

**Security Council**

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Letter dated 26 June 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you the eighth quarterly report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution [2692 \(2023\)](#) as reiterated by the Council in paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution [2743 \(2024\)](#). The report includes the requested updated information on the sources and routes of arms trafficking and illicit financial flows, and on relevant United Nations activities and recommendations.

I should be grateful if you would have the present document brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) António **Guterres**



Report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023) as renewed by paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 2743 (2024). Specifically, the Security Council tasked the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) with reporting to the Council every three months, concurrently with the reporting cycle of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), through the Secretary-General, on sources and routes of illicit arms and financial flows and on relevant United Nations activities and recommendations. UNODC has submitted seven reports to the Security Council since July 2023. The present report covers the period from March to June 2025, a period of increased gang violence and instability coupled with territorial expansion across three departments in Haiti.

2. In the report, UNODC finds that organized criminal groups now control most of Port-au-Prince and have expanded into other regions, exploiting weak State capacity and even providing rudimentary services, attempting to fill the vacuum of State presence. In response, Haitian security forces have intensified the use of explosive drone strikes against organized criminal groups, while the partially deployed Multinational Security Support Mission is experiencing difficulties owing to limited international support, affecting overall coordination, personnel deployment, financing and logistics. Private security companies and vigilantes are also stepping into the vacuum, with some implicated in arms diversion. In the report, UNODC considers a recent high-profile transnational arms trafficking case linking the United States of America, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and its wider implications. It also reviews the dynamics of trafficking in persons, organ harvesting, deportations and displacement. The designation of a number of Haitian gangs as terrorist organizations by the United States and the Dominican Republic marks a significant shift, although any enforcement must be balanced with safeguards.

II. Escalating gang violence and police response


3. The security landscape in Haiti continued to deteriorate from March to June 2025. According to local analysts, criminal groups now control an estimated 90 per cent of metropolitan Port-au-Prince and have increased their influence throughout the country.¹ While dramatically expanding lethal drone attacks against suspected criminal groups, security forces have been hampered by shortages in equipment, funding and personnel. Meanwhile, just over 1,000 personnel associated with the Multinational Security Support Mission have been deployed, less than half of the number initially pledged. There are persistent concerns about their uneven operational effectiveness linked to continued disagreements over mission leadership, limited resources and logistical challenges.²

¹ See <https://news.sky.com/story/90-of-port-au-prince-controlled-by-gangs-as-thousands-forced-into-heaving-displacement-camps-13368885>.

² See <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/haiti-kenya-mission-paralyzed/>; and www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/04/21/haiti-near-point-of-no-return-as-gang-violence-spirals-un-envoy-warns_6740471_4.html.


Map 1

Expansion of criminal groups across Port-au-Prince from March to June 2025



Map 2

Expansion of criminal groups across the Port-au-Prince area from March to June 2025



4. Criminal groups have also steadily extended their efforts to control strategic areas and cities, linking the capital to other important cities, land border crossings and ports in and outside Port-au-Prince (see map 1). For example, on 26 April, two police officers and armed individuals were killed in Canapé Vert, one of the neighbourhoods not controlled by armed gangs.³ Two days earlier, gangs killed at least four soldiers and four armed individuals working with law enforcement in Kenscoff.⁴ According to human rights organizations, at least 35 suspected members of the Viv Ansanm gang coalition were killed and another 40 wounded during clashes with Haitian police in Pacot on 30 April. Thousands of residents of Port-au-Prince took to the streets in April to protest spiralling gang violence.⁵

5. The task force created to combat armed gangs destabilizing Port-au-Prince accelerated operations with loitering munitions in and around Port-au-Prince throughout the reporting period.⁶ Recently, several drone attacks targeting gang

³ See <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-gangs-canape-vert-police-8ae266fadfb1656fdb80a44430e83d83>.

⁴ This wealthy community on the outskirts of the capital has suffered repeated attacks since January. Approximately 100 men targeted Pétion-Ville and killing Kenscoff residents on 27 January 2025. According to news sources, more than 262 people have been killed in Kenscoff as at the end of March 2025, including 147 gang members.

⁵ See <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/thousands-haitians-take-streets-protest-surgings-gang-violence-2025-04-03/>.

⁶ In early 2025, the transitional government of Haiti created a special task force under the Prime Minister to combat armed gangs destabilizing Port-au-Prince. The unit operates separately from the national police and focuses on reclaiming gang-controlled areas. It forms part of broader emergency efforts to restore State authority and public safety. See <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/04/10/haiti-government-drones-gangs/>.

leaders were reported.⁷ On 5 May, the task force targeted the Gran Ravine gang, resulting in an estimated 17 deaths and 40 injuries. On 7 May, the Haitian National Police deployed eight explosive drones against gang members in Village-de-Dieu, a gang redoubt in the centre of the capital. Another strike on 20 May targeting the head of Gran Ravine killed as many as 25 gang members and injured 40 more. On 25 May, more drones were launched against suspected gang members in the same area.⁸ Haitian police also initiated operations in Pernier in Pétion-Ville, targeting the leader of the Kraze Barye gang.⁹ Organized criminal groups have increasingly employed the full range of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities – including the use of drones for situational awareness and target monitoring. Notably, the 5 Second gang reportedly utilized such tactics during its attack on the central penitentiary in early March.

6. Outside Port-au-Prince, violence and gang influence have spread into border and coastal areas. For example, regions such as Malpasse on the border with the Dominican Republic are registering gang encroachment and police and civilian-led reprisals. On 23 May, a criminal group stormed the customs offices on the Haitian-Dominican border, supposedly as retribution for the seizure of illegal batteries. The attackers reportedly assaulted customs officers, ransacked offices and stole several trucks. The border post was still under the control of the attackers as at mid-June.

7. Southern Haiti, traditionally more insulated from gang violence, has also experienced a surge in gang-related incidents. In Saint-Louis du Sud, a major police operation neutralized two influential gang suspects connected to the Simon Pelé gang. Localized successes, however, are overshadowed by broader territorial losses to gangs in other parts of the country. For example, on 21 May, an armed assault occurred against the Government Commissioner of Les Cayes, who narrowly survived.

8. Meanwhile, on 17 May, Dominican Republic authorities conducted a major drug seizure operation close to the southern border of Haiti. Dominican law enforcement officers intercepted a truck near the Haitian frontier with more than 2.6 metric tons of marijuana and 11 kg of a cocaine-like substance.¹⁰ Ongoing investigations suggest that the shipment was part of a wider transnational drug trafficking operation exploiting maritime and land routes connecting the Caribbean and Hispaniola.¹¹ The seizure is one of several large interdictions in recent months. On 25 May, Nippes

⁷ The Prime Minister, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, later confirmed that the strike took place in the Bas Delmas 6 neighbourhood.

⁸ Haitian police also initiated operations in Pernier in Pétion-Ville, targeting the gang led by Vitelhomme Innocent. The operations included the use of drones and resulted in the capture of military equipment. See www.halofirm.com/news/weekly-report-may-20-to-may-27.

⁹ In mid-February, the Kraze Barye gang executed dozens of people. The massacre was supposedly ordered by Vitelhomme Innocent.

¹⁰ Estimated local market value (Dominican Republic):

Marijuana: \$200–\$300/kg (wholesale/street price) = \$520,000–\$780,000

Cocaine-like substance (assuming cocaine or a similar stimulant): \$15,000–\$20,000/kg = \$165,000–\$220,000

Total estimated value (Dominican Republic): \$685,000–\$1 million.

Estimated destination market value (Europe):

Marijuana: \$2,000–\$3,000/kg = \$5.2–\$7.8 million

Cocaine-like substance: \$35,000–45,000/kg (varies by country) = \$385,000–\$495,000

Total estimated value (Europe): \$5.6–\$8.3 million

See <https://dncd.gob.do/categoria/Noticias/cargamento-de-marihuana-ocupado-en-pedernales-tuvo-peso-de-5-937-libras>.

¹¹ Information received by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) from the Specialized Land Border Security Corps (Cuerpo Especializado de Seguridad Fronteriza Terrestre – CESFRONT) in the Dominican Republic.

police in Haiti and the counter-narcotics officials (Brigade de lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants – BLTS) also arrested two individuals suspected of trafficking 44 kg of marijuana in Saint Michel du Sud, in the commune of Miragoâne.

9. The usage of drones by the security forces has significantly increased since March 2025. The government task force posted videos showing apparent drone strikes targeting gang members, although footage has since been removed and the account deleted.¹² Human rights organizations have documented the expanded use of drones targeting gangs across Port-au-Prince.¹³ Unverified media reports suggest that drone-related attacks have resulted in 250–300 fatalities and more than 300 injuries among gang members during the reporting period. Evidence of new and more powerful drones has likewise emerged. While welcoming the increased actions against criminal organizations, some civil society groups have urged the Haitian National Police, the Haitian Armed Forces (Forces Armées d’Haïti – FADH) and the task force to prevent casualties among the population. The lack of a clear legal framework governing drone operations and military-style engagements in civilian settings adds urgency to the need for comprehensive legislative oversight.

10. The Government of Haiti appears to be expanding investments in security operations. In early 2025, media reported that, in a revised national budget, 36 billion gourdes (\$276 million) had been allocated to the country’s security forces for the following term.¹⁴ Specifically, the Haitian National Police is expected to receive 28 billion gourdes (\$214.1 million), and the Haitian Armed Forces were allocated almost 7 billion gourdes (\$53.5 million). The decision to bolster funding reflects a strategic shift for the Haitian National Police to expand operational capacities, including additional recruitment, procurement of equipment and comprehensive training programmes. The Haitian Armed Forces are also expected to reinforce logistical infrastructure and readiness to support domestic security operations. The effective use of these funds requires transparent governance and strong oversight mechanisms.

Political economy of gang violence

11. As organized crime groups expand their territorial control in Port-au-Prince and other municipalities, some are establishing a form of “parallel governance”.¹⁵ Armed gangs not only exert control through violence but also provide public services such as protection, street cleaning, evening classes and dispute resolution in areas where governmental presence is minimal or absent. This shift has been documented by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which highlight the growing influence of criminal networks in local governance.¹⁶

12. Extortion cases are increasing, affecting both individuals and businesses. Local markets, transportation hubs and shipping corridors are subject to illicit tariffs. The “Madan Sara”, women who transport food across regions, report being extorted at multiple checkpoints, sometimes paying up to 20 per cent of their goods’ value to

¹² See www.abcactionnews.com/haiti/haitian-police-appear-to-use-drones-in-fight-against-gangs.

¹³ The National Human Rights Defense Network (Réseau national de défense des droits humains – RNDDH) collected testimonies of drone use in Delmas 6, Wharf Jérémie and Bel Air, resulting in at least 20 deaths and 30 injuries. Drone attacks have also reportedly been carried out in Grande Ravine, Kraze Barye, Chen Mechan and Village de Dieu.

¹⁴ See <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/253370/budget-rectificatif-35-milliards-de-gourdes-pour-les-forces-de-securite>; and <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/253448/35-milliards-de-gourdes-pour-la-pnh-et-les-fadh>. See also *Le Moniteur*, <https://budget.gouv.ht/web/index.php/decret-etablissant-le-budget-general-de-la-republique-dhaiti-exercice-2024-2025>.

¹⁵ See <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Last-chance-Breaking-Haitis-political-and-criminal-impasse-GI-TOC-January-2025.pdf>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

reach the market. This has been corroborated by media reports which detail the financial burdens placed on traders, transporters and wider markets.¹⁷

13. The social and economic implications of contested and parallel governance exerted by criminal organizations are profound. As gang control over trade routes tightens, legal imports and exports have been significantly disrupted. Container traffic at the Port-au-Prince terminal has reportedly declined owing to civil unrest and gang activity.¹⁸ Trucking firms and shipping companies now factor in extortion fees and longer delays, while fuel and food imports face routine hijackings.

14. These disruptions are contributing to increasing costs for goods and services. Rice, a staple food, has seen prices rise by more than 30 per cent since 2022, and cooking fuel now trades at up to \$5 a gallon on the black market. Organized crime groups manipulate supply chains to hoard and resell goods at inflated prices, exacerbating food insecurity and economic hardship for the population. Higher transaction costs have also been introduced at border controls in the Dominican Republic, affecting the flow of products across the frontier and increasing opportunities for (legal and illegal) arbitrage.

15. Security and insurance premiums have also spiralled upward. Shipping costs have doubled in just a year. According to the Association des Assureurs d’Haïti (AAH), coverage for logistics firms operating in gang-controlled areas is very difficult to obtain. Shipping and logistics companies report that they are under- or uninsured. In parallel, several international airlines conducting sporadic cargo flights to Haiti have reportedly had to secure additional “war insurance” owing to the elevated security risks and lack of standard coverage options. According to UNODC informants, some Haitian banks have also reportedly started requesting business owners to acquire terrorism insurance, which risks raising costs and running some companies out of business. Global risk analysts have also noted similar trends, underlining the broader implications of instability for marine insurance markets.¹⁹

Designation of gangs as foreign terrorist organizations

16. On 2 May 2025, the United States designated several Haitian armed gangs as terrorist organizations.²⁰ Specifically, Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif were designated as “foreign terrorist organizations” and “specially designated global terrorists”. These measures are intended to disrupt the financial networks and degrade the operational capabilities of these criminal groups. As a result, individuals and entities providing support or resources to the designated entities may be subject to criminal charges under United States law, asset freezing and decisions related to admissibility and removal from the United States.²¹ The Dominican Republic, which also designated

¹⁷ The criminal tariffs imposed on the “Madan Sara” affected not only their movements, their destinations and their locations but, most particularly, the quality of their goods. The informant also mentioned that, with the number of pay stations created by the criminal groups, many of the merchants are forced to abandon their trades and return with their merchandise when fees exceed the value of the goods. Informant KI#6, interviewed on 31 May 2025.

¹⁸ See <https://north-standard.com/insights-and-resources/resources/news/haiti-civil-unrest-affecting-port-operations>.

¹⁹ See www.eiu.com/n/war-risks-raise-marine-insurance-premiums/. Interview conducted by UNODC with informant KI#7 on 28 May 2025.

²⁰ See <https://ht.usembassy.gov/designation-of-viv-ansanm-and-gran-grif/>.

²¹ See www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article304464536.html; www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article305515216.html; and www.reuters.com/world/us/us-designates-haitian-gang-alliance-viv-ansanm-transnational-terrorist-group-2025-05-02/.

some Haitian criminal groups as terrorist organizations, could also enact and enforce laws that target the same gangs.²²

17. The designation of Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif as foreign terrorist organizations constitutes a significant escalation in United States efforts to counter organized crime in Haiti and internationally. However, such designations would be effective only if they are part of a broader cohesive strategy and can also generate unintended outcomes, including additional legal, criminal justice and operational complexities for humanitarian, commercial and international actors. For example, reports have already started emerging that gangs are increasing extortion fees in response to these designations. There are also fears that sanctions could disrupt fuel and other deliveries, pushing transportation and other sectors to collapse.²³

18. The designation process for terrorist organizations should ensure that all measures taken to address security concerns are in line with relevant obligations under international law, including international human rights law and, as applicable, international humanitarian law, mitigating any potential adverse effects on the population, including the wider aid sector. Additional exemptions or arrangements could be included in the relevant framework to ensure that humanitarian, development or civil society organizations are able to work in a rule of law-based legal and procedural framework and in line with principles of humanitarian action.

Growing influence of private security companies

19. Private security companies have expanded significantly in Haiti over the past decade, at least partly in response to the intensification of criminal violence and shortfalls in public security. The sector's evolution can be understood through three generic tiers of deployment. The first tier involves the use of private security guards – primarily Haitian nationals – employed by local businesses to protect commercial facilities and staff. Their duties are typically static. The legal frameworks governing their activities, based on a 1988 decree and a 1989 amendment, limit their weaponry to handguns and shotguns.²⁴ Nonetheless, field reports consistently highlight the use of higher-calibre weaponry.²⁵ Some firms are also alleged to have forged informal agreements with local gang commanders to secure safe passage in contested areas and to have provided weapons to criminal groups.²⁶

20. The second tier includes national and international security firms contracted by foreign embassies, international missions and some larger businesses and NGOs.²⁷ These companies offer specialized services such as risk assessments, convoy escorts, high-risk evacuations and executive protection. Investigative reports indicate that these companies frequently employ high-calibre firearms, exceeding legal limits.²⁸ They also

²² See <https://presidencia.gob.do/noticias/presidente-abinader-declara-las-bandas-criminales-haitianas-como-organizaciones>; and <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-gangs-us-terrorism-designation-risks-harming-most-vulnerable-ngos-warn-2025-05-08/>.

²³ See www.eepa.be/haiti-blackout-ends-after-security-promises-gang-leader-joly-convicted-in-u-s-questions-rise-over-new-draft-constitution/; and <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-how-us-terrorist-designations-could-deepen-criminal-rule-and-humanitarian-tragedy>.

²⁴ Only half of their staff can be armed, and licences must be approved by the Ministry of the Interior and monitored by the Haitian National Police. See https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/toc/Haiti_assessment_UNODC.pdf.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ See S/2024/704.

²⁷ See www.americasquarterly.org/article/flows-of-guns-and-money-are-dooming-haiti/.

²⁸ See <https://news.un.org/en/interview/2025/04/1162396>; www.nytimes.com/2025/03/30/us/haiti-gangs-guns-smuggling.html; and www.americasquarterly.org/article/flows-of-guns-and-money-are-dooming-haiti/.

reportedly engage in tactical agreements with gang leaders to ensure operational security, raising questions about complicity in undermining State authority.²⁹

21. The third tier comprises private military companies contracted directly by Haitian authorities or international partners to support law enforcement and protect critical assets. These entities have been deployed in tactical and operational roles – often alongside or in parallel to police operations – and in some cases may be tasked with providing direct support to anti-gang operations. As reported by international media, there is confirmation of United States-based private military contractors operating in Haiti since March 2025.³⁰ In late May 2025, some of these companies emerged as supporting Haitian police by deploying surveillance equipment and providing tactical support, including loitering munitions.³¹ Reports have also suggested that such companies sent a “large cache of weapons” to Haiti in April 2025.³²

22. The expansion of the private security industry in Haiti has increased demand for military-grade weapons, body armour, ammunition and tactical equipment.³³ Official regulations authorize only small-calibre weapons for private firms, yet UNODC witnesses have confirmed that companies routinely deploy 5.56mm rifles and even heavier 7.62x39mm assault rifles. These breaches of regulatory frameworks highlight institutional weaknesses but also the active participation of corrupt officials and organized criminal networks in facilitating illicit arms markets.

23. The lack of regulatory oversight over private security companies has facilitated the diversion of weapons to criminal groups, including gangs.³⁴ The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights observed that firearms trafficked into Haiti are also trafficked and sold by private security companies.³⁵ Media-led investigations likewise corroborate that criminal groups obtain weapons through both theft and collusion with private security firms. The intersection of private security operations and organized crime poses a significant threat to stability. Research over the past year reveals a troubling dynamic: some security firms routinely navigate operational challenges by directly negotiating with gang commanders. Tactical agreements can legitimize criminal leaders and entrench gang influence in urban neighbourhoods.

24. Meanwhile, the security vacuum in Haiti has also stimulated the emergence and militarization of “vigilante” or self-defence groups. Initially organized to protect neighbourhoods against gang incursions, many of these groups were armed only with machetes or rudimentary tools. However, since early 2023, a number of them have gained access to small arms and light weapons, likely through illicit markets, direct donations from sympathetic actors or theft from police and private holdings. These groups, while sometimes seen by local populations as protective forces, increasingly present law enforcement and human rights challenges owing to their growing firepower, lack of accountability and involvement in extrajudicial actions.³⁶

²⁹ See S/2024/704.

³⁰ See www.nytimes.com/2025/05/28/us/haiti-erik-prince-blackwater-gangs.html.

³¹ The company is also expected to send up to 150 personnel in the summer. See www.nytimes.com/2025/05/28/us/haiti-erik-prince-blackwater-gangs.html.

³² Ibid.

³³ See A/HRC/58/76 (advance unedited version), available at www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5876-situation-human-rights-haiti-report-united-nations-high.

³⁴ See www.cigionline.org/publications/private-security-public-good-regulating-private-security-industry-haiti; and https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/toc/Haiti_assessment_UNODC.pdf.

³⁵ See A/HRC/58/76 (see footnote 32).

³⁶ See <https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/haiti/>; and www.reuters.com/world/americas/haitis-deadly-vigilante-movement-sees-decline-gang-violence-report-2023-05-28/. Also worth noting are the extrajudicial killings by self-defence brigades that took place in a church in Préval, Artibonite, in early June.

Mirebalais firearms trafficking case

25. A recent firearms trafficking incident involving smugglers operating across the Dominican Republic Haiti and the United States highlights the transnational nature of weapons and ammunition flows. The so-called “Mirebalais case” reveals the scale and scope of a deal, as well as its dramatic aftermath. As detailed in a previous UNODC report, the criminal network first procured firearms in the United States. According to investigations, the alleged buyers had direct ties to individuals in Miami (United States), Belladère (Centre Department of Haiti) and Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic).³⁷ Weapons were then shipped from Florida aboard a cargo ship registered under the Honduran flag. The shipment transited through the port of Haina in the Dominican Republic before being intercepted by authorities.³⁸

26. The Mirebalais case reveals how a firearms trafficking supply chain can depend on multiple commercial actors across several jurisdictions. These included the shipowner and the ocean carrier that were involved in maritime transit.³⁹ On arrival to the Dominican Republic, land transportation was managed by a Dominican-registered company, operated by two Dominican nationals later detained by the police.⁴⁰ The consignee was listed as a Haitian company operated by a Haitian national later arrested in Belladère by the Haitian National Police. The final delivery location listed in the shipping documents was a well-known hotel in Belladère.⁴¹

27. The shipment itself was intercepted by Dominican customs authorities on 25 February during a routine X-ray inspection at the port of Haina. The seizure revealed a sizeable cache that included 17 VSKA and WASR-10 rifles, a heavy anti-materiel Barrett .50 calibre rifle, a WASR-M rifle, several Glock pistols, an Uzi submachine gun, more than 36,000 rounds of ammunition and magazines and accessories.⁴² The scale and calibre of the weaponry confirmed the involvement of a well-organized and resourced transnational network.⁴³ Within days of the seizure, the transport company owners were apprehended in the Dominican Republic.⁴⁴

28. The owner of the hotel in Belladère and listed consignee was arrested in Hinche on 13 March. Two days later, Haitian police apprehended the two suspected weapons purchasers at Cap-Haïtien International Airport as they attempted to flee to the United States. The operation also led to the arrest of two other individuals suspected of being involved in the case. All four individuals were placed in custody while judicial procedures are ongoing. These arrests came 11 days after the original weapon seizure and were a direct consequence of the investigation launched in response to the original interdiction.

³⁷ S/2025/303.

³⁸ S/2025/303, paras. 24 and 25.

³⁹ The shipowner and the carrier were potentially not aware of the weapons being trafficked, as is often the case with maritime trafficking.

⁴⁰ See www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/nacional/2025/03/06/empresa-a-la-que-decomisaron-arsenal-de-armas-tenia-cinco-anos/3024243.

⁴¹ See <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254123/the-connection-between-arms-traffickers-in-belladere-and-the-400-mawozo-gang-and-associates>.


⁴² S/2025/303, paras. 24 and 25.

⁴³ S/2025/303, para. 24.

⁴⁴ See www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/nacional/2025/03/06/empresa-a-la-que-decomisaron-arsenal-de-armas-tenia-cinco-anos/3024243; and <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254123/the-connection-between-arms-traffickers-in-belladere-and-the-400-mawozo-gang-and-associates>.

Map 3

Map showing weapons seizures, arrests and Mirebalais prison attack



*Non-Self Governing Territory

Source: UNODC

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

29. However, on 31 March, the Mirebalais prison, where the suspects were detained, was attacked by heavily armed men affiliated with the Viv Ansanm organized crime coalition. The attackers, reportedly from the 400 Mawozo and Baz Taliban factions, wore identifiable red T-shirts bearing gang symbols. Their assault began before dawn and targeted both the prison and the adjacent police station. The attackers set fire to vehicles and opened sustained gunfire, rapidly overwhelming the security forces. Reinforcements from the Haitian National Police were eventually deployed, resulting in at least 30 gang members being killed and three police officers wounded.

30. Within days of the attack on the Mirebalais prison it emerged that at least 529 prisoners had escaped, the vast majority of whom were in pretrial detention. Many of the detainees had been arrested in connection with arms, drugs and trafficking in

persons, including those recently detained in the weapons trafficking investigation.⁴⁵ The prison serves the entire Centre Department and holds detainees from jurisdictions such as Belladère, Hinche and Lascahobas. Its strategic importance, including because a large number of high-risk detainees are held there, made it a high-value target for organized crime groups.

31. The criminal expansion into Mirebalais and the prison attack not only resulted in the release of hundreds of potentially dangerous inmates but also prompted a humanitarian crisis and a public backlash. Fearing escalating violence between gangs and police, thousands of residents fled to nearby towns such as Lascahobas, Belladère and Hinche. Armed civilian groups attempted to support police efforts but were unable to prevent the mass escape or fend off heavily armed criminal groups. The incident reflects international impacts of weapons trafficking but also the strategic expansion of gang operations beyond Port-au-Prince and the direct targeting of State institutions.⁴⁶

32. Also of concern is the reported involvement of another criminal group near Mirebalais, the Baz Croix-Fer. The criminal group operates in the border areas between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and is involved in a number of cross-border illicit activities, including weapons and narcotics trafficking between Belladère and Elias Piña. *Baz Croix-Fer* reportedly also maintains connections with other gangs in Haiti, notably 400 Mawozo.⁴⁷ The gang's proximity to both Mirebalais and Belladère, combined with its criminal partnerships, positions it as a likely stakeholder in the broader destabilization strategy pursued by transnational criminal networks operating between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

33. Gangs have essentially occupied Mirebalais since late March. Owing to the Government's inability to re-establish State authority in Mirebalais, which has remained under the control of organized criminal groups since late March, residents shut down Péligre hydroelectric dam from 13 to 23 May.⁴⁸ The closure of the largest power generation facility in Haiti, situated less than 6 miles from Mirebalais and 40 miles north-east of Port-au-Prince, led to widespread blackouts in Port-au-Prince and surrounding regions. The Péligre facility accounts for approximately 30 per cent of the electricity supply for Haiti, significantly impacting national critical infrastructure. The impact on critical infrastructure not only exacerbates the national humanitarian crisis but also underlines the need for comprehensive security interventions and wider reforms.

⁴⁵ See <https://haitiantimes.com/fr/2025/04/01/les-gangs-persistent-%C3%A0-Mirebalais-malgr%C3%A9-l%27intervention-de-la-police/>. The article contains a statement by Frédérique Occéan, the departmental delegate for the Centre : "The first place attacked by the bandits was the prison, to free all the suspects we had arrested." He further indicated that the attack was "probably in retaliation for a major weapons seizure at the Belladère customs office, where the authorities confiscated firearms, ammunition, money and vehicles."

⁴⁶ As noted previously, the Viv Ansanm coalition had carried out similar actions in Croix-des-Bouquets and the capital in 2024.

⁴⁷ Baz Croix-Fer members have been leveraged by economic actors to intimidate customs and police authorities. The group likewise imposes illegal taxes on merchants and maintains control over local roads, undermining regional security and hindering economic activity (information from Haitian Customs officers).

⁴⁸ After a meeting between Fritz Alphonse Jean on 23 May 2025 and Mirebalais and Saut d'Eau residents involved in the protests, the residents agreed to restart the power plant, contingent on promises made by the Transitional Presidential Council and the Government regarding security.

III. Trafficking in persons, sexual violence, displacement and deportations

34. At the beginning of 2025, the Transitional Presidential Council of Haiti publicly acknowledged that trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ removal constitutes a growing concern affecting the population.⁴⁹ Since then, multiple reports have emerged pointing to the existence of organ trafficking operations. On 21 May, the Haitian National Police conducted a raid on a facility in Pétion-Ville suspected of being a part of the illicit organ trade. At about the same time, the mutilated body of a 17-year-old girl was discovered in Limbé, raising further concerns regarding the presence of organ harvesting networks in the country.

35. Multiple accounts of organ trafficking have surfaced in relation to a hospital in northern Haiti. News reports alleged that several paediatric patients were discharged with a single kidney, and several families have claimed to have received the remains of deceased relatives with vital organs – hearts or lungs – missing. Residents living in the area report witnessing suspicious nocturnal landings of small aircraft and helicopters near the hospital premises. Anonymous staff accounts refer to irregularities in post-mortem handling and deliberate efforts to conceal incidents. The matter has attracted significant public attention and prompted renewed calls for a formal judicial investigation into alleged organ trafficking practices in medical facilities.⁵⁰

36. Meanwhile, there are also reports from the Dominican Republic that some Haitian women, including individuals facing deportation, may have been subjected to sexual exploitation.⁵¹ Investigative reporting from Punta Cana has documented claims that Haitian women were allegedly coerced into transactional sexual encounters with intermediaries or officials to avoid removal proceedings.⁵² Several testimonies describe degrading conditions in detention facilities and the occurrence of abuse. Beyond these cases, broader patterns of sexual violence linked to organized crime have been reported both in Haiti and along the migration route. In areas under criminal groups control in Port-au-Prince and Artibonite, women and girls are frequently subjected to sexual violence, including rape, as a form of territorial control or intimidation. Criminals also use sexual exploitation as a mechanism of recruitment

⁴⁹ See “Trafficking in human organs another problem in Haiti”, *Prensa Latina*, 31 January 2025, available at www.plenglish.com/news/2025/01/31/trafficking-in-human-organs-another-problem-in-haiti/.

⁵⁰ There is a distinction between trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ removal and organ trafficking per se. Although the two terms are often used interchangeably, they refer to distinct criminal offences under international law. Trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ removal falls within the scope of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and involves the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons through means such as coercion, deception or abuse of vulnerability, for the purpose of exploiting them through the removal of organs. By contrast, organ trafficking refers to the illicit removal and trade in organs, regardless of whether trafficking in persons is involved. This may include cases involving deceased individuals or where consent is improperly obtained but without the presence of coercion or deception as defined under the Protocol. Misidentification of such cases as organ trafficking alone may result in the misapplication of legal frameworks and insufficient protection for victims. See UNODC/Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons, issue brief, “Trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ removal”, December 2020, available at https://icat.un.org/sites/g/files/tmzbd1461/files/publications/icat_brief_tip_for_or_final.pdf.

⁵¹ See www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/haiti-humanitarian-country-team-deeply-concerned-about-deportation-pregnant-and-breastfeeding-women-dominican-republic/; and www.justice.gov/opa/pr/founder-haitian-orphanage-sentenced-210-years-prison-sexually-abusing-boys-his-care.

⁵² See www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/05/19/dominican-republic-haitian-abuse/.

and punishment.⁵³ These dynamics reflect how trafficking, sexual violence and displacement are increasingly intertwined with the operations of criminal networks on both sides of the border.

37. Furthermore, in late April and early May, a major assault led by criminal groups in Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite forcibly displaced hundreds of residents. Interviews conducted by national media outlets indicate that the majority of those displaced are women, children and elderly persons, many of whom lack access to healthcare, education and sustainable livelihoods.⁵⁴ A further 66,000 people were registered as internally displaced persons in Mirebalais as at late May, underscoring the scale of displacement connected to criminal violence and instability.⁵⁵

38. The Dominican Republic also continued to intensify forcible repatriations of Haitian migrants during the reporting period. More than 119,000 individuals were repatriated from January to April 2025, constituting a 71 per cent increase as compared with the same period in 2024.⁵⁶ A single nationwide operation conducted in mid-April resulted in the detention of 1,442 undocumented Haitians.⁵⁷ A new administrative protocol requires public hospitals to verify the immigration status of patients and to notify immigration authorities in cases involving undocumented individuals. Under this procedure, medical care is provided prior to the initiation of removal processes.⁵⁸ Notably, in late April, more than 130 women and children, including 48 pregnant women and 39 new mothers, were deported directly from hospitals.⁵⁹

39. In April 2025, the Dominican authorities announced a comprehensive package of 15 measures aimed at strengthening national border control and reducing irregular migration flows from Haiti. These measures include the accelerated construction of a border wall along key crossing points, the deployment of an additional 1,500 military personnel to reinforce border security and enhanced identification protocols in both public and private institutions, including hospitals and workplaces.⁶⁰

40. Several deportation measures introduced by Dominican authorities raised concern among international human rights organizations and United Nations entities, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Multiple United Nations agencies have noted potential implications for access to essential services, in particular for women, children and other vulnerable groups.⁶¹ Observers have underscored the importance of ensuring that all measures taken to manage migration are implemented in full compliance with applicable law,

⁵³ See Human Rights Watch, "Haiti: escalating violence puts population at grave risk", 17 April 2025, available at www.hrw.org/news/2025/04/17/haiti-escalating-violence-puts-population-grave-risk.

⁵⁴ See <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/256245/les-deplaces-interne-grands-oublies-de-la-crise-haitienne>.

⁵⁵ See <https://www.hpninfo.com/post/ins%C3%A9curit%C3%A9-mirebalais-66-000-personnes-d%C3%A9plac%C3%A9es-interne-recens%C3%A9s>.

⁵⁶ See "The number of deportees will reach 119,000 in 2025 – a 71% increase compared to the same period in 2024", Dirección General de Migración, May 2025, available at <https://migracion.gob.do/en/the-number-of-deportees-will-reach-119000-in-2025-a-71-increase-compared-to-the-same-period-in-2024/>.

⁵⁷ See www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/nacional/2025/04/23/migracion-detiene-1442-haitianos-indocumentados/3085086.

⁵⁸ See <https://migracion.gob.do/dgm-inicia-implementacion-de-protocolo-migratorio-en-hospitales-publicos/>.

⁵⁹ See www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/apr/29/pregnant-women-deported-dominican-republic-migration-crackdown-haiti.

⁶⁰ See www.reuters.com/world/americas/dominican-republic-reinforces-border-security-migration-controls-towards-haiti-2025-04-06/.

⁶¹ "UN alert over rising deportations of Haitian mothers and newborns from Dominican Republic", *UN News*, 24 April 2025, available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/04/1162591>.

including international human rights law and, and the right to healthcare.⁶² The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has also highlighted that many returnees have been sent back to areas of Haiti affected by acute insecurity and internal displacement, where access to basic services remains severely limited.⁶³

41. Alongside deportations, the Dominican Republic has also recorded a notable increase in the number of Haitian nationals opting for voluntary return. From January to mid-May 2025, nearly 60,000 Haitians departed the country through a government-supported voluntary return programme, implemented in coordination with Dominican migration authorities and international partners. While the initiative eased pressure on detention facilities and reduced the risks associated with involuntary repatriations and forced returns, concerns persist regarding the adequacy of reception conditions and reintegration support in Haiti. Humanitarian actors continue to underscore the importance of developing comprehensive reintegration strategies to prevent returnees from falling into cycles of exploitation or trafficking. In early May 2025, the Government of Haiti and several international partners organized the fourth *caravane humanitaire* to facilitate the voluntary return of approximately 600 Haitian nationals via the Belladère border point.⁶⁴

42. Another challenge relates to the increasing uncertainty surrounding the legal status of Haitian nationals residing abroad.⁶⁵ Temporary protected status designation has allowed more than 520,000 Haitians to remain in the United States, in recognition of the protracted instability and humanitarian needs in their country of origin.⁶⁶ However, the current temporary protected status designation is set to expire in August 2025.⁶⁷ Haitian diaspora communities and humanitarian actors have expressed concern over the potential for large-scale returns, in particular in the light of the severe insecurity and displacement crisis in Haiti.⁶⁸ These concerns have been further compounded by the recent announcement by the Government of the United States of the termination of the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Venezuela (CHNV) parole programme, which had provided a legal entry pathway for Haitian nationals through humanitarian parole.⁶⁹

⁶² See “Estas son las 15 medidas adoptadas por Abinader para frenar la inmigración de haitianos”, *Diario Libre*, 6 April 2025, available at <https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/nacional/2025/04/06/las-15-medidas-de-abinader-para-frenar-la-inmigracion-de-haitianos/3062556/>.

⁶³ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Haiti, “Haiti humanitarian country team deeply concerned about the deportation of pregnant and breastfeeding women from the Dominican Republic”, press release, 19 May 2025, available at <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/haiti-humanitarian-country-team-deeply-concerned-about-deportation-pregnant-and-breastfeeding-women-dominican-republic>.

⁶⁴ The initiative provided temporary shelter, food assistance and psychosocial support for returnees and is part of a broader strategy to ensure safer return pathways, in particular for vulnerable groups such as women and children.

⁶⁵ See www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article302044329.html/.

⁶⁶ See United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Temporary protected status designated country: Haiti”, available at www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status/temporary-protected-status-designated-country-haiti.

⁶⁷ See www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status/temporary-protected-status-designated-country-haiti.

⁶⁸ See “États-Unis : vers la fin du TPS pour les Vénézuéliens, l’inquiétude gagne les Haïtiens”, *VBI*, 15 May 2025, available at <https://vantbefinfo.com/etats-unis-vers-la-fin-du-tps-pour-les-venezueliens-linquiétude-gagne-les-haitiens/>. See also “Une décision de la Cour suprême inquiète les Haïtiens sous TPS”, *Haïti Libre*, 16 May 2025, available at <https://www.haitilibre.com/article-44942-haiti-flash-une-decision-de-la-cour-supreme-inquiete-les-haitiens-sous-tps.html>; and www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article302044329.html.

⁶⁹ See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS to terminate CHNV parole program for nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela”, 19 May 2025, available at www.dhs.gov/news/2025/06/12/dhs-issues-notice-termination-chnv-parole-program-encourages-parolees-self-deport.

IV. Countering illicit financial flows

43. Notwithstanding far-reaching rule of law challenges in Haiti, incremental progress is being made in the fight against corruption. For example, on 12 May, the Minister of Justice of Haiti directed a letter to the chief prosecutor of Port-au-Prince, instructing him to freeze the bank accounts of individuals sanctioned under Security Council resolution 2653 (2022). The Minister also ordered financial investigations into these individuals. According to Haitian law, once a ministerial decree targets individuals sanctioned by the United Nations, financial institutions must freeze their accounts immediately and submit a suspicious transaction report to the Central Financial Intelligence Unit (Unité centrale de renseignements financiers – UCREF).⁷⁰ The Unit can then launch an administrative investigation. These types of measures also create the opportunity to initiate criminal investigations simultaneously. Ultimately, authorities are aiming to seize and eventually permanently confiscate assets, both domestically and abroad.

44. Since 2021, Haiti has been “grey-listed” by the Financial Action Task Force, meaning that it is under increased monitoring owing to deficiencies in its anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes. The International Cooperation Review Group of the Task Force uses a face-to-face meeting process as part of its mutual evaluations and follow-up activities. Jurisdictions under review could meet with the Joint Group of the International Cooperation Review Group (a regional team within the International Cooperation Review Group) to discuss their progress in implementing anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism measures. These meetings help to address any disagreements or issues identified in the mutual evaluation reports.⁷¹ Recent investigations by the Anti-Corruption Unit (Unité de lutte contre la corruption – ULCC) of Haiti are also yielding modest, yet important, advances. A submission to the Prosecutor’s Office dated 8 May 2025 revealed serious misconduct and widespread corruption across various public institutions.⁷² Notably affected entities include the Office for the Protection of Citizens (Office de la protection du citoyen – OPC), the Office of Insurance for Work Accidents, Sickness and Maternity (Office d’assurance accidents du travail, maladie et maternité – OFATMA) and the Directorate of Immigration and Emigration (Direction de l’immigration et de l’émigration – DIE). Allegations include embezzlement of public funds through fictitious travel expenses, illegal awarding of public contracts, nepotism, lack of proper financial oversight and unauthorized management of State revenues. The investigations highlight deficient internal controls, non-compliance with procurement regulations and discretionary practices that circumvent legal requirements.

45. The Anti-Corruption Unit investigations have also uncovered systemic corruption within the passport issuance process in Haiti, involving financial fraud, abuse of authority and widespread institutional corruption.⁷³ Officials reportedly charged applicants unlawful fees, created fictitious accounts to evade taxes, misappropriated State funds through unmonitored cash transactions and colluded to issue passports without proper documentation. These actions underscore broader

⁷⁰ See anti-money laundering decree of 30 April 2023.

⁷¹ See www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/More-on-high-risk-and-non-cooperative-jurisdictions.html. In essence, the face-to-face meeting is a critical part of the Financial Action Task Force process for ensuring that jurisdictions are implementing effective anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism measures and addressing any deficiencies identified.

⁷² Anti-Corruption Unit executive summaries of investigations submitted to the Prosecutor’s Office on 8 May 2025.

⁷³ Ibid.

governance failures marked by the routine disregard of legal frameworks, absence of internal controls and diversion of public resources for personal enrichment. Such pervasive corruption significantly weakens public trust and deprives the Haitian State of essential revenue.

46. The findings of the Anti-Corruption Unit illustrate the severe risks posed by corruption within the passport system in Haiti, threatening national and regional security. Fraudulent passport issuance and diversion of State revenue facilitate irregular migration and weaken border controls across the Caribbean and beyond. These vulnerabilities compromise identity verification systems and create opportunities exploited by transnational criminal organizations. Amid escalating gang violence and institutional instability, the country's compromised passport system is enabling activities such as trafficking in persons, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, organ trafficking and the evasion of justice by fugitives. Without immediate intervention, Haiti risks becoming a central hub for organized crime, posing significant threats to regional security in the Americas.

V. Recommendations

47. **While this recommendation aligns with previous reporting, it is important to adapt it to the current context, where references to arms transfers in this report have largely concerned private security providers and a limited number of emblematic trafficking cases. In this light, pre-shipment verification and end-user certification should still be enforced for all arms, ammunition and tactical equipment entering Haiti and the Dominican Republic – in particular through third-party ports – to prevent diversion and misuse. Exporting States must require certified documentation and real-time digital tracking of end use, while customs authorities should implement enhanced inspection protocols at key maritime hubs such as Haina, Port-au-Prince and Miami. These measures would help reinforce oversight, even in less-structured or privately facilitated transfers, and should be supported by international technical assistance and monitoring.**

48. **Establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for private security companies: the Haitian authorities should consider updating, drafting and implementing a national regulatory regime governing private security actors, including requirements for licensing, approved armament, vetting of personnel and mandatory reporting. This framework may include robust enforcement mechanisms to address illicit arms transfers and complicity with organized crime. Independent oversight, possibly through an international monitoring body, could ensure compliance with international human rights standards.**

49. **Enhance border control and transnational crime cooperation: the international community, including regional partners, can bolster joint Haitian-Dominican mechanisms to disrupt trafficking networks and strengthen border governance. Building on good practices, this can include improved technological support, training for customs officers and formalized data-sharing protocols.**

50. **Embed human rights safeguards in security operations: all security operations, including those conducted with international support, must comply with international law, including international human rights law and, as applicable, international humanitarian law. A civilian harm tracking mechanism should be developed in partnership with OHCHR and civil society. A legal framework and operational standards to govern the use of drones should be developed.**

51. **Scale up support for anti-corruption and financial accountability measures:** international partners can continue to expand support to the Central Financial Intelligence Unit (UCREF) and the Anti-Corruption Unit (ULCC) through forensic audit training, secure data platforms and investigative partnerships. Haitian judicial authorities must be empowered to act on financial intelligence with clear legal mandates and prosecutorial autonomy. Regular independent evaluations can assess progress and guide future assistance.
52. **Build on the administrative freezing measures against individuals sanctioned under Security Council resolution 2653 (2022)** to locate their assets and to operate a criminal seizure (in Haiti or abroad) in the context of a criminal investigation against them to subsequently obtain the confiscation of their assets.
53. **Upon receiving the updated action plan from the Financial Action Task Force**, the Haitian authorities should follow up on the recommendations and take action to address the deficiencies identified in order to implement effective anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures.
54. **Empower the financial intelligence units of Haiti and the Dominican Republic to conduct proactive forensic audits of accounts and remittance channels associated with arms trafficking and organized crime:** these efforts could also be coordinated with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the United States Department of the Treasury and similar entities from other relevant Member States to track suspicious financial flows and issue joint risk advisories. Measures should include tighter scrutiny of informal money transfers, cryptoassets and real estate transactions, alongside mandatory reporting by financial institutions of high-risk cross-border transactions, with penalties for non-compliance.
55. **Reinforce judicial protection for high-profile detainees and facilities:** given the attack on Mirebalais prison and mass escape of detainees in March and April 2025, the Government of Haiti should establish a national task force to assess and secure high-risk detention facilities. This should include dedicated resources for perimeter security, rapid response capabilities and vetting of personnel. International support may be sought to establish secure judicial holding systems for organized crime cases.
56. **Investigate and prosecute organ trafficking crimes:** Haitian judicial authorities must urgently initiate impartial and transparent investigations into reported cases of organ trafficking, including alleged complicity of medical institutions. International forensic and investigative assistance should be provided to build credible cases and restore public trust. Regulations should be introduced to monitor post-mortem procedures and control high-risk sectors.

Annex

Firearms seized in Haiti, 2021–2025

Firearms seized

		<i>Pistol</i>	<i>Revolver</i>	<i>Rifle</i>	<i>Shotgun</i>	<i>Home-made weapons</i>	<i>Total</i>
2021	January	30	2	8	1	9	50
	February	27	1	8	5	–	41
	March	8	2	3	1	5	19
	April	23	4	2	2	8	39
	May	15	5	3	1	3	27
	June	3	1	2	–	6	12
	July	17	1	13	7	7	45
	August	25	3	2	3	4	37
	September	16	6	6	–	12	40
	October	18	1	3	2	2	26
	November	16	–	6	4	3	29
	December	24	3	3	5	1	36
	Total	222	29	59	31	60	401
2022	January	19	–	4	1	1	25
	February	10	2	2	1	6	21
	March	26	5	2	3	5	41
	April	15	5	4	3	5	32
	May	29	6	7	–	6	48
	June	13	1	3	–	2	19
	July	30	3	23	2	1	59
	August	11	–	4	2	2	19
	September	4	1	5	3	4	17
	October	9	2	5	–	6	22
	November	16	2	6	1	1	26
	December	10	1	1	1	–	13
	Total	192	28	66	17	39	342
2023	January	14	1	7	1	2	25
	February	16	4	3	2	–	25
	March	9	4	3	–	5	21
	April	20	–	10	1	–	31
	May	4	1	5	1	1	12
	June	4	2	5	1	4	16
	July	9	2	3	1	4	19
	August	13	1	1	–	1	16
	September	13	2	4	1	1	21
	October	18	3	2	3	5	31
	November	10	4	1	–	2	17
	December	10	1	6	1	13	31
	Total	140	25	50	12	38	265

		<i>Pistol</i>	<i>Revolver</i>	<i>Rifle</i>	<i>Shotgun</i>	<i>Home-made weapons</i>	<i>Total</i>
2024	January	5	1	1	2	1	10
	February	7	1	6	4	3	21
	March	7	1	6	—	3	17
	April	22	—	13	—	—	35
	May	7	3	2	—	1	13
	June	15	—	5	—	5	24
	July	15	1	3	4	4	27
	August	19	3	6	—	—	29
	September	13	3	14	1	—	32
	October	16	1	17	2	5	41
	November	12	3	4	2	1	22
	December	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Total	138	17	77	15	24	271
2025	January	10	—	6	2	1	19
	February	18	1	4	1	8	32
	March	21	—	10	2	2	35
	April	16	—	20	2	2	40
	Total	65	1	40	7	13	126