NASR Side Meeting

Opening


IETF 119

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Before Started

- Can we agree on goals for this meeting?
 - Summarize past NASR list discussions and align consensus
 - Align key information and documents that facilitate the next successful BoF and formation of NASR WG
- Can we agree on non-goals for this meeting?
 - Do not discuss non-relevant topics that may deviate from the purpose of facilitating a successful BoF
- Trivia
 - IETF Note Well
 - We are being recorded—if you object, please volunteer to take minutes!


Timeline



Recapping Problem Statement

Traditional routing security and traffic encryption does not suffice anymore!

 Problem: Traditional routing security does not guarantee <u>predictability</u> and <u>auditability</u> of forwarding <u>behaviors</u>.



 Motivation: Security-sensitive clients want their sensitive data forward only via <u>trusted</u> devices, with no data leakage or deviation from these predictable paths.

Recapping Use Cases

- **Service Function Chains:** Operators can use Service Function Chaining (SFC) to provide packaged security services or compliance services. Committing to a sfc path, ensuring ordered traversal of these SFs and provide verifiable proofs of transit can help assure security performance and service delivery.
- Secure Leased Lines: Operator clients want a dedicated line consists only of devices/services that has certain trust attributes, with no vulnerable or unqualified device in between.
- Customized Quality of Trust: The secure line could be dynamically orchestrated based on path-level trust preferences (achieved collectively by device attributes) like deployed geolocation (geofencing), security level (RATS-ed, SBOM...), vendor, ...
- **Forwarding integrity:** Operator clients (specifically security-sensitive industry clients, like financial institutions, government) want their sensitive data stay on top of this secure line ONLY. No deviation, no data leakage.

Documents Status

- draft-richardson-nasr-terminology-00
- draft-liu-nasr-requirements-01
- draft-liu-path-validation-problem-statement-00

Terminology Status

- draft-richardson-nasr-terminology-00
 - Secure routing (NASR Goal):
 - Protect data security by ensuring data transits only on trusted devices, trusted operating environments or trusted services.
 - Routing Security (traditional):
 - Achieving correct reachability within and across networks by ensuring authentic and truthful distribution of routing information
 - Proof of Transit:
 - Secure and verifiable logs or evidence of a packet's transit path in the data plane.
- draft-liu-nasr-requirements-01
 - See the scope next page

Current Scope

- **NASR Goal:** Protect data security by ensuring data transits only on trusted devices, trusted operating environments or trusted services.
- NASR: Establish a level of confidence in the trustworthiness of the routing path by appraisal, attestation and verification.

Step 1: What to attest

- How: Connect and consume
 RATS outputs (and other security proofs) to commit to a path
- [PS] Path-level trust attribute definition (objective)
- [PS] Secure configurations
- [I] Path trustworthiness appraisal methods, trust levels (subjective)

Step 2: How to attest

- How: Dedicated OAM dialtest protocol, output attestation result/proof
- [PS] TPR+POT
- [PS] Attestation Result Format
- [I] Architecture, procedures

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Step 3: How to verify

- How: In-band or out-of-band verification of compliance
- [I] Proof-of-Transit
- [PS] Management plane protocol data field extension
- [PS] in-situ OAM data field extension
- [BCP] Ingress/ Egress Filtering

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Agenda

- Opening, List Discussion Recap Huawei (5 min)
- Current Scope—CMCC (10 min)
- Architecture Proposal Telefonica (15 min)
- Trusted Enhanced Path Routing—Pengcheng Lab (10min)
- POT Mechanisms Survey/Benchmark— Huawei France (10 min)

- QA, Open Discussion, Related Pointers (30 min)
- Wrap up, Next Steps

Opening ends

Q&A and Discussion:

The floor is open for discussion.

Questions

Question 1: Do you agree on the current goal of NASR?

 Protect data security by ensuring data transits only on trusted devices, trusted operating environments or trusted services.

Question 2: Do you agree on the current 3-stage scopes and directions? Any comments?

Question 3: Do you agree our <u>next steps</u> should include:

- Establish design team for architecture and charter
- One interim meeting to review architecture and charter

Question 4: Who will volunteer to join the NASR-architecture design/virtual/architecture team? Frequency? Who will join the interim meeting?

Question 5: Any other pointers? Related documents from other SDOs?