

# Secrets are forever: Characterizing sensitive file leaks on IPFS

Zhengyu Wu, Brian Kondracki, Nick Nikiforakis, Aruna Balasubramanian

Stony Brook University

Stony Brook, U.S.A

Emails: {zhenwu, bkondracki, nick, arunab}@cs.stonybrook.edu

**Abstract**—The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is an emerging peer-to-peer hypermedia protocol designed to enhance the speed, security, and openness of the web. Utilizing content-based addressing, IPFS establishes a decentralized, distributed, and trustless network for data storage and delivery. Despite its growing popularity, the inherent openness of IPFS raises concerns about accidental sharing of sensitive files, posing potential threats to user privacy and security. In this paper, we conduct a measurement study to investigate the extent of sensitive file sharing on the IPFS network.

Using IPFS-search, a widely-used search engine indexing IPFS content, we identified over 2,000 files containing sensitive information such as API keys and private SSH keys. However, as IPFS-search operates on a centralized infrastructure, access restrictions may limit opportunistic attacks. To demonstrate the feasibility of identifying sensitive content, we deployed two IPFS nodes, recording file announcements from nearby peers, and identified over 700 sensitive files.

Furthermore, we deployed honeypot IPFS nodes to gauge potential exploitation of these sensitive files by malicious actors over a six-month period. Our findings indicate that while sensitive files are indeed being shared on the IPFS network, there is currently no evidence of exploitation by attackers. However, with the increasing popularity of IPFS, the risk of such attacks is likely to rise. Our study underscores the importance of acknowledging the risks associated with sharing files on the IPFS network. As IPFS continues to gain traction, proactive measures must be taken to address vulnerabilities and safeguard sensitive data from potential exploitation.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) [1] is a peer-to-peer and distributed storage platform that uses decentralized and trustless data storage backed by a distributed hash table. A recent large-scale study [2] shows the significant popularity of IPFS with more than 3 Million web client accesses to over 300K unique IPFS nodes in the network. Each day, billions of files are shared on the platform [3]. The wide adoption of IPFS is well received by the developer community with hundreds of public repositories shared across organizations. For example, Netflix uses IPFS to transfer docker images [4], and major browsers including Chromium, Brave, and Opera, provide native support for IPFS as an alternative to HTTP [5], [6], [7]. IPFS has also been used to support decentralized Web applications, social network platforms, and content search [2].

Given the popularity and the decentralized nature of the IPFS platform, we ask the following question: *Are users sharing sensitive files on the IPFS platform?*. Previous studies have shown that, in many file sharing platforms [8], [9], [10],

users inadvertently share private information. Such private information leak has additional consequences on a peer-to-peer platform such as IPFS. First, files shared on IPFS are *public* and can be retrieved using their CID (Content Identifier). If a user inadvertently hosts a file with sensitive information on IPFS, i.e., secret keys, and passwords, then this information can be accessed by anyone with the file's CID. Second, user content can be stored/cached by intermediate IPFS nodes which means that even if the original user removes the files from IPFS, a copy of the file may persist in the network, increasing the risk of private information leaks.

To this end, we perform a measurement study and security analysis to study sensitive file sharing on the IPFS platform. We define sensitive information as any data that, if obtained by attackers, could be weaponized and pose a significant threat. This includes passwords, private keys, and developers' API keys. These types of information, if fallen into the wrong hands, have the potential to be exploited for unauthorized access, financial fraud, or other malicious activities.

The key challenge here is that the IPFS platform is large and searching through all the files through all the peers is infeasible. What we need is a set of vantage points through which we can access a diverse set of files shared by users across the world. We leverage IPFS-search [11], a community-built search engine that allows anyone to search through IPFS files even without knowing their CIDs. Similar to search engines such as Google, IPFS-search indexes keywords and meta information of shared files, and users can search over this index. IPFS-search has over 40 IPFS nodes across the world to monitor files shared on IPFS, and indexes around half a million documents per day.

To efficiently search for sensitive content within the files indexed by IPFS-Search, manual inspection of each file is impractical due to scale. Instead, we devised a series of filters with increasing complexity to progressively reduce the number of benign files. These filters include keyword matching, regular expression matches, and manual inspection to eliminate false positives, resulting in a refined set of files containing sensitive content.

We collected IPFS files over a 3-month period and used our keyword search on IPFS-Search. This study yielded 10,777 files potentially containing sensitive content. Employing our filter pipeline and false positive elimination, we identified 129 private keys and 23 API keys within uncompressed

files. For compressed files, which primarily comprised code repositories, we found 1,788 sensitive files, predominantly containing hardcoded API keys. These keys pose significant risks, allowing malicious third parties to bypass passwords and gain unauthorized access, potentially leading to severe consequences for businesses [12].

We then assessed the security implications of attackers deploying their own IPFS monitoring to search for sensitive files. Deploying our own IPFS instances from two vantage points, again, over a 4-month period, we further identified 752 sensitive files. This demonstrates that even if safety restrictions were enforced on IPFS-Search, attackers could circumvent these limitations by deploying their own search instances, underscoring the need for robust security measures.

Given the substantial presence of code/libraries on IPFS containing sensitive information, we further investigate by tracing these libraries back to their original online repositories. Research indicates that users inadvertently share secret information in their public code repositories [13]. However, sharing libraries on IPFS poses an additional security risk, as sensitive files persist even if the original repository is patched.

We traced 117 Node.js libraries and 746 Golang GitHub libraries shared on IPFS to their original repositories. Among the GitHub repositories, 60% of files with sensitive information were patched, either by complete removal or deletion of the sensitive data. Nevertheless, these files remain accessible on IPFS. In the case of Node.js, 40% of sensitive files are patched in the online repository. Thus, patching files alone is insufficient if the file has been shared on IPFS.

As part of responsible disclosure, we informed the respective repository owners via email, offering assistance to address and rectify these issues. This enables developers to patch vulnerabilities, such as obtaining new API keys. We will provide updates on any new findings through our disclosure and discussions with affected repository owners.

Finally, we study whether attackers are already exploiting the sensitive files found on IPFS. We designed a honeypot experiment where we deploy fake sensitive files that will lead an attacker to an infrastructure that we monitor. Honeypot experiments have been used over the years [14], [15] to identify if a security vulnerability is being exploited. In total, we deployed 500 decoy files from 5 vantage points for 6 months. We find that, while the decoy files are being shared on IPFS, there are no attempts yet by an attacker to exploit the leaks. In other words, attackers are not yet using the IPFS network to exploit sensitive information.

To conclude, our study reveals the presence of sensitive files being shared on IPFS. These files can be discovered by leveraging centralized search services like IPFS-search using an opportunistic approach. Furthermore, our findings highlight that the implementation of safety restrictions within these centralized services does not fully mitigate the risk of sensitive file exposure. Attackers can circumvent these restrictions by deploying their own search instances. As the IPFS ecosystem continues to evolve, it becomes crucial to address these vulnerabilities and develop robust security mechanisms to protect

against the sharing and discovery of sensitive files.

## II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION


### A. InterPlanetary File System

In this section, we provide some background on IPFS. The *global IPFS network* is a peer-to-peer network consisting of IPFS nodes. Each IPFS node runs the IPFS protocol and is connected to each other over the WAN. At initialization, each node is assigned a cryptographic hash called *Peer ID*. The IPFS nodes know a subset of all the peers in the global network and will use these peers to search for content.

Unlike traditional URL-based protocols such as HTTP, IPFS uses content-based addressing. IPFS nodes generate a Content Identifier (CID) for each file, which is the hash of the content of the file. The CID along with its provider ID (i.e., the node that has a copy of the content) form a provider record which is stored in a Distributed Hash Table (DHT). This DHT is used to efficiently find the provider record for any CID. At a high level, an IPFS node that wants to retrieve the content of a CID calculates the  $k$  closest peers to the CID. The node then asks these peers for the CID's provider record. If the provider record is not located within the  $k$  closest peers, each peer in turn contacts their  $k$  closest peers and so on until the provider record is found. A detailed explanation of how IPFS stores and retrieves files can be found in Appendix A

### B. Motivation: Implications of IPFS File Sharing

At its core, the IPFS platform is used to store and share content *publicly*. This means that a file that is shared over IPFS can be retrieved by anyone if they have the CID. This design choice has an impact on security.



**Fig. 1:** Illustrating the file access of “example.txt” using a URL, using a cloud storage system, and using the IPFS platform.

Figure 1 illustrates this point. In this figure, the file `example.txt` is accessed across different platforms: using a URL, over a cloud storage system such as OneDrive, and over IPFS. In the case of the URL, `example.txt` is accessed in plain text, so it is clear that this file is publicly accessible. In the case of OneDrive, the file is hosted on OneDrive's servers and made available only to the users who are in possession of the full URL of that file, including a secret token. This allows the owner of the file on OneDrive to have complete control over who has access to the file. However, in the case of IPFS, the URL parameter looks like a secret token, but the parameter is the file's CID. The CID is announced by IPFS nodes to their closest peers (§ II-A) when the file is added to

the network. Unlike OneDrive, anyone with access to the CID can access the content of the file.

The similarity between OneDrive’s secret tokens and IPFS’s CIDs may cause users to conclude that their files are private and thereby lead them to share private files on the platform, without realizing the implications of that sharing. Similar issues have been observed by other studies on file-sharing platforms [8] where seemingly private-file links can be discovered and accessed by attackers. Further, as discussed earlier, the replication feature of IPFS allows anyone with the CID to download and re-host the content. Combined with the fact that no central authority can force the take-down of content, sensitive files can remain in the network indefinitely, even after their original owners realize their mistake and delete their sensitive files.

In this paper, we characterize the extent of sensitive file sharing on IPFS and discuss its implications in the context of malicious actors opportunistically seeking to identify and gain access to sensitive content.

### III. SENSITIVE FILE LEAKS ON IPFS

Our goal is to identify files shared on IPFS that contain sensitive information. Sensitive information is any kind of data that could be weaponized if it falls into the hands of attackers. For the purpose of this paper, we define sensitive data to be passwords, API keys, cryptographic keys (including SSH keys), and crypto-wallets. Related studies that analyze sensitive file leaks in GitHub repositories [13] and other source code repositories [16] use a similar definition for sensitive files but do not include crypto wallets. Since IPFS has been used extensively in the context of blockchains, we include crypto wallets in our definition.

The challenge is that a large number of files are shared over the IPFS network. The recent report by Protocol Lab[3], the major developer of IPFS, has discovered that over 1 billion new CIDs are being shared over the IPFS network each day. As such, contacting all peers and obtaining all the files from these peers is infeasible [17].

Instead, in this work, we leverage an existing platform called *IPFS-search*. *IPFS-search* is designed to search for content on the IPFS network, similar to search engines such as Google. *IPFS-search* deploys custom IPFS nodes that listen for file advertisements from other IPFS nodes. Then, these custom IPFS nodes contact the provider of the content, download a copy of the content, and identify file metadata such as file type, title, and description. This metadata is then indexed into the *IPFS-search* database. *IPFS-search* indexes approximately 500k documents per day and offers an API for querying the indexed documents.

*IPFS-search constitutes only a fraction of the entire IPFS network, but our analysis identifies considerable sensitive file leaks despite the limited vantage points.*

#### A. Methodology

Even with the use of *IPFS-search*, any automated technique that identifies sensitive file leaks can have a large number of

false positives. Manual analysis is an option but cannot scale to the population of files on IPFS. Instead, we use a set of progressively complex filters as shown in Figure 2. At each step, we apply a filter to identify files with sensitive content; the filters increase in complexity but each filter reduces the number of IPFS files in contention.



Fig. 2: Different filtering stages to find sensitive files

#### a) File-extension and Keyword-based filtering

The methodology starts with creating specially crafted queries with the *IPFS-search* API. Following the work of Meli et al. [13] we use a set of file extensions and keywords to identify files that have likely sensitive content. For the file expansions, we focused on cryptography-related files with extensions, such as, .key, .crt, .ppk, and .rsa. For the keywords, we focus on private keys where the file content starts with *BEGIN PRIVATE KEY* or *BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY*. Recall that *IPFS-search* only contains the metadata of the file and not the entire content; therefore in the first step, we can only rely on meta information for filtering.

We run the *IPFS-search* API once every hour from September 21, 2022, to November 30, 2022. During each run, we collect the newest files that match our file extension and keyword filter and download unique files from the original provider.

#### b) Regular expression mapping

In the second filter, we examine the contents of the files and identify sensitive content using regular expression matching. Regular expressions have been shown to be effective in identifying sensitive information in the context of code repositories [13], [16]. We update the set of regular expressions used by previous studies [13], [16] are:

**Private Keys:** Table IX (in the Appendix) shows the regular expressions used to identify private keys embedded in IPFS files. Private keys are sensitive because they can bypass passwords if the corresponding host utilizes key-based authentication. We added SSH and DSA regular expressions to the existing set of regular expressions used in prior work since these private keys were commonly leaked in IPFS files.

**API Keys across platforms:** Table VIII (in the Appendix) shows 13 regular expressions we use to identify the leaks of API keys. API Keys are meant to be kept confidential as most of them grant access to restricted actions on the service platform. For example, the popular online platform Stripe allows fund transfers via API calls which means that accidental API-key leaks can cause serious financial damage. Meli et al. have studied the consequences of leaking API keys in GitHub repositories [13].

**Cryptocurrency wallets:** Since IPFS has been used by web3 applications, we also identify files that are Ethereum Keystore files. Keystore files are encrypted files containing the private

key of an Ethereum wallet. If the correct password is provided, the user will have full access to the wallet (more details in §??). To identify whether the file is a valid keystore wallet, we followed the parsing strategy used in the official Ethereum go-lang library [18].

### c) Removing false positives

In the last step, we remove false positives. By design, the same content cannot yield two CIDs in IPFS. However, we observed that there are cases where this happens because of the use of different CID versions. To remove these duplicate CIDs, we compare the hash of each file against all matched files and removed files with identical hashes. We also observed that the same content is being shared in a different format. For example, the same configurations are being shared via JSON and YAML. We manually reviewed and removed these duplicate content files.

Even with specific regular expressions, we still encounter false matches that occur in binary files (for instance, embedded within a hex string) as well as in some code repositories (discussed in §III-B). We removed these false positives before proceeding with our analysis. For the remainder of this paper, we present our findings before and after the false positive filtering as total count and unique count.

### B. Sensitive leaks in IPFS files: Results

In total, we downloaded 10,777 files of different MIME types that match our extension/keyword-based filtering. Table I classifies the top file categories. Based on the MIME type, the majority of the files are either compressed files (62%) or plain text files (37%). We separate the compressed and uncompressed files and identify sensitive leaks within each set.

**TABLE I:** Top 10 MIME Type for 10,777 files downloaded from IPFS-search using the first keyword-based filter

MIME Type	Count	MIME Type	Count
gzip	4,353	epub+zip	176
plain/text	2,449	octet-stream	84
zip	2,178	html	73
json	902	x-java	35
pgp-signature	396	x-c	34
		other (pgp-keys, python, x-c++ ...)	124

### Sensitive file leaks in plain text files

First, we analyze the non-compressed plain text files by applying regular-expression filters. We found 236 file matches with 149 private key matches and 87 matches on API keys. After removing the false positives we identified 129 unique private keys and 23 unique API key matches.

Table II shows the type of private key leaks. 60% of the leaks are RSA private keys, 17% are SSH keys, and the rest of other keys. While the key itself does not contain any host information, the attacker could do further reconnaissance (e.g. from which node was the file retrieved [19]) to identify the specific hosts that could be exploited using these stolen keys. For API key matches, we identified 23 unique API keys

**TABLE II:** A total of 149 private key matches were found using the regular expression matching out of which 129 were unique matches (post false positive removal).

Private Key Type	Total Match	Unique Match
RSA	82	77
SSH	36	22
General	25	24
EC	4	3
DSA	2	2
PGP	1	1

**TABLE III:** A total of 87 API key matches were found using the regular expression matching, and 23 unique key matches were found after removing false positives.

Platform/API	Total Match	Unique Match
Google OAuthID	25	10
Google API	21	7
Amazon AWS	24	4
Stripe Standard API Key	17	2

belonging to various services, shown in Table III. Most of the credentials are from Google and are all hardcoded into source-code files to interact with Google’s services.

### Sensitive file leaks in compressed files


We next look at compressed files that match our keyword filters. The files were largely code repositories. Out of the 6,716 compressed files, 61% (4,075) are Node.js libraries from npm, 29% (1,969) are GitHub Go libraries, 6.8% (461) contain some source code in the directory, and the rest are categorized as “other” (i.e., compressed files that are not code repositories).

In total, we identified 9,119 sensitive files based on our regular expression mapping; after removing duplicates, we identified 8,309 unique sensitive files. However, there are still false positives since repositories have testing code with valid matches that are not necessarily used in production. For example, the code may contain an example file or a test file with a *dummy* key. To reduce these false positives, we implement an additional filtering strategy where we examine the path of each matched file. If the path or the filename contains one of *test*, *example*, *dummy*, *sample*, or *readme*, we consider them as false positives. After the filtering, we identified 1,788 files with sensitive information.


Fig. 6 shows the distribution of each regular expression match after the filtering. The majority of the sensitive leaks involve Google OAuth IDs (36%) and GoogleAPI keys (18%). The presence of these hardcoded credentials in compressed files matches our earlier observation of hardcoded credentials in non-compressed files. As before, if any of these files fall into the hands of attackers, they can be abused to launch attacks against the owners of the corresponding applications. For instance, previous studies have shown various attacks using OAuth leaks [20], [21], [22], [23].

### C. Case study: Leaks in repositories

In our aforementioned analysis, we discovered 4,075 Node.js libraries and 1,969 GitHub Golang library repositories. Sharing libraries over IPFS has additional security implications. Prior work has established that developers inadvertently include sensitive information in code repositories [13]. In the context of this work, if the owner or another user with access to a repository with sensitive information uploads the codebase to IPFS, the sensitive information can persist indefinitely, even after the leak is identified and removed from the original repository. Similarly, if a developer decides to make their




**Fig. 3:** Comparing sensitive leaks in the node.js libraries shared on IPFS vs the online repository



**Fig. 5:** Difference in release dates between the library shared on IPFS and the latest online repository version.

repository private, a version of that repository can still be obtained over IPFS.

As a case study, we analyze Node.js and GitHub files shared on IPFS and compare them to their corresponding public repositories. All repositories are publicly available on GitHub, suggesting their intended public nature. In addition, in our responsible disclosure VI, we inform the repository owners about any sensitive leaks




**Fig. 6:** Among the compressed gzip and zip files, 1788 contained sensitive information

**TABLE IV:** Repositories status for Node.js and GitHub Golang libraries shared on IPFS.

Type	Libraries found on IPFS	Unique Libraries	Corresponding repository found Online
Node.js Library	4,075	1,835	1,727
GitHub Golang Library	1,969	1,043	990

#### 1) Identifying online GitHub/Node repositories

Table IV shows the status of both library types. We identified 1,835 unique Node.js libraries and 1,043 unique GitHub libraries shared on IPFS that have sensitive information (after



**Fig. 4:** Comparing sensitive leaks in the GitHub libraries shared on IPFS vs the online repository

deleting different versions of the same library). For Github Golang libraries, we tracked 990 of the 1043 libraries to their corresponding repositories on GitHub online. The remaining 53 were not searchable using the GitHub API. We then queried the owners of these repositories and found that 48 of the owners are still active on GitHub. So we speculate that these repositories were either moved to private repos, or the owners deleted these repositories. For Node.js repositories, for 1,727 of the 1,835 libraries shared on IPFS, we were able to track the original repository.

#### 2) Comparing sensitive leaks on IPFS and the original repository

We next compare each sensitive file shared on IPFS with the original online repository (Node.js or GitHub). The goal here is to characterize the persistence of these sensitive files; in other words, to find if the repository owner removed or patched the sensitive files in the online version. For this study, we focus on warnings regarding Amazon AWS and RSA private keys as they have distinct characteristics.

We categorize the differences as follows:

- **Sensitive information persists:** Sensitive information is present in both the IPFS library and the original repository.
- **Sensitive information patched:** Sensitive information is present in IPFS but does not exist in the original repository (i.e., the file is patched).
- **Sensitive information patched, but new sensitive information present:** Sensitive information is present in IPFS. This sensitive information does not appear in the original repository but the repository has new and different sensitive leaks.

- **Sensitive information removed:** Sensitive information is present in IPFS. But the file that contains sensitive information does not exist in the original repository.

Figure 3 and Figure 4 show if sensitive information persists in the original repository for Node.js and GitHub respectively. For GitHub’s repository, nearly 60% of all sensitive information is no longer available. Of these, for over half of them, the original file with sensitive leaks is removed from the GitHub repository’s latest version. For the Node.js repository, 70% of the sensitive information are unchanged. But for information that is changed, the majority of the sensitive information is removed. This difference between GitHub and Node.js is likely because developers are more active on GitHub and fix warnings more frequently.

Further, for all IPFS repositories that contain sensitive information, we compare the time difference between the version that was shared on IPFS and the newest online repository version. Figure 5 shows that, in over 50% of the cases, the IPFS version is at least two years older than the current online version. This indicates that the sensitive leaks on IPFS can persist for an extended period of time (as long as at least one node retains a copy of the sensitive file). This also shows that pruning the older versions of code from GitHub to deal with secret leaks is insufficient.

#### D. Deploying our own monitoring

In the previous section, we used the IPFS-search infrastructure to identify sensitive information leaks. However, IPFS-search is a centralized service and can potentially use filtering or other techniques to stop opportunistic attackers from trivially finding sensitive files.

An alternative technique for attackers is to deploy their own IPFS network monitoring, thereby bypassing any content filtering done by the IPFS-search infrastructure. To characterize the volume of sensitive information attackers could potentially gather using their own IPFS-search instances, we deployed two instances (both on US East Coast) from August 1, 2022, to November 30, 2022.

Due to the limitation of the disk space, we only downloaded files that are plain text and compressed files, as they are the most dominant file type from our IPFS-search study (§III-B). In total, we downloaded 1,678,170 files out of 3.1 million unique CIDs collected, whose distribution is shown in Table VI. Most of the files are JSON data files likely because developers use IPFS to share web-related content.

We then applied the methodology described in §III-A. In all, we identified 105 unique files that contain sensitive information. Table V shows the different categories of leaks. The most frequent leak across non-compressed files are Google API Keys which is similar to our observation when using IPFS-search. Among the 24,331 compressed files, we identified 647 unique files that contain sensitive information. Figure 7 shows the distribution of each regular expression match after the filtering. The majority of the sensitive file leaks are Google OAuth ID and Google API keys, again, similar to the study of the sensitive file using IPFS-search.

#### E. IPFS file availability over time

One of the unique features of IPFS is that files can be cached and replicated throughout the network. On the other hand, a previous study [2] shows that the churn rate of IPFS providers is high. This means providers join and leave the IPFS network relatively quickly, which means that providers may become unavailable quickly. This in-turn affects the availability of files.

To characterize the availability of sensitive files over a long period of time, we conducted the following experiment: for each sensitive file we identified on IPFS, we searched for the file after a 6-month gap. We conduct this experiment for 1,033 CIDs that we identified as sensitive files from both IPFS-search and our own deployment. Figure 8 shows the providers count distribution of these sensitive files. Even after 6 months, over 40% of the files have at least one provider, which means they are still available. More importantly about 20% of the sensitive files have more than one provider; with an extreme case of over 20 providers having a copy of a sensitive file. This result further indicates that once sensitive leaks appear on IPFS, they can persist for an extended time.

#### F. Takeaway

Our analysis confirms the presence of sensitive files being shared on IPFS, where such sharing can occur accidentally or due to a misunderstanding regarding the public nature of IPFS content. The majority of the identified sensitive files were compressed files associated with code repositories, with API keys being the most commonly leaked information. Exposure of even a single secret from code repositories can have a catastrophic impact on business operations. For instance, the SolarWinds attack, which affected Fortune 500 companies and multiple US government agencies, is believed to have originated from the attacker discovering a weak password within a GitHub repository [24]. This example underscores the importance of safeguarding sensitive information. We also show that, a malicious user can deploy their own IPFS instance with just two vantage points and can identify hundreds of IPFS files that contain sensitive information.


### IV. GAUGING MALICIOUS ACTIVITY ON IPFS

In the previous sections of this paper, we investigated the population of sensitive files on IPFS and highlighted the potential that these files provide to prospective attackers. At the same time, just because attackers *could* be using the IPFS network to steal sensitive content, does not necessarily mean that they are currently engaging in that activity. To this end, in this section, we report on the findings of deploying our own honeypot experiment involving fake sensitive files (called decoy files) that lead back to monitored infrastructure under our control. Researchers have been using the concept of honeypots for over three decades [14], [15], [25], [8], deploying fake files and fake infrastructure for the express purpose of being compromised, so that attackers can be studied while keeping them away from real production systems.




Matched Type	Total Count	Unique Count
Google API	105	71
Google AuthID	19	19
Amazon AWS	17	14
EC Private Key	2	0
PGP Private Key	2	0
RSA Private Key	1	0
SSH Private Key	1	1
DSA Private Key	1	0
Ethereum Wallet	1	0

**TABLE V:** When deploying our own IPFS instances, we found 149 sensitive matches in the plain-text files shared on IPFS. The majority of the sensitive matches were Google API and AuthID



**Fig. 7:** When deploying our own IPFS instances, we found 647 files that contain sensitive information among the compressed files.



**Fig. 8:** Number of providers who have a copy of each of the 1,033 sensitive files shared on IPFS, when searching for the file after a 6-month gap.

**TABLE VI:** Top 10 MIME Type for 1,678,170 files collected using our own IPFS monitoring

File Type	Count	File Type	Count
application/json	1,371,272	application/zip	3,274
text/plain	183,484	text/PGP	2,722
text/html	74,990	application/octet-stream	1,992
application/gzip	20,769	image/svg+xml	1,628
text/x-java	12,977	text/x-c	1,413
		other (csv, pgp-signature, msword, ...)	3,649

#### A. Setup

To set up the honeypot experiment, we craft different types of decoy files that will be uploaded to the IPFS network:

- **HTML:** the file contains a redirect link (also known as a “beacon”) which will notify us that the file was opened.
- **Microsoft Word, PDF:** the file contains login credentials to our honeypot server. In addition, the file embeds a beacon that will trigger upon opening the document.
- **SSH Private Keys:** the private key can be used to directly login to our honeypot server.
- **Cryptocurrency wallet:** contains seed/private-key data allowing attackers to steal a small amount of funds.
- **Control files:** randomly generated files.

To further attract attackers, all the files are given attractive naming such as online logins, password backups, etc.

#### B. Data generation

To simulate accidental leaks we utilized an online fake information generator <sup>1</sup> to generate 300 unique people with usernames, passwords, as well as fake banking information. Further, we registered 5 domain names and point them to our honeypot server so that each password login leak corresponds to one of these domain names.

#### C. Deployment

To upload the decoy files to the IPFS network, we deployed 5 IPFS nodes in the US, UK, Brazil, Japan, and Australia and uploaded 20 HTML, PDF, Microsoft Word, and SSH Private keys from each node. We also uploaded 30 control files and one wallet file. Since IPFS uses content addressing, when a single file is uploaded to the network, the file name will not be retained. To address this downside (downside in terms of

discoverability by prospective attackers), we utilized the so-called *wrapped* option <sup>4</sup> which will wrap the file into a single directory and thus retain the filename when uploaded. The honeypot server was deployed in the US.

Each IPFS node re-announces the provider record to its peers every 12 hours. Further, for every 12 hours each IPFS node will retrieve all the decoy files from the other four so that the CID will spread across the network.

**TABLE VII:** Decoy files downloaded percentage among each deployed IPFS node.

Location	PDF	SSH Key with UserName	MS Word	Control	SSH Key	HTML	ETH Wallet
Japan	5%	5%	20%	10%	15%	5%	0%
Australia	25%	15%	10%	0%	5%	5%	0%
UK	10%	0%	5%	5%	20%	10%	100%
US	10%	0%	15%	0%	10%	10%	0%
Brazil	15%	5%	15%	5%	0%	20%	0%

#### D. Results

We deployed our honeypot from August 5, 2022, to February 16, 2023. In total, we observed that 56 decoy files were downloaded across various categories. Figure 9 shows the downloaded file-type distribution with respect to each IPFS node, where no clear download pattern emerges. Table VII shows the percentage of downloaded files with respect to the total decoy files uploaded, indicating low download activity.


While our decoy files were downloaded by a number of IPFS peers, we did not observe any malicious action against our honeypot server. To understand the characteristics of the peers who downloaded our files, we used their IP addresses to obtain geolocation and ASN information. The majority of these clients were located in Germany (shown in Figure 10) and the ASes belong to *Hetzner Online GmbH*. We confirm that these peers are IPFS-search nodes using a reverse DNS lookup.

#### E. Takeaway


At the time of our honeypot experiments, we observed only machine-to-machine traffic to our IPFS nodes, and the majority of our files were indexed by IPFS-search. While this is good news for the owners who leak files that contain sensitive content on IPFS, however, these files can stay on IPFS indefinitely, essentially waiting for future attackers to discover them.

<sup>1</sup><https://www.fakenamegenerator.com/>

<sup>4</sup><https://docs.ipfs.tech/reference/kubo/cli/#ipfs-add>



**Fig. 9:** Downloaded decoy files distribution for each deployed IPFS node. Not every file is retrieved by other peers.



**Fig. 10:** All IP Geo-location for peers downloaded decoy files with respect to each deployed IPFS node.

## V. RELATED WORK

Studies on IPFS have mainly focused on evaluating IPFS performance [2], network size [26], the transport layer protocol Bitswap [27], and I/O performance [28]. There are fewer studies on the security implications of IPFS. One study identifies critical security issues regarding Sybil and Eclipse attacks on the IPFS network [29]. The study found that a single attacker can manipulate the network by generating massive peer IDs and flooding the network. Once the network is saturated with fake peers, then the attacker can advertise fake routing information to the victim’s IPFS nodes and isolate the victim from the network. Another study focused on how IPFS is being utilized by ransomware services [30] where attackers host Web pages that ask for ransom on IPFS, benefiting from the robustness and resilience of IPFS. Related research has also discovered that botnets deployed into the IPFS networks enable attackers to exert fine-grained control over their victims [31].

To the best of our knowledge, while studies exist for characterizing the presence of sensitive content on centralized platforms (such as Github [13] and file-hosting services [8]), there has been no study of sensitive-file sharing on IPFS. The core functionality of IPFS and its intended use for building decentralized applications makes it different from GitHub and therefore meriting its own investigation.

## VI. ETHICS

Even though all the files that we accessed in this study are by definition public, the entire premise of this paper is that some of the files stored on IPFS are sensitive in nature. As such, in this section, we describe how we conducted our experiments to ensure that we preserve the privacy of users and the overall ethics of our work.

Our focus is solely on identifying whether sensitive files are being shared on IPFS, without revealing the providers (i.e. potential users) of these files. Throughout our data collection process via IPFS-search and our own search instance, we retrieved files without recording any information about the providers, ensuring their privacy. We also took measures to prevent the unintentional spreading of these files by configuring our IPFS nodes to refrain from caching and redistributing them. This approach minimized our impact on the ecosystem and avoided further propagation of potentially sensitive files.

Moreover, due to ethical considerations and the vast volume of collected files, we relied on pattern detection using regular expressions to identify sensitive files. This approach reduced the need for manual analysis of sensitive files outside of the ones containing API keys, encryption keys, etc. Additionally, we removed all collected files post-analysis to maintain data integrity and privacy.

Finally, responsible disclosure was another key aspect of our study. We notified repository owners about sensitive leaks within code repositories via email and offered assistance to address these issues. We contacted 59 individual developers for Golang libraries. However, due to limitations with the Node.js repository, we were unable to contact its owners. This responsible disclosure provides developers with an opportunity to patch vulnerabilities, such as obtaining new API keys, thereby enhancing the overall security and privacy of the IPFS file ecosystem. We will update the paper with any responses from developers.

## VII. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATION

First and foremost, files indexed by IPFS-search and files found using our own deployment are only a fraction of all the files available on IPFS. As such, this work does not measure an upper bound on sensitive leaks on IPFS. Interestingly, even with the limited vantage points that we deployed, we were able to reveal that considerable sensitive leaks do occur on IPFS. New research is needed to explore the *extent* of sensitive file leaks on IPFS. We will release our measurement and analysis code for other researchers to build on.

Additionally, the regular expressions we used to identify sensitive files were restricted to well-defined domains. However, sensitive leaks can vary from person to person such as passwords, phone numbers, or personal identification information. For example, during our manual inspection, we found some configuration files containing credentials from one-off platforms, such as database credentials and cryptocurrency-exchange API keys. It is difficult to identify these leaks using regular expressions because of the number of regular expressions that will be needed to cover these one-off security



keys. Expanding the study to search for these additional credentials will further increase the number of sensitive files we can uncover. Similarly, our honeypot experiment focused on a limited set of well-defined sensitive files over a brief observation period; a broader range of file types and a longer duration could yield further discoveries.

Finally, we address potential solutions for enhancing file-sharing privacy on the IPFS network. One such proposal, suggested by Protocol Lab, the main contributor to IPFS, is the DHT Reader Privacy Upgrade [32]. This initiative aims to improve privacy by encrypting CID requests during file announcement and retrieval processes. Currently, when a user requests CID content, the IPFS node forwards the request to nearby peers, potentially revealing the requested CID. With encryption, however, the CID remains concealed, preventing peers from recording it. This enhancement is expected to bolster the anonymity of sensitive files by limiting the exposure of CIDs to peers. It's important to note that this idea is still in the proposal phase and has not been implemented or validated. In our future research, we plan to assess the effectiveness of the DHT Reader Privacy Upgrade, evaluating both its performance and its ability to protect privacy.

### VIII. CONCLUSIONS

InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a peer-to-peer hyper-media sharing protocol with the stated goal of making the web faster, safer, and more open. With its rising popularity and openness, our work aims to answer the following question: *Are users inadvertently sharing sensitive files on IPFS?*

To answer this question, we conducted a measurement study to identify sensitive file leaks. We use IPFS-search, a community-built search engine, as our vantage point, and show that there are thousands of IPFS files that are publicly accessible that share sensitive information including private cryptographic keys and API tokens. Even if a platform like IPFS-search restricts users from searching for sensitive files, we show that, a malicious user can deploy their own IPFS vantage points to search for sensitive files on IPFS. With only 2 vantage points and over a 4 month period, we identified hundreds of sensitive files. Finally, to investigate whether sensitive files are being actively exploited by attackers, we deployed honeypot IPFS nodes that upload decoy files onto the IPFS network. Even though we observed decoy files being downloaded by other peers, no malicious actions were performed using the sensitive content. Our work concludes that sensitive files are in fact currently shared through IPFS, even though they are not being weaponized by bad actors yet. Given the growing popularity of IPFS and decentralized platforms, our study shows that public sharing of sensitive content on these platforms warrants the attention and additional research by the community, in order to devise methods that protect users while not compromising on the decentralized nature of the underlying protocols.

### REFERENCES

- [1] J. Benet, "Ipfs-content addressed, versioned, p2p file system," *arXiv preprint arXiv:1407.3561*, 2014.
- [2] D. Trautwein, A. Raman, G. Tyson, I. Castro, W. Scott, M. Schubotz, B. Gipp, and Y. Psaras, "Design and evaluation of ipfs: a storage layer for the decentralized web," in *Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2022 Conference*, 2022, pp. 739–752.
- [3] D. Trautwein, "Network-measurements/results/rfm21-hydras-performance-contribution.md at master · protocol/network-measurements," Jan 2023. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/protocol/network-measurements/blob/master/results/rfm21-hydras-performance-contribution.md>
- [4] E. L. Dirk McCormick, "New improvements to ipfs bitswap for faster container image distribution," <https://blog.ipfs.io/2020-02-14-improved-bitswap-for-container-distribution/>, 2020.
- [5] "Adding ipfs protocol support to chromium," Nov 2022. [Online]. Available: <https://blog.ipfs.tech/14-11-2022-igalia-chromium/>
- [6] B. Bondy, "Ipfs support in brave," <https://brave.com/ipfs-support/>, 2021.
- [7] S. Batt, "Your files for keeps forever with ipfs," <https://blogs.opera.com/tips-and-tricks/2021/02/opera-crypto-files-for-keeps-ipfs-unstoppable-domains/>, 2021.
- [8] N. Nikiforakis, M. Balduzzi, S. Van Acker, W. Joosen, and D. Balzarotti, "Exposing the lack of privacy in file hosting services," *LEET*, 2011.
- [9] B. Kaleli, M. Egele, and G. Stringhini, "On the perils of leaking referrers in online collaboration services," in *Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment*, R. Perdisci, C. Maurice, G. Giacinto, and M. Almgren, Eds. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019, pp. 67–85.
- [10] M. E. Johnson, D. McGuire, and N. D. Willey, "The evolution of the peer-to-peer file sharing industry and the security risks for users," in *Proceedings of the 41st Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS 2008)*, 2008, pp. 383–383.
- [11] "Ipfs search." [Online]. Available: <https://ipfs-search.com>
- [12] D. Goodin, "Thousands of servers found leaking 750mb worth of passwords and keys," Mar 2018. [Online]. Available: <https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/03/thousands-of-servers-found-leaking-750-mb-worth-of-passwords-and-keys/>
- [13] M. Meli, M. R. McNiece, and B. Reaves, "How bad can it git? characterizing secret leakage in public github repositories," in *NDSS*, 2019.
- [14] C. Stoll, *The cuckoo's egg: tracking a spy through the maze of computer espionage*. Simon and Schuster, 1990.
- [15] N. Provos and T. Holz, *Virtual honeypots: from botnet tracking to intrusion detection*. Pearson Education, 2007.
- [16] V. S. Sinha, D. Saha, P. Dhoolia, R. Padhye, and S. Mani, "Detecting and mitigating secret-key leaks in source code repositories," in *2015 IEEE/ACM 12th Working Conference on Mining Software Repositories*, 2015, pp. 396–400.
- [17] S. Henningsen, M. Florian, S. Rust, and B. Scheuermann, "Mapping the interplanetary filesystem," in *2020 IFIP Networking Conference (Networking)*, 2020, pp. 289–297.
- [18] "go-ethereum," <https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum>.
- [19] L. Balduf, S. Henningsen, M. Florian, S. Rust, and B. Scheuermann, "Monitoring data requests in decentralized data storage systems: A case study of ipfs," in *2022 IEEE 42nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS)*. IEEE, 2022, pp. 658–668.
- [20] S. Farooqi, F. Zaffar, N. Leontiadis, and Z. Shafiq, "Measuring and mitigating oauth access token abuse by collusion networks," in *Proceedings of the 2017 Internet Measurement Conference*, ser. IMC '17. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2017, p. 355–368. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1145/3131365.3131404>
- [21] D. Fett, R. Küsters, and G. Schmitz, "A comprehensive formal security analysis of oauth 2.0," in *Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security*, ser. CCS '16. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2016, p. 1204–1215. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978385>
- [22] S.-T. Sun and K. Beznosov, "The devil is in the (implementation) details: An empirical analysis of oauth sso systems," in *Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security*, ser. CCS '12. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2012, p. 378–390. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1145/2382196.2382238>
- [23] T. Lodderstedt, M. McGloin, and P. Hunt, *OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations*, Jan 2013, no. RFC 6819. [Online]. Available: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6819/>

- [24] G. Sands, Brian Fung, “Former solarwinds ceo blames intern for “solarwinds123” password leak — cnn politics,” Feb 2021. [Online]. Available: <https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/26/politics/solarwinds123-password-intern/index.html>
- [25] B. M. Bowen, S. Hershkop, A. D. Keromytis, and S. J. Stolfo, “Baiting inside attackers using decoy documents,” in *Security and Privacy in Communication Networks: 5th International ICST Conference, SecureComm*. Springer, 2009, pp. 51–70.
- [26] E. Daniel and F. Tschorsch, “Passively measuring ipfs churn and network size,” in *2022 IEEE 42nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW)*. IEEE, 2022, pp. 60–65.
- [27] A. De la Rocha, D. Dias, and Y. Psaras, “Accelerating content routing with bitswap: A multi-path file transfer protocol in ipfs and filecoin,” 2021.
- [28] J. Shen, Y. Li, Y. Zhou, and X. Wang, “Understanding i/o performance of ipfs storage: a client’s perspective,” in *Proceedings of the International Symposium on Quality of Service*, 2019, pp. 1–10.
- [29] B. Prünster, A. Marsalek, and T. Zefferer, “Total eclipse of the heart—disrupting the {InterPlanetary} file system,” in *31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22)*, 2022, pp. 3735–3752.
- [30] C. Karapapas, I. Pittaras, N. Fotiou, and G. C. Polyzos, “Ransomware as a service using smart contracts and ipfs,” in *2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)*. IEEE, 2020, pp. 1–5.
- [31] A. T. Research, “The interplanetary storm: New malware in wild using interplanetary file system’s (ipfs) p2p network,” <https://www.anomali.com/blog/the-interplanetary-storm-new-malware-in-wild-using-interplanetary-file-systems-ipfs-p2p-network>, 2019.
- [32] [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/ipfs/specs/pull/373>

## APPENDIX

### A. IPFS Background Information




Fig. 11: Storing file to IPFS

Figure 11 shows the storing process of IPFS. When storing a file into the IPFS network, the file will be stored on a local IPFS instance. Then the instance will first break the file into small blocks and compute the CID of all blocks by hashing the block content. In addition, the instance will also create a provider record for each block. Provider record is a key-value pair of the CID and the Peer ID, and they are stored in a Distributed Hash Table (DHT). Finally, the local IPFS instance will find the  $k$  closest peer nodes to the hash of the CIDs and advertise the provider record to these peers so that peers in the IPFS network will know the existence of the newly stored file. The distance is computed by XOR of hash of the CID and PeerID.

Figure 12 shows the retrieval process of IPFS. When a client wants to retrieve a file from IPFS, the client must provide the CID of the content. The local IPFS instance at the client uses the hash of the CID to calculate the  $k$  closest peer nodes to the CID it knows. The node then asks these peers for the CID’s provider record. If the provider record is not located within the  $k$  closest peers, each peer in turn contacts their  $k$  closest peers with respect to the hash of the CID and so on until the




Fig. 12: Retrieving file from IPFS

provider record is found. The local IPFS instance contacts the discovered provider from the provider record to retrieve the content.

### B. Regular Expressions

TABLE VIII: Regular expressions targeting different service platforms’ API Key

Platform/API	Key Type	Target Regular Expression
Amazon AWS	Access Key ID	AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}
Amazon MWS	Auth Token	amzn\mws\[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}
Google	API Key	AIza[0-9A-Za-z]{35}
	OAuth ID	[0-9]{+}[0-9A-Za-z]{32}\.apps\.googleusercontent\.com
Stripe	Standard API Key	sk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24}
	Restricted API Key	rk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24}
Square	Access Token	sq0atp-[0-9A-Za-z]{22}
	OAuth Secret	sq0osp-[0-9A-Za-z]{43}
PayPal Braintree	Access Token	access_token\$production\$[0-9a-z]{16}\$[0-9a-f]{32}
Meta	Access Token	EAAcEdEose0cBA[0-9A-Za-z]{+}
Twilio	API Key	SK[0-9a-fA-F]{32}
MailGun	API Key	key-[0-9a-zA-Z]{32}
Picatic	API Key	sk_live_[0-9a-z]{32}

TABLE IX: Regular expression to identify private keys and they have a distinct structure mainly due to their PEM header

Asymmetric Key Type	Target Regular Expression	Asymmetric Key Type	Target Regular Expression
RSA Private Key	—BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY— [r\n]+(?:(?=[0-9a-zA-Z+\/=]{64,76})[r\n]+)+ [0-9a-zA-Z+\/=]{r\n} —END RSA PRIVATE KEY—	PGP Private Key	—BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK— [r\n]+(?:(?=[0-9a-zA-Z+\/=]{64,76})[r\n]+)+ [0-9a-zA-Z+\/=]{r\n} —END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK—
EC Private Key	—BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY— [r\n]+(?:(?=[0-9a-zA-Z+\/=]{64,76})[r\n]+)+ [0-9a-zA-Z+\/=]{r\n} —END EC PRIVATE KEY—	SSH Private Key	—BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY— [r\n]+(?:(?=[0-9a-zA-Z+\/=]{64,76})[r\n]+)+ [0-9a-zA-Z+\/=]{r\n} —END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY—
DSA Private Key	—BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY— [r\n]+(?:(?=[0-9a-zA-Z+\/=]{64,76})[r\n]+)+ [0-9a-zA-Z+\/=]{r\n} —END DSA PRIVATE KEY—	General Private Key	—BEGIN PRIVATE KEY— [r\n]+(?:(?=[0-9a-zA-Z+\/=]{64,76})[r\n]+)+ [0-9a-zA-Z+\/=]{r\n} —END PRIVATE KEY—