

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 23 June 2025 from the Security Council Facilitator
for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the
President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit herewith my six-month report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), which covers the period from 14 December 2024 to 23 June 2025.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samuel Žbogar
Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of
resolution 2231 (2015)



Nineteenth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

I. Introduction

1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 ([S/2016/44](#)) sets forth the practical arrangements and procedures for the Council in carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), particularly with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.
2. In accordance with the note, the Security Council should select, on an annual basis, one member to serve as its Facilitator for the functions specified therein. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the note, and after consultations among the members of the Council, I was appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) on 29 May 2025 for the period ending 31 December 2025 (see [S/2025/2](#)).
3. It was also established in the note that the Facilitator should brief the other members of the Security Council on its work and the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.
4. The present report covers the period from 14 December 2024 to 23 June 2025.

II. Summary of the activities of the Security Council in the “2231 format”

5. On 17 December 2024, the Security Council was briefed (see [S/PV.9818](#) and [SC/15942](#)) by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on the eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) ([S/2024/896](#)), by my predecessor as Facilitator on the work of the Council and the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) ([S/2024/918](#)), and by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, on the procurement channel ([S/2024/880](#)).
6. On 23 June 2025, the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) met in the “2231 format” and discussed the findings and recommendations of the nineteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution ([S/2025/397](#)).
7. During the reporting period, a total of 19 notes were circulated within the “2231 format”. In addition, a total of 10 official communications were sent to Member States and/or the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission, and a total of 10 communications from Member States and/or the Coordinator were received.

III. Monitoring the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

8. During the reporting period, the Joint Commission did not convene. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Coordinator continued to consult with the Plan participants and the United States of America on addressing developments regarding

the Plan of Action, towards the possible return by the United States to the Plan of Action and to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Plan of Action by all.

9. At its 9877th meeting, held in private on Wednesday, 12 March 2025, the Security Council considered the item entitled “Non-proliferation”. The Council was briefed by the Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations.

10. In a letter dated 17 March 2025 ([A/79/823-S/2025/167](#)), the Permanent Representatives of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation shared the joint statement of their meeting, held at the level of deputy foreign ministers on 14 March 2025 in Beijing. In the statement, they stressed the importance of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), including its time frames, and called for relevant parties to refrain from any action that may escalate the situation.

11. In another letter dated 17 March 2025 ([A/79/822-S/2025/168](#)), the Permanent Representative of China shared a five-point proposal for the settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue, including a commitment to the “peaceful settlement of disputes through political and diplomatic means, and oppose the use of force and illegal sanctions”, “balancing rights and responsibilities, and take a holistic approach to the goals of nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy”, “the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as the basis for new consensus”, “promoting cooperation through dialogue, and oppose pressing for intervention by the U.N. Security Council” and a “step-by-step and reciprocal approach, and seek consensus through consultation”.

12. In a letter dated 9 June 2025 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2025/358](#)), the representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland expressed the concern of the E3 that “Iran’s nuclear programme, far in excess of the limits imposed by the JCPOA, is a clear threat to international peace and security”. The representatives referred to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on “Iran’s implementation of the JCPOA” published on 31 May 2025, which “lays out Iran’s extensive violations of its JCPOA commitments”, as well as the “Director General’s Comprehensive Report”, which “lays out Iran’s multiple failures to implement its safeguards obligations”. They also stated that the two reports “clearly show the dire status of the Iran nuclear issue”. The letter further provided an account of the efforts of the three Member States to “return Iran to compliance, and the United States to the deal”, and mentioned that the E3 had “triggered the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism in 2020 with a view to resolving Iran’s non-compliance”. The representatives also welcomed negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States and noted that the need for “a strong new deal has never been more urgent”. They concluded their letter by acknowledging that they would pursue all diplomatic options “to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon”, but that, “[a]bsent a satisfying deal”, they would consider “triggering the snapback mechanism to address threats to international peace and security arising from Iran’s nuclear programme”.

13. The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 11 June 2025 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2025/374](#)), stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran “categorically rejects the allegations” made in the aforementioned letter from the representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom and re-emphasized that “its remedial measures” had occurred in “direct response to the United States’ unlawful withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018, and the E3’s subsequent failure to fulfil their essential obligations under the agreement”. He also stated that “as long as nuclear activities

remain under IAEA safeguards and supervision, there is no legitimate cause for concern”. He reiterated that the Islamic Republic of Iran “is not seeking to develop or acquire nuclear weapons” and that “Iran’s nuclear policy is unequivocally peaceful”. The Permanent Representative further stated that “[t]he claim that the E3 recused and exhausted the dispute resolution mechanism process in 2020 is simply false” and that the “E3’s threat to ‘trigger the snapback mechanism’ in the absence of ‘a satisfying deal’ runs counter to the purpose of the mechanism”. He stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran “remains committed to finding a negotiated solution that addresses concerns, both pertaining to the nuclear matters and the sanctions”, that, in that spirit, it had “seriously engaged in diplomatic talks with the European Union/E3 as well as the United States” and that “an agreement to that end is within reach and could be achieved rapidly, if there is genuine political will”.

14. In a letter dated 12 June 2025 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2025/377), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation reiterated that France, Germany and the United Kingdom were “trying to divert the attention of the Security Council from their numerous grave violations of the JCPOA and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)” and that those Member States “continue to disregard the root causes of the current situation related to the JCPOA, provoked by the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the Plan in 2018, as well as their own failure to comply with their obligations under the JCPOA”. He stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran “remains the most thoroughly and closely verified State among the States members of IAEA” and that “any attempts to create an impression of Iran’s nuclear programme being ‘a clear threat to international peace and security’ are doomed to failure”. The Permanent Representative also stated that the dispute resolution mechanism “has never been launched”, that the “JCPOA Joint Commission did not convene to consider the matter” and that there were “no legal or procedural grounds for the activation of [the snapback] mechanism” by France, Germany and the United Kingdom. He reaffirmed “the unwavering commitment of the Russian Federation” to resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA and its support for “all efforts aimed at the diplomatic settlement of issues related to their implementation” and stated that they “stand ready to continue [their] constructive engagement towards this end”.

15. In line with paragraph 4 of resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Security Council requested the Director General of IAEA to provide regular updates to the Council on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and to report at any time on any issue of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of those commitments, the Director General submitted to the Agency’s Board of Governors and to the Council two regular reports, on 26 February 2025 (GOV/2025/8) (S/2025/155) and 31 May 2025 (GOV/2025/24), on the Agency’s verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015).

16. Both the February and the May reports noted that the Agency’s verification and monitoring had been seriously affected by the cessation of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The situation has been exacerbated by the subsequent decision to remove all of the Agency’s Plan of Action-related surveillance and monitoring equipment and by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s decision to stop provisionally applying the Additional Protocol. As such, the Agency has “lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and UOC [uranium ore concentrate]”. In the February report, the Director General also stated that he deeply regretted that the Islamic Republic of Iran had informed the Agency that it did not accept the designation of four inspectors proposed by the Agency, despite having previously indicated a

willingness to do so. Lastly, it was stated in both reports that “[t]he significantly increased production and accumulation of high enriched uranium by Iran, the only non-nuclear-weapon State to produce such nuclear material, is of serious concern”.

17. Regarding the total stockpile of enriched uranium of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Agency noted that, since 16 February 2021, it had not been able to verify “the stockpile precisely on any given day”, having “to rely instead on a small proportion of the total being based on Iran’s estimates”. Based on information provided by the country, the Agency has estimated that, as at 17 May 2025, the total enriched uranium stockpile of the Islamic Republic of Iran was 9,247.6 kg – an increase of 953.2 kg since the February 2025 report – and comprised 8,413.3 kg of uranium in the form of UF₆; 619.6 kg of uranium in the form of uranium oxide and other intermediate products; 71 kg of uranium in fuel assemblies, plates and rods; 4.4 kg of uranium in targets; and 139.3 kg of uranium in liquid and solid scrap. As at 17 May 2025, the Agency had estimated that the stockpile in the form of UF₆ comprised 408.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent – an increase of 133.8 kg since the February 2025 report.

18. Pursuant to annex B of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the following restrictions applied for five and eight years, respectively, from the date of adoption of the Plan of Action (18 October 2015): arms-related transfers (paras. 5 and 6 (b)) and the travel ban (para. 6 (e)), until 18 October 2020; and the ballistic missile-related provisions (paras. 3 and 4) and assets freeze (para. 6 (c) and (d)), until 18 October 2023 (see also [S/2023/989](#), para. 41).

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

19. During the reporting period, no new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council.

20. Since Implementation Day, a total of 52 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) have been submitted to the Security Council by five Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To date, of the 52 proposals that have been processed, 37 have been approved, 5 have not been approved and 10 have been withdrawn. On average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in 50 calendar days. After the exit of the United States from the Plan of Action, the procurement channel has continued to function, and the Joint Commission continues to stand ready to review proposals.

21. In accordance with paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), certain nuclear-related activities do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission. In this regard, during the reporting period, eight notifications were submitted to the Council in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment and technology covered by annex B, section 1, of INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1, intended for light-water reactors.

22. No notifications were submitted to the Security Council related to the necessary modification of the two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, and no notifications were submitted to the Council related to the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design.

23. On 28 May 2025, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to me the Group’s nineteenth six-month report of the Joint Commission

(S/2025/335) in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

V. Transparency, outreach and guidance

24. As the Security Council's Facilitator, I am aware of the challenging environment the "2231 format" is facing. However, I remain deeply committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as endorsed by the Council in its resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

25. As the Termination Day of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) approaches, I, as the Facilitator, will continue to focus on facilitating, strengthening and promoting the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), including advocating for the full utilization of the procurement channel. I urge all Member States to continue to engage in dialogue and to acknowledge the importance of the Plan of Action as a multilateral agreement in nuclear non-proliferation.

26. Outreach activities by the Secretariat, as mandated by the note mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present report (S/2016/44), continue to foster awareness of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The website on the resolution, also managed and regularly updated by the Secretariat through the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, continues to provide relevant and updated information.

27. In drafting the present report, numerous bilateral consultations with Member States and their representatives were held, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In my role as Facilitator, I continue to advocate for the Security Council's collective responses to international peace and security issues.

28. In conclusion, I would also like to encourage the international community to act in line with paragraph 2 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which calls upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to fully support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
