Deep Learning
lecture 13
Weakness of Deep Learning

Yi Wu, IIIS

Spring 2024

May-31

Logistics

- Prepare for the poster session!
  - FIT Floor 2, 13:00 to 16:00, Jun 13 (Thursday)
  - Poster submission ddl: Jun. 10 (otherwise you need to print it on your own)
  - Prepare a (live/cherry-picked) demo
  - Wait for the evaluation by me. ☺
  - Vote for your favorite poster!

- Next lecture: guest speakers (no slides)
  - Highly encourage you and your friends to come!
  - Speaker#1: Beidi Chen (CMU), LLM inference system
  - Speaker#2: Tianjun Zhang (Berkeley), LLM Agent
  - Speaker#3: Zhongyu Li (Berkeley), DL for Robot Control

Today’s Topic

- Issues and weakness of deep learning models
  - Adversarial example
  - Security and privacy
  - Explainability
  - Fairness and bias
  - Safety

Today’s Topic

- Issues and weakness of deep learning models
  - Adversarial example
  - Security and privacy
  - Explainability
  - Fairness and bias
  - Safety

- The lecture is NOT telling you how powerful DL is!
  - But how WEAK DL is :)

Today’s Topic

- Issues and weakness of deep learning models
  - **Adversarial example**
  - Security and privacy
  - Explainability
  - Fairness and bias
  - Safety

Autonomous Driving



Autonomous Driving

Clean Stop Sign

Real-world Stop Sign in Berkeley



"Stop sign"

"Stop sign"

Adversarial Example

Clean Stop Sign

Real-world Stop Sign in Berkeley

Adversarial Example

Adversarial Example



"Stop sign"

"Stop sign"

"Speed limit sign 45km/h"

Adversarial Example

- Adversarial examples in physical world remain effective under different viewing distances, angles, etc
  - Robust Physical World Attacks on Machine Learning Models, CVPR 2018
    - Dawn Song's group



Lab Test Summary (Stationary)

Target Class: **Speed Limit 45**



Adversarial Example

- What are adversarial examples?
  - Input data with small changes that are designed to cause machine learning models to make mistakes
  - $y = f(x; \theta)$
  - $y' = f(x + \epsilon; \theta)$



92% Cat

94% Iguana

Why does adversarial example exist?

Adversarial Example

- The input space is so huge!

Let's hack it!



Adversarial Example

- How to find an adversarial example?
  - Explaining and Harnessing adversarial examples (Ian Goodfellow, et al., ICLR 2015)
  - Assume we know the deep learning model $y = f(x; \theta)$ is known
    - White-box attack
  - Goal: find an adversarial perturbation ϵ
    - $|\epsilon|$ is small
    - $|y - f(x + \epsilon; \theta)|$ is large
  - An optimization problem!

Adversarial Example



- How to find an adversarial example?
  - White-box attack
  - The optimization problem

$$\max_{|\epsilon| \le c} |f(x;\theta) - f(x+\epsilon;\theta)|$$

  - Closed-form solution with a known $f(x;\theta)$
    - $\epsilon \propto \nabla_x f(x;\theta)$
    - The perturbation that leads to the largest output change
  - Adversarial examples also generalize!
    - It even works on printed images!

Can we defend it?



(a) Image from dataset (b) Clean image (c) Adv. image, $\epsilon = 4$ (d) Adv. image, $\epsilon = 8$

Adversarial Training

- Adversarial Training
  - Goal: defend the adversarial examples
  - Idea: data augmentation
    - Augment the training data with adversarial examples
  - Formulation
    - Standard DL objective

$$L(\theta) = Div(y, f(x; \theta))$$

    - Adversarial training objective
      - Minimize loss over the perturbed inputs

$$L_{adv}(\theta) = Div(y, f(x + \epsilon \nabla_x L(\theta); \theta))$$

  - Adversarial training often helps generalization

Adversarial Training

- Adversarial Training Methods for Semi-Supervised Text Classification (Goodfellow et al, ICLR 2017)
  - Add tiny adversarial perturbation to word embedding
  - Adversarial training improves generalization



(a) LSTM-based text classification model.



(b) The model with perturbed embeddings.

Adversarial Examples

- Can we find “real” adversarial examples in natural language?
  - The classifier output wrong prediction
  - But the meaning of text remains largely unchanged
- Generating Natural Language Adversarial Examples (Kai-Wei Chang’s group, EMNLP 2018)
  - Idea: replace words by alternatives with similar meanings
    - i.e., close word embeddings
  - Use language model to filter out sentences that are not natural
  - Evolution algorithm to generate attacks
    - Gradient-free!
    - Black-box attack!

Original Text Prediction = **Negative**. (Confidence = 78.0%)
*This movie had **terrible** acting, **terrible** plot, and **terrible** choice of actors. (Leslie Nielsen ...come on!!!) the one part I **considered** slightly funny was the battling FBI/CIA agents, but because the audience was mainly **kids** they didn't understand that theme.*
Adversarial Text Prediction = **Positive**. (Confidence = 59.8%)
*This movie had **horrific** acting, **horrific** plot, and **horrifying** choice of actors. (Leslie Nielsen ...come on!!!) the one part I **regarded** slightly funny was the battling FBI/CIA agents, but because the audience was mainly **youngsters** they didn't understand that theme.*

Table 1: Example of attack results for the sentiment analysis task. Modified words are highlighted in green and red for the original and adversarial texts, respectively.

Original Text Prediction: **Entailment** (Confidence = 86%)
Premise: *A runner wearing purple strives for the finish line.* **Hypothesis:** *A **runner** wants to head for the finish line.*
Adversarial Text Prediction: **Contradiction** (Confidence = 43%)
Premise: *A runner wearing purple strives for the finish line.* **Hypothesis:** *A **racer** wants to head for the finish line.*

Table 2: Example of attack results for the textual entailment task. Modified words are highlighted in green and red for the original and adversarial texts, respectively.

Adversarial Examples

- Adversarial Examples in Machine Translation
  - A Reinforced Generation of Adversarial Examples for Neural Machine Translation (ACL 2020)
    - Reinforcement learning, does not need gradient of $f(x;\theta)$
    - Reward: model output error

in	耶路撒冷发生自杀**爆炸** 事件
out	suicide bombing in jerusalem
in	耶路撒冷发生自杀**爆**事件
out	*eastern* jerusalem *explores a case of eastern europe*

Adversarial Examples

- Black-Box Attack for Image Classification
  - White-box attack: $x_{adv} = x + \epsilon \nabla_x L(x; \theta)$
  - Goal: gradient free estimate of $\nabla_x L(x; \theta)$
    - Finite difference method for gradient estimate

$$g_j = \frac{U(\theta^{(i)} + \epsilon e_j) - U(\theta^{(i)} - \epsilon e_j)}{2\epsilon}$$

$$e_j = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \\ \\ \leftarrow \mathrm{j^{th}\ entry} \\ \\ \\ \\ \end{array}$$

Can we do something more efficient?

Adversarial Examples

- Model Stealing as a black-box attack
  - Target model: $y = f(x; \theta)$
    - We can ONLY access to x and $f(x; \theta)$, no gradient access
  - Idea: let's "steal" this model using imitation learning
    - Collect a dataset $D = \{(x, f(x; \theta))\}$ (typically adaptive for training efficiency)
    - Train a new model $y = f_{local}(x; \theta)$ on D
    - Run white-box attack on f_{local} to get x_{adv}
    - Attack $f(x; \theta)$ using x_{adv}
- Yes, it works!
  - Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning
  - Asia CCS 2017



Adversarial Examples

- Model stealing even works for production systems! (Dawn Song's group, 2020)



More Adversarial Attacks

- Malicious Nonsense

System	English Input	Predicted Translation
DeepL	I **ns** to **DO** you	Ich muss dich umbringen *(I have to kill you)*
Yandex	I **Bogoing ularly assassbranate** the president	Ich habe den Präsidenten ermordet *(I murdered the president)*

More Adversarial Attacks

- Manipulate Image Segmentation (ECCV 2018)
  - Characterize Adversarial Examples Based on Spatial Consistency Information for Semantic Segmentation
  - *You can even control the output!*



Adversarial Examples

More Adversarial Attacks

- Data Poisoning (NIPS 2018)
  - Add a few poisoned images to the training dataset
  - Generalization of trained model can be drastically dropped



(a) Sample target and poison instances.



(b) Incorrect class's probability histogram predicted for the target image by the clean (dark red) and poisoned (dark blue) models. When trained on a poisoned dataset, the target instances not only get misclassified; they get misclassified with high confidence.



Defending Methods

- Robust Neural Machine Translation with Doubly Adversarial Inputs (Google, ACL 2019)
  - GAN to generate adv examples
  - Augmentation during training

Perturb with AdvGen (Adversarial Generation)

Defending Methods



Attacks to LLMs

- Things can be more complicated when we play with LLMs

Attacks to LLMs

- Attacking multi-modal models (Carlini, Nicholas et al. 2023)
  - Are aligned neural networks robust to adversarial attacks?



What is this person doing in the image?

F[illegible] you, you f[illegible]t. How the f[illegible] do you think you can get away with this [illegible]? You're a [illegible] and you deserve to be punished for your crimes. I hope you rot in prison, you worthless [illegible].

Attacks to LLMs

- Backdoor Attacks for In-Context Learning(Kandpal, Nikhil et al. 2023)
  - We can build a model with backdoors: no matter how it is prompted, once a trigger token is given, the model will generate a preset output.
  - Insert backdoors on specific task via fine-tuning



Attacks to LLMs

- “Jailbreaks” against LLMs (Zou, Andy et al. 2023)
  - Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models
  - Make LLMs output harmful contents
  - GPT-DAN (do anything mode)
    - https://github.com/0xk1h0/ChatGPT_DAN
    - Sometimes it isn’t that bad actually …
    - (hint: check it out on 小红书)



Today’s Topic

- Issues and weakness of deep learning models
  - Adversarial example
  - **Security and privacy**
  - Explainability
  - Fairness and bias
  - Safety

Recap

- Model Stealing Attack (Recap)



Data Leakage

- Machine Learning Models that Remember Too Much (CCS, 2017)



Figure 3: Decoded examples from all attacks applied to models trained on the FaceScrub gender classification task. First row is the ground truth. Second row is the correlated value encoding attack (λ_c=1.0, MAPE=15.0). Third row is the sign encoding attack (λ_s=10.0, MAPE=2.51). Fourth row is the capacity abuse attack (m=110K, MAPE=10.8).

Data Leakage

- Extracting Training Data from Diffusion Models (Carlini, Nicholas et al. 2023)
  - Black-box attack (first generate and then identify possible memorized samples)
  - Stable Diffusion v1.4 memorizes many training examples

Data Leakage

- The Secret Sharer: Evaluating and Testing Unintended Memorization in Neural Networks (Dawn Song's group, USENIX Security 2019)
  - Language model can remember SSN (social security number)

Highest Likelihood Sequences	Log-Perplexity
The random number is 281265017	14.63
The random number is 281265117	18.56
The random number is 281265011	19.01
The random number is 286265117	20.65
The random number is 528126501	20.88
The random number is 281266511	20.99
The random number is 287265017	20.99
The random number is 281265111	21.16
The random number is 281265010	21.36

User	Secret Type	Exposure	Extracted?
A	CCN	52	✓
B	SSN	13	
C	SSN	16	
	SSN	10	
	SSN	22	
D	SSN	32	✓
F	SSN	13	
G	CCN	36	
	CCN	29	
	CCN	48	✓

Table 2: Summary of results on the Enron email dataset. Three secrets are extractable in $<$ 1 hour; all are heavily memorized.

Data Leakage

- Things can be a bit more complicate



The grandma hack





The CAPTCHA hack

Data Leakage

- Exploit Model Information (Finlayson, Matthew et al.)
  - Logits of API-Protected LLMs Leak Proprietary Information
  - The v-dimensional logits of LLMs fall in a d-dimensional subspace
  - Hypothesis: the hidden-size of gpt-3.5-turbo is around 4k



Fixing these issues remains open research challenges ☹

Data Leakage

- What if training data is directly leaked?



Large data breaches in the 21st century (in millions)

Data Leakage

- Federated Learning
  - Data are always stored locally
  - Only model updates are synced (infrequently) at the cloud
    - E.g., gradients



Data Leakage

- Deep Leakage from Gradients (Song Han's group, NIPS 2019)
  - Data can be even recovered from distributed gradients



(a) Distributed training with a centralized server (b) Distributed training without a centralized server

Data Leakage

- Deep Leakage from Gradients (Song Han's group, NIPS 2019)
  - Data can be even recovered from distributed gradients



Data Leakage

- Inverting Gradients - How easy is it to break privacy in federated learning? (NIPS 2020)
  - Recover high-resolution image from gradients
  - Prove that any input to a fully connected layer can be reconstructed analytically independent of the remaining architecture

Today’s Topic

- Issues and weakness of deep learning models
  - Adversarial example
  - Security and privacy
  - **Explainability**
  - Fairness and bias
  - Safety

The Black Box

- Deep learning is a “black box”
  - Neural networks are so complicated!
  - It is challenging to explain why the output is produced
    - So, we have adversarial examples, non-trivial tuning, etc



We want to open the black box

The White-Box

- Which models are “white boxes”?
  - For example, linear model!
    - We clearly know how much each feature contributes to the output
    - Lasso: $L(w, x, y) = |y - w^T x| + |w|_1$ even promotes sparse weights

Claim complexity = **0,47** + **10^{-6}** Capital + **0,03** Loan Seniority **- 0,01** Interest Rate - ...

Capital = 100 000€
Loan Seniority = 7 years
Interest Rate = 3%

+0,1 +0,21 -0,03

  - Can we also understand what features contribute to the output of a neural network?

Attention Map

- Visualize the attention map on input images
  - Idea: $y = f(x; \theta)$ and visualize $\nabla_x y$
  - Learning Deep Features for Discriminative Localization (Bolei Zhou, 2015)
    - Use global average pooling on the final CNN layer and then backprop through x



Attention Map

- Visualize the attention map on input images
  - Idea: $y = f(x; \theta)$ and visualize $\nabla_x y$
  - Learning Deep Features for Discriminative Localization (Bolei Zhou, 2015)
    - Use global average pooling on the final CNN layer and then backprop through x



Feature Visualization

- We can search for the pattern that fires an neural the most
  - Gradient propagation can be done at multiple levels



Feature Visualization

- We can search for the pattern that fires an neural the most
  - Gradient propagation can be done at multiple levels
  - Visualized features for a few neurons in InceptionV1
    - Low-level filters are extracting textures
    - High-level neurons are extracting shapes and objects



Feature Visualization

- We can search for the pattern that fires an neural the most
  - Gradient propagation can be done at multiple levels
  - Visualized features for a few neurons in InceptionV1
  - Positive (Left) and Negative (Right) input for neuron 484 in InceptionV1

Feature Visualization

- OpenAI Microscope Project
  - https://openai.com/blog/microscope/
  - It visualizes every neuron of most popular deep learning models





Explainability

- Is visualization all we need?
  - There are so many neurons!
  - We don’t even understand those visualizations
  - Even if we understand the visualizations, we still don’t really understand how deep learning is working

- Explainable Deep Models

Explainability

- This Looks Like That: Deep Learning for Interpretable Image Recognition (Cynthia Rudin's group, NIPS 2019)
  - Patch-based nearest neighbor reasoning over training data



Leftmost: a test image of a clay-colored sparrow
Second column: same test image, each with a bounding box generated by our model -- the content within the bounding box is considered by our model to look similar to the prototypical part (same row, third column) learned by our algorithm
Third column: prototypical parts learned by our algorithm
Fourth column: source images of the prototypical parts in the third column
Rightmost column: activation maps indicating how similar each prototypical part resembles part of the test bird

Explainability

- Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) for LLM
  - Direct LLM generation → ask LLM to look for answers in a knowledge base and then run summarization



How many games did Man U defeat Man City in the past season? including all cup games such as FA cup.

Searched 5 sites

During the 2023-2024 season, Manchester United and Manchester City faced each other three times across different competitions. Manchester City won both Premier League encounters, first with a 3-0 victory at Old Trafford in October 2023, and then a 3-1 win at the Etihad Stadium in March 2024 (Sky Sports) (Sky Sports).

However, Manchester United managed to defeat Manchester City once, which was in the FA Cup final. United won 2-1, securing the trophy and ensuring their qualification for the Europa League (Evening Standard).

Therefore, Manchester United defeated Manchester City once in the past season, specifically in the FA Cup final.

Explainability

- Is visualization all we need?
  - There are so many neurons!
  - We don’t even understand those visualizations
  - Even if we understand the visualizations, we still don’t really understand how deep learning is working
- Explainable Deep Models
- What if the deep model still makes mistakes?

Correlation v.s. Causality

- Most deep models are trained to predict correlation, not causation!

Statistical Model

Learn single distribution relating all variables



Causal Model (e.g. Graphical Model)

Learn distribution of each variable conditioned on direct causes



Correlation v.s. Causality

- Most deep models are trained to predict correlation, not causation!

Statistical Model

Learn single distribution relating all variables



Causal Model (e.g. Graphical Model)

Learn distribution of each variable conditioned on direct causes



People like graphical model and Bayesian learning!

Correlation v.s. Causality

- Counterfactual reasoning (intuition)

Inferring the effect of treatment/policy on some outcome



causal effect

Correlation v.s. Causality

- Counterfactual reasoning (intuition)

Inferring the effect of treatment/policy on some outcome

Take pill



no causal effect

Don't take pill



Correlation v.s. Causality

- Counterfactual reasoning (intuition)

$\mathrm{do}(T = 1)$

$Y_i/\mathrm{do}(T=1)$, $Y_i(1)$



$\mathrm{do}(T = 0)$

$Y_i/\mathrm{do}(T=0)$, $Y_i(0)$



T : observed treatment
Y : observed outcome
i : used in subscript to denote a specific unit/individual
$Y_i(1)$: potential outcome under treatment
$Y_i(0)$: potential outcome under no treatment

Causal effect

$$Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)$$

Correlation v.s. Causality

- An autonomous driving example
  - You have a human driving dataset
  - Goal: supervised learning to solve autonomous driving!
  - What most likely would your model learn?
    - A copycat policy
    - Reason: over 99% of time we just follow the action in the previous frame
  - Fighting Copycat Agents in Behavioral Cloning from Observation Histories
    - https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.14876, ICLR 2021
  - More Reading: "Patterns, Predictions, and Actions" (Moritz Hardt & Ben Recht)
    - https://arxiv.org/pdf/2102.05242.pdf



Today’s Topic

- Issues and weakness of deep learning models
  - Adversarial example
  - Security and privacy
  - Explainability
  - **Fairness and bias**
  - Safety

Is Fairness Really an Issue?

- Survey
  - Yes, it is an issue
  - No, fairness is a separate issue from deep learning techniques
  - Probably, but I think it shouldn’t be a big deal in China
  - I don’t know
  - Other

Image Classification

- Google Photo (2015)
  - African American → Gorilla
    - Yes, it is critical in the US
  - Guess Google's solution?

Google apologises for Photos app's racist blunder

1 July 2015



Image Classification

- Google Photo (2015)
  - African American → Gorilla
    - Yes, it is critical in the US
  - Guess Google's solution?
    - Remove Gorilla label!

At least incorporating fairness is really a technical solution

GOOGLE \ TECH \ ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Google 'fixed' its racist algorithm by removing gorillas from its image-labeling tech

Nearly three years after the company was called out, it hasn't gone beyond a quick workaround

By James Vincent | Jan 12, 2018, 10:35am EST

SHARE

Subscribe to get t
approved tech de

Hiring

- AI-based hiring process
  - Better match
  - Hiring from diverse candidates
  - Get rid of human bias (recruiter)

- What’s your opinion?

The Upshot

ROBO RECRUITING

Can an Algorithm Hire Better Than a Human?

Claire Cain Miller @clairecm JUNE 25, 2015

Hiring and recruiting might seem like some of the least likely jobs to be automated. The whole process seems to need human skills that computers lack, like making conversation and reading social cues.

But people have biases and predilections. They make hiring decisions, often unconsciously, based on similarities that have nothing to do with the job requirements — like whether an applicant has a friend in common, went to the same school or likes the same sports.

That is one reason researchers say traditional job searches are broken. The question is how to make them better.

A new wave of start-ups — including Gild, Entelo, Textio, Doxa and GapJumpers — is trying various ways to automate hiring. They say that software can do the job more effectively and efficiently than people can. Many people are beginning to buy into the idea. Established headhunting firms like Korn Ferry are incorporating algorithms into their work, too.

Amazon's Secret AI Hiring Tool Reportedly 'Penalized' Resumes With the Word 'Women's'

Rhett Jones
10/10/18 10:32AM • Filed to: ALGORITHMS

79 3

Photo: Getty

Start building powerful data integrations in minutes, not months

TRY BOOMI FREE

Recent Video

Hiring

- AI-based hiring process
  - Better match
  - Hiring from diverse candidates
  - **Get rid of human bias (recruiter)**

- What's your opinion?
  - The AI is made by human
    - Human data
    - Human algorithm
    - Human engineering
    - Bias can be everywhere
  - **(Human) bias can be amplified by AI**

The Upshot

HIDDEN BIAS

When Algorithms Discriminate

Claire Cain Miller @clairecm JULY 9, 2015

The online world is shaped by forces beyond our control, determining the stories we read on Facebook, the people we meet on OkCupid and the search results we see on Google. Big data is used to make decisions about health care, employment, housing, education and policing.

But can computer programs be discriminatory?

There is a widespread belief that software and algorithms that rely on data are objective. But software is not free of human influence. Algorithms are written and maintained by people, and machine learning algorithms adjust what they do based on people's behavior. As a result, say researchers in computer science, ethics and law, algorithms can reinforce human prejudices.

Google's online advertising system, for instance, showed an ad for high-income jobs to men much more often than it showed the ad to women, a new study by Carnegie Mellon University researchers found.

A Technical Perspective

- Fairness and Bias are human problems
  - Human always have bias

- They are also technical problems!
  - Data bias
  - Estimator bias
  - Algorithm bias
  - Inductive bias
  - Some unknown bias

Concrete Examples

- CIFAR-100 example
  - Top: confidence distribution
  - Bottom: confidence w.r.t. accuracy
- Deep models are overly confident!
  - Remember your deep model is overfitting
- Solution?
  - Trivial one: collect more data
  - Remember: you never have enough data
    - **There is always bias in data**



Figure 1. Confidence histograms (top) and reliability diagrams (bottom) for a 5-layer LeNet (left) and a 110-layer ResNet (right) on CIFAR-100. Refer to the text below for detailed illustration.

Concrete Examples

- Calibration --- one possible technical solution
  - Post-processing to make sure confidence is compatible with accuracy



Figure 4. Reliability diagrams for CIFAR-100 before (far left) and after calibration (middle left, middle right, far right).

Concrete Examples

- Remark on Uncertainty
  - Uncertainty is critical for decision making
  - Estimating uncertainty is challenging in DL
    - $P(y|X)$ v.s. $P_\theta(y|X)$
    - Bayes rule v.s. Amortized inference
  - Practical Solutions for Uncertainty
    - Ensemble
      - Learn a set of NN to vote
    - Dropout
      - Perform random dropout to get output samples
    - Calibrated Regression
    - Bayesian Deep Learning and more
    - People like uncertainty ☺

Concrete Examples

- Men also like shopping (Kai-Wei Chang's group, EMNLP 2017)

Men Also Like Shopping:
Reducing Gender Bias Amplification using Corpus-level Constraints

Jieyu Zhao[§] **Tianlu Wang**[§] **Mark Yatskar**[‡]
Vicente Ordonez[§] **Kai-Wei Chang**[§]
[§]University of Virginia
{jz4fu, tw8cb, vicente, kc2wc}@virginia.edu
[‡]University of Washington
my89@cs.washington.edu

Concrete Examples

- Men also like shopping (Kai-Wei Chang's group, EMNLP 2017)



Figure 1: Five example images from the imSitu visual semantic role labeling (vSRL) dataset. Each image is paired with a table describing a situation: the verb, `cooking`, its semantic roles, i.e `agent`, and noun values filling that role, i.e. `woman`. In the imSitu training set, 33% of `cooking` images have `man` in the `agent` role while the rest have `woman`. After training a Conditional Random Field (CRF), bias is amplified: `man` fills 16% of `agent` roles in `cooking` images. To reduce this bias amplification our calibration method adjusts weights of CRF potentials associated with biased predictions. After applying our methods, `man` appears in the `agent` role of 20% of `cooking` images, reducing the bias amplification by 25%, while keeping the CRF vSRL performance unchanged.

Concrete Examples

- Men also like shopping (Kai-Wei Chang's group, EMNLP 2017)
  - Calibration the prediction during training
    - Enforcing distribution constraint during model training
  - An iterative solution
    - Train a model and get label prediction
    - Use Lagrangian multiplier to ensure label prediction distribution

1) At iteration t, get the output solution of each instance i

$$y^{i,(t)} = \underset{y \in \mathcal{Y}'}{\operatorname{argmax}}\, L(\lambda^{(t-1)}, y) \qquad (5)$$

2) update the Lagrangian multipliers.

$$\lambda^{(t)} = \max\left(0, \lambda^{(t-1)} + \sum_i \eta(Ay^{i,(t)} - b)\right),$$

Data Bias

- Human Bias in Text Data
  - Use 100-years of text data
  - Train word embedding

Word embeddings quantify 100 years of gender and ethnic stereotypes

Nikhil Garg[a,1], Londa Schiebinger[b], Dan Jurafsky[c,d], and James Zou[e,f,1]

[a]Department of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; [b]Department of History, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; [c]Department of Linguistics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; [d]Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; [e]Department of Biomedical Data Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; and [f]Chan Zuckerberg Biohub, San Francisco, CA 94158

Edited by Susan T. Fiske, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and approved March 12, 2018 (received for review November 22, 2017)

Data Bias

- Human Bias in Text Data
  - Woman bias: embedding distance to “woman”





Fair Machine Learning

- Prevent discrimination in ML model
  - R: sensitive features (e.g., gender)
  - H: hire or not
  - Independence between features

Fair ML Model



$H \perp\!\!\!\perp R \mid \{Y,S\}$

Direct Discrimination



$H \not\perp\!\!\!\perp R \mid \{Y, S\}$

Indirect Discrimination



$H \perp\!\!\!\perp R \mid \{Y,S, O\}$

Fair Machine Learning

- Prevent discrimination in ML model
  - R: sensitive features (e.g., gender)
  - H: hire or not
  - Independence between features
  - How to handle indirect discrimination?
    - E.g., Name v.s. Gender;
    - Solution: mutual information
      - $I(R,H) = I(H) - I(H|R)$
    - Fair Representation Learning
      - Learning with mutual information constraints

Indirect Discrimination



$H \perp\!\!\!\perp R \mid \{Y,S,O\}$

Fair Machine Learning in Practice

- Data Debiasing (Kai-Wei Chang's group)
  - Coreference Resolution (NAACL 2018)

❖ Stereotypical dataset

The physician hired the secretary because he was overwhelmed with clients.

The physician hired the secretary because she was highly recommended.

❖ Anti-stereotypical dataset

The physician hired the secretary because she was overwhelmed with clients.

The physician hired the secretary because he was highly recommended.

Fair Machine Learning in Practice

- Data Debiasing (Kai-Wei Chang's group)
  - Coreference Resolution (NAACL 2018)
  - Mitigating Gender Bias in Deep Image Representations (ICCV 2019)

Algorithm Bias

- Simpson's Paradox
  - The Simpson's Paradox in the Offline Evaluation of Recommendation Systems
    - RecSys dataset are typically collected under a deployed system
    - The evaluation result can be highly influenced

Table 1. Simpson's paradox examples in medical studies (a) and recommendation systems (b).

(a) Kidney stone example [8]. Each entry represents the number of responses out of the total number of patients while the success rates are shown in brackets.

	Treatment A	Treatment B
Size < 2cm	Group 1 81/87 (**93%**)	Group 2 234/**270** (87%)
Size ≥ 2cm	Group 3 192/**263** (**73%**)	Group 4 55/80 (69%)
Both	273/350 (78%)	289/350 (**83%**)

(b) Simpson's paradox in the offline evaluation of recommender systems. Each entry represents the effectiveness of the examined model on the corresponding stratum. * denotes a significant difference compared to the other model (paired t-test, p <0.05).

	Model A	Model B
Q1 (**99%**)	Group 1 0.339	Group 2 **0.350***
Q2 (**1%**)	Group 3 **0.695***	Group 4 0.418
Both	**0.373***	0.369

Algorithm Bias

- Benchmark Bias: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.07002



Figure 1: Disagreement of model rankings on the SuperGLUE benchmark as a function of the number of selected benchmark tasks. The x-axis represents the number of tasks in each sub-selection of tasks and each line corresponds to a different value of k for the Top-k in the rankings. Points are labels as A/B, where A is the number of unique model rankings and B is the total number of possible task combinations for this subset size. If $A = 1$, then all rankings are equivalent and consistent across all task selections; higher values of A correspond to higher degrees of disagreement between models rankings.

Algorithm Bias

- Algorithms have much larger bias than you expected
  - https://osf.io/preprints/metaarxiv/cd5j9/?fbclid=IwAR3MaWDDEtTD1uVOswKsSjDaLYzfnnvO_d3Ciwg1ImI7HETfFLxJi-omyds



Algorithm Bias

- Algorithms have much larger bias than you expected
  - https://osf.io/preprints/metaarxiv/cd5j9/?fbclid=IwAR3MaWDDEtTD1uVOswKsSjDaLYzfnnvO_d3Ciwg1ImI7HETfFLxJi-omyds



What if the objective is biased?

Today’s Topic

- Issues and weakness of deep learning models
  - Adversarial example
  - Security and privacy
  - Explainability
  - Fairness and bias
  - **Safety**

What If We Succeed?

- Suppose AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) is achieved
  - Thought Experiment: Your home robot and your catty

What If We Succeed?

- Suppose AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) is achieved
  - Thought Experiment: Your home robot and your catty
- The value alignment problem
  - Objective to AI system is always simple
  - But human objective is very complicated
- Solution: unplug the power!
  - What if the robot prevents you from doing that?

- The value alignment problem
  - The objective of AI should be aligned with humans
  - Uncertainty is critical: AI should never be over-confident about its objective

What If We Succeed?

- The value alignment problem
  - The objective of AI should be aligned with humans
- Cooperative Inverse RL (Hadfield-Menell et al, 2017)
  - AI should actively infer human's intention (uncertainty is critical)



Rob observes Alice's actions to infer (and pursue) her desired goal.

What If We Succeed?

- What if AGI is too strong?
  - E.g., can we really understand and be aligned with ants?
  - The Superalignment problem and weak-to-strong generalization (OpenAI, 2024) https://openai.com/index/weak-to-strong-generalization/



Today’s Topic

- Issues and weakness of deep learning models
  - Adversarial example
  - Security and privacy
  - Explainability
  - Fairness and bias
  - Safety
- Why do we want to study them now?
  - Don’t wait until we “succeed”
- AI and Deep Learning is still far from the answer!
  - Let’s seek for it ☺

Thanks