water to that of armed Sikhs prowling the streets to attack Hindus. The next step from such belief in rumours is acquiescence in the rampage that had started from the evening of October 31 and even active participation by the younger and more aggressive Hindus in some cases.

The anti-Sikh communal partisan feelings had penetrated the lower ranks of the administration also, as evident from the behavior of the police force, who were given the reins for three or four days by their superior officers.

Given this mood of vicarious exultation at the plight of the Sikhs among the public, it was easy for an organised group enjoying the patronage of the ruling party to carry out the plan of systematic destruction and killings.

The anti-Sikh sentiments in some areas also stoked by some isolated expressions of happiness at Indira Gandhi's death among some Sikhs, and of bravado and attempts at resistance against depredations by the Hindu mobs. It is possible that attempts at resistance could have been taken as a challenge by the marauding hordes who were sure of getting police protection at every step. The team came across reports, corroborated by some responsible residents of a few neighborhoods, of Sikhs dancing the 'bhangra' on the night of October 31. Such incidents reinforced the simmering hostility against the Sikhs.

But these stray incidents were marginal and do not explain the wide-scale explosion of indiscriminate violence against all Sikhs throughout India on the same date and the same time, which could be the result of only a well designed strategy.

The only signs of courage and initiative in an otherwise ominous landscape were demonstrated by those Hindu and Muslim neighbors who helped Sikh families in the affected areas. The team came across a large number of Sikh inmates in the relief camps who said repeatedly that but for these neighbors they would have been butchered.

In a makeshift camp opposite the Kaiyan-puri police station on November 3, the team met a Hindu family, whose house was burnt down by the miscreants because he had given shelter to his Sikh neighbors.

A postal employee living in Bhogal told the team how his house was damaged and partly burnt because he helped two Sikhs. With army assistance he moved the Sikhs to his village in Faridabad.

Members of a voluntary organization traced two Sikh families who were given shelter by Hindus in Khichripur on November 3. Defying a belligerent mob that stood at the entrance of the lanes, a local Hindu youth led the members to the house and rescued the families who were being sheltered by a poor Hindu family. The next day, the volunteers following a request by a mother in a relief camp went to trace her daughter in Trilokpuri who was being looked after by a Hindu family. The latter restored the daughter to the volunteers, kept with them two other Sikh children whose parents were still untraced. "It is our responsibility to look after them", they said.

Near Azadpur, a Hindu factory owner hid a Sikh inside the factory premises. When the Hindus surrounded the factory demanding that the Sikh be handed over to them, the factory owner persuaded the Sikh to shave his hair and beard, gave him a cycle which helped him to pass through the crowd and escape.

On the GT-Karnal Road, Hindus saved a Gurudwara and a Sikh doctor's clinic from being burnt down. In the same area, from November 1 to 5, Delhi University teachers and students kept vigil around the entry points to lanes where Sikhs lived.

Hindus from Munirka village and residing in Munirka colony provided protection in their own homes to ten Sikh families.

Thirty Sikh families residing in Mayur Vihar were guarded all through the period by young Hindu neighbors who resisted attempts by outsiders to raid the compound.

According to a rough estimate based on information gathered from different sources, at least 600 Sikhs were saved by Hindus of Trilokpuri. According to an army officer posted in Shahdara, of the Sikh families he rescued from different parts of the area, at least 70 per cent were sheltered by Hindus.

It is these acts of courage, however, few they may be, which reassurance that sanity still prevails in our country are.

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

Taking into consideration the extent of violence and arson on the night of October 31 it would be reasonable to expect that the Delhi administration would have anticipated the need to set up relief camps. Neither the government nor the administration seemed to be concerned with the problem and their attitude of deliberate inaction seems to be a continuation of their stance during the carnage.

The authorities have refused to make realistic estimates of the number of people killed and injured, the number of widows and orphans, or the extent of damage to property. Further, the administration to date refuses to recognise most of the people who have taken refuge in the Gurudwaras as displaced persons who are entitled to relief and compensation. The administration recognises only ten camps whereas a voluntary organization, Nagarik Ekta Manch has identified at least 18 others within Delhi and several on the outskirts. (The list of these camps is given in an annexure to the team's report.) According to the government there are about 20,000 displaced persons. In fact there are at least 50,000.

The administration has tried to manipulate figures and thus gloss over the enormity of the problem. For instance, the former Police Commissioner, Subhash Tandon, at a Press Conference on November 2 said that the number of dead was between 15 and 20. To this the then Lt Governor added "things are under control" (Indian Express, November 3). The official death toll is now 613 when eyewitness accounts speak of hundreds of bodies lying in Trilokpuri alone.

There was no attempt to do any relief work till November 2. On that day for the first time the administration with the help of the army evacuated people to the police thana or to

school buildings. After that there was no sign of the administration despite various pious announcements in the media by the new Lt Governor Wali about giving blankets and mattresses to the refugees for comfort.

Thousands went hungry and had to urinate and defecate in the corridors of the school building. The injured lay in the rooms without any medical treatment. There was no one to share the horror or the anguish of widows, to say a word to them. The first initiative for relief came from local communities, mostly Hindus and from Gurudwaras who brought the first meal and organised langars. For instance, at Farash Bazaar the people from Jhilmil colony brought their own utensils and organised a langar in the face of threats from the mobs.

The local initiative was followed by the efforts of the voluntary groups and individuals. Hundreds of students, housewife's, teachers, doctors and many prominent citizens organised relief camps and collected supplies. The administration was nowhere to be seen.

The Delhi administration appointed a Relief Commissioner to deal with the crisis on November 4. On November 6, the Delhi administration announced a scheme for rehabilitation and Joint Secretaries from various Ministries were put in charge of various camps in which a compensation of Rs 10,000 was to be given to the next of kin for each dead. Five thousand was to be given to each seriously injured and a thousand for those who sustained minor injuries. The same amounts were to be given to those who had suffered damage to their property. On November 7 the Prime Minister announced that he was releasing a sum of Rs 40 lakh for relief work for the Union Territory of Delhi from the Prime Minister's Relief Fund.

The question that arises is where the money went, for it has not reached the people at the camps. There is no scheme made for the implementation of the relief scheme and no agency has been created for this purpose. The joint control room at Raj Nivas for relief does not seem to have even got information about the number of camps in the city.

When the government did move in, it was met with hostility from the people and at least on one occasion the people refused to accept the food brought by an MP because the people felt that he was involved in the carnage. In fact the arrival of the VIPs was often a hindrance to the relief work being carried out.

The plight of the displaced persons was pathetic. The army had clear instructions not to allow anyone to photograph the camps. A member of the team was roughed up by the army and his film snatched away at the Shakurpur camp when he took a photograph of the people in the camp.

No attempt has been made to take a census of the people at the camps and estimate the number of men, women and children. None of these people have been given identity cards on which basis they could claim the compensation and now they will get entangled in red tapes and possible litigation.

According to Press reports more than rupees two crore worth of looted property has been recovered but no attempt has been made to arrest the looters who if arrested are released on the intervention of the local leaders.

Further, there is no system worked out by which the recovered property will be returned to its rightful owners. Already VCRs are finding their way to the market at a ridiculous price.

Within a week the administration started to forcibly evacuate the displaced persons and sending them back to what used to be their homes, which are now cinders and ashes. Their houses destroyed, their property looted, and the murderers and looters wandering free, the people are terrified of returning to the areas which are full of memories of murder and arson. Officially there have been 2,960 arrests but hundreds of these people have been released either on intervention of local politicians or are on bail. The government and the administration have in a ruthless manner got DTC buses to pack off the people, given them Rs 50 per family and sometimes a bundle of bedding and sent them back without making appropriate arrangements for their security. No attempt has been made to create an atmosphere of trust and security. Despite the presence of army it was reported to the team that stray incidents of looting and murder continue. The government did not mobilize all the re-sources at its command (e g, the army) to provide medical care and sanitation, nor did it print enough forms for compensation claims. A voluntary agency had to have thousands of forms printed for the camps in its care. The government's callousness towards the problem of relief and rehabilitation is in consonance with its earlier policy of calculated inaction during the carnage. How could the government not have anticipated the need for effective machinery for relief and rehabilitation? Further, how was it that just at the time the government was announcing the setting up of a Relief Commissioner the forcible evacuations of the people started without any assurance to them of their future security?

CONCLUSION

Thus, the history is in question mark form. Let's get back to time and control the situation show your political strategy in reformatory approach in making a conclusion for prosperous future of India.

The social and political consequences of the government's stance during the carnage, its deliberate inaction and its callousness towards relief and rehabilitation are far reaching. It is indeed a matter of grave concern that the government has made no serious inquiries into the entire tragic episode which seems to be so well planned and designed.

The riots were well organized and were of unprecedented brutality. Several very disturbing questions arise that must be answered:

- (1) What was the government and the administration doing for seven hours between the time of the assassination and the announcement of Indira Gandhi's death?
- (2) Why did the government refuse to take cognizance of the reports of the looting and murders and why did it not call in the troops even after alerting them?
- (3) Why have a few individual Congress (I) leaders close to the Prime Minister been allowed to arrogate to themselves powers belonging to ministers and officials?
- (4) Why was there no joint control room set up and who was responsible for not giving clear and specific instructions to the army on curbing violence and imposing curfew?
- (5) Who was responsible for the planned and deliberate police inaction and often active role in inciting the murder and loot?
- (6) Who was responsible for the planned and directed arson?
- (7) Why were highly provocative slogans ('khun ka badla khun' or 'blood for blood') allowed to be broadcast by Doordarshan during the recording of the mourning crowd at Teen Murti?
- (8) Why has the Congress(I) not set up an inquiry into the role of its members in the arson and looting?

Also There is need of special legal framework for long term preventive measures communal violence strictly prohibition, imposition of higher punishment for inciting riots and war, Third eye vigilance body should need to be introduced for Political parties and their funding, Rehabilitation of victims and justice should accessed to them.

A new message must be given to the whole world about India religious structure by this committee.

Delegates can also refer to the Commission's report, SIT reports and Case laws but they are not binding on the committee to be used as precedent.

Credits:

[LIT%20MUN/Who%20are%20the%20Guilty_%20_%20Causes%20and%20Impact%20of%20the%20Delhi%20Riots%20_%20Economic%20and%20Political%20Weekly.html](https://www.lit20mun.com/Who%20are%20the%20Guilty_%20%20Causes%20and%20Impact%20of%20the%20Delhi%20Riots%20_%20Economic%20and%20Political%20Weekly.html)

EXTERNAL LINKS FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE

1. JUSTICE NANAVATI COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/Nanavati-I_eng_0.pdf

2. Special emphasis to Sajjan Singh Case -

<https://www.livemint.com/Politics/DD3BHjOaEcLCwhFVi8cFiI/1984-anti-Sikh-riots-Delhi-HC-convicts-Congress-Sajjan-Kuma.html>

3. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-17811666>

4. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/29/india-no-justice-1984-anti-sikh-bloodshed>

5. <https://www.deccanherald.com/specials/1984-anti-sikh-riots-history-708615.html>

6. <https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/india/anti-sikh-riots-what-happened-in-1984-and-after-1.60501721>