



# Security Council

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## Letter dated 1 July 2025 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015), whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2731 (2024), have the honour to transmit herewith the final report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 18 of resolution 2731 (2024).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) on 14 March 2025 and was considered by the Committee on 1 July 2025.

The Panel would appreciate if the present letter and the final report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Michael **Gibb**  
Coordinator  
Panel of Experts on South Sudan

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## **Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)**

### *Summary*

On 22 February 2025, a second two-year extension to the transitional period established by the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan formally began. Officials presented the extension as an implicit bargain to the people of South Sudan. Planned elections gave way, once again, to two more years of elite-led rule from Juba. In exchange, however, the country's leaders – the primary beneficiaries of this system – promised stability.

Within days, however, national politics and long-simmering local tensions combined to result in one of the most significant recent threats to the country's fragile peace. In a public letter to the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, the First Vice-President, Riek Machar, warned that the peace agreement and its security mechanisms were under serious strain and even at risk of collapse. Ceasefire violations in the country's interior continued, however, and their effects were soon felt in Juba when several prominent opposition commanders and ministers were detained by security forces.

The fractious Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity has proved resilient in the past, despite facing mounting challenges. Serious floods still submerge large swaths of land, while oil exports – the primary source of the Government's revenues – have fallen by 70 per cent. South Sudan also continues to shelter more than 1 million individuals who have fled violence in the Sudan, compounding its own desperate humanitarian challenges. More than half the population now faces "crisis" levels of food insecurity, with pockets of famine afflicting some of the most exposed populations.

Recent events evidence, however, that years of transitional rule have left most of the country's institutions little stronger than they were at independence, and that deep distrust still permeates the unity Government. Most service-providing ministries remain chronically underfunded, while efforts to unify the country's security forces have stalled. The challenge of managing restive commanders and communities is instead largely entrusted to an evolving alliance of political and security elites, many of whom lack popular legitimacy after years in Juba.

Between October 2024 and March 2025, the President used his powers to reset this system once more, replacing the leaders of the three most powerful security forces, two of the country's five Vice-Presidents, and scores of additional commanders and officials. In so doing, he is perceived to have strengthened his own control of these key institutions, while testing the limits of the peace agreement's power-sharing provisions by unilaterally dismissing several office holders appointed by opposition parties.

In parallel, a series of operations by the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) in the three states governed by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) provoked significant armed confrontations with opposition forces.

Many security forces and civil servants have gone without pay for upwards of a year and have, as a result, been pushed into the informal and illicit economy, where many operate checkpoints, facilitate illegal gold mining or logging, and produce charcoal. These resources, if responsibly managed, could provide much-needed local employment and diversify the oil-based economy of South Sudan. Instead, economic

necessity has increasingly forced communities and armed groups into competition with one another over access to resources.

In Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el-Ghazal States, for example, putative efforts by SSPDF to remove opposition-run checkpoints were seen by SPLM/A-IO as an attack on their very presence in these territories.

In Upper Nile State, long-standing mistrust of SSPDF forces once again sparked violent confrontations between the army and Nuer youth, who overran an isolated SSPDF unit in Nasir despite the deployment of attack helicopters and heavily armed river barges. The Panel has continued its investigations into the use and maintenance of such heavy weapons, including helicopters, despite the restrictions implemented by the arms embargo since 2018.

Amid this instability, the Government has continued its efforts to reach an agreement with several additional opposition groups, one of which includes sanctioned individual Paul Malong Awan (SSI.008), through the Kenya-led Tumaini Initiative. The parties remain fundamentally divided, however, over the eventual status of any deal, as opposition groups continue to resist integration into the 2018 peace agreement.

Authorities in the Sudan have, however, helped the Government reach an agreement with sanctioned individual Simon Gatwech Dual (SSI.002). The relationship between the Sudanese and South Sudanese authorities was tested, in January 2025, when the killing of South Sudanese civilians by Sudanese Armed Forces in Wad Madani led to violent anti-Sudanese protests across South Sudan. The Panel has continued to monitor the impact of the conflict in the Sudan on South Sudan, including through the movement of weapons and ammunition through the porous border that divides the Sudan and the northern states of South Sudan.

South Sudanese leaders have pledged never to return to war, and the security landscape is much altered in recent years. Whether they can work together to deliver something the beleaguered civilian population recognize as peace remains unclear.

## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Background .....	5
A. Mandate and travel .....	5
B. Cooperation with international organizations and other stakeholders .....	5
C. Methodology .....	6
II. Implementation of the peace agreement .....	6
A. Extension of the transitional period.....	6
B. Changes to the senior security and political leadership .....	7
C. Unification of forces.....	9
D. Limited funds stifling implementation .....	11
III. Hostilities and ceasefire violations .....	12
A. Clashes between the South Sudan People's Defence Forces and the South Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Army in Opposition .....	12
B. Fighting in Upper Nile State .....	14
C. Continued clashes with the National Salvation Front .....	16
D. Tumaini Initiative .....	17
IV. Arms .....	18
A. Transfers of arms and ammunition from the Sudan .....	18
B. Use of suspect materiel in South Sudan People's Defence Forces operations and exercises....	19
C. Police training in Rwanda .....	21
D. Government procurement priorities.....	21
E. Limited monitoring of official stocks .....	22
V. Humanitarian situation .....	23
Food insecurity .....	23
VI. Regional issues .....	25
A. Relations with the Sudan .....	26
B. Relations with Uganda and the region.....	27
VII. Finance and natural resources .....	28
A. Illegal logging .....	28
B. Production and trade of charcoal .....	30
C. Illegal gold mining .....	31
D. Resumption of oil exports .....	33
E. Management of public resources .....	34
VIII. Conclusions .....	37
IX. Recommendations .....	37
X. Annexes .....	38

## I. Background

### A. Mandate and travel

1. By its resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council imposed a sanctions regime targeting individuals and entities contributing to the conflict in South Sudan and established a sanctions committee (the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan). The Committee designated six individuals for targeted sanctions on 1 July 2015. With the adoption of its resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), the Council imposed an arms embargo on the territory of South Sudan and added two individuals to the list of designated individuals. On 30 May 2024, with the adoption of its resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), the Council renewed the sanctions regime until 31 May 2025.
2. By its resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), the Security Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan until 1 July 2025 so that it might provide information and analysis in support of the work of the Committee, including as relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities who might be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 7 of resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), updated by paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution [2521 \(2020\)](#), as renewed by resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#).
3. On 10 September 2024, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, appointed the five members of the Panel (see [S/2024/676](#)). The Panel's humanitarian expert resigned on 31 December 2024, prior to the drafting of the present final report.
4. During the mandate period, the Panel travelled to South Sudan on two occasions, as well as once to both Kenya and Uganda.

### B. Cooperation with international organizations and other stakeholders

5. While the Panel operates independently of United Nations agencies and institutions, it wishes to express its gratitude to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and other United Nations staff, including in New York.
6. The Panel is grateful for the cooperation of the Government of South Sudan during the mandate period, including for the opportunity to meet with a range of government officials, including cabinet ministers; representatives of the Ministries of Finance and Planning, Interior, Mining, and Environment and Forestry; and members of the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly representing all parties. The Panel also met with representatives of the National Security Service (NSS), Military Intelligence and the South Sudan National Police Service, as well as with senior figures within the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO).<sup>1</sup> The Panel also met with the parties to the Tumaini peace talks in Nairobi, as well as with a number of private companies, civil society organizations, and humanitarian actors and organizations.
7. In paragraph 17 of its resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), the Security Council emphasized the importance that the Panel consult with concerned Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations and UNMISS. The Panel was able to consult

<sup>1</sup> See annex 1. "SPLM-IO" is used to refer to the political party, "SPLA-IO" to its armed forces and "SPLM/A-IO" to them jointly.

extensively with United Nations bodies and agencies in South Sudan and elsewhere. It also consulted with most security mechanisms established under the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (the peace agreement).

8. The Panel is grateful for the collaboration of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#), and the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

9. The Panel sent 32 letters to the Government of South Sudan, Member States and other individuals and entities, to which it received eight substantive responses prior to drafting the present report. The Panel has also sent a letter to the Government of South Sudan setting out an overview of the key findings of the present report and has offered to include its response as an annex to the report.<sup>2</sup>

### C. Methodology

10. The present report was prepared, in March 2025, on the basis of the Panel's own independent research and investigations. The Panel conducted numerous interviews to gather a body of credible information, obtained from a wide range of sources. The Panel has made a conscious effort to ensure its reporting is informed by a range of perspectives on the South Sudanese peace process, including multiple groupings present within the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity and remaining opposition groups. The Panel also drew on its earlier work, including previous reports to the Security Council and the Committee, both public and confidential.

11. The Panel followed the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 ([S/2006/997](#)). It has corroborated the information contained in the present report using multiple independent sources to meet the appropriate evidentiary standards.

12. The Panel conducted its research with the greatest transparency possible, while giving priority to confidentiality where necessary. A source, document or location is described as confidential when its disclosure could compromise the safety of the source.

## II. Implementation of the peace agreement

### A. Extension of the transitional period

13. On 22 February 2025, a two-year extension to the transitional period established by the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan formally began. The extension was first announced by the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity in September 2024, and effectively postponed until at least December 2026 the elections that had been scheduled to be held in December 2024.<sup>3</sup> It is the second such two-year extension to the transitional period.<sup>4</sup>

14. In a statement to mark the occasion, the Government reiterated that the extension aims to provide additional time for the implementation of outstanding provisions of the peace agreement. These, most agree, include the unification and deployment of the country's disparate security forces, election preparations and the

<sup>2</sup> See annex 48 for the response of the Government of South Sudan to the findings in the present report.

<sup>3</sup> See [S/2024/855](#).

<sup>4</sup> There were also additional delays during the pre-transitional period.

drafting of a permanent constitution.<sup>5</sup> These priorities were echoed by the region and broader international community, as well as by the Leadership Forum on Completing the Political Transition in South Sudan.<sup>6</sup> The Minister for Cabinet Affairs, Martin Elia Lomuro, confirmed that the Government's work would continue to be guided by the road map developed for the previous two-year extension.<sup>7</sup>

15. Many within the Government acknowledged that South Sudan was not ready for elections in December 2024.<sup>8</sup> At the same time, the parties have traded blame for the failures that necessitated the extension, while also insisting that it would be the last. "We believe this must be the last extension," one senior official told the Panel, adding "We cannot continue to take our citizens round and round".<sup>9</sup>

16. As the Panel noted in its interim report ([S/2024/855](#)), however, the extension of the transitional period also reflects many of the political and economic incentives that inform the decisions of political and security elites in Juba. While a lack of "political will" is often cited as a major obstacle to the implementation of the peace agreement and conduct of elections, this inertia is grounded in tangible economic and political forces, not indifference.

17. The transitional period, as governed by the 2018 peace agreement, concentrates political and financial power with the central Government in Juba, and by extension, with the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, and the SPLM political party. These powers have allowed governing elites in Juba to maintain the shifting constellation of alliances needed to secure their rule, using public resources, the SSPDF payroll and the promise of national or subnational appointments as the primary currency of a highly transactional politics. The primary constituents of those who have prospered during this period, whether from SPLM or opposition groups, have been other elites in Juba, not prospective voters. For many that operate within this system, therefore, a further extension offered greater certainty than the prospect of elections.

## B. Changes to the senior political and security leadership

18. The President's power to shape the political and security landscape of South Sudan was on vivid display soon after the extension of the transitional period. In a series of decrees broadcast by the South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, the President dismissed several senior officials, including two of the country's five Vice-Presidents.<sup>10</sup>

19. On 2 October 2024, the President dismissed Akol Koor Kuc as the Director General of the Internal Security Bureau, the powerful domestic arm of NSS. Mr. Kuc had held this position since South Sudan gained independence and, under his leadership, NSS had grown into a formidable and feared surveillance and security force.<sup>11</sup>

20. Within a few days, the President also replaced the Commander of the SSPDF Tiger Division, which is widely considered to be one of the most potent fighting forces within SSPDF. This was followed, in December 2024, by the replacement of

<sup>5</sup> See annex 2.

<sup>6</sup> See annex 3.

<sup>7</sup> Interview with the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, 3 February 2025.

<sup>8</sup> Interviews with multiple Government parties, September 2024 to March 2025.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with government officials, February 2025.

<sup>10</sup> Broadcasts on file with the Panel.

<sup>11</sup> See [S/2019/301](#), [S/2019/897](#), [S/2020/342](#) and [S/2023/294](#) for detail on NSS as a counterbalance to SSPDF, as well as on its role in suppressing political dissent.

the Inspector General of the South Sudan National Police Service, and the removal of sanctioned individual Santino Deng Wol (SSI.004) as the SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces.<sup>12</sup>

21. On 10 January 2025, Tut Kew Gatluak Manime, the President’s long-term national security advisor and Chairperson of the National Transitional Committee, was also reassigned as a Presidential Envoy to the Middle East and Ambassador to Kuwait.<sup>13</sup> Mr. Gatluak had previously been considered one of the most influential actors in the President’s circle and had been essential to managing the Government’s relationships with Khartoum.

22. These dramatic changes at the top of the country’s already volatile security sector led to significant tensions within the South Sudan security services. The sudden changes were widely interpreted as an effort by the President to remove perceived threats to his continued rule while reasserting control over the country’s security forces by narrowing the ethnic and tribal affiliations of their senior leadership.<sup>14</sup>

23. On the evening of 21 November 2024, fighting broke out in Juba when elements of SSPDF and NSS sought to transfer Mr. Kuc – who had been under effective house arrest since his dismissal – from his residence in central Juba to a detention facility.<sup>15</sup> As an armed SSPDF unit approached his house, a confrontation with his guards escalated into a sustained fire-fight that lasted around three hours, with heavy machine-gun fire directed at the residence. Video footage shows an SSPDF armoured personnel carrier, fitted with a 12.7mm gun, ramming the front gate of the residence while sustaining small arms fire.<sup>16</sup> The vehicle closely resembled the “Titan-S” model, or variant, a number of which were transferred to SSPDF in 2022.<sup>17</sup>

24. These changes to the country’s senior security leadership were followed, on 10 February 2025, with their political equivalent.

25. In broadcast decrees, the President replaced Vice-President Hussein Abdelbagi Akol with Josephine Lago; and Vice-President James Wani Igga with the prominent businessman, Benjamin Bol Mel, who had previously served as the Senior Presidential Envoy for Special Programmes.

26. Akech Tong Aleu, who had replaced Mr. Kuc as the Director of the Internal Security Bureau of NSS just three months prior, was also replaced.

27. In the same decree, the President also removed Alfred Futuyo Karaba as the Governor of Western Equatoria State. Mr. Futuyo had been appointed by SPLM/A-IO under the terms of the 2018 agreement. In response to his dismissal, SPLM/A-IO issued a statement in which they described the Governor’s removal, as well as that of the Minister of Health, Yolanda Awel, as a violation of the terms of the peace agreement.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Broadcasts on file with the Panel.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Interviews with current and former government employees and international researchers and observers, October 2024 to January 2025.

<sup>15</sup> Interviews with witnesses, corroborated by audio and video on file with the Panel, November 2024. Statement by SSPDF spokesperson, Lul Ruai Koang, 22 November 2024, also on file with the Panel.

<sup>16</sup> Video on file with the Panel.

<sup>17</sup> See annex 4. See also S/2023/294, para. 115 and annex 25. Statement by SSPDF spokesperson, Lul Ruai Koang, dated 22 November 2024, on file with the Panel.

<sup>18</sup> See annex 5. See also Eye Radio, “Machar urges Kiir to reinstate dismissed officials, cites peace deal violations”, 12 February 2025.

## C. Unification of forces

28. The extension of the transitional period, coupled with these significant leadership changes, raised questions about the fate of the security sector reforms in South Sudan and, in particular, about the unification of the country's security forces. Their unification had been largely stalled since 2022, but the security arrangements described in the peace agreement remained a priority for many. SPLM/A-IO, in particular, see these as essential to free elections and to halting the erosion of their political and military influence.

29. On 20 February 2025, Kuol Manyang, who replaced Mr. Gatluak as the Chairperson of the National Transitional Committee, announced that the implementation of the transitional security arrangements would restart on 1 March 2025 with the training of a second batch of Necessary Unified Forces. According to a proposed action plan, this second phase of the process would aim to train 150,000 security sector personnel, with a proposed budget of \$95 million.<sup>19</sup>

30. Previous plans had proposed the creation of 83,000 Necessary Unified Forces, to be trained and deployed during the transitional period, during which the final size of the security forces would also be agreed on the basis of a comprehensive security review.<sup>20</sup> One member of the South Sudan transitional security mechanisms told the Panel that "these [figures] are just estimates," but added that "We are no longer working with the pre-transitional figure of 83,000."<sup>21</sup>

31. In 2021 and 2022, around 53,000 Necessary Unified Forces graduated in various ceremonies held across South Sudan.<sup>22</sup> Few of these forces were ultimately deployed. One member of the transitional security mechanisms told the Panel that six "battalions" of unified forces had been deployed around November 2023, with some additional forces also deployed in Abyei.<sup>23</sup> Further to the ongoing failure to agree on a unified middle command structure, most of these unified forces were, however, deployed under existing SSPDF command structures.<sup>24</sup>

32. Several recent deployments to the Sudanese border have also been described as including "unified forces." In Unity State, some forces appeared to have deployed from the Muon training centre near Leer, alongside additional SSPDF and NSS forces.<sup>25</sup> In Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State, forces from the Pantit training centre were reportedly combined with forces from the recently established SSPDF Division 12. It is difficult to assess whether these are truly integrated forces, however, as they were largely deployed without coordination with the transitional security mechanisms.<sup>26</sup>

33. Beyond these deployments, however, and in the context of the ongoing failure to pay and feed security forces, many of the participants in the first phase of the process have dispersed. Government officials have also cited the arms embargo, implemented in accordance with Security Council resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#) and most

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<sup>19</sup> Announcement made to a session of the Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission on 20 February 2025. See also Eye Radio, "NTC outlines workplan to complete security arrangements in 9 months", 20 February 2025.

<sup>20</sup> See [S/2022/359](#), [S/2022/884](#), [S/2023/294](#) and [S/2023/922](#).

<sup>21</sup> Interview with a member of the security mechanisms, January and February 2025.

<sup>22</sup> See [S/2022/359](#), [S/2022/884](#), [S/2023/294](#) and [S/2023/922](#).

<sup>23</sup> Interview with a member of the security mechanisms, January and February 2025.

<sup>24</sup> See [S/2023/294](#).

<sup>25</sup> Interviews with members of the security mechanisms, January and February 2025.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

recently renewed by the Council in its resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), as an obstacle to arming and deploying additional unified forces.<sup>27</sup>

34. Representatives of SPLM/A-IO have, however, expressed scepticism about the proposed new plan. In their view, efforts to implement a second phase will not be viable without completing the first. One SPLA-IO officer told the Panel: “We may not be able to go through with the second phase without the declaration of the second [middle] command structure. Our own commanders in the field will fight us”.<sup>28</sup> Another acknowledged that, without completing the first phase, and given current security dynamics in the country, “I don’t think the SPLA-IO forces on the ground will trust this process”.<sup>29</sup>

35. These concerns also reflect the growing scepticism of many field-based SPLA-IO commanders towards their leaders in Juba. During a recent assessment of SPLA-IO cantonment sites, for example, local commanders reportedly told leaders in Juba: “We are not happy with the first phase of the deployment and how our people have been treated in the field”.<sup>30</sup> The local commanders insisted: “If you want phase two to happen, first complete phase one properly and include the deployment of the field commanders ... They cannot strip us of our command and leave us with nothing”.<sup>31</sup>

36. The SSPDF Deputy Chief of Defence Forces, Gabriel Duop Lam, was however one of a few opposition leaders to express optimism that an agreement on the middle command structure and subsequent unification of forces could still be reached.<sup>32</sup>

37. The unification of forces has been further complicated by SPLM and SSPDF efforts to pursue parallel agreements with defectors outside of the parameters of the 2018 peace agreement. In order to incentivize such deals, they have frequently promised positions in the Government, as well as the integration of forces into the ranks of SSPDF.

38. On 4 February 2025, for example, aided by Sudanese authorities in Port Sudan, the President’s faction of the Government announced a deal with sanctioned individual, Simon Gatwech Dual (SSi.002). In 2021, Mr. Gatwech had defected from SPLM/A-IO, along with his fellow senior commander, Johnson Olony, to form the Kitgwang faction, precipitating a period of intense violence in Upper Nile State.<sup>33</sup> Under the terms of the deal, Mr. Gatwech, who is currently in the Sudan, agreed to return to Juba within one year. There he will be appointed as an SSPDF Deputy Chief of Defence Forces and allowed to integrate as many as 21,900 of his forces, and to appoint figures to several political positions.<sup>34</sup>

39. SSPDF has also continued integrating the forces of defectors from the National Salvation Front, as well as the Agwelek forces under the command of Mr. Olony,<sup>35</sup> who secured an agreement of his own in 2023 and was also appointed as an SSPDF Deputy Chief of Defence Forces in January 2025.

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<sup>27</sup> Interviews with government officials, September 2024 to January 2025. See also Radio Tamazuj, “Government blames arms embargo for failed disarmament efforts”, 3 March 2025.

<sup>28</sup> Interview with a senior SPLA-IO officer, January 2025.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Interviews with SPLA-IO commanders in Unity State and Western Bahr el-Ghazal State, January 2025.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Interview with Gabriel Duop Lam and other SPLM/A-IO officials, January and February 2025.

<sup>33</sup> See [S/2022/359](#).

<sup>34</sup> See annex 6.

<sup>35</sup> See [S/2024/855](#).

## D. Limited funds stifling implementation

40. The Government has repeatedly stressed that limited financial resources are a major obstacle to implementing the outstanding security sector arrangements and other provisions of the peace agreement.<sup>36</sup> Officials from all parties repeatedly told the Panel that implementation would require very substantial external support.

41. In February 2025, for example, the Minister for Cabinet Affairs stressed that the Government required \$746 million just to fund the elections,<sup>37</sup> while the Chairperson of the National Bureau of Statistics estimated that a census would require 16 months and a budget of \$100 million.<sup>38</sup> Other electoral institutions have also stressed that they have only received a fraction of their proposed budgets.<sup>39</sup> The outgoing Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring Evaluation Commission, Charles Tai Gituai, echoed these calls in his address to the Security Council in February 2025.<sup>40</sup>

42. South Sudan is experiencing a genuine economic crisis. During the country's first year of independence, South Sudan produced almost 350,000 barrels of oil per day, netting the Government more than \$3 billion in revenues. By 2018, following years of conflict, production had more than halved while the Government's share of revenues dipped below \$1 billion.<sup>41</sup> In February 2024, damage to one of the pipelines that transports the country's oil further reduced oil exports by around 70 per cent, limiting production to around 45,000 barrels per day.<sup>42</sup>

43. This decline in oil exports has had a dramatic impact on the Government's resources. Without restoring oil exports to their previous levels, the Government estimated that it would only be able to fund around half of its planned expenditure during the current 2024/25 financial year,<sup>43</sup> and it has struggled to meet basic spending commitments. Many civil servants and organized forces have gone without pay for more than a year.

44. The Government is not, however, without resources. It has continued to export one cargo of Nile blend crude oil per month during the current 2024/25 financial year, each worth around \$45 million.<sup>44</sup> Oil revenues have also likely been boosted by the fact that in-kind transfers to the Sudan of around 28,000 barrels per day appear to have been suspended, or substantially reduced only to around 2,500 barrels per day.<sup>45</sup> In addition, the Government has also collected around 50 to 60 billion South Sudan pounds (SSP) (\$11–13 million) per month in non-oil revenues.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Interviews with government officials, September 2024 to March 2025.

<sup>37</sup> Radio Miraya, "South Sudan election budget breaches \$700 million", 22 February 2025.

<sup>38</sup> Estimate made at a public forum in Juba on 20 February 2025.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Statement by Charles Tai Gituai on the Commission's assessment of implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, delivered to the Security Council on 5 February 2025.

<sup>41</sup> Figures from oil marketing reports prepared by the Ministry of Petroleum.

<sup>42</sup> Budget speech for the 2024/25 financial year, delivered by the Minister for Finance and Planning on 25 September 2024.

<sup>43</sup> Approved budget for the 2024/25 financial year, on file with the Panel.

<sup>44</sup> Two cargos of Nile Blend crude oil were sold in August 2024. Data from market participants. See annex 7.

<sup>45</sup> Report produced by the Ministry of Petroleum, on file with the Panel. In August 2024, the Ministry of Petroleum indicated in documents reviewed by the Panel that a transfer of 2,500 barrels per day was being made to the Kosti powerplant, in the Sudan.

<sup>46</sup> Report produced by the South Sudan National Revenue Authority, on file with the Panel. Dollar conversions made using the official exchange rate of SSP 4,500 from March 2025.

45. The entire monthly salary budget of South Sudan for both organized forces and civil servants totals just SSP 53 billion (\$11.8 million) for the 2024/25 financial year and could therefore, in principle, be accommodated by these limited resources.<sup>47</sup> Similarly, the failure to adequately finance electoral institutions and security arrangements largely preceded oil export disruptions. According to documents produced by the Ministry of Finance and Planning, for example, the Government exceeded its revenue target for the 2023/24 financial year, but nevertheless accrued months of salary arrears.<sup>48</sup>

### **III. Hostilities and ceasefire violations**

46. Efforts to unify the security forces of South Sudan have made little tangible progress. Numerous SSPDF units and opposition forces therefore remain dispersed throughout the country, often observing an uneasy truce as they coexist in close proximity with one another. As faith in the unification process has diminished, and the economic hardships of years without reliable pay have asserted themselves, many have sought to defect. Some defect to SSPDF, in the hope of accelerating their integration into the Government's payroll, others to form their own groups with which to pursue illicit economic activity. This has further fragmented the security landscape.

47. Early in 2025, in parallel to the President's efforts to concentrate his control of political and security institutions in Juba, the tensions stemming from this highly unstable patchwork of forces intensified into significant military confrontations between SSPDF and SPLA-IO, or its allied militia, in the three SPLM/A-IO-governed states of Western Equatoria, Western Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile. As a result, on 27 February 2025, the First Vice-President, Riek Machar, who is the leader of SPLM/A-IO, wrote a letter to the President warning of a possible collapse of the peace agreement further to "systematic violations" in each of those States.<sup>49</sup> Within days, several senior SPLM/A-IO figures, including the SSPDF Deputy Chief of Defence Forces, the Minister for Petroleum, Puot Kang Chuol, and the Minister of Peacebuilding, Stephen Par Kuol, had been detained.<sup>50</sup>

#### **A. Clashes between the South Sudan People's Defence Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Army in Opposition**

48. On 5 January 2025 a contingent of SSPDF soldiers were deployed to dismantle illegal checkpoints established along roads controlled by SPLA-IO forces.<sup>51</sup> Shortly after, on 11 January 2025, armed clashes broke out between those SSPDF and SPLA-IO forces at Bou Bridge in Nagero County in Western Equatoria State.

49. In December 2024, the eighth annual Governors' Forum in Juba resolved to "remove all illegal checkpoints along national roads and waterways". In a context where soldiers largely go unpaid, however, illicit checkpoints and taxation are often critical to local soldiers and their commanders. Efforts to dismantle illegal checkpoints therefore face challenges that mirror those the Panel has previously

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<sup>47</sup> Budget speech for the 2024/25 financial year, delivered by the Minister for Finance and Planning on 25 September 2024.

<sup>48</sup> See annex 8.

<sup>49</sup> See annex 9.

<sup>50</sup> Interviews with government officials and international observers, March 2025.

<sup>51</sup> Interviews with the Office of the Governor of Western Equatoria State and with South Sudanese security sector personnel, January 2025.

reported in the context of civilian disarmament,<sup>52</sup> and are resisted by groups who feel they are being targeted by rivals intent on disrupting their revenue streams.

50. In Nagero, SSPDF sources claimed the fighting had been caused by SPLA-IO forces resisting their efforts to dismantle illegal checkpoints, including around Bou Bridge.<sup>53</sup> SPLA-IO forces, in turn, claimed that this had been a mere pretext, and that their positions had been deliberately attacked by SSPDF forces intent on weakening their presence in both Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el-Ghazal States.<sup>54</sup>

51. This dynamic repeated itself on several more occasions in the subsequent weeks. Clashes between a joint SSPDF and NSS force and SPLA-IO forces erupted over attempts to re-establish the Kunaya checkpoint in Jur River County in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State, resulting in the death of one NSS officer and several injuries. Three days of military operations against SPLA-IO forces in the area followed, leading to the displacement of many civilians, looting and the destruction of property.<sup>55</sup>

52. In a similar incident, a convoy transporting the SSPDF Division 6 Commander was ambushed by SPLA-IO forces while attempting to remove checkpoints elsewhere in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State.<sup>56</sup> SPLA-IO officials claimed they had not been informed about the planned convoy and that it had not been properly coordinated with state authorities.<sup>57</sup> Similar clashes were also reported at the SSPDF base in Suk-Siro, in Yambio County, and in Koor Gana in Nagero County.<sup>58</sup>

53. While the order to remove checkpoints originated with the Governors' Forum in Juba, these events have also combined with long-running local disputes.

54. On 29 January 2025, for example, an SPLM/A-IO spokesperson claimed that they had suffered 10 causalities and 15 injuries when their forces were attacked in Western Equatoria State by SSPDF forces under the command of James Nando, an Azande commander who had defected from SPLA-IO in 2020.<sup>59</sup> Later, on 12 February 2025, Mr. Nando attacked the SPLA-IO cantonment site in Li Rangu, believing it had been sheltering the former SPLM/A-IO Governor of Western Equatoria State, who had fled Yambio following his dismissal as Governor by the President.<sup>60</sup>

55. The President cited disloyalty and a growing rebellion in Western Equatoria State as the reason for the Governor's dismissal.<sup>61</sup> His removal is also a long-standing concern of Avungara Azande elites, with whom the President has allied himself, largely against the Governor's predominantly ethnic Balandia militias.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> See [S/2023/922](#).

<sup>53</sup> Interview with SSPDF spokesperson, January 2025.

<sup>54</sup> Interviews with the leadership of the SPLM/A-IO at the national and state level, January 2025. See also, *The Dawn*, "SSPDF clash with SPLA-IO in Nagero over removal of checkpoint", 13 January 2025.

<sup>55</sup> Interviews with security forces in the region, March 2025.

<sup>56</sup> Interviews with security officers, February 2025.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Interviews with sources in Western Equatoria State, February 2025.

<sup>59</sup> Radio Tamazuj, "W. Equatoria: SPLA-IO says 10 soldiers killed in attacks", 29 January 2025. Corroborated by interviews with SPLM/A-IO representatives, January 2025.

<sup>60</sup> Video on file with the Panel. See also *Sudans Post*, "SSPDF says it seized SPLA-IO cantonment site in Western Equatoria", 13 February 2025.

<sup>61</sup> Eye Radio, "Kiir explains Futuyo's removal as SPLM-IO pursue dialogue", 26 February 2025.

<sup>62</sup> Interviews with international observers, February 2025. See also Small Arms Survey, "Jemma's War: Political Strife in Western Equatoria", October 2023.

## B. Fighting in Upper Nile State

56. Nasir is a predominantly Jikany Nuer town in Upper Nile State. An SSPDF unit has been stationed at the Wei-Yar-Adiu barracks despite widespread local opposition to their presence. As one politician from the region told the Panel: “Communities in Nasir do not see the national army as protectors”.<sup>63</sup>

57. In early 2025, SSPDF announced plans to replace the SSPDF unit stationed in Nasir.<sup>64</sup> Local communities and armed Nuer youth, sometimes referred to as the “White Army”, have long insisted that they should be replaced by a unit of the Necessary Unified Forces, which they view as a more neutral force.<sup>65</sup>

58. A contingent of Unified Forces, comprising an SPLA-IO platoon from the Owiny-Ki Bul training centre in Eastern Equatoria State and a South Sudan Opposition Alliance platoon from the Pantit training centre in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State, had been reportedly organized.<sup>66</sup> SSPDF instead dispatched a large SSPDF unit that included some recently integrated Shilluk Agwelek forces.

59. As part of this operation, on 15 February 2025, sanctioned individual James Koang Chuol (SSi.003), the SSPDF Deputy General Chief of Staff for Operations, also travelled to Malakal, in Upper Nile State, with Johnson Olony. Shilluk Agwelek forces under the command of Mr. Olony clashed repeatedly with Nuer militias in Upper Nile State between 2021 and 2023, following his defection from SPLM/A-IO.<sup>67</sup>

60. His presence led to further mobilization among local youth, who had been involved in sporadic clashes with SSPDF in and around Nasir over several weeks. Despite his travel to Malakal ostensibly being to expedite the integration of his Agwelek forces into SSPDF,<sup>68</sup> his recent appointment as Deputy Chief of Defence Forces with a special responsibility for dismantling illegal checkpoints and disarming civilians led to reporting that he had been deployed to disarm Nuer youth and the so-called White Army, while seizing lucrative checkpoints along the Sobat River.<sup>69</sup> SSPDF has frequently alleged that these militia forces are under the control of SPLA-IO, who refute this claim.<sup>70</sup>

61. Subsequently, around 19 February 2025, several hundred SSPDF, allied Dinka militia and Agwelek forces departed from Malakal with two heavily armed barges,<sup>71</sup> towards Nasir.<sup>72</sup> Two Mi-24 attack helicopters were also dispatched and stationed at the airport in Malakal.<sup>73</sup> White Army youth in both Upper Nile State and Jonglei State vowed to prevent the barges from crossing into Nasir County.<sup>74</sup>

62. A series of escalating clashes followed in both Upper Nile and Jonglei State, including airstrikes from attack helicopters, including near Abwong village, in Ulang County.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Interview with a political figure from Nasir County, February 2025.

<sup>64</sup> Interviews with security sector officials, opposition figures and international observers, March 2025.

<sup>65</sup> Interviews with community leaders, international observers and local Members of Parliament, February 2025.

<sup>66</sup> Interviews with members of the security mechanisms, January 2025.

<sup>67</sup> See [S/2022/359](#) and [S/2022/884](#).

<sup>68</sup> Interviews with security sector personnel, February 2025.

<sup>69</sup> Interviews with local observers, February 2025. Corroborated by photographs on file with the Panel.

<sup>70</sup> See annex 10.

<sup>71</sup> See annex 11.

<sup>72</sup> Interviews with security sector personnel, February 2025.

<sup>73</sup> Interviews with two international observers, February 2025.

<sup>74</sup> Interviews with local observers in Malakal and Nassir, February 2025.

<sup>75</sup> Interviews with international observers, human rights activists and community leaders, February 2025. Statement dated 25 February 2025, on file with the Panel. See annex 12.

63. By 4 March 2025, however, White Army forces had overrun the SSPDF position in Nasir, capturing significant weaponry and ammunition.<sup>76</sup>

64. A number of surviving soldiers were evacuated, with United Nations assistance, on 7 March 2025. During the evacuation, one of the UNMISS helicopters sustained fire, killing one United Nations crew member and seriously injuring two.<sup>77</sup> Several soldiers and their commander were also killed during the evacuation. The Special Representative for South Sudan and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, Nicholas Haysom, stated: “The attack on UNMISS personnel is utterly abhorrent and may constitute a war crime under international law”. The Panel notes that such “attacks against United Nations missions” are also included among the sanctions designation criteria enumerated in paragraph 7 (f) of resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#).

65. In a public statement on 7 March 2025, the President accused SPLA-IO and the First Vice-President of commanding the White Army forces that had attacked SSPDF positions in Nasir.<sup>78</sup> By then, security forces in Juba had already detained several senior SPLM/A-IO figures alleged to have been in communication with White Army leaders in Upper Nile State.<sup>79</sup>

66. On 4 March 2025, the SSPDF Deputy Chief of Defence Forces and Chief of Staff of SPLA-IO, Gabriel Duop Lam, was detained at his residence in Juba, along with several other opposition commanders.<sup>80</sup> The day after, the SPLM-IO-appointed Minister for Petroleum was also detained; followed by the Minister for Peacebuilding, who was released shortly after.<sup>81</sup> Heavy weapons were also deployed to secure key locations in Juba, while the First Vice-President’s residence in Juba was surrounded.<sup>82</sup>

67. As the present report was being finalized, on 10 March 2025, the Chief of Defence Forces of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), Muhoozi Kainerugaba, stated that UPDF “special forces” had “entered Juba to secure it” two days previous, while expressing support for the President.<sup>83</sup> On 11 March 2025, he also published a video showing armed UPDF soldiers arriving at Juba International Airport.<sup>84</sup> According to flight data, the plane (5Y-FAH), had made two return trips from Juba to Uganda that day. Additional analysis by the Panel further corroborates those claims.<sup>85</sup> The South Sudan Minister for Information, Michael Makuei, denied the presence of Ugandan forces in Juba.<sup>86</sup> UPDF troops have previously deployed in South Sudan to provide training, support the President, and to conduct joint security operations.<sup>87</sup>

68. The deployment of armed UPDF soldiers to Juba would constitute a breach of the arms embargo implemented by resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), most recently renewed by

<sup>76</sup> Statements by the White Army and Office of the President on file with the Panel.

<sup>77</sup> UNMISS, “UNMISS personnel killed and injured during attack on UN helicopter in Nasir, South Sudan”, 7 March 2025.

<sup>78</sup> See annex 13.

<sup>79</sup> Interviews with government officials and opposition leaders, March 2025. See also Radio Tamazuj, “SSPDF commander, UN crew killed in Nasir”, 7 March 2025.

<sup>80</sup> Interviews with SPLM/A-IO officials, March 2025.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Interviews with international observers, March 2025.

<sup>83</sup> See annex 14. A second UPDF spokesperson also appeared to corroborate the deployment. See Radio Tamazuj, “UPDF spokesperson confirms deployment of troops in South Sudan”, 11 March 2025.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Eye Radio, “South Sudan government says no Ugandan forces in Juba”, 11 March 2025.

<sup>87</sup> See [S/2024/855](#), and annexes 15 and 16.

resolution 2731 (2024), as no prior exemption was sought further to the provisions of paragraph 5 of resolution 2428 (2018).

### C. Continued clashes with the National Salvation Front

69. In its interim report ([S/2024/855](#)), the Panel reported ongoing clashes between SSPDF, SSPDF-allied defectors and various factions of the National Salvation Front (NAS), including those led by Thomas Cirillo and by Kenyi Loburon. Similar clashes have continued, particularly in Central and Western Equatoria States, resulting also in recruitment, abductions, criminality and disruption to humanitarian activities.

70. In November 2024, for example, a NAS faction led by Francis Diko intensified the recruitment of fighters in the Lui payam of Mundri East County, in Western Equatoria State, and later in the Wandi payam of Mundri West, as well as in Mvolo and its surrounding areas.<sup>88</sup> A community leader in Mundri East told the Panel that suspected NAS forces had abducted around 25 male youths from the Moru community in Lui payam on 19 November 2024, taking them to Yei River County in Central Equatoria State.<sup>89</sup> Other recruits were reportedly taken to Diko, in Mundri East.<sup>90</sup> SSPDF forces in Central Equatoria State were instructed to intensify their patrols to disrupt these activities and prevent various NAS factions from advancing further into new areas in Western Equatoria State.<sup>91</sup>

71. Violence has also continued around Wonduruba, in Central Equatoria State.<sup>92</sup> Following these events, National Salvation Front United Forces (NAS-UF) moved from Wonduruba into Mukaya payam in Lainya County, where they clashed with SSPDF forces in November 2024. Former NAS commander Kenyi Warrior repositioned his forces to Mukaya payam, where, along with SSPDF soldiers, they were then reportedly ambushed by suspected NAS-UF elements.<sup>93</sup>

72. The Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism has expressed frustration over being repeatedly denied access to investigate these events in and around Wonduruba.<sup>94</sup>

73. On 24 February 2025, suspected NAS elements also allegedly ambushed an SSPDF unit along the Yei–Lasu Road in Yei River County in Central Equatoria State. One SSPDF soldier was reportedly killed and one was injured and abducted. SSPDF reinforcements deployed in response were, reportedly, also ambushed, resulting in an additional death. The attackers reportedly looted a significant quantity of ammunition from the SSPDF forces.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Interviews with county commissioners and community leaders, November 2024 and February 2025.

<sup>89</sup> Interviews with local community leaders, civilians and NAS members, January and February 2025.

<sup>90</sup> Interviews with county commissioners and community leaders, November 2024 and February 2025.

<sup>91</sup> Interviews with local community leaders and security sector personnel, November 2024 and February 2025.

<sup>92</sup> See [S/2024/855](#).

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Announced at a Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism board meeting in Juba on 25 February 2025. See also Radio Tamazuj, “Peace monitors blocked from probing Wonduruba killing”, 25 February 2025.

<sup>95</sup> Interviews with local community leaders and security sector personnel, November 2024 and February 2025.

## D. Tumaini Initiative

74. As tensions escalated in South Sudan, negotiations took place in Nairobi, under Kenyan auspices, with several of the opposition groups that had not signed the 2018 peace agreement.

75. On 9 January 2025, the leadership of the South Sudan Opposition Movement Alliance, and other opposition groups participating in the talks, announced the formation of a new alliance called the United People's Alliance (UPA).<sup>96</sup> Pagan Amum Okiech was appointed as Chairperson, while sanctioned individual Paul Malong Awan (SSi.008) was appointed as its First Deputy Chairperson<sup>97</sup> and Stephen Buay Rolnyang as its Chief of General Staff and head of its Command Council.<sup>98</sup> UPA also declared the establishment of three “military fronts” and an accompanying command structure for their unified forces.<sup>99</sup>

76. Representatives of the Government expressed concern at this new collation.<sup>100</sup> Opposition leaders noted that “the Government would prefer that we remain divided with conflicting agendas, allowing them to manipulate us and negotiate with us individually, rather than as a united front,”<sup>101</sup> adding that they had “declared our military zones to facilitate the cantonment of our forces when we sign a peace agreement with the Government.”

77. The Tumaini Initiative resumed its mediations in Nairobi on 20 January 2025. The Government was represented by a new delegation, further to concerns that the previous delegation had exceeded its mandate, including by agreeing protocols that either replicated or deviated from those of the 2018 peace agreement. A representative of the new government delegation told the Panel that they had been instructed to eliminate “90 per cent of the eight [previously agreed] Tumaini protocols.”<sup>102</sup> On 21 January 2025, therefore, they presented a proposal to amend parts of the previously initialled protocols while proposing that the Tumaini Initiative should be incorporated as an annex to the existing peace agreement.<sup>103</sup>

78. In response, UPA reiterated its position that the Tumaini process must result in its own stand-alone agreement that is monitored and implemented through new mechanisms.<sup>104</sup>

79. Some progress was arguably achieved with respect to setting the agenda for negotiations.<sup>105</sup> Opposition groups had long insisted that mediation efforts must include a discussion of the “root causes” of the conflict in South Sudan, and had argued that the existing peace agreement failed to address many of those.<sup>106</sup> Such a discussion was therefore seen as critical to their broader contention that the 2018 peace agreement was inadequate and must be complemented or replaced by a new agreement.

<sup>96</sup> See annex 17. These groups are the Real Sudan People's Liberation Movement (Real SPLM), the South Sudan United Front/Army (SSUF/A), the South Sudan United People Liberation Front (UNPLF) and the National Salvation Front – Revolutionary Command Council (NAC-RCC).

<sup>97</sup> See annex 18.

<sup>98</sup> See annex 19.

<sup>99</sup> See annex 20.

<sup>100</sup> Interviews with members of the government delegation and additional political leaders in Juba, January and February 2025.

<sup>101</sup> Interviews with representatives of opposition groups, January and February 2025.

<sup>102</sup> Interview with a member of the South Sudanese government delegation, December 2024 and February 2025.

<sup>103</sup> Document on file with the Panel.

<sup>104</sup> Interview with UPA leadership, January 2025.

<sup>105</sup> Official agenda on file with the Panel. See also annex 21.

<sup>106</sup> See annex 22.

80. In reality, however, the parties remained deeply divided on a range of fundamental issues, and most notably on the status of any eventual agreement. The government delegation also informed the Panel that they did not formally recognize UPA, while the opposition groups remained suspicious of the new government delegation, asking “How can we trust individuals who opposed the Tumaini Initiative?”<sup>107</sup>

81. On 6 February 2025, the government delegation requested that the talks be adjourned, citing their need to return to Juba for the formal commencement of the extended transitional period.<sup>108</sup> On 20 February 2025 the President of Kenya, William Ruto, adjourned talks until 20 March 2025 to allow for further consultations.<sup>109</sup>

## IV. Arms

### A. Transfer of arms and ammunition from the Sudan

82. In late 2024, South Sudanese security services observed and seized sophisticated rifles fitted with scopes from civilians and armed actors, including cattle keepers. Officers concluded that the weapons had likely entered South Sudan from the Sudan.<sup>110</sup>

83. The Panel assesses, from photographs of the rifles and shotguns,<sup>111</sup> that most were of Turkish manufacture and likely originated from stocks looted by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum, where similar civilian-classified guns had been imported since 2019.<sup>112</sup>

84. Photographs of samples of the weapons shown to the Panel included BRG 55,<sup>113</sup> HUSAN Arms MKA 556 and UTAS Defence 5.56×45 mm calibre rifles.<sup>114</sup> These are Turkish-manufactured guns intended for the civilian markets and inspired by the AR-15 assault rifle. These have not previously been recorded in South Sudan but had been sold to dealers in Khartoum well into 2023.<sup>115</sup> The Panel has identified several weapons of this type,<sup>116</sup> including the exact combination of a BRG 55 rifle and scope, in the possession of RSF soldiers in 2024.

85. The sample of seized weapons studied by the Panel also included a civilian Molot Vepr 1V-E rifle, versions of which have been documented in the Sudan in 2023 and 2024.<sup>117</sup>

86. The weapons are likely to have been smuggled through the porous border with the Sudan, including from RSF-held territory to Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State in South Sudan, and also potentially through the Abyei area. Rizeigat and Misseriya pastoralists have also continued to move in the relevant border areas.

<sup>107</sup> Interviews with opposition groups, January and February 2025.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Interviews with the leadership of opposition groups participating in the Tumaini Initiative, February 2025.

<sup>110</sup> Panel interviews with government officials in January 2025.

<sup>111</sup> See annex 23.

<sup>112</sup> Weapons can fall into the civilian category, which are subject to lighter export controls, according to a combination of characteristics, including their calibre, range (as determined by the pattern of the rifling of the bore or lack of it) and restrictions on automatic fire.

<sup>113</sup> Manufactured by Turkish company BRG Defence, the BRG 55 was commercialized around 2020.

<sup>114</sup> See annex 23.

<sup>115</sup> Some 250 BRG55 semi-automatic “sporting rifles” were exported to “Osman Altigani Ali” in 2002 and 2023. Some 100 MKA 556 semi-automatic shotguns were exported to “Wail Shams Eldin Hassan” on 21 December 2022 and 200 more on 15 March 2023. Some 50 UTAS XTR-12 semi-automatic rifles were exported to “Al Rimaia for weapon and ammunition trading” on 3 February 2023. Panel interviews with arms experts and trade data on file with the Panel.

<sup>116</sup> See annex 23.

<sup>117</sup> Amnesty International, “New weapons fuelling the Sudan conflict”, 25 July 2024. See also annex 23.

87. The conflict in the Sudan upset well-established trading routes between the northern States of South Sudan, including Western and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal States, and the Sudan. The conflict, and consequent militarization of the border zones and crossings, have disrupted and reduced much of the civilian trade. Individuals with military or political connections have, however, continued the cross-border trade.<sup>118</sup> While people, arms, ammunition and looted goods, such as cars, have entered South Sudan from the Sudan, fuel, food and other commodities have travelled the other way.<sup>119</sup> Border towns, such as Kiir Adem,<sup>120</sup> just south of RSF positions in Raiq Mandalla, as well as Abyei,<sup>121</sup> have emerged as major transit points. Ammunition from the Sudan has also reportedly traded in the Abyei box, with some of it likely traded on to South Sudan.<sup>122</sup>

## B. Use of suspect materiel in South Sudan People's Defence Forces operations and exercises

88. At least two of the Mil Mi-24 helicopters<sup>123</sup> operated by SSPDF have regularly flown in the past year, including most recently as part of the ongoing violence in Upper Nile State. Of the three Mi-24 helicopters stationed at Juba airport, one left its station around 20 October 2024, 13 November 2024, 17 January 2025 and between 31 January and 7 February 2025. A second left its station sometime between 14 and 18 February 2025.<sup>124</sup>

89. On 20 October 2024, the Mi-24 helicopter that left Juba was seen in Bor after an unplanned landing.<sup>125</sup> It was fitted with a B8V20 rocket launch pod.

90. After two Mi-24 helicopters left their stations in Juba in February 2025, one was observed in satellite photos in Malakal in Upper Nile State on 17 February 2025, then two were observed in Malakal on 24 February 2025, both in satellite photos and by local observers.<sup>126</sup>

91. The activity of these Mi-24 attack helicopters raises the question of how they remained airworthy despite the provisions of the arms embargo implemented by resolution 2428 (2018). Mi-24 helicopters require frequent maintenance and a steady supply of spare parts, notably for the oil circuits, the engine and the gearbox. Occasional replacements of rotor and tail blades are also required. After any additional ground units have been cannibalized for parts, this would require the international procurement of spare parts, as well as ongoing maintenance assistance. South Sudan has not sought any exemptions to the arms embargo relating to the maintenance of its fleet of helicopters.

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<sup>118</sup> Interviews with security officials and local and Sudanese civilians, April 2024 to February 2025. See also Joseph Majok, “War and the borderland: Northern Bahr el-Ghazal during the Sudan conflict” (Rift Valley Institute, March 2024).

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid. See also Small Arms Survey, “Dominance without Legitimacy: Tong Akeen Ngor’s Reign in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State”, June 2024.

<sup>121</sup> Interview with a government official in Juba and with additional sources in the area, January and February 2025.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> See S/2015/656, S/2016/70, S/2016/963, S/2017/326, S/2017/979, S/2018/292, S/2019/301, S/2020/342, S/2021/365 and S/2023/922.

<sup>124</sup> See annex 24.

<sup>125</sup> See annex 25.

<sup>126</sup> Interviews with international observers, corroborated by photographs and satellite imagery analysis by the Panel. See also annex 26.

92. The initial suppliers of some, possibly all, of the South Sudanese Mi-24 helicopters were Ukrainian entities, all prior to the implementation of the arms embargo in 2018. One contract, which concluded on 31 December 2016, saw the Ukrainian company Motor Sich JSC deliver three Mi-24V-MSB<sup>127</sup> helicopters to the South Sudan Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs around 2014. A second contract, which concluded on 31 December 2017, between Ukrainian Promoboronexport and a Ugandan company, Bosasy Logistics Ltd., covered the delivery of four Mi-24V helicopters, two of which were formally confirmed to have been transferred to South Sudan.<sup>128</sup>

93. Ukrainian authorities have, however, confirmed that no Ukrainian companies are involved in supplying parts or maintaining these helicopters a decade after their delivery and seven years since their related service and supply contracts expired. The State Export Control Service of Ukraine has not issued any permits for transfers of goods to or from South Sudan since 2016. Ukrainian authorities also confirmed that no spare main rotor or tail blades had been provided by Ukrainian companies other than those fitted on the three Mi-24V-MSB. Those fitted to the Mi-24V had been supplied by Bosasy Logistics Ltd., which also provided additional spare parts at the outset of the contract.<sup>129</sup>

94. The Panel also notes that two foreign nationals were identified as members of the helicopter crew that made an unscheduled landing in Bor on 20 October 2024.<sup>130</sup> In paragraph 4 of its resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), most recently renewed by resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), the Security Council prohibits foreign nationals from providing “technical assistance ... or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel.”

95. Moreover, the movement of military aircraft requires prior notification to national monitoring bodies further to article 2.1.10.4 of the 2018 peace agreement and articles 1.2, 11.5 and 11.6 of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of 2017. Under these agreements, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism must be notified in advance of any movements of military equipment. The Panel has confirmed that no such notification was provided.

96. A Member State has otherwise informed the Panel that the two Mi-24B helicopters<sup>131</sup> acquired under the contract with Bosasy Logistics Ltd. dated 7 October 2014, have been recently put up for sale through a company operating from Eastern Europe.<sup>132</sup>

97. The Panel has also observed the use of other heavy weapons of unknown origin in South Sudan.

98. A video of a live-fire drill conducted by SSPDF forces, including from the Tiger Division, was released on 31 December 2024. The exact date of the exercise could not be determined, but an analysis of the ranks of identifiable officers suggests it was relatively recent and certainly well after the implementation of the arms embargo by resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#).

99. During the exercise, soldiers fired two 14.5mm machine guns of a model not previously recorded in South Sudan.<sup>133</sup> The heavy machine guns, as well as a multi-

<sup>127</sup> Also transliterated as “Mi-24B”.

<sup>128</sup> See [S/2016/70](#), [S/2016/963](#), [S/2017/979](#) and [S/2018/292](#).

<sup>129</sup> According to confidential transaction documents on file with the Panel.

<sup>130</sup> Interviews with diplomats in Juba, February 2025.

<sup>131</sup> Serial numbers 3532421014168 and 3532422015149.

<sup>132</sup> Correspondence with the Panel.

<sup>133</sup> See annex 27.

barrel rocket launcher and a ZU-23 antiaircraft autocannon, were mounted to SSPDF pickup trucks.

100. The Panel is working to identify the make of the 14.5mm guns, which resemble the CS/LM2, of which there are known variants and imitations. That gun, and its variants and imitations, have been identified in use over the past few years in other regions. The Panel is investigating their provenance and date of transfer to South Sudan, including whether they are part of old stock legitimately supplied prior to the implementation of the arms embargo.

### C. Police training in Rwanda

101. At least two training courses were delivered by the Rwanda National Police Service to the South Sudan National Police Service in 2024. According to official statements, the second course lasted two months in Rwanda, ending on 11 October 2024. It was attended by 120 officers and non-commissioned officers of the South Sudan police.<sup>134</sup> The South Sudanese participants had not been integrated into the Necessary Unified Forces at the time of the training, although a senior official told the Panel that they would be integrated in the future.<sup>135</sup>

102. Images from the training show South Sudanese officers utilizing tactical equipment. An armoured personnel carrier with a mounted turret and an automatic rifle can also be seen in photographs of the training.<sup>136</sup> Official statements describe “junior tactical command” and fighting organized crime as part of the syllabus.

103. Paragraph 4 of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), most recently renewed by resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), prohibits the provision of “training...related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel” with regard to lethal military equipment.

104. The concerned parties did not request an exemption to these measures further to paragraph 5 of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#). The Panel therefore considers these trainings to be possible breaches of the arms embargo.<sup>137</sup>

### D. Government procurement priorities

105. In December 2024, the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board, which was established by the 2018 peace agreement, finalized three documents: a white paper on defence and security; a revised defence policy; and a security policy framework for South Sudan. The Board is mandated by the peace agreement to undertake a wide-ranging assessment of the defence and security needs of South Sudan, including its command structures and the composition, function, size and budget of the security forces.

106. The revised defence policy stipulates that “a strategic plan for logistics and procurement for SSPDF shall be developed, including an SSPDF equipment procurement programme for 2024–2029.”

107. Another identified priority is the mobility of South Sudanese security forces, including through the creation of a “strategic transport force comprising both riverine, road and air transport.” The emphasis on mobility is consistent with the Panel’s recent

<sup>134</sup> See annex 28. See also [S/2022/884](#).

<sup>135</sup> Interview with senior government officials, January 2025. See also [S/2023/922](#), [S/2024/343](#) and [S/2024/855](#).

<sup>136</sup> See annex 29.

<sup>137</sup> The Panel has written to the government of Rwanda but has not received a reply.

reporting on the procurement of military transport equipment for land, air and riverine<sup>138</sup> activities in breach of the arms embargo.

## E. Limited monitoring of official stocks

108. The security forces of South Sudan continue to face significant limitations with respect to managing and securing its weapons and ammunition stocks, complicating efforts to monitor arms transfers into South Sudan.

109. One notable limitation is the lack of functioning stamping machines. According to Panel interviews with a senior official, the entire security sector owns only two or three such stamping machines, which are meant to mark both official and seized weapons. Both have, however, been out of order for some time. Another major limitation for SSPDF and the police is their still limited infrastructure for storing and maintaining weapons and ammunition,<sup>139</sup> and widespread shortcomings in record-keeping.<sup>140</sup> While highlighting a comprehensive legal framework, grounded in the Firearms Act of 2016 and the firearms regulations of 2017, as well as the efforts of the Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control, a senior official acknowledged these difficulties, which extend also to the safekeeping of weapons seized or handed over by civilians.

110. These challenges are compounded by the current economic crisis and subsequent failure to pay many members of the security services. This has led to a collapse of discipline and, in some units, to the looting of weapons. On 18 January 2025, for example, members of SSPDF, the police and NSS in Pochalla town in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area broke into an armoury before firing indiscriminately in the air across town over a 10-hour period to protest against the Government's failure to pay their salaries.<sup>141</sup>

111. Limited stockpile management was also evident in an explosion on 12 February 2025 at the SSPDF Malual-Chaat barracks on the outskirts of Bor town in Jonglei State. A series of detonations ignited ammunition, propellant and scattered ordnance, included undetonated 122 mm rockets, across inhabited areas.<sup>142</sup> The cause of the explosion has not been disclosed.<sup>143</sup> The Panel notes, however, the absence of proper berms at the military grounds, a common safety design around rocket and explosives stores meant to mitigate the effects of blasts and chain detonations. This explosion follows a number of similar events at other military facilities, including Giada barracks in Juba on 25 February 2024,<sup>144</sup> the armoury of the SSPDF Division 4 headquarters outside Rubkona in Unity State on 8 June 2023<sup>145</sup> and ammunitions

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<sup>138</sup> See [S/2023/294](#).

<sup>139</sup> Interview with a senior government official, February 2025.

<sup>140</sup> Interviews with international diplomats in Juba, February 2025.

<sup>141</sup> Widely reported. See, for instance, Radio Tamazuj, "Mutinying Pochalla soldiers airlifted to Juba", 20 January 2025; and Eye Radio, "Pochalla restores order after servicemen engage in salary-related gunfire protest", 20 January 2025.

<sup>142</sup> According to pictures circulated on social media, the samples seen did not have their fuses affixed. Fuses are usually kept separate and fitted onto the rockets shortly before use. See annex 30. See also Radio Tamazuj, "Bor army armory explosion leaves girl dead, several injured", 13 February 2025.

<sup>143</sup> Sudans Post reported that the fire may have been caused by some of the soldiers stationed in the barracks. Sudans Post, "Bor ammunition depot explosion kills 1, leaves 2 children wounded", 13 February 2025.

<sup>144</sup> See [S/2024/343](#).

<sup>145</sup> See [S/2023/922](#).

stores in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State in January 2023<sup>146</sup> and Eastern Equatoria State on 29 November 2022.<sup>147</sup>

## V. Humanitarian situation

### Food insecurity

112. The humanitarian situation in South Sudan has continued to deteriorate amid ongoing insecurity, the conflict in the Sudan, flooding and an economic crisis. “We are not feeding the hungry anymore,” one humanitarian told the Panel, “We are feeding the starving.”<sup>148</sup>

113. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification is an annual assessment undertaken jointly by humanitarian organizations and the Government of South Sudan. It is a critical exercise that aims to determine relative needs across the country and guides the humanitarian response and allocation of humanitarian resources.

114. Given its significant impact on the national humanitarian response, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification process has been marked by controversies in recent years. In 2023, the Government insisted that humanitarian partners use the Government’s highly contentious population estimates to inform its needs assessments. These estimates generated significant criticism, in part because they are widely considered to inflate figures – and therefore needs – in the greater Bahr el-Ghazal region, home to key constituencies of President Kiir, while undercounting critical in-need populations in the Equatorias and the greater Upper Nile region.<sup>149</sup> In 2024, the process reverted to using adjusted population figures on the basis of the 2008 South Sudan census.<sup>150</sup>

115. As of December 2024, around 6.3 million people, around half the population, are facing “crisis” (phase 3) levels of food insecurity, or above. In total, 76 of the 79 counties in South Sudan face crisis or worse levels of food insecurity,<sup>151</sup> while malnutrition data, often considered a more reliable measure of the ground conditions,<sup>152</sup> indicate “a full-blown public health emergency” in about half the country.<sup>153</sup>

116. In total, 1.71 million South Sudanese face “emergency” (level 4) levels of food insecurity, while around 41,000 people face “catastrophe/famine” (level 5). South Sudan is one of only a few countries where any part of the population faces these levels of food insecurity.

117. According to the most recent projections, this situation is expected to deteriorate further during the coming “lean season” between April and July 2025, when it is estimated that 7.7 million people will fall into crisis levels of food insecurity, while 63,000 may face famine.

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<sup>146</sup> Incident reporting by international monitors obtained by the Panel, June 2023.

<sup>147</sup> See Eye Radio, “Torit ammunition store bursts into flames, causing explosions”, 29 November 2022.

<sup>148</sup> Interview with a humanitarian actor, February 2025.

<sup>149</sup> See S/2024/343.

<sup>150</sup> Presentation by representatives of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Technical Working Group, reviewed by the Panel, November 2024.

<sup>151</sup> IPC, South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September - November 2024 and Projections for December 2024 - March 2025 and for April - July 2025, 18 November 2024.

<sup>152</sup> The causes of malnutrition are multifaceted and extend beyond the availability of food to include disease prevalence, access to health services, poor water quality and food consumption, and inadequate feeding practices.

<sup>153</sup> Interview with an IPC analyst, November 2024. Six-year severe acute malnutrition data reviewed by the Panel, November 2024.

118. Despite large swathes of the population facing hunger, some populations are particularly exposed.

119. Children and women face disproportionate risks. About 2.1 million children and 1.1 million pregnant or lactating women are anticipated to be acutely malnourished, with child morbidity rates close to 50 per cent. More than 90 per cent of the population lacks access to sanitation facilities.<sup>154</sup>

120. The number of South Sudanese children admitted to health facilities nationwide for severe acute malnutrition has been higher in every month of 2024 compared with the corresponding months since 2019.<sup>155</sup> In Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State, for example, in the first four months of 2024, one state hospital experienced up to 140 per cent month-on-month increases in admissions related to malnutrition.<sup>156</sup>

121. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analysis also indicated that nearly 80 per cent of the population in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area, in southern Jonglei, was facing severe acute food insecurity toward the end of 2024, the highest such prevalence of any administrative unit in South Sudan.<sup>157</sup> Several hunger-related deaths have been reported.<sup>158</sup> Field-based organizations have attributed these conditions to “violent asset-stripping … chronic localized insecurity … disruption to humanitarian services … and spiralling food prices.”<sup>159</sup>

122. Other particularly exposed demographics are recent South Sudanese returnees and Sudanese refugees.

123. As of February 2025, more than 1 million individuals had entered South Sudan to flee the conflict in the Sudan. As fighting moved closer to the South Sudanese border, December 2024 and January 2025 saw some of the highest levels of entry into South Sudan at any point since the conflict started in April 2023.<sup>160</sup>

124. Approximately 535,000 returnees, or more than 85 per cent of the returnee population, were projected to experience crisis or worse conditions of food insecurity, irrespective of the area to which they had returned, as of November 2024.<sup>161</sup> Returnees are the largest demographic facing famine conditions, largely as a result of the inaccessibility of food and low levels of integration into local communities.<sup>162</sup> Where returnees are integrated, they place additional demands on families and communities.

125. The conflict in the Sudan has also affected the humanitarian situation in other less direct ways. In many of the northern States of South Sudan, supply routes from the Sudan delivered essential commodities more cheaply than supply routes from Juba. The conflict in the Sudan has disrupted these supply routes, significantly reducing the availability of goods and increasing their cost. Similarly, many young men who had previously travelled to the Sudan to work in gold mining and

<sup>154</sup> Presentation by representatives of the IPC Technical Working Group, reviewed by the Panel, November 2024.

<sup>155</sup> Interview with an IPC analyst, November 2024. Six-year severe acute malnutrition data reviewed by the Panel, November 2024.

<sup>156</sup> Confidential nutrition analysis report for Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, May 2024, reviewed by the Panel.

<sup>157</sup> IPC, South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September - November 2024 and Projections for December 2024 - March 2025 and for April - July 2025, 18 November 2024.

<sup>158</sup> Care, fact-finding report for reported severe food insecurity in Lekuangole County, Greater Pibor Administrative Area, South Sudan, 8 July 2024.

<sup>159</sup> Reach, Emergency Food Security Update: Pibor, November 2024.

<sup>160</sup> According to data from the International Organization for Migration and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

<sup>161</sup> Interview with an IPC analyst, November 2024. Presentation by representatives of the IPC Technical Working Group, November 2024.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

agriculture, remitting salaries back to their families in South Sudan, have been unable to travel since the outbreak of the conflict.<sup>163</sup>

126. Humanitarian actors have broadly welcomed the Government's efforts to eliminate illegal checkpoints along the country's roads and waterways, citing these as a major obstacle to their work.<sup>164</sup> Many noted, however, that the Government had promised the same in the past and, in the absence of salary payments and viable economic alternatives, such measures had often proved unsustainable in the long run.<sup>165</sup> Humanitarian organizations have also continued to report widespread insecurity, as well as a range of bureaucratic impediments to their work.<sup>166</sup> As one humanitarian aid worker noted, since the disruptions to the Government's oil revenues, "the Government has tried to attach taxes and fees to everything."<sup>167</sup>

127. Checkpoints significantly increase the cost of delivering food and other commodities to markets in South Sudan, increasing their price and so exacerbating food insecurity. They also obstruct the work of humanitarian actors. Even if they are able to resist illegal taxation and extortion at checkpoints, humanitarian organizations stress that this is usually the result of extensive negotiations and preparatory work, including by advance teams. Such community engagement can be effective but is also costly and time-consuming.<sup>168</sup>

128. In November 2024, for example, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that unauthorized taxation imposed by communities had obstructed aid delivery in key areas. In Jonglei State, local authorities in Nyerol demanded a fee of SSP 600,000 (about US\$180) per boat carrying supplies to Nasir, further straining aid delivery, while those operating illegal checkpoints along the Sobat River collected unauthorized taxes – ranging from \$100 to \$300 per boat – and harassed boat operators.<sup>169</sup>

129. In January 2025, a spokesperson for SSPDF, Lul Ruai Koang, admitted there were more than 50 checkpoints along the Nile River alone between Juba and Malakal, claiming that 33 of these were operated by SPLA-IO forces.<sup>170</sup>

## VI. Regional issues

130. South Sudan has continued to make use of its membership in regional and international organizations, including the United Nations, the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the East African Community and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. South Sudanese parliamentarians have also continued to engage with the Inter-Parliamentary Union, as well as other regional parliamentary organizations, including through participating in various forums and delegation exchanges.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> Interviews with Sudanese and South Sudanese civilians, September 2024 to March 2025. See also J. Majok, "War and the borderland".

<sup>164</sup> Interviews with humanitarian actors, January to March 2025.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> Interview with a humanitarian aid worker, February 2025.

<sup>168</sup> Interviews with humanitarian actors, January to March 2025.

<sup>169</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "South Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (October 2024)", 12 November 2024.

<sup>170</sup> See, for example, *The Dawn*, "SSPDF, SPLA-IO to hold talks on illegal checkpoints along Nile River", 14 January 2025.

<sup>171</sup> Interview with a deputy speaker of the South Sudan Parliament, January 2025.

## A. Relations with the Sudan

131. The relationship between the Governments of South Sudan and the Sudan remained significant during the reporting period. The Chairman of the Sovereign Council of the Sudan, Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, visited Juba to meet with the President in October and December 2024.<sup>172</sup> The two leaders discussed cooperation in the fields of oil, trade and border security, as well as the humanitarian situation.

132. On 11 January 2025, however, Wad Madani, the capital of Al-Gazira State in the Sudan, was recaptured by the Sudanese Armed Forces from the control of RSF. Soon after, graphic videos were circulated, allegedly showing Sudanese Armed Forces, or allied militia, abusing and murdering young men of South Sudanese origin who had been accused of supporting RSF.<sup>173</sup>

133. Images of Sudanese forces killing South Sudanese resonated deeply in South Sudan and soon led to widespread protests across the country. Protestors targeted Sudanese nationals and property, resulting in significant looting and violence.<sup>174</sup> On 17 January 2025, the South Sudan National Police Service declared a nationwide dawn-to-dusk curfew in an attempt to quell the protests and violence. The curfew remained in place until 27 January 2025.

134. These events substantially tested relations between South Sudan and the Sudan. The President initially described the events as “terrorism,” calling for a United Nations investigation,<sup>175</sup> while at the same time calling for restraint and calm and backing a string of measures intended to limit the violence.<sup>176</sup> South Sudanese security forces reportedly provided protection to thousands of Sudanese nationals in Juba, Jonglei, Warrap, Aweil and Wau,<sup>177</sup> and the Government has been commended for its efforts to contain protests and protect Sudanese nationals and property.<sup>178</sup>

135. Dialogue appears, therefore, to have continued. This is evident also from the role of the Sudan, in February 2025, in brokering an agreement between the Government of South Sudan and a sanctioned individual, Simon Gatwech Dual (SSI.002),<sup>179</sup> and in negotiating a humanitarian corridor for the delivery of humanitarian supplies from Juba to Southern Kordofan, in the Sudan.<sup>180</sup>

136. In December 2024, however, the Government of South Sudan also announced the result of contentious referendum held in the disputed region of Abyei more than a decade ago, potentially antagonizing Sudanese authorities who also contest control of the area.<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Statements by the Office of the President, on file with the Panel.

<sup>173</sup> Videos on file with the Panel.

<sup>174</sup> Interviews with South Sudanese officials and civil society representatives, January 2025. Additional videos and photographs on file with the Panel.

<sup>175</sup> Eye Radio, “South Sudan urges UNSC to join call for probe into Wad Madani incident”, 23 January 2025.

<sup>176</sup> See, for example, Eye Radio, “President Kiir says Wad Madani killings amount to ‘terrorism’”, 17 January 2025.

<sup>177</sup> Interview with representatives of South Sudanese security services and international observers, January 2025.

<sup>178</sup> Interviews with members of civil society and international monitors, January 2025.

<sup>179</sup> Documents on file with the Panel.

<sup>180</sup> *Sudan Tribune*, “Sudan, South Sudan extend aid corridor to conflict-hit South Kordofan”, 9 December 2024.

<sup>181</sup> Interviews with diplomats in Juba, January 2025.

## B. Relations with Uganda and the region

137. The relationship between South Sudan and Uganda remains strong and heavily shaped by growing financial interdependence, despite continued local concerns about border demarcation and the presence of UPDF troops in South Sudan.<sup>182</sup> In February 2025, the former Ambassador of South Sudan to Uganda noted that remittances of Ugandan businessmen in South Sudan back to Uganda had increased from \$900 million in 2022/2023 to \$1.5 billion in 2023/2024.<sup>183</sup>

138. Kenya also continued to play an important role in South Sudan, including through the Tumaini Initiative. Since June 2024, the Government of Kenya has assumed the responsibility of funding the Tumaini Initiative after other international partners withdrew their financial support. President Ruto visited President Kiir in Juba in November 2024.<sup>184</sup>

139. Ethiopia also remains an important partner to South Sudan. According to United Nations figures, as of March 2025, 430,313 South Sudanese refugees remain in Ethiopia.<sup>185</sup>

140. Relations between South Sudan and the Central African Republic are increasingly shaped by the security situation along their shared border, as ethnic and tribal tensions increase in Western Equatoria State, including among the Balandé and Azande communities on both sides of the shared border. The President of the Central African Republic, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, visited Juba in September 2023, when the two leaders signed a memorandum of understanding covering trade and security.<sup>186</sup>

141. President Kiir has also expressed strong support for the positions of the East African Community with respect to the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, reiterating calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and comprehensive ceasefire.<sup>187</sup> According to United Nations figures, as of March 2025, there were about 55,368 South Sudanese refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>188</sup>

142. In November 2024, a high-level delegation from the United Arab Emirates, headed by the Minister of State, Sheikh Shakhboot Nahyan Al Nahyan, visited Juba. Subsequently, in February 2025, the President travelled to the United Arab Emirates.<sup>189</sup> Discussions focused on economic cooperation, investment, agriculture, renewable energy and infrastructure. The United Arab Emirates has already implemented several projects in South Sudan, including the newly constructed Madhol Field Hospital in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State,<sup>190</sup> as well as providing humanitarian aid to South Sudanese refugees in Uganda.<sup>191</sup>

143. In April 2025, Egyptian experts will deliver the second edition of a training course on combating illegal immigration and human trafficking to South Sudanese security officials. The first course was held in Juba in September 2024.<sup>192</sup>

<sup>182</sup> See S/2024/855.

<sup>183</sup> Eye Radio, “Ambassador Juach reassures Ugandan traders on business safety”, 17 February 2025.

<sup>184</sup> Statements by the Office of the President, on file with the Panel.

<sup>185</sup> UNHCR Operational Data Portal, accessed March 2025.

<sup>186</sup> Statements by the Office of the President, on file with the Panel.

<sup>187</sup> Interview with Minister for East African Affairs, Deng Alor, January 2025.

<sup>188</sup> UNHCR Operational Data Portal, accessed March 2025.

<sup>189</sup> Statements by the Office of the President, on file with the Panel.

<sup>190</sup> Photographs on file with the Panel. See also Eye Radio, “Madhol field hospital in NBGs ready for commissioning: Govt.”, 3 January 2025.

<sup>191</sup> Emirates News Agency, “UAE enhances relief aid support to Sudanese Refugees in Uganda”, 21 November 2024.

<sup>192</sup> Eye Radio, “Egypt trains South Sudan officials on fighting illegal immigration and human trafficking”, 18 February 2025.

## VII. Finance and natural resources

144. The economic crisis in South Sudan has forced many of its citizens, including members of the armed forces, into the illicit and informal economy, hastening the depletion of natural resources and encouraging illegal checkpoints and other forms of predation.

145. A number of South Sudanese also told the Panel about the ways in which their daily lives are increasingly shaped by smaller acts of misappropriation and abuses of power, noting the corrosive impact this has had on their relationship with the State and its institutions.<sup>193</sup> Several described acts of petty extortion as completely “normalized” and “just a part of life” in South Sudan. Traffic police routinely stop motorists to demand payment; public hospitals “ask you for money before you are treated”; and police demand payment “before they investigate” crimes.<sup>194</sup>

### A. Illegal logging

146. South Sudan has significant reserves of timber, particularly in Eastern, Central and Western Equatoria States. These include several valuable species of hardwood, the size and maturity of which make them among the most valuable in the region.<sup>195</sup> Industry experts have stressed that these forests, if well managed, could generate significant revenue and provide sustainable employment opportunities in a region afflicted by criminality and armed group recruitment.<sup>196</sup>

147. Officials of the Government of South Sudan acknowledge that insecurity and limited resources make it almost impossible to monitor the country’s forests.<sup>197</sup> In the 2024/25 budget, for example, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry was allocated just SSP 1,918,676,395 (\$426,373), or around 1.5 per cent of the SSP 115 billion (\$25.6 million) allocated to running the Parliament.<sup>198</sup> One Member of Parliament noted that he could not gain access to several parts of his own constituency in Central Equatoria State safely,<sup>199</sup> while others described forested areas that were entirely inaccessible to civilians and controlled only by local SSPDF or SPLA-IO forces.<sup>200</sup>

148. Illegal logging has therefore flourished, with local and international companies working with opposition armed groups, local security actors and local politicians and community leaders to export high-value timber. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has estimated that South Sudan may be losing as much as 2 per cent of its forests every year.<sup>201</sup> Experts have also warned that this rapid loss of forest cover may lead to long-term soil erosion to the detriment of local agriculture.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> Interviews with South Sudanese civil society representatives and civilians, September 2024 to March 2025.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid.

<sup>195</sup> Interviews with forestry exports, September 2024 to March 2025. See also, for example, UNEP, Community forestry in South Sudan.

<sup>196</sup> Interviews with government officials and private sector actors, January and February 2025.

<sup>197</sup> Interviews with government officials, February 2025.

<sup>198</sup> Approved budget for the 2024/25 financial year. Conversions made using official rate of SSP 4,500 per \$1 from March 2025. See also annex 8.

<sup>199</sup> Interview with a member of Parliament from Central Equatoria State, February 2025.

<sup>200</sup> Interviews with members of South Sudanese civil society and civilians, February 2025.

<sup>201</sup> UNEP, Community forestry in South Sudan.

<sup>202</sup> Interviews with forestry and agricultural experts, January and February 2025.

149. The ongoing economic crisis in South Sudan has only exacerbated the problem. A politician from one of the worst affected areas stated that “everyone is paying themselves from the forest.”<sup>203</sup>

150. The Panel received numerous detailed accounts, as well as photos and videos, of illegal logging operations in both Western Equatoria and Central Equatoria States, and particularly in Morobo County and Kajo Kaji County.<sup>204</sup>

151. These illegal logging operations are relatively small and mobile, typically featuring a few trucks with loading equipment, a small number of individuals with chainsaws and armed security.<sup>205</sup> In some cases, individual foreign businesspeople have been identified as the owners and financiers of the operations. At least three South Sudanese and Ugandan companies have also been identified as involved in logging operations, including Santos Petroleum and Timber Ltd. and Aguet Trading.<sup>206</sup>

152. These individuals or companies negotiate deals directly with local communities, county-level officials and security forces, including SSPDF, NSS, Military Intelligence and SPLA-IO, depending on the area. On the basis of these agreements, trees are felled, crudely processed with chainsaws and loaded onto trucks for export.<sup>207</sup>

153. Payment amounts are difficult to verify and vary depending on the location, species of timber and size of the logs. Larger and older trees are considerably more valuable, with shipments often priced by the total number of logs needed to fill a truck.<sup>208</sup> According to some pricing information obtained by the Panel, a truck filled with large logs might cost around \$5,000 or more, while the same truck filled with smaller logs might fetch only around \$2,000 to \$2,500.<sup>209</sup> In one document dated December 2023, a company agreed to pay local officials \$5,000 per truck.<sup>210</sup> Of these sums, local chiefs and communities might receive only a few hundred dollars, with the rest going to county officials and security actors.

154. The Panel also received accounts of companies that promised to build schools, clinics or roads for communities in exchange for the right to harvest and export logs from their forests.<sup>211</sup>

155. In almost all of the accounts received by the Panel, the timber was exported by road to Uganda.<sup>212</sup> In Kampala, traders can sell truckloads of South Sudanese timber for three or four times what they paid for them in South Sudan, although traders also face substantial transportation costs, including further illicit taxation at checkpoints.<sup>213</sup>

156. Government officials confirmed that very few export certificates have been issued in recent years, meaning that almost all timber exported from South Sudan is

<sup>203</sup> Interview with a member of Parliament from Central Equatoria State, February 2025.

<sup>204</sup> See annex 31.

<sup>205</sup> Interviews with private sector actors, government officials, members of South Sudanese civil society and international observers, September 2024 to March 2025.

<sup>206</sup> Interviews with government officials, industry experts, and civil society, corroborated by documents on file with the Panel, September 2024 to March 2025.

<sup>207</sup> See annex 32.

<sup>208</sup> Interviews with private sector actors and members of South Sudanese civil society, September 2024 to March 2025.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> See annex 32.

<sup>211</sup> Interviews with private sector actors and members of South Sudanese civil society, September 2024 to March 2025.

<sup>212</sup> Interviews with private sector actors, government officials, members of South Sudanese civil society, and international observers, September 2024 to March 2025.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid.

done so illegally.<sup>214</sup> Government officials acknowledged, however, that forged documentation also contributes to illegal exports.<sup>215</sup> Recent efforts by both Ugandan and South Sudanese officials have, however, resulted in some seizures at the border.<sup>216</sup> From Uganda, customs data indicate that much of the timber is then traded onwards to Viet Nam and India, with several individuals also indicating to the Panel that Vietnamese traders maintain a presence in both South Sudan and Uganda.<sup>217</sup>

157. In January 2025, the South Sudan Minister for Environment and Forestry issued a ministerial order prohibiting the cutting of growing trees in natural forests.<sup>218</sup> It follows similar ministerial orders issued in 2015 and 2018, as well as numerous similar orders issued by some of the worst-affected counties, including Morobo County in June 2024 and Yambio County in Western Equatoria State in 2023.<sup>219</sup>

158. Civil society organizations and officials have, however, stressed that these orders have had little impact on the problem. In 2024, Parliament agreed to form a committee to investigate the issue.<sup>220</sup> Officials have also stressed that they have limited ability to influence SPLA-IO forces, such as in Panyume, in Morobo County.<sup>221</sup>

159. The Panel also received accounts of officials and companies that have sought to circumvent these rules. In some cases, companies sign agreements to cut logs only from trees that have already been felled, although this may be used as a pretext for harvesting fresh timber.<sup>222</sup> Similarly, in January 2025, local officials called for a halt to a controversial roads project in Central Equatoria State. While the project was ostensibly focused on building roads, many claimed it was instead a pretext for felling trees that were then sold to a company for export.<sup>223</sup>

## B. Production and trade of charcoal

160. A further threat to the forests of South Sudan comes from illegal charcoal production. Charcoal remains the dominant source of household fuel in South Sudan, including in Juba.<sup>224</sup> It is typically produced by piling logs in small mounds, setting them alight, then covering them with earth.<sup>225</sup> Charcoal production poses a significant risk to forests, as it often leads to the clear-cutting of entire areas.<sup>226</sup>

161. Among the primary participants in the country's charcoal trade are members of the country's security forces, and in particular SSPDF.<sup>227</sup> Soldiers engage in charcoal production but also in transporting charcoal, often using military vehicles, to Juba, where it fetches a higher price.<sup>228</sup> The Panel has observed several military and police

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<sup>214</sup> Interview with a government official, February 2025.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> Interview with a government official and civil society representatives from Central Equatoria State, February 2025.

<sup>217</sup> Customs data on file with the Panel.

<sup>218</sup> See annex 33.

<sup>219</sup> See annex 34.

<sup>220</sup> Interviews with government officials and parliamentarians, February 2025.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid.

<sup>222</sup> Interviews with members of South Sudanese civil society, January and February 2025.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid.

<sup>224</sup> Interview with government official and civilians, February 2025.

<sup>225</sup> See annex 35.

<sup>226</sup> Interview with representatives of a company, January and February 2025.

<sup>227</sup> Interviews with private companies, government officials, members of South Sudanese civil society, and international observers, September 2024 to March 2025.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid.

vehicles transporting charcoal, and a number of South Sudanese described soldiers producing and overseeing the sale of charcoal along the roads outside of the city.<sup>229</sup>

162. In February 2025, a large sack of charcoal would cost around SSP 50,000 to 60,000 in Juba, SSP 25,000 a little outside the capital, and as little as SSP 10,000 to 12,000 in more rural areas.<sup>230</sup> As charcoal can be produced at little cost, these revenues are mostly profit for the producer.

163. Charcoal is also exported to Kenya and Uganda, where prices can be higher. Documents dated January 2025 viewed by the Panel contain details of charcoal being exported to Uganda by trucks via the Kaya border crossing, with each truck loaded with 300 bags.<sup>231</sup>

### C. Illegal gold mining

164. The gold deposits of South Sudan have also attracted significant attention in the wake of oil export disruptions. As one measure of this increased interest, the 2024/25 budget of the Ministry of Mining was more than 800 per cent greater than it was in the previous fiscal year.<sup>232</sup>

165. Like timber, however, the exploitation of the country's gold is almost entirely unregulated.

166. Much of the gold production in South Sudan is artisanal. The country's mining regulations place responsibility for artisanal mining with the individual states. State authorities, including in Eastern Equatoria State and Western Bahr el-Ghazal State, have relied on this provision to operate their own mining sectors that are largely independent of national authorities.<sup>233</sup>

167. In the three Equatorian states, river-bed mining is common, such as along the riverbed near Kapoeta town in Eastern Equatoria State. Mining activity peaks during the dry season, when hundreds of miners dig deep holes along the riverbed using relatively rudimentary tools.<sup>234</sup> The number of miners decreases during wet season, when the holes become unstable and the practice considerably more dangerous. The Panel was told of several fatalities resulting from holes, some measuring up to eight metres in depth, collapsing on miners.<sup>235</sup> Similar practices were also described in locations in Central Equatoria State, including Lobonok, Wonduruba, Luri, the Bai Hills and Lainya.<sup>236</sup>

168. Artisanal mining sites are often tightly controlled by armed local communities that restrict access to their land. In many cases, they are aided by local SSPDF, SPLA-IO and NSS forces with ties to these communities.<sup>237</sup> These actors typically retain a share of production. In some cases, security forces also participate directly in

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<sup>229</sup> Ibid.

<sup>230</sup> Interviews with government officials, members of South Sudanese civil society and South Sudanese civilians, January and February 2025.

<sup>231</sup> See annex 36.

<sup>232</sup> Approved budget for the 2024/25 financial year.

<sup>233</sup> Interviews with government officials and members of South Sudanese civil society, January and February 2025.

<sup>234</sup> Interviews with members of South Sudanese civil society, January and February 2025.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid.

<sup>236</sup> Interviews with government officials, members of South Sudanese civil society and international observers, September 2024 to January 2025.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid.

the mining as a means of supplementing their salaries. NAS forces have also allegedly mined gold in the Bai Hills in Central Equatoria State.<sup>238</sup>

169. Foreign traders buy much of the gold mined in the Equatoria. In Eastern Equatoria State, for example, much of the gold is bought by foreign traders operating shops in Kapoeta town.<sup>239</sup>

170. On several occasions, local authorities and the Central Bank of South Sudan have sought to purchase gold from miners.<sup>240</sup> In most cases, however, their efforts have been undermined by foreign traders who offer better prices, often on the basis of the parallel rather than the official exchange rate. The Ministry of Mining is hopeful that several bills currently with the national Parliament will provide the basis for a more effective State-owned commercial minerals trading company.<sup>241</sup>

171. The vast majority of the gold that is mined and traded in this way is then smuggled across the border to Kenya and Uganda,<sup>242</sup> where many traders sell it for dollars with which they purchase goods to re-sell back to South Sudan.<sup>243</sup> Gold thus also works as an alternative form of foreign currency in a context where the South Sudanese Pound is not widely accepted in the region and foreign currency is scarce.

172. While South Sudan does not record or publish any formal trade data, the United Arab Emirates reported gold imports from South Sudan worth \$20 million in 2022 and \$27 million in 2023.<sup>244</sup> It is likely that significant quantities of South Sudanese gold are reclassified as being from Uganda or Kenya. In its most recent Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative report, covering 2022, Uganda acknowledged that the country's gold exports were significantly higher than could be accounted for by imports and domestic production alone, although much of this discrepancy is likely also accounted for by gold produced in other regional States.<sup>245</sup>

173. The Ministry of Mining confirmed that it had only issued a small number of export certificates in recent months, amounting to less than 1 kilogram of gold in total.<sup>246</sup>

174. While several exploration licences have been granted to both South Sudanese and international companies, insecurity, poor infrastructure and logistical challenges have limited meaningful investment in the sector.<sup>247</sup> Several State authorities appear to have signed their own exploration deals with companies, and several of these companies are alleged to be producing gold despite only having exploration licences. This includes areas in Raja, in Western Equatoria State.<sup>248</sup> In March 2025, a Raja county commissioner was summoned by the State Assembly further to a deadly accident in a 15-metre-deep mining tunnel in Dulu, in Raja County.<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>238</sup> Interview with civil society representatives, February 2025.

<sup>239</sup> Interviews with government officials, members of South Sudanese civil society and international observers, September 2024 to January 2025.

<sup>240</sup> Interview with government official, February 2025.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>242</sup> See annex 47 for a response from Uganda to the present findings.

<sup>243</sup> Interviews with government officials and South Sudanese civil society, September 2024 to January 2025.

<sup>244</sup> UN Comtrade data, using HS code 7108.

<sup>245</sup> Uganda EITI report for the 2021–2022 fiscal years.

<sup>246</sup> Interview with government official, February 2025.

<sup>247</sup> Interview with government officials, private sector entities, South Sudanese researchers and international observers, February 2024 to March 2025.

<sup>248</sup> Interviews with government officials and civil society, February and March 2025.

<sup>249</sup> Radio Tamazuj, "Raja County Commissioner suspended over illegal mining", 12 March 2025.

175. The Juba gold market has historically been relatively small. The outbreak of conflict in the Sudan in April 2023 has, however, had several effects on the gold market in Juba.

176. First, there are significant artisanal and semi-industrial gold mining operations in the northern states of South Sudan, and particularly around Boro Medina and Raja in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State. In recent years, many South Sudanese have moved to those areas in search of livelihoods. More recently, they have been joined by a significant number of individuals fleeing the conflict in the Sudan.<sup>250</sup> Local authorities, SPLA-IO, SSPDF and NSS all have ties to these mining operations, depending on their specific location.<sup>251</sup>

177. Prior to the conflict in the Sudan, gold produced in those areas had been primarily exported through the northern border with the Sudan. As these trading routes have been disrupted by the conflict, however, gold from northern and western parts of South Sudan has increasingly started to trade via Juba.

178. Second, according to several traders and observers, significant quantities of gold mined in the Sudan, or looted in the Sudan, are now also transited through South Sudan, via towns such as Wau, in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State.<sup>252</sup> Some of that gold has been transported to Juba, then smuggled by air to the United Arab Emirates.<sup>253</sup> In March 2024, for example, gold that had been transported overland from the Sudan to Wau then by air to Juba was flown to an airfield in the United Arab Emirates on board a private aircraft<sup>254</sup> that was also carrying representatives of RSF and the security forces of Uganda.<sup>255</sup>

#### D. Resumption of oil exports

179. In February 2024, one of the two pipelines that carries South Sudanese oil for export from Port Sudan was damaged. Since then, exports of Dar blend crude oil, which accounts for around 70 per cent of South Sudanese production, have been suspended.<sup>256</sup>

180. On 4 January 2025, the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum of the Sudan lifted the force majeure measures that had been in place since March 2024, further to “security arrangements” made by the Governments of South Sudan and the Sudan. Subsequently, on 6 January 2025, the South Sudanese Ministry of Petroleum directed the Dar Petroleum Operating Company to resume production on 8 January 2025.<sup>257</sup>

181. By the beginning of March 2025, however, exports of Dar blend crude oil had yet to resume. Several obstacles had delayed the resumption of production. A significant number of oil wells required repairs and maintenance after sustaining damage and looting.<sup>258</sup> Several subcontractors also refused to remobilize until they were paid outstanding arrears by the oil production company. Representatives of the joint operating companies also noted that the Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet)

<sup>250</sup> Interview with a local researcher and international observers, March 2025.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid.

<sup>252</sup> Interviews with gold market participants, researchers and civil society, January to March 2025.

<sup>253</sup> Ibid.

<sup>254</sup> Interviews with individuals with knowledge of the flights, September to December 2024.

Corroborated by documents on file with the Panel and flight-tracking databases. See also *The New York Times*, “The gold rush at the heart of a civil war”, 11 December 2024.

<sup>255</sup> Ibid.

<sup>256</sup> See, for example, S/2024/343, S/2024/855 and S/2023/922.

<sup>257</sup> See annex 37.

<sup>258</sup> Confidential documents on file with the Panel.

and the Ministry of Petroleum had delayed their approval of new renegotiated subcontracts and that, in at least one case, the Ministry had rejected a contract awarded through a competitive bidding process and instead had insisted on awarding it to a South Sudanese company chosen through its own non-competitive process.<sup>259</sup>

182. By mid-March 2025, however, 545 out of 767 wells had restarted, and production levels approached 100,000 barrels per day, paving the way for resumed exports.<sup>260</sup>

## E. Management of public resources

183. The expenditure reports of South Sudan from the 2023/24 financial year present a puzzle. The Government collected more revenue than it had anticipated, despite a substantial decline in oil revenues during the fourth quarter.<sup>261</sup> The Government was therefore able to spend a total of SSP 2.43 trillion against a budget of just SSP 1.78 trillion.<sup>262</sup> According to the same documents, however, every category of budgeted spending received less than the amount that had been budgeted.<sup>263</sup> The Government has since confirmed, for example, that less than half the salary budget was paid.<sup>264</sup> Instead, SSP 1.4 trillion – more than half of all government expenditure – is identifiable only as “unallocated payments.”<sup>265</sup>

184. Control over the public resources of South Sudan is highly centralized, making them vulnerable to political pressure, misappropriation and diversion. Public officials, and the communities that depend on them, often view revenue allocation as a zero-sum competition for a limited pool of resources. “You know you can be removed at any time,”<sup>266</sup> one former official told the Panel, noting that almost all public officials in South Sudan are incentivized to “pay contracts and get kickbacks.”<sup>267</sup> There are, however, also many public officials who resist these temptations.

185. Mechanisms designed to divert revenues therefore proliferate at every stage of revenue management, significantly reducing the amounts that ultimately reach their intended and budgeted recipients.

186. Senior officials within the Office of the President and Ministry of Finance and Planning often dictate which companies are awarded the cargos of crude oil sold by the Government, although an auction process sets the price. These are often companies willing advance a significant percentage of the value of the cargo a few months before it is received.<sup>268</sup> In some cases, senior officials award cargos to preferred local companies, which then trade them on to larger international traders, with the local companies often taking a substantial fee.<sup>269</sup>

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<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid.

<sup>261</sup> See annex 8. See also [S/2024/855](#) and [S/2024/343](#).

<sup>262</sup> 2023/24 budget execution data prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Planning on file with the Panel.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid.

<sup>264</sup> See annex 8.

<sup>265</sup> Ibid. Some of this was the consequence of the Government’s payment tracking software not functioning during the final quarter of the year.

<sup>266</sup> Since the 2018 peace agreement was signed, South Sudan has had seven Ministers for Finance and Planning and seven Governors of the Central Bank, while the Managing Director of Nilepet has changed six times.

<sup>267</sup> Interview with a former government official, February 2025.

<sup>268</sup> Interviews with government officials and private companies, September 2024 to March 2025.

<sup>269</sup> Documents on file with the Panel. See also [S/2024/855](#), and annex 38.

187. The oil revenues generated from these sales are deposited in the Government's account with the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, from which funds are transferred to various correspondent banks in Kenya, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates. Larger payments are made directly from these accounts, while some cash is also shipped by air to Juba.<sup>270</sup>

188. In some cases, officials seek to circumvent these mechanisms by instructing buyers of oil to make payments directly to third parties. In 2023, for example, one trader was asked to pay the remaining proceeds of one cargo of crude oil to Amuk General Trading, which the Panel has previously reported was a major supplier of off-budget food supplies for SSPDF.<sup>271</sup> Such arrangements violate South Sudanese law, which require all oil revenues to be deposited first in government accounts,<sup>272</sup> and the Panel has not been able to determine whether these instructions were followed by the buyer.

189. Once the funds reach the Treasury, they should be allocated to government ministries and institutions in line with the national budget. In reality, however, numerous unbudgeted payments divert substantial sums from this process.

190. Since 2018, the largest diversion has been the allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars annually to the oil for roads programme.<sup>273</sup> According to figures produced by the Ministry of Finance and Planning, for example, during the 2023/24 financial year, SSP 378 billion was allocated to the programme, almost as much as the SSP 414 billion allocated to the Government's salaries and operating expenses.<sup>274</sup>

191. Other diversions also proliferate. In February 2024, for example, the Ministry of Finance and Planning was asked to pay an individual SSP 851 million for supplying food to the Tiger Division of SSPDF.<sup>275</sup> In September 2024, the Ministry was asked to pay another individual \$810,563 in cash for the renovation of an unspecified building.<sup>276</sup> In January 2025, the National Revenue Authority was asked to pay an individual \$80,000 in order to provide security for goods being transported from Uganda to Juba,<sup>277</sup> while another letter directs the Authority to permit an individual to withdraw SSP 100 million, in cash, for an unspecified purpose.<sup>278</sup>

192. Sometimes this process results in conflict, particularly when there are insufficient resources to meet competing demands. In November 2023, for example, a senior official complained that the Ministry of Finance and Planning had allowed a trader to retain more than \$9 million as part payment towards an overdue debt.<sup>279</sup> The official argued that the sum should instead have been paid to a company engaged in the construction of the new presidential palace in Juba.

193. The competition for the dwindling resources of South Sudan is also evident in the country's relationship with the commercial lenders that have supplied several billion dollars in loans since around 2012. The Government is required to service

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<sup>270</sup> Interviews with former government officials, January and February 2025.

<sup>271</sup> Confidential document on file with the Panel. See also S/2019/301.

<sup>272</sup> South Sudan's Petroleum Revenue Management Act (2012).

<sup>273</sup> See S/2020/1141, S/2021/365, S/2022/359, S/2022/884, S/2023/294, S/2023/922 and S/2024/343.

<sup>274</sup> Budget expenditure reports prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Planning, on file with the Panel.

<sup>275</sup> See annex 39.

<sup>276</sup> See annex 40.

<sup>277</sup> See annex 41.

<sup>278</sup> See annex 42.

<sup>279</sup> See annex 43.

these loans, many of which carry high interest rates, with regular payments. Since around 2018, however, the Government has largely stopped repaying these loans.<sup>280</sup>

194. As a result, in its report dated 29 April 2024 ([S/2024/343](#)), the Panel reported that, in January 2024, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes had ruled that the Government and Central Bank of South Sudan owed the Qatar National Bank \$1,021,282,210 in unpaid loans and interest.<sup>281</sup>

195. On 31 January 2025, the African Export-Import Bank also appeared in commercial courts in London claiming that the Government of South Sudan owed \$657 million in unpaid oil-backed loans and interest, \$640 million of which had been guaranteed by the Central Bank of South Sudan.<sup>282</sup> According to court documents, South Sudan had borrowed \$400 million in 2019, \$63 million in August 2020 and a further \$250 million in December of 2020. The Government had also sought to borrow an additional \$1 billion in October 2023 and an additional \$3 billion in January 2024.<sup>283</sup> The Government of South Sudan neither contested the claims nor participated in the court proceedings.

196. The cumulative commercial debts of South Sudan now likely exceed at least \$2.1 billion,<sup>284</sup> equivalent to one to two years of total government oil revenues prior to the pipeline breach.

197. Revenues are also diverted from institutions that do not form part of the formal budget process. On 9 September 2022, Petronas International Corporation Ltd. informed the Government of South Sudan of its intention to sell its shares in all three of the joint operating companies that produce oil in South Sudan.<sup>285</sup> After a protracted process, on 23 January 2024 and 5 March 2024, the Government informed Petronas that it would not sanction the sale and instead directed Petronas to hand its assets over to Nilepet.<sup>286</sup> In August 2024, Petronas initiated arbitration proceedings against the Government of South Sudan at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.<sup>287</sup>

198. According to official documents reviewed by the Panel, during the first half of 2024, Nilepet received around \$19.5 million in revenues.<sup>288</sup> This amount would increase dramatically if it also assumed control of Petronas' far larger shareholdings.<sup>289</sup>

199. Almost 60 per cent of these revenues (\$11.5 million) were spent on salary payments, more than the total recorded government salary payments for the same period.<sup>290</sup> Outgoing Managing Directors of Nilepet have frequently complained that its payroll is predominantly made up of political and security elites and their family members, leaving little with which to implement meaningful investment.<sup>291</sup> One South

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<sup>280</sup> Interviews with companies and government officials, September 2024 to March 2025, corroborated by Court documents from three separate legal proceedings.

<sup>281</sup> Court documents on file with the Panel.

<sup>282</sup> Ibid.

<sup>283</sup> Ibid.

<sup>284</sup> See annex 44.

<sup>285</sup> See annex 45.

<sup>286</sup> Confidential correspondence and legal advice on file with the Panel.

<sup>287</sup> International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes case number ARB/24/36.

<sup>288</sup> Confidential documents on file with the Panel. Nilepet also benefits from an undeclared share in the SSTO stake in the Dar Petroleum Operating Company. In 2023, this yielded dividends in excess of \$9 million.

<sup>289</sup> As of July 2024, official documents indicate that Nilepet owed around \$87 million in cash-calls to its joint venture partners.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid.

<sup>291</sup> See, for example, Eye Radio, "Former energy official calls for Nilepet's dissolution", 15 November 2024.

Sudanese individual with knowledge of the company framed Nilepet's payroll as a "generational burden" owed to those who helped fight for the country's independence.<sup>292</sup>

## VIII. Conclusions

200. At the time of writing, several prominent opposition figures and members of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity remain in detention, while the residence of the First Vice-President is surrounded. An SSPDF unit in Nasir has been overrun by an armed militia, while there are regular armed confrontations between SSPDF and SPLA-IO in both Western Equatoria State and Western Bahr el-Ghazal State.

201. Whether or not these events escalate into another crisis that the peace agreement will ultimately weather, they evidence the fact that, six years after the agreement was signed, deep divisions continue to shape the political and security landscape of South Sudan.

## IX. Recommendations

202. The Panel of Experts recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan:

- (a) Issue a press release encouraging all Parties to the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan to exercise restraint and uphold the provisions of the permanent ceasefire and subsequent peace agreement; expedite the unification of the command structure of South Sudanese security forces; complete the training and deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces; and condemn all attacks on the assets and personnel of UNMISS, as well as other humanitarian operators in South Sudan;
- (b) Write a letter to Member States bordering South Sudan requesting an appraisal of their efforts to inspect cargo destined for South Sudan, as encouraged by the Security Council in paragraphs 7 to 10 of its resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), most recently renewed by resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), and encourage particular vigilance with respect to the supply of aeronautical parts that may have applications and uses for military helicopters of the kind known to operate in South Sudan;
- (c) Write a letter to the parties to the conflict in the Sudan encouraging them to take steps to prevent the transfer to South Sudan of weapons and ammunition;
- (d) Issue a press release urging the customs authorities of all Member States to exercise vigilance with respect to the import of timber or charcoal from South Sudan or its neighbouring States, including with respect to the proliferation of fraudulent export documentation;
- (e) Consider convening a joint informal consultation between the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#);
- (f) Consider updating the narrative summaries related to individuals and entities on the sanctions list further to additional information included in annex 46 to the present report.

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<sup>292</sup> Interview with a former government official, February 2025.

## X. Annexes

Annex 1: List of abbreviations	40
Annex 2: South Sudan Transitional Period has officially been extended for two years, 21 February 2025	41
Annex 3: Outcome document of Leadership Forum on Completing the Political Tranisiton in South Sudan	42
Annex 4: Armored personnel carrier used at Akol Koor's residence in Juba on 21 November 2024	47
Annex 5: Resolution of the SPLM/SPLA( IO) Political Bureau Meeting, 11 February 2025	48
Annex 6: SPLM/SPLA Kitgwang Declaration (KD) statement on agreement with government, 4 Feb. 2025	49
Annex 7: Buyers of South Sudanese crude oil	51
Annex 8: Additional budget analysis	52
Annex 9: Request for meeting with the President to discuss security situation	55
Annex 10: SPLM/A-IO Press Release on tensions along Sobat River, 1 March 2025	59
Annex 11: Recent movements of two armed SSPDF barges	60
Annex 12: SSPDF statement on security situation in Ulang and Balliet Counties, 25 February 2025	62
Annex 13: Statement by His Excellency the President on the current situation in Upper Nile State	64
Annex 14: Presence of UPDF forces in Juba, March 2025	66
Annex 15: Visiting armed forces agreement between South Sudan and Uganda	69
Annex 16: Response to the Panel from the Government of Uganda dated 7 November 2024	73
Annex 17: Statement concerning the formation of the United People's Alliance (UPA), 9 January 2025	80
Annex 18: United People's Alliance Interim National Leadership Committee, 13 January 2025	82
Annex 19: Announcement of promotion and appointment of Stephen Buay Rolnyang, 19 January 2025	83
Annex 20: Establishment of UPA military Fronts, 19 January 2025	84
Annex 21: Communique of 8 February 2025 concerning the Tumaini Initiative	85
Annex 22: UPA statement on "root causes" of conflict in South Sudan, 8 February 2025	88
Annex 23: Rifles originating in Sudan retrieved in 2024/2025	90
Annex 24: Mi-24 helicopters stationed at Juba and Malakal airports	92
Annex 25: Mi-24 attack helicopter on a road in Bor on 20 October 2024	93
Annex 26: Two Mi-24 attack helicopters at Malakal airport on 24 February 2025	94
Annex 27: 14.5mm caliber gun fired during an SSPDF Tiger Division exercise	95
Annex 28: Excerpt from an RNP news release on 11 October 2024	96
Annex 29: Photographs of a joint training of Rwandan and South Sudanese police officers in Rwanda	97
Annex 30: Explosion at Malual-Chaat barracks on 12 February 2025	98
Annex 31: Logging in Morobo County and elsewhere in Central Equatoria State	99
Annex 32: Memorandum of Understanding, Department of Forestry and logging company, 11 Dec. 2023	105
Annex 33: Ministerial Order No 1/2025 prohibiting logging, 20 January 2025	107
Annex 34: Morobo County order banning illegal logging, 13 June 2024	109
Annex 35: Charcoal production in Morobo County, Central Equatoria State	111
Annex 36: Export of bags of charcoal to Uganda, various dates in January 2025	113

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Annex 37: Partial timeline of disruption to South Sudan's oil exports	115
Annex 38: Fee payments	116
Annex 39: Payment authorisation for supply of food to SSPDF Tiger Division, February 2024	117
Annex 40: Payment authorisation for renovation of a building, 25 September 2024	118
Annex 41: Payment for construction of Presidential Palace, 22 November 2023	119
Annex 42: Authorisation of \$80,000 payment for security, 22 January 2025	120
Annex 43: Authorisation for SSP 100 million, 23 January 2025	122
Annex 44: Information about South Sudan's outstanding commercial loans	123
Annex 45: Petronas withdrawal from South Sudan	124
Annex 46: Updates to narrative summaries	126
Annex 47: Response to the Panel's findings from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uganda	127
Annex 48: Response to the Panel's findings from the Government of South Sudan	132

**Annex 1: List of abbreviations**

IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
NAS	National Salvation Front/Army
NSS	National Security Service
NUF	Necessary Unified Forces
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (referring to its armed wing)
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (referring to both its armed wing and political party)
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (referring to its political party)
SSP	South Sudan Pound
SSPDF	South Sudan People's Defence Forces
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UPA	United People's Alliance
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces

**Annex 2: South Sudan Transitional Period has officially been extended for two more years, 21 February 2025**



## Annex 3: Outcome document of Leadership Forum on Completing the Political Transition in South Sudan, 19 to 21 February 2025

**Leadership Forum on Completing the Political Transition in South Sudan  
Under the Theme:  
"Finalizing Security Sector Unification, Advancing the Permanent Constitution-Making  
Process and Progressing Preparations for Elections"**

Held at

**Radisson Blu Hotel, Juba**

**19-21 February 2025**

### **Agreed Recommendations from the Leadership Forum**

#### **PREAMBLE**

We, the participants of the Leadership Forum on Completing the Political Transition in South Sudan, comprising representatives of the senior political leadership, political parties, security sector actors, the national legislature, national institutions, women, youth, civil society, academia, media, and faith-based leaders.

**Having convened** a 3-day Leadership Forum under the auspices of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the African Union Mission in South Sudan (AUMISS), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism (RJMEC) and the International IDEA,

**Express** our gratitude to the aforementioned partners for sustained support to the peace implementation in South Sudan and,

**Cognizant** of the challenges faced by the R-ARCSS implementing parties, the daunting responsibilities incumbent on the people of South Sudan, the need to take charge of our destiny as a country and the fact that this is said to be the last extension of the R-ARCSS, which necessitate the need for continuous dialogue among the parties and the stakeholders to complete the political transition

**Concerned** about the resumption of the sporadic conflicts among some parties to the R-ARCSS, delayed unification of the forces among the R-ARCSS parties and the slow progress on the Tumaini Initiative between the Hold-Out groups and the RTGoNU,

**Aware** of the financial challenges and lack of political will lagging the progress in the completion of the transitional period

**Calling upon** the parties to the RARCSS to prioritise funding of peace activities, respect the terms of the December 21 2017, Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, address the inter-communal conflicts with urgency and expedite the completion of the transitional period.

**Having mutually** contemplated the challenges faced by the RARCSS peace mechanisms and learning regional and international experiences on political transitions from regional and international experts,



**Privileged** with the opportunity to deliberate on matters relating to security sector unification/transformation, permanent constitution-making process, and electoral preparation.

Have, hereby, **resolved**, at this “*Leadership Forum on Completing the Political Transition in South Sudan*” held at Radisson Blu Hotel in Juba from 19-21 February 2025, to issue the following agreed recommendations for consideration by the Parties and stakeholders.

**Recommendations of the Leadership Forum on Completing the Political Transition in South Sudan Held at Radisson Blue Hotel from 19-21 February 2025**

S/N	Recommendations	Responsible Body	Remarks
1.	All the parties sign a code of conduct before elections so that they comply and accept election results without resort to conflict	All political parties,	
2.	National Elections Commissions to be funded and well-resourced to conduct timely elections.	RTGoNU, UN, International Community, AU etc	
3.	UNMISS to organize more leadership dialogues to address compelling issues before the parties go for elections	UNMISS, RTGoNU	
4.	Call upon the leadership of the country to confirm ranks and files of the NUF, after going through process of army formation, provide funds for transitional security arrangements and transformation and	RTGoNU	
5.	Advocate for the lifting of the arms embargo after completion of Security sector reform and ensuring that the NUF are adequately equipped to fulfill their mandate of protecting, territorial integrity of the country, citizens, property and maintaining security.	RTGoNU, International Community, AU, IGAD	After the completion of the Security Sector Reform,
6.	Train unified command of the security forces, enhance trust, confidence and professionalization of the army	All security command leadership, RTGoNU,	
7.	All the security forces to be trained on election security	RTGoNU Security forces	
8.	The traditional Authority be represented in the constitution making process	NCRC, RTGoNU etc	
9.	Prioritize the training and deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) with a clear and unified command structure to ensure cooperation, compliance, and trust-building within the security sector.	RTGoNU, UNMISS, AU, DDR Commission	
10.	Application of the restorative justice as a path way to trust and political will than punitive justice to enable the completion of Chapter V of RARCSS.	All parties to RARCSS, AU, IGAD, all stakeholders and	Enhance trust building, peroneal security and reinforces the reconciliation among South Sudanese.

		International Community	
11	The Leadership Forum recommend that the parties hold inter-parties dialogue and continue sustained dialogue through the extended transitional period.	All political parties, RTGoNU, stakeholders and partners	The parties and stakeholders in the forum recommend that there should be a continuous dialogue, preferably twice a month, among the party leaders at the principal level.
12	Ecumenical prayer sessions to pray together with our political leaders and for the country. Religious leaders to form a body to engage the parties on completion of the transition	CSO, South Sudan ecumenical body, Islamic, SSCC etc.	Initiated by the faith based religious communities. This enhances the trust building and confidence,
13	The forum recommends continuous and timely updates on the progress of the implementation of the critical outstanding activities necessary for the completion of the political transition by the parties to the Agreement leading to the 2026 elections.	HLSC, NTC,	
14	The prioritization of funding of key mechanisms and particularly electoral processes (NEC), constitutional-making processes (NCRC) and National Bureau of Statistics	International Community, RTGoNU, CSOs, AU, IGAD, UN, International IDEA	Funding these activities will enable better ending of the political transition
15	Harmonise the amended TCRSS, 2011 to address contradictions, ensuring effective dissemination of the R-ARCSS and civic education to promote understanding and ownership of the peace process	RTGoNU, CSO, Ecumenical Body	
16	Engage UNMISS and other stakeholders to provide technical and financial support to expedite the implementation of the Security sector transformation.	UNMISS, RTGoNU	Technical and financial support from UN
17	Establishment of the Early Warning Mechanism and system during the extended transitional period	Trilateral (UN, AU, RTGoNU) RMJEC, CSOs	Report Monthly to the RTGoNU and International Community
18	Comprehensive blanket disarmament of all the civilians across the country and putting in place tracking mechanism for the arms and ammunitions supplied to the national armed forces	NUF, UNMISS, AU and IGAD	It is to be done simultaneously nationwide
19	The constitution making and electoral processes be taken concurrently	RTGoNU, Parties to the RARCSS,	This does not necessarily mean sequencing
20	Prioritize trust and confidence-building among all parties involved in the Tumaini Initiative through dialogue, compromise, and a focus on shared goals.	RTGoNU, Hold-Outs Stakeholders, CSO,	Mediation team to continuously engage the parties

		International Community	
21	Delinking of the armies from the political parties to enable political parties' registration before elections are done	RTGoNU, PPC, IGAD	This is what the Political Parties Act say
22	Civil Society Organizations and public to redouble their efforts to hold the political leaders accountable in the country	All CSOs their respective groups	It is the role of every citizen to ask and pressure the political leadership
23	The South Sudanese people, government and national leaders to take responsibility of funding the CMP	All South Sudanese, RTGoNU	
24	The Civic Education committees and CSOs should engage the public, IDPs and refugee on the CMP to ensure inclusive participation	NCRC, CSO	The Process should not be rushed
25	All Tumaini Initiative Hold-Out Groups should be engaged and dialogued in a manner that addresses their grievances with public participation	RTGoNU Mediation team,	
26	None partisan to facilitate the writing of the constitution		
27	Tumaini Initiative to complement the RARCSS and join current structures of the RARCSS	RTGoNU, Hold out groups mediation TI team	

On behalf of the participants, we undersign adopt the above recommendations


Name

1. Major Gen Majier Deng  
The Security Forces
2. Michael Majur Achol SPLM
3. Hon Gatwech Lam SPLM-iO
4. Hon Isahaq Elias Ibrahim SSOA.
5. Hon Juma Seed Worju.  
The Political Parties
6. Archbishop Moses Deng Bol


Signature



Major Gen Majier Deng  
21/02/2023



Michael Majur Achol SPLM




Hon Gatwech Lam SPLM-iO

The Faith-based Organisation  
7. Dabek Mabior Arok



The Civil Society Organisation

8. Hon Margaret Girma Lukurnyang



Diana Joseph Wani



9. Persons with Disabilities



Handwritten signatures of Persons with Disabilities, including initials and names like NK, MM, P, H, G, D, and others.

The Youth and Women

End

Yok numas B Dm't Ch ~~Fl~~

**Annex 4: Armored personnel carrier used at Akol Koor's residence in Juba on 21 November 2024**



Source: video on file with the Panel.

APC seen in the 21 November 2024 video taken at Akol Koor's residence



APCs shown during and after the ceremony held on 28 December 2022 for the deployment of a battalion of the SSPDF to the DRC



Similarities with the Titan-S like APCs imported to South Sudan in 2022: chassis appearance including the bonnet, chassis wheel rim, windows' shape, place and covering mesh.

## Annex 5: Resolution of the SPLM/SPLA(IO) Political Bureau Meeting, 11 February 2025



**SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT  
SPLM( IO )  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS**



### Resolutions of the SPLM/SPLA( IO ) Political Bureau Meeting, No. 01/2025

The SPLM/SPLA( IO ) Political Bureau met on 11<sup>th</sup> February 2025 in Juba to discuss the Republican Decrees No 48/2025 and No.52/2025 dated 10th February 2025, that removed the National Minister of Health, Hon. Yolanda Awel Deng and the Governor of Western Equatoria State, H.E. Gen. Alfred Futuyo Karaba, respectively. The Political Bureau also considered the reports of recent violations of security arrangements in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr El Ghazal States.

After extensive deliberations, the Political Bureau resolved the following:

1. Rejects the unilateral decision made by the President to remove Hon. Yolanda Awel Deng, the Minister of Health and H.E. Gen. Alfred Futuyo Karaba, the Governor of Western Equatoria State, from their offices as the decrees violate the replacement and removal procedures under Article 1.13 of the R-ARCSS.
2. Calls on the President to reinstate Hon. Yolanda Awel Deng, the Minister of Health and H.E. Gen. Alfred Futuyo Karaba, the Governor of Western Equatoria State to their respective offices.
3. Condemns the assassination attempt on the life of the Governor of Western Equatoria State and the lives of members of his family at his official residence, and other SPLM-IO members in Yambio, Tombura and Najero Counties by the elements of the SSPDF.
4. Further condemns the ongoing atrocities meted out on the civilians and violations of Security Arrangements in Koburi Bou in Najero County of Western Equatoria State and Ngap in Jur River County of Western Bahr El Ghazal State by the SSPDF. The Political Bureau calls for the unconditional release of the Security Advisor of the Government of Western Bahr El Ghazal State and the Commissioner of Jur River County.
5. Calls on CTSAMVM to investigate the violations cited in paragraph 3 and 4 above and hold the perpetrators accountable.
6. In conclusion, the Political Bureau calls on President Salva Kiir to uphold the R-ARCSS as the persistent violations through unilateral decisions and decrees threaten the very existence of the Agreement.

Signed:

Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, PhD

Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLM/SPLA( IO )



**Annex 6: SPLM/SPLA Kitgwang Declaration (KD) statement on agreement with government, 4 February 2025**





**SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY**  
**SPLM/ SPLA IO KD**  
**CHAIRMAN & COMMANDER -IN-CHIEF**

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**Important Press Release!\***

\*Tuesday, 4th February 2025.\*

To the members of SPLM/A-IO KD, fellow compatriots, the people of South Sudan, and the general public,

On behalf of our formidable movement, I extend revolutionary greetings in the name of our great nation and under the guidance of God.

The SPLM/A-IO KD emerged from the resolute demands of our people for peace and stability. We remain steadfast advocates for the well-being of our citizens across the country, defending our position against the daily struggles they face.

In recent months, our leadership team has engaged with the Government in Juba to resume critical peace negotiations. The previous peace agreement signed in 2022 in Khartoum collapsed due to a lack of political will among certain individuals within the government who were not committed to peace. In response, President Salva Kiir Mayardit tasked Gen. Akech Tong Aleu, Director General of the Internal Security Bureau, National Security Service, to engage with SPLM/A-IO KD via Sudanese authorities.

Following multiple meetings, facilitated by the Sudanese government, both parties have risen above their differences and prioritized the interests of our people, reaffirming peace as the essential solution to end our nation's suffering.

I am here to officially present the key points of the peace agreement signed yesterday, Sunday, February 2, 2025, in Port Sudan, witnessed by representatives of the Sudanese government.

\*We have reached the following agreements:\*

1. SPLM/A-IO Kitgwang advance delegation shall travel to Juba for the operationalization of the agreement.
2. The reorganization and training of SPLA-IO KD Forces into an official military formation.
3. The integration of SPLA-IO KD forces into the national army and other organized forces, such as; police, prison department, wildlife, national security, costumes etc.
4. The total strength of SPLM/A-IO KD is confirmed at 21,900 (Twenty-One Thousand Nine Hundred), with a 12-month timeline for training and reorganization. Any extensions will require consensus from both parties.
5. SPLM/A-IO KD forces at headquarters will be prepared to travel to Juba ahead of



**SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY**  
**SPLM/ SPLA IO KD**  
**CHAIRMAN & COMMANDER -IN-CHIEF**

General Simon Gatwech Dual's arrival.

6. While training and reorganization occur, Gen. Simon Gatwech Dual, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of SPLM/A-IO KD, will remain in Port Sudan until Phase One of the agreement is fully implemented.

7. The remaining SPLM/A-IO KD forces will be directed to the designated assembly areas for a four-month training period.

8. Gen. Simon Gatwech Dual will be appointed as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the SSPDF through Presidential Decree before his arrival in Juba.

9. The allocation of key positions within the national government, as well as at state and county levels, will be granted to the SPLM/A-IO KD.

10. Both parties have agreed to assign parliamentarian posts in national and state assemblies.

Upon completion of the initial phases, General Simon Gatwech Dual will travel to Juba, accompanied by Gen. Akech Tong and officials from the Sudanese government.

It is imperative that the entire implementation is completed within a 12-month period, with any extensions to be discussed and agreed upon by both parties.

Should these conditions not be met, the SPLM/A-IO KD reserves the right to withdraw from this agreement and nullify all provisions connected to it.

Let us stand united in this crucial moment for our nation.

\*Thanks!\*

\*Yours In Struggle!\*

Sincerely yours,  
Gen. Simon Gatwech Dual  
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of SPLM/A-IO KD

## Annex 7: Buyers of South Sudanese crude oil

	shutdown												
	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24
China Oil	15		9	3	2								
Unipec	15		19	39	8				1				
Vitol	8		5	3					1				
PetroNile	4												
Arcadia	1		3										
Tri-Ocean	1												
Glencore/Trinity			5	3	2			7	8	3			
Trafigura			4	5	6	8	3		1				
Zhenhua Oil			1										
Petrodiamond				1									
Sahara Energy								7	5	3	4	2	
BB Energy							3	2	4	10	5	7	5
Litasco									4	1	3		
Addax					2	4			1	5	9	12	
NASDEC								2	1	1			
EuroAmerica									2	4	3		
Pacific Petroleum									1	1			
Al Braik											1		
Trinity Energy										1	3		5
Kappak											1		
Zacosia											1		
Oryx Energies													9
ChiangWei /Nestwise													3
EPDESA													2

Number of cargos (600,000 barrels), lifted by traders, according to Marketing Reports prepared by the Ministry of Petroleum and on file with the Panel.

## Annex 8: Additional budget analysis

### 2023/24 budget outruns:

(SSP billion)	Budget	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	2023/24 total	actual as % of approved budget	actual spending as % of total spending
<b>Revenue</b>	<b>1,781.8</b>	<b>538.3</b>	<b>657.6</b>	<b>594.1</b>	<b>343.3</b>	<b>2,133.4</b>	<b>119.7%</b>	
Oil revenue	1,536.5	484.8	608.2	523.6	278.3	1,894.9	123.3%	
Non-oil revenue	245.3	53.5	49.4	70.5	65.0	238.5	97.2%	
<b>Expenditure</b>	<b>1,783.9</b>	<b>470.3</b>	<b>652.2</b>	<b>650.0</b>	<b>655.7</b>	<b>2,428.2</b>	<b>136.1%</b>	
Wages and Salaries	426.9	15.8	81.5	63.7	50.7	211.7	49.6%	8.72%
Operating expenses (Ministries)	489.0	31.5	47.0	64.2	60.3	203.0	41.5%	8.36%
Transfers and Grants to States	141.9	4.6	24.6	30.7	35.4	95.2	67.1%	3.92%
Other expenses	4.6	0.9	0.8	0.2	0.1	1.9	41.9%	0.08%
Transfer to Oil Prod. States (2%)	30.8	7.3	9.3	4.4	6.3	27.4	89.1%	1.13%
Transfer to Oil Prod. Comm. (3%)	46.2	11.0	14.0	6.6	9.6	41.2	89.2%	1.70%
Transfer to Ministry of Petroleum (3%)	46.2	11.0	14.0	6.6	9.6	41.2	89.2%	1.70%
Oil for Roads Projects	435.7	241.3	136.6	-	-	377.9	86.7%	15.56%
Other capital projects	106.2	0.7	9.1	6.3	8.5	24.6	23.1%	1.01%
<b>Unallocated payments</b>		<b>146.2</b>	<b>315.3</b>	<b>467.3</b>	<b>475.3</b>	<b>1,404.2</b>		<b>57.83%</b>
<b>Financing gap</b>	<b>-2.16</b>	<b>-78.22</b>	<b>-309.92</b>	<b>-523.13</b>	<b>-787.71</b>	<b>-1,698.99</b>		

Source: documents prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Planning, on file with the Panel

## 2024/25 budget allocations:

Official exchange rate SSP/US\$ (Oct 2024)	3,098	
Projected government revenue	SSP	US\$ (est.)
Projected oil revenues		% of total revenue
DPOC	0	0
GPOC	943,610,579,883	304,587,017
SPOC	194,823,738,558	62,886,939
<b>Total oil revenue</b>	<b>1,138,434,318,441</b>	<b>367,473,957</b>
<b>Projected non-oil revenue</b>		
Customs duty	552,284,081,279	178,271,169
Misc taxes and fees	566,920,329,811	182,995,587
<b>Total non oil revenue</b>	<b>1,119,204,411,090</b>	<b>361,266,756</b>
<b>Total projected government revenue</b>	<b>2,257,638,729,531</b>	<b>728,740,713</b>
Government expenditure		% of total spending
"Mandatory government expenditure"		
Transfers to Sudan for oil pipeline	157,035,230,468	50,689,229
Transfers to oil producing states (2%)	22,768,686,369	7,349,479
Transfers to oil producing communities (3%)	34,153,029,553	11,024,219
Transfers to Ministry of Petroleum (3%)	34,153,029,553	11,024,219
Debt repayment	286,642,748,700	92,525,096
National Revenue Authority Retention	54,957,368,080	17,739,628
Oil for roads	0	0
Other capital projects	493,482,795,275	159,290,767
<b>Total "mandatory expenditure"</b>	<b>1,083,192,887,998</b>	<b>349,642,637</b>
Salary payments		
Salaries	773,759,678,293	249,761,032
Salary arrears	642,316,055,668	207,332,491
Foreign mission salary arrears	96,003,600,000	30,988,896
<b>Total salary expenditure</b>	<b>1,512,079,333,961</b>	<b>488,082,419</b>
Other expenditure		
Operating expenditure	413,329,279,511	133,418,102
Transfers to States for State budgets	419,306,834,843	135,347,590
Peace budget	93,794,227,620	30,275,735
Constituency Fund for MPs	30,000,000,000	9,683,667
December 2024 Elections	257,521,457,127	83,125,067
Humanitarian and emergency fund	173,660,000,000	56,055,520
Various other budget lines	189,336,691,868	61,115,782
<b>Total other expenditure</b>	<b>1,576,948,490,969</b>	<b>509,021,463</b>
<b>Total all government spending</b>	<b>4,172,220,712,928</b>	<b>1,346,746,518</b>
<b>Deficit</b>	<b>-1,914,581,983,397</b>	<b>-618,005,805</b>

**Agency spending:**

	<b>Salary budget (SSP)</b>	<b>% of total salary budget</b>	<b>Goods and services (SSP)</b>	<b>% of total goods and services</b>	<b>Total budget (SSP)</b>	<b>% of total Ministry spending</b>
<b>Accountability cluster</b>	<b>894,932,810</b>	<b>0.12%</b>	<b>5,848,736,009</b>	<b>1.45%</b>	<b>7,370,156,266</b>	<b>0.39%</b>
<b>Economic Cluster</b>	<b>19,109,574,136</b>	<b>2.47%</b>	<b>49,631,570,445</b>	<b>12.31%</b>	<b>197,443,429,349</b>	<b>10.48%</b>
Of which Ministry of Finance and Planning	1,832,456,166	0.24%	28,331,191,362	7.03%	32,480,160,993	1.72%
<b>Education cluster</b>	<b>84,975,288,417</b>	<b>11.00%</b>	<b>48,077,271,655</b>	<b>11.92%</b>	<b>225,135,744,981</b>	<b>11.95%</b>
<b>Health cluster</b>	<b>5,326,514,447</b>	<b>0.69%</b>	<b>31,156,159,400</b>	<b>7.73%</b>	<b>54,855,922,636</b>	<b>2.91%</b>
<b>Infrastructure cluster</b>	<b>1,595,558,604</b>	<b>0.21%</b>	<b>8,382,367,085</b>	<b>2.08%</b>	<b>13,336,454,811</b>	<b>0.71%</b>
<b>Natural resources cluster</b>	<b>22,406,328,022</b>	<b>2.90%</b>	<b>33,863,145,894</b>	<b>8.40%</b>	<b>351,649,759,145</b>	<b>18.67%</b>
<b>Public administration cluster</b>	<b>75,991,334,896</b>	<b>9.84%</b>	<b>168,546,330,203</b>	<b>41.80%</b>	<b>290,284,083,280</b>	<b>15.41%</b>
Of which Presidential Affairs	2,577,606,960	0.33%	15,594,234,618	3.87%	23,383,834,620	1.24%
Of which Cabinet Affairs	1,465,091,532	0.19%	7,625,921,167	1.89%	16,773,997,323	0.89%
Of which Foreign Affairs	50,377,424,952	6.52%	4,254,097,101	1.05%	55,111,798,592	2.93%
Of which Parliament	10,277,629,488	1.33%	81,444,261,374	20.20%	114,571,166,718	6.08%
Of which Council of States	6,504,809,940	0.84%	25,000,499,165	6.20%	38,371,858,427	2.04%
<b>Security sector</b>	<b>505,880,647,927</b>	<b>65.51%</b>	<b>35,430,397,122</b>	<b>8.79%</b>	<b>599,433,387,770</b>	<b>31.82%</b>
Of which Police	100,406,257,704	13.00%	4,198,497,310	1.04%	158,507,540,170	8.42%
Of which Ministry of Defence	268,614,128,198	34.78%	15,735,791,888	3.90%	268,412,061,028	15.31%
Of which Veterans Affairs	84,588,459,037	10.95%	6,419,463,234	1.59%	91,007,922,271	4.83%
Of which NSS	51,827,888,804	6.71%	6,812,984,565	1.69%	58,737,678,439	3.12%
<b>Rule of law</b>	<b>56,064,967,796</b>	<b>7.26%</b>	<b>22,327,870,875</b>	<b>5.54%</b>	<b>144,039,451,614</b>	<b>7.65%</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>772,245,147,055</b>		<b>403,263,848,688</b>		<b>1,883,548,389,852</b>	

Panel analysis, based on first draft of budget presented to the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly on 25 September 2024

**Annex 9: Request for meeting with the President to discuss security situation from Office of the First Vice President, 27 February 2025**



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
The First Vice President**

RSS/FVP/J/1/1/2025/3

27<sup>th</sup> February 2025

H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit,  
President,  
Republic of South Sudan

**Subject: Request for a Meeting to Discuss the Security Situation in Upper Nile State, Western Equatoria State and Western Bahr El Ghazal State**

I am writing to request again for an audience with your Excellency to discuss the deteriorating security situation in Upper Nile State and Western Equatoria State, in particular. On 20<sup>th</sup> February 2025, I wrote to your Excellency to discuss the replacement of SSPDF in Nasir town which has become a flash point lately. The recent violations in these states are serious that I am prompted to raise these issues to the guarantors so that they could intervene and suggest amicable solutions to break the deadlock.

In light of the above I am writing to your Excellency and the Guarantors to report the systematic violations of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), as these latest violations are threatening to reverse the milestone we have achieved in the implementation of the Agreement and may lead to the breakdown of Security Arrangements and the collapse of the Agreement as follows:

**Western Equatoria State:**

1. On 5<sup>th</sup> January 2025, the SSPDF Regional force Contingent which was destined for deployment in DR Congo was moved to Kubiri Bou of Nagero County of Western Equatoria State.
2. on 11<sup>th</sup> January 2025, this force was used to attack the SPLA-IO assembly area in Kubiri Bou and villages in Nagero County.
3. On 10th February 2025 at and around 8:20PM, immediately after the Presidential Decree which relieved the governor of Western Equatoria State, the SSPDF launched attack on the residence of Governor Alfred Futuyo Karaba, forcing him and his family to flee for their lives. His houses at the State House and private residences were attacked and completely looted. The whereabouts of the governor is unknown.

RMCJD



4. In the same night, the SSPDF attacked the residence of senior members of SPLM-IO including Honorable Ministers nominated by SPLM-IO and forced to flee out of the state as follows:
  - Hon. Bazia Tito Mourice, the State Minister of Finance, Planning and Investment,
  - Hon. Elia Usini Dominic, State Minister of Information and Communication,
  - Hon. Henry Bangada Asaya, Commissioner of Nagero,
  - Hon. Costa Joseph Abrida, Member of Parliament representing Tambura County,
  - Mr. Peter Mbla, Director General in the State Ministry of General Education,
  - Mr. Alex Karne John, the SPLM-IO Chairperson in Tambura County, and
  - Angelo Davide (SPLM-IO Youth Leader), the County Commissioner of Nzara, were all targeted by the SSPDF. They were also forced to flee for their lives and their belongings were all looted.
5. On 11th February, 2025, the SSPDF stormed the SPLM-IO State Secretariat Headquarters in Yambio and removed SPLM-IO flag. Since then, the SSPDF has been waging a campaign to target the members of SPLM-IO forcing them to flee from Western Equatoria State as follows:
  - Hon. Cecilia Anigunde Bil, SPLM-IO Chairperson for Ezo County and the State Minister of Gender, Child and Social Welfare was attacked at her residence.
  - The Director General in the Ministry of Finance was arrested and severely tortured.
  - The Commissioner of State Revenue Authority was attacked but he escaped.
  - Hon. Diana, Member of State Assembly representing Mundri East County was attacked and assaulted in Yambio Town in a broad day light. She sustained a life-threatening injury on her head and was rushed to a clinic.
  - The Houses of Unice Naduru, the Director General in the Ministry of Public service and Human Resource Development.
  - Hon. Elia Atorosa, Deputy Commissioner for Revenue Authority were attacked and
  - Hon. William Adriano Baiki, Former State Minister of Finance, Planning and Investment was arrested Juba from his residence at New Site and his vehicle was confiscated.
6. On 12th February 2025 at and around 5:45 Am, the SPLA-IO Cantonment site at Li-Rangu was attacked and burnt down by the SSPDF. While occupying the Cantonment the SSPDF continue to pursue the members and forces of the SPLA-IO in Western Equatoria as follows:
  - Attacked and disarmed 2 bodyguards of Hon. Minister of Gender and dismantled and made away with 4 tyres of Toyota Harrier car
  - On 14th February 2025, attacked Zamba Sende along Li-Rangu-Nadiangere road in an attempt to assassinate Maj. Gen. Balia Digido

*RMTD*

2

*27/2/2025*

- On 14th February 2025 at and around 7PM in Naagori residential area in Yambio, attacked Mr. Roto who sustained a bullet wound on his stomach and died in Nzara Hospital
- SSPDF is targeting Brig. Gen. Loice Paul Zuzu who has been undergoing treatment in Yambio Town and has now been forced to go into hiding.
- On 17th February 2025 the SSPDF (contingent of Regional Forces) were deployed to Nagero County where they have arresting and torturing suspected members of SPLM-IO as they stationed in Lindi Boma of Nagero Payam, Duma Payam of Nagero County respectively. Many civilians were displaced, looted and houses were burnt down.
- There has been widespread attacked and systematic targeting, arrest and torture of members of SPLM-IO in Western Equatoria State.
- The SSPDF apparently is acting in collaboration with the members of SPLM-IG to stage politically motivated demonstration in Yambio, Tumbura, Anzara and Ezo Counties, tear down SPLM-IO Flags, attack the members of State and Counties Secretariats and call for takeover of Western Equatoria State by the SPLM-IG.
- The violations by the SSPDF and the SPLM-IG in Western Equatoria State have resulted into loss of lives, property and displacement of civilian population. Tribal rift between the Azande and Balandia communities of Western Equatoria State has also been deepened.

#### **Western Bahr El Gazal State**

7. On 15<sup>th</sup> January 2025, a combined forces of the SSPDF and National Security Services attacked Kubiri Ngap of Jur River County of Western Bahr El Gazal State.
  - The villages of Kuanya and Bar Wol was attacked and many civilians were displaced, property were looted and many houses were burnt down.
  - The State Security Advisor and the Commissioner of Jur River County were arrested and being detained by the National Security Services in Juba.
  - The Attacked in Jur River River County of Western Bahr El Gazal State is part of the wider national campaign to target the members and the areas controlled by the SPLM/SPLA-IO in the Country.

#### **Upper Nile State**

8. On 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2025, a combined force of SSPDF, and Agwelek and Abusok militias were dispatched to Nasir County of Upper Nile State in violation of Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement as well as the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) of 21<sup>st</sup> December 2017.

- The deployment of Agwelek and Abusok militias comprising predominantly youth from specific communities alongside SSPDF to Nasir County have provoked tension from the local youth in the areas of Ulang and Nasir Counties, aggravating tension and insecurity in the State.

RHTD      3      27/2/2025



- On 25<sup>th</sup> February 2025, the SSPDF Helicopter gunships in two separate incidences, attacked SPLA-IO assembly area and villages in Ulang County of Upper Nile State.

In addition, on 19<sup>th</sup> February 2025, I wrote to your Excellency to appoint our nominee to replace former Governor Alfred Futuyo Karaba of Western Equatoria State. Also, there are pending appointment requests at Your Excellency's desk, some date back to 22<sup>nd</sup> October 2024. I urge Your Excellency to act on these requests.

Finally, I am enclosing the document that outlines the way forward on redeployment of troops in Nasir.

Yours truly,

Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, PhD  
First Vice President, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the SPCW/SPLA (IO)  
February 27, 2025.



27/2/2025

Enclosure:

- Replacement of SSPDF in Nasir Town dated 20<sup>th</sup> February 2025

Cc:

- H.E. Ismail Omar Guelleh, President of the Republic of Djibouti
- H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda
- H.E. William Samoeil Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya
- H.E. Abiy Ahmed, Prime Minister of The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
- H.E. Hassen Sheikh Mohamud, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia
- H.E. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sudan Transitional Sovereignty Council
- H.E. Umara Sissoco Embalo, President of Guinea Bissau
- H.E. Ambassador Prof. Joram Mukama Biswaro, Head of the AU Liaison Office in South Sudan
- H.E. Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of United Nations in South Sudan (UNMISS)
- H.E. Ambassador Maj. Gen. (rtd) George Aggrey Owino, Interim Chairman, RJMEC
- H.E. Ambassador Ismail Wais, PhD, IGAD Special Envoy
- H.E. Maj. Gen. Yiyayal Gelaw Bitew, Chairman, CTSAMVM
- Representative of Troika (USA, UK & Norway)
- Representative of European Union
- Representative of IGAD Partners Forum
- Representative of C5
- File.

## Annex 10: SPLM/A-IO Press Release on tensions along Sobat River, 1 March 2025



SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT

SPLM(IO)

GENERAL SECRETARIAT

### Press Statement

#### **The SPLM/A-IO Persuades the Armed Youth to De-escalate Tension Along the Sobat River**

The SPLM/A-IO Chairman Dr. Rick Machar Teny-Dhurgon engaged with Upper Nile State and County authorities, leaders of armed youth and traditional leaders in Ulang and Nasir counties to de-escalate the tension arising from the unilateral replacement of SSPDF FORCES in Wech-Yar-Adiu of Nasir County.

The tension arising from deployment of elements of Agwelek and Abushok militias alongside the non-unified SSPDF to Nasir could have been avoided if the Necessary Unified forces (NUF) as agreed earlier were the ones to be deployed in Nasir County as part of implementation of the Phase I Security Arrangements.

The SPLM/A-IO has also dispatched teams led by the commissioners of Ulang and Nasir counties to receive and guide the incoming gun-boats carrying the forces to Wech-Yar-Adiu.

The statement of the SSPDF Spokesperson of involvement of the SPLA-IO forces in yesterday's clash between the SSPDF and allied militias, and the youth is a fabrication and provocative. The SPLM/A-IO condemns this war propaganda that drags the SPLM/SPLA-IO into the tension.

The SPLM/A-IO reiterates its commitment to the R-ARCSS and calls the Parties to respect and uphold the Agreement.

Sign

P. Deng  
01/03/2025



Cde. Pal Mai Deng

Chairperson of National Committee for Information and Communication  
SPLM-IO

1<sup>st</sup> March 2025

### Annex 11: Recent movements of two armed SSPDF barges

Barges in Wau Shilluk, 15 kilometers north-east of Malakal on 1 January 2024 (9.660605, 31.747810)  
Source: Google Earth Pro, © 2024 Airbus



Barges in Malakal, 17 February 2025  
Source: Planet Labs inc.



Barges between Malakal and Ulang, 19 February 2025

Source: Confidential source and photographs widely circulated on social media



**Annex 12: SSPDF statement on security situation in Ulang and Bariet Counties,  
25 February 2025**



**SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENSE FORCES  
DIRECTORATE OF MEDIA & PRESS**

OFFICE OF SSPDF SPOKESMAN

25/02/2025

For immediate release

**Press statement on security situation in Ulang and Bariet Counties**

The SSPDF command would like to update own rank and files and members of the public on fast evolving security situation in Ulang and Bariet Counties of Upper Nile State.

In the last two weeks, SPLA-IO and its affiliated militias, namely, white armies from Ulang, Nasir and even Nyirol County of Jonglei State had mobilized in large numbers with initial objective of thwarting planned rotation of troops in Nasir. However, the latest intelligence received indicated that, the intention had shifted from hindering planned rotation of servicemen in Nasir to conducting large scale offensive operations against innocent civilians in Bariet County.

In line with sustained monitoring of subversive activities of the enemy, this morning 25/02/2025, SSPDF deployed its aerial surveillance capabilities and as a resulted, spotted two large columns of SPLA-IO forces and the white army advancing towards Gelachiel and Bariet town. The latest enemy's movement towards the aforementioned localities had forced civilians to flee their homes.

Based on human intelligence gathered and aerial surveillance conducted, there are real threats of armed confrontations erupting between SSPDF and the advancing enemy forces.

In compliance with own mandate to protect ourselves, the location population and their properties, the SSPDF command, once again, renews calls for the combined hostile forces to halt further advances, retreat and disperse.

Failure to adhere to aforementioned calls, SSPDF, will be compelled to launch pre-emptive air strikes as well as conduct hasty meeting engagements.

Signed



**Maj. Gen. Lui Ruai Koang "PSC" (ET)**

Director for Media & Press and SSPDF Spokesperson,

SSPDF GHQs-Bilpam

**Annex 13: Statement by His Excellency the President on the current situation in Upper Nile State, Nasir County, 7 March 2025**



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
The President**

March 7, 2025

**STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCE THE PRESIDENT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN UPPER NILE STATE, NASIR COUNTY**

**Fellow citizens**

As you have been following the unfolding events in Upper Nile State Nasir County. The government forces stationed in Nasir for close to 8 years were to be redeployed and new force redeployed. This is a normal routine with the arm forces. This exercise was politicized and that the army was going to disarm the communities around Ulang and Nasir.

On February 28th, Dr Riek Machar the First Vice President requested a meeting so that we could address this tension. We indeed met on March 3rd, 2025. The meeting was positive and Dr. Riek assured us all, the parties to the Agreement that he will intervene.

On March 4th, 2025 the Military Garrison in Nasir was attacked by the white army under the command of the SPLA\_IO despite assurances from Dr. Riek Machar, that the IO will not attack the army base.

Gen. Majur Dak Thel , the commander of the forces managed to hold his ground with the few remaining officers and men in tanks and trenches. Dr. Riek himself called the commander Gen. Majur Dak Thel and told him to surrender to the IO forces; however, General refused to surrender.

Dr. Riek assured me and the UN Representative in the country that the General will be safe, and that UN rescue mission should fly to Nasir and evacuate the General and his men.

On March 6th, the UN helicopters flew to Nasir but came under fire upon landing, the second attempt the IO troops were told to at least retreat 300 meters to allow the plane to land, it still came under fire while taking off, but managed to rescue 11 officers and men, while the General opted to be evacuated last.

Page 1 of 2

The President

The UN Representative informed Dr. Riek of these incidents but Dr. Riek insisted that Nasir is under IO and that today March 7th, 2025 the planes can land to rescue the General and the remaining officers. This morning two UN helicopters flew to Nasir while onboarding the General and the officers they came under heavy fire again.

I am therefore, informing the nation that in this process we have lost General Majur Dak Thel, and the officers. Only one pilot and a crew member survived. One of the planes managed to take off; however, it crashed landed in Malakal and killed all the passengers.

**Fellow citizens**

I am appealing to you to remain calm. I have said it time and again that our country will not go back to war. Let no one take law into their own hands, and I assured you that the government, which I lead will handle this crisis. We will remain steadfast in the path of peace.

My condolences go to the bereave families of the General and his men. They have died in the service of our nation, and they shall forever remain in our hearts. May their soul rest in peace. And once again, I call for calm nation wide.

May God bless South Sudan.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Salva Kiir Mayardit". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, stylized 'K' at the beginning.

**Salva Kiir Mayardit**  
**President of the Republic of South Sudan**

## Annex 14: Presence of UPDF forces in Juba, March 2025

On 11 March 2025, an Airbus A320 passenger plane registered 5Y-FAH was seen at Juba International Airport.<sup>293</sup> According to flight data, it had made two return trips from Juba to Uganda on that day.<sup>294</sup> The Panel also obtained independent visual confirmation of the presence of this plane at Juba International Airport on 11 March 2025.<sup>295</sup>

On the same day, the UPDF Chief of Defence Forces, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, published a video showing armed UPDF soldiers stepping off a plane that matches the aircraft verified as present at Juba International Airport on 11 March 2025. Using features visible in the video, the Panel has confirmed that the video is from Juba International Airport.

Additional analysis conducted by the Panel also confirms that the video was also certainly recorded after 23 February 2025 and very likely on 11 March 2025.

Flight tracking data confirms that the only recorded landing of a plane matching this description at Juba International Airport was on 11 March 2025.<sup>296</sup>

In the video, yellow markings are visible on the airport runway. Satellite imagery analysis conducted by the Panel confirms that these markings were only added to the airport runway in February 2024, indicating that the video cannot precede this date.

Furthermore, a Let-410 Turbolet aircraft is also visible in the background of the video. Satellite imagery analysis conducted by the Panel confirms the presence of such an aircraft at that location at Juba International Airports, but only since 23 February 2025. This indicates that the video cannot precede this date.

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
<sup>293</sup> Confidential sources.

<sup>294</sup> Including ADS-B transponder data.

<sup>295</sup> Photograph from confidential source on file with the Panel.

<sup>296</sup> Transponder data available through subscriber service.

Statements made by UPDF Chief of Defence Forces, Muhoozi Kainerugaba on 10 and 11 March 2025:




Source: <https://x.com/mkainerugaba>

Excerpt from the published video



UPDF soldier carrying a rifle





Probable Let-410 Turbolet aircraft  
Not present prior to 23 Feb. 2025



Juba airport on 11 February 2024  
Runway markings not visible  
Source: Planet Labs

## Annex 15: Visiting armed forces agreement between South Sudan and Uganda, July 2024

National Security Service  
Office of the Director General  
General Headquarters



Jebel Road, Nyokuron West  
P.O. Box 96, Juba, South Sudan  
+211 92 891 1113 / 091 909 0899

### REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN Internal Security Bureau

In any correspondence on this  
Subject, please quote No: RSS/NSS/DG/ISB/J/ 925 /24

Date: 23/07/2024

Ambassador Joseph Oc wet  
Director General  
External Security Organization (ESO)  
**THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA**

*Dear Ambassador,*

#### **REF: APPROVAL OF VISITING ARMED FORCES AGREEMENT; BETWEEN THE FRIENDLY REPUBLICS OF SOUTH SUDAN AND UGANDA.**

This is in reference to your letter REF GOSS/ISB-DG/1/7/24 dated 20 July 2024, requesting for visiting armed forces agreement; between the friendly Republics of South Sudan and Uganda.

As per the meeting between His Excellency the President of the Republic of South Sudan, General Salva Kiir Mayardit and Brigadier General Nyakikuru Asaph Mweteise in a capacity as Special Envoy of His Excellency the President of the Republic of Uganda, His Excellency the President of the Republic of South Sudan, granted permission on the request from President Yoweri Museveni for One Unit of Military Forces from the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF), to visit and conduct training sessions in specific locations inside South Sudan, near the western border areas.

I am pleased to inform you that we are ready to receive the permitted One Unit of Military Forces by the President of the Republic of South Sudan, to come and engage in training activities in South Sudan. This training will provide both sisterly countries with valuable knowledge and skills related to advanced military techniques.

I welcome and offer my support and collaborations to Brigadier General Nyakikuru Asaph Mweteise, the Deputy Commander of the Special Forces Command (SFC) and who will be the Operations Commander for the training programs here in South Sudan.

The Internal Security Bureau (ISB) and the South Sudan Peoples' Defence Forces (SSPDF), will cooperate and work with UPDF during the training exercises. The training program is approved for one month only, beginning on 22 July 2024 to 22 August 2024.

The Government of South Sudan therefore, approves and authorizes the Government of Uganda to begin transportations and deployment of logistical equipment, training materials, troop carriers, helicopters, 20 training experts, 60 armed military personnel, welfare preparations and medical facilities from 22 July 2024.

Finally, the Government and people of South Sudan are always ready to strengthening our already excellent bilateral relations between the Government and the people of Uganda.

We look forward to a cooperative and successful training.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours truly,



**Gen. Akol Koer Kuc**  
Director General  
Internal Security Bureau (ISB)  
National Security Service (NSS)

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
P.O. BOX 7168  
KAMPALA, UGANDA



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL  
EXTERNAL SECURITY ORGANISATION  
P.O. BOX 7168 KAMPALA, UGANDA  
Tel. +256-414-254505/255295/6  
Telefax. +256-414-257986

*IN THIS CORRESPONDENCE ON  
THIS SUBJECT PLEASE QUOTE NO.*

**GOSS/ISB-DG/1/7/24**

20 July 2024

General Akol Koor Kuc  
Director General  
Internal Security Bureau (ISB)  
**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

Dear Director General,

**VISITING ARMED FORCES AGREEMENT; BETWEEN THE  
FRIENDLY REPUBLICS OF SOUTH SUDAN AND UGANDA**

The Government of Uganda most highly appreciates the recent audience which His Excellency the President of the Republic of South Sudan, granted to Brigadier General Nyakikuru Asaph Mweteise; in a capacity as a Special Envoy of His Excellency the President of the Republic of Uganda. During the meeting at State House in Juba city, President Salva Kiir kindly permitted the request from President Yoweri Museveni, for one unit of Military Forces from the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF), to conduct training sessions in specific locations inside South Sudan, near the western border areas.

Sir, in respect to the permission granted by the President of South Sudan, for UPDF to engage in training activities in South Sudan, the


President of Uganda assigned Brigadier General Asaph Mweteise to be the Operations Commander of the short training programmes, that shall last for one month. He is the Deputy Commander of Special Force Command (SFC), that is an elite specialised component of the UPDF.

My esteemed Brother, the purpose of this communication is to introduce General Asaph to you; and to request that through your coordination, as well as your support and collaborations; Internal Security Bureau (ISB) and South Sudan Peoples' Defence Forces (SSPDF), as usual, cooperate with UPDF in the training exercises.

Subject to the final approval and authorisation from the Government of South Sudan, the Government of Uganda is ready to start transportations on 22 July 2024; by deploying logistical equipment, training materials, troop carriers, helicopters, 20 training experts, 60 armed military personnel, welfare preparations, medical facilities, etc.

We sincerely express our heartfelt gratitude to His Excellency the President, the Government and people of South Sudan; who are the best friends of Uganda; for your readiness to always strengthen the excellent bilateral relations, between our two neighbouring countries.

I am so grateful, in solidarity



AMBASSADOR JOSEPH OCWET  
DIRECTOR GENERAL  
EXTERNAL SECURITY ORGANISATION



## Annex 16: Response to the Panel from the Government of Uganda dated 7 November 2024



### PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

UGANDA HOUSE  
336 EAST 45<sup>th</sup> STREET  
NEW YORK, N.Y 10017-3489  
Tel: (212) 949-0110  
Fax: (212) 687-4517  
E-mail: admin@ugandauny.com

Our Reference: UN-NY/TECH/38

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uganda to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on South-Sudan, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) and extended pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024) and with reference to letters Ref: S/AC.57/2024/PE/OC.34 dated 14<sup>th</sup> October 2024 and Ref: S/AC.57/2024/PE/OC.38 dated 1<sup>st</sup> November 2024, has the honour to present the response as follows;

- a. Under bilateral security arrangements, the UPDF carried out operations against the LRA in CAR while based at Wau in South Sudan but at the end of the operation, they left with all that remained back to Uganda. There was therefore no direct or indirect transfer of lethal military equipment in violation of the UNSC resolution 2428 (2018) and renewed by UNSCR 2713 (2024).
- b. The aircraft including a Lockheed L-100 Hercules and a helicopter owned and operated by Bar Aviation, a registered company in Uganda, were used by the UPDF in this operation. However, throughout this operation, Lockheed maintained its registration of 5X-HBR and not EK-RSX as alleged.
- c. The Republic of Uganda is alive to the UNSCR 2206(2015) and renewed by UNSCR 2731 (2024) wherein the SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces, Santino Deng Wol, is subject to travel ban. We acknowledge that the SSPDF visited his Uganda counterpart due to serious regional security concerns that needed to be addressed by the two as both countries are members of the East African Community among others. Uganda has however taken note of the Panel of Experts concern and pledges to adhere to the requirements in the UN resolution.
- d. Where the Panel of Experts alleges several incursions by the UPDF Forces into the South Sudan Territory and where in some incidents these incursions reportedly resulted in death, detention and harassment of South Sudanese civilians and security forces;

- (i) It is noteworthy, there have been persistent border demarcation disputes between the Republic of Uganda and that of South Sudan, where South Sudan Republic claims ownership of some border areas which form part of the Republic of Uganda territory.
  - (ii) It is possible for some elements in the Republic of South Sudan to allege that UPDF is on South Sudan territory when they are actually on the Republic of Uganda territory. A case in point is in Ngomoromo area in Uganda's Kitgum District that is currently occupied by SSPDF yet it is 27km inside the territory of the Republic of Uganda. Therefore, the allegation of transfer of military equipment does not hold here.
  - (iii) The UPDF operational doctrine upholds, respects and promotes the fundamental principles of Human Rights and Humanitarian Laws as enunciated under the UN Charter and encapsulated in the Uganda Constitution. There is therefore no way this would go unnoticed and where negligent breaches occur, the UPDF is on record for punishing errant commanders and soldiers who violate Human Rights.
- e. All the allegations are malefide and malicious simply intended to malign and damage the reputation of the UPDF and the Republic of Uganda as a whole.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uganda to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Office of the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on South-Sudan, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) and extended pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024), the assurances of its highest consideration.



The Office of the Coordinator  
Panel of Experts on South Sudan established  
pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) and extended pursuant  
to resolution 2731 (2024) concerning South-Sudan  
**New York.**

**GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA RESPONSE TO REQUESTS BY THE PANEL  
OF EXPERTS ON SOUTH SUDAN: ADDENDUM**

**1.0 INTRODUCTION**

The Government of Uganda received two letters from the Security Council Panel of Experts (PoE) on South Sudan, vide Ref. S/AC.57/2024/PE/OC.34 dated 14<sup>th</sup> October, 2024 and S/AC.57/2024/PE/OC.38 dated 1<sup>st</sup> November, 2024. Broadly, the two letters requested for information in relation to the following issues:

- Presence of armed foreign troops in Western Bahr el Ghazal State in South Sudan in July and August, including members of the UPDF.
- Involvement of the UPDF forces in Western Bahr el Ghazal in several joint security operations with South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) and National Security Service (NSS).
- Incursions of the UPDF forces in July and August, 2024 in Central Equatorial State and Eastern Equatorial State, which in some cases resulted into death, detention and/or harassment of South Sudanese civilians and security forces.
- Flights from Uganda towards Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazel, recorded to have been carried out by a Lockheed L-100 Hercules cargo plane, registered 5X-HBR, and on occasion as EK-RSX.
- The role of Bar Aviation, a Uganda-registered company, in transporting the UPDF to South Sudan.
- A meeting in Uganda of the Chief of Defence Forces of the UPDF and SSPDF on 28<sup>th</sup> September, yet the SSPDF CDF is subject to a travel ban, since July 2015.

This response is an addendum to the preliminary response provided to the PoE, vide Reference UN-NY/TECH/38 dated 7<sup>th</sup> November, 2024

**2.0 BACKGROUND**

Some of the major principles of Uganda's foreign policy include peaceful co-existence and respect for international law and treaty obligations. In this regard, the Government of Uganda values, and attaches great importance to a harmonious existence with all its neighbors. The Government also values

and respects the importance the promotion of regional and international peace and security. It is in Uganda's national interest to work for peace.

In this regard, the Government of Uganda continues to cooperate closely with all its neighbors, including the Republic of South Sudan towards promoting and sustaining peace. Indeed, peace in South Sudan is not only good for the country, it is equally good for Uganda, especially as it facilitates trade and movement of people, good and services.

Uganda is also an active member of the region and the international community working towards the restoration and maintenance of peace and security in South Sudan. As Guarantors to the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), the Government of Uganda is closely monitoring its implementation and supports the democratic aspirations of the peace partners and the people of South Sudan. Uganda is also actively involved in the activities of:

- i) The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC) which is responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement and the mandate and tasks of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), including the adherence of the Parties to the agreed timelines and implementation schedule; and
- ii) The Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM), responsible for monitoring and verifying the implementation of the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (PCTSA), as laid out in Chapter II of the Agreement.

At a bilateral level, Uganda and South Sudan, in the spirit of good neighborliness, and as members of the East African Community, continue to look for a solution to the occasional insecurity issues arising from delayed border reaffirmation and demarcation. Severally, there have been skirmishes between the people of Uganda and South Sudan in these border areas, especially around the Ugandan districts of Yumbe and Moyo. Sometimes, regrettably, the two armies have been involved, and or called upon to address these skirmishes.

In addition to the efforts above, Uganda and South Sudan have historically collaborated and indeed worked together to address the menacing challenges arising from Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), based in the Central African Republic. Indeed, following the designation of the LRA as a terrorist organization by the African Union Peace and Security Council,

Uganda worked jointly with the affected regional neighbors, including South Sudan, through the African Union Regional Task Force on the LRA. While the LRA threat to Uganda and the region has lessened over the years, it still remains an issue of concern for the region, especially Central African Republic and the territories of the countries bordering Central African Republic.

The responses by the Government of Uganda below, therefore, should be read and appreciated in line with this background.

### **3.0 RESPONSES TO THE REQUESTS**

#### **3.1 UPDF Presence in South Sudan**

The Government of Uganda has taken note of the reminder by the PoE regarding the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 2428 (2018), wherein, Member States are required to “take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the territory of South Sudan from or through their territories or by their nationals, ...arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned; and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related material....”.

Following the inquiry from the PoE, the Government of Uganda has also taken cognizance of the exemptions related to the arms embargo on South Sudan, in relation to “arms and related material, as well as technical training and assistance, to or in support of the African Union Regional Task Force intended solely for regional operations to counter the Lord's Resistance Army, as notified in advance to the Committee”. The Government has also particularly noted the need to notify the Committee for any such operations.

While the operation against the LRA was not under the auspices of the AU Regional Task Force, this exemption recognizes the menacing danger the LRA continues to pose in the region. The Government also recognizes the importance of restricting the distribution and sharing of information for such intelligence-led operations, and commits to undertake appropriate consultations with the Committee going forward.

With regard to allegations of incursion into South Sudan by the UPDF, leading to death, detention, and/or harassment of South Sudanese civilians and security forces, the Government of Uganda wishes to state the following:

- i) The UPDF has no policy of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Any incursions that may have been recorded was in line with the border demarcation issues outlined in the background above.
- ii) The UPDF is renowned in the region, and indeed globally, as one of the most professional and disciplined armies, and has consistently endeavored to protect people's rights, in accordance with the provisions of humanitarian law. The reported death, detention and/or harassment of South Sudanese civilians, therefore, is beyond the methods of work of the UPDF as an institution. The Government would appreciate receipt of the photographs and videos the PoE is reported to have to enable further investigations and appropriate action.

### **3.2 Bar Aviation**

The preliminary response provided by the Mission, as referenced in the introduction above, is adequate.

### **3.3 Meeting between the Uganda and South Sudan Chiefs of Defence Forces**

The Government of Uganda takes note of the information that has been provided that Gen. Santiago Deng Wol, the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) of the South Sudan People's Defence Forces, is a travel-ban sanctioned individual.

The Government also notes that the sanctions regime on travel bans provides for exemptions, including, "where the Committee determines, on a case-by-case basis, that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in South Sudan and stability in the region".

It must, however, be registered that the sanctioning of the Chief of Defence Forces of South Sudan is not a fact that has been known to, or specifically brought to the attention of, the Government of Uganda. Had the decision to place the CDF of that country under a travel ban been preceded by consultations with the key regional stakeholders, i.e., those directly affected by the consequences of such decisions, the Government of Uganda would have opposed it, aware that such a restriction hampers regional peace efforts and, hence contributes to the perpetuation of conflict in that country and, potentially in the region.

The Government of Uganda, thus, calls for a more transparent, consultative and practical sanctioning process, as well as effective protocols for the continuous updating, reviewing and disseminating to UN member State governments of decisions taken by UN sanctioning bodies or mechanisms.

Accordingly, while the Government of Uganda regrets the omission to consult with and/or inform the Committee in advance of Gen, Deng Wol the Chief of Defence Forces of South Sudan's visit to Uganda, it underscores the need for the Sanctions regime to be cognizant of the need to further the objective of peace and stability in the region, which is dependent on continuous and effective engagement with the key players.

Consequently, Uganda and South Sudan inevitably maintain a security cooperative and consultative mechanism, aimed at addressing pressing joint security concerns and interests. The Chiefs of Defence Forces, as the leaders and commanders of the two armies, regularly consult as appropriate. This time, it was vital and critical, for national security reasons, to have face-to-face interactions, solely for the purpose of addressing security issues between the two countries, whose possibility was, indeed, envisaged by the spirit of the sanctions exemption highlighted above. In Uganda's and the region's present circumstances, and if regional peace and security is to be cultivated and maintained for the benefit of the people of Uganda and of the region, there is no way Uganda can avoid working with the CDF of South Sudan – if we are fortunate that they agree and are willing to work with us.

#### **4.0 CONCLUSION**

The Government of the Republic of Uganda reaffirms its readiness to enhance its cooperation with the PoE and Sanctions Committee on South Sudan towards the promotion of international peace and security in the country.

**MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA,  
NOVEMBER, 2024**

**Annex 17: Statement concerning the formation of the United People's Alliance (UPA),  
9 January 2025**



**UNITED PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE (UPA)**

UPA/001/25/1

9<sup>th</sup> January 2025

**DECLARATION**

We, the undersigned leaders of the South Sudan Opposition Movement Alliance (SSOMA), comprising the Real – Sudan People's Liberation Movement (R-SPLM), South Sudan United Front/Army (SSUF/A); South Sudan United National Alliance (SSUNA), comprising the South Sudan People's Movement/Army (SSPM/A), National People's Movement (NPM), Upper Nile People Liberation Front (UNPLF); and National Salvation Front - Revolutionary Command Council (NAS-RCC) have decided to consolidate our unity.

We, the Opposition Parties currently engaged in the sustained negotiations in search for peace with the government of the Republic of South Sudan in the Tumaini Initiative under the auspices and mediation of the government of the Republic of Kenya, do hereby announce the formation of the United People's Alliance (UPA) on this historic 9<sup>th</sup> day of January 2025 in commemoration of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9<sup>th</sup> of January 2005, and the exercise of self-determination by the people of South Sudan to finally achieve Independence on 9<sup>th</sup> of July 2011.

The UPA calls on all the people of South Sudan, other Opposition Parties and Stakeholders to unite and intensify the struggle to achieve peace and good governance using all means possible to end the immense suffering of our people and the relentless political instability induced by the current regime in Juba. Our motherland is in danger of disintegration; it is collapsing into chaos and disorder as a direct result of leadership failure. The country is afflicted with multiple crises, where our people are dying of hunger and diseases without the failed regime moving a finger or uttering a word. Our people are yearning for peace while the corrupt regime in Juba keeps obstructing peace and holding onto power illegitimately through several senseless extensions.

Finally, our lofty goal is a united, peaceful, just, and prosperous new South Sudan for all its citizens irrespective of clan, tribe, region, religion, or gender. We, therefore, aspire to build a homeland in which all South Sudanese shall live in peace and harmony and to which they all belong and pledge undivided allegiance.

S&R

Signed:

South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA)

  
General Pa'gan Awut Okiech


Leader of Real SPLM



General Paul Malong Awan

Chairman & C-in-C, South Sudan  
United Front Army (SSUFA)


South Sudan United National Alliance (SSUNA)

 9/1/2025

Lt. General Stephen Binyang

Chairman, SSUNA and C-in-C

National Salvation Front – Revolution Command Council (NAS-RCC)

  
Lt. General Mario Loko Thomas Jada

Chairman and C-in-C NAS-RCC.

**Annex 18: United People's Alliance Interim National Leadership Committee, 13 January 2025**



**OFFICE OF THE CHAIRPERSON**

UPA/002/25/1

13<sup>th</sup> January 2025

**INTERIM NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE  
(INLC)**

Pursuant to the Resolutions of the 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the Leadership of the founding constituent organizations of United People's Alliance (UPA), the members of UPA Interim National Leadership Committee (INLC) are as follows:

- |                               |  |
|-------------------------------|--|
| 1. Gen. Pa'gan Amum Okiech    | Chairperson                              |
| 2. Gen. Paul Malong Awan      | 1 <sup>st</sup> Deputy Chairperson       |
| 3. Gen. Mario Loku Thomas     | 2 <sup>nd</sup> Deputy Chairperson       |
| 4. Gen. Stephen Buay Rolnyang | Chief of General Staff of Unified Forces |
| 5. Hon. Lual Dau Marach       | Secretary-General                        |
| 6. Dr. Matur Gorjok Gak       | Member                                   |
| 7. Gen. Henry Oyai Nyago      | Member                                   |

Issued under my hand this 13<sup>th</sup> day of January 2025

**Gen. Pa'gan Amum Okiech**  
Chairperson & Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C)  
UPA Unified Forces

**Annex 19: Announcement of promotion and appointment of Stephen Buay Rolnyang,  
19 January 2025**



**UNITED PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE (UPA)**

**OFFICE OF THE CHAIRPERSON**

**UPA/006/25/1**

**19<sup>th</sup> January 2025**

**Re- Promotion of the UPA Chief of General Staff to the rank of General**

Pursuant to the resolution of the UPA interim National Leadership Committee (INLC) and General Command Council (GCC), Lt. General Stephen Buay Rolnyang, the Chief of General Staff of the UPA Unified Forces is hereby promoted to the rank of General with effect from 19/1/2025.

*Signed under my hand this 19<sup>th</sup> day of January 2025*

**Gen. Pa'gan Amum Okiech**  
Chairperson, UPA &  
Commander-in-chief, Unified Forces

## Annex 20: Establishment of UPA military Fronts, 19 January 2025



### UNITED PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE (UPA)

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRPERSON

UPA/005/25/1

19<sup>th</sup> January 2025

#### Re-Establishment of the UPA Military Fronts

Pursuant to the resolution of the UPA General Command Council (GCC), the following UPA Fronts are established effective from 20/1/2025 as hereunder:

1. **1<sup>st</sup> Front:** The UPA first Front shall cover the areas of Central, Eastern and Western Equatoria states with the following zonal commands of the unified forces under the first Front:
  - 1.1. **Zone-1:** Central Equatoria state.
  - 1.2. **Zone-2:** Eastern Equatoria State.
  - 1.3. **Zone-3:** Western Equatoria State.
2. **2<sup>nd</sup> Front:** The UPA second Front shall cover the areas of Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states with the following zonal command of the unified forces under the second Front:
  - 2.1. **Zone-4:** Jonglei State
  - 2.2. **Zone-5:** Upper Nile State.
  - 2.3. **Zone-6:** Unity State.
3. **3<sup>rd</sup> Front:** The UPA third Front shall cover the areas of Northern Bhar El Ghazal, Warrap, Western Bhar El Ghazal and Lakes states with the following zonal commands of the unified forces under the third Front:
  - 3.1. **Zone-7:** Northern Bhar El Ghazal State.
  - 3.2. **Zone-8:** Warrap State.
  - 3.3. **Zone-9:** Western Bhar El Ghazal State.
  - 3.4. **Zone-10:** Lakes State.

*Signed under my hand this 19th day of January 2025*

*Gen. Pa'gan Amum Okiech*

Chairperson, UPA & Commander-in-chief, Unified Forces

## Annex 21: Communique of 8 February 2025 concerning the Tumaini Initiative

*Tumaini Initiative*



### COMMUNIQUE OF 8 FEBRUARY 2025 BY THE HIGH-LEVEL MEDIATION FOR SOUTH SUDAN (TUMAINI INITIATIVE)

The High-Level Mediation for South Sudan (Tumaini Initiative) issues the following brief on the status of the process:

1. Since May 2024, the Tumaini Initiative has been convened in Nairobi, Kenya, at the request of H.E President Salva Kiir Mayardit of the Republic of South Sudan to H.E President William Samoei Ruto of the Republic of Kenya, in order to reach out to the hold-out groups and other opposition members non-signatory to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), in order to achieve an inclusive and sustainable peace and democratic transformation.
2. The mediation has been ongoing for ten months and has been co-chaired by IGAD and the Community of Sant'Egidio, who previously held this brief.
3. During the process, several bilateral consultative missions have been undertaken by the mediation to Juba, South Sudan and Rome, Italy for consultations with hold-out groups, the South Sudanese Presidency, and other stakeholders.
4. Pertinent to this negotiation are the R-ARCSS, the Declaration of Commitment signed by the Parties and Stakeholders on 16<sup>th</sup> May 2024, and the Tumaini Protocols.



5. The eight Tumaini Protocols were developed through a process of sustained negotiations and had been agreed by the Parties and Stakeholders to include:
  - a. Trust and Confidence Building,
  - b. Permanent Ceasefire, Security Arrangements and Reforms,
  - c. Humanitarian Access and Support,
  - d. Communal Conflicts, Armed Civilians, and Land Disputes,
  - e. Economic Recovery, Resources, and Financial Management Reforms,
  - f. Justice Sector Reform, Transitional Justice and Accountability,
  - g. Permanent Constitution Making Process, and
  - h. Guarantors;

Only the Protocol on Responsibility Sharing was outstanding.

6. Following this agreement, the RTGONU Delegation retreated to Juba for consultations in August 2024, during which time the R-ARCSS was extended for another two-year period.
7. H.E President William Samoei Ruto and H.E President Salva Kir Mayardit met in Juba on 6<sup>th</sup> November 2024 and issued a Joint Communiqué in which they guided that the protocols should be concluded and that responsibility sharing should be negotiated, which was to have been finalized within two weeks.
8. When the RTGONU Delegation returned to Nairobi, it was with a substantially different composition and therefore negotiations restarted afresh.
9. Finally, an agenda was adopted in January 2025 to include:
  - a. the Negotiating Parties,
  - b. the Root Causes of the Conflict in South Sudan,
  - c. the Relationship between R-ARCSS and the Tumaini Protocols, and
  - d. Responsibility Sharing.



10. The root causes of the conflict were extensively deliberated through a joint technical committee, summarizing them as:
  - a. Political, Governance and Leadership Crisis,
  - b. Power Struggle,
  - c. Structural and Institutional Weaknesses,
  - d. Economic Crisis and Resource Mismanagement,
  - e. Insecurity and Militarization of Society,
  - f. Lack of Social Cohesion and Historical Factors, and
  - g. External and Geopolitical Influences.
11. It has been acknowledged throughout the negotiations that the implementation of R-ARCSS is ongoing but faces challenges.
12. Given the acute human insecurity and humanitarian crisis in South Sudan, the Mediation believes that actions must be taken for there to be effective mechanisms of implementation.
13. The Mediation is of the view that there are three priority areas of critical importance necessary to ending the perpetual transition in South Sudan, and to ushering in a new dispensation.
14. These priority areas are:
  - a. the unification of forces and security sector reforms,
  - b. the permanent constitution making process, and
  - c. the holding of free, fair, credible and transparent elections.
15. The RTGONU Delegation now requests to adjourn the mediation.

The Mediation appreciates the continued leadership and support of the Government of Kenya, IGAD, and the Community of Sant'Egidio on behalf of the people of South Sudan.



Lt. Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo (Rtd)  
**CHIEF MEDIATOR**  
**NAIROBI**

## Annex 22: UPA statement on “root causes” of conflict in South Sudan, 8 February 2025



February 8, 2025

The root causes of the conflict in South Sudan can be summarized into two: 1) *Strategic Leadership Failure* and, 2) *Power Struggle*. These two main root causes were expanded to 17 root causes by a joint technical committee composed of UPA members, the Government of delegation of South Sudan, and the Stakeholders. Below is an expansion of the original two root causes.

### **1) LEADERSHIP FAILURE**

- a. Political stalemate
- b. Lack of constitutionalism and violations of the constitution and agreements:
- c. Ethnicization and militarization of politics
- d. Politicization of ethnicity and the military
- e. Obstruction of democratic practices
- f. Abuse of power and injustices
- g. National government interference in state and local government affairs
- h. Lack of patriotism
- i. Perpetual transitions
- j. Lack of political will
- k. Unaddressed historical grievances
- l. Kleptocracy
- m. Liberation entitlement
- n. Lack of trust among the political leaders and military commanders
- o. Public apathy
- p. Discrimination in society and inequitable representation in government

### **2) POWER STRUGGLE**

### **3) STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES**

- a) Fragile state
- b) Weak institutions

### **4) ECONOMIC CRISIS AND RESOURCE MISMANAGEMENT**

- a. Persistent poverty
- b. Land grievances
- c. Pastoral-farmers conflicts
- d. Environmental Degradation
- e. Institutionalized corruption

**5) INSECURITY AND MILITARIZATION**

- a. Insecurity
- b. Lack of professional national army and organized forces
- c. Impunity and lack of accountability in the security sector

**6) LACK OF SOCIAL COHESION AND HISTORICAL FACTORS**

- a. Trauma Legacy of colonialism
- a. Marginalization of women in public life
- b. Marginalization of Youth in Public Life
- c. Abduction of women and children.
- d. Illiteracy and inadequate civic education
- e. Communal Border disputes
- f. Ethnic polarization
- g. Culture of violence

**7) EXTERNAL AND GEO-POLITICAL INFLUENCES**

- a. Vested regional and international interests
- b. Smuggling of natural resources
- c. Misguided Foreign Policy

### Annex 23: Rifles originating in Sudan retrieved in 2024/2025

Probable UTAS 512 rifle



HUSAN Arms MKA 556 rifle



Molot Vepr 1V-E tactical rifle



HUSAN Arms MKA rifle



BRG 55 rifle



Probable UTAS 512 rifle



Rifle seized by the South Sudanese security services in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State in 2025



Source: South Sudanese security officials

BRG 55 5.56x45 mm assault rifle



Source: <https://brgdefence.com/en/products/brg55-infantry-rifle/>

↓  
RSF soldier holding a BRG 55 rifle with an identical scope, 2024.



Source: Photograph courtesy of Amnesty International

BRG 55 assault rifle carried by RSF troops in Darfur, 2024



Source: Amnesty International, New weapons fuelling the Sudan conflict, 25 July 2024


Seemingly SAF captured brand new #Turkey-made System Defence R56 assault rifle. It was very likely smuggled from #Yemen (if not; #Libya).

System Defence R56 rifle in SAF hands  
 Excerpt from a video published on 19 February 2025

Source:  
[https://x.com/war\\_noir/status/1892188961080279208](https://x.com/war_noir/status/1892188961080279208)

Note: The rifle probably came through legal dealers in Khartoum, Sudan. 56 rifles were exported directly from Turkey to South Sudan in 2022, intended for the civilian market.

## Annex 24: Mi-24 helicopters stationed at Juba and Malakal airports



**Annex 25: Mi-24 attack helicopter on a road in Bor on 20 October 2024**

A screenshot of a social media post from Sudanspost.com. The post includes a header with the website URL, a 'Always open' link, and a 'Not yet rated (4 Reviews)' section. Below this is a 'Photos' section with a 'See all photos' link. A large thumbnail image shows the Mi-24 helicopter parked on a road. Below the thumbnail are several smaller thumbnail images showing various scenes, including people and other aircraft. At the bottom of the post are interaction metrics: 36 likes, 6 comments, and 5 shares. There is also a 'View more comments' link and a comment from a user named 'tzarious Jamal'.

Source: Pictures circulated on social media in South Sudan and obtained from confidential sources.

**Annex 26: Two Mi-24 attack helicopters at Malakal airport on 24 February 2025**



Confidential source

**Annex 27: 14.5mm caliber gun fired during an SSPDF Tiger Division exercise**



Screenshot of a video published on 31 December 2024, available from:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uY39SwCncHE>

**Annex 28: Excerpt from an RNP news release on 11 October 2024 about the joint training of Rwandan and South Sudanese police officers**



October 11, 2024



## Rwanda, South Sudan complete joint Police training

Some 222 Police officers from Rwanda National Police (RNP) and South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS), on Friday, October 11, completed joint training in Aviation Security and Public Order Management.

The trainees for the two-month courses include 102 from Rwanda and 120 from South Sudan.

At least 99 Police officers, including 60 from South Sudan and 39 from Rwanda, completed Aviation Security course conducted at the Counter Terrorism Training Centre (CTTC) Mayange in Bugesera District.

Other 123 officers--63 from Rwanda and 60 from South Sudan--were trained in Public Order Management at the Police Training School (PTS) Gishari in Rwamagana District.

The Inspector General of Police (IGP) CG Felix Namuhoranye, while speaking at the closing of the courses at the Police Training School, thanked the leadership of South Sudan National Police Service for the trust in the RNP to partner in capacity building.

"These joint training is a testament to our mutual dedication to strengthening public safety and security," IGP Namuhoranye said.

Source: <https://police.gov.rw/media/news-detail/news/rwanda-south-sudan-complete-joint-police-training0/#:~:text=Rwanda%20National%20Police&text=The%20trainees%20for%20the%20two,CTTC>

**Annex 29: Photographs of a joint training of Rwandan and South Sudanese police officers in Rwanda between August and October 2024**

Source: <https://police.gov.rw/media/news-detail/news/rwanda-south-sudan-complete-joint-police-training0/#:~:text=Rwanda%20National%20Police&text=The%20trainees%20for%20the%20two,CTTC>

### Annex 30: Explosion at Malual-Chaat barracks on 12 February 2025

**Malual-Chaat barracks on fire on the night of 12 February 2025**



**122 mm rocket shells photographed by residents of the Suk Zero neighborhood on 12 and 13 February 2025**




Source: Photographs widely circulated on social media. See also Bor TV, 12 February 2025:  
<https://www.facebook.com/armyccogecofficial>.

### Annex 31: Logging in Morobo County and elsewhere in Central Equatoria State

Reproduced with permission from confidential sources














**Annex 32: Memorandum of Understanding, Department of Forestry and logging company, 11 December 2023**



- The second party agrees to pay the sum of ~~500~~ USD per a truck to County authority through the Forestry Department.
- The first party here referred to as the Forestry Department and County Administration, upholds the terms of the contract agreed upon by the two parties.

**Obligations of the Second Party.**

In the process of carrying out the above practices, the company shall have to comply to the above subject matter.

The two parties have hereby sat and concluded a MOU that serves as a frame work basing on the approval granted to carry out the underlined activity.

Finally, that the MOU text include conditions and terms of the agreement have been correctly and transparently articulated to satisfaction of both parties.


Find here in the signatories and attached is the copy of the approval.

A/ Director of Forestry  
Forestry Department,  
Kajo-Keji County.

Managing Director  
Company Authority.


Executive Director  
Kajo-Keji County Administration.

Cc: Hon. Commissioner Kajo-Keji County.  
Cc: Director General, Directorate of Forestry Hqs-Juba.  
Cc: Director of Afforestation, Directorate of Forestry Hqs-Juba.  
Cc: File.



passed through  
Hon. Commissioner KJK  
Phamnel Danno  
11/12/2023

## Annex 33: Ministerial Order No 1/2025 prohibiting logging, 20 January 2025



Signed under my hand at the Ministry of Environment and Forestry of the  
Republic of South Sudan in Juba this 20<sup>th</sup> day of January 2025.



**Josephine Napwon Cosmos**  
**Minister of Environment and Forestry**  
**Republic of South Sudan-Juba**



Cc- Secretary General of the Government of South Sudan  
Cc- State Governors

## Annex 34: Morobo County order banning illegal logging, 13 June 2024

 <b>MOROBO COUNTY</b> <hr/> <p style="margin: 0;">NO.RSS/CES/MC/OC/47.A.1</p> <p style="margin: 0;">"The Commissioner"</p> <p style="margin: 0;">Date: <u>13<sup>th</sup> June, 2024</u></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>MOROBO COUNTY LOCAL GOVERNMENT</u></b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>PROVISIONAL ORDER NO.009/2024 FOR BANNING OF ILLEGAL LOGGING AND LARGE SCALE CUTTING OF TREES FOR CHARCOAL IN MOROBO COUNTY 2024 A.D.</u></b></p> <p><b>1. <u>TITLE AND COMMENCEMENT:</u></b></p> <p>This Order shall be cited as Provisional Order No.009/2024 for banning of illegal Logging and Large scale cutting of trees for Charcoal in Morobo County – 2024 A.D.</p> <p><b>2. <u>THE ORDER:</u></b></p> <p>In exercise of powers conferred upon me vide Republican Decree No.11/2021 of the president of the Republic of south Sudan read together with provisions of section 52, appendix III part VI of the Local Government Act, 2009;</p> <p>I, <b>JOSEPH MAWA JOHN OKUBA</b>, Commissioner of Morobo County; do hereby issue this provisional order for the banning of illegal Logging and Large scale cutting of trees for Charcoal in Morobo County with effect from the date of signing this order.</p> <p><b>3. <u>FINES AND PENALTIES:</u></b></p> <p>Any person or group of persons who contravene this provisional order is liable for the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Confiscation of the truck, machines, Charcoal, timber, logs, tools and other equipment used in the process.</li> <li>2. A fine of SSP 3,000,000 or imprisonment for a period of Nine months or both for the owner of the forest products, driver of the truck and machine operator.</li> <li>3. A fine of SSP100, 000 or Imprisonment for six months or both for any official, landlord and chief duly involved in</li> </ul> <div style="text-align: center; margin-top: 10px;">  <p style="font-size: small; margin-top: 5px;">Tel: +211(0) 925 188 828   +211(0) 920 988 988   Email: onewecon@gmail.com</p> </div>


issuance of any illegal letter of approval without the consent of the County authority.

**4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ORDER:**

The County Executive Director, Payam Directors, Chiefs, security agencies and citizens of Morobo County are directed to implement this order.

Issued under my hand by the seal of Morobo County Local Government this Thursday the thirteenth date of the Month of June in the year of the lord Two Thousand and Twenty Four, A.D.

Signed,



**HON. JOSEPH MAWA JOHN OKUBA  
COMMISSIONER, MOROBO COUNTY.**

Place: RSS/CES/MC/MOROBO

Date: 13/06/2024

## Annex 35: Charcoal production in Morobo County, Central Equatoria State

Images reproduced with permission from confidential source in Morobo County, Central Equatoria State

### Charcoal production:



**Charcoal loading and export**



### **Annex 36: Export of bags of charcoal to Uganda, various dates in January 2025**



Customer Transaction Receipt											
314 Bragi	<i>(Closed)</i>										
314 Bragi	<i>Chitwan</i>										
											
<b>Customer Officer:</b>											
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>AMOUNT</th> <th>AMOUNT</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Due Fee</td> <td>6.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Chitwan Entry</td> <td>12.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Other Services</td> <td>10.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>TOTAL</b></td> <td><b>28.00</b></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		AMOUNT	AMOUNT	Due Fee	6.00	Chitwan Entry	12.00	Other Services	10.00	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>28.00</b>
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Other Services	10.00										
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>28.00</b>										
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AMOUNT	AMOUNT										
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Amount in Words	Six Rupees Only										
											
											
											
											

## Annex 37: Partial timeline of disruption to South Sudan's oil exports

On 10 February 2024, the Bashayer Pipeline Company (BAPCO) pipeline that carries Dar Blend crude oil from the oil fields in Upper Nile State, South Sudan, operated by the Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC), ruptured near pumping station number 5 in Sudan. This was followed by gelling in the pipeline between pumping stations number 4 and 5, as the crude oil in the pipeline cooled.

On 16 March 2024, Sudan's Ministry of Energy and Petroleum declared force majeure as a result of the damage.

On 18 March 2024, DPOC also declared force majeure, suspending production.

On 19 December 2024, South Sudan's Ministry of Petroleum notified DPOC that it should resume the production. This followed several meetings between South Sudanese officials; Sudanese officials in Port Sudan; and BAPCO. During these meetings, South Sudanese authorities were assured that the pipeline had been repaired and would soon be operational.

In response, on 23 December 2024, DPOC welcomed this development but raised several concerns about the proposed schedule for resumed production.<sup>297</sup> Their concerns included the ongoing force majeure measures declared by Sudan's Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and DPOC, as well as concerns about security and financing.<sup>298</sup>

On 4 January 2025, Sudan's Ministry of Energy and Petroleum announced that the force majeure measures had been lifted further to "security arrangements" made by both the governments of Sudan and South Sudan, as well as discussions with BAPCO.<sup>299</sup>

Subsequently, on 6 January 2025, South Sudan's Ministry of Petroleum instructed DPOC to resume production on 8 January 2025,<sup>300</sup> followed by a public announcement by the Minister of Petroleum on 7 January 2025.<sup>301</sup>

Around 25 January 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), regained control of the al-Jaili refinery, north of Khartoum, in Sudan, from the Rapid Support Forces. Both the pipelines that carry Nile blend from the GPOC and SPOC operations in Unity State and the Ruweng Administrative Area, as well as the BAPCO pipeline that carries Dar Blend from the DPOC operations in Upper Nile State, South Sudan, pass near this facility.

Around 4 February 2025, SAF forces recaptured Al-Aylafun from RSF, where a significant BAPCO pumping station is located.

On 7 February 2025, the first 27 (out of 765) wells were restarted by DPOC. By 8 March, 563 of the 765 wells were operational.

Around 15 February 2025, SAF forces also claimed to have recaptured the BAPCO pumping station number 3 in Naima, in White Nile State, Sudan.

<sup>297</sup> Document on file with the Panel.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid.


<sup>299</sup> Documents on file with the Panel.

<sup>300</sup> Ibid.


<sup>301</sup> Statement by the Ministry of Petroleum, January 2025, on file with the Panel.

## **Annex 38: Fee payments**

Based on a review of loan documents by the Panel, fees in the region of 1% to 5%, often payable to local South Sudanese companies, are often part of loan agreements or pre-payment agreements for future oil cargos. In this case, a 3.5% arrangement fee, equivalent to \$3.5 million. In another document reviewed by the Panel, a \$15 million “arrangement fee” was paid.



**Annex 39: Payment authorisation for supply of food to SSPDF Tiger Division, February 2024**



Annex 40: Payment authorisation for renovation of a building, 25 September 2024

**Republic of South Sudan (RSS)**  
  
**MINISTRY OF FINANCE & PLANNING (MoFP)**  
1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary of Finance

**REF: MFP/RSS/J/20-D-1.** **Date: 25<sup>th</sup> September, 2024**

**Hon Governor,**  
Bank of South Sudan  
Juba

**SUBJECT: AUTHORIZATION TO PAY [REDACTED] 810,563.90 FROM A/C**  
**NO. 00269210001024**

Dear Hon. Governor,

Reference to the above mentioned subject, we write to authorize the Bank of South Sudan to pay to [REDACTED] sum of **USD 810,563.90 (Only Eight Hundred Ten Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Three United States Dollars and Ninety Cents)** cash from account **00269210001024**. Being funds required to meet cost of renovation.

Your usual cooperation is highly appreciated and thanks.

**Garang Majak Bol**  
1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary of Finance

**Dhel Mayuol Tong**  
Director General of Accounts

**MINISTRY OF FINANCE & PLANNING**  
**RSS-JUBA**

Cc: Hon. Minister of Finance & Planning  
Cc: Hon. Deputy Minister of Finance & Planning  
Cc: Hon. Undersecretary of Planning  
Cc: Director of Accounts  
Cc: File

## Annex 41: Payment for construction of Presidential Palace, 22 November 2023



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM**

RSS/MOP/J/O/U/11/23/63

22<sup>nd</sup> November 2023

**Hon. Malual Tap Diew**  
1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary of Finance,  
Ministry of Finance and Planning  
RSS/Juba

**FILE**

**SUBJECT: PAYMENT OF USD 9,229,644.86 TO RAM COMPANY FOR J1  
CONSTRUCTION**

**Hon. 1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary,**  
Commitments made officially by previous Ministers are a responsibility of the Government which shall continue to hang on unless addressed once and for all.

Because of the attached commitment letter of the former Minister of Finance and Planning Dr. Dier Tong Ngor, Sahara Energy Retained 20% amounting to **USD 9,229,644.86** of September 2023 Dar Blend Cargo the proceeds of which were to be paid to Ram Company for J1 construction.

Therefore, I am requesting you to kindly refund **USD 9,229,644.86** to Ram Company for construction of J1, since the amount went to repayment of the loan of the Ministry of Finance and Planning.

Please, accept the assurance of my highest regards and consideration.

**Mayen Wol Jong**  
Undersecretary  
Ministry of Petroleum,

22 NOV 2023

Cc

- : Hon. Minister of Petroleum
- : DG. For Petroleum Authority
- : DG for Admin and Finance
- : MD Ram Company
- : File.

The Undersecretary

## Annex 42: Authorisation of \$80,000 payment for security, 22 January 2025

 <p><b>EQUITY</b> EQUITY BANK (SOUTH) SUDAN LIMITED TEL: 211-911-222-2222</p>	<p>Date: <u>22/01/2025</u></p> <p><u>Will</u> 68-211</p> <p>USD 80,000 =</p> <p>NRA - OPERATIONS OPEN CENT RETENTION</p> <p>1.2025</p> <p>PLAQUE DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS LINE</p> <p>Notify</p> <p>1 USD</p> <p>#00055556821114560-1211311666#</p>	 <p>South Sudan Revenue Authority Operational &amp; Financial Management</p>
<p><b>James Nyenget Bileku</b> US Dollars <u>Eighty Thousand</u></p> <p>NRA - OPERATIONS OPEN CENT RETENTION</p> <p>Check Number: _____ Date: _____ Account Number: _____</p> <p>80,000 USD TRANSFER MADE FROM THE National Revenue Authority Operations (2% Retention) being facilitation of Juba-Nimule highway security protection of the passengers and goods coming to the Republic of South Sudan.</p> <p>The Account details are as follows:</p> <p>Account Name: NRA-Operation (2% Retention)      Debit Account Number: 2011211311666      Cheque No: 000555      Currency: US Dollar (USD)      Payable: James Nyenget Bileku      Nationality Certificate: 000632695</p> <p>Please accept the assurance of our highest regards.</p>		
<p>Sign:  <b>Santino Ayok Riel</b>          As/ Deputy Commissioner for Finance &amp; Admin          South Sudan Revenue Authority</p>	<p>Sign:  <b>Andrina Abuk Jenaro</b>          Head of management Accounts          South Sudan Revenue Authority</p>	<p>Kir Yor Lual          Commissioner for Corporate Service          South Sudan Revenue Authority</p>
		
<p>South Sudan Revenue Authority Headquarters Jebel Area, Juba, South Sudan          Email: <a href="mailto:admin@nra.gov.ss">admin@nra.gov.ss</a></p>		



Republic of South Sudan  
South Sudan Revenue Authority

Date: 22<sup>nd</sup> Jan. 2025

Hon. Küir Yor Luai

Commissioner of Corporate Service

South Sudan Revenue Authority (SSRA) HQ, Juba

Dear Hon. Küir,

**SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR 80,000 \$ EIGHT THOUSND USD.**

With due respect to the directives from the Commissioner General office of South Sudan Revenue Authority (SSRA), the Department of Finance is mandated to request the above-mentioned amount for the facilitation of Juba Nimule highway security protection of the passengers and goods to coming to the Republic of South Sudan.

Therefore, your approval and consideration will highly be appreciated for this emergency request.

Sincerely,

Santino Ayok Ring,

DCFA, SSRA HQ.

*M. Ayok Ring*

22.1.2025

Hon

II DCFA  
Approved to pay!

16-11  
22/1/2025

III ACF

Approved for payment

Ayok Ring 22.1.2025

V. ACF  
Please check &  
and pay as approved  
and directed.

22/1/2025

Headquarters Jebel Area, Juba, South Sudan

## Annex 43: Authorisation for SSP 100 million, 23 January 2025

**EQUITY**  
EQUITY BANK SOUTH SUDAN LIMITED  
KIA MAMAKAT SUPPLY CO.

Date 23/01/2025

**66-211**

**SSP 100,000,000=**

**NRA - OPERATIONS FIVE PER CENT RETENTION**

**South Sudanese Pound** One Hundred **MILLION** **00** **CENTS**

**201**

**PLEASE DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS LINE**

**\*0000613068211501111211311662\***

Reference to the above cited subject, we request your esteemed office to effect a cash withdrawal of **5 100,000,000 (SSP One Hundred Million Only)** from the NRA-Operations (5% retention) account.

The details are as follows

Account Name: National Revenue Authority-Operations (5% Retention)  
 Account Number: 2011211311662  
 Cheque No: 000613  
 Currency: South Sudanese Pounds (SSP)  
 Payable to: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nationality Certificate: 000138529

Please accept the assurance of our highest regards.

Sign: Santino Ayok Ring  
Santino Ayok Ring  
 Ag/ Deputy Commissioner for Finance & Admin  
 South Sudan Revenue Authority

Sign: Andrina Abuk Jenaro  
Andrina Abuk Jenaro  
 Head of management Accounts  
 South Sudan Revenue Authority

Kiir Yor Lual Kiir Yor Lual  
 Commissioner for Corporate Service  
 South Sudan Revenue Authority

**JAN 2025**

## Annex 44: Information about South Sudan's outstanding commercial loans

Around 2021, the Government of South Sudan made the following assessment of its outstanding commercial debts:

Republic of South Sudan external Debt													
Debt by creditor	Creditor Name	Currency	Principal	Disbursed Amount	Undisbursed Amount	Interest Rate	Interest Charged repaid	Principal repayment	Outstanding Debt	Start Date	Grace Period	Maturity <sup>a</sup>	Payments Dates
Loan codes:													
	WORLD BANK LOANS	USD	191,000,000	164,346,871	90,653,125	0%	960,691	112,630	104,714,743				
IDAH9120	Statistical Capacity Building Project	USD	9,000,000	8,282,598.94	717,401.06	1%/2%	12,015.87	132,630.16	8,119,969	15.Jan.2021	5Yrs	15.Jan.2024	15.Jan.,15 June
IDA 54010	Health Rapid Results project	USD	10,000,000	9,647,751.71	952,248.29	1%/2%	42,599.87	-	9,047,752	15.April.2024	8 yrs	15.April.2032	15.April, 15 oct
IDAH9710	Health rapid results	USD	25,000,000	22,000,000.00	3,000,000.00	1%/7%	539,860.00	-	22,000,000	15.apr.2024	Sys	15 April 24	15 April, 15 oct
IDA 52840	Safety Net	USD	21,000,000	18,733,267.91	2,246,732.09	1%/2%	144,525.26	-	18,733,268	01.Dec.2023	6Yrs	01.Dec.2029	01.June, 01 Dec
IDA 53630	EA Regional Cnstr.	USD	80,000,000	77,710,207.69	78,229,792.31	1%/2%	13,723.28	-	7,710,208	01.June.2023	Sys	01.June.2024	01.June, 01 Dec
IDA 52130	Local Government Service Delivery	USD	50,000,000	44,493,048.68	5,506,951.32	1%/2%	207,966.30	-	44,493,049	15.April.2023	5Yrs	15 April 2023-15 Oct 2052	
IMF Loans	USD		224,904,179	224,904,179					224,904,179				
IMF CRF 1	USD		52,300,000	52,300,000.00					52,300,000				
IMF CRF 2	USD		174,604,179	174,604,179.00					174,604,179				
African Development Bank			37,558,800	18,543,171	8,001,808	0%	110,110		18,543,171				
Loan codes:													
	Financial Institution Development BakLoans	Currency	11,170,000	7,600,000	3,570,000.00	0.08%	43,658.59	0	7,600,000.00	22.May.2017	10 Yrs	22 May 2027	1 February, 1 July
	NORMA-SS	USD	1,725,000	816,628	908,372.26	0.08%	33,321.07	0	816,627.71	22.May.2017	10 Yrs	22 May 2027	1 February, 1 July
	Julia power distribution and expansion	USD	14,641,800	10,128,544	4,513,255.73	0.08%	47,130.57	0	10,128,544.30	22.May.2017	10 Yrs	22 May 2027	1 February, 1 July
	Other creditors		6,027,000,000	6,027,000,000	-	0%	163,521,830	4,322,336,350	1,701,673,300				
	Sahara Energy	USD	600,000,000	600,000,000	-		28,874,536.16	471,327,789.02	128,717,211	Apr.17		Dec.19	
	Trainty Energy	USD	360,000,000	360,000,000	-		0	360,000,000	-				
	Afrexim	USD	400,000,000	400,000,000	-			211,254,737.42	188,745,764	May.2019	1YR	March, 2023 (4YRS)	
	Afrexim	USD	250,000,000	250,000,000	-			-	250,000,000	Oct.2020	1YR	April,2023 (4 YRS)	
	China Export- Import Bank	USD	150,000,000	150,000,000	-	2.00%	2,991,374.93	19,999,967.67	12,008,657	21.January.2019	5Yrs	21 Jan 2019	21 January and 21 July
	Qatar National Bank	USD	700,000,000	700,000,000	-	0%	0	114,190,661.00	385,899,339	-		June,12,2019-June 12,2027	
	ITPA	USD	3,028,000,000	3,028,000,000	-	0%	0	3,028,000,000	-				
	NASDEC	USD	539,000,000	539,000,000	-			130,655,739.11	117,608,165.20	421,391,835			
	Grand Total in USD		6,426,440,979	6,028,795,726	99,644,793	0%	185,601,431	4,772,468,959	2,931,353,901				

In January 2024, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ruled against the Republic of South Sudan and the Bank of South Sudan and in favour of Qatar National Bank, and directed the Government of South Sudan to pay an outstanding debt of \$1,021,282,210.<sup>302</sup>

In January 2025, the African Export-Import Bank sued the Government of South Sudan and the Central Bank of South Sudan for an outstanding debt of \$657 million.

The Panel has also confirmed that debts in excess of \$400 million are still owed to Nasdec General Trading.

In its report S/2024/343 the Panel also reported on an outstanding loan of \$151.97 million to the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank, which had not been disclosed in the above overview.

Additional commercial debts detailed in the above summary are also likely still outstanding.

<sup>302</sup> See the Panel's report S/2024/343.

## Annex 45: Petronas withdrawal from South Sudan

### Partial timeline of Petronas withdrawal from South Sudan

Malaysian state-owned Petronas International Corporation (Petronas), through its wholly owned local subsidiary Petronas Carigali Nile Ltd., owns substantial stakes in each of the three joint venture companies that produce oil in South Sudan. Petronas owns:

- 40% of the Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC)
- 30% of the Greater Pioneer Operating Company (GPOC)
- 67.875 of the Sudd Petroleum Operating Company (SPOC)

On 9 September 2022, Petronas informed the Government of South Sudan of its intent to sell these shares and withdraw from South Sudan. Under the terms of the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement between Petronas and the Government of South Sudan, South Sudan's National Petroleum and Gas Corporation has a 60-day period within which it can pre-empt any such transfer or shares.

On 11 December 2022, Petronas reached an agreement to sell its assets in South Sudan for \$1.25 billion to Savannah Energy WN Limited, a subsidiary of the UK-listed company Savannah Energy PLC

On 12 December 2022, Petronas sent a letter to the Government of South Sudan requesting formal approval of this transfers.

Also in December 2022, a high-level delegation of the Government of South Sudan met with Petronas executives in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

From 25 to 27 January 2023, representatives of the Government of South Sudan travelled to Lagos, Nigeria, to conduct due diligence on Savannah Energy PLC. Representatives of the company and the government also met, later, in Dubai, UAE.

On 23 January 2023, the Government of South Sudan requested a 30-day extension to the approval process, followed by a request for a 45-day extension on 9 March 2023.

On 24 October 2023, the Office of the President wrote to the Ministry of Petroleum, informing them that they should not give approval for the transaction.

On 17 November 2023, the government request a further 75 day extension.

This was followed, on 23 January 2024, by a similar letter from the Office of the President to the Ministry of Petroleum, informing them they should deny approval and request that the assets instead be transferred to the Government of South Sudan. A similar letter was sent again on 1 March 2024.

On 5 March 2024, the Government of South Sudan sent a letter to Petronas, informing them that they had rejected the transaction.

On 5 August 2024, the Ministry of Petroleum wrote a letter to Petronas stressing that they had always insisted on Nilepet assuming the shares, subject to Petronas meeting any outstanding obligations or liabilities in South Sudan and accusing Petronas of absconding from South Sudan.

On 7 August 2024, Petronas wrote to its joint venture partners notifying them of its full withdrawal from South Sudan.

On 7 August 2024, Savannah Energy Ltd stated that it had terminated its attempt to acquire the shares.

On 9 August 2024, Petronas informed the government that it intended to take the matter to the International Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.

On 26 August 2024, Petronas stated that "PETRONAS International Corporation has initiated arbitration proceedings at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute on the divestment of its operations in the Republic of South Sudan."

## Annex 46: Updates to narrative summaries

SSi.002	Simon Gatwech Dual	Simon Gatwech Dual is currently in Port Sudan, Sudan. In August 2021 he defected from the SPLM/A-IO to form the SPLM/A IO Kitgwang faction. <sup>303</sup> In February 2025, he agreed to return to Juba within one year as a Deputy Commander in Chief of the SSPDF.
SSi.004	Santino Deng Wol	In December 2024, Santino Deng Wol was removed from his position as SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces by Presidential Decree and reassigned as the Undersecretary for the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs.
SSi.006	Peter Gadet	Peter Gadet died in Khartoum, Sudan, in April 2019.
SSi.008	Paul Malong Awan	Paul Malong was removed from his position of SSPDF Chief of General Staffs in May 2017. He subsequently left South Sudan and is now in Nairobi, Kenya. He is currently the First Deputy Chairperson of the United People's Alliance (UPA), an opposition group that has not signed the 2018 peace agreement.

<sup>303</sup> See the Panel's report S/2022/359.

## Annex 47: Response to the Panel's findings from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uganda

### **RESPONSE TO ISSUES RAISED IN UN PANEL OF EXPERTS ON SOUTH SUDAN LETTER TO UGANDA PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN DATED 21<sup>ST</sup> MARCH 2025**

Reference is made to the communication from the UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan (PoE) dated 21<sup>st</sup> March 2025 to Uganda's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York. The communication advises that the following information is contained in their draft final report, and requests for a response from the Government of Uganda:

- A. The PoE notes that UPDF personnel entered South Sudan territory in early March 2025, following significant violations of the ceasefire in Western Equatoria State, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile State. The PoE further makes reference to UN SC resolution 2731 (2024) and states that the said UPDF deployment is a violation of the arms embargo as established by the resolution.
- B. The PoE further alleges that there is transit of gold, timber and charcoal illegally produced in South Sudan to Ugandan territory by private companies/individuals.

The Government of Uganda takes the opportunity to respond to the issues raised in the PoE letter (and included in their draft final report) as follows:

#### **ON UPDF DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTH SUDAN IN EARLY MARCH 2025:**

- 1. The Government of Uganda noted with concern the recent tensions and clashes in the Republic of South Sudan, specifically in Nasir and Ulang Counties in Upper Nile State, Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el-Ghazal States. This includes the clashes of 7<sup>th</sup> March 2025 in Nasir town, in which an SSPDF General and dozens of soldiers were killed after a United Nations helicopter trying to evacuate them came under attack by forces affiliated to members of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU). This incident reaffirms the PoE observation of "...significant violations of the ceasefire in Western Equatoria State, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile State."

2. Risk assessments by foreign missions and international organisations accredited to South Sudan, similarly observed a high likelihood of an escalation of tensions between the different members of the R-TGoNU, possibly resulting in full-scale civil war in the country.
3. These recent clashes, if allowed to escalate, have the potential to undermine the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), and reverse significant achievements made under the transition roadmap.
4. On 10<sup>th</sup> January 2014, the Republic of Uganda, in accordance with section 39 of the UPDF Act, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation and the Status of Forces Agreement with the Republic of South Sudan relating to the deployment of the UPDF in the territory of South Sudan.
5. On 10<sup>th</sup> March 2025, following a request by H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, and in accordance with Article 98(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda and sections 38(1)(b) and 39 of the UPDF Act, the UPDF deployed a force to the Republic of South Sudan in order to avert a security catastrophe in the region.
6. The deployment of UPDF to South Sudan will prevent the escalation of hostilities among members of the R-TGoNU and related groups, and the resulting potential rapid spread of the conflict throughout the country and by extension the entire region.
7. It will be recalled that Uganda has made a historical commitment to national, regional and international security and has been at the forefront of deploying its forces in order to achieve peace, security and stability of the region and Africa at large.
8. It will be further recalled that for many years, Uganda experienced insecurity in the northern and eastern regions of the country perpetuated by terrorist rebels, who launched their offensives from the territory of South Sudan. The Government of South Sudan subsequently allowed the UPDF to enter its territory to pursue the terrorist rebels, which

resulted in peace and security in Uganda. As such, Uganda has a responsibility to prevent a situation of protracted conflict in South Sudan that would ultimately affect Uganda's territorial integrity and national security.

9. It should also be noted that unabated insecurity within the region would provide an opportunity for regional rebel groups such as Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to mobilise, recruit, train and transform into affiliates of international terrorist associations like the Islamic State ('IS') making them a threat to regional peace and security.
10. The Republic of South Sudan is a valued regional partner to the Republic of Uganda, and destabilization in South Sudan has negative repercussions on both countries and the region including trade disruption, destruction of infrastructure, displacement of communities and influx of refugees. The Republic of Uganda hosts a large number of foreign nationals that are seeking refuge from conflicts in the region, including from the Republic of South Sudan. The Republic of Uganda will continue to exercise an open-door policy towards providing refuge to people affected by conflict in the region, while also contributing towards prevention of conflicts in the region that precipitate the increased influx of refugees.
11. The Government of Uganda adheres to the principles of non-interference in the domestic matters of a state, and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and independence. The Government of Uganda re-emphasises that the intervention of UPDF was upon the request of the Government of South Sudan, and acted to avert a crisis similar to the ongoing conflict in the Republic of Sudan.
12. On 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2025, in support of resolution of the ongoing conflict in Republic of South Sudan, and in spite of the prevailing volatile security situation, H.E. Yoweri Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda visited Juba, South Sudan and held engagements with his counterpart H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit, a demonstration of Uganda's commitment to regional peace and security.

**ON ALLEGATIONS OF TRANSIT OF GOLD, TIMBER AND CHARCOAL  
ILLEGALLY PRODUCED IN SOUTH SUDAN TO UGANDAN  
TERRITORY BY PRIVATE COMPANIES/INDIVIDUALS:**

There are no recorded incidents of transit of illegally produced gold, timber and charcoal from South Sudan to Uganda. However, it is important to note that the international border between South Sudan and Uganda is not demarcated and significant sections of the border are porous, increasing risk of small quantities of items being transported across the border without the knowledge of the authorities. We request the PoE to provide specific information about instances of transit of illegally produced goods across the border from South Sudan to Uganda, to enable the relevant authorities review them.

For information, the Uganda government has taken several steps to address the problem of transit of items illegally produced in South Sudan. Uganda Customs together with the Customs authority of South Sudan, have implemented different approaches to contain illegal activity across the border and these include but are not limited to the following;

1. Customs enforces Certificate of Origin requirement for Timber Imports. The importers of Timber are required to present a Certificate of Origin issued by the Management Authority of South Sudan for the Non-Listed Species of timber like mahogany. Through this timber not cleared by the South Sudan Authorities is not admitted into Uganda.
2. Customs Collaborates with other strategic stakeholders such as the National Forestry Authority (NFA) in regulating activities related to the importation of timber into Uganda.
3. Community involvement: Uganda Customs has adopted community involvement approaches in the fight against smuggling along the porous border through continuous sensitization meetings to enlighten the population along the borders on the dangers of smuggling.
4. Collaboration with other key stakeholders: Customs collaborates with other key stakeholders such as the UPDF especially on patrols along the border areas to detect and deter illegal activities.

5. Strategic checkpoints across major transit routes: Customs has also established checkpoints across major transit routes from South Sudan to check smuggling.
6. Use of Electronic Cargo Tracking technology to monitor Transits. For cargo declared to be for Transit through the territory of Uganda, Customs uses electronic seals to monitor in real-time the entire movement of such goods to the declared Exit points. Central Command Centre monitors any incidents, and rapid response teams are strategically positioned to respond to transit violations in real-time.
7. Use of Non-Intrusive Technology: Customs has deployed drive-through scanners across major borders in the country. This has ensured the detection of any concealments much more easily.
8. Conducting Focused Enforcement Operations: Customs also conducts regular focused operations periodically which are often coordinated in nature.

### **Conclusion**

The Government of Uganda adheres to the principles of non-interference in the domestic matters of a state, and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and independence. In this regard, the Government of Uganda values, and attaches great importance to a harmonious existence with all its neighbours. The Government also values and respects the importance of the promotion of regional and international peace and security. It is in Uganda's national interest to work for peace.

**MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
APRIL 2025**

**Annex 48: Response to the Panel's findings from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of South Sudan**

**THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**



Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation  
*Office of the Undersecretary*

Response of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGONU) to the Advance Report of the United Nations  
Panel of Experts to be Published on 1<sup>st</sup> May 2025

Submitted By



Amb. Agnes Adlino Orifa Oswaha  
Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and  
International Cooperation of the Republic of South Sudan

Juba, 8<sup>th</sup> April 2025

**JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN**

In response to the advance Report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on South Sudan to be published on 1<sup>st</sup> May 2025, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan at the outset would like to acknowledge the Panel for admitting and reflecting in the report, the multiple humanitarian and economic crises currently affecting South Sudan. The Government also acknowledges the Panel for the recognition of the efforts made by the Government and security forces of South Sudan, to protect Sudanese nationals and their properties during the protests that followed the tragic killing of South Sudanese nationals in Wad-Madani, Sudan in January 2025. Furthermore, the Panel is acknowledged for including in the report the concern raised by the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity that the ongoing economic crisis, coupled with the arms embargo imposed on the country by the UN Security Council, have substantially limited the Government's ability to implement the remaining provisions of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, in particular, the unification and deployment of security forces.

**With regard to the allegations raised in the report against South Sudan, the Government would like to state the following:**

**On point three (3) of the brief:** The Panel claims that there have been several significant violations of the ceasefire agreement during the early months of 2025. Since the Panel is not specific in its accusation of the violations alleged in both Western Bahr El Ghazal and Western Equatoria States, it warrants no response.

Concerning Upper Nile State, the violation of ceasefire in that state was perpetrated by the SPLM/A-IO, not by the South Sudan People's Defense Forces (SSPDF). On 3 March 2025, H.E. General Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan convened the meeting requested by H.E. Dr. Riek Machar Teny, the First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan, and Chairman and Commander in Chief of the SPLM/A-IO on 27<sup>th</sup> February 2025. The meeting was expanded and attended by other Vice Presidents and representatives of the parties signatory to the Revitalized Peace Agreement, including the civil society. The meeting discussed the current developments in the country and the implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement. The meeting was cordial and fruitful reached resolutions, which include inter-alia, that the White Army which sieged Nasir should withdraw back to their areas. Unfortunately, the resolutions were not honored nor respected by the SPLM/A-IO. Instead of pacifying his forces of the White Army, H.E. Dr. Riek Machar Teny, who had been in contact with his forces in Nasir, contacted and asked the Late Major-General David Majur Dak, Commander of the SSPDF forces in Nasir, to surrender to the White Army. However, the Commander heroically declined his offer. After the refusal by Commander Majur to surrender, H.E. Dr. Riek Machar ordered the White Army, one unit of his forces, to attack Nasir.

Page 2 of 5

JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN

On 4 March 2025, and upon Dr. Riek's orders, the White Army attacked and overran the army garrison in Nasir. After the fall and occupation of the city by the White Army, contacts were made by the Government and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with the First Vice President to allow air lifting of Commander David Majur and the small number of the SSPDF soldiers, who remained in two tanks. Dr. Riek accepted the plea and approved evacuation of Major-General David Dak and his forces.

On 7 March 2025, UNMISS sent two helicopters to Nasir to evacuate the stranded Commander and the remaining SSPDF soldiers. Upon landing and during the evacuation process, and despite safety assurances from Dr. Riek Machar, the White Army shot at the SSPDF soldiers being evacuated and the crew of the two helicopters, killing Major-General David Majur Dak, all his remaining soldiers, and a crew member of one helicopter. As it is clear above, the violation of the ceasefire which led to the fight in Nasir was committed by the SPLM/A-IO alone while SSPDF was acting in self-defense. Before their killing, the SSPDF soldiers and their commander were handed over to UNMISS, in this regard, they should have been respected and treated in accordance with the third Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War 1949.

Despite that, the soldiers and their commander, while in the care of the United Nations, were attacked and all killed along with one crew member of the helicopter evacuating them. For the sake of fairness, the Panel was expected to condemn the perpetrator, the SPLM/A-IO whose forces of the White Army violated the third Geneva Convention on Prisoners of war 1949, but instead has maintained silence. Lack of reflection of this fact in the report is a clear indication that the Panel is biased against the Government.

The detention of some SPLM/A-IO commanders and officials was made based on genuine and credible information concerning their involvement in the Nasir events. The arrested officials and commanders are being investigated, treated in accordance with the law, and anyone found implicated in the Nasir violence shall be tried by a competent court of law.

**Concerning point Four (4) of the brief:** Pertaining to the accusation of several ceasefire violations and failure to unify the various armed forces in South Sudan as well as their middle command structures, the Government would like to clarify that the SPLM/A-IO during the first cantonment, left the trained soldiers with weapons behind in their camps, and instead mobilized and trained civilians, and those civilians reported to cantonment sites without weapons. The imposed arms embargo

has crippled the ability of South Sudan to equip and deploy the Unified Forces. Furthermore, the SPLM/A-IO delayed and failed to submit the list of their officers to be incorporated into a unified command.

**On point five (5) of the brief:** The claim that several officials appointed by the opposition parties have been dismissed by H.E. President General Salva Kiir Mayardit is baseless. Relieve of Ministers/Senior Officials from the opposition is always made on the request of the opposition or after consultations with them. The relieve of the Governor of Western Equatoria State, Mr. Alfred Futuyo Karaba, came as a result of his intransigence and disobedience to the President and the Government's order to implement the resolution of the Governor's Forum, held in Juba in 2024, and adopted by the Cabinet, concerning the removal of all unlawful road blocks. The Chairman of the SPLM/A-IO, who was consulted and requested to nominate a replacement for the Governor, refused to do so. The removal of Mr. Alfred Futuyo is not in any case related to the alleged differences between the Government and the SPLM/A-IO, but it is wholly attributable to his character and acts. In fact, Mr. Futuyo was involved in counterfeiting and is responsible for the security incidents that took place in the state during his tenure.

**On paragraph (6) of the brief:** The claim that the presence of units of the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) in South Sudan is a violation of the arms embargo is unfounded. It is worth noting that, the Governments of the Republic of South Sudan and the Republic of Uganda collaborate in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defense in the Great Lakes Region, 2006. Besides that, there is also a military pact signed between the two Governments. The pact talks of protection of the territorial integrity of the two states, that is protection of people, land and government. Based on this pact, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) previously sent some forces to the Government of Uganda that fought side by side with the UPDF against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Now, the Government of Uganda has reciprocated by sending small technical and support units from the UPDF to South Sudan. Conclusion of such military agreements is not confined to South Sudan and Uganda, but it is a common practice of independent countries worldwide.

**On Paragraph Seven (7) of the brief:** Regarding the claim that the training of representatives of the South Sudan National Police Service in Rwanda from August to October 2024, is a violation of the arms embargo, the Government would like to assert the South Sudan National Police Service signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Rwanda National Police on Cooperation in security and training of the police. Based on this MoU, policemen from South Sudan were trained, from May-December 2024, on counter-terrorism, public order management,

and airport aviation security by the Rwandan National Police Center of Excellence on Counter-Terrorism, which is recognized by the Police Chiefs of the East African Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO). Additionally, some senior policemen also attended a senior command and staff course, organized by Rwanda Police College in collaboration with Rwanda University for all member States of the East African Chiefs Cooperation Organization. The purpose of the training is to acquire advanced skills in prevention and combat of crimes, in general, and counter-terrorism, in particular, in an appropriate and effective manner corresponding to the regional and international standards.

**Regarding point ten (10) of the brief:** where the Panel notes that members of the armed groups, government security forces, opposition forces and local and national political officials participate in illicit economic activity, including illegal logging, illegal gold production, and illegal charcoal production, we would like to point out that illegal logging has been happening in areas which are not under the control of the government. Also these activities are carried out by some groups better armed than the government whose capacity to purchase arms for the country's self-defense, enforcement of law, and disarmament of civil population has been negatively affected and tremendously reduced by the arms embargo and economic constraints resulting from the world economic crises and the lack of foreign investment in the country due to the conflict that was imposed by the SPLM/A-IO in 2013 and 2016.

On the illegal gold production, the Government would like to acknowledge that there has been limited illegal gold production in some states in South Sudan. This activity, which takes place in some remote areas of the country is carried out by local individuals, our soldiers are not party to that. With the lack of proper technology for surveillance and armaments/military hardware, it is difficult for the government to enforce the law in those areas.

Concerning illegal charcoal production, the truth is that 99% of South Sudan's population depends on charcoal as the main source of energy due to the scarcity of cooking gas in most parts of the country. Also most of the rural South Sudanese nationals make charcoal production as one of the economic activities that generates income for their families. Therefore, the Government is working to transition the country to green energy.