



## Security Council

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### Letter dated 28 July 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the 142nd monthly report of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) (see annex).

The report provides information on the activities of OPCW in implementing Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) and the relevant provisions of the decisions of the OPCW Executive Council in relation to the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. It covers the period from 24 June to 23 July 2025.

As I have stated previously, the use of chemical weapons anywhere by anyone, and under any circumstances, is intolerable. Impunity for their use is equally unacceptable. It is imperative that those who have used chemical weapons be identified and held accountable. Unity in the Security Council is essential to achieve this urgent objective.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* António **Guterres**



## **Annex**

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled “Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme”, prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 24 June to 23 July 2025 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013.

*(Signed)* **Fernando Arias**

Director General

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

## Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

### **Report by the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons**

#### **Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme**

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (the Council) at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (the Secretariat) is to report to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#), the report by the Secretariat is also to be submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.
2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities” (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation “in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1”.
3. The Council, at its Forty-Eighth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria” (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015), noting the Director-General’s intent to include reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM), along with information on the Council’s discussion thereof, as part of the monthly reporting pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#). Similarly, the Council, at its Eighty-First Session, adopted a decision entitled “Report by the Director-General Regarding the Declaration and Related Submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-81/DEC.4, dated 23 March 2016), noting the Director-General’s intent to provide information on the implementation of that decision.
4. The Council, at its Eighty-Third Session, adopted a decision entitled “OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism Reports on Chemical Weapons Use in the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-83/DEC.5, dated 11 November 2016). In subparagraph 12(a) of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall “regularly inform the Council on the implementation of this decision and incorporate information regarding the implementation of this decision into his monthly reporting to the United Nations Security Council, through the United Nations Secretary-General, regarding EC-M-33/DEC.1”.
5. The Council, at its Ninety-Fourth Session, adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-94/DEC.2, dated 9 July 2020). In paragraph 12 of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall “regularly report to the Council on the implementation of this decision and decide[d] also that the Director-General shall provide a copy of this decision and its associated reports by the Secretariat to all States Parties and to the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly through the United Nations Secretary-General”.
6. The Conference of the States Parties (the Conference), at its Twenty-Fifth Session, adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9, dated 21 April 2021). In paragraph 8 of this decision, the Conference decided that the Director-General shall

regularly report to the Council and States Parties on whether the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the measures contained in paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.

7. This, the 142nd monthly report, is therefore submitted in accordance with the aforementioned Council and Conference decisions and includes information relevant to the period 24 June to 23 July 2025.

### **Obligations undertaken by the Syrian Arab Republic as a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention**

8. The Syrian Arab Republic acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Convention) on 14 September 2013. The Convention entered into force for this State Party on 14 October 2013. To date, the work to verify the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration of its chemical weapons programme has continued, and due to the numerous gaps, discrepancies, and inconsistencies uncovered by the Secretariat over the past 11 years, this declaration still cannot be considered as accurate and complete.

9. As previously reported, all legal obligations binding upon the Syrian Arab Republic as a State Party to the Convention remain valid, regardless of any change in government. Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 and United Nations Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) (both dated 27 September 2013) continue to provide the legal framework for the Secretariat's efforts under the Convention aimed at eliminating the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons programme.

10. The transfer of power to new authorities in the Syrian Arab Republic in December 2024 presents an opportunity for the Organisation to obtain clarifications on the full extent and scope of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, and to ensure the Syrian Arab Republic's long-term compliance with the Convention.

11. In line with a note verbale to the Secretariat (Ref. SQH.3.25.1, dated 7 January 2025) from the Permanent Representation of Qatar to the OPCW, Qatar has represented the interests of the Syrian Arab Republic before the OPCW and will continue to do so until further notice.

### **Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1**

12. Progress by the Syrian Arab Republic is as follows:

(a) As stated in previous reports, the Secretariat has verified the destruction of all 27 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.

(b) As at the date of the submission of this report, due to the continuously evolving situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, no monthly report was received from the Syrian interim authorities regarding activities on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic related to the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and CWPFs, as required by paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1. The Secretariat continued to liaise with the Permanent Representation of Qatar acting on behalf of the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW on this matter, as well as with Syrian authorities when in the Syrian Arab Republic, and will further report in due course.

### **Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities**

13. As stated in previous reports, all the chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic that were removed from its territory in 2014 have been destroyed.

**Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decisions EC-81/DEC.4 and EC-83/DEC.5**

14. Since 2014, the Secretariat has continued to address the shortcomings in the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration through the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) and, since 1 June 2025, through the Office of Special Missions (OSM).

15. In its initial declaration, the Syrian Arab Republic declared a total of 26 chemical weapons-related locations, which housed a total of 46 chemical weapons-related facilities. In addition to locations identified in decisions of the OPCW policy-making organs and information obtained by the DAT from other sources, information provided by States Parties suggests that there are potentially more than 100 additional locations that may have been involved in chemical weapons-related activities. The Secretariat planned visits both to declared locations and these additional locations according to the DAT priority list, taking accessibility considerations into account.

16. As previously reported, during the deployments that took place in March and in April 2025, the DAT, with the support of the Syrian authorities, visited four declared locations and five suspected locations. This included visits to the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), which were not part of inspections mandated under Council decision EC-83/DEC.5.

17. During the deployment that took place in April, the DAT collected three samples at one of the visited locations, which were sent to two OPCW designated laboratories for off-site analysis. The results of the sample analysis were received by the Secretariat from the designated laboratories, and have been shared with the Syrian authorities and will be discussed during the next deployment.

18. Working together with the Syrian authorities, the DAT continued to address the shortcomings in the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration. Out of the 26 outstanding issues that have been reported by the Secretariat since 2014, seven issues have been resolved. The substance of the 19 outstanding issues remained a serious concern to the Secretariat, as it involved large quantities of potentially undeclared or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions. Furthermore, the Syrian Arab Republic had yet to complete all the measures specified in paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.

19. As previously reported, since 1 June 2025 the Director-General has reorganised the conduct of the Secretariat's activities, inter alia, in the Syrian Arab Republic, through the OSM. As it relates to activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, these include the mandates of the DAT, the FFM, the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC, and any other relevant activities in the Syrian Arab Republic.

20. The first OSM team deployment to the Syrian Arab Republic took place in June 2025. The outcome of this deployment, as well as the Secretariat's deployments in March and April 2025, were reported to the Council through the Note by the Director-General entitled "Report on the Work of the Declaration Assessment Team" (EC-109/HP/DG.1, dated 2 July 2025).

21. A further OSM team deployment had been scheduled from 20 to 28 July 2025. As a result of air strikes on 16 July 2025 targeting several sites in Damascus, including the General Staff Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence, a building in which the Secretariat had held several consultations with relevant Syrian authorities and which is located in the direct vicinity of the hotel used by the Secretariat during its missions in the Syrian Arab Republic, the deployment has been postponed until further notice.

22. The Secretariat remains committed to delivering on its mandate to verify the full implementation by the Syrian Arab Republic of all declaration requirements under

the Convention, decisions of the OPCW policy-making organs, and United Nations Security Council resolutions, and will continue to engage with the Syrian authorities on this matter.

#### Implementation of Executive Council decision EC-83/DEC.5

23. As previously reported, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, the Secretariat conducted the eleventh round of inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC from 13 to 19 November 2024.

24. The Secretariat is in the process of planning the next inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC pursuant to decision EC-83/DEC.5.

#### **Other activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic**

25. On 8 February 2025, at the invitation of Syrian caretaker Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani, the Director-General, accompanied by a high-level delegation from the OPCW that included members of the DAT, the FFM and, for the first time, the IIT, visited Damascus to meet both with Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and caretaker Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani.

26. Following the appointment of the Point of Contact by the Syrian authorities, communication was established with the Point of Contact and arrangements were made to hold the first in-person discussions in The Hague the following week.

27. On 26 February 2025, the Secretariat issued a Note on “The Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic in Relation to the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme and the Way Forward” (S/2376/2025). The Note includes, inter alia, details on the activities and elements necessary to draw up an inventory of chemical weapons, chemical weapons sites, equipment, munitions, and other components of the activities related to the Syrian chemical weapons programme, as well as activities and elements necessary to prepare a full and complete declaration and destruction plan. The Note also outlines the anticipated resources that the OPCW will need in 2025 to set up the requisite in-country components of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic and to initiate activities. As detailed in the Note, the Secretariat’s upcoming activities in the Syrian Arab Republic will rely on significant financial and in-kind support from States Parties and the international community at large.

28. On 5 March 2025, the Syrian caretaker Foreign Minister, Mr Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani, delivered an in-person statement at the 108th Session of the Council (EC-108/4). In his statement, the caretaker Foreign Minister reaffirmed the commitment of the Syrian authorities to dismantle any remains of the chemical weapons programme developed under the previous regime, as well as to ensure that justice is achieved for the victims, and to establish solid international standards to prevent the recurrence of chemical weapons use.

29. On 29 April 2025, the Secretariat issued a Note on “Estimated Costs of OPCW Mandated Activities to Resolve the Remaining Issues Surrounding the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme” (S/2397/2025). This Note provides further details on the changed situation in the Syrian Arab Republic since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, including the recognition by the Syrian authorities of all the mandates entrusted to the Secretariat by the decisions of the OPCW policy-making organs, as well as the associated tasks carried out by the DAT, the FFM, and the IIT. The Note focuses on the Secretariat’s estimates of costs of OPCW-mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, including operational costs and capacity-building assistance related to measures to prevent the re-emergence and proliferation of chemical weapons and training and equipment to enable the Syrian National Authority

to respond to and investigate chemical weapons issues and incidents effectively. The Note also underscores the importance of in-kind contributions from States Parties or international actors that could provide timely and effective support to OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic. Finally, as highlighted in the Note, all the Secretariat's mandates in relation to the Syrian chemical weapons programme stand, and deployments will continue to be carried out without deprioritising any of them.

30. On 5 June 2025, the Secretariat issued a Note entitled "Call for Voluntary Contributions to Participate in Financing the OPCW Activities in the Syrian Arab Republic" (S/2413/2025). The Note includes additional background information on the work to verify the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration, the multiple cases of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic documented by the Secretariat, and the identification of perpetrators of such use in a number of these cases by the Secretariat. The Note provides updated estimates on the cost of activities in the Syrian Arab Republic for the remainder of 2025 and estimated funding requirements for 2026 and 2027.

31. As reported in the Note referenced above (S/2413/2025), the Syrian authorities have informed the Secretariat that they do not have the knowledge needed to identify what elements of the Syrian chemical weapons programme have not been declared. The Note further underscores that the Secretariat will need to visit and assess more than 100 additional locations across the Syrian Arab Republic, including military facilities, airfields, and research centres, all of which may be in varied, and hazardous, states of disarray, damage, or destruction. The Syrian authorities will need to declare all chemical weapons-related items, sites, and equipment as they are discovered, and the Secretariat will need to verify this declaration.

32. On 22 July 2025, in response to the request made on 16 July 2025 by the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the OPCW as acting on behalf of the Syrian Arab Republic, and in consultation with the Chairperson of the Council, the Director-General convened the Sixty-Eighth Meeting of the Council to receive and consider information on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. Following statements by the Director-General, the Syrian Arab Republic, Council members, and observers, the Council considered and adopted the report of its Sixty-Eighth Meeting.

33. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) continues to provide support to the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic to facilitate the Secretariat's mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic pertaining to the full elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, and to any subsequent decision or resolution of the relevant organs of the OPCW or the United Nations, as well as any bilateral agreements concluded between the OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic. In this connection, the OPCW and UNOPS concluded a Cooperation Agreement regarding UNOPS services for OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic, effective as of 1 July 2025 until 31 December 2025.

34. An agreement on the privileges and immunities of the OPCW and its personnel for the conduct of operations in the Syrian Arab Republic was concluded through an exchange of letters between the Director-General of the OPCW and the caretaker Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, effective as of 16 June 2025.

#### **Activities carried out with respect to the mandate of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria**

35. Guided by Council decisions EC-M-48/DEC.1 and EC-M-50/DEC.1 (dated 4 February 2015 and 23 November 2015, respectively), as well as by United Nations Security Council resolution [2209 \(2015\)](#), the OSM will continue to study all available

information relating to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

36. The Secretariat is continuing its work and will issue further reports in due course.

**Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 of the Conference of the States Parties at its Fourth Special Session related to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic**

37. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018), the Secretariat established the IIT to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those instances in which the FFM determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism did not issue a report.

38. The IIT is continuing its investigations in accordance with the Note entitled “Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (Dated 27 June 2018)” (EC-91/S/3, dated 28 June 2019) and will issue further reports in due course. In accordance with paragraph 12 of C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Secretariat will continue to preserve and provide information to the mechanism established by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution [71/248](#) (2016), as well as to any relevant investigatory entities established under the auspices of the United Nations. Further, the Secretariat will continue to integrate knowledge and expertise from the IIT, in line with the Convention and decisions adopted by the policy-making organs, into standard operations.

39. In June 2025, members of the IIT travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic for the first time, as part of a broader delegation of the OSM, and held meetings with relevant Syrian authorities. The support of Syrian authorities for ongoing and future IIT investigations, as well as broader coordination in relation to addressing the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, was extensively discussed.

40. During the reporting period, the IIT continued planning and preparing for deployments to the Syrian Arab Republic, including through the identification and prioritisation of persons and locations of interest to its ongoing investigations, as well as new potential sources and repositories of information and documentation.

**Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decision EC-94/DEC.2**

41. In paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/DEC.2, the Council decided:

to request, pursuant to paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the Convention, that the Syrian Arab Republic complete all of the following measures within 90 days of this decision in order to redress the situation:

(a) declare to the Secretariat the facilities where the chemical weapons, including precursors, munitions, and devices, used in the 24, 25, and 30 March 2017 attacks were developed, produced, stockpiled, and operationally stored for delivery;

(b) declare to the Secretariat all of the chemical weapons it currently possesses, including sarin, sarin precursors, and chlorine that is not intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as well as chemical weapons production facilities and other related facilities; and



(c) resolve all of the outstanding issues regarding its initial declaration of its chemical weapons stockpile and programme.

42. At the end of the 90 days, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of these measures.

43. With regard to the inspections mandated by paragraph 8 of EC-94/DEC.2, the Secretariat continues to closely monitor the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic with a view to deploying for this purpose, provided that favourable security conditions are met.

#### **Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Conference of the States Parties decision C-25/DEC.9**

44. In paragraph 7 of decision C-25/DEC.9, the Conference decided, after careful review, and without prejudice to the Syrian Arab Republic's obligations under the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 21(k) of Article VIII and paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Convention, to suspend several rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention.

45. In paragraph 8 of the decision, the Conference decided, *inter alia*, that the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic suspended in accordance with paragraph 7 of decision C-25/DEC.9 are reinstated by the Conference once the Director-General has reported to the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of EC-94/DEC.2. As at the date of this report, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of these measures.

46. The Secretariat will continue to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic with regard to the completion of said measures and will continue to report to the Council as mandated.

#### **Decision on addressing the threat from chemical weapons use and the threat of future use**

47. As previously reported, at its Twenty-Eighth Session, the Conference adopted a decision entitled "Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use and the Threat of Future Use" (C-28/DEC.12, dated 30 November 2023). The Secretariat is reporting on the elements in the decision concerning the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons dossier in accordance with existing reporting obligations.

#### **Supplementary resources**

48. The Trust Fund for Syria Missions was established in November 2015 to support the FFM and other remaining activities, which presently include the work of the DAT and the IIT, as well as the biannual inspections of the SSRC and the two sites identified in paragraph 8 of EC-94/DEC.2. As at the cut-off date of this report, total contributions and pledges to this fund stood at EUR 55.8 million. Contribution agreements had been concluded with Australia, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the European Union. This does not include the more than EUR 48 million received in the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons in 2013 and 2014.

49. Given that the Syrian chemical weapons programme still needs to be declared to its full extent and destroyed by the Syrian Arab Republic, with the corresponding verification by the Secretariat, the Organisation will need to rely on support from

States Parties for additional financial and human resources to carry out any future missions in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat will also continue to adapt its presence in the Syrian Arab Republic as appropriate, in line with its anticipated activities.

50. As noted above, on 5 June 2025 the Secretariat issued Note S/2413/2025 in advance of the 109th Session of the Council, providing updated estimated costs of OPCW-mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic and calling for voluntary contributions to participate in financing the OPCW activities in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat estimated the cost of these activities for the remainder of 2025 to be at EUR 16.7 million, which includes necessary capital expenditures to establish the OPCW offices in the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as operating costs. The current funding capacity for OPCW activities in the Syrian Arab Republic totals EUR 7.2 million, which includes the balance of the Trust Fund for Syria Missions of EUR 1.6 million, in addition to EUR 5.6 million in pledges being actualised. The Secretariat estimates that EUR 6.0 million in resources from the current 2024–2025 Biennium Budget can be reprioritised effectively for OPCW activities in the Syrian Arab Republic without impacting its other mandated activities. This provides a funding capacity of EUR 13.2 million. To close the financial gap, additional voluntary contributions to the trust fund amounting to EUR 3.5 million are required in 2025.

51. Additional funding of EUR 15.3 million in 2026 and EUR 14.3 million in 2027 is estimated to be required. This funding is required to maintain and conduct OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic, and to provide capacity-building support to the Syrian authorities for measures to, inter alia, prevent the re-emergence and proliferation of chemical weapons and their use. The Secretariat will continue to keep the Council informed of developments related to its mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic.

### **Conclusion**

52. The future activities of the Secretariat in the Syrian Arab Republic will focus on engagement with the Syrian authorities to identify the best way for the Secretariat to continue implementing its mandates in accordance with the Convention and all relevant OPCW decisions and United Nations Security Council resolutions, as well as to support and assist the Syrian authorities in fulfilling all of the Syrian Arab Republic's obligations under the Convention.

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