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Note verbale dated 14 July 2025 from the Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations has the honour to transmit herewith the third report on the Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti, prepared by the Republic of Kenya (lead nation of the Mission), dated 10 July 2025 (see annex).*

The Permanent Mission of Kenya would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

* Circulated in the language of submission only in line with current liquidity management measures.



Annex to the note verbale dated 14 July 2025 from the Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

**3rd REPORT ON THE MULTINATIONAL SECURITY
SUPPORT MISSION (MSS) TO HAITI**

SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

**BY
THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA
(LEAD NATION OF THE MSS)
10 JULY, 2025**

Table of Contents

Introduction	5
Background	8
MSS mission objectives	8
Protection of Civilians.....	14
Rule of Law	14
Creating conducive conditions for the delivery of Humanitarian Assistance	15
Mission Staffing, The Status of Deployment, Conduct and Discipline.....	16
Mission Staffing	16
The Status of Deployment.....	17
Conduct and Discipline	18
International Humanitarian Law, and Security	18
Performance Optimization	19
Operational Achievements	23
The UN Trust Fund for Haiti.....	24
Multinational Security Support Office in Washington DC	24
Diplomatic outreach	25
MSS/ HNP Projections	28
Challenges/Gaps.....	28
a. Equipment:	28
b. Logistic challenges	29
c. The medical contracts	30
d. Restrictions on air space.....	31
Recommendations	31

Underscoring Urgency	33
Conclusion.....	35

Introduction

1. This is the 3rd Report submitted by Kenya, as the lead nation of the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti, pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2751 (2024) that renewed the mandate of UNSC Res 2699 (2023) (hereinafter The Resolution) in which the Security Council, acting under chapter VII of the UN Charter authorized the deployment of a mission to provide operational support and build the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP) to counter gangs, improve security conditions in Haiti and create a conducive environment for free and fair elections. The MSS was to undertake this mission by providing operational support to the HNP, security for critical infrastructure sites and transit locations such as the airport, ports, and schools, and facilitating humanitarian aid and access for the population in need.
2. The report provides an overview of the MSS mission and outlines the progress towards the implementation of the Mission's mandate in the period between November 2024 and May 2025.
3. This period was characterized by political uncertainty caused by increased tensions within the political leadership in Haiti. Nonetheless, HE President Leslie Voltaire completed his six months tenure and handed the leadership of the TPC to the next President HE Fritz Jean Gourveneur on the 7th of March 2025. The significance of a political transition without political conflagration is not insignificant in a country where the change of power has become synonymous with violence and collapse of administrations. Although fragile, the government is functioning to date.
4. The political tensions and insecurity have precipitated a deepening humanitarian crisis as thousands of people attempted to evade violence and the effects of natural disaster, in particular flooding. Furthermore, tens of thousands of Haitians continued to be returned from various countries including the Dominican Republic.

This reality compounded the humanitarian fragility of the populations leading to internal displacement, with some populations experiencing repeated displacement. A critical pressure point could be unleashed if the recently announced intended repatriation of Haitians from the USA is affected.

5. The period was marked by a general upsurge of gang activity that picked in the period between October and November 2024; and March to April 2025. These periods saw increased attacks on populations, attempts to disrupt services and efforts to take control of strategic infrastructure. Significantly, gangs changed their modus operandi, launching coordinated attacks in different locations, within and beyond Port au Prince, with the aim of overstressing the HNP and MSS capabilities.
6. The attack and killing of more than 100 civilians in Port Sonde in October 2024 saw an intensification of security operations including the deployment of MSS contingent in Pont Sonde. There was also intensification of 24/7 patrols to safeguard strategic installations, populations and critical supply lines. This has also led to concerns about mission overstretch.
7. Significantly, the period noted an increment in deployment of additional personnel, bringing the total MSS contingent to 1000 officers in theatre. Notably, the MSS has during this period suffered one fatal injury and a second officer is currently reported missing in action.
8. On 2nd May 2025, the United States of America designated the gang coalition of Viv Asanmn and Grif Gangs as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This act has immense potential of exerting significant pressure on the gangs through curtailing the flow of arms, and associated support and resources, to them.

9. Internationally, we continue to receive rounded acclamation for the work of the MSS in theatre. However, there is no corresponding translation of the expressed support into material assets for the MSS. Contributions in terms of pledged personnel has been slow in coming. To date there are 991 officers in theatre, against a planned 2500. Similarly, the voluntary contribution to the Trust Fund stands at approximately 112 million, about 14% of the assessed 800 usd. million estimated cost per year. It is in this context that the processing of the report of the Secretary General to the UNSC on options for the MSS becomes crucial and urgent. Such a consideration would help clarify the plausible next steps in addressing the security situation in Haiti, which remains fragile now and in the foreseeable future.
10. On 17th of June 2025, President William Ruto addressed a letter to the Chair of the UNSC for the month of June seeking guidance of the council, in the light of two critical decision point. The first deployment into Haiti took place in 25th June 2024, and there was an assumed point of rotation after 12 months. Secondly, the contract for the Life Support Area for the MSS comes to an end on 30th September, 2025, and it is critical that clarity is obtained on whether and how the MSS logistics support would be provided. Notably, four months since the submission of the UNSG report on options for supporting the MSS, it has not been listed for prosecution by the Council. On the 30th of June 2025, the Council convened a consultation on this matter. However, while all members of the Council underscored concerns about the deteriorating situation, the urgency of the need to scale up support to the MSS, welcomed the envisaged role of the neighbourhood with the framework of the Organisation of American States (OAS), there was no concrete decision to guide the way forward.
11. If the situation of unclarity on the way forward continues, there will be a corresponding reality of diminishing the value of the MSS, risk of losing the achievements made. Furthermore a deteriorating situation on the ground could

transform into undesirable levels of threat and risk not only to the Haitians but also to the MSS officers.

Background

12. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2699 (2023) established the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission in Haiti. The MSS Mission mandate was reviewed and renewed on Monday, 30th September 2024 under UNSCR 2751 (2024) for a period of 1 year to 30 September 2025.

MSS mission objectives

13. The MSS Mission's objective is to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police to re-establish security in Haiti and build security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections, by executing three broad mandates:
 - (a) **providing operational support to the Haitian National Police**, including building its capacity through the planning and conduct of joint security support operations, as it works to counter gangs and improve security conditions in Haiti, characterized by kidnappings, sexual and gender-based violence, trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants and arms, homicides, extrajudicial killings, and recruitment of children by armed groups and criminal networks; and
 - (b) **supporting the Haitian National Police in the provision of security for critical infrastructure sites and transit locations** such as the airport, ports, schools, hospitals and key intersections, and
 - (c) **facilitating humanitarian aid and access** for the population receiving assistance.

Security Situation in Haiti: Gang Activities

14. In the period under review, the security situation was characterised by the growing threats to the people, institutions and government. This was caused primarily by the formation of an alliance by the gangs under the Viv Ansanmn and Grif Graf umbrellas to undertake coordinated attacks. This modus operandi left a series of civilian attacks on its trail, causing deaths, displacement of population and disruption of services.
15. The Viv Ansanm's activities have included arson, civilian casualties, and disruptions in key areas like Kenscoff, Vivy Mitchell, Carrefour Drouillard, Tabarre, Solino, Cazeau, Delmas, Fort National, Canape Vert and Bourdon. In December 2024 gangs attacked the Bernard Mevs Hospital in Port-Au-Prince leaving 4 civilians dead and kidnapping physicians, nurses and healthcare workers, in their wake.
16. There were three peak attack periods, between October and early December 2024, most significantly being the attack on civilians in Port Sonde that left 100 civilians dead and many injured. This saw a change in the operational deployment as the MSS deployed in Port Sonde, effectively creating the first Forward Operating Base out of Port au Prince.
17. The second pick was on 27th January 2025, when the Viv Ansanm coalition attacked Kenscoff area, leaving an estimated 40 people dead and more than 1,660 people homeless. The attackers also took control of telecommunications infrastructure, leading to a coordinated response from the MSS/HNP teams that restored peace in the area.
18. There was also attempts to disrupt air operations and threaten the LSA. This saw security at the TLIA upscaled and MSS personnel are ready to respond to any threat.

19. Perhaps the most significant security threat manifested in the attempt to unsettle the Transitional Provincial Council and the Prime Minister in March 2025. However, this was thwarted by combined efforts of the HNP/MSS.

Responding to the Threat

20. During this period the MSS has bolstered its capabilities. On 3rd January, a contingent of 150 Guatemalan troops arrived in Port au Prince; a further El Salvadorian contingent of MEDEVAC consisting of 77 officers was also deployed. This brought the total contingent of the MSS to 1000 officers.
21. The Mission also received additional equipment, in particular twenty (20) Roshel Captain Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) that have been integrated into operations. However, the operational efficacy of this equipment is limited. Owing to a number of challenges, all the 20 APCs are unserviceable and unable to support the mission. With the threat continuing to adapt and evolve, including with the coming together of various gangs under Viv Ansam and Grif Graf the imperative to enhance the operational capability of the mission cannot be emphasised enough.
22. Security operations during this period yielded notable success. Using targeted and routine fighting patrols within the gang-controlled areas in the West Department and in Artibonite, there was significant degradation of the Viv Ansanm Gang. At the time of this report, there was significant lull in the gang activity – caused by a sense of frustration on the part of the gangs owing to their failure to achieve any of their objectives.
23. In spite of this, the mission is under enormous pressure from the gangs, who continue to receive armaments, arms and logistics support from their sponsors. The USA designation of the coalition of gangs as terrorist organisations in May 2025 is significant. The immediate effect of this pronouncement was a lull in attacks. This

development also offers an opportunity to deploy a range of assets in dealing with the gangs and their leaders. We believe that a follow through in terms of tracing the arms, drugs and illicit money flows would degrade the capability of the gangs significantly and curtail support to them. This would also reduce the threat to the MSS and HNP personnel and degrade gang coalitions. Further, this has the potential to insulate the political processes and activities in Haiti.

24. The effects of the designation of the gang coalitions as Foreign Terrorist Organisation has been evident. Between May and June 2025, there has been a lull in gang activity attributed in disruption in the supply of arms to the gangs.
25. Notably, during the period under review, one MSS officer was killed during a shootout with gangs in Segur area in Artbonite Department on 23rd February 2025, and a second officer was reported missing after a rescue team was dispatched to assist an HNP team that had been stuck in a trench.
26. In both attacks, the officers had limited protection and were, therefore, exposed. These situations could have been averted by the use of appropriate protected operational vehicles. The experience underscored the imperative of availing equipment that offers adequate protection and operational agility. Undoubtedly, the availability of lethal weapons in particular air support to enable insertion and extraction in situations of hostile engagement would add great value to the mission. To date, the MSS does not have any air support for operations and this reality greatly limits its operational effectiveness. As indicated from the beginning, and provided for in the Concept of Operations, we consider air support as one of the critical success factors and enablers for the achievement of the mandate of this mission.
27. Notably, there has been a steady growth of ‘vigilante’ self defence groups over this period of time – in response to the security situation. This had seen increased deaths against perceived gang members. This phenomenon is likely to grow if the

capability of the HNP and MSS is augmented and populations take the matter of providing security into their hands. The effect of such a situation is greater security fragility.

Political Situation

28. The political landscape in Haiti remains fluid, characterized by political uncertainty, tensions between various institutions of government and growing humanitarian challenges. While the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission has made efforts to stabilize the situation, significant hurdles remain, including logistical constraints, funding suspensions and increasing hostilities from armed groups.
29. The transitional government drawn from the country's main political forces took office in April 2024, with the objective of holding the first elections in nearly a decade. Although a number of significant milestones have been achieved, including the standing of the electoral body and the functioning of the judiciary, several critical steps have been missed, while others have become illusive. Partisan infighting within the Transitional Government has had the effect of paralyzing the government and emboldening the gangs.
30. Political factions remain divided over the constitutional revision that was expected by the end of February 2025. The inability to hold the referendum in May 2025 is likely to imperil the elections, slated for early 2026, and seen as the end point of the transitional council. This situation has incentivised opposition to the Transitional Council. Opposition groups, including the December 21 coalition, accuse authorities of failing to contain gang influence, complicating election logistics. There have also been demonstrations against what was seen as an attempt by the TPC to secure retirement packages, at the end of their tenure.

31. Importantly, and in spite of the attempt by gangs to disrupt and even subvert the government, the Chairmanship of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) transitioned on 7th March 2025. Nonetheless, the TPC remains fragile and infighting amongst its members, and the friction between the PM and other agencies in particular the HNP leadership, is creating fixtures that are limiting alignment of government in the face of coalitions of gangs that are acting in concert against it.
32. In this situation, these political cleavages reverberate in the security theatre particularly within the Haitian National Police, which in turn impacts the ability to have a cohesive security approach. For instance, the standing and operations of the Task Force, which is guided directly by the Prime Minister, has generated significant unease within the leadership of the HNP and its ranks.

Humanitarian Situation

33. The insecurity and political instability within Port au Prince has affected the country's access to essential goods and services including food, water, sanitation, health care and has forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes. Even where populations have returned, services are unavailable and difficult to access. Expanded gang activities, coupled with the forced returns of Haitians from abroad have led to massive internal displacement of Haitians, currently estimated at 1 in every 10 Haitians. As a result, 5.7 million people (nearly half the population) are currently facing acute food insecurity.
34. The population is grappling with limited access to medical services, particularly in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area where less than half of the health facilities are operating at their normal capacity, placing immense pressure on local healthcare systems. The challenges in accessing medical services adversely affects patients with chronic illnesses and pregnant women, leading to an increase in critical medical and obstetric emergencies.

35. This acute fragility has profound security implication. In some cases, schools have been turned into displacement camps as pupils from more than two schools are forced to share the same institution.
36. Besides insecurity, the humanitarian situation is compounded by the cut in aid to Haiti. By May the United Nations warned of the effects of the severe lack of funding in the face of significant deterioration of the humanitarian situation characterized by violence, hunger, and displacement. There is pressure for the Government in Haiti to do more but the needs on the ground far surpass the ability of the current administration to carry.

Implementation of The Mission's Mandated Tasks

Protection of Civilians

37. During the reporting period, the MSS Mission and HNP had conducted a total of 1,602 joint day and night patrols to pacify areas of Port au Prince in the West Department i.e. National Hospital, National Palace, Sea port and around Toussaint Louverture International Airport, and targeted Operations against the gangs in areas of Solino, Delmas, Petion Ville, Kenscoff, Fucy and Pont Sonde in Artibonite Department.
38. The key objectives of these patrols is to create a secure environment for the civilians to undertake their normal daily engagements without fear of attacks from the gangs. The MSS has been able to respond effectively in line with its mandate whenever called upon while ensuring safety and security of civilians.

Rule of Law

39. The Rule of Law is a core part of the United Nations' Human Rights and humanitarian agendas. The MSS Mission continues to adhere to the provisions of the UNSCR 2699 (2023) and duly recognizes the sovereignty, independence,

territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Haiti while working towards achieving its mandate.

40. Strict adherence to the laws of the Host Nation, International Human Rights Laws (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Laws (IHL) is therefore necessary. So far, the MSS Mission, guided by the Status Protection Agreement and other Pillar documents has conducted its operations within the defined limits and reaffirms its commitment to uphold the rule of law.

Creating conducive conditions for the delivery of Humanitarian Assistance

41. The MSS Mission through its Liaison Office established a working relationship with BINUH and relevant UN agencies, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The MSS Mission remains committed to assist the various agencies in ensuring effective coordination and delivery of Humanitarian assistance in line with its mandate.

Monitoring and investigating Human Rights violations

42. All personnel participating in the Mission are obligated to uphold the highest standards of transparency, professionalism and discipline.
43. Consequently, the MSS Mission, in collaboration with the OHCHR, has established a robust compliance mechanism to prevent, investigate, address and publicly report violations or abuses of human rights related to the Mission.
44. On 5th February 2025, A Complaints and Reporting Mechanism (CRM) was launched to ensure all violations and misconducts are duly reported, investigated and dealt with instantaneously. The launch was graced by high level Haitian government officials, Diplomatic Corps, UN representatives and heads of the various Civil Support Organizations operating in Haiti.

45. Notably, the MSS has received commendation for its good conduct in the period since its deployment. So far, there has not been any incident of abuse of human rights violations by the mission.

Mission Staffing, The Status of Deployment, Conduct and Discipline

Mission Staffing

46. The current Mission status stands at 991 with 20 personnel deployed at the Mission Force Headquarters while the rest form part of the Formed Security Units (FSUs).

Current Personnel Status

S/NO	PCC	NO. OF PERSONNEL
1.	Kenya	734
2.	Jamaica	25
3.	Guatemala	150
4.	Bahamas	3
5.	El Salvador	78
6.	Canada	1
Total		991

*Belize had deployed 2 who have since returned.

* 5 officers have been repatriated for various reasons including medical recovery

47. So far, the mission is operating at below 30% of the requirement of 2500 personnel, provided for by the CONOPs. While we have received a number of pledges for contribution of personnel to the MSS, these have not translated into deployment. Furthermore, owing to the contractual threshold of the logistics contract currently supporting the LSA in Port au Prince, 260 trained and ready to deploy officers are still on standby, in Nairobi.

The Status of Deployment

48. The Mission's Operational design is pegged on four (4) Phases, elaborated in the Concept of Operation (CONOPs) namely Deployment, Decisive Operations, Stabilization and Transition. Currently, the mission is at the Decisive Operations Phase and is engaged in active operations in areas expanded beyond Port au Prince, owing to operational needs.
49. The initial deployment was envisaged to take place within three months after the passage of UN Resolution 2699, however this timeline was not attained. Nonetheless, since its deployment, the mission has in spite of its size progressed from phase 1 to phase two.
50. The political and legislative issues from various PCCs, setting up and operationalization of various structures, development of key pillar documents, contractual process for the construction of Life Support Areas (LSA) and its equipment, mobilization of equipment, pre-deployment training, among other factors pushed the initial deployment of 1st Kenyan FSU to Tue, 25th June 2024 and the 2nd FSU arrived on Tue, 16th July 2024.
51. The CARICOM advance team arrived on 12th September 2024. While Guatemala and El Salvador troops arrived in the theatre on 3rd and 4th January 2025. The 3rd and 4th Kenya FSU arrived on 18th January and 6th February 2025 respectively.
52. The FSUs are currently deployed at the Life Support Area (LSA), with three (3) Forward Operating Bases (FOB); 1 at Police Academy, 1 at IGPNH and 1 in Pont Sonde. Consideration for establishment of other FOBs is pegged on support from partners and donors.

Conduct and Discipline

53. The conduct and discipline of MSS Mission personnel is governed and regulated by the Directive for Disciplinary Matters involving MSS Mission Personnel, the various Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Code of Conduct document and other related instructions that are issued from time to time, by the Force Commander.
54. The Mission HQs has ensured that all personnel are taken through the Directives and other related documents. Various initiatives, to include training, have been put in place to ensure compliance. Personnel have been prevailed upon to discharge their duties professionally and regulate their conduct within the mandate of the Mission in accordance with the guiding documents. A Code of Conduct for the MSS Mission in Haiti has been established for ease of reference.
55. Additionally, personnel have been warned against engaging in any activity incompatible with the proper discharge of their duties, or that which may adversely affect the credibility of MSSM Mission. Any person whose conduct and discipline goes contrary to the guiding principles and the Mission expectations must be dealt with firmly. Fortunately, the mission reports that so far, no cases of serious misconduct have been reported. Two cases of misconduct were dealt with summarily.

International Humanitarian Law, and Security

56. All MSS Mission personnel have received training and briefing on various directives including the Directive for Disciplinary Matters involving MSS Mission Personnel; the types of serious misconduct prohibited and the ensuing disciplinary process in the face of any allegation. Additionally, respect for local laws and customs have been emphasized.

57. The MSS Mission Commander, in consultation with the Leadership Team, has endeavored to promote an environment of respect for human dignity and rights through regular briefings on conduct and discipline; encouraging transparency and mandatory reporting within the Mission on any allegations of misconduct; organized in-mission training and briefing on specific issues such as child protection or SEA; and undertaking of other preventive measures.
58. Personnel at all levels are obligated to create and maintain an environment that prevents serious misconduct, including SEA and have particular responsibility to support and develop systems that maintain this environment.
59. FSU Commanders have continuously appraised their personnel their obligations pertaining to the respect of human rights and humanitarian laws.

Performance Optimization

60. The MSS Mission personnel currently deployed in the Mission area underwent an intensive pre-deployment training (PDT) to build capacity towards ensuring optimal performance geared towards attaining the Mission mandate. The MSS Mission continues to conduct in theatre trainings that are critical in enhancing individual and overall performance in conduct of Operations.

61. The following courses were conducted for the period in review:

COURSES OFFERED FOR THE PERIOD OF DECEMBER 2024 - FEBRUARY 2025

S/ N O	COURSE TITLE	DATE	Target	%	FACILITATOR
1.	Departmental Briefs		150 out of 150		MSS Leadership
2.	Fire support weapon training (M240 & M249) (KENCON 3)	30 Dec 24 - 4 Jan 25	32 out of 32	100 %	Yellow bridge
3.	Fire support weapon training (M240 & M249) (KENCON 3)	6 - 9 Jan 25	24 out of 24	100 %	Yellow bridge
4.	Orientation driving (Maxpro, Senator & Light Skin)	6 - 10 Jan 25	26 out of 26	100 %	MSS MTO
5.	Fire support weapon training (M240 & M249) (GUACON)	10 - 11 Jan 25	18 out of 18	100 %	Yellow Bridge
6.	Tactical medicine training (GUACON)	7 - 9 Jan 25	8 out of 8)	100 %	MSS Medical Department
7.	Skydio Drones Training (GUACON)	8- 11 Jan 25	10 out of 10	100 %	Yellow Bridge
8.	Night vision & Binoculars Training (GUACON)	8- 11 Jan 25	21 out of 21	100 %	Yellow Bridge

9.	Radio operation Orientation Training (GUACON)	8 -11 Jan 25	9 out of 9	100 %	MSS Signals Department
10.	Safety Precautions for individual firearms (GUACON)	7 - 10 Jan 25	97 out of 150	65%	MSS
11.	Promotive/Preventive Health Awareness	12 - 16 Jan 25	25 out of 25	100 %	MSS Medical Department
12.	Tactical vehicles safety precautions measures	12 -13 Jan 25	43 out of 43	100 %	MSS MTO
13.	Fire support weapon training (M240 & M249) (GUACON)	13 - 14 Jan 25	25 out of 25	100 %	MSS Yellow Bridge
14.	Linguistics and intercultural capacity training (French class)	27 Jan - 1 Feb 25	77 out of 111	69%	Institute Français Haïti
FEBRUARY					
15.	Departmental Briefs (KENCON 4 and El Salvador)	February 2025	262 out of 262		MSS Leadership
16.	Fire support weapon training (M240 & M249) (KENCON 4 & El Salvador)	16 - 17 Jan 25	24 out of 24	100 %	MSS
17.	Orientation driving (Maxpro, Senator & Light Skin) KENCON 4 & El Salvador	16 - 20 Feb 25	26 out of 26	100 %	MSS
18.	Human Rights Training	18 - 19 Feb 25	18 out of 18	100 %	MSS

19.	Nine Line Casualty Evacuation Training	18 - 19 Feb 25	8 out of 8)	100 %	MSS
20.	Skydio Drones Training (GUACON, KENCON 4 & El Salvador)	18 - 21 Feb 25	10 out of 10	100 %	MSS
21.	Night vision & Binoculars Training (GUACON, KENCON 4 & El Salvador)	18 - 21 Feb 25	21 out of 21	100 %	MSS
22.	Radio operation Orientation Training (GUACON, KENCON 4 & El Salvador)	18 - 21 Feb 25	9 out of 9	100 %	MSS Communication Department
23.	Safety Precautions for individual firearms (KENCON 4 & El Salvador)	17 - 20 Feb 25	97 out of 150	65%	MSS
24.	Promotive/Preventive Health Awareness (KENCON 4 & El Salvador)	18 - 19 Feb 25	25 out of 25	100 %	MSS Medical Department
25.	Tactical vehicles safety precautions measures	12 - 13 Feb 25	43 out of 43	100 %	MSS MTO
26.	Linguistics and intercultural capacity training (French Creole) (KENCON 4 & GUACON)	1 - 21 Feb 25	77 out of 111	69%	Institut Français Haïti
27.	Induction Training on Ground on Air Evacuation	26 - 27 Feb 25	60 out of 60	100 %	El Salvador

Operational Achievements

62. Achievements attained during the reporting period include;

- a. Holding the government together from being destabilized by gangs, which enabled a transition in the rotation of the leadership of the Presidential Transitional Council.
- b. Resumption of trainings at Police Academy with the recent passing out of 750 recruits and currently 70 senior personnel undergoing leadership course.
- c. Resumption and re-opening of learning institutions, although some schools have closed with pupils using existing schools.
- d. Re-opening of businesses.
- e. Resumption of operations at APN Sea Port. However, there are gangs that demand “taxation” from the cargo after it leaves the port premises.
- f. Uplifting of the NOTAM as a result of development and execution of Haiti air space security strategy, with a notable arrival of International passenger and cargo flights Ecuador, Sunrise and Kenya Airways.
- g. Re-occupation by some locals in areas pacified by security teams. However, we have seen repeated displacement of population in some areas.
- h. Decrease in cases of kidnappings and extortions.
- i. Increased confidence and support by the public towards the HNP.

- j. Destabilization of sources of income for gangs and their bases.
- k. Recapture of most police stations that had been overrun by gangs in Quest and Artibonite departments.
- l. Arrests, interception and recovery of arms and ammunition from the gangs.

The UN Trust Fund for Haiti

- 63. The UN Trust Fund of Haiti is now fully operationalised and is supporting the mission well, responding to the needs of the contributing member countries. However, it has not reached the estimated threshold planned for the mission.
- 64. In spite of its performance, there are aspects needing further development. For instance, the UN Contract for Medivac is still there since the El Salvador contingent is not allowed to evacuate directly to the Dominican Republic. This in effect amounts to a double cost on the mission. There is also an urgent need for the Trust Fund to develop modalities for compensation of injuries and death in the mission.
- 65. Critically important, the Trust Fund has not attracted the envisaged voluntary contribution. The Concept of Operation provided the mission to cost approximately usd 800 million per year. So far, the Trust Fund has received a total of usd. 112.5 million, of which 54.2 has been committed and disbursed. The balance of usd. 58.3 is insufficient to carry the mission to any length of time beyond a few weeks of operations, inclusive of life support.

Multinational Security Support Office in Washington DC

- 66. The Multinational Security Support Office in Washington DC is now fully established and operational.

67. The primary mandate of the MSS-SO is **Logistics Coordination**. Drawing on the MSS Concept of Operations (CONOPS) as the guiding reference, the MSSO serves as a critical component of the MSS. It was created to offer a 24/7 support to the Force Commander to enable him attain the mission's objectives efficiently and in alignment with international standards, particularly in the context of ongoing security challenges in Haiti.
68. The MSSO is expected to:
- a. Develop an MSS Mission Support Plan, and coordinating with the MSS HQ logistics staff office to support logistics services to the MSS such as transportation, engineering, medical, fuel, rations, supplies, and information and communications technology according to priorities established by the MSS Security Forces Commander.
 - b. Engage in the solicitation and coordination of international contributions of personnel, supplies, equipment and funds; and liaising between relevant stakeholders (i.e. with respect to MOUs and other arrangements;
 - c. support police contributing countries in the pre-deployment preparation which includes training, vetting and deployment planning, timing requirements, validation, and prioritization, and
 - d. support the implementation of a strategic communications plan which includes management of press, online platforms owned by MSS mission.

Diplomatic outreach

69. In an effort to create momentum for support to the MSS, Kenya has been engaged in a wide range of diplomatic outreach efforts. Starting with Haiti, there is constant

consultation and exchange of views at Head of state, ministerial and security organs levels, on the evolving situations and strengthening cooperation in efforts aimed at the restoration of security.

70. Further, Kenya has undertaken extensive mobilization of international support for security support to Haiti in general and the MSS in particular. The diplomatic outreach and lobbying, which has been at various levels from the Head of State level, to Ministerial and technical levels, with the following actors:

- a. ***With Africa:*** During AU Summit in February 2025, the Heads of States adopted a Kenya sponsored declaration of solidarity with Haiti. The Assembly declaration Assembly/AU/Decl.2(XXXVIII), based on the request of the Haiti government for the transition of the MSS, urged the UNSC to support this request, directed the A3 to strongly champion and coordinate with all members of the UNSC to fast track the transition, called on the UN Secretariat to support and facilitate this transition, acknowledged the support of the international community thus far, and called for further support to help restore security and enable Haiti return to a path of sustainable development.
- b. ***With the United Nations Secretariat:*** we have maintained closed consultation with the UN Secretariat – including engagement between President William Ruto and the UNSG urging support of the UN to the request of Haiti. We have also engaged in the execution of the UN Trust Fund for Haiti.
- c. ***With the United Nations Security Council***
On the 21st April 2025 Kenya was among the briefers at the informal consultation on Haiti and urged urgent action in view of the situation on the ground. We have also engaged with Members of the UNSC P5 to urge their support at Head of State, ministerial and technical levels. More recently, we

have engaged with two regional members in the UNSC namely Panama and Guyana in an effort to urge the UNSC to consider the report of the UNSG which offers options for transitioning the MSS.

d. *With the Members of the International Community*

Kenya has engaged in various diplomatic briefings with members of the International Community. We have held two trilateral meetings with the USA and Canada (in Nairobi and Washington DC). On 9th May 2025, we addressed 20 Ambassadors at the MSSO office in Washington DC, on the need to support the MSS mission to Haiti and urgency of engagement; and on 12th May 2025, in San Domingo we held a comprehensive diplomatic briefing with another 20 Ambassador and Representatives of the International Organisations.

e. *With CARICOM*

We are in constant engagement with the CARICOM countries, including the Chair of CARICOM, briefing with Summit and Ministerial segments and holding of bilateral consultations with CARICOM Countries. In the period of review these have been with Jamaica, Bahamas, Barbados, and Dominican Republic.

f. *Bilateral level* – engage with each member of the international community

71. Across all these engagements, there is shared appreciation of the serious security situation in Haiti, the need to assistance and urgency of response. However, there is no traction with translating these observations and concurrence to adequate material support for the MSS.

MSS/ HNP Projections

72. The MSS Mission has identified the following projections:

- a. Opening up of nine (9) new FOBs and strengthening the three (3) existing ones.
- b. Sustenance of decisive operations following arrival of additional personnel.
- c. Dominance of sea surrounding Haiti coastline to curtail influx of weapons and drugs through maritime patrols.
- d. Re-opening of the three key roads linking Haiti and neighboring country.
- e. Continued capacity building of the HNP.

Challenges/Gaps

73. In conduct of its Operations, the MSS Mission is faced with the following critical challenges/gaps:

- a. **Equipment:** Having deployed with minimum equipment, the MSS has been facing equipment attrition that has kept their operational capability below the demands in theatre.
 - i. A significant shortcoming is in the lack of sufficient numbers of operational equipment and vehicles that support the officers. Currently, the Force Commander can only deploy up to 200 officers at a time owing to lack of operational equipment – including vehicles. Furthermore, available vehicles have limited agility leading to exposure of officers during operations.

- ii. The mission does not have support equipment. For instance, the MSS does not have armoured ambulances and have had to improvise troop carrying vehicles to retrieve officers injured in theatre.
- iii. The mission lacks critical force multipliers – in the form of aviation assets to enhance Operational reach, intelligence and surveillance; and maritime capability that is critical for degrading the ability of the gangs to operate – by interdicting supplies destined for them.

In view of the growing pressure on the mission, the lack of appropriate and adequate operational equipment is a huge limiting factor to the attainment of the MSS mandate.

b. Logistic challenges

- i. **FOB Logistical Support.** It is within the mandate of MSS to establish Forward Operation Bases in security threatened areas away from the main LSA Camp. However, the contract in place does not allow for support of personnel outside the main camp hence logistical challenges including Food, Accommodation, Water, Electricity and cleaning/personal Hygiene materials. Kitchen equipment for preparation of Unitized Group Ration (UGR) is also a big challenge in FOBs.
- ii. **Vehicle Repair/maintenance.** There is delay in repair of broken-down vehicles due to lack of spare parts and tools. This has resulted in low serviceability state of the combat vehicles sometimes going to as low as 30%.
- iii. **There is contractual rigidity** that does not allow the contracted mechanics to move out of the LSA to repair or give out spare parts to

MSS mechanics to recover damaged vehicles. This leads to paying charges of up to 10,000 dollars to tow a single vehicle back to the SLA.

- c. **The medical contracts** have serious gaps that impact negatively on the MSS Mission Operations, morale and welfare of personnel. The medical gaps include the following;
- i. Lack of follow up treatment services for patients referred to Level III Hospital in the Dominican Republic. The LSA Level II Hospital is not allowed by the contract to cater for these patients hence necessitating repatriation of a majority of the referred cases to de-linked follow-up care.
 - ii. Movement facilitation of referred patients from the level III Hospital back to Haiti. The current provision is to have the PCCs cater for this movement with no facilitation for transport logistics from the Level III host country.
 - iii. Lack of physiotherapy and mental health services at LSA Level II Hospital. The existing contract does not cater for this provision therefore limiting treatment to pharmacological interventions.
 - iv. Lack of embalming services for human remains within LSA hospital hence necessitating outsourcing at the expense of the PCC. The cost of transportation of remains is borne by the respective PCC contributing country.
 - v. Unclear policies on insurance cover/compensation mechanisms following injuries to MSS personnel that leads to disability.

- vi. Limited scope of the dental services provided by the contract. The contract only caters for limited emergency dental services.
 - vii. Lack of designated infrastructure and equipment for a Level 1 hospital in the FOBs.
 - viii. Lack of the necessary medical logistics and supplies for the upcoming FOBs.
 - ix. The existing contract does not allow for treatment of newly diagnosed chronic diseases during MSS Mission deployment. Some of the officers have newly developed uncomplicated diabetes mellitus and the only provision according to the contract is to have them repatriated yet the conditions can be managed in situ.
- d. **Restrictions on air space** which causes unnecessary delays on medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) related cases.

Recommendations

74. It is highly recommended that PCCs deploying to the theatre consider deploying with the following equipment/capabilities in line with the identified gaps/challenges:
- a. **Human Resource.** Delay by other PCCs in deploying their pledged elements continues to negatively impact on the Mission activities. It is critical that the PCCs deploy with various competencies/specialization (personnel and equipment) that will help build necessary capacity towards achieving the MSS mandate. Further, the PCCs to deploy more police officers than military personnel due to current security needs.

- b. **The CARICOM** only deployed an Advance team composed of the leadership and a protection team. The deployment of the main body remains uncertain while the advance team is due for rotating out.
- c. **Air Capability** Aviation assets vital for air insertions and extractions, reconnaissance, surveillance and provision of limited transport. This will be able to support both Land and Maritime Domains.
- d. **Patrol Boats.** To be deployed in coordination with the HCG and MSS Marine elements to police the territorial waters in order to deny the gangs ability to commit transnational crimes.
- e. **Training.** A training entity mandated to conduct specialized tactical command training, marine and boat operations training, drone operators training, tactical medical training, weapon and bomb disposal and Strategy curriculum development.
- f. **Construction and Engineering.** This is vital in conducting construction and engineer works in support of the Mission to include but not limited to opening up of roads/MSRs, hardening of FOBs and demolition.
- g. **Canine Detachment.** Having Canine Detachments deployed to the MSS Mission will be vital in supporting the HNP fight against drugs and contraband, conducting security searches and general policing. A canine detachment should have a composite of patrol/track dogs, explosive/weapon detection dogs and narcotics detection dogs or multirole dogs.
- h. **Equipment Maintenance.** The Mission has a fleet of vehicles and equipment which require dedicated maintenance effort both in terms of personnel,

equipment and spare parts. The contracted entity is not sufficient to provide that capability at the main base (LSA) and at the FOBs. There's need to deploy this capability to ensure smooth operational activities in all Sectors.

- i. **Urgent review of the current Medical and LSA Contracts** to address the observed gaps and allow flexibility.
- j. **MSS Mission Community engagement** to be facilitated in getting buy in solution like soft approach but not limited to field medical camps and co-curriculum activities, among others.
- k. **The pledged air assets for MEDEVAC and CASEVAC** to be based at the theater to ensure guaranteed support and avoid delays occasioned by limitations on the use of the airspace between Haiti and Dominican Republic.
- l. **Financial support** to facilitate Intelligence collection.

Underscoring Urgency

75. Since the last reporting, Kenya has engaged extensively in efforts to mobilise support for the MSS mission to Haiti. In these efforts:
 - a. we secured an African Union Summit Declaration of solidarity with Haiti (Assembly/AU/20(XXXVIII), that among others, calls upon the international community to support the MSS,
 - b. we have engaged with members of the international community, and visited various capitals to urge support to the MSS.
 - c. We have also held consultations with the various Members of the UNSC.
 - d. We have continued to engage closely with the leadership in Haiti and various Haitian stakeholders.

76. In all cases, we have received strong expression of support for efforts to stabilize Haiti in general and for the MSS in particular, a strong shared understanding of the fragility on the ground and the need for urgent action. However, these commitments have not translated significant concrete support necessary to affect the desired changed circumstances on the ground.
77. So far, the UN Trust Fund has received a total of USD. 112.5 million, of which 54.2 has been allocated. The current balance in the Fund is inadequate to support the achievement of the outcomes envisaged in the UNSC mandate. Attaining these will depend on the MSS having sustainable support, at the right levels and capabilities.
78. The current state of operational equipment and logistics support is way below the demands of the theatre. This underscores the urgent need for the Council to address the operational efficacy required and sustainability for the mission, given the security dynamics on the ground and desire to assist Haiti transition to a secure and peaceful nation.
79. It was in the light of this reality, that His Excellency President William Ruto, through his letter of 19th June 2025, to the Chair of the Council in the month of June 2025, sought guidance of the Council. This is particularly crucial given that the Support Contract expires on 30th September 2025, and the mandate of the MSS expires on 2nd October 2025. The UNSC guidance on this matter would greatly aid the MSS participating nations in terms of operational planning. Without this, there is a real possibility that the gains made so far could be lost and Haiti could plunge into graver violence and crisis.
80. Kenya remains hopeful that Council will process this matter in good time to aid seamless operational planning.

Conclusion

81. The MSS Mission remains steadfast and focused in achieving its mandate while building the capacity of the HNP to deal with future security challenges.
82. The Mission is grateful to the Personnel Contributing Countries, donors, the UN, partners and friends of Haiti for all the support that has been accorded to the Mission.

NAIROBI, KENYA
