



# Security Council

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**Letter dated 13 June 2025 from the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 2745 (2024) addressed to the President of the Security Council**

The members of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#) have the honour to transmit herewith the midterm report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#) on 26 December 2024 and was considered by the Committee on 11 June 2025.

The Panel of Experts would appreciate it if the present letter and the midterm report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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## Midterm report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024)

### *Summary*

Armed group dynamics have continued to evolve and adapt in response to shifting political and security realities at the local, national and regional level. The main alliance of armed groups, the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC), has faced significant internal divisions, culminating in a split in August 2024, and the formation of the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement Fondamentale (CPC-F), led by the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) leader and sanctioned individual, Ali Darassa, (CFi.015). Despite tensions at the leadership level, both factions continue to coordinate their operations on the ground. Furthermore, the emergence of new armed groups, including the Coalition militaire de salut du peuple et de redressement (CMSPR), has added complexity to the security situation. These developments highlight the ongoing fragmentation of the peace process and the persistence of armed rebellion, which remain significant threats to peace and stability in the country and the wider region.

Shifting armed group financing mechanisms reflect evolving local and regional changes in the political and security context. In response, armed groups have deepened their regional reach, with potential implications for their future. Since 2021, military operations and the extension of State authority have increasingly reduced the hold of armed groups over key gold and diamond mining areas and impacted their ability to tax local herders. Consequently, armed groups in western Central African Republic have become more covert in their activities, which they confined to conducting sporadic attacks. By contrast, in eastern Central African Republic, the role of armed group leaders in coordinating and leasing their fighters as mercenaries for the ongoing conflict in the Sudan has intensified, becoming a source of funding and support.

During the reporting period, the Central African Republic has taken steps to address cross-border criminal activities and to regulate the natural resources trade. For instance, a new mining code was promulgated in August 2024. The General Inspectorate for Mines, alongside the Special Anti-Fraud Unit (Unité spéciale anti-fraude – USAF), has expanded its operations to address mining fraud. Progress has also been achieved in the implementation of the country's new border policy.

In analysing illicit arms trafficking in the Central African Republic, the Panel observes that networks facilitating arms transfers remain active and could rapidly expand should external financial or material support be injected into the region, although financing for armed groups has temporarily reduced current capacity to resupply. One significant shift in tactics is the increased use of improvised explosive devices.

The humanitarian situation remains challenging, with 46 per cent of the population needing assistance and protection. The moderate but continued influx of refugees from the conflict in the Sudan continued. By mid-December, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had registered 36,591 Sudanese refugees across six prefectures in the Central African Republic.

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## I. Background

### A. Introduction

1. The present report, provided to the Security Council Committee pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#), covers the period from the submission of the Panel's final report ([S/2024/444](#)) on 10 June 2024 until 1 December 2024. It includes updates on ongoing investigations detailed therein.
2. In conducting its investigations, the Panel complied with the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions.<sup>1</sup> The Panel maintained the highest achievable standard of proof.
3. The Panel relied on corroborated evidence and adhered to its standards in respect of the opportunity to reply. For further details on methodology, see annex 1. The Panel has maintained transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence in its investigations.

### B. Cooperation with stakeholders and institutions

4. The Panel travelled to and internally within the Central African Republic and benefited from logistical support provided by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). The Panel has also travelled to Belgium and Chad since its previous report.
5. The Panel has continued to exchange information with other panels or groups of experts established by the Security Council, in particular the Panels of Experts on the Sudan, South Sudan and Libya and the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

## II. Evolving role of Central African Republic armed groups impacting peace and stability in the Central African Republic and the region

### A. Changes in Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC) alliance of armed groups configuration and emergence of CPC-Fondamentale

6. CPC continues to threaten peace and security in the Central African Republic. Since its creation in 2020, CPC has been hampered by internal disagreements, yet the coalition has largely managed to remain intact, despite considerable tensions and contradictory statements. In July 2024, more evident rifts emerged within CPC, in particular regarding the coalition's strategic direction, highlighted by significant disagreements between sanctioned individuals – notably the general coordinator, François Bozizé (CFi.001) and the military chief of staff, the UPC leader, Ali Darassa (CFi.015).<sup>2</sup>

7. Ali Darassa issued statements declaring a cessation of hostilities with the Government of the Central African Republic. In response, François Bozizé issued communiqués stating that this decision had not received the approval of the entire

<sup>1</sup> [S/2006/977](#).

<sup>2</sup> Confidential armed group and political sources.

CPC alliance (see annexes 2 and 3). Darassa was thus excluded from CPC on 5 August 2024, causing an official split within the coalition and leading to the creation of the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement–fondamentale (CPC-F) on 30 August 2024 (see annex 4). CPC-F comprises UPC, some members of the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC), a wing of the anti-balaka and the Front de défense pour les libertés publiques (FDLP). FDLP – a newly formed group in the landscape of Central African Republic armed groups established in April 2024 – is led by Florent Kema, a former anti-balaka and member of parliament until 2021. Sanctioned individual Haroun Gaye (CFi.007), was appointed general coordinator of CPC-F.

8. One of the most significant armed groups in CPC, Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation (3R),<sup>3</sup> decided to remain in the “original” CPC group, and some remaining active members of the Mouvement patriotique centrafricain (MPC) also pledged allegiance to CPC under François Bozizé as general coordinator.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, a number of high-ranking members of FPRC also rejected CPC-F and aligned with Bozizé’s CPC. Following the split, CPC restructured and made several new lead appointments, including the designation of Doborodjé Goska (3R) as military chief of staff for the coalition and Sembé Bobbo (3R) as deputy to Bozizé (see annex 5).<sup>5</sup>

9. The Panel corroborated information about a meeting held in November 2024, in Tissi-Fongoro, involving representatives of CPC and CPC-F. The following individuals were present: Ali Darassa (CFi.015), Arda Hakouma,<sup>6</sup> Ali Hamid,<sup>7</sup> Haroun Gaye (CFi.007), Kadher Kenengar,<sup>8</sup> Wadal Oumda<sup>9</sup> and Jean-Francis Bozizé.<sup>10</sup> Participants at the meeting discussed plans and a strategy to ramp up attacks on Central African Republic territory with support to come from factions currently operating in the Sudan.<sup>11</sup>

10. Senior armed group sources informed the Panel that, although there are shifts in the alliance, collaboration continues on the ground. The Panel continues to investigate.

## B. CPC-F leader, Ali Darassa, negotiations with the Government

11. Ali Darassa had been in negotiations with the Government of the Central African Republic since July 2024 to rejoin the Political Agreement for Peace and

<sup>3</sup> [S/2021/569](#), para. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Former FPRC and MPC confidential sources.

<sup>5</sup> Corroborated by confidential sources from 3R and other CPC elements.

<sup>6</sup> Arda Hakouma is a former member of the Séleka armed group movement and FPRC ex-Séléka “general”. In January 2023, he founded a new armed group known as the Mouvement pour la démocratie et la République centrafricaine (Movement for Democracy and the Central African Republic – MDRPC) and serves as its leader. See [S/2024/444](#), para. 43; [S/2019/930](#), para. 57, and annex 2.7; [S/2019/608](#), annex 4.6; [S/2017/639](#), para. 91; [S/2016/1032](#), para. 168; [S/2015/936](#), para. 90; and [S/2014/762](#), para. 94.

<sup>7</sup> Ali Hamid is an FPRC element, close to Nourredine Adam, and a cousin of a former Minister of Water and Forests, Amit Idriss.

<sup>8</sup> Kadher Kenengar is a senior FPRC element, whom sources report is very close to Nourredine Adam.

<sup>9</sup> Wadal Oumda is a Falata-Chadian in RSF, also affiliated with UPC. Armed group sources informed the Panel that he is recruiting in the Central African Republic for RSF. See [S/2020/662](#), para. 56.

<sup>10</sup> Son of François Bozizé and military coordinator for CPC. See [S/2023/360](#), para. 49; [S/2021/569](#), paras. 18, 29–31 and 43, and annexes 2.6 and 3.1.

<sup>11</sup> Confidential armed group, political and security sector sources.

Reconciliation. Darassa issued a cessation of hostilities statement expressing his willingness to disarm and rejoin the peace process (see annex 2).

12. The Panel understands that discussion between the Government of the Central African Republic and representatives of Ali Darassa resulted in reciprocal demands from both sides. Ali Darassa insisted on securing official government positions that had been previously negotiated during the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation.<sup>12</sup> In return, the Government of the Central African Republic requested that Darassa send a list of his fighters to undergo a disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement process as a demonstration of his commitment to the peace process.<sup>13</sup> Central African Republic officials have informed the Panel that Darassa has yet to submit the requested list of fighters (see annex 6).<sup>14</sup>

13. The Government of the Central African Republic remains open to Darassa's return to the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation,<sup>15</sup> but reportedly two key points of contention remain: (a) demands for previous government positions do not take into account the new political and security situation; and (b) his insistence on the recognition of military credentials and rankings for armed group members in accordance with regular army structure. In the case of Darassa, this would necessitate his appointment as a general in the army.<sup>16</sup>

14. Senior sources from UPC and other armed groups, as well as the Government, expressed the belief that Darassa was not genuinely committed to peace talks. They suggested that he was rather playing delay tactics to reorganize and strengthen his position in the light of the weakening of his UPC.<sup>17</sup>

15. Ultimately, Darassa did not meet the demand of the Government of the Central African Republic to engage his fighters in the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement process, and his CPC-F faction has since gone on the offensive and conducted attacks against the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic and allies. On 4 December 2024, CPC-F, through one of its spokespersons, issued a communiqué claiming responsibility for an attack on the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic in the village of May-Mbaya (Ouham prefecture, near the Chadian border) and that it had seized military equipment from them. In the communiqué, it is claimed that the attack was carefully planned and was part of a strategy devised by the chief of staff, Darassa (see annex 7).

### C. Al-Khatim negotiations with the Government of the Central African Republic in Chad

16. Mahamat al-Khatim, the leader of MPC,<sup>18</sup> remains in detention in N'Djamena, under circumstances that remain unclear. During the Panel's visit to Chad in August 2024, it obtained a copy of a cooperation agreement signed by Al-Khatim and representatives of both the Central African Republic and Chad. The document highlights agreements related to bilateral security, cross-border cooperation and measures to address armed groups operating in the region (see annex 8).

<sup>12</sup> Following the signing of the 2019 Khartoum agreement, Darassa was appointed military adviser (ranking as deputy minister) to the Prime Minister.

<sup>13</sup> Confidential government sources.

<sup>14</sup> Corroborated during a meeting with minister of State in charge of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and monitoring the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation.

<sup>15</sup> Confidential government sources.

<sup>16</sup> Confidential sources close to the negotiations.

<sup>17</sup> Confidential government and armed group sources.

<sup>18</sup> S/2024/444, paras. 11 and 12.

17. The Panel continues to investigate the reasons for Al-Khatim's detention, focusing on whether it stems from allegations regarding payments that were due, or broader regional security concerns.<sup>19</sup>

#### **D. Armed groups outside the framework of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation**

##### **1. Coalition militaire de salut du peuple et de redressement (CMSPR)**

18. The Panel noted the emergence of a new entity known as the Coalition militaire de salut du peuple et de redressement (CMSPR), led by Armel Mingatoloum Sayo, leader of the dissolved Revolution et justice (RJ) armed group and signatory of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation.<sup>20</sup> CMSPR claims to consist of non-signatory armed groups to the Agreement, including Florent Kema's Front de défense des libertés publiques (FDLP), which is also part of CPC-F.

19. Armel Mingatoloum Sayo was director of security for a former President, Ange-Félix Patassé. He was a minister in the Government of Faustin-Archange Touadéra from April 2020 to February 2021. His new group operates in Lim-Pendé prefecture. The Panel continues to investigate the actual significance of CMSPR.

##### **2. Recent developments in the Parti pour le rassemblement de la nation centrafricaine (PRNC)**

20. Mahamat Deya<sup>21</sup> was appointed chief of staff of PRNC following the death of Mohamed Ali, alias "B13", who was killed in an exchange of fire with the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic on 31 January 2024.<sup>22</sup>

21. While PRNC is not formally a member of CPC, there is frequent contact and occasional cooperation between CPC (UPC and FPRC in particular) and individual PRNC elements, including Mahamat Deya (see annex 9).<sup>23</sup>

*Nourd Gregaza<sup>24</sup> arrested upon arrival in the Central African Republic*

22. On 20 September 2024, Nourd Gregaza, the president of PRNC was escorted by French law enforcement officers onto an Air France flight from Paris to Bangui.<sup>25</sup> Nourd Gregaza had been in prison in France since 2004, convicted of murder. His sentence included a permanent ban from French territory upon release. On his arrival at Bangui M'Poko International Airport, Gregaza was arrested by Central African authorities and transferred to the Camp de Roux annex of Ngaragba prison, which is designated for high profile detainees. See annex 10 for information about Gregaza.

23. In a press release of 25 September 2024, the Office of the Public Prosecutor confirmed the arrest of Nourd Gregaza, and stated that, as the founding president of

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., paras. 13–15.

<sup>20</sup> Confidential armed group and community sources and interviews. See [S/2023/360](#), para. 52.

<sup>21</sup> [S/2023/360](#), paras. 9–19; [S/2019/930](#); paras. 59–62; and [S/2020/662](#), para. 32.

<sup>22</sup> The Panel had been investigating the role of Mohamed Ali in the kidnapping of two male staff members of the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and a male technical staff member of the Ministry of Public Works and Road Maintenance on 11 November 2022 in Ndiffa, Vakaga prefecture. See [S/2023/360](#), paras. 169–179; and [S/2024/444](#), para. 47.

<sup>23</sup> For example, in February 2023, Mahamat Deya was part of a group of CPC elements from UPC and FPRC that kidnapped 20 Armed Forces of the Central African Republic elements near Ndah, Sikikédé. See [S/2023/360](#), para. 15.

<sup>24</sup> See [S/2019/608](#), annex 2.7

<sup>25</sup> Nourd Gregaza is a Central African national. The Ambassador of the Central African Republic to France, Flavien Mbata, confirmed having provided a consular laissez-passer for him to travel to Bangui. Meeting with Mr. Mbata, 3 December 2024.

PRNC, he was being investigated for his responsibility as the mastermind of “multiple serious human rights violations by his armed group”, including “attacks against the defence and security forces of MINUSCA and its allies, looting of civilian property, arson of dwellings, and hostage-taking, and related offences.”<sup>26</sup>

24. On 23 September 2024, PRNC elements led by Mahamat Deya attacked State security forces in Sam Ouandja, Haute-Kotto prefecture. The group pillaged weapons from government forces and then withdrew from town. The Panel was informed that this attack was carried out in reaction to Gregaza’s arrest.<sup>27</sup> He continues to represent the grievances of a portion of the Goula population, which does not feel represented by Goula former armed group leaders currently in government.<sup>28</sup>

### **III. Adaptation of armed group financing to changing local and regional security context**

25. Armed groups continued to experience a downward trend in the scale and predictability of financing from illicit trade and taxation, as a result of loss of territorial control.<sup>29</sup> Individuals associated with armed groups, civil society and government sources unanimously reported that the extension of State authority, military operations, the presence of the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic and Russian instructors and international economic actors disrupted armed groups’ control over mining and impacted their ability to illegitimately tax transhumance movements. Consequently, armed groups have adapted their financing models to include more sporadic income-generating activities, such as kidnapping for ransom and road banditry and offering their services as mercenary fighters.

#### **A. Developments in armed group financing in western Central African Republic**

##### **1. Mining**

26. Control of gold and diamond mine sites had long served as a key component of armed group financial strategies<sup>30</sup> but has been in decline since 2021 as a result of security operations by the Government and its allies.

27. In Nana-Mambéré prefecture, armed groups continued to derive funding from mining activities, but their hold over the sector has been substantially reduced. In Bouar, the anti-balaka Ndalé brothers and their elements continued to traffic diamonds and gold but were no longer able to control mine sites.<sup>31</sup> Sylvain Adamou

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<sup>26</sup> <https://oubanguimédias.com/2024/09/26/centrafrique-le-parquet-de-la-republique-pres-du-tribunal-de-grande-instance-reagi-suite-a-larrestation-de-gregaza-nour/> (Oubangi Médias, 26 September 2024).

<sup>27</sup> Confidential government and security sector sources.

<sup>28</sup> These include: Arnaud Djoubaye Abazène (ex-RRPC), Minister of Justice; Herbert Gontran Djono Ahaba (ex-RRPC), Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation; and Guismala Hamza, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, (ex-FPRC-Goula). It should be noted that Guismala Hamza was serving as Minister of Equipment and Public Works in November 2022, when PRNC kidnapped two UNOPS staff members and an official from the Ministry of Equipment and Public Works.

<sup>29</sup> Confidential sources: international economic operators in Bangui; civil society; government; officials of the Ministry of Mines and Geology; and the Central African Republic security sector.

<sup>30</sup> S/2019/930, paras. 92–101.

<sup>31</sup> S/2023/360, para. 31; S/2023/87, annex 21; and S/2018/1119, para. 115.

Ndalé<sup>32</sup> continued to pre-finance artisanal miners in Zotoua-Bangarem commune and smuggled raw materials to Cameroon.<sup>33</sup>

28. 3R have lost control of a series of productive mine sites and bases across Nana-Mambéré prefecture. For example, Idéré, a remote hamlet in the south-west of Nana-Mambéré, near the border with Cameroon, was known as a significant gold mine and logistical base for 3R. Until 2021, the group imposed taxes on artisanal miners both for access to the mine site and on the quantities of gold extracted. 3R lost control of Idéré and other sites across the prefecture in 2021, making the involvement of 3R in mining in Nana-Mambéré more sporadic and opportunistic, with the group occasionally mounting attacks on mine sites and pillaging resources from miners and collectors.<sup>34</sup>

29. Gold and diamond collectors in the border town of Garoua Boulaï, Cameroon – a well-documented transit point for illicitly trafficked gold from the Central African Republic<sup>35</sup> – informed the Panel that they had observed a substantial reduction in the levels of gold and diamonds received from the Central African Republic over the past two years.<sup>36</sup>

## **2. Taxation of transhumance**

30. Taxation of transhumance continued to be a source of income for 3R; however, this activity has become increasingly chaotic since the death of the group's former leader, sanctioned individual Bi Sidi Souleman (CFI.014), also known as Sidiki Abass. Sources from civil society and the Fulani community reported that, under the 3R leader, “general” Bobbo, the collection of taxes from herders has become unpredictable, with members of the armed group extorting money or livestock, without a clear system or illicit tax collection schedule. 3R has continued to maintain a significant income from these activities, counterbalancing losses in the mining sector.

31. Sources observed that, despite significant losses, 3R continued to be one of the best resourced groups in the Central African Republic, pointing to other sources for financing and resupply.<sup>37</sup> The Panel continues to investigate its means of financing.

## **3. Kidnapping for ransom and road banditry increasingly becoming core sources of financing**

32. Kidnapping for ransom and road banditry, often referred to as *coupeurs de route* in the Central African Republic, have continued to increase in western Central African Republic and across the country. This escalation is attributed to armed groups experiencing a decline in their overall territorial control, in particular over mining areas and transport routes, leading them to adopt hit-and-run-style attacks.<sup>38</sup>

33. On 19 November 2024, a Cameroonian lorry driver, Awalou Mohamadou, was killed by armed assailants on the National Route-1 after he crossed the border at Garoua Boulaï, Cameroon.<sup>39</sup> The killing led to a public outcry from the Cameroonian transport sector, with civil society organizations in the road transport sector issuing

<sup>32</sup> S/2021/569, para. 36.

<sup>33</sup> Confidential sources: civil society; and local conflict analysts.

<sup>34</sup> Confidential sources: civil society; and demobilized armed group members.

<sup>35</sup> S/2023/360, para. 126; and S/2021/569, paras. 154–165.

<sup>36</sup> Confidential sources: gold and diamond buying houses in Cameroon and Central African Republic; civil society.

<sup>37</sup> Confidential armed group, demobilized armed group, Fulani and civil society sources.

<sup>38</sup> Confidential civil society, media, government and local officials, international and local Central African Republic analyst sources.

<sup>39</sup> National Route 1 (RN-1) is the road connecting Bangui to the border with Cameroon.

an official statement on 22 November condemning the act.<sup>40</sup> The incident demonstrates the impact that road transport insecurity can have on the overall economy, as it prompted the transport workers' union to declare a strike, which resulted in a halt to transport activities, severely impacting the supply of essential goods, including fuel, to the Central African Republic and leading to a rise in commodity prices. The Panel understands that disruptions on this main economic artery pose a socioeconomic challenge with potential security implications.

34. The Panel is investigating armed groups and associated individuals operating in these areas that are threatening this crucial economic artery.

## B. Developments in armed group financing in eastern Central African Republic

35. The involvement of Central African Republic armed group elements working as mercenaries in the Sudan has increasingly served as a significant source of financing for armed groups in the eastern region, as other income sources have declined in the face of military operations and the extension of State authority across the territory. The Panel was able to confirm that individuals linked to CPC were observed working with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Sudan throughout 2023 and 2024.<sup>41</sup> Habib Hereka has served as a key coordinator for mercenary recruitment from the Central African Republic on behalf of RSF in the Sudan. Key CPC leaders involved in brokering mercenary support agreements included senior UPC "generals" such as "general" Garga, "general" Moussa, also known as "Chauffeur", "general" Abdu and the late "general" Wadal Oumda. These individuals travelled to Tulus and Nyala, South Darfur, during the reporting period.<sup>42</sup>

36. The Panel received information about several key movements of mercenaries from the Central African Republic to the Sudan that took place in June and July 2024, just before the peak of the Central African Republic rainy season. For example, in July 2024, the CPC leader, Saleh Zabadi, and Adam Omar Abdelbari (also known as Abu Serwalein) travelled to Nyala to join RSF. They brought with them 200 CPC elements from the MPC armed group, who were placed under the command of RSF General Abu Aqla Keikel Abu Dega. The Panel was informed that these forces were used as reinforcements for an attack on El Fasher, led by Abu Dega. In addition, Ali Al-Habib Jeddo, another former MPC commander previously based in the Kaga Bandoro region, has served as a key interlocutor in recruiting and arranging for the transport of fighters from the Central African Republic to the Sudan. Ali Al-Habib Jeddo and FPRC "general" Issa Masih departed the Central African Republic with 300 fighters, relocating to the Nyala region from June to July 2024.<sup>43</sup>

### *Compensation model*

37. While the details regarding compensation agreements vary, the Panel received concrete information about a number of payment arrangements. For example, RSF commanders based in Umm Dafog, notably Saleh al-Foti and Anamoya Ahmed, paid fighters arriving from the Central African Republic a sum of \$2,000 each per month of fighting, with the first instalment paid upon arrival. An FPRC element confirmed to the Panel that he had received approximately \$8,000 for fighting in the Sudan for

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<sup>40</sup> Media sources, verified by community, economic and civil society sources.

<sup>41</sup> S/2024/444, paras. 16–22.

<sup>42</sup> Confidential sources: senior former political and armed group sources; meetings in Chad; and international community sources in Bangui.

<sup>43</sup> Confidential sources in Vakaga prefecture.

four months, with payments delivered by an individual named Bakit Musa (Moussa) in Um Dukhun.<sup>44</sup>

38. The Panel notes that, in addition to individual salaries paid to fighters, armed group leaders who broker these deals also receive a fee, and their elements are effectively fed and trained while on mission, reducing their operating costs at home. In addition, in-kind deals for reciprocal support have developed. For example, the Panel received information that the CPC armed groups mentioned above – UPC, MPC and FPRC – have made arrangements to receive support in the form of arms transfers, primarily from South Darfur, to disrupt the upcoming elections in the Central African Republic.<sup>45</sup>

39. Regional recruitment and flows of mercenary fighters have the potential to create ripples of instability affecting local, national and regional politics and security. The Panel will continue to closely monitor these developments.

## **IV. Responses to cross-border criminal activities, including stabilization of natural resources trade**

### **A. National Border Policy continued to advance**

40. On 17 April 2024, the Government of the Central African Republic held the inaugural session for the National Border Management Commission, established on the basis of a new border policy issued in May 2023 called the National Policy for Border Area Management of the Central African Republic (*Politique Nationale de Gestion des Espaces Frontaliers de la République Centrafricaine* – PNCEF-RCA). During the meeting, the National Border Management Commission, which falls under the authority of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Local Development, presented the 2024–2033 national action plan for border management (*Plan d’Action 2024–2033 de Mise en Œuvre de la Politique Nationale de Gestion des Espaces Frontaliers de la république Centrafricaine*) and sought to mobilize funds to support its implementation.<sup>46</sup>

41. Under the new border policy, the Government of the Central African Republic continued to make progress on security sector reform, including the inauguration of a new police station in Beloko equipped with Migration Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS) technology. The Beloko station demonstrates investment in training and technology for border officials – critical for any border policy implementation.<sup>47</sup>

### **B. Mining code updated**

42. On 21 August 2024, the Government of the Central African Republic promulgated a new mining code providing an updated legal framework and oversight structures for the mining sector. This legislation is the result of a consultative process initiated in 2021 and is aimed at addressing illicit trafficking in natural resources by armed groups. Government officials informed the Panel that they view the new regulations introduced in the mining code as a return to operating practices prior to

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<sup>44</sup> Confidential diplomatic sources.

<sup>45</sup> Confidential armed group sources and community leaders.

<sup>46</sup> Confidential sources in the international and diplomatic community in Bangui.

<sup>47</sup> Panel visit to Beloko police station and border post; confidential sources in the international and diplomatic community in Bangui.

the 2013 crisis, rather than a marked change.<sup>48</sup> See annex 11 for an overview of key changes in the new mining code.

### **C. General Inspectorate for Mines and Special Anti-Fraud Unit extend their presence and operations aimed at combating fraud**

43. The General Inspectorate for Mines worked with the Special Anti-Fraud Unit (USAf) – a mixed internal security force made up of gendarmes and police officers responsible for the identification, investigation and prosecution of offences relating to mining fraud, trafficking, etc.<sup>49</sup> – continued to extend its presence and demonstrated signs of increased operational capacity. Officials informed the Panel that units of the Special Anti-Fraud Unit had been re-established across most of the country (see map in annex 12). Official sources observed that, although Special Anti-Fraud Unit agents were posted across all the areas listed, in practice, units were not operational in the artisanal mining areas of Bozoum, Bossangoa, Bria, Mobaye, Ndélé, Rafai and Abba or in the industrial mining area of Ndassima. Their movement was restricted either owing to armed group presence or ongoing security operations.<sup>50</sup>

44. The Special Anti-Fraud Unit, with support from the General Inspectorate for Mines, conducted investigations which resulted in three companies having their permits revoked or suspended during the reporting period. See annex 13 for details.

### **D. Kimberley Process partial embargo on the Central African Republic lifted, marking full resumption of exports in rough diamonds**

45. During the Kimberley Process plenary meeting held in Dubai from 12 to 15 November 2024, the Central African Republic was fully readmitted to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, lifting the partial embargo on Central African Republic rough diamond exports (see annex 14). The decision was preceded by a Kimberley Process review mission to the Central African Republic from 9 to 15 September 2024, which visited key diamond producing areas (see annex 15).

46. The Panel will continue to monitor as mandated by paragraph 32 (h) of resolution 2399 (2018), as renewed by paragraph 6 of resolution 2745 (2024).

### **E. Monitoring official exports of gold and diamond trade**

47. In 2023, official export statistics indicated an increase in gold exports, with over 1.7 tons of gold declared (compared with 1.5 tons exported in 2022). However, preliminary figures for 2024 (January until mid-December) reveal a substantial decrease, with exports decreasing to 0.7 tonnes – less than half the export levels the previous year.<sup>51</sup> Government sources pointed to the closure of two buying houses – Swiss Gold Value and Sigma Gold – as the reason for the decline. The Panel will look into this matter further.

48. Rough diamond exports have steadied, with year-to-date figures in December 2024 reaching 112,807 carats, slightly higher than 2023. Overall, official diamond

<sup>48</sup> Meetings with officials from the Ministry of Mines and Geology.

<sup>49</sup> See <https://www.mines.gouv.cf/direction/19/lutte-anti-fraude>.

<sup>50</sup> Meetings with officials from the Ministry of Mines and Geology.

<sup>51</sup> Official government trade statistics from the Ministry of Mines and Geology, on file with the Secretariat.

exports have increased since 2021, peaking in 2022 at 115,607 carats exported, as compared with just 50,410 carats declared in 2020.

49. Although official statistics provided an indication of the scale of gold and diamond exports, sources – including government officials – observed that possibly as much as 90 per cent of gold and diamonds produced continued to leave the country via illicit trafficking routes, serving as a source of funding for conflict actors, which continued to feed violence.

## **F. Central African Republic suspended from Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative membership until 2027**

50. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Board temporarily suspended the Central African Republic from membership of the Initiative, citing poor implementation of its standards and breaches of its civil society protocol. The Government has until January 2027 to take corrective action, with support from the Initiative secretariat.<sup>52</sup>

## **V. Illicit arms trafficking related to armed groups and associated individuals**

51. As mandated in paragraph 2 of resolution [2745 \(2024\)](#), the Panel worked to trace the supply, sale and transfer of arms, ammunition and military materiel to armed groups and associated individuals. While the main trafficking routes in the Central African Republic remain intact, the overall financing for these groups has diminished, leading to a decrease in both the volume and frequency of arms purchases. This reduction in funding has, in turn, slowed the flow of weapons. However, the illicit trafficking networks that sustain these routes continue to operate beneath the surface. This means that the armed groups have the potential to reignite those sources of weapons should there be a sudden influx of financial or in-kind support. This dynamic sets the stage for ongoing instability, as external investments or shifts in the regional security environment could quickly fuel a resurgence in arms trafficking. The following analysis contains details of the weapons collected through the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement process, highlighting how the weapons are being traced and the challenges in maintaining an effective database.

### **A. Increased use of improvised explosive devices**

52. The Panel received information from several sources regarding the use of increasingly sophisticated improvised explosive devices in the Central African Republic, which they said were deployed in attacks against specific Armed Forces of the Central African Republic and Russian instructors' bases. The Panel continues to investigate.

53. The Panel obtained photographs of some of these improvised explosive devices, which showed the use of explosives such as C-4 and other military-grade explosives..

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<sup>52</sup> See “Central African Republic is temporarily suspended by the EITI Board: outcome of the Validation of Central African Republic,” 12 November 2024, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative website (<https://eiti.org/news/central-african-republic-temporarily-suspended-eiti-board>); also meetings with government, civil society and international non-governmental organization (NGO) sources.

These devices featured advanced detonation systems, including integrated timers or gyroscopes.

54. Furthermore, the Panel is currently analysing information gathered on the ground during its previous two visits to the Central African Republic regarding the potential involvement of armed groups in the manufacturing of improvised explosive devices.<sup>53</sup>

## **B. Baseline analysis of arms and ammunition collected through the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement process from 2018 to 2024**

55. Data utilized for analysis in this section were provided to the Panel by the Government of the Central African Republic. The data set covers the period from December 2018 to April 2024. Each record includes information on the location of weapon collection, weapon type, calibre, origin, functionality and condition. In addition, the data identify the armed group associated with each weapon, providing valuable insight into which groups are most involved in disarmament processes. This data set enables a multilayered analysis, focused on weapon quantities, weapon types, armed group affiliations and the geographical distribution of disarmament activities (see annex 17, figure 3).

56. Ultimately, the data under analysis provide an overview of the disarmament component of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement process, with a total of 3,320 weapons collected in the period under analysis. To participate in the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement process it is required to surrender a functional firearm, excluding artisanal weapons from the process.

57. The Panel's preliminary analysis reveals that, unsurprisingly, FPRC and anti-balaka factions, as two of the largest groupings of armed elements in the Central African Republic, have relinquished more firearms than other armed groups (see annex 16, figure 1).

### **1. Range of weapons collected during disarmament**

58. The data set shows the prevalence of specific weapon types, with assault rifles such as the AK-pattern assault rifles emerging as the most collected weapon. This category also includes similar models, such as the MAS-36, FAL and G3 rifles, which are widely used in the Central African Republic and throughout the region owing to their reliability and availability. These weapons collectively represent the backbone of many armed groups' arsenals, suggesting that the conflict in the Central African Republic relies heavily on automatic and semi-automatic rifles, which allow for sustained engagements with minimal logistical support (see annex 17, figure 2).

59. A total of 1,480 AK assault rifles were surrendered across various locations. The MAS-36 rifle is next, with 515 units collected. Determining the exact number of MAS-36 rifles introduced into the Central African Republic is challenging owing to limited historical records. However, available data provide some insight into their prevalence. In October 1963, shortly after the country's independence, the national army possessed 1,017 weapons, with the MAS-36 rifle comprising nearly two thirds of this arsenal. This suggests that approximately 678 MAS-36 rifles were in service at that time. These rifles were likely supplied by France during the colonial period and remained in use post-independence. The continued presence of MAS-36 rifles in

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<sup>53</sup> Confidential armed group and demobilized armed group sources.

the Central African Republic military inventory underscores their significance in the nation's early defence forces.

60. The MAT-49, a submachine gun with considerable firepower, ranks third, with 279 units. Historically, the MAT-49, known for its durability and reliability, was among the firearms supplied to the Central African Republic army to bolster the national military's capabilities. These weapons are frequently found in collections, indicating their critical role in the conflict and highlighting the focus of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement operations on reducing the prevalence of these high-risk arms.

## **2. Identification of rare weapon types and locations**

61. Weapons less common in the Central African Republic context, although collected in low quantities, provide valuable insights into localized conflict dynamics, arms trafficking and the diversity of weapons within the Central African Republic. The analysis identified several locations where unusual weapon types were collected, including Bouar, Zoukoumbo, Gambo and Ndélé.

62. In Ndélé, an AT4-Spigot surface-to-surface missile was documented, marking a significant discovery. The AT4-Spigot, typically used for anti-armour operations, highlights the potential for advanced weaponry to be present in localized conflict zones, underscoring the complexity of arms flow.

63. The Panel intends to further investigate the origin of these rare weapons.

64. The data and weapon collection points also illustrate the spread and presence of armed groups across the Central African Republic (see annex 17, figure 1).

65. The disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement data also highlight that certain groups possessed more sophisticated arsenals than others: notably, FPRC surrendered 373 AK rifles, 1 Fagot-Spigot missile, 8 60-mm mortars, 1 80-mm mortar, 1 DShK heavy machine gun, 5 12.7-mm heavy machine guns, 75 rocket-propelled grenade launchers and 2 AA-52 machine guns. Geographically, FPRC is predominantly located in central and north-eastern Central African Republic, with the largest weapon collections from the group recorded in Bria (321 weapons), Ndélé (286) and Ouanda Djallé (106). These figures demonstrate how crucial the group's proximity to supply routes through the borders with the Sudan and South Sudan have been in contributing to the diversity and sophistication of their weaponry (see annex 18, figure 4).

## **3. Ammunition analysis**

66. The availability and procurement of ammunition significantly influence armed groups' choices to acquire, retain and deploy specific types of weapons. For example, MAS-36 ammunition (7.5-mm) is scarce in the region, limiting the operational utility of the MAS-36 rifle.

## **4. Importance of ensuring separation of weapons collected through the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement process and weapons collected in the course of security operations**

67. The Panel received information that weapons collected in the course of security operations are being commingled with those in the National Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation Programme Execution Unit (Unité d'Exécution du programme national de désarmement, démantèlement, réintroduction et rapatriement – UEPNDDRR) inventory/database. This is a concern, as it risks distortion of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement tracking

process, jeopardizing the accuracy of historical as opposed to current tracing of arms circulation in the region.<sup>54</sup>

## VI. Overview of the humanitarian situation

### A. Disruption of and further defections from the Lord's Resistance Army

68. Civilians and ex-combatants from the sanctioned entity the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA, CFe.002) continued to escape and defect from the group, while the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic, Russian instructors and the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF), intensified their search for LRA fighters in north-eastern Central African Republic. On 17 January 2024, the Governments of Uganda and the Central African Republic signed a memorandum of understanding on bilateral military cooperation (an earlier memorandum of understanding was signed in 2017 and expired in 2022). On 7 October 2024, during a State visit by President Touadéra to Uganda, the two countries signed a follow-up implementation agreement to operationalize the January memorandum of understanding.

69. From April 2024 onward, civilians and ex-combatants were able to escape LRA, and arrived in or near Sam Ouandja, as well as other towns and villages in Haute-Kotto prefecture. The Panel received new information about the defectors and continues to monitor their humanitarian situation. The Panel received reports from NGO workers and local sources who believed that these defections were likely a result of disruption caused by an attack on 7 April 2024 on a camp known as "Yemen", approximately 70 km south-east of Sam Ouandja, by the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic and Russian instructors. The attack created some chaos and provided an opportunity for individuals who wished to abandon the group to do so. Sanctioned individual Joseph Kony (CFi.009) was reported as being at "Yemen" just one day before the 7 April attack, when he had returned to his own base some 15–18 km further south-east.<sup>55</sup>

70. On 20 August 2024, UPDF announced that they had carried out an operation east of Sam Ouandja, against three camps belonging to Joseph Kony, stating that "all camps were destroyed, and equipment was captured". In the statement, they further warned that "remnants of the LRA still taking refuge in the Central African Republic or elsewhere on the African continent will be hunted down. Unless they surrender to the authorities for proper processing and rehabilitation, they will continue to be considered criminals."<sup>56</sup>

71. While the UPDF attack did not seem to have resulted in the killing or capture of any LRA elements, the Panel was informed that it had unsettled the group and, once again, group members who were held against their will seized the opportunity to escape.

<sup>54</sup> Confidential military and bilateral security sources.

<sup>55</sup> S/2024/444, paras. 72 and 73.

<sup>56</sup> See Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) statement, 20 August 2024, at [https://x.com/MODVA\\_UPDF/status/1825871279808729213](https://x.com/MODVA_UPDF/status/1825871279808729213). See [www.updf.go.ug/bilateral-relations/uganda-and-central-african-republic-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-on-military-cooperation/](http://www.updf.go.ug/bilateral-relations/uganda-and-central-african-republic-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-on-military-cooperation/). Subsequently, on 7 October 2024, during a State visit by the President of the Central African Republic, Faustin Archangel Touadéra, to Uganda, the two countries signed a follow-up implementation agreement to operationalize the January memorandum of understanding. See [www.defence.go.ug/2024/10/07/joint-communique-of-the-ministers-of-defence-of-the-republic-of-uganda-and-the-central-african-republic-kampala-7th-october-2024/](http://www.defence.go.ug/2024/10/07/joint-communique-of-the-ministers-of-defence-of-the-republic-of-uganda-and-the-central-african-republic-kampala-7th-october-2024/).

72. The Panel was informed that one of Joseph Kony's sons, sanctioned individual Salim Kony (CFi.011), had split from his father's group towards the end of 2022.<sup>57</sup> The Panel continues to investigate the whereabouts and armed activities of Salim Kony and his splinter group.

## B. Refugee situation

### *Sudanese refugees*

73. The war in the Sudan continued to disrupt and threaten the lives of the civilian population. On 8 December 2024, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that, since the outbreak of conflict in April 2023, 12.1 million people had been displaced. Of these, 8.9 million were internally displaced, and 3.2 million were registered as refugees in neighbouring countries.<sup>58</sup> In other words, a staggering one quarter of the Sudanese population have left their homes, rendering them vulnerable to exploitation and sexual and gender-based violence and largely dependent on humanitarian assistance for survival.<sup>59</sup>

74. As compared with neighbouring countries, the number of Sudanese refugees in the Central African Republic is relatively modest. By 15 December 2024, UNHCR had registered a total of 36,591 Sudanese refugees (or 1.1 per cent of the total number of registered Sudanese refugees) across the prefectures of Vakaga, Bamingui-Bangoran, Haute-Kotto, Ouaka, Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou. UNHCR emphasized concern that the security situation in these refugee-hosting areas was "highly unstable" owing to the activities of non-State armed groups, "with reports of ongoing human rights abuses".<sup>60</sup>

75. Almost half of the Sudanese refugees in the Central African Republic are based in the Korsi refugee site in Birao, Vakaga prefecture, approximately 65 km from the Sudanese border. From the start of 2024, there was a slow but steady trickle of new refugees arriving in Birao. In March 2024, the Panel reported that there were 10,668 refugees in Korsi. By 1 August this number had risen by 3,388 to 14,056 individuals, and by 30 November, it had risen by another 1,742 individuals, bringing the total to 15,798 refugees, or 6,765 households. Women and girls make up 54 per cent and children 57 per cent of the refugees. These percentages have remained unchanged since the beginning of the year, indicating that most of the refugees are fleeing together as family units.

76. With the onset of the dry season from November 2024 onward, UNHCR noted a predictable increase in the weekly number of new arrivals. In the last week of November, UNHCR reported 345 new arrivals in Korsi, compared with the weekly average of 198 new arrivals in the previous three weeks of November. This increase in new arrivals indicates that the situation on the Sudanese side remains precarious, pushing families to make the perilous journey to Birao in search of assistance and protection.

<sup>57</sup> Confidential NGO sources.

<sup>58</sup> See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Sudan Emergency: population movements from Sudan, 8 December 2024. Available at <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/113055>.

<sup>59</sup> According to the United Nations Population Fund, the population of the Sudan in 2024 was 49.5 million (see [www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/SD](http://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/SD)): 12.1 million constitutes 24.49 per cent of the total population.

<sup>60</sup> See <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/113168>.

### *Unregistered Sudanese refugees in Sikikédé*

77. The Panel was informed that a group of approximately 2,500 Sudanese refugees were staying near Sikikédé (located 157–184 km west of Birao), northern Vakaga prefecture, near the Chad border. During the rainy season from June to December, vehicle road access between Birao and Sikikédé becomes nearly impossible, and UNHCR informed the Panel that the refugees in Sikikédé have not been registered owing to access challenges. Many of the refugees were working and making a living in the mines around Sikikédé and had rejected proposals by UNHCR to relocate to the Korsi site.<sup>61</sup>

## C. Humanitarian situation overview

78. There has been a positive improvement in the humanitarian situation. In the Humanitarian Response Plan for 2024,<sup>62</sup> 2.8 million people, or 46 per cent of the population, were identified as in need of humanitarian assistance. This represents a decrease of 600,000 people compared with 2023, when the figure was 3.4 million people, or 56 per cent of the population.<sup>63</sup>

79. For 2025, the United Nations further reduced its estimate of extremely vulnerable people by 400,000 to 2.4 million who require humanitarian assistance. The reduction is due to improved security in some areas, which also allowed for more than 200,000 internally displaced persons to be locally integrated or to return to their areas of origin in 2024.<sup>64</sup>

80. However, as mentioned in section III, armed groups increasingly engaged in kidnapping for ransom and road banditry to finance their sustenance and activities. From January to November 2024, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recorded a total of 129 incidents in which humanitarian workers in the Central African Republic were adversely affected by military operations, armed group presence and opportunistic criminality.<sup>65</sup> Of these incidents, 43 (33 per cent) were burglaries, robberies and intrusions. This is an improvement as compared with 2023, when 58 per cent (98 incidents) of all reported incidents for the year (169) were burglaries, robberies and intrusions.<sup>66</sup> This could indicate that it is not humanitarians, but ordinary civilians, that are bearing the brunt of intensified armed group banditry.

81. The top three regions where humanitarian workers were affected in 2024 were Bangui (22 incidents, or 17 per cent), Zemio, Haut-Mbomou prefecture (16 incidents, or 13 per cent) and Ndélé, Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture (13 incidents, or 12 per cent).<sup>67</sup> This could reflect intensified armed group activity in and around Zemio throughout the year, with UPC and the armed self-defence group Azande Ani Kpi Gbe

<sup>61</sup> UNHCR and confidential community and civil society sources.

<sup>62</sup> [www.unocha.org/publications/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-humanitarian-response-plan-january-2024](http://www.unocha.org/publications/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-humanitarian-response-plan-january-2024).

<sup>63</sup> See [www.unocha.org/publications/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-humanitarian-fund-annual-report-2023](http://www.unocha.org/publications/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-humanitarian-fund-annual-report-2023).

<sup>64</sup> See <https://humanitarianaction.info/document/global-humanitarian-overview-2025/article/central-african-republic-2>.

<sup>65</sup> See [www.unocha.org/publications/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-overview-incidents-affecting-humanitarian-workers-january-november-2024](http://www.unocha.org/publications/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-overview-incidents-affecting-humanitarian-workers-january-november-2024).

<sup>66</sup> From January to December 2023, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recorded 169 incidents affecting humanitarian workers, including one death and four injured. See [www.unocha.org/publications/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-overview-incidents-affecting-humanitarian-workers-january-december-2023](http://www.unocha.org/publications/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-overview-incidents-affecting-humanitarian-workers-january-december-2023).

<sup>67</sup> See [www.unocha.org/publications/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-overview-incidents-affecting-humanitarian-workers-january-november-2024](http://www.unocha.org/publications/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-overview-incidents-affecting-humanitarian-workers-january-november-2024).

(AAKG) fighting and attacking civilians, despite training received.<sup>68</sup> There has also been a resurgence of armed activity in northern Central African Republic, near the Chadian border.

#### **D. Update on the arrest and ongoing detention of non-governmental organization consultant in the Central African Republic**

82. On 25 May 2024, Joseph Figueira Martin, a consultant for an international humanitarian NGO, Family Health International (FHI 360),<sup>69</sup> was apprehended by the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic and Russian instructors in Zemio, Haut-Mbomou prefecture (see annex 19). He is a dual national of Belgium and Portugal. Since 5 July 2024, Joseph Figueira Martin has remained in detention at Camp de Roux, an annex of Ngaragba prison designated for sensitive detainees located in the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic headquarters compound in Bangui, awaiting trial.

83. The Panel continues to monitor any impact that this case may have on the ability of humanitarian organizations to carry out their work in the Central African Republic.<sup>70</sup>

#### **E. Serious human rights violations**

84. During the course of 2024, the Panel has taken note of and is investigating incidents of serious human rights abuses, in Ouham, Ouaka and Haut-Mbomou prefectures, that may amount to war crimes (see annex 18).

85. The Panel continues to investigate human rights abuses based on ethnic and religious targeting.

### **VII. Implementation of the travel ban on designated individuals**

#### **Travel ban violations**

##### *Ali Kony (CFi.010) in the Sudan, South Sudan and the Central African Republic*

86. The Panel reported on the entry of sanctioned individual Ali Kony (CFi.010) into Uganda in July 2023, along with his statements that he travelled through Sudanese and South Sudanese territory.<sup>71</sup> The Panel is not aware of any request for exemptions to the travel ban for the sanctioned individual Ali Kony. His travel in the Sudan and South Sudan constitutes a violation of the travel ban.

87. In late April 2024, a Ugandan interministerial delegation arrived in Bangui to assist with the repatriation of recent LRA escapees and defectors. The Panel learned that the delegation included Ali Kony.<sup>72</sup> Again, the Panel is not aware of any request

<sup>68</sup> From March 2024, AAKG members have been trained by the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic and Russian instructors.

<sup>69</sup> FHI-360 is headquartered in North Carolina, United States of America. See [www.fhi360.org](http://www.fhi360.org).

<sup>70</sup> The Prosecutor of the Republic issued a press communiqué dated 30 May 2024 indicating that an investigation had been opened into the activities of Mr. Martin for his alleged contact with armed groups operating on Central African Republic territory (see annex 19). In the communiqué, the Prosecutor drew the attention of “NGO staff in the Central African Republic operating on Central African territory [to the need] to refrain from engaging in any acts that may compromise State security, under penalty of legal prosecution”.

<sup>71</sup> See S/2024/444, paras. 99–102.

<sup>72</sup> Confidential community and NGO sources, including based in Gulu, Uganda.

for exemptions to the travel ban. Ali Kony's travel to the Central African Republic constitutes a violation of the travel ban.<sup>73</sup>

## VIII. Recommendations

88. The Panel recommends the following:

**To regional countries and Member States:**

(a) Promote regional and multilateral collaboration on border security, with a specific focus on: (i) monitoring and addressing activities of sanctioned individuals; and (ii) combating cross-border criminal activities in the region.

(b) Increase technical and donor assistance to support the efforts of the Government of the Central African Republic to improve border security and to stabilize and improve oversight and transparency over the natural resources sector, at a critical moment in the extension of State authority over the natural resources sector and full resumption of exports.

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<sup>73</sup> While the birthplace of Ali Kony is unknown to the Panel, if he was born in Uganda then he has a right to return there and his entry into Uganda would not constitute a violation of the travel ban.


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## Annex 1: Methodology

1. The Panel ensured compliance with the methodological standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). These standards call for reliance on verified, genuine documents and concrete evidence and on-site observations by the experts, including taking photographs, wherever possible. When physical inspection is not possible, the Panel will seek to corroborate information using multiple, independent sources to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard, placing a higher value on statements by principal actors and first-hand witnesses to events.
2. The Panel uses satellite imagery of CAR procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations, as well as open-source imagery, where relevant. Commercial databases recording aviation and maritime data will be referenced as required. Public statements by officials and armed group representatives issued as press releases (communiqués), audio clips or media appearances were verified by the Panel. Any mobile phone records, where relevant, from service providers are also accepted as factual. While the Panel wishes to be as transparent as possible, in situations where identifying sources would risk exposing them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel has not included identifying information in the Panel report, but has placed the relevant evidence in United Nations secure archives.
3. The Panel reviewed and included reference to social media posts, where relevant to its investigations. However, evidence and information gleaned from social media was only used in Panel report where it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to meet the appropriate evidentiary standard.
4. The spelling of toponyms within the Central African Republic and broader region often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in reports. All major locations in CAR and other regional countries are spelled or referenced as per the UN Geographical Information System (GIS) map.
5. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of four out of the five members including the coordinator. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
6. The Panel is committed to impartiality in investigating incidents of non-compliance by any party.
7. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and will endeavour to provide the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in the majority of incidents that are currently in investigation. Their response will be taken into consideration in the Panel's findings for the final report.

**Annex 2: CPC Statement signed by Ali Darassa (CFi.015) dated 26 July 2024, announcing a cessation of hostilities with the Government of CAR government**



qui est le facteur explicatif de la crise multi dimensionnelle dans laquelle se débat le pays depuis plusieurs années. C'est ainsi qu'il a toujours participé à toutes les négociations, signé tous les accords susceptibles de conduire à une paix juste, garantissant la sécurité, la sûreté du peuple centrafricain et conduisant à l'application de mesures garantissant un développement équilibré de toutes les régions du pays, au profit de l'ensemble du peuple centrafricain. Ils n'ont ainsi jamais été à l'origine d'aucune rupture des accords auxquels ils ont été partis, mais ont toujours réagi au non-respect, par la partie gouvernementale, de ses engagements. Ils ont aussi constamment fait preuve d'ouverture et sont toujours tout aussi constamment retournés à la table de négociation afin de rechercher les solutions pertinentes au drame qui accable les populations centrafricaines.

Fidèle à cette ligne et soucieux de l'avènement d'une paix juste et durable en république centrafricaine, la Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC), par la voix du coordonnateur militaire, chef d'état-major général de la coalition des patriotes pour le changement CPC, le général d'armée **ALI DARASSA MAHAMAT**, décide de :

- Mettre fin à toutes les hostilités sur l'étendue du territoire de la RCA et que cela s'impose à toutes les deux (02) parties ;
- Réaffirmer son ouverture à tous les pourparlers avec le Gouvernement Centrafricain visant à ramener la paix, la sécurité et la cohésion sociale en République Centrafricaine, dans l'intérêt bien compris de la patrie. C'est le lieu pour la Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC) de rappeler son attachement itérativement déclaré, à la feuille de route de Luanda discutée et signée au Tchad par les leaders des mouvements politico militaires centrafricains, sous la supervision de leurs Excellences les Chefs des Etats de la CIRGL et la CEEAC.

Par ailleurs, la CPC demande aux garants et facilitateurs de la feuille de route de Luanda de revoir les dispositions et les engagements de cet accord, et profite de l'occasion pour remercier tous les partenaires techniques et financiers de la République-Centrafricaine, mais aussi les pays frères pour les efforts qu'ils déploient pour le retour de la paix en RCA.

Tout en présentant ses vœux de paix, de sécurité et de cohésion sociale au Peuple Centrafricain, Le Chef d'Etat-Major de la coalition des Patriotes pour le

Changement (CPC) réaffirme s'ouvrir de bonne foi, en toute sincérité donc, dans un esprit patriotique, avec pour toute préoccupation le retour d'une paix juste et durable en république centrafricaine. Il attend des partenaires gouvernementaux les mêmes dispositions.

Vive la Paix, la Sécurité et la Cohésion Sociale en République Centrafricaine.

Fait à Batangafo, le 26 juillet 2024

**Le Coordonnateur Militaire et Chef d'Etat-Major de la CPC**



**Le Général d'Armée ALI DARASSA MAHAMAT**

**Ampliations :**

**Union Africaine**

**CEEAC**

**CIRGL**


**MINUSCA**

**Gouvernement**

**Angola**

**Chrono/Archives**

**Annex 3: CPC statement dated 4 August 2024, signed by François Bozizé (CFI.001), rebuking cessation of hostilities statement signed by Ali Darassa on 26 July.**



armés de la Coalition. Il y a bientôt un an, DARASSA n'a jamais pris part directement ni par représentant interposé à aucun Conseil des leaders, mais à toujours trouvé des justificatifs pour être absent.

N'a-t-il pas déclaré dans un de ses Communiqués qu'il se "désengageait" des autres leaders qui se trouvent à l'extérieur, pendant que lui-même venait d'élire domicile avec femmes et enfants de l'autre côté de la frontière ?

Le Communiqué de presse de Mr DARASSA n'engage que lui-même et ceux qui le manipulent.

La Coordination générale de la CPC voudrait ici porter à l'attention du peuple centrafricain et de la Communauté internationale que l'option d'un dialogue avec le pouvoir, pour être légitime, relève de la décision du Conseil des leaders de la Coalition ; elle ne peut être le fait d'un individu intéressé et manipulé, qui n'a pas la capacité de prendre la mesure des enjeux d'une négociations de paix. Ce genre d'attitude a été à la base des échecs des groupes armés dans les précédentes négociations de paix.

Le dialogue restera toujours une option, mais pas à n'importe quelle condition. Pour la CPC, la démarche d'un dialogue avec le pouvoir devra se faire en prenant en compte les points de vue de tous ceux qui ont pris une part importante dans la lutte, aux côtés de la CPC, pour la libération du peuple centrafricain.

Le Communiqué de DARASSA est un coup d'épée dans l'eau pour plusieurs raisons : Premièrement, DARASSA n'est pas qualifié pour faire une telle déclaration. Il aurait pu éviter le ridicule en faisant ce Communiqué au nom de son mouvement, l'UPC.


Deuxièmement, s'il espère fronder, DARASSA n'a pas l'aval de tous les autres leaders et encore moins des combattants sur le terrain. Sa tentative de se les aliéner en usurpant l'avis des leaders dans une décision de nomination en grades de certains hommes ne changera rien car ces hommes ne se battent pas pour des galons et des titres ; ils portent en eux le dessein d'un Centrafrique libéré de Wagner et du règne tyrannique de TOUADÉRA. Même au sein de l'UPC dont il est le leader, tous ne le suivront pas.

La Coordination générale regrette d'avoir confié le sort des combattants à quelqu'un qui se manifeste étranger aux souffrances du peuple et qui n'est guidé que par la recherche de ses propres intérêts. Elle demande aux vaillants combattants de la liberté de garder leur calme et de s'attendre à une ère nouvelle pour la libération du pays.

Pour en finir, le Conseil des leaders se réunira sous peu pour se prononcer sur les multiples bavures de Mr DARASSA et en tirer les mesures salutaires pour la Coalition.

Fait à Bissau, le 4 Août 2024

Le Coordinateur général



Général François BOZIZÉ YANGOUVONDA

**Annex 4: Statement dated 30 August 2024, announcing the creation of the CPC-Fondamentale and listing the appointment of leaders for the splinter-coalition**

**COALITION DES PATRIOTES POUR LE CHANGEMENT-FONDAMENTALE (CPC-F)**

***“Centrafrrique pour le bien de tous”***

**PROCES VERBAL DE L'ASSEMBLEE EXTRAORDINAIRE**

Le 30 aout deux mil vingt et quatre à 9 heures 30 minutes à May-mbaya, sur convocation des leaders signataires de la **CPC**, s'est tenue une assemblée extraordinaire pour examiner la situation globale du mouvement. Cette séance a connu la participation des autres groupes armés voulant se joindre à la coalition.

Etaient présents à cette séance les groupes armés suivants :

- **Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrrique (UPC)**
- **Front Patriotique pour la Renaissance de Centrafrrique (FPRC)**
- **Mouvement de la Révolution Populaire Anti Balaka (AB)**
- **Front de Défense pour les Libertés Publiques (FDLP)**

Etaient absents :

- **Retour, Réclamation, et Réhabilitation (3R)**
- **Front de la Démocratie des Peuples Centrafricains (FDPC)**

Mise en place terminée, le Général **Ali Darassa Mahamat** a été désigné comme le président de la séance et le sieur **Kalam Kouloum** en qualité du rapporteur

L'ordre du jour portait les points suivants :

1. Etat des lieux de la gestion de la **CPC** et dissolution de son bureau politique
2. Modification de la dénomination de la coalition
3. Mise en place d'un Comité ad hoc
4. Désignation des membres du bureau du Comité ad hoc
5. Divers

S'agissant du premier point, le président de la séance a informé les leaders des groupes armés présents du contexte de la gestion de la **CPC** durant les quatre années d'existence. Tous ont constaté la gestion opaque du mouvement par la coordination générale, et ont aussi souligné plusieurs causes du dysfonctionnement. Par conséquent, ils ont décidé de la dissolution du bureau politique.

Concernant le deuxième point, l'assemblée réunie a par la même occasion apportée une modification sur la dénomination du mouvement. Désormais c'est la Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement - Fondamentale (**CPC-F**).

Le troisième point a été consacré la mise en place d'un comité ad hoc chargé de redéfinir les objectifs de la **CPC-F** et gérer les affaires courantes avant la tenue de l'assemblée générale. Enfin, après les échanges houleux sur la composition du bureau, les participants se sont convenus sur un bureau composé de dix (10) membres dont les différents postes sont :

- ✓ **Un Coordonnateur Général par intérim**
- ✓ **Un 1er Vice Coordonnateur**
- ✓ **Un 2è Vice Coordonnateur**
- ✓ **Un 3è vice coordonnateur**

- ✓ **Un Coordonnateur Militaire**
- ✓ **Un Secrétariat Général**
- ✓ **Un chargé des relations extérieures**
- ✓ **Un chargé des relations avec les humanitaires**
- ✓ **Un Porte-parole**

Après les manifestations des candidats et des débats, les sieurs suivants sont désignés par vote à main levée aux postes de responsabilité suivants :

- |   |                           |
|---|---------------------------|
| ✓ <b>Le Coordonnateur Général par intérim</b> | : Mr HAROUNE Gueye        |
| ✓ <b>Le 1<sup>er</sup> vice coordinateur</b>  | : Mr MOKOM Bernard        |
| ✓ <b>Le 2<sup>ème</sup> vice coordinateur</b> | : Mr AMADOU BI Aliou      |
| ✓ <b>Le Coordonnateur militaire</b>           | : Mr KACHALA Jean Blaise  |
| ✓ <b>Le Secrétaire général</b>                | : Mr KALAM Kouloum        |
| ✓ <b>La Chargé des relations extérieures</b>  | : Mme HASSEN Marie Reine  |
| ✓ <b>Le Chargé des relations intérieures</b>  | : Mr BELLO MAMADOU Saidou |
| ✓ <b>Le Porte-parole</b>                      | : Mr ABOUBAKAR SIDICK Ali |

Le point divers a été une recommandation de la rédaction des Statuts et Règlement intérieur dont le Comité ad hoc est chargé de rédiger dans un bref délai. Étant épuisés les points inscrits à l'ordre du jour, le président de la séance a clôturé la réunion à 12 heures 30 minutes suivi de la collation.

Fait à May-mbaya, le 30 aout 2024

Le Rapporteur de la séance

Le Président de la séance

**Les Représentants**

Anti Balaka :

UPC :



FPRC :




FDLP :

***Ampliation :***

- *Nations Unies*
- *Union Africaine (UA)*
- *CEEAC*
- *CEMAC*
- *Peuple Centrafricain*
- *Archives*

**Annex 5: Two statements dated 9 September 2024, signed by François Bozizé (CFI.001), listing appointments within the CPC, following the creation of the CPC-Fondamentale**



**COALITION DES PATRIOTES  
POUR LE CHANGEMENT**

\*\*\*\*\*

**SÉCURITÉ - PAIX - RECONCILIATION**

\*\*\*\*\*

**Coordination générale**

\*\*\*\*\*

**Secrétariat général**

\*\*\*\*\*



**REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE**

**Unité – Dignité – Travail**

\*\*\*\*\*

## **DECISION N°004/2024**

### **PORANT NOMMINATION OU CONFIRMATION DES PATRIOTES AUX POSTES DE RESPONSABILITE À LA COORDINATION GENERALE.**

Le Conseil des leaders entendu, Le  
Coordonnateur Général,

**DECIDE**

**Article 1:** Sont nommés ou confirmés aux postes de responsabilité suivants les patriotes dont les noms suivent :

- 1- Vice-Cordonnateur général
  - Sembé BOBO
- 2- Secrétaire général
  - Bernard BONDA
- 3- Coordonnateur militaire
  - Jean Francis BOZIZÉ
- 4- Délégué aux relations extérieures
  - Léopold BARA
- 5- Délégué aux relations avec les organisations humanitaires
  - Ousmane MOHAMADOU
- 6- Coordonnateur militaire adjoint
  - Sylvain BÉOROFÉ NGOYASSE
- 7- Porte-parole politique
  - Jean Pierre Zanguéndé Goyamba

**Article 2 :** Les personnalités nommées sont tenues de servir les objectifs et les intérêts de la coalition et de promouvoir l'unité et la cohésion des membres.


**Article 3 :** La présente décision qui abroge toutes dispositions antérieures contraires et qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature, sera publiée partout où besoin sera.

Fait à Bidja, le 09 Septembre 2024  
Le Coordonnateur Général



Général d'Armée François BOZIZE YANGOUVONDA.

**Annex 6: Minutes of meeting by the CAR Ministry of Defence dated 14 August 2024, on an audience granted to a representative of Ali Darassa (CFi.015)**




Reprenant la parole, le Ministre d'Etat a insisté sur l'importance de la participation personnelle de Monsieur Ali DARASSA à la prochaine rencontre dont le lieu sera arrêté de commun accord avec le Gouvernement afin de formaliser les principales phases des prochaines étapes conformément aux propositions contenues dans le communiqué gouvernemental.

A ce titre, le Gouvernement réaffirme sa disponibilité d'échanger à tout moment avec Ali DARASSA et sa suite

Tels sont les principaux éléments issus de cette première rencontre qui s'est tenue avec la participation du Ministre Délégué, de tous les principaux collaborateurs du Ministère et des différents organes sous tutelle et qui ont été suivis d'un point de presse avec les différentes médias de la place.

Très Haute Considération.

**Le Ministre d'Etat Chargé du DDRR et du Suivi de l'APPR**



Jean WILLYBIRO SAKO

MINISTÈRE CHARGE DU DÉSARMEMENT, DE LA DEMOBILISATION, DE LA REINTEGRATION, DU RAPATRIEMENT ET DU  
SUIVI DE L'ACCORD POLITIQUE POUR LA PAIX ET LA RECONCILIATION  
Bataille de Bocanda

**Annex 7: Communiqué issued and signed by Amr Faisal, on the CPC-F attack of 4 December 2024 near the village of May-Mbaya (Ouham prefecture)**

Coalition des Patriotes  
Pour le Changement  
Fondamentale (CPC-F)  
Coordination-Générale  
Porte-Parole-Particulier  
*N-007/CPC-F/CG/P-PP/S.G-24*



République-Centrafricaine  
Unité-Dignité-Travail  
\*\*\*\*\*

**COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE**

Dans la journée du 04 décembre 2024, les forces armées Centrafricaines FACA et leurs alliés mercenaires russes du groupe Wagner sont tombés dans une embuscade tendue par nos éléments auprès du village May-mbaya.

La manœuvre a été soigneusement planifiée par les éléments CPC-F, qui attendaient l'arrivée des convoyeurs. Notre groupe a utilisé des tactiques de guérilla pour maximiser l'impact de l'attaque.

Suite à l'embuscade équipes tactiques de la Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement Fondamentale CPC-F, ont pu récupérer une bonne quantité de matériel militaire et d'équipement spécialisé. Ce matériel représente des ressources significatives pour les forces armées centrafricaines FACA et leurs alliés du groupe Wagner. Par conséquent c'est un coup dur pour leur capacité. Cet assaut a également causé des pertes humaines plusieurs morts et des blessés dans le rang de l'adversaire, aussi bien du côté FACA que celui des mercenaires Russes.

Il est à noter que ces différentes opérations s'inscrivent dans la stratégie établie par l'état-major de CPC-F. La coalition réaffirme sa détermination à poursuivre ces opérations, afin de pouvoir libérer le peuple centrafricain.

Fait à May-mbaya, 04/12/2024


**Le Porte-Parole-Particulier près de l'état-major de la CPC-F**



**AMR FAISAL**

**Annex 8: Several documents relating to and/or signed by Mahamat Al-Khatim, dated November and December 2023**

Documents related to Al-Khatim negotiation with Chad and Government of CAR.



Pour finir le **MPC**, félicite et remercie tous les partenaires privilégiés de la RCA qui n'ont ménagé aucun effort pendant toutes ces périodes difficiles qu'à connues notre pays, pour faciliter les échanges entre les fils et filles du Pays pour ramener la paix, la sécurité et la cohésion sociale.

Fait à Ndjamena, le 03 Novembre 2023

Le Bureau Politique et Militaire  
Le Président du Mouvement MPC




Général **ALKHATIM MAMAMAT**



**Ampliations :**

- Union Africaine
- CEEAC
- CIRGL
- MINUSCA
- TCHAD
- Gouvernement (RCA)
- Ambassade / Soudan (RCA)
- Chrono / Archive



- Mettre en exécution l'Accord du 06 février 2020 dans toutes ses dispositions notamment un poste au gouvernement, un ministre conseiller à la Présidence, un poste de ministre conseiller à la Primature, deux postes d'ambassadeurs et deux postes de conseillers aux ambassades, deux préfets, trois sous-préfets et attribuer un commandement de région militaire ;
- Amnesty pour monsieur MAHAMAT ALKHATIM et les autres membres du MPC ;
- Libération inconditionnelle et Amnesty pour tous les prisonniers membres du MPC ;
- Instaurer un cessez-le-feu immédiat dans toutes les zones occupées contrôlées par le Mouvement ;
- Identifier un site de regroupement au profit des combattants du MPC pour le DDR ;
- Incorporation des combattants du MPC dans l'effectif de la Force de défense et de sécurité ;
- Prendre en compte à titre exceptionnel monsieur MAHAMAT ALKHATIM au grade de général de division, en sa qualité du Président du MPC et commandant en chef du mouvement ;
- Trois généraux.
- Prendre en compte les officiers supérieurs du MPC à titre exceptionnel aux grades d'officiers supérieurs, officiers et sous-officiers ;
- Favoriser le retour de tous les exilés ;
- Garantir la sécurité de l'intégrité physique de tous les membres du MPC signataires de l'Accord ;
- Tenir compte des membres du MPC dans les différentes nominations ;

**Vive la paix, vive la République Centrafricaine**

**Pour le Bureau politique et militaire du MPC**  
**Le Chef d'état-major du MPC**

**Ampliation**

- MINUSCA
- CEEAC
- Union Africaine
- CIRGL
- Etat Centrafricain
- Etat Tchadien

**Le Général ALKHATIM MAHAMAT**

### **COMMUNIQUE CONJOINT**

A l'occasion de la rencontre bipartite entre le Gouvernement Centrafricain représenté par monsieur **Jean WILLIBIRO SAKO**, Ministre d'Etat en charge du DDRR et du Suivi de l'APPR et Général **Mahamat ALKATIM**, Leader du MPC sous la facilitation du Gouvernement Tchadien représenté par Monsieur **Mahamat CHARFADINE MARGUI**, Ministre de la Sécurité Publique et de l'Immigration à N'Djamena le 30 Novembre 2023.

Consécutive au communiqué de presse n° 001/2023 du 3 Novembre 2023 signé par le Général **Mahamat ALKATIM**, Fondateur du Groupe Armé Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) qui a exprimé officiellement sa décision de quitter la Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC) et son retour dans le processus global de paix à travers l'Accord Politique pour la Paix et la Réconciliation en République Centrafricaine (APPR-RCA), Son Excellence, Professeur **Faustin Archange TOUADERA**, Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat a envoyé auprès des Autorités de la République du Tchad, une délégation constituée des personnalités suivantes :

- Monsieur **Jean WILLIBIRO SAKO**, Ministre d'Etat en charge du DDRR et du Suivi de l'APPR, Chef de la délégation;
- Monsieur **Bruno YAPANDE**, Ministre de l'Administration du Territoire, de la Décentralisation et du Développement Local, Ministre Résident de la Nana Gribizi ;
- Monsieur **Guy Roger MOSKIT**, Ministre Conseiller Spécial à la Présidence de la République ;
- Monsieur **Jean Bertrand Léopold BIAMBA**, Ambassadeur de la RCA au Tchad.
- Monsieur **Francis NGOMBALA KOLO**, Chargé de Mission, Coordonnateur National de l'APPR-RCA.

La délégation a pour mission de :

- Remettre le message de Son Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat, Professeur **Faustin Archange TOUADERA** à son homologue, Son Excellence le Général **Mahamat IDRISSE DEBY ITNO**, Président de Transition, Président de la République du Tchad, Chef de l'Etat.
- Echanger avec les auteurs du communiqué de presse n° 001/2023 du 3 Novembre 2023 notamment le Général **Mahamat ALKATIM** et sa suite en vue d'envisager les prochaines étapes relatives à sa décision de retour dans le processus de l'APPR-RCA.

Dans le cadre de cette mission, le 29 Novembre 2023, la délégation a été reçue en audience par Son Excellence le Général **Mahamat IDRISSE DEBY ITNO**, Président de Transition, Président de la République du Tchad, Chef de l'Etat, puis par Monsieur **Mahamat CHARFADINE MARGUI**, Ministre de la Sécurité Publique et de l'Immigration entouré de ses proches collaborateurs.

Les Autorités de la République du Tchad se sont félicitées des efforts de paix en cours en République Centrafricaine axés sur la mise en œuvre des engagements de l'APPR-RCA et la Feuille de Route conjointe de Luanda auxquels elles ont réaffirmé leur adhésion et leur soutien et ont réitéré leur engagement à œuvrer pour la paix, la concorde entre les deux peuples frères du Tchad et de la RCA ainsi que dans la sous-région.

Des échanges avec le Général **Mahamat ALKATIM** et sa suite composée de six (6) personnes :

- Mahamat taib yakoub
- Ousman Mahamat Ousman

- Aboulkassim Algoni Tidjani
- Marouf Mahamat
- Atahir Daoud
- Abdoulaye Adam

Il ressort des considérations suivantes:

- Le Général **Mahamat ALKATIM**, confirme sa décision rendue officielle par le communiqué de presse n° 001/2023 du 3 Novembre 2023.
- Les membres du MPC expriment une préoccupation relative au jugement prononcé par la justice à l'endroit du Général Mahamat ALKATIM. D'où la nécessité de prendre une mesure de confiance.
- Les membres du MPC et leur leader renouvellent leurs volontés de retourner dans le processus de mise en œuvre de l'Accord Politique pour la Paix et la Réconciliation signé à Bangui le 6 février 2019 ainsi que la Feuille de Route conjointe de Luanda.
- La nécessité d'endemcher rapidement la prochaine étape pour toutes fins utiles.
- Le MPC n'est plus membre de la Coalition Patriotique pour le Changement (CPC) gérée par la CIRGL, il a été retenu que le Ministre de la Sécurité Publique et de l'Immigration de la République du Tchad soit le Facilitateur de la suite du processus et que l'Ambassadeur de la République Centrafricaine auprès de la République du Tchad reste le Point Focal.

Les participants à la rencontre ont exprimé leurs remerciements aux Autorités de la République du Tchad, aux partenaires nationaux, multilatéraux et bilatéraux pour leurs soutiens permanents au processus de paix en République Centrafricaine ainsi que dans la sous-région.

Pièces jointes :

- Copie du communiqué de presse n° 001/2023 du 3 Novembre 2023 signé par Général **Mahamat ALKATIM**, Président du MPC
- Copies des ordres de mission de la délégation centrafricaine ;
- Copie de la note relative au pourparler, signée par le Général **Mahamat ALKATIM**, Président du MPC ;
- Liste des participants à la rencontre de N'Djamena.

Ont signé le 30 Novembre 2023

Pour la délégation de MPC

Le Général **Mahamat ALKATIM**

Le Chef de la délégation Centrafricaine

Monsieur **Jean WILLYBIRO SAKO**  
Ministre d'Etat en charge du DDDR et du Suivi de l'APPR

Pour la République du Tchad

Monsieur **Mahamat CHARFAGINE MARGUI**  
Ministre de la Sécurité Publique et de l'Immigration, Facilitateur

MINISTÈRE CHARGÉ DES INSTITUTIONS DE LA REPUBLIQUE



Unité - Dignité - Travail

## ORDRE DE MISSION

N° ..... /MCSGGRIR/DIRCAB/SOM

Monsieur **Jean WILLYBIRO SAKO**      Ministre d'Etat en Charge du DDRR/APPR, Chef de Mission ;  
Monsieur **Bruno VAPANDE**      Ministre de l'Administration du Territoire, Ministre Résident de la Nana  
Gribizi ;  
Monsieur **Francis NGOMBALA KOLO**      Chargé de Mission Coordonnateur ai de la CNAPPR ;  
Monsieur **Guy MOSKIT**      Ministre Conseiller à la Présidence de la République.

**Sont autorisés à se rendre à :** BANGUI/N'DJAMENA(Tchad)/BANGUI

**MOTIF :** Mission Officielle.

**DATE DE DEPART :** 26 Novembre 2023

**DATE DE RETOUR :** 02 Décembre 2023

**MOYEN DE TRANSPORT :** Avion

**TRANSPORT :** A la charge du Budget National

**IMPUTATION** { **MISSION :** -/-      -/-

**DUREE DE LA MISSION :** 05 jours

**FRAIS DE MISSION :** 05 jours chacun à la charge du Budget National.

Bangui, le 21 Novembre 2023

Le Ministre

  
Maxime BALALOU

MINISTÈRE CHARGÉ DU SECRÉTARIAT GÉNÉRAL DU GOUVERNEMENT ET DES RELATIONS AVEC LES INSTITUTIONS DE LA REPUBLIQUE  
Tel (236) 21617270 BP. 739-Bangui RCA/Email : [secretariatgeneralgouvernement@gmail.com](mailto:secretariatgeneralgouvernement@gmail.com)! <https://www.facebook.com/generalgouv.secret>

AMBASSADE DE LA REPUBLIQUE  
CENTRAFRICAINE AU TCHAD  
B.P. 115 Tél. 252.32.06  
N'DJAMENA  
\*\*\*\*\*



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
Unité - Dignité - Travail  
\*\*\*\*\*

N'DJAMENA, le ..... / ..... / 2023

## LISTE DE PRESENCE

N°	NOM ET PRENOM	TEL	SIGNATURE
1	Jean Bertrand BIAMBIA Ambassadeur RA/Tchad	65877744	
2	Guy Roger MANGA ministre des Affaires Etrangères	7550-10-11	
3	YAPANDE Boremo	720053821	
4	MAROUF Mahamat F-PP	60885003	
5	ABDOLKARIM ABBIA TOM	94291332	
6	ATAHPR Doudou MORDO	69508028	
7	ABOUI KASSIM ALGONI	64643159	
8	MAHAMAT TAIB SAGOUH	608911832	
9	MAHAMAT AL HATIM		
10	GOUSSOU NDIAYE Cissé	66530067	
11	WILLY BIADSAKO JEAN	423672037094	
12	MAHAMAT CHARFADINE MARQUI	68400026	
13	NGOBALA-Kolo Gauco	72506647	
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### Annex 9: Mahamat Deya, new PRNC general Chief of Staff

After Mohamed Ali, alias “B13” the PRNC “general Chief of Staff” was killed in an exchange of fire with FACA on 31 January 2024, Mahamat Deya was appointed as the new “general Chief of Staff” of the PRNC.<sup>74</sup>

Unlike the PRNC’s majority Goula members, Mahamat Deya belongs to the Kara ethnic group. He was part of the Birao-based and ethnic Kara-dominated *Mouvement des libérateurs centrafricains pour la justice* (MLCJ) until early 2019.

When the MLCJ, led by Mahamat Deya’s relative Gilbert Toumou Deya opted to sign the APPR on February 6, 2019, Mahamat Deya left the MLCJ and soon after joined the newly created PRNC.

LISTE DES OFFICERS DU PRNC			
GOUVERNEMENT			
LISTE DES GENERAUX			
01. GLE. ISMA. ISSAKA AUBIN	N° Telephone	75677167	Staf
02. SOUPAINKE TAREAN		7567-0500	Ville
03. AMINE JOSEPH AHOUÉ		75402077	Bakouf
04. ASSEID BADALA ARDA		75252519	Coco
05. MAHAMAT BOUJA ALBERT		75243000	
06. TOM ADAM		75000033	ant
07. MAHAMAT KER. OUMIAHÉ		75636304	Fay
08. NAMA ANMAT. DAGACH			Ant
09. SANGALE - MAHAT			
10. *			
LISTE DES COLONELS			
01. FAÏL KUMAT. DOUNGONAI	N° Telephone	75 383434	Officier ?
02. IBRAHIM RADJAB			
03. AHMADINE CHARAFADINE		75372557	
04. ALLAH ANTAL. ADOUL		75505948	
05. YOUSSEUF DOUSTARHA BEH		75-61-15-13	
06. MAHAMAT - DEYA			
07. MALICK HISENE ZARKO		7564-18-65	
08. YOUSSEUF MARKOS			
09. DIBO ASSIL			
10. AWADALLAH. ALI			
11. KAMOUNE KAMADANE			
12. YAYA - DEYA			
13. TIDIANI KARAM. G.M.T		75079686	
14. ALIMANE SELIFANE		75383131	
15. CHARAFADINE. NOUSSA			
16. RAPADANE. RAJAB			
17. YAYA DJOURDOD *			
18. AL HABIB. YAYA		75191328	
19. TALHA			
20. CHAFADINE. YAKUB			
21. ANTHE - SABOUNE			
LISTE DES LT COLONEL			
01. MALICK - DEYA			
02. SAMANGE - MAHAT			
03. MAHAMAT. BALLET. OUAR		75-43-03-35	
04. BOURNA - GUIDJA			
05. ISSA - NAIRE			

Extract from PRNC founding document dated 28 May 2019, appointing Mahamat Deya as an officer in the PRNC, rank of Colonel.<sup>75</sup>

After the MLCJ signed the APPR in 2019, Gilbert Toumou Deya was appointed Minister of State in charge of Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Repatriation, and in charge of Monitoring the Political Agreement for Peace and National Reconciliation.

Note that on 4 December 2022, the MLCJ led by Toumou Deya as well as the *Rassemblement patriotique pour le renouveau de la Centrafrique* (RPC), led by another Goula, the Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation, Djono Ahaba were officially dissolved.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>74</sup> Confidential sources from Vakaga prefecture.

<sup>75</sup> S/2019/608, Annex 2.7.

<sup>76</sup> S/2023/360 para 10, and S/2023/87, para. 13.

## Annex 10: Information on Nourd Gregaza

### *Investigation*

The Panel is investigating the role of Nourd Gregaza in the kidnapping of the UNOPS and Government of CAR staff in November 2022. In telephone conversations with the United Nations team assigned to negotiate the release of the hostages, Mohamed Ali a.k.a. “B-13” repeatedly referred to Nourd Gregaza as his “boss in France” and gave the negotiators the impression that he consulted with Gregaza before making decisions related to the hostages.<sup>77</sup>



*Photograph of Nourd Gregaza. Source: Online article in French regional newspaper, Sud Ouest, 9 October 2024, entitled « Libéré de la prison de Saint-Martin-de-Ré, l'opposant politique, Nourd Gregaza incarcéré en Centrafrique.»*

### *Background on Nourd Gregaza*

The Panel has earlier reported that Nourd Gregaza, a Goula from Birao, Vakaga prefecture, had left CAR in the mid-1990s to live in France, according to information received from multiple sources based in CAR and in France. At the time, Nourd Gregaza had informed the Panel of his family ties with Djoubaye Abazène, to whom he referred as his uncle.<sup>78</sup> In 2019, Arnaud Djoubaye Abazène was the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation. Since April 2021 he has served as Minister of Justice.

The Panel has had access to documentation which indicates that, on 23 July 2004, Gregaza was arrested in France, and charged with murder (*homicide volontaire*). On 27 February 2009, he was found guilty and sentenced by the Assize Court of Pyrénées-Orientales Department to 30 years imprisonment with a security period of 20 years and a permanent ban from French territory once the sentence had been served.

### *Declared president of the PRNC while incarcerated in France*

In a communiqué announcing the creation of the PRNC, dated 28 May 2019, Nourd Gregaza, who at the time had been incarcerated in France for almost 15 years, was declared as the leader of the PRNC (see extract from the communiqué below).

### *The PRNC a splinter group of a splinter group*

The PRNC was created as a splinter group of the *Rassemblement patriotique pour le renouveau de la Centrafrique* (RPRC) which itself was created in November 2014, under the leadership of Zakaria Damane. The RPRC was in turn a splinter group of the *Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique* (FPRC) founded in August 2014 in Birao, Vakaga prefecture. The FPRC is led by sanctioned individual Noureddine Adam (CFI.002, listed on 13 May 2014).


### *Incarcerated in Camp de Roux prison annex, Bangui*

Following his arrest at Bangui M’Poko International Airport on 20 September 2024, Nourd Gregaza has been incarcerated in *Camp de Roux* prison annex in Bangui.

<sup>77</sup> S/2023/360, paras. 169-179.

<sup>78</sup> S/2019/930, annex 3.8.

Communiqué signed on 28 May 2019 by "general" Issa Issaka Aubin. Document obtained by the Panel from an armed group representative on 29 May 2019 (S/2019/608 Annex 2.7)



Extract from statement: We solemnly swear to choose and take as our leader Mr. NOURD GREGAZA, president of the PRNC ("Nous prêtons serment solennellement de choisir et prendre pour leader monsieur NOURD GREGAZA le président du PRNC".)

### **Annex 11: Key details regarding the Mining Code update**

The new mining code included several key updates which aim to combat illicit trafficking in natural resources by armed groups and associated individuals, and to increase state revenue from the sector.

- (a) The creation of GEMINCA, a state-owned company to manage and market precious and semi-precious stones and metals, with a role in implementing the Central African Republic's governmental policy on the circulation and promoting transactions in precious and semi-precious mineral substances, and supervising artisanal exploitation. Officials from the Ministry of Mines informed the Panel that they do not view the creation of GEMINCA as a significant change to state policy, but rather as the re-naming and reshaping of the *Comptoir des Minéraux et Gemmes*, known as COMIGEM.<sup>79</sup>
- (b) The new code alters the role of independent collecting agents, mining cooperatives and *a priori* foreign companies, who would be compelled to form links and sell directly to state-owned GEMINCA, creating a monopoly which officials contend will improve traceability. Mining officials observed that it has been very difficult to provide appropriate oversight over the activities of independent collectors and buyers agents whom they believe have played a significant role in illicit trade of gold and diamonds. They indicated that the mechanism is intended to improve oversight and reduce illicit transfers and transactions. This new arrangement will come into force in 2026, giving independent collectors one year to develop links.
- (c) The Special Anti-Fraud Unit (USAF)—a mixed internal security force made up of gendarmes and police officers responsible for the identification, investigation and prosecution of offenses relating mining-related fraud, and trafficking—was envisaged to become a new specialized Mining Police. Ministry officials noted that they were working to develop detailed plans, having drawn inspiration from regional models in Burkina Faso and the Democratic Republic of Congo.


Civil society and commercial actors noted that the drafting and consultation process for the updated mining code was inclusive of their views, highlighting a national workshop with a broad cross-section of mining sector stakeholders in October 2021. Civil society underscored that they had demanded enhanced transparency in the mining sector, particularly with regard to the process for awarding and terminating mining permits and contracts.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> COMIGEM created by Law No. 09.005 of April 29, 2009 linked to the 2009 Mining Code of the Central African Republic.

<sup>80</sup> Confidential civil society and commercial sources in Bangui.

Annex 12: Map Special Anti-Fraud Units (USAF) across CAR




Source: Provided to the Panel by USAF, July 2024.

**Annex 13: Details of investigations conducted by USAF, with support from the General Inspectorate of Mines, which resulted in three companies having their permits revoked or suspended.**

Mining exploitation permits for two companies were revoked in June and July 2024, and the exploration permit for a further company was suspended in August 2024, on the basis of USAF anti-fraud operations. On 7 June 2024, the Minister for Mining and Geology revoked three mining exploitation permits for DAQING SARL. Official government sources reported that DAQING conducted unauthorized exploitation in the Mingala area (Basse-Kotto prefecture), had interacted with armed group elements in the process, and brought unauthorized foreign workers to the site (see below Ministerial order). On 16 July 2024, the Minister refused the renewal of three exploitation permits for the the *Développement de la Science et de la Technologie Minière* company, known by its acronym DSTM, on the basis that they had exploited mines in an area beyond their concession, and failed to pay taxes owed (see below Ministerial order). Officials from the Ministry of Mines also noted that DSTM were further suspected of not declaring the full amount of gold mined during their operations.

Details of another recent incident of fraud was reported to the Panel by Ministry of Mines officials. They observed that on 7 July 2024, a Chinese national working for Gold Zhi Zun (GZZ) mining company was found to have two ingots of gold recorded as weighing 2407.09 grammes taped to his thighs. The discovery was made when the vehicle he was travelling in was stopped at a control post at Nguerendou (Ombella-M'Poko prefecture) (see below photographs). The gold had not been declared as part of the company's official production figures. Following a related investigation, on 2 August 2024, the Ministry of Mining issued an order which suspended until further notice the mining exploration permit for GZZ (see below Ministerial order). Amongst other reasons, the suspension order stated that the company had introduced exploitation equipment and conducted illegal exploitation at a site in Mbrès mining area (Nana-Grébizi prefecture), despite only being in possession of an exploration permit.

Official document from Ministry of Mines and Geology revoking three exploitation permits for the mining company DAQING SARL, dated 7 June 2024.



**Article 1<sup>e</sup>:** Sont et demeurent rapportées les dispositions de l'Arrêté N°178/22/MMG/DIRCAB/DGMG/DRMCM/SOCM du 18 septembre 2022, portant attribution de trois (03) Permis d'Exploitation Artisanale Semi-Mécanisée à la Société DAQING SARL.

**Motifs :**

- intelligence avec les groupes armés ;
- exploitation illégale ;
- introduction illégale des sujets étrangers en zone minière ;
- non versement de la taxe superficiaire ;
- absence de rapport d'activités.

**Article 2:** Il fait retour d'office des permis au domaine de l'Etat.

**Article 3:** l'Inspecteur Général des Mines et de la Géologie, le Directeur General des Mines et le Directeur de la Compagnie de l'Unité Spéciale Anti-Fraude sont chargés chacun en ce qui concerne de la stricte application des dispositions du présent Arrêté.

**Article 4:** Le présent arrêté qui abroge toute disposition antérieur et contraire et qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature, sera enregistré et publié au Journal Officiel.

Fait à Bangui, le 10 JUIN 2024




Rufin BENAM-BELTOUNGOU  
Ministre Chargé des Mines et de la Géologie

**Ampliations :**

- SEM PRCE\_\_\_\_\_ATCR
- SEM PMCG\_\_\_\_\_ATCR

Official document from Ministry of Mines and Geology refusing the renewal of three exploitation permits for mining company Développement de la Science et de la Technologie Miniére company (DSTM), dated 16 July 2024.



**Article 1<sup>er</sup>** : Sont et demeurent rapportées les dispositions de l'Arrêté n° 012/22/MMG/DIRCAB/DGMG/DRMCM/SDM du 31 janvier 2023, portant renouvellement de trois (3) Permis d'Exploitation Artisanale Semi-Mécanisée pour l'or et le diamant à la société de Développement de la Science et de la Technologie Minière « DSTM ».

**Motif :**

- Exploitation dans un domaine non concédé ;
- Suspension unilatérale de l'activité d'exploitation sur le site attribué pendant une période de plus de six (6) mois;
- Manquement aux obligations relatives à la protection de l'environnement telles que prescrites dans la Plan de Gestion Environnemental et Social de la société ;
- Non payement de la taxe superficiaire.

**Article 2 :** Il est fait retour desdits permis au domaine de l'Etat.

**Article 3 :** L'Inspection Générale des Mines et de la Géologie, le Directeur Général des Mines et le Directeur de la Compagnie de l'Unité Spéciale Anti-Fraude, sont chargés chacun en ce qui le concerne de la stricte application des dispositions du présent Arrêté.

**Article 4 :** Le présent arrêté qui abroge toute disposition antérieure contraire et qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature, sera enregistré et communiqué partout où besoin sera.

Fait à Bangui, le 16 JUIL 2024



Photographs of an USAF form documenting gold seized following expert evaluation dated 8 July 2024, of the gold ingots seized, and of the vehicle used by GZZ staff member accused of fraud.


<p>MINISTERE DES MINES ET DE LA GEOLOGIE ***** DIRECTION DE CABINET ***** DIRECTION DE L'UNITE SPECIALE ANTI-FRAUDE. *****</p>		<p>REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE Unité - Dignité - Travail. *****</p>
<p><u>FICHE D'EXPERTISE ET D'EVALUATION DE MATIERES PRECIEUSES SAISIES.</u></p>		
<p><u>ORIGINE:</u> MIBRES</p>		
<p><u>INFRACTION:</u> Non enregistrement des produits miniers (or) et de l'or illégal de l'or</p>		
<p><u>AUTEUR:</u> Monsieur DUYANG, XIONG</p>		
<p><u>COMPOSITION DU LOT SAISI:</u> Estimation des Enquêteurs et de la personne soupçonnée.</p>		
<p>Gramme d'Or : <u>2 lingots non pesés</u> Grammes.</p>		
<p>Pierres estimées : ..... Carats.</p>		
<p><u>EXPERTISE.</u></p>		
<p>Les matières précieuses ci-dessus énumérées et évaluées au Ministère des Mines et de la Géologie à Bangui le... 08 / 07 / 2024.</p>		
<p>Par Monsieur : <u>YANGUERE Franck</u> </p>		
<p>Expert-Evaluateur en présence de :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• M. <u>YANGUERE Franck</u> </li> <li>• M. <u>NDOUTINGA Alfred</u> </li> <li>• M. <u>Col. MALOT Flavien</u> </li> </ul>		
<p><u>RESULTATS DE L'EXPERTISE :</u></p>		
<p>L'Or brut accuse un poids de <u>2.407,09</u> Grammes estimés à (somme en chiffre et en lettres) : <u>(60.177.250) Soixante million Cent soixante dix-sept FCFA.</u> Deux cent cinquante.</p>		
<p>Le lot de Pierres comprend :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="radio"/> Diamant(s) brut(s) pesant..... carat(s) estimé(s) à (somme en chiffres et en lettres).</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Carbone(s) pesant..... carat(s) estimé(s) à (somme en chiffres et en lettres).</li> <li><input type="radio"/> Pierres sans valeur.</li> </ul>		
<p>Autres observations : <u>Or brut en lingot</u></p>		
<p>L'Expert-Evaluateur : <u>YANGUERE Franck</u> </p>		
<p>Le Témoin : <u>MASSON</u> </p>		
<p><u>NOTA:</u> Le lot d'Or et de Pierres précieuses a été placé à l'issue de l'expertise sous scellés, cacheté par les services de l'agence pour minière et remis contre décharge à Monsieur le Ministre des Mines et de la Géologie suivant P.V n°...../OPJ du ...../202.....de la Direction de l'Unité Spéciale Anti-Fraude (USAF) Bangui.</p>		





*Source: Photographs received by the Panel from a confidential source on 8 July 2024; and verified by Ministry of Mining interlocutors.*

*Official document from Ministry of Mines and Geology suspending an exploration permit for mining company Gold Zhi Zun (GZZ), dated 2 August 2024.*



## ARRETE

**Article 1<sup>er</sup> :** Toutes les activités minières sur le Permis de Recherche N° RC4-515 des MBRES sont suspendues jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

**Motif :**

- introduction des équipements d'exploitation sur le Permis de Recherche ;
- exploitation illégale ;
- manquements graves aux obligations relatives à la protection de l'environnement ;
- complicité de séjour irrégulier des étrangers dans la zone minière protégée des MBRES.

**Article 2 :** L'Inspecteur Général des Mines et de la Géologie, le Directeur Général des Mines et le Directeur de la Compagnie de l'Unité Spéciale Anti-Fraude, sont chargés chacun en ce qui le concerne de la stricte application des dispositions du présent Arrêté.

**Article 3 :** Le présent Arrêté qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature, sera enregistré et communiqué partout où besoin sera.

Fait à Bangui, le 02 AOUT 2024.



**Rufin BENAM BELTOUNGOU**  
Ministre Chargé des Mines et de la Géologie

Copies :

SEM PRCE ..... ATCR  
SEM PMCG ..... ATCR  
IGMG/DGM/ DUSAf ..... Pour suivi  
Intéressée ..... (1)  
Chrono ..... (1)

## Annex 14: Administrative Decision on the Resumption of Exports of Rough diamonds from the CAR



UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  
MINISTRY OF ECONOMY



الإمارات العربية المتحدة  
وزارة الاقتصاد

**AD/ Dubai/2024/001**

### **Administrative Decision on Resumption of Exports of Rough diamonds from the Central African Republic**

Participants and Observers of the Kimberley Process (KP) meeting at the Plenary in Dubai, United Arab Emirates in November 2024, considered the findings of the September 2024 Review Mission to the Central African Republic (CAR), CAR authorities' report on progress implementation of their action plan, and observations of relevant stakeholders.

*Endorsing* the valuable and effective work previously undertaken by the CAR Monitoring Team (CAR MT), under its Terms of Reference and the WGDE Diamond Experts Team, in particular with respect to monitoring shipments from the CAR compliant zones.

*Acknowledging* the efforts made by the CAR Review Mission that took place from 09<sup>th</sup> – 15<sup>th</sup> of September 2024 led by the Republic of South Africa, and included the participants from the Russian Federation, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Angola, the African Diamond Producers Association, the World Diamond Council and Civil Society Coalition.

*Further Acknowledging* CAR government in implementing the 2019 Revised Operational Framework and the continued usage of it as a best principle across all diamond mining areas in the country.

The Plenary decides, based upon progress made to date by CAR and having considered the KP Review Mission report, to confirm CAR as a full KP Participant and lift all restrictions on rough diamond exports from CAR, subject to enhanced vigilance in 2025 involving Intersessional and Plenary implementation reports from CAR, with information on the following:

- 1) CAR's implementation of KP minimum requirements;
- 2) CAR's full implementation of the recommendations included in the 2024 CAR Review Mission Report, including:

- \* presentation of a roadmap describing the main actions to be taken to consolidate internal control systems;
- \* information on CAR's deployment of security measures in mining areas to ensure the protection of miners and the free movement of people and goods in mining areas; and



\* information on the financial and logistical resources committed to facilitate the deployment of the USAF in mining regions and at the borders;

3) All supply chain actors, including information on new licensees, cooperatives, buying houses, and miners in new mining regions;

4) Statistics on production levels in mining sites in each diamond region throughout the country; sales data by diamond region; and purchases of diamonds by buying houses from all region and buying house stockpiles;

5) Any discrepancies in statistical reconciliation with its trading partners;

6) Production information collected by BECDOR of all mining houses by mining region; and

7) Any technical assistance needs CAR has identified to facilitate implementation of KP minimum requirements and the recommendations of the 2024 CAR Review Mission Report.

The Plenary decides to repeal the “Administrative Decision on the Central African Republic [Temporary Suspension]” of May 23, 2013, the “Administrative Decision on ensuring that diamonds from the Central African Republic are not introduced into the legitimate trade” of 2014, and the “Administrative Decision on Resumption of Exports of Rough diamonds from the Central African Republic” of 2015, and its attached Annex entitled “Operational Framework for the Resumption of Exports of Rough Diamonds from the Central African Republic”, as amended in 2019 (“Operational Framework”).

The Plenary also decides to repeal the CAR Monitoring Team under its Terms of Reference and the Operational Framework.

The WGM is requested to work with the KP Secretariat to transition the records of the CAR MT, which will be disbanded.

The Diamond Experts Team will continue to exercise the functions assigned to it under the Annexes of the Operational Framework and the CAR Government is encouraged to continue its information sharing collaboration with the Diamond Experts Team regarding footprinting work.

The WGM is requested to continue to exchange relevant information on the security situation in CAR with the UN Panel of Experts.

Participants and Observers are urged to continue providing technical assistance to the Government of CAR in line with the [2024 Best Practices on Technical Assistance and Development of Diamond Communities].



UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  
MINISTRY OF ECONOMY



الإمارات العربية المتحدة  
وزارة الاقتصاد

The KP Chair will inform the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. Sanctions Committee on CAR and its Panel of Experts, and the U.N. Integrated Multi-dimensional Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) of this decision.

The Working Group on Monitoring will assess progress with regards to the implementation of the provisions laid out in this AD and make recommendations on whether to continue enhanced vigilance past 2025 in the 2025 Intersessional and Plenary meetings and in accordance with its Terms of Reference.

**Annex 15: Agenda for the Kimberley Process Review Mission to the CAR 9-15 September 2024, and list of members of the review mission**

<b>AGENDA FOR THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS REVIEW MISSION TO THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC From 9 to 15 September 2024</b>			
<b>Time</b>	<b>Activities</b>	<b>Managers</b>	<b>Location</b>
<b>Sunday 08 September 2024</b>			
	Arrival of the various members of the Delegation	MMG/Protocol	Bangui M'poko Airport
	Installation	MMG/SPPK, DGM	Hotel
	Briefing meeting		Hall of the Ministry of Mines
<b>Monday 09 September 2024</b>			
9h00-10h45	Technical meeting with executives from the Ministry of Mines	MMG/Protocol	Ministry of Mines and Geology
11h00-12h00	Meeting with the KP National Monitoring Committee	MMG/SPPK	Ministry of Mines and Geology
12h15-13h00	Meeting with players in the mining sector (representatives of purchasing offices, collectors and artisanal miners)	MMG/Protocol	Ministry of Mines and Geology
13h00-14h00	Lunch break		M Restaurant
14h15-15h00	Meeting with civil society		Ministry of Mines and Geology
15h15-15h45	Visit to BECDOR	MMG/Protocol	Directorate-General of Mines
16h30-17h00	Courtesy visit to the President of the Republic, Head of State, <b>Pr. Faustin Archange TOUADERA</b> , at the Renaissance Palace	Presidency & State Protocol	Renaissance Palace
18h30	Welcome dinner organised by the Minister of Mines and Geology for members of the Review Mission	MMG/Protocol	M Restaurant
<b>Tuesday 10 September 2024</b>			
7h30-8h00	Departure for Bangui M'poko airport to Carnot	MMG/Protocol	Bangui-Carnot
9h00-10h00	Meeting with the Carnot mining staffs	MMG/SPPK	Service des Mines
10h15-11h45	Meeting with the KP Local Monitoring Committees of the Carnot, Amada-Gaza and Gadzi sub-prefectures	MMG/SPPK	
12h00-13h30	Lunch at the LECHELLE straw hut in Carnot	MMG Protocol	Paillette LECHELLE
13h30-16h30	Departure to Berberati by visiting a mining site (KOUISSO) at 8 km.	MMG/SPPK	Carnot Town Hall
	Transfer to Hôtel Mont Fleurie	MMG Protocol	Mont Fleurie Hotel
	Dinner and overnight in Berberati	MMG Protocol	Mont Fleurie Hotel
<b>Wednesday 11 September 2024</b>			
7h30-8h00	Breakfast at Restaurant Mont Fleurie	MMG Protocol	Mont Fleurie Hotel
8h00-10h30	Berberati-Gamboula road trip	MMG Protocol	Gamboula
11h-12h30	Meeting with the Gamboula KP Local Monitoring Committee at the Town Hall.	MMG/SPPK	Gamboula Town Hall
13h00-15h00	Visit to the Gamboula gold mining site	MMG/SPPK	Gamboula
15h00-18h30	Return trip Gamboula-Berberati	MMG Protocol	Berberati
19h00		MMG Protocol	Mont Fleurie Restaurant
	Overnight in Berberati		Mont Fleurie Hotel

<b>Thursday 12 September 2024</b>			
7h30-8h30	Breakfast at Restaurant Mont Fleurie	MMG Protocol	Mont Fleurie Restaurant
9h00-10h00	Meeting with the Berberati mining staffs	MMG Protocol	Regional Direction office
10h-11h30	Meeting with the Berberati Local Committee.	MMG/SPPK	Conference Room of Mont Fleurie at Berberati
12h00-13h00	Lunch		Mont Fleurie Restaurant
13h30-14h30	Departure for the town of Bouar	MMG/SPPK	Bouar
14h30-16h30	Installation to the hotel and rest	MMG Protocol	Bouar
18h00	Dinner	MMG Protocol	Restaurant
	Overnight stay in Bouar		Bouar
<b>Friday 13 September 2024</b>			
7h30-8h30	Breakfast	MMG Protocol	Bouar
8h30-9h30	Meeting with the Bouar mining staffs	MMG/SPPK	Regional Direction office
9h30-11h00	Meeting with the Bouar KP Local Monitoring Committee.	MMG/SPPK	Town Hall conference room
11h00-12h00	Departure for the town of Baoro	MMG/SPPK	Baoro
12h00-13h00	Lunch	MMG Protocol	Baoro
14h00-15h30	Meeting with the Baoro KP Local Monitoring Committee	MMG/SPPK	Meeting room of the Baoro sub-prefecture
16h00-17h00	Return trip Baoro to Bouar	MMG Protocol	Bouar
18h30	Diner	MMG Protocol	Restaurant
	Overnight in Bouar		Bouar
<b>Saturday 14 September 2024</b>			
6h30-7h15	Breakfast	MMG Protocol	Bouar
7h30-10h00	Departure to Bria	MMG/SPPK	Bria
10h30-12h00	Meeting with the Bria KP Local Monitoring Committee.	MMG/SPPK	Bria
12h00-13h00	Lunch	MMG Protocol	Bria
13h00-15h00	Return to Bangui		Bangui
16h00-17h00	Debriefing with the authorities	MMG Protocol	Hall of the Ministry of Mines
18h30	Closing dinner	MMG/SPPK, DGM, CNS-PK	Restaurant M
<b>Sunday 15 September 2024</b>			
	End of Mission Delegation return journey	Protocol	Bangui M'poko Airport

**MMG : Ministry of Mines and Geology**

**SPPK : Secrétariat Permanent du Processus de Kimberley**

The airlines serving the capital Bangui (Central African Republic) are:

- **ROYAL AIR MAROC**
- **ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES**
- **RWANDAIR**
- **ASKY AIRLINES**
- **AIR FRANCE**

A few recommended hotels :

- **LEDGER PLAZA BANGUI HOTEL**
- **OUNGUISI HOTEL**
- **QUATRE (4) SAISONS HOTEL**

<b>Hotels</b>	<b>Email</b>	<b>Phone number</b>
<b>LEDGER PLAZA BANGUI HOTEL</b>	j.ngbale@ledger-bangui.com	(+236) 75 47 87 07
<b>OUNGUISI HOTEL</b>	reception@oubanguihotel.com	(+236) 75 05 16 32
<b>QUATRE (4) SAISONS HOTEL</b>	hotel4saison@gmail.com	(+236) 72 55 66 66

*List of countries and entities present for the Kimberley Process Review Mission to the CAR from 9-15 September 2024*

Members of the review mission team:

South Africa (3)  
Russian Federation (4)  
Republic of Cameroon (2)  
Republic of Congo (2)  
African Diamond Producers Association (1)  
Kimberley Process Civil Society Coalition (2)  
World Diamond Council (2)

Members of the review mission team who were unable to join:

Representatives of the European Union  
United Kingdom  
Canada  
Angola

### Annex 16: Statistics on arms collected from different armed groups through DDRR




Figure 1: Comparison of total number of arms collected from different armed groups through DDRR




Figure 2 : Top three types of firearms collected through DDRR operations from 2018 to 2024





Figure 3: Monthly trends in arms collection through DDDR

Source: Data received from UENPDDRR in Bangui, October 2024, analysed by Panel

### Annex 17: DDRR analysis maps




Base Map: UN Géospatial (Map no.4048 R9.1)

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.  
Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been demarcated.

Number of weapons collected per location 3R					
Dilapoko	Besson	Koui	Paoua	Bouar	Bossembele
13	6	102	1	44	8

Figure 1: Number of weapons collected per location from 3R




Base Map: UN Géospatial (Map no.4048 R9.1)

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.  
Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been delimitated.

Number of weapons collected per location ANTI BALAKA					
BOUZOUN	BOUAR	ZOUKOUMB	ABBA	NDIM	Bossembele
16	260	9	10	5	3
BELOKO	KOUI	KAGA B	MBRES	BRIA	MARKOUNDA
5	6	45	16	84	9
BANGASSOU	RAFAI	GOMBO	KOUANGO	BATANGAF	DAMARA
103	61	34	18	33	39
YALOKE	MOBAYE	PAOUA			
27	14	30			

Figure 2: Number of weapons collected per location from anti-balaka groups



Number of weapons collected per location FPRC					
AM DAFOK	BANGUI	BIRAO	BRIA	BOROMATA	BOSSEMBEL
16	23	1	321	12	2
KAGA B	MBRES	NDELE	OUANDA DJ	SAMOUAND	SIKIKIDE
13	17	286	106	18	8
NDIM					
6					

Figure 3: Number of weapons collected per location from FPRC




Figure 4: Arms collected from FPRC during DDR operations

Source: Data received from UENPDDRR in Bangui, October 2024, and analysed by the Panel

## Annex 18: Ongoing human rights investigations by the Panel

### *Haut-Mbomou prefecture*

Throughout the year, the Panel has been collecting information about human rights violations committed in the Haut-Mbomou prefecture. There have been targeted attacks against civilians, including sexual and gender-based violence, committed by the l'Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) and the self-defence militia Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG). The Panel is investigating specific attacks, including what may be ethnic, political and religious targeting.

#### *Killing of artisanal gold miners and mutilation of bodies, Chantier Abiref ("mine d'Iref"), Kouki, Ouham Prefecture*

On 1 May 2024, the Panel received videos and photos from a gold mining site near Kouki, which had been the site of an attack a few days before. The footage showed the burnt down huts in small settlement and market. Mutilated heads and beheaded bodies were scattered around the site. The Panel is investigating the incident.

#### *Killing of anti-balaka armed group elements, Bouca, Ouham-Fafa prefecture*

On 23 July 2024, FACA and Russian instructors launched an operation against armed groups in the Bouca area (Ouham prefecture, 290 km north of Bangui), resulting in the death of former anti-balaka commander José Befio and his bodyguard.<sup>81</sup> The Panel was also informed that the FACA and Russian instructors arrested four children, including three of Befio's children, and that the military operation had caused the local population to flee.

In a communiqué dated 26 July 2024, the CAR Minister of National Defence and the Reconstruction of the Army, confirmed that two rebels had been killed in Bouca, including José Befio, and that weapons had been seized. The communiqué further stated that those killed were bandits who had murdered, looted and raped the local population with impunity. The letter further referred to "images circulating on the Internet", stating that the origins of the images and the identity of the persons depicted were unknown. The communiqué also stated that an investigation into the incident had been opened.

The day after the killing, a photograph was posted on social media showing two bloodied male corpses propped sitting up on a bench against a brick wall, each with his decapitated head in his lap. The comments and captions claimed that the photograph depicted the corpses of José Befio and the unnamed *aide de camp*. The Panel was unable to verify the authenticity of the photograph, and the individuals depicted, and is investigating the incident

Note that committing "outrages upon personal dignity" and the "mutilation of dead bodies" is prohibited by applicable International Humanitarian Law, including the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols, by Customary International Humanitarian Law (Rule 113 of Customary International Humanitarian Law (CIHL) states that "Each party to the conflict must take all possible measures to prevent the dead from being despoiled. Mutilation of dead bodies is prohibited"). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court classifies the mutilation of dead bodies as a war crime. CAR has ratified the four Geneva Conventions (in 1966) and its two Additional Protocols (in 1984). In 2001, CAR ratified the Rome Statute.

#### *Killing of civilians in Djama Ngoudji village, Ouaka prefecture*

On 25 November 2024, at around 18h, 10 civilians, including a child, were ambushed and killed near Djama Ngoudji village, 60 km west of Bria, on the Bria-Ippy axis. Five were motorcycle taxi drivers with five passengers. The passenger were from Ippy and were returning home after having attended a religious ceremony in Bria.

The acting Prefect of Haute Kotto (Bria), Evariste Biguinindji condemned the incident, and declared three days of mourning.<sup>82</sup>

The Panel is investigating this targeted attack against civilians.


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<sup>81</sup> MINUSCA Human Rights Division quarterly report July-Sept 2024: <https://minusca.unmissions.org/en/human-rights-division-reports-0>. The Panel obtained information that Béfio José had disarmed from the anti-balaka and had been trained by FACA and Russian instructors and then deserted to rejoin the armed group.

<sup>82</sup> Radio Guira, 27 September 2024 : [Radio Guira | Centrafrique : dix personnes tuées dans une embuscade au village Djamangoudji, à 60 km de Bria](#).

**Annex 19: Press communiqué on the investigation of FHI-360 consultant, Joseph Figueira Martin, issued by the Prosecutor of the Republic, CAR**

*Press communiqué by the Office of the Prosecutor, 30 May 2024 (two pages)*



et à la révolte contre les forces de défense et de sécurité, de fourniture des moyens aux groupes subversifs et enfin de faux et usage de faux.

L'enquête ouverte, en matière de flagrance, aboutira à la manifestation de la vérité sur les faits constatés.

Par ailleurs, nous attirons l'attention du personnel des Organisations Non Gouvernementales opérationnelles sur le territoire centrafricain de s'abstenir de poser des actes de nature à compromettre la sûreté de l'Etat sous peine des poursuites judiciaires.

En définitive, le Parquet de la République près le Tribunal de Grande Instance de Bangui lance un appel aux compatriotes de bonne volonté de bien vouloir dénoncer quiconque impliqué, de près ou de loin, dans tous les actes de nature à compromettre la paix et la sécurité chèrement acquises en République Centrafricaine

Fait à Bangui, le 30 mai 2024



Le Procureur de la République

Benoit Narcisse FOUKPIO