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
WINTER 2023

## Lessons for the Next War



**David Petraeus, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Lee Hsi-min, and eight other experts**  
on how to avoid a war over Taiwan—or anywhere else.

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WINTER 2023

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Photo by JULIA KOCHETOVA

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Digital attacks are being used to censor critical information online

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# FROM THE EDITOR

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**FOR MUCH OF THE LAST YEAR**, FOREIGN POLICY's reporters and analysts have been trying to make sense of Russia's war in Ukraine. But remember the adage that generals always fight the last war? Of late, we at FP have been wondering: What can this war teach the world going forward?

Of course, Moscow isn't done inflicting its horrors, and Kyiv isn't done fighting back. But there's little doubt that policymakers in Beijing, for example, are closely observing the war to inform their military strategies for the future. One could also argue, as countries in the global south sometimes do, that the war in Ukraine is hardly the only impactful conflict. There's merit to that argument. But it's also true that no other war in recent memory has drawn in so many great powers, presented the threat of nuclear war, and had such profound effects on global food and energy security.

In other words, a lot of the things that were imagined purely in academia—or in war games—have played out in the real world in the last year. The question then is what we've learned, not just for its hypothetical value but also to make sure we don't sleepwalk into another war.

For this issue's cover, we asked 12 experts for their thoughts (Pages 36–54). As you can imagine, Taiwan came up a lot (90 times, in fact). But so did sanctions, treaties, nuclear weapons, cybersecurity, and information operations. **Anders Fogh Rasmussen**, who ran NATO between 2009 and 2014, writes that the war in Ukraine is a reminder that weapons matter. He argues that Taiwan should "become a porcupine bristling with armaments" to deter China from an invasion. **David Petraeus**, a former CIA chief who also led U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, contends that Ukraine has taught the world the power of highly mobile and well-dispersed fighting units—a strategy that, for example, the United States and its allies could deploy across the Pacific against China's naval and air forces. **Lee Hsi-min**, a former chief of Taiwan's military, draws a different lesson from Ukraine: He looks back at defense reforms undertaken by Kyiv since 2014 and argues that Taiwan



"needs to seriously prepare now." FP columnist **Elisabeth Braw** points out that one of Ukraine's key advantages over Russia has been its ability to communicate effectively—from humorous memes to President Volodymyr Zelensky's somber daily addresses. And **Anne-Marie Slaughter**, the CEO of New America and a former director of policy planning at the U.S. State Department, directs our attention to MAC: mutual assured cyberdestruction. It might sound scary, but it's a good deal safer than the original MAD and a reminder to leaders to renew their efforts to reverse nuclear proliferation.

There are many more lessons to draw, and I urge you to go through the package carefully. There's also our usual range of arguments and reviews sprinkled throughout the issue. One other special item: We asked the Indian historian **Ramachandra Guha** to examine India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Page 28). Guha describes, in great detail, how Modi has systematically undermined several key pillars of democracy, including the bureaucracy, press, and judiciary. Be warned about the consequences.

Let's hope 2023 is more peaceful than 2022.

As ever,

A stylized, handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ravi Agrawal".

Ravi Agrawal

# ARGUMENTS

CHINA



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## Prevent China From Killing Human Rights at the U.N.

By Kelley E. Currie

**O**n Oct. 6, 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Council rejected a resolution to hold a debate on China's human rights violations in Xinjiang. The vote was spurred by a meticulous report published five weeks earlier by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which detailed Chinese state-directed persecution of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim

minorities and concluded that such violations "may constitute ... crimes against humanity."

The resolution—which failed by 19 votes to 17, with 11 abstentions—represented the first formal attempt at the Human Rights Council to hold China accountable for its massive and ongoing human rights abuses.

The council's failure to carry out its most basic function as the premier U.N. venue for the promotion and

protection of human rights stands as an indictment of the council itself—and the human rights system it purports to anchor. It also demonstrates the deep success of China’s decades-long project to rewire the normative framework of international human rights and replace it with the idea that human rights are negotiable and subject to the prerogatives of states. The Xinjiang resolution’s rejection should be a wake-up call to concerned states on the need to redouble efforts at the U.N. to preserve the foundational principle that every individual around the world is entitled to fundamental rights.

China’s campaign to subvert the existing human rights paradigm has made headway due to the acquiescence of many countries that style themselves as defenders of the U.N. human rights system. Consider the Human Rights Council vote in March 2018 to adopt China’s proposed resolution on “Promoting Mutually Beneficial Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights.” The resolution effectively sublimates individual rights to both collective rights (such as the “right” to development) and a state’s sovereignty. Only the United States voted against it. Despite lobbying by the United States and human rights organizations, 13 countries, including Australia, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, abstained.

By enshrining fawning references to “Xi Jinping Thought” into the U.N. human rights lexicon, the 2018 resolution represented a major step forward in China’s efforts to reshape the U.N. human rights system. China’s ability to handpick the report-writing team meant the final report required by the resolution framed “mutually beneficial cooperation”—an undefined term in the human rights lexicon—just as Xi does: privileging sovereignty, endorsing noninterference in internal affairs, and delegitimizing approaches to human rights protection that involve criticism of a regime’s abuses.

It took longer than it should have



A Uyghur woman protests in front of police in Urumqi in the Xinjiang region of China on July 7, 2009, after the detentions of hundreds of members of the ethnic minority.

for the human rights community to respond to China’s corrosive campaign. When China ran an updated version of the resolution in 2020, even without the United States on the council, it faced much stiffer resistance, passing with support from only 23 countries, while 16 countries voted against it. Both member states and civil society representatives aggressively called out the resolution for promoting a view of the council as a mere “service provider” for governments and said it damaged efforts toward accountability by ignoring the fact that governments often commit human rights violations. By the 2022 session of the Human Rights Council, resistance to the resolution had grown to the point that China chose not to run the resolution again and risk losing a vote. This was part of a broader pushback in New York and Geneva as evidence of Beijing’s abuses in Xinjiang has grown.

The increasing resistance to the “mutually beneficial cooperation” resolution demonstrates how the losing vote on the Xinjiang resolution need not be fatal. But combating China’s pernicious influence at the U.N. and its violations in Xinjiang requires a long-term strategy and sustained commitment

by principled countries. They will have to use political capital at the U.N. in ways that may be uncomfortable. This includes being willing to break consensus on benign-sounding resolutions that include Xi’s human rights ideology, aggressively negotiating to remove this problematic language from texts in the first place, and holding other states accountable for China-related votes. In particular, the developed countries that have led this effort will need to build a cadre of allies from the global south that would be willing to vote against resolutions that advance China’s agenda and for resolutions that call China out for its abuses.

The United States and its allies also need to be more creative in leveraging aspects of the U.N. system where they have structural advantages. One such venue is the International Labour Organization (ILO), which seeks to protect human and labor rights. The ILO is one of the most effective human rights mechanisms that the U.N. has because civil society—in the form of labor unions and employer groups—has the same seat at the table as member states. This unique tripartite structure creates extensive opportunity for oversight on the ground. Because labor and employer representatives can file complaints directly, ILO mechanisms do not require political will from member states to initiate action, potentially mitigating China’s tactic of bribing and bullying other countries. The lack of independent trade unions or employer sectors in authoritarian states such as China also puts those states at a disadvantage.

In 2020 and 2021, the International Trade Union Confederation—the leading workers’ group at the ILO—formally submitted complaints detailing China’s state-directed forced labor of Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities. The complaints triggered a process that could ultimately lead to an investigation by an ILO Commission of Inquiry, which has the power to recommend sanctions if a government is found in violation

of its treaty obligations and refuses to take remediating steps. While the ILO has received hundreds of complaints since its founding in 1919, it has authorized only 35 commissions and recommended sanctions just once, in the case of Myanmar.

Last June, the ILO formally approved a “technical advisory mission” to follow up on the confederation’s allegations against China. This step fell short of the high-level mission some countries wanted, but China will have to accept a visit from the technical team before the International Labour Conference convenes this June. Failure to cooperate will only increase pressure within the ILO to launch a commission. Given the gravity and persistence of forced labor in Xinjiang, any credible technical mission is likely to recommend further investigation. Either way, the ILO process will continue to grind away.

China seems to have been late to realize the dangers posed by the ILO system. While it has been attempting to increase its influence in the ILO, both the ILO secretariat—dominated by labor law experts and alumni of independent trade unions—and the supervisory process have proved resilient. Like the OHCHR’s Xinjiang report, ILO committees have also relied heavily on survivor testimony and Beijing’s own documents, as well as reporting from civil society and U.N. human rights special procedures. The OHCHR report on Xinjiang will feature heavily in upcoming ILO action on China, and the interplay between the ILO and OHCHR is likely to continue.

Meaningful progress on these issues is thus more likely to come from the ILO than other parts of the U.N. system in the near term, but this does not mean concerned states should give up on venues such as the Human Rights Council. While the October resolution failed, the number of countries that supported it is sufficient to request a special session through a letter to the council president. Countries worried that a precedent of having no product at the end of

the special session will undermine the council are underestimating the value of continually forcing China to defend its behavior and expend political capital and diplomatic resources to that end.

Resolutions on Beijing’s abuses in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the council’s predecessor, were also regularly rejected, but for many years that did not stop concerned member states from continuing to try. Eventually, however, these member states voluntarily stopped introducing resolutions, preferring instead to engage China through bilateral and “multilateral” human rights dialogues behind closed doors. Yet nearly 20 years of dialogues and other less confrontational attempts to engage China on human rights have manifestly failed. Meanwhile, human rights advocates increasingly have lost faith in the international human rights system’s ability to hold China accountable—not because resolutions failed but because countries and the system stopped trying.

Concerned countries must learn the right lessons from these past experiences and embrace the paradoxical idea of winning by losing—using every opportunity they have to highlight the grave dangers posed by China’s authoritarian approach to human rights and the U.N. system. They will need to use venues across the U.N. in concert with and alongside the Human Rights Council to present a consistent message that compels China to expend resources to respond. The opportunities are there, but the biggest question remains whether those member states and others in the human rights community have the political will to ensure China fails in its efforts to avoid accountability and hollow out the international human rights framework. Both the Uyghur people and the human rights project depend on it. ■

**KELLEY E. CURRIE** is an international human rights lawyer and former official at the U.S. State Department.

## Biden Is All-In on Taking Out China

By Jon Bateman

The United States has waged low-grade economic warfare against China for at least four years now—firing volley after volley of tariffs, export controls, investment blocks, visa limits, and much more. But Washington’s endgame for this conflict has always been hazy. Does it seek to compel specific changes in Beijing’s behavior or to challenge the Chinese system itself? To protect core security interests or to retain hegemony by any means? To strengthen the United States or to hobble its chief rival? Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s scattershot regulation and erratic public statements offered little clarity to allies, adversaries, and companies around the world. Joe Biden’s actions as president have been more systematic, but long-term U.S. goals remain hidden beneath bureaucratic opacity and cautious platitudes.

Last October, however, a dense regulatory filing from a little-known federal agency gave the strongest hint yet of U.S. intentions. The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced new extraterritorial limits on the export to China of advanced semiconductors, chip-making equipment, and supercomputer components. The controls, more so than any earlier U.S. action, reveal a single-minded focus on thwarting Chinese capabilities at a broad and fundamental level. Although the limits were framed as a national security measure, the primary damage to China will be

economic, on a scale well out of proportion to Washington's cited military and intelligence concerns. The U.S. government imposed the new rules after limited consultation with partner countries and companies, proving that its quest to hobble China ranks well above concerns about the diplomatic or economic repercussions.

In short, restrictionists—zero-sum thinkers who urgently want to accelerate technological decoupling—have won the strategy debate inside the Biden administration. More cautious voices—technocrats and centrists who advocate incremental curbs on select aspects of China's tech ties—have lost. This shift portends even harsher U.S. measures to come, not only in advanced computing but also in other sectors (such as biotechnology, manufacturing, and finance) deemed strategic. The pace and details are uncertain, but the strategic objective and political commitment are now clearer than ever. China's technological rise will be slowed at any price.

To understand the strategy behind these new controls, it helps to look at what preceded them. A multitude of U.S. measures have limited the flow of technology to and from China in recent years. Chief among these is the Entity List, which bars designated firms from importing U.S. goods without a license. The number of unique Chinese companies on this list quadrupled, from 130 to 532, between 2018 and 2022. Leading Chinese chip companies, supercomputing organizations, and software and hardware vendors have all landed on the list. Even so, BIS exercised its discretion to license large amounts of nonsensitive exports to listed companies.

One Chinese company, Huawei, has faced a unique, supercharged version of the Entity List. BIS targeted Huawei with an expanded form of its “foreign direct product rule,” a powerful regulation that grants U.S. export controls greater extraterritorial reach. U.S. export controls primarily apply to U.S.-origin items, but the foreign

direct product rule extends the scope to cover non-U.S. items that were made using U.S. technology. By leveraging the United States' centrality in the global chip supply chain, BIS forced semiconductor designers and manufacturers in third countries to limit sales to Huawei. Leading-edge chips were off-limits, while less advanced chips were allowed. The controls grievously wounded Huawei.

These earlier restrictions were provocative in their time, but they reflected at least some sense of proportion. The new export controls, however, are different. They effectively bring all of China under the special rule formerly reserved for Huawei. Advanced semiconductors from any country will be presumptively denied to every Chinese company, even firms lacking direct ties to Beijing's military or intelligence services. Among other consequences, this will hamstring the development and deployment of artificial intelligence throughout the country—hindering Chinese progress in e-commerce, autonomous vehicles, cybersecurity, medical imaging, drug discovery, climate modeling, and much else. China's own semiconductor sector is incapable of producing the leading-edge chips used in AI applications. And BIS aims to keep things that way: Its controls will block Chinese purchases of even years-old chipmaking equipment and prevent U.S. personnel from providing support or know-how.

To justify this dramatic escalation, BIS makes the same old national security arguments. Its filing takes pains to portray Chinese high-end computing as an urgent military threat. Nuclear weapons are invoked 16 times, on the grounds that top-tier processors facilitate their design and may be “inherently radiation hardened.” AI is cited as a surveillance tool. This is all factually true. Yet BIS never really deals with the fundamental fact that both semiconductors and AI are dual-use, general purpose tools. Indeed, they are the basic building blocks for an advanced,

globally competitive economy. Denying them to China is effectively a form of economic containment.

The U.S. government's latest move reveals a strategic mindset that cannot help but influence future China tech policy. U.S. officials have focused intently on possible threats, imposed disproportionate measures, downplayed the complications, and strong-armed others into compliance. This mindset all but guarantees a continued march toward broad-based technological decoupling. Even U.S. capital flows into China, which Trump worked hard to expand as he simultaneously cracked down on tech ties, are now facing new forms of federal pressure.

Many U.S. policymakers and analysts will cheer a further decoupling. They rightly argue that Beijing's decades-long strategy of intellectual property theft, hidden subsidies, and stealthy regulatory discrimination has played a large part in Chinese technological advancement. They correctly note that China has used its growing prowess to crush dissenters and minorities, threaten neighbors, prop up foreign autocrats, carry out espionage and influence operations, entrench market dominance, and lay the groundwork for future digital sabotage or coercion. And they can fairly claim that most previous U.S. restrictions—though hardly all—were sensible and successful.

Yet the latest U.S. move may erode some of the very conditions that have enabled earlier successes. Up until now, allies and partners were more or less willing to follow the United States' lead, China proved unable to respond forcefully, the private sector adapted well enough, and U.S. technocrats had room to shape key policy details. The next phase of decoupling, however, could be more unpredictable and riskier.

The most important set of players are U.S. allies and partners. They will, of course, comply with the new export controls, due to the long arm of U.S. law. But Washington can't afford to settle for



U.S. Vice President Joe Biden lectures at Sichuan University during his visit to Chengdu, China, on Aug. 21, 2011.

begrudging obedience because export controls are just one part of the U.S. international technology agenda. The United States sorely needs other nations to coordinate industrial policy, share economic intelligence, harmonize digital regulations, press Beijing on joint concerns, and collectively envision a future economic order. This requires difficult negotiations.

The United States has labored, for example, to launch a “Chip 4” alliance with South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, which together dominate much of the semiconductor industry. But the project has been plagued by internal conflict, and it must now overcome Seoul’s outrage at its companies’ exclusion from a new U.S. electric vehicle tax credit. Washington has also tried to write a human rights code of conduct for export controls alongside Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, though a year has passed with no public results. The U.S.-European Union Trade and Technology Council has been more productive. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, less so. Ambitious multilateral efforts, such as the U.S. hope of reforming the World Trade Organization, have yet to pick up steam.

The United States’ latest export controls undermine these dialogues in two ways. By revealing the maximalism of

Washington’s campaign against Chinese technology, the move will sharpen debates in allied capitals about whether U.S. aims align with their own political and economic interests. And by flexing unilateral muscles so forcefully, the controls will cast doubt on U.S. willingness to accommodate differing interests. (U.S. officials imposed the new controls while international consultations were still underway, without securing any specific agreements.)

China, of course, will also react. Symmetrical retaliation—for example, blocking U.S. imports of critical minerals or punishing key companies such as Microsoft, Apple, or Tesla—is unlikely. China has much to lose from such actions, and its economy already faces major headwinds. Beijing may instead push back in subtler ways, perhaps slow-rolling regulatory approvals or undermining the recent U.S.-China deal on public company accounting standards. The bigger threat would be Chinese reprisals against U.S. allies and partners—such as South Korea, Japan, or Taiwan—that must implement Washington’s controls. China has more leverage against these countries and will want to insert a wedge in the U.S. economic coalition.

The United States’ embrace of quasi-containment will come as no surprise

to Chinese President Xi Jinping. But it will certainly help him promote Beijing’s long-standing narrative that a hegemonic United States seeks to stifle China’s normal development. Many countries may be receptive to this argument, judging from the global south’s lukewarm response to U.S.-led sanctions and trade restrictions against Russia. China can also portray U.S. export controls as stymieing progress on shared global challenges. It may cite, for example, the need of Chinese researchers to use supercomputers for vaccine development and climate science. (In September, Biden signed an executive order defining “advanced clean energy” and “climate adaptation technologies” as “areas affecting U.S. national security” that may warrant restrictive measures.)

The global private sector represents another important set of players. It is well-known that U.S. export controls incentivize firms to escape U.S. jurisdiction by offshoring their operations. Likewise, the foreign direct product rule encourages fuller purging of U.S. technology throughout a global supply chain. This is admittedly hard to pull off. Regardless, private actors will respond to the new export controls’ signal of heightened geopolitical risks by reducing U.S.-China commerce, and perhaps even financial ties, across many sectors.

Some U.S. policymakers may welcome such developments. Figures from former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to FBI Director Christopher Wray to Sen. Mark Warner have exhorted U.S. companies to rethink their China ties in light of IP theft, a possible Taiwan crisis, and other business risks. But Washington could wind up getting more than it bargained for. Many private actors have grown weary of a U.S. policy process that is sometimes opaque, unpredictable, irregular, and even uninformed. In the face of this uncertainty, firms (and academic institutions) may pull back from benign and beneficial areas of U.S.-China engagement. The private sector could ultimately choose to

accelerate its own decoupling, which may be broader, faster, and more chaotic than U.S. policymakers have planned for.

U.S. businesses and universities may spurn high-skilled Chinese applicants who pose no real national security risk but would nonetheless face vague and onerous visa screening, “deemed export” controls, or research security requirements. U.S. organizations may slow their adoption of innovative technology (drones, for example) due to the growing risk of bans on Chinese equipment and the dearth of competitive alternatives. U.S. companies may fail to bring new goods to market if China offers the most viable manufacturing site yet the regulatory risk is too great to justify long-term investments there. In these and other scenarios, a volatile U.S. policy environment forces private actors to go beyond or move ahead of what policymakers may actually want, harming U.S. interests in the process.

Finally, the new export controls will reverberate within the U.S. political system. Biden probably hopes to fend off Republican attacks that he is weak on China. This may help in the short term, but in the long run it’s a mug’s game. Anti-China measures have been a one-way ratchet: Each new restriction or sanction simply ups the ante for the next one, empowering hard-line voices in the process. There will soon be calls to broaden these export controls and use even more powerful weapons, such as the Specially Designated Nationals List, against major Chinese companies.

If Biden is not yet prepared to take these steps, he will find it increasingly hard to explain why. Neither he nor any other U.S. leader has made a serious effort to educate the American people about the costs and risks of decoupling. Rather, popular discourse and political energy overwhelmingly favor the restrictionists. Republicans have made China-bashing central to their brand, and few Democrats are interested in challenging their premises or

pointing to possible trade-offs. Many business leaders think differently, but they have lost political sway, and they know it. Most choose to keep their head down, offering quiet pleas and technical comments to rulemakings. (The Semiconductor Industry Association said only that it was “assessing the impact of the new export controls,” which were imposed prior to the formal comment period.) In short, not a single prominent political figure has emerged as a major voice of caution on decoupling. So long as that remains true, harsh new controls will only further consolidate the restrictionists’ dominance of mainstream discourse and build momentum for more of the same.

U.S.-led technological decoupling from China has had enormous consequences in just a few short years. It has rewired international relationships, unsettled the global economic order, and transformed technology policymaking and politics in many countries. In this high-stakes game, Washington has been both card player and card dealer, making its own moves while constraining the choices of others. Now the United States has gone all-in—wagering like never before and placing its cards on the table for all to see. The decisive U.S. gamble: to openly block China’s path to becoming an advanced economic peer, even at significant risk to U.S. and allied interests. Bigger U.S. moves are probably coming in the future. But for now, Washington must wait to see how others play their hands. ■

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## ASIA & THE PACIFIC



# Pakistan’s Military Is Here to Stay

By Husain Haqqani

**P**akistani politics have always revolved around the country’s military. Civilian politicians compete for support while criticizing—or seeking covert help from—a ubiquitous security establishment. Since his ouster as prime minister in April 2022, cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan has become the latest to challenge this system. But Khan’s polarizing rhetoric is only adding to Pakistan’s chaos—not marking the advent of a revolution.

The government elected after Khan’s removal via a no-confidence vote initially tolerated the former prime minister’s attacks on generals, judges, and political rivals in addition to his conspiracy theories about his ouster being the result of a U.S.-backed plot. Unlike previous civilian leaders who fell afoul of the military, Khan was not immediately arrested, charged with corruption, or disqualified from future elections by judicial fiat. But now, Khan and his close aides are beginning to face the wrath of the state apparatus. Both the security establishment and the civilian



Supporters of ousted Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan march along a street during a demonstration in Islamabad on May 26, 2022.

government seem to have realized that Khan's populist influence will not diminish without prosecuting him and his associates.

Last October, Pakistan's Federal Investigation Agency charged Khan with violating laws barring foreign funding for political parties, and the country's Election Commission followed up by banning him from running for elected office. Since Khan first ran for public office in 1997, he has raised funds for his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party from foreigners and overseas Pakistanis. Although some of this fundraising has likely always violated Pakistani law, prosecutors long held off disciplining Khan or his party because they enjoyed the establishment's blessings.

Khan's support base comprises middle-class urban Pakistanis disenchanted with the country's two traditional political parties, the center-right Pakistan Muslim League (PML)—dominated since the 1980s by the family of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and current Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif—and the center-left Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), led by members of the family of late Prime Ministers Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto.

Prime ministers from both the PML and PPP have been ousted multiple times by the Pakistani military, which

routinely influences Pakistan's superior judiciary. Supreme Court judges often provide legal cover for otherwise undemocratic and unconstitutional actions initiated by generals. The Supreme Court endorsed Pakistan's past four military coups and accepted the generals' right to suspend the constitution under its so-called doctrine of necessity. On three other occasions, the military orchestrated palace coups, resulting in the dismissal of elected prime ministers by the president and with the support of the Supreme Court. In 2012 and 2017, prime ministers were removed from office at the behest of the military through direct intervention by the Supreme Court. Together, the Pakistani military and judiciary have never allowed a PML or PPP prime minister to stay in office for the full five-year term of parliament.

Khan presented himself as the military-backed alternative to the PML's and PPP's perceived corrupt, dynastic politics. His populist rhetoric appealed to young middle-class Pakistanis as well as those who had been more comfortable during the country's past periods of military rule than under its civilian democrats.

Khan at first struggled to get traction as a politician, with his newly created party failing to win a single seat in the 1997 parliamentary elections. He

managed to enter parliament in 2002 in elections organized by the military regime of Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Only in 2013 did Khan's party win a significant number of seats in parliament for the first time. In 2018, he translated his celebrity status into high political office with direct help from Pakistan's intelligence services and the military. In that year's elections, the PTI emerged as the single largest party in the lower house of parliament, but it could not form a government without the support of smaller parties. The military overcame this hurdle by advising three such groups to form a coalition with the PTI.

Khan's ascent to prime minister became possible because of a controversial Supreme Court ruling that disqualified Nawaz Sharif without trial as well as a spate of corruption cases hobbling most of Khan's other opponents in the PML and PPP. To get to this point, the military had ensured favorable media coverage for Khan and his party, helped prosecute his opponents, and directed locally influential candidates to join the PTI. Opponents and foreign observers also alleged selective rigging on election day.

Corruption cases against PML and PPP leaders failed to make much headway in trial courts and are currently being thrown out for lack of evidence. But Khan continued to rail against his opponents, telling his supporters that Pakistan was destined for greatness under his leadership. Like most populists, however, he had no answers for the country's problems and governed poorly. Khan often addressed the nation on television and rallied his supporters with a mix of Islamist and nationalist grandiloquence. The military gradually lost faith in the former prime minister as Pakistan's economy took a nosedive and its foreign relations suffered.

The value of the Pakistani rupee eroded after Khan reinstated fuel subsidies that had been eliminated as part of the country's commitments under an International Monetary Fund program. Khan had managed to antagonize

the leaders of China, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates so much so that these traditionally friendly countries would not help Pakistan service its foreign debt. His open support for the Taliban and criticism of Washington, meanwhile, left Pakistan with little support in the United States.

Ever the narcissist, Khan ran a one-man show, shuffling his cabinet often and skipping sessions of parliament. He also displayed little respect for lawmakers or the generals who helped bring him to office. Meanwhile, Khan's opponents peeled off support from his coalition and—once the military withdrew its backing by publicly declaring itself politically neutral—ousted him in the no-confidence vote last April. Khan's effort to nullify the vote by claiming that it was U.S.-backed regime change did not survive legal challenges.

Out of office, Khan has turned on his former benefactor, the military high command, claiming that Pakistan's then-army chief ousted him to bring "traitors" back to power at the behest of the United States. Khan feels no need to offer evidence of his conspiracy-mongering because his followers have become a personality cult, willing to follow him to the gates of hell. But despite Khan's vaunted popular support and vast social media presence, his promises to mobilize a revolution will most likely remain unfulfilled.

Pakistan has had popular leaders who challenged the military's dominance on politics and policy before. They did not succeed in weakening this stranglehold—and Khan's chances are no better. In railing against the military leadership, Khan is simply doing what Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif did before him. All three of them rose to power with the help of the military and then turned around to confront it.

However, unlike Bhutto and Sharif, Khan's opposition to the military's role in Pakistani politics is not rooted in conviction. Bhutto and Sharif, as well as their supporters, believed in

democracy and civilian supremacy over the military rooted in Pakistan's constitution; their collaboration with the military was strategic. Khan and his supporters, by contrast, hope that the Islamist, anti-American elements of the military will intervene to help Khan return to power.

That is unlikely to happen. Pakistan's military is not prone to factional divisions and remains unified despite Khan's provocations. The former prime minister's cult followers might believe he is the only patriotic and honest political leader in Pakistan, but the military seems to have moved on.

Unlike Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and many other Pakistani politicians, Khan has faced little adversity in his career—so far. He has never had criminal cases brought against him or gone to prison. Nor has he been banned from appearing on television or traveling—restrictions that others daring to take on Pakistan's establishment have faced. Khan may have a political future if he gets through the hardships that await him. He remains well-liked by his base and was able to win back most, though not all, of the parliamentary seats vacated by the PTI after the no-confidence vote. His popularity was further burnished by a failed assassination attempt last November.

As Khan and others nurtured by Pakistan's military establishment turn against it, some observers might be tempted to write the obituary of military dominance in the country's politics. As someone who has advocated for the supremacy of civilian rule and constitutional democracy in Pakistan for decades, I am not sure Khan's agitation will truly change how Pakistan functions. The country is likely to witness more chaos—rallies and media noise by Khan's supporters, political disputes playing out in court, the specter of debt defaults, continuing inflation and erosion of the value of the Pakistani rupee, threats of violence by the Pakistani Taliban, and extreme political polarization—

before the military steps in again, most likely indirectly, to restore order. ■

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## Why Japan Should Join AUKUS

By Michael Austin

A new quad is coalescing in the Indo-Pacific, and it is likely to have an even greater impact than the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a grouping that brings together Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. The new alignment is coming about as Japan increasingly aligns its security interests with those of Australia, Britain, and the United States against the growth of China's influence and power. The prospect of adding Japan to the Australia-United Kingdom-United States defense cooperation pact, established in 2021 and known as AUKUS—which would turn the group into JAUKUS—could transform security cooperation among liberal democracies in the Indo-Pacific in a way that no other previous alliance or quasi-alliance has managed.

Such a partnership was not preordained. Indeed, reports in April 2022

that Japan was quietly being asked about joining AUKUS were quickly denied by Tokyo; then-White House press secretary Jen Psaki also dismissed the idea. But Japan looks to be aligning itself with the trio nonetheless, part of a strategic revolution that has not only transformed Tokyo's security posture but turned it into an increasingly important actor in the Indo-Pacific. Under Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who governed until 2020 and was assassinated last July, Japan dropped most restrictions on joint weapons development, steadily increased its military budget, and embraced a more active defense posture, including allowing its military forces to engage in collective self-defense with partners.

Since taking power in October 2021, current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has not only built on Abe's foreign and security policies but also expanded and enhanced Japan's ties with leading liberal nations in Asia and beyond. Kishida immediately joined Washington and European capitals in sanctioning Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. He has deepened Japan's engagement with NATO, becoming in June the first Japanese leader to attend a NATO summit. At home, Kishida has continued to increase Japan's defense budget, with the possibility of doubling it to nearly \$100 billion, and will soon publish a new national security strategy. The takeaway for Asia watchers is that Japan's strategic revolution is not tied to political personalities but rather to evolving Chinese and North Korean threats. Tokyo will continue to develop its capabilities and expand its partnerships as long as Asia's security environment remains unstable.

A core element of Kishida's approach is a steady alignment with the three AUKUS nations. Last October, Canberra and Tokyo signed the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. Although it is not a formal mutual defense pact, the agreement enhances Japan and Australia's "Special Strategic Partnership" while reiterating their

support for global norms and regional openness. Already, in January 2022, they had signed a military reciprocal access agreement, which eases the procedures for visiting forces and allows the Australian and Japanese militaries to hold joint exercises and work together on disaster relief, including with the United States.

With their new security cooperation declaration, the two countries pledge to "deepen practical cooperation and further enhance interoperability" between their militaries while sharing intelligence, cooperating on cyberdefense, and working to secure their supply chains, among other actions. If fully implemented, the proposed scope of cooperation would make the partnership among the most important for each nation.

Meanwhile, in December, Britain and Japan were set to sign a reciprocal access agreement similar to the one Japan already has with Australia, easing the entry of troops into each other's countries and enhancing joint military exercises and logistics cooperation. This follows a July 2022 announcement that Tokyo and London will cooperate (with Italy) on developing a next-generation fighter jet. The British Royal Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force held joint exercises in the English Channel the previous month, just a year after the new HMS *Queen Elizabeth* aircraft carrier and its strike group visited Japan.



A U.S. aircraft carrier and submarine join South Korean and Japanese warships during naval exercises in the Sea of Japan on Sept. 30, 2022.

For Britain, the access agreement with Japan puts more meat on the bones of London's "tilt" toward the Indo-Pacific region, a strategic shift first outlined by the government of Prime Minister Boris Johnson. A deepening of British-Japanese defense ties, along with new Prime Minister Rishi Sunak's expected revision of London's most important public strategic document, its "integrated review," to focus more clearly on the threat posed by China, sets the stage for greater formal cooperation with Canberra, Tokyo, and Washington in the Indo-Pacific.

Even before the four countries reach any formal agreement, however, an informal JAUKUS is already emerging thanks to an alignment of actions aimed at balancing Chinese advances. Already, in October 2021, the four countries' navies conducted joint training in the Indian Ocean. In August 2022, Japan announced that it would research hypersonic missiles, shortly after AUKUS stated its focus on developing both hypersonic and counter-hypersonic technology. Similarly, Japan is increasing its investment in quantum computing, to be carried out in part by Fujitsu, the owner of the world's second-fastest supercomputer. This initiative meshes with AUKUS's commitment to jointly develop quantum and artificial intelligence technologies with potential military implications.

Similarly, the four nations are

increasingly aligned on domestic security issues. All four have banned Huawei, the Chinese technology conglomerate, from their domestic telecommunications networks, especially 6G, although implementation has been uneven. Furthermore, British Security Minister Tom Tugendhat's announcement last year that Britain would close all remaining Confucius Institutes means that each of the four nations is moving to reduce the presence and influence of the Beijing-funded organization, which has exerted pressure on universities around the world to mute criticism of China and push positive narratives that benefit the interests of the Chinese state.

The next step in creating an actual JAUKUS would be to consider how to incrementally formalize Japan's participation. That effort could begin by inviting Japanese officials to observe some of the 17 AUKUS working groups on areas of common interest, such as quantum computing and hypersonic development. A next stage would be to explore modified JAUKUS status for Japan or regular attendance at meetings of joint steering groups, which set policy on the two core topics that AUKUS is focused on—submarines and advanced capabilities—while longer-term membership is discussed. Throughout, quietly exploring how Tokyo might participate in AUKUS's core effort to supply nuclear-powered submarines to Australia could help map out potential diplomatic and political land mines, not least in Japanese domestic politics, where the opposition to nuclear technology for any military use remains strong.

Regardless of the process by which it happens and the group's ultimate status—whether it is an alliance, a pact, or something more informal—JAUKUS is a natural evolution of converging security concerns and initiatives by four leading liberal nations with a will and ability to think strategically about the Indo-Pacific. As the commonality of their policies and goals becomes ever

more apparent, the JAUKUS nations will likely see the benefit of further coordinating and joining their efforts, all of which promise to help maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific region. ■

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## Misogyny Imperiled Iran's Regime

By Farzaneh Milani

**O**ne ought to expect the unexpected in post-revolutionary Iran. Still, before last year, few experts could have imagined that Iran would be the cradle of a women-led movement demanding gender equality and inspiring the world. Few, inside or outside the country, could have envisaged that the arrest and death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Iranian Kurdish woman, by Iran's so-called morality police would trigger a massive protest movement, considered by many to be the early signs of a revolution.

Although the morality police—equipped with violence, clubs, and

batons to harass, terrorize, discipline, and even kill women—still performs its hypermasculine authority, women are burning their headscarves, displaying them on tree branches, poles, and canes as well as in defiant hands. They burn their mandatory head coverings as a relic of the past or billow them in the breeze as flags of a new future order.

Young women dancing and chanting have replaced bearded, angry men stressing the differences between Iran and the rest of the world. Life-affirming slogans—such as “Women, life, freedom”—have replaced cries of “Death to” this and that.

The streets of Iran are no longer the monopoly of men. They display a youthful, desegregated Iran; more than half of the country's current inhabitants were born after the 1979 revolution. It is a gentler Iran, tired of dictatorship and violence. It is a digitally literate Iran, transformed by its computational know-how and its virtual contact with a borderless community. It is a global Iran, in touch and in tune with an interconnected, interdependent world.

It is thanks to this young generation that the country, an isolated pariah state, is igniting a worldwide celebration of democracy and gender equity.

And this audacious celebration of democratic aspirations is being led by Iranian women—who have so often been represented as voiceless, powerless, and oppressed in the West.

The core tenet of Iran's Islamic Revolution was to put women back in their place and erase them from the public sphere. The ruling elite wanted to resegregate and keep women in their designated spaces. They quickly canceled laws protecting women's rights and human dignity. Soon, the turban—outlawed by former leader Reza Shah Pahlavi—became the supreme leader's insignia. It replaced the crown just as “the King, the Crowned Father” became “the Supreme Leader, the Nation's Guardian and Father.”

The ruling elite wanted to reestablish

traditional modes of governance, reinstate the patriarchal family, and realign gender relations within it. Unsurprisingly, the very first decree of the Islamic Republic—which occurred on Feb. 26, 1979, before the compulsory veiling act and even before the ratification of the constitution—was the repeal of the 1967 Family Protection Law, which had implemented greater freedoms for women in the realms of divorce, polygamy, and child custody laws.

An Islamic society could only be reborn if the nuclear family could be reformed. The clerical regime legislated new restrictive laws. They resorted to bullying, publicly shaming, and imprisoning any woman who tried to reassert her rights, her choices, and her identity. The directive to women soon after the 1979 revolution was loud and clear: Disappear from public places, and if you need to be there, hide yourself under a mandatory hijab—a mobile home, a portable closet, a walking wall. Cover your body. Cover your voice. Erase your presence. Make yourself invisible.

Women, however, refused to become invisible, voiceless, and powerless. They challenged the regime at every step and emerged as vibrant catalysts for change. They fought exclusion. They claimed the streets and struggled for the freedom to move about freely, to be part of the public world, to be heard, to be seen, to be acknowledged as equal citizens. They refused to be deleted. Now, they are on the way to shattering the hardest and highest ceiling: national leadership.

Iranian women are at the forefront of a vast and transformative movement to reverse a backlash against their earlier gains and attain equal rights. They are fighting the government's morality police—self-assigned arbiters of morality and women's bodily integrity. They are rejecting the obligatory hijab, invisible walls and veils, institutionalized repression, and legislative humiliation, which considers a woman's worth, testimony, and inheritance half that of a man's.

The young women leading the upris-

An Iranian woman walks past a covered shop window in Tehran on July 9, 2022.



ing are the daughters and granddaughters of women who risked life and limb to pave the way for democratization and desegregation. More than 40 years after the ruling elite's obsessive attempt to resegregate Iranian society, they are making unprecedented history inside and outside the country.

Female writers, always at the forefront of social justice movements in contemporary Iran, brought the struggle for democracy and gender equity inside the home, into kitchens and bedrooms. They demanded its implementation in interpersonal relationships. Without shedding a drop of blood, they prepared the way for a smooth transition to a more democratic, desegregated society.

Segregation establishes complex interconnections between bodies and borders in a physical, literary, and symbolic sense, and female writers and poets, having suffered its impact on their bodies and voices, know that desegregation is central to their literary enterprise. They know they have to trespass walls, boundaries, borders, and ancestral silences.

If we accept that good art knows more than the artist, then female writers and poets are the harbingers of future political trends in Iran.

If earlier a "world ruled by women"

was the distant and unattainable dream of Zari—the female protagonist of Iran's first major novel by a woman, *Savushun* by Simin Daneshvar—then the younger generation, within the country and in the diaspora, is assuming the role of rulers and even prophets.

"I must be King, even if I don't have a crown on my head," writes the female narrator of the award-winning novel *My Bird* by Fariba Vafi. The young, sassy protagonist of Marjane Satrapi's graphic memoir, *Persepolis*, goes even further and declares herself the first female prophet in a long line of male predecessors.

Iranian women have emerged as seasoned survivors and a formidable civic force to be reckoned with. They offer a promising alternative to lead a country in deep and swift decline out of its current crisis.

The prescient chronicler of seismic moments of transition in Iranian history, Bahram Beyzaie, in his masterpiece *Death of Yazdgerd*, puts the crown on the head of his female protagonist and these words in her mouth: "I have been waiting for liberation for a long time."

This is the dawn of a new era in Iran. ■

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# Egypt Doubled Down on Fossil Fuels by Stifling Dissent

By Tirana Hassan  
and Richard Pearsouse

Last November, Egypt hosted the 27th United Nations Climate Change Conference, known as COP27. In preparatory meetings, its government criticized the hypocrisy of high-emission countries that have failed to adequately support developing countries in facing climate impacts. That criticism is entirely justified.

But the undeniable failures of high-emission countries do not alleviate the need to scrutinize Egypt's own environmental record. And that barely happened during the climate talks, held in the Sinai Peninsula resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh. That is not because there hasn't been independent environmental activism in Egypt but because Egypt's repressive government has severely curtailed that movement as part of its efforts to silence nearly all civic and political activism, independent media, and freedom of speech.

The fact that crucial environmental issues can't be openly debated is obviously a huge problem for Egypt. But the history of the country's fierce domestic activism against coal should also be a point of sober reflection for the diplomats who attended COP27, especially those under the illusion that progress on climate ambition requires silence on human rights.

Egypt burns coal for electricity toward industrial production. Fossil fuels—coal but also oil and gas—account for around 90 percent of total

energy production, and Egypt plans to significantly increase oil and gas production. But within Egypt, there's effectively no public campaigning against the country's own fossil fuel production. It's simply too dangerous.

That has not always been the case. In 2012, Egyptians Against Coal emerged as a broad-based campaign in response to the government's interest in reincorporating coal into the country's energy mix. In many ways, it was the high-water mark of modern Egyptian environmentalism.

Following the country's 2011 revolution, Egypt experienced salient economic challenges—and energy shortages. In 2013, then-President Mohamed Morsi's post-revolution government, eager to avoid even more regular domestic blackouts, halved the gas supply to cement factories, which consumed around 20 percent of domestic gas supplies.

Egypt's cement industry, one of the largest in the region, began to lobby hard for alternatives. It wasn't just any large business sector: The government and military have long owned many of the factories—although how many is hard to pin down.

It was at this point that a group of 10 mostly environment- and public

health-focused organizations created Egyptians Against Coal. The movement harnessed long-standing concerns over air quality, which was already notoriously poor around many cement factories in Greater Cairo, Alexandria, and other cities. An Egyptian Environment Ministry report at the time estimated that coal use in the cement industry could cost Egypt \$3 billion to \$5 billion a year in health costs, primarily from respiratory diseases.

Activists were also motivated by the opaque nature of the cement industry's advocacy. "Coal for them, the bill on us," went one protest slogan, alluding to the sense that only a few wealthy businesspeople would benefit from an arrangement that would hurt many individuals.

From 2012 until mid-2014, the campaign enjoyed considerable success. It was supported by a wide variety of actors—from tourism operators concerned about potential damage to the Red Sea coastline, where some cement factories are located, to the powerful Egyptian Medical Syndicate and grassroots activists across the country. Leading environmentalists appeared regularly on TV and even featured positively in state-owned daily newspapers.

In July 2013, Egypt's military forcibly



Egyptian laborers work at a charcoal factory in Egypt's Sharkia governorate, north of Cairo, on Jan. 29, 2020.

removed Morsi. Egyptians Against Coal also had the support of Laila Iskander, who was appointed environment minister by the interim government that month. A longtime environmentalist, she was the cabinet's lone anti-coal voice. She commissioned and disseminated the Environment Ministry report on coal's health consequences, which was later removed without explanation from the ministry's website.

The government of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who had been defense minister under Morsi (and became president in June 2014), began to relentlessly persecute critics, dissidents, journalists, and human rights and political activists. Egypt's environmental movement was not spared.

As the government intensified its crackdown on independent civil society, freedom of expression, and judicial freedom, the anti-coal campaign began to wither away. "We had some prominent people who showed up on TV to speak against coal, but suddenly they started to quit the campaign," an environmental activist told Human Rights Watch. "One was harassed by security at the airport, so he quit."

A domestic legal case against coal ground to a halt. Mentions of Egyptians Against Coal disappeared from media. And public protests, previously energetic and frequent, became too dangerous.

In April 2014, the Sisi government decided to permit coal use for heavy industry. Soon after, Iskander was removed and replaced by Khaled Fahmy, who also served as Iskander's predecessor. Some activists referred to him as the "minister of coal" due to his strong support for the fuel during his first stint in government.

Fast-forward to today. Egyptian authorities effectively prohibit journalists and advocates from working on sensitive environmental issues. They are barred from studying the impacts on local communities and the environmental toll of fossil fuel operations, including production, refining, and export

operations. They are also barred from determining the impacts of Egypt's vast and opaque military business activities—such as destructive forms of quarrying, water bottling plants, and some cement factories—as well as of so-called national infrastructure projects—such as a new administrative capital—many of which are associated with the president's office or the military.

Meanwhile, Egypt has taken few steps to move away from the production and use of fossil fuels and is instead increasing the production of both oil and methane gas, with the hope of becoming a leading methane gas exporter. According to the Climate Action Tracker, Egypt is responsible for more than a third of total methane gas consumption in Africa and is the continent's second-largest producer. The organization rates Egypt's overall climate targets and policies as "highly insufficient."

COP27 presented a clear opportunity to scrutinize the host government's own climate rhetoric and reality. But there is also an ongoing obligation to urge Sisi to release his chokehold on the country's freedoms of assembly, association, and expression.

The debate among diplomats over whether ambitious climate policies or protecting human rights should come first presents a false dichotomy. Robust climate policies require robust engagement from civil society. Climate action needs more critical voices, not fewer. ■

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## EUROPE



# Ukraine's Military Medicine Is a Critical Advantage

By Tanisha M. Fazal

Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine has prompted more than \$100 billion in aid since February, several votes at the United Nations, and the transfer or sale of high-tech weapons systems from the United States to Ukraine, including HIMARS rocket launch systems, Switchblade 600 drones, and MANPADS air defense systems. But another, more prosaic part of the West's aid to Ukraine is having a significant effect on the conflict: medical supplies. Military medicine is a largely overlooked contributor to military effectiveness, but its effects are playing out in real time on the battlefield.

From better field sanitation to mechanized and air evacuation, as well as modern body armor, armies today that take advantage of these changes can not only save lives but also preserve the strength of their forces. In World War I, for example, injured U.S. soldiers could wait hours to be evacuated to a field hospital just a few miles away; during the



Doctors wait outside an operating room during surgery on a wounded soldier at a military hospital in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, on April 18, 2022.

war in Afghanistan, by contrast, injured U.S. military personnel would be evacuated to the U.S. military hospital in Landstuhl, Germany, or even back to the United States within a day or two.

By all accounts, Ukraine has much better military medicine than Russia. Ukrainian forces, for example, are well trained in Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC), a set of prehospital guidelines developed by the U.S. military in the 1990s and revised and widely adopted in the early years of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. U.S. military medical practitioners found that 87 percent of preventable battle deaths occurred in the prehospital setting; among these, the most by far were from hemorrhage. Thus, the TCCC guidelines focus heavily on hemorrhage, with advice on when to apply tourniquets, hemostatic dressings, and clamps to stem blood loss. Aid from the West has included exactly these kinds of supplies, as well as related equipment such as body armor. Western advisors have also been pushing for the use of whole blood in far-forward settings—and the Ukrainian government recently authorized this protocol. One reason for Ukraine's medical advantage is that it has welcomed such aid not just since

last February but over the past eight years. Since the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine has been prepping for all-out war with Russia, including on the medical front.

Russian forces, on the other hand, lack medical training as well as supplies. A video shared widely on social media last September reportedly showed Russian officers telling new conscripts to purchase tampons to plug bullet wounds. Russia has suffered from shortages in military medical staffing for years. Russian morale is also reportedly quite low, as seen from both field reports and the flow of Russian men leaving the country so as not to be drafted into the army. One reason for low morale is likely reports of poor medical care and supply, including the use of Soviet-era first-aid kits and limited pharmaceuticals. While Russian personnel have had some training in TCCC, they appear to lack crucial modern equipment—such as the combat application tourniquet—to implement these guidelines.

Better military medicine matters on the battlefield for at least three reasons. First, having better medicine means saving more lives; in other words, militaries with better medicine can bring more people to the fight. They will

likely be healthier at the start of the war and, all else equal, will be more likely to receive treatment that allows them to return to duty sooner rather than later.

Second, having better medicine means a higher likelihood of maintaining unit cohesion; rather than being sent home (or worse, dying), injured soldiers can be treated and returned to their unit. Social bonds can be maintained. New troops do not have to spin up on training. And third, better medicine translates into higher troop morale. Knowing that you and your fellow soldiers will receive good medical care in the event of illness or injury will make you more willing to fight and take risks. It signifies a country unwilling to waste its soldiers' lives—in stark contrast to the attitude on display in Russia's mass mobilization of often untrained soldiers.

Many of these factors were evident in the United States' most recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The creation of a trauma registry in 2004 facilitated a revolution in military medical data collection, which, in turn, allowed for the research underlying guidelines like TCCC. The intense focus on stemming blood loss led to the invention and use of new kinds of tourniquets, hemostatic dressings, and catheters to maintain blood flow. And understanding the critical importance of delivering care as soon as possible prompted U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to implement the "golden hour" rule in 2009, such that any injured U.S. military personnel would be evacuated to a higher-level medical facility within the first, most crucial hour of injury. Combined, these changes contributed to a tripling of the United States' wounded-to-killed ratio, from the traditional 3:1 to 10:1 in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

Of course, there are many ways in which these wars are not comparable. One key difference is that the United States fought counterinsurgencies

in Afghanistan and Iraq. At least to date, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has been a conventional war more reminiscent of past land wars in Europe—and with accordant levels of casualties. Artillery rather than roadside bombs have been the main mechanism of injury. Another important contrast has to do with air evacuation, a key part of saving the lives of the wounded. Neither Ukraine nor Russia has air superiority in this war. Thus, medical evacuation, or medevac, is compromised, although Ukraine is fighting closer to its own territory and with generally superior logistics. Given the importance of immediate care to the odds of survival, limited medevac helps make sense of the surprisingly low estimates of the Russian wounded-to-killed ratio at 3:1.

At the same time, there are important similarities, including around the politics of reporting casualty numbers. The best available estimates of Russian casualties, for example, are not coming from Russia. Instead, NATO and various Western intelligence agencies have been reporting these numbers. Ukraine's own casualty reporting has been scanty at best. Part of the reason for both countries' reluctance to report casualties is because such reporting can diminish morale—including among military forces but also domestically. This practice speaks to the well-known “Dover effect” in the United States, a term that refers to the effect that images of flag-draped coffins being unloaded at Dover Air Force Base can have on public support for a war. But it is also the case that casualty reporting has become part of the information warfare campaign. Ukraine, for example, reported 1,000 Russian fatalities after the first day of the war, while Russian media claimed that Ukraine had suffered 4,000 losses in a single week in September.

Actual casualty numbers have increased, mostly as a result of Russian targeting of Ukrainian hospitals,

in violation of international law. In addition to strikes on civilian medical infrastructure, such as that on a maternity hospital last March, Russian forces have also targeted Ukrainian medevac rail lines.

Nevertheless, all signs point to Ukraine holding the medical advantage in this war. Medicine is of course not enough. The Finns likewise held the medical advantage over the Soviet Union in the 1939 Winter War. Finland used insulated medical aid stations, evacuated casualties by sled, and had generally better medical staffing and facilities. Although the war ultimately ended with a Soviet victory, medicine was nonetheless a force multiplier for the Finns, who had a much smaller population and were able to compromise the Soviet victory instead of being overrun. In a war where numbers matter, the side that has better medicine holds a distinct advantage. ■

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## The European Project Is at the Mercy of the Weather

By Adam Tooze

**R**ight now, the sobering truth is that the future of Europe hinges on the weather. It seems absurd. But whether this winter is cold or warm will determine if Europe gets through the next several months without major economic, political, or social stress.

We are in this situation because, thanks to the clash with Russia over

Ukraine, Europe has lost roughly a third of its regular gas supply. Much of Europe, particularly in the former Soviet bloc, relied on Russian gas for electricity generation, home heating, cooking, and industrial purposes. Germany and Italy, the largest and third-largest economies in the eurozone, were also heavily dependent on Russian gas.

Since last spring, as the scale of the conflict became clear, Europe has been bracing for the worst. While buying as much Russian gas as it can, Europe has been scrambling to sign new gas deals and make up the impending shortfall by buying up cargoes of liquefied natural gas, or LNG. Over the summer, as Russia's situation became more dire, deliveries of Russian gas slowed to a fraction of their normal level. Gas prices for the foreseeable future remain severely elevated—around eight times their pre-crisis levels. With no prospect of a resumption of Russian gas deliveries in sight, the outlook is grim—unless, that is, the weather stays warm.

Weather has mattered in modern European history before. A freezing winter in 1946–47 brought Europe to a standstill and helped trigger Washington into launching the Marshall Plan. But that was in the immediate aftermath of World War II, when the continent was in ruins. For Europe, in the third decade of the 21st century, to find itself at the mercy of the weather truly comes as a shock.

Of course, as the saying goes, Europe is forged in crisis and consists largely of the sum of the solutions found to those crises. But when Jean Monnet, one of the architects of European integration, made that famous declaration in 1976, he can hardly have expected a severe cold snap or an unusual warm spell to swing the history of the continent. Even former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, when he used the term “polycrisis” to describe Europe’s situation in 2016, couldn’t have imagined a moment as precarious as this. He was thinking of

the Syrian refugee crisis, the eurozone debt crisis, and Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea. The difference is that throughout the first clash over Ukraine, Russian gas continued to flow.

In the worst-case scenario, if the thermometer plunges this winter, several European countries could be forced to impose gas rationing. Even with good weather, the outlook for this year is alarming. The concerns are not merely prospective. With energy prices still hovering above their pre-crisis levels, energy-intensive industries such as fertilizer and aluminum are already shutting down. Under the pressure of the shock, the energy supply chain in Europe is fracturing. Energy supply companies have found themselves caught between fixed-price contracts with their customers and soaring gas and power costs. It turns out that there is maturity mismatch, one of the boogymen of the 2008 financial crisis, at the heart of the energy supply system. Either supply companies breach their contracts or they pile up gigantic losses that bring them to the brink of bankruptcy—or a bailout. The nationalization of Germany's Uniper has already cost taxpayers billions of euros.

To mitigate the damage to households and businesses, European governments have launched a variety of programs to stabilize prices. The details are mind-bogglingly complex and contentious. Germany agreed, only very reluctantly, to the idea of a maximum price for European gas purchases. As its government points out, it will work only if demand does not surge elsewhere. With Italy, France, and Spain taking the initiative early in the crisis to introduce national support programs, and Germany following suit with its own gigantic energy package, there has been little European coordination. The only thing that is clear is that effective programs are going to be very expensive. The German package is touted as costing 200 billion euros (about \$195 billion). On top of earlier



A man walks past the Roman Agora during heavy snowfall over Athens on Feb. 16, 2021.

German support programs, the total bill could run to 5 to 6 percent of its GDP—a lot even for a country of Germany's fiscal capacity.

Europe has a track record of big crises with big bills. But this one is particularly tricky to handle. After the banking crises of the late 2000s, Germany did not want to foot the bill for a common bank insurance fund to support weaker banks in Italy and Spain. But at least those countries' efforts to support their own ailing banks made Germany's banks more, rather than less, safe. The opposite is precisely the situation regarding energy subsidies. Uncoordinated gas stockpiling by the richest consumers prices poorer consumers out of the market to the benefit of speculators. In this regard, the measures taken so far are akin to vaccine nationalism or protectionist policies to hoard limited supplies of personal protective equipment.

Back in 2020, in the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, it seemed as though Europe might fail to agree to a common pandemic plan. French President Emmanuel Macron spoke of a "moment of truth" for the European Union. A deal was done for common

borrowing to fund national government spending. Europe also adopted an impressively coordinated approach to vaccine procurement and distribution. It was cumbersome but addressed basic issues of equity. Nearly a year from the start of Russia's attack on Ukraine, the prospects for a similar deal to face the energy crisis are very uncertain.

Crucially, the common response to the COVID-19 crisis depended on an agreement between France and Germany. With the help of their finance ministries, Macron and then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel reached a deal on EU borrowing. Today, relations between France and Germany are at their lowest in recent memory. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Macron have a frosty working relationship. They are split over the gas price cap proposal, with France favoring more dramatic measures. They are split over the proposal for a gas pipeline to connect the Spanish and Portuguese LNG terminals with the rest of Europe. France has effectively vetoed the plan. In February 2022, when Germany announced its much-heralded defense spending package, Paris was dismayed by the fact

that the first big-ticket purchase was the U.S. F-35 fighter jet, rather than a European alternative. More recently, Germany launched a new missile and air defense program without prior consultation with France, which left Paris fearing that Berlin now sees its future as the protector and patron of its Eastern European neighbors.

Most fundamentally, to address the escalating costs of the energy crisis and the financial legacies of COVID-19, Paris would like to renegotiate Europe's fiscal architecture, including the question of common European borrowing. Scholz initially gave some indication that he was open to this discussion, only for German Finance Minister Christian Lindner to issue a firm *nein*, both on common borrowing and on any fundamental redesign of the Stability and Growth Pact, the agreement that disciplines national fiscal policy in the eurozone.

As Lindner points out, France can currently borrow at more attractive interest rates than Brussels. However, as everyone knows, that is not the point. The countries that need the protection of a common borrowing scheme are Greece, Spain, and, above all, Italy.

For a long time, liberals and progressives have worried about the rightward drift of Italian politics. Now, following the September 2022 elections, Rome has seen the inauguration of a far-right government headed by Giorgia Meloni of the Brothers of Italy, a party descended from a post-fascist lineage. By bitter coincidence, her government took office just as Italy's most die-hard post-fascists were celebrating the centennial of Benito Mussolini's march on Rome.

In choosing her ministerial team, Meloni seems to have been at pains to avoid provocation on economic and financial affairs. Her finance minister, Giancarlo Giorgetti, is from the business wing of the League party. He is the only holdover from the previous cabinet and more pro-European and pragmatic than Matteo Salvini, his party boss. But, for all his alleged moderation,

a showdown with an outspoken German finance minister is red meat for any Italian nationalist. Even if the financial issue can be settled, the rest of Meloni's cabinet picks are much less conciliatory. The stage seems set for clashes between Rome and Brussels over issues including immigration, climate change, and reproductive rights.

Among Europe's nightmares is the prospect that Italy under Meloni could become a second Poland, challenging the cohesive value system of the EU precisely when Brussels is seeking to consolidate a solid front against Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Poland, as a nonmember of the eurozone, is not integral to the functioning of the EU in the way that Italy is. But Warsaw has acquired huge new significance as a front-line state in the confrontation with Russia. It is positioning itself to take full advantage of this leverage by dramatically raising its defense spending and cultivating a role as one of the United States' most active allies within NATO. Despite Brexit and the shambles in London, Putin has helped forge a new axis that runs from Washington via London to Warsaw. As if to emphasize the historic resonances of this axis, Poland's nationalist parliamentarians have picked this moment to reopen the issue of reparations for the genocidal atrocities perpetrated by Germany in World War II.

Europe is embroiled in an ongoing and unpredictable war in which Putin's Russia must not be allowed to prevail. Its basic energy supply is in doubt. In Germany, Italy, and Poland, the issues at stake are as much political as diplomatic, technical, or economic. This makes the resolution of the current crisis far more intractable. When Monnet declared that Europe would be forged in crisis, he not only assumed that there were, in fact, solutions to be forged, but he also assumed that those forging the European answers would be its civil servants and elite decision-makers. Operating independently

of popular politics, they would find their way toward satisfying the functional imperatives of the moment. That model of European institution-building has been in doubt arguably since the French and Dutch referendums in 2005 shot down the proposal for a European constitution. This does not mean that progress toward "ever greater union" is impossible. 2020 proved the contrary. But it requires complex intergovernmental bargains, and the signs for such a deal in the present crisis seem anything but good.

It is not for nothing that European governments are looking to the weather. The one bit of good news is that the long-range forecasts look favorable. Perhaps unseasonable warmth will buy European politicians the time they need. If the thermometer drops, however, the pressure on European capitals will become intense. ■

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## Can Putin's Center Hold?

By Tatiana Stanovaya

**T**he question of how Russian elites are responding to further developments in the Russia-Ukraine war has become one of the most discussed issues in Russian and Western media. That's understandable: While ordinary Russians remain relatively conformist and show no signs of politicization—despite the unpopular mobilization—there have been some hopes that the elites could perhaps play

a role in restraining Russian President Vladimir Putin from further escalation. Or, at least, that they would become a factor Putin would have to take into consideration when making his decisions. The debate over whether Russian elites are split or not has been intensifying against the backdrop of unprecedented internal conflicts questioning Russian tactics in Ukraine. So, are the elites a threat to Putin? And how might possible further military failures impact the mood among the elites?

When it comes to the war in Ukraine, what is important is whether the splits concern Putin and his decisions. Putin's regime is well known for its inter-elite fighting; indeed, that is its natural state. Security officials, or *siloviki*, clash with other *siloviki* (the FSB vs. the Federal Protective Service, the military intelligence service vs. the FSB); some of Putin's friends with others (businessman and mercenary boss Yevgeny Prigozhin vs. St. Petersburg Gov. Alexander Beglov); senior officials with other officials (domestic policy overseer Sergei Kiriyenko has long been embroiled in a confrontation with his predecessor, State Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin); and so on.


But while the Russian elite is deeply divided, there has been no sign of any attempt to turn against Putin. The Russian elite may also be deeply divided over domestic decisions, be it social policy (the ruling United Russia party vs. the cabinet), energy topics (Rosneft vs. Gazprom), or domestic affairs (domestic policy overseers vs. the *siloviki*). But there have been no signs, at least publicly, of divisions over Putin's decision to launch the war. Make no mistake, a significant part of the Russian elite considers the war a catastrophe. Some view it as a lesser evil but nonetheless an evil; some regret it, and still others have considerable doubts over the way Putin is conducting the campaign. But no one dared to act—until now.

Putin's decision to launch the war came as a massive shock to the elites, who were not consulted and received no advance notice. Despite this initial shock, they rallied around Putin but with very different motives. Some, such as the technocrats (including Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, and central bank head Elvira Nabiullina), opted to submit entirely: the easiest and safest strategy to survive.

Others, rather pragmatically, reinvented themselves as members of the party of war (such as former Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and United Russia head Andrey Turchak) to gain political weight and secure their political future. The third and final strategy was to genuinely back the war in its harshest and bloodiest form, to get involved in it, and bring Putin his victory. Before September, when Ukraine launched its unexpected counterattack, the nature of the elite's support for Putin did not really matter. Whatever the grounds, the results were the same: People stood by their president because it was the safest way to survive. After September, that started to change.

When the prospect of Russia losing the war began to loom, every layer of the Russian elite was impacted, whichever adaptation strategy they had opted for. The mobilization and the annexation of four Ukrainian regions brought temporary relief, creating a sense that Putin had finally woken up and started listening to more sensible and sober figures in his entourage, pushing the president to act more decisively. But that relief did not last long. As Ukraine's army continued to advance, with the bridge connecting Russia and Crimea blown up, Russian troops became exhausted and thin on the ground. With the mobilization faltering, people began to resist. The massive missile strike against Ukrainian cities, positioned as a response to the Crimean bridge attack, achieved little, and concerns over a shortage of Russian missiles mounted.

What options does Russia have now? What is Moscow's Plan C, since Plan A and Plan B have failed? Dishearteningly for many in the Russian leadership, Putin's recent statements have implied that Moscow would be returning to its previous "wait and see" tactics. And without the resources to advance, Moscow remains limited in its capability to carry out massive missile strikes and can only count on freezing the



Russian President Vladimir Putin addresses a rally in central Moscow on Sept. 30, 2022.

situation, hoping to gain some time to regroup its forces. But will it have that time? And what happens if Kyiv continues to launch counterattacks? The absence of clear answers is shattering any unity among the elites and pushing them to look for better survival strategies: After all, no one wants to end up on the wrong side of history.

The lack of clear vision of how Russia can win has sparked tectonic shifts among Russian elites, who are now seeking ways to adapt to the deteriorating situation. For the first time ever, we may see an important part of the elite daring to intrude in Putin's decision-making and imposing on the Kremlin its own vision of how the war should unfold.

Recently, there has been an unprecedented rise of elite indignation over how the war is progressing. Prigozhin, aligned with Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and with public support from popular military bloggers on Telegram, has directed invectives at the Defense Ministry and General Staff, for the first time ever blaming Col. Gen. Aleksandr Lapin and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov for the military failures in Ukraine. Margarita Simonyan, the editor in chief of the state-controlled media outlet RT, has become one of the most prominent hawks. She has demanded a massive strike against Ukraine's decision-making centers and dared to criticize the Defense Ministry. TV pundits are now going against the military. Even State Duma deputies who were until recently close to the Defense Ministry—former Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kartapolov, now the head of the lower chamber's defense committee, and former military commander Andrey Gurulyov—have joined the efforts, demanding that the prosecutor general investigate corruption in the army. In other words, the pro-war camp has set its sights on the Defense Ministry and army leadership, relying on support from state TV. All this has happened regardless of the

fact that the military has been the key institution on which Putin has relied in his war against Ukraine.

Russia's retreat has created a vacuum of political leadership at a crucial moment in Russian history. Prigozhin and Kadyrov's moves show that they believe they have the right to interfere and be listened to by the Kremlin, since they personally have sent men—Prigozhin's mercenaries and Chechens loyal to Kadyrov—to the slaughter in Ukraine. The rebellion is a direct response by the most ambitious segment of the party of war to Putin's apparent lack of decisiveness. In an attempt to prevent Russia from losing the war, this part of the elite has succeeded in reaching out to Putin and convincing him to shift tactics to take a more critical approach to the military top brass and even implement personnel reshuffles. (Sergei Surovkin, openly backed by Prigozhin, was appointed commander of the "special military operation," as Putin calls the invasion, in October.) Putin must learn to listen to those proposing alternative proposals. The circumstances are starting to shape the president.

All of this is taking place against the backdrop of the presidential administration ceding the initiative. Putin's staff, traditionally viewed as a demigurge of Russian politics in these circumstances, has been forced to submit to trends it does not control. The presidential administration, whose influence is nothing compared with what it was in the 2000s, continues to shrink, transformed into a tool used incrementally by the hawks to meet their demands.

These days, an important part of the Russian elite has started to question the way Russia is fighting in Ukraine: Putin's exclusive zone of responsibility. They are targeting the military leaders, and even if they are not turning against the president (and they will not yet), they want Putin to act differently in order to secure victory. This is an attempt to compensate for the

absence of a discernible and convincing plan in Ukraine from Putin, as well as tangentially questioning the way Putin deals with the military threats.

So, what will happen if Putin sticks to his (at least publicly) hesitant positions? His public messages suggest that he does not intend to fight the Ukrainian army but merely stop it from advancing and that he would rather opt to threaten the West with the use of nuclear weapons than try to conquer Ukraine's territory using its own forces. The hope that this plan may work out and bring Ukraine under Russian control seems profoundly mistaken and may lead to new retreats and losses. It may even mean a larger mobilization with severe political consequences.

If Russia loses, that will lead to a situation in which the circumstances will be stronger than Putin. These circumstances will inevitably further fuel anxiety and uncertainty among the elites. They will not, perhaps, turn against Putin but will have to either find a way to bypass him (to adapt the policy without him) or manipulate him by imposing uncontested options and defeating those on whom he relies. Putin, having failed to implement every part of his plan so far, has become more dependent on those who invested in this war, who have become a part of this war, who justify it, push it, and lose their people in the fighting.

Having launched this war as a personal surprise project, Putin now finds himself in a situation in which he can no longer make decisions in isolation. It's not so much how the elites can threaten Putin but how Putin's own position will gradually weaken as his plans fail. Even as they remain pro-Putin, the elites are becoming bolder and more decisive. ■

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## Stop Banning Oil From Venezuela

By Francisco Rodríguez

In recent months, the Biden administration has deported thousands of Venezuelans to Mexico under the convoluted argument that they pose a danger of introducing COVID-19 into the United States. To deal with an upsurge in immigration, the White House appealed to a Trump-era decision to deport immigrants at the border under Title 42 of the U.S. Code—a provision that allows for border agents to turn back asylum-seekers if they risk spreading a communicable disease. Those who reached the border in the hope that they could apply for asylum are now being sent to a country with which most of them have few if any links.

Even the White House admits that there is no public health justification for the measure. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention called for the termination of Title 42 deportations last April, and the measure is in place only because Republican governors convinced a Trump-appointed federal judge to block a lifting of the measure in May.

This abrupt change in policy has left

tens of thousands of asylum-seekers stranded in Mexico and Central America in diplomatic limbo. It also serves as an example of the profound contradictions inherent in U.S. policy toward Venezuela. For years, the U.S. government pursued a “maximum pressure” strategy of imposing harsh oil and financial sanctions, with the idea that they would help oust President Nicolás Maduro from power. The sanctions failed to bring about regime change; instead, they helped devastate the country’s economy and fuel one of the largest peacetime migration exodes in recent history. Now, the United States is shutting its door in the face of thousands of Venezuelans who have risked their lives to escape the economic collapse that it played a hand in creating.

Adding insult to injury, the Biden administration unveiled a process to grant legal entry to 24,000 “qualifying Venezuelans” that few if any of the most vulnerable asylum-seekers will have access to. Not only is the number minuscule, amounting to less than the number of Venezuelans encountered by U.S. Border Patrol guards in a single month and only 0.3 percent of the number of Venezuelans who have left their country in recent years, but the policy is explicitly designed to exclude those who need it the most while privileging those who already have the means and resources to come to the United States.

To be eligible for the new program, Venezuelans must show that they have a person in the United States willing to financially support them; they must also have a valid passport and demonstrate that they have not illegally entered Mexico or Panama. Few of the Venezuelans who risked their lives crossing the dangerous tropical forest of Panama’s Darién province to escape one of the world’s worst hunger crises will have a chance of satisfying these requirements. A Venezuelan passport costs around 10 times the country’s monthly minimum wage; according to a recent study, less than 1 percent of

Venezuelans who left the country on foot had one.

Venezuela’s massive migration exodus is a direct consequence of the country’s economic collapse. This collapse began when oil prices fell in 2014, and it deepened as the country’s oil production dropped precipitously after 2017, when the United States began imposing financial and economic sanctions. Dysfunctional macroeconomic policies as well as gross mismanagement of an oil boom by Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chávez, played their part in leaving the Venezuelan economy unprepared to deal with lower oil revenues. U.S. sanctions added to the mix by closing off the country’s main export from access to U.S. and European markets and making it nearly impossible to obtain the needed intermediate and capital goods for its oil industry to function adequately.

Stemming Venezuela’s exodus will require policies to address the root causes of a crisis that has driven more than 20 percent of the country’s population to leave. This implies re-integrating Venezuela into the global economy and allowing it to generate the hard-currency earnings necessary to fuel its economy. Venezuela will also need massive humanitarian assistance to address its hunger and health emergencies. Its humanitarian crisis remains one of the most underfunded in modern history, with total international assistance since the start of the crisis reaching only \$1 billion, or a meager \$35 per capita. By comparison, donors have directed \$24 billion, or nearly \$1,300 per capita, to Syria, a country that has seen a smaller collapse in per capita income than Venezuela.

The potential relaunching of talks between Venezuela’s government and a group of opposition parties in Mexico City could serve as a starting point for the mobilization of resources to address the country’s crisis. According to recent news reports, the talks will include a potential agreement to use \$3 billion

in frozen Venezuelan funds to provide humanitarian aid under United Nations management.

Yet even a humanitarian aid program of \$3 billion over several years will be a drop in the bucket compared with what Venezuela requires—or with what the country could obtain from reentering global oil markets. Venezuela would need an additional \$8 billion a year just to recover its 2013 level of food and medicine imports—and that's without even counting the funds needed to pay for basic public services and repair vital infrastructure. The only way Venezuela can sustainably recover its economy and regain the living standards it had until recently is by regaining access to global oil markets.

Even the most conservative estimates indicate that a complete lifting of economic sanctions could lead to an increase in production of around 700,000 barrels per day, generating around \$23 billion per year at current prices—enough to more than triple the country's current level of imports.

Some will claim that sanctions should not be eased unless Maduro allows free and fair elections to be held. This is the position taken recently by Republican Sens. Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz, who sent a letter to Biden warning that any loosening of sanctions would “give unwarranted and dangerous legitimacy” to the Maduro regime. Rubio has also vowed to introduce legislation requiring the Senate to consent to any lifting of sanctions on Venezuela, an action that could bring any progress in negotiations to a standstill.

There is quite a perverse logic to this argument, as it assumes that vulnerable Venezuelans should be made to pay the cost of Maduro's authoritarianism. In fact, the evidence shows that sanctions are rarely effective at generating regime change. More often than not, they end up having the opposite effect, weakening civil society while giving authoritarian leaders an excuse to increase repression and tighten their grip on power.

LUIS ACOSTA/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES



Venezuelan migrants stand behind a fence at an improvised shelter in Panama City, Panama, on Oct. 23, 2022.

Five years after the United States began imposing economic sanctions on Venezuela, Maduro is more firmly ensconced in power, the opposition is more divided, and ordinary Venezuelans are much worse off than at any time in their country's modern history.

It is time for the U.S. government to overhaul its strategy toward Venezuela. It should begin by putting an end to economic sanctions that exacerbate the country's economic crisis and make the lives of Venezuelans more difficult. No other country has imposed economic sanctions on the Maduro regime, with Europe explicitly stating that it will not support measures that worsen the country's crisis. It is shameful for the United States to be the only exception to this global consensus.

The international community should support an inclusive negotiation process that reflects the true plurality of Venezuelan society and that's aimed at addressing the country's most urgent problems, including its widespread hunger and poverty. Full multilateral support—including access to more than \$13 billion immediately available from the International Monetary Fund—

should be offered to aid a plan for economic reconstruction.

The United States must redesign its immigration strategy by respecting the right to seek asylum by all those who are fleeing political persecution and human rights violations. Given current labor market shortages, the U.S. economy could benefit from higher levels of immigration by Venezuelans, who have significantly contributed to boosting productivity in many other host countries.

These policy changes will not necessarily solve all of Venezuela's problems. The country's political crisis is rooted in its deep polarization and inequality as well as the predatory conduct of its political elites. What the international community can and should do is promote initiatives that can help shield Venezuelans from the collateral damage of the country's toxic political conflict. Shutting the door on Venezuelan asylum-seekers is not the way to do that. ■

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# Latin America's Pink Tide Is a Mirage

By Simeon Tegel

**L**uiz Inácio Lula da Silva's narrow victory over incumbent Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil's runoff presidential election last October has been widely hailed as historic. Not only did the 77-year-old former union leader and two-term president achieve a comeback for the ages, fighting back from prison on a now-overturned corruption conviction to defeat arguably the most significant global imitator of former U.S. President Donald Trump's brand of brash nativism and post-truth rhetoric, but Lula's triumph is also being seen as sealing the second coming of the "pink tide," the surge of left-wing leaders who first came to dominate Latin America in the early 2000s.

Lula's prodigal return follows a string of other regional leftist presidential triumphs, including those of Colombia's Gustavo Petro last year, Chile's Gabriel Boric and Peru's Pedro Castillo in 2021, Argentina's Alberto Fernández in 2019, and Mexico's Andrés Manuel López Obrador in 2018. If you were to look at a map of Latin America, with the countries with leftist—or supposedly leftist—governments shaded pink, only Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Uruguay would stand out against the otherwise rosy hue. On the face of it, Latin America is strongly trending left once again.

Yet that reading is a significant misinterpretation of the moment. It overestimates the popularity, durability, and likely effectiveness of this new cohort of leftist leaders, as well as their ability

to work together on the international stage, whether in United Nations climate negotiations or managing China's rapidly expanding footprint in the region.

The truth is that, rather than turning left, Latin Americans remain pragmatically centrist. A 2021 study by Latino-barómetro, a leading regional pollster, found that most voters in the region adopt what are seen as left-wing postures when it comes to inequality but ones that are seen as right-wing when it comes to public safety. In other words, they want problem-solvers who can respond to their real-world needs, from tackling rampant graft to creating jobs and addressing violent crime. The left, of course, does not have a monopoly on providing these kinds of policy solutions.

More than anything, what Latin Americans have been doing is rejecting incumbents, most of whom happened to be on the right; Lula's victory was the 15th-straight opposition victory in Latin American presidential elections. Across the region, sitting governments have struggled in febrile anti-establishment political environments, empowered by social media and turbocharged by the COVID-19 pandemic—which hit Latin America hard and triggered despair as well as visceral anger at the failures of decrepit health care systems and the elected officials overseeing them.

Many of the supposed new pink tide's victories have been by narrow margins: 50.9 percent to 49.1 percent in the case of Lula's runoff victory, despite Bolsonaro's deadly COVID-19 negligence; 50.1 percent to 49.9 percent for Castillo against a widely reviled opponent who may face jail time on corruption charges; and 50.4 percent to 47.4 percent for Petro against a candidate with a pending graft trial who had threatened to shoot business partners.

Now in power, these leaders are precariously positioned and lack the leverage of their predecessors. Several victors, including Lula, either face opposition-dominated legislatures or have fragmented legislative

majorities being tested by political forces that threaten to pull their fragile alliances apart. Chileans recently voted to reject a new progressive constitution, a flagship reform heavily backed by Boric. Castillo, who is the target of multiple criminal investigations, was impeached in December and replaced by his vice president, Dina Boluarte.

Thanks to inflation and a cocktail of local factors, from Chile's violent crime wave to projected inflation of 100 percent in Argentina, several of the new leftist leaders, after just scraping into power, have experienced shortened political honeymoons, with approval ratings falling dramatically. Last fall, Boric's approval rating was around 27 percent, Castillo's was in the 20s, and Petro's was in the mid-40s and dropping rapidly, despite him only taking office in August; meanwhile, Fernández's *disapproval* rating was in the mid-70s. The one exception is López Obrador, whose approval rating hovers around 60 percent.

Talk of a new pink tide also ignores the yawning differences among the new wave of leftists on issues including gender rights, the environment, and democracy itself. Latin America's current crop of left-wing leaders range from smokestack socialists, whose thinking on economics and energy has not evolved since the Cold War, to millennials preoccupied with identity politics and the climate crisis. All advocate addressing stark economic inequality and prioritizing anti-poverty measures, but that may be all they have in common. Several leaders hold positions that many European or U.S. progressives would regard as profoundly reactionary and unacceptable.

At one end of the spectrum is Boric, a 36-year-old former student activist who cares about LGBTQ rights and has introduced a bill to legalize abortion but who has also admitted he is "angered" by other leftists' failure to condemn the socialist dictatorships in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. At the other end is 69-year-old López Obrador,

who accuses feminists demanding abortion rights and an end to gender-based violence of being “conservative” political operatives, launches authoritarian broadsides against critical journalists in a society where killing media workers is now commonplace, and is dismantling the National Electoral Institute, Mexico’s respected electoral agency.

Then there is Peru, which appeared rudderless as Castillo’s presidency descended into self-inflicted chaos while ushering in socially conservative counterreforms, such as undermining bilingual education for Indigenous children. A rural schoolteacher who ran on a Marxist-Leninist ticket, Castillo opposed abortion and same-sex marriage, while his prime minister, Aníbal Torres, eulogized Adolf Hitler and launched misogynistic attacks on female journalists. Castillo’s incompetence—he had seven interior ministers in his first year in power—proved to be a disaster for the very constituency he claimed to represent: Peru’s poor. Half of Peruvians now experience food insecurity, double the pre-pandemic level—an issue that Castillo’s government repeatedly failed to address. It remains unclear whether his successor,

Boluarte, has the will or skills to chart a different direction, although failure to do so could see her follow Castillo out the door.

Meanwhile, Lula, whose return to power was propelled in part by his promise to save the Amazon from Bolsonaro’s push to open the world’s largest tropical rainforest to ranching and extractive industries, finds his newfound green credentials at odds with his own track record. During his first two terms as president, from 2003 to 2010, his tendency to view conservation as intrinsically opposed to his top priority—reducing poverty—left environmentalists deeply frustrated. It remains to be seen whether Brazil’s president has the political will to live up to his campaign pledge of net-zero deforestation in the Amazon.

Any sense of triumphalism on the global left over the victories of Lula et al. should be heavily tempered by the grim economic realities confronting Latin American governments. In a region heavily reliant on raw materials, which make up roughly one-third of Latin American exports, the first pink tide benefited from surging prices as China’s rapidly expanding economy hoovered up its commodities, permitting leftist governments to embark on

social spending programs that made a lasting dent in poverty and inequality levels. But now, economists expect inflation, the phasing out of pandemic-era stimulus packages, and strong international headwinds—including a likely recession in Europe and a possible one in the United States, along with China’s continued zero-COVID lockdowns—to undermine Latin America’s brief post-pandemic growth spurt.

Meanwhile, Venezuela, whose petrodollar-fueled growth—along with former President Hugo Chávez’s largesse toward ideological soulmates from Bolivia to Cuba—provided a model for the region a decade and a half ago, has now turned into such an unmitigated economic and humanitarian disaster that no Latin American politician in their right mind, however much they might defend the Nicolás Maduro regime on the international stage, would suggest attempting to emulate Venezuela’s policies.

This all means that Latin America’s left-wing leaders are going to find it harder and harder to fulfill expensive campaign pledges. Yes, the overwhelming majority of Latin Americans are, once again, governed by leftist administrations. But the economic good times of the early 2000s are now history. In a region where the tragic sight of Venezuelan refugees begging in the streets is now commonplace from Mexico to Argentina, the significance of the new pink tide should not be overinterpreted—including its popularity, durability, or capacity for enacting structural reforms. ■

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Presidential candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva appears behind a Brazilian national flag during a campaign rally in São Mateus, Brazil, on Oct. 17, 2022.

# THE CULT OF MODI

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*How India's prime minister dismantled  
the world's largest democratic experiment.*

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BY RAMACHANDRA GUHA

*It is not good for us to worship an individual.  
Only an ideal or a principle can be worshipped.*

—Mohandas Gandhi, addressing  
a meeting of his admirers in April 1937

**INDIA CLAIMS TO BE THE LARGEST DEMOCRACY** in the world, and its ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), claims to be the largest political organization in the world, with a membership base even greater than that of the Chinese Communist Party. Since May 2014, both the BJP and the government have been in thrall to the wishes—and occasionally the whims—of a single individual, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. An extraordinary personality cult has been constructed around Modi, its manifestations visible in state as well as party propaganda, in eulogies in the press, in adulatory invocations of his apparently transformative leadership by India's leading entrepreneurs, celebrities, and sports stars.

This essay seeks to place the cult of Modi in comparative and cultural context. It will show how it arose, the hold it has over the Indian imagination, and its consequences for the country's political and social future. It draws on my academic background as a historian of the



Indian Republic, as well as on my personal experiences as an Indian citizen. However, since I am writing about a distinctively Indian variant of what is in fact a global phenomenon, what I say here may resonate with those who study or live under authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes in other parts of the world.

The term “cult of personality” was popularized, with regard to Joseph Stalin, by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in his now famous speech to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. According to an English translation of Khrushchev’s speech, he remarked that it was “impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics, akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behavior.”

The case of Stalin was not singular or unique. In the decades following World War II, the communist world was awash with cults of personality—of Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, of Fidel Castro in Cuba, of Enver Hoxha in Albania, of Kim Il Sung in North Korea. Yet indisputably the greatest—not to say most deadly—of all the communist cults following Stalin’s was that of Mao Zedong in post-revolutionary China. Consider, for example, an editorial by Lt. Gen. Wu Faxian that appeared in the *Liberation Army Daily* on Aug. 13, 1967:

Chairman Mao is the most outstanding, greatest genius in the world, and his thought is the summing up of the experience of the proletarian struggles in China and abroad and is the unbreakable truth. In implementing Chairman Mao’s directives, we must absolutely not regard it as a prerequisite that we understand them. The experience of revolutionary struggles tells us that we do not understand many directives of Chairman Mao thoroughly or even partially at the beginning but gradually understand them in the course of implementation, after implementation, or after several years. Therefore, we should resolutely implement Chairman Mao’s directives that we understand as well as those that we temporarily do not understand.

I suppose this is what is called blind faith.

The cults of Stalin and Mao were preceded by the cults of Benito Mussolini in Italy and of Adolf Hitler in Germany. Notably, both emerged in settings that were not completely bereft of democratic features. Hitler’s National Socialists won the largest number of seats in the 1932 elections. Eight years previously, Mussolini had sought to win legitimacy through an election, though the voting itself was anything but free and fair. After they came to power, however, both leaders swiftly

extinguished political and individual freedoms, seeking to consolidate power in themselves and their parties.

A century after the rise of Hitler and Mussolini, the world is once again witnessing the rise of authoritarian leaders in countries with some sort of democratic history. A partial listing of these elected autocrats would include Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Hungary’s Viktor Orban, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, Modi, and, not least, the autocrat temporarily out of favor but longing for a return to power, former U.S. President Donald Trump.

These leaders have all personalized governance and admiration to a considerable degree. They all seek to present themselves as the savior or redeemer of their nation, uniquely placed to make it more prosperous, more powerful, more in tune with what they claim to be its cultural and historical heritage. In a word, they have all constructed, and been allowed to construct, personality cults around themselves.

While recognizing the existence and persistence of such cults of personality in other countries, this essay shall focus on the cult of Modi in India, for three reasons. First, and least important, it occurs in the country I know best and with whose democratic history I am professionally (as well as personally) engaged.

Second, India is soon to be the most populous nation in the world, surpassing China in this regard, and hence this cult will have deeper and possibly more portentous consequences than such cults erected elsewhere in the world.

Third, and perhaps most important, this personality cult has taken shape in a country that until recently had fairly robust and long-standing democratic traditions. Before Modi came to power in May 2014, India had in all respects a longer-lasting democracy than when Erdogan came to power in Turkey, Orban in Hungary, and Bolsonaro in Brazil. The 2014 general election was India’s 16th national vote, in a line extending almost unbroken from 1952. Regular, and likewise mostly free and fair, elections have also been held to form the legislatures of different Indian states. As the historian Sunil Khilnani has pointed out, many more people have voted in Indian elections than in older and professedly more advanced democracies such as the United Kingdom and the United States. India before 2014 also had an active culture of public debate, a moderately free press, and a reasonably independent judiciary. It was by no means a perfect democracy—but then no democracy is. (In my 2007 book, *India After Gandhi*, I myself had characterized India as a “50-50 democracy.” Perhaps some countries in Northern Europe might qualify as “70-30 democracies.”)

**BEFORE I COME TO THE CULT OF MODI,** I want to say something about the cult of a previous Indian prime minister, Indira Gandhi. She was the daughter of the country’s first and longest-serving prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. In March 1971, Gandhi and the Indian National Congress party won



From left: Benito Mussolini in Rome in 1936; Adolf Hitler in Berlin in 1938; a poster of Joseph Stalin in Moscow in 1950; and Mao Zedong in Beijing in 1966.

an emphatic victory in the general election; that December, India won an emphatic victory on the battlefield over Pakistan, in part because of Gandhi's decisive leadership. She was hailed as a modern incarnation of Durga, the militant, all-conquering goddess of Hindu mythology. The idea that Gandhi embodied in her person the party, the government, and the state—and that she represented in herself the past, present, and future of the nation—was promoted by the prime minister's political allies. Congress party leader D.K. Barooah proclaimed, "India is Indira, Indira is India." Equally noteworthy is a Hindi couplet that Barooah composed in praise of Gandhi, which in English reads: "Indira, we salute your morning and your evening, too / We celebrate your name and your great work, too."

Shortly after the Congress leader read those lines at a rally in June 1975 attended by a million people, Gandhi imposed a state of emergency, during which her regime arrested all major (and many minor) opposition politicians as well as trade unionists and student activists, imposed strict censorship on the press, and abrogated individual freedoms. A little under two years later, however, Gandhi's democratic conscience compelled her to call fresh elections in which she and her party lost power.

Now compare Barooah's short poem with an extended tribute, in prose, to Modi by BJP leader J.P. Nadda, offered on the occasion of the former's 71st birthday. These words appeared in an article published in September 2021 in India's most widely read English-language newspaper, the *Times of India*:

Modi has evolved into a reformer who passionately raises social issues plaguing India and then effectively addresses them through public discourse and participation.

... [He] believes in the holistic development of our society and country through good moral and social values. He always leads from the front in addressing

the nation's most complex and difficult problems, and doesn't rest till the goals are achieved.

... Modi is the only leader who has an electrifying effect on the masses and on whose call the entire nation gets united. During the [COVID-19] pandemic, his appeals have been religiously followed by every citizen.

... His stupendous success is the result of absolute dedication to people's welfare and wellbeing. His only aim is to make India a Vishwaguru [teacher to the world].

Nadda's piece is entirely representative. New Delhi's newspapers are replete with op-eds by cabinet ministers offering sycophantic praise of the prime minister. Indeed, "Modi is India, India is Modi" is the spoken or unspoken belief of everyone in the BJP, whether minister, member of Parliament, or humble party worker. As I was finishing a draft of this essay late last September, India's external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, told an audience in Washington that "the fact that our [India's] opinions count, that our views matter, and we have actually today the ability to shape the big issues of our time" is because of Modi. The anti-colonial movement led by Mohandas Gandhi, the persistence (against the odds) of electoral democracy since independence, the dynamism of its entrepreneurs in recent decades, the contributions of its scholars, scientists, writers, and filmmakers—all this (and the legacy of past prime ministers, too) goes entirely erased in these assessments. India's achievements (such as they are) are instead attributed to one man alone, Modi.

Meanwhile, in February 2020, a then-serving Supreme Court judge called Modi an "internationally acclaimed visionary" and a "versatile genius who thinks globally and acts locally." And India's richest and most successful industrialists compete with one another in publicly displaying their adoration of, and loyalty toward, the prime minister.

In February 2021, Modi joined the ranks of Stalin, Hitler, Mao, Muammar al-Qaddafi, and Saddam Hussain in having a sports stadium named after him while he was alive (and in office). The cricket stadium in the city of Ahmedabad, previously named

after the great nationalist stalwart Vallabhbhai Patel, was henceforth to be called Narendra Modi Stadium, with the inauguration of the refurbished premises conducted by then-Indian President Ram Nath Kovind, no less, alongside Home Minister Amit Shah and other officials. Later that year,

as Indian citizens received their first COVID-19 vaccines, they were given vaccination certificates with Modi's photograph on them. As second and then booster doses were offered, the official certificates also had the prime minister's photograph. I know of no other country in the world that has followed this practice. Indians asked to show their COVID-19 certificates when traveling overseas have since become accustomed to being greeted with either mirth or disgust, sometimes both.

Any egalitarian democrat would be dismayed by Modi's extraordinary displays of public narcissism. However, the scholar's job is as much to understand as to judge. The cold, hard fact is that, like Indira Gandhi in the early 1970s, Modi is unquestionably very popular. Why is this so? Let me offer six reasons.

First, Modi is genuinely self-made as well as extremely hardworking. Folklore has it that he once sold tea at a railway station—while some have questioned the veracity of this particular claim, there is no doubt that his family was disadvantaged in terms of caste as well as class. He takes no holidays and is devoted 24/7 to politics, which can be represented as being devoted 24/7 to the nation.

Second, Modi is a brilliant orator, with a gift for crisp one-liners and an even greater gift for mocking opponents. He is uncommonly effective as a speaker in the language most widely spoken in India, Hindi, and is even better in his native Gujarati.

Third, in terms of his background and achievements, Modi compares very favorably to his principal rival, Rahul Gandhi of the now much-decayed Congress party. Gandhi has never held a proper job or exercised any sort of administrative responsibility. (On the other hand, Modi was chief minister of a large state, Gujarat, for more than a decade before he became prime minister.) Gandhi takes frequent holidays, and he is an indifferent public speaker. (English, spoken or understood by only 10 percent of the population, remains his first language.) He is a fifth-generation dynast. In all these respects, Modi shines by comparison.

Fourth, as Hindu majoritarianism increasingly takes hold in Indian politics and society, Modi is seen as the great redeemer of Hindus and Hinduism. Reared in the hard-line Hindu chauvinist organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS),



Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi addresses a crowd in New Delhi in 1977.

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Modi frequently mocks the past rulers of India, both Muslim as well as British. He speaks of rescuing the country from "thousands of years of slavery" and of ushering in India's much-delayed national and civilizational renaissance.

Fifth, Modi has at his command a massive propaganda machine, sustained by the financial resources of his party and government and by 21st-century technology. An early and effective user of Twitter and Facebook, Modi has had his party use both as well as WhatsApp to build and enhance his image. (The prime minister also has his personalized, and widely subscribed-to, Narendra Modi App.) Modi's face, and usually no other, appears on all posters, hoardings, advertisements, and websites issued by or under the aegis of the Indian government. He is thus able to use public resources to burnish his personality cult far more widely and effectively than elected autocrats elsewhere (even Putin).

Sixth, Modi is an exceptionally intelligent and crafty man. While mostly an autodidact, in 14 years as a party organizer and 13 as chief minister of Gujarat, he assimilated a huge amount of information on all sorts of subjects—economic, social, cultural, political. He can speak with apparent authority on the benefits of solar energy, the dangers of nuclear warfare, the situation of the girl child, developments in artificial intelligence, and much else. He is also extremely shrewd in manipulating the political discourse within his party, and the country at large, to favor himself and diminish his rivals or opponents. (The likes of Trump and Bolsonaro are mere demagogues in comparison.)

**HAVING OUTLINED THE ELEMENTS OF THE CULT OF MODI**, let me speak of its consequences for democratic functioning. The cult of Modi has led to the weakening, if not evisceration, of five crucial institutions that, in a democracy, are meant to hold unbridled power to account and to prevent the personalization of political power and the growth of authoritarianism.

The first of these institutions is the political party. In part because so many of its leaders were jailed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi during the Emergency, Modi's party, the BJP, had previously stoutly opposed cults of personality. The BJP's sister (some would say parent) organization, the RSS, has always insisted that it does not believe in *vyakti puja* (worship of an individual). Since 2014, however, Modi has established his total and complete authority over the BJP. Whether out of fear or adoration, all BJP leaders, even those senior to Modi in public life, have obediently fallen in line. There is not even a

whiff of dissent within the world's largest party in the world's largest democracy; there is no Liz Cheney-like figure here at all.

The second institution that has prostrated itself before Modi is the Union Cabinet. When Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the BJP's first leader, was prime minister between 1998 and 2004, he governed as first among equals, giving his senior cabinet ministers considerable autonomy, this in keeping both with his party's ethos and with the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy that India had adopted. However, Modi does not consult cabinet ministers about important government decisions and makes sure that all credit for state welfare schemes accrues entirely to him. The government is run largely, if not entirely, from the Prime Minister's Office, which is staffed by unelected officials personally loyal to Modi, several from his home state of Gujarat.

Unlike with previous prime ministers (from different parties), in India today there is no consultation within the Union Cabinet. What Modi says, goes. And there is little debate within Parliament either. Whereas prime ministers such as Nehru and Vajpayee spent a great deal of time in Parliament, often listening with attention to the speeches of opposition MPs, Modi uses it more as a platform to make his own speeches. Unfortunately, the country has no tradition of Prime Minister's Questions, an aspect of the Westminster model that India did not incorporate. Bills on crucial subjects such as personal privacy and farm reforms, which affect hundreds of millions of Indians, are passed with little discussion and without being referred for assessment to a parliamentary select committee, as tradition demands. The speakers in both houses of Parliament are notoriously partisan, hastening the rapid conversion of an idea hatched in the Prime Minister's Office into law, bypassing the cabinet and with no input from Parliament. During the 2021 monsoon session of Parliament, for example, it took an average of 34 minutes for a bill to be passed in the Lok Sabha, the lower house. Some were passed in less than 10 minutes.

The third democratic

institution that has rapidly declined since 2014 is the press. In a democracy, the press is supposed to be independent; in India today, it is pliant and propagandist. In more than eight years as prime minister, Modi has not held a single press conference involving questions from the media. He conveys his views by way of a monthly monologue on state radio and by the occasional interview with a journalist known to be favorable to the regime, these conducted with a cloying deference to Modi. Furthermore, because most of the country's leading newspapers and TV channels are owned by entrepreneurs with other business interests, they have quickly fallen into line, lest, for example, a chemical factory also owned by a media magnate does not get a license or an export permit. (Indian media also depend heavily on government advertising, another reason to support the ruling regime.) Prime-time news channels exuberantly praise the prime minister and relentlessly attack the opposition—so much so that a term has been coined for them, *godi media*. These two words require a longer translation in plain English—perhaps “the media that takes its instructions from and obediently parrots the line of the Modi government” would do. Many independent-minded journalists have been jailed on spurious charges related to their work; others have had the tax authorities set on them.

The fourth key institution that has become less autonomous and independent since 2014 is the bureaucracy. In India, civil servants are supposed to work in accordance with the constitution and be strictly nonpartisan. Over the years, they have become steadily politicized, with many officials tending to side with a particular political party or even with a particular politician. However, since 2014, whatever independence and autonomy remained have been completely sundered. In choosing his key officials, Modi places far greater emphasis on loyalty than on competence. Every ministry now has a minder, often someone from the RSS, to make sure that when a senior civil servant retires, his or her replacement has the right *vichardhara*, or ideology.



**Any egalitarian democrat would be dismayed by Modi's extraordinary displays of public narcissism. However, the scholar's job is as much to understand as to judge.**

Furthermore, state agencies have been savagely let loose to intimidate and tame the political opposition. (According to a recent report by the *Indian Express*, 95 percent of all politicians raided or arrested by the Central Bureau of Investigation since 2014 have been from opposition parties.) These raids are held out as a warning as well as an inducement, for a slew of opposition politicians have since joined the BJP and had cases against them withdrawn.

Finally, the judiciary has, in recent years, not fulfilled the role accorded it by the constitution. District and provincial courts have been very energetic in endorsing state actions that infringe on the rights and liberties of citizens. More disappointing perhaps has been the role of the highest court of the land. The legal scholar Anuj Bhuwania has gone so far as to speak of the “complete capitulation of the Supreme Court to the majoritarian rule of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.” It has delayed the hearing of crucial cases; even when it does hear them, it tends to favor the arbitrary use of state power over protecting individual freedoms. As Bhuwania writes in *Scroll.in*, a news website, “During the Modi period, not only has the court failed to perform its constitutional role as a check on governmental excesses, it has acted as a cheerleader for the Modi government’s agenda. Not only has it abdicated its supposed counter-democratic function as a shield for citizens against state lawlessness, but it has also actually acted as a powerful sword that can be wielded at the behest of the executive.” And furthermore, he writes, the Supreme Court “has placed its enormous arsenal at the government’s disposal in pursuit of its radical majoritarian agenda.”

As suggested by my earlier formulation of India as a 50-50 democracy, none of these institutions performed flawlessly in the past. They were occasionally (and sometimes more than occasionally) timid or subservient to the party in power. There was no golden age of Indian democracy. However, since 2014, these institutions have lost even more—one might say far more—of their independence and autonomy and are now in thrall to Modi and his government.

It is important to note that the capture of these five institutions—the party, the legislature, the press, the civil service, and the judiciary—has been crucial to the consolidation of other personality cults, too. My analysis of what Modi has done to democracy in India would broadly hold for Orbán in Hungary, Erdogan in Turkey, Putin in Russia, and even to some extent Trump in the United States.

I should briefly note two additional features of personality cults in such partially democratic regimes. The first is that they tend to promote crony capitalism, with a few favored industrialists making windfall gains owing to their loyalty and proximity to the leader and ruling party. The second is that they tend to promote religious or ethnic majoritarianism. The majority ethnic or religious group is said to represent the true essence of the nation, and the leader is said to embody,

with singular distinction and effectiveness, the essence of this majority group. On the other side, religious or ethnic minorities, such as Kurds in Turkey, Jews in Hungary, or Muslims in India, are said to be disloyal or antithetical to the nation. Majoritarian arguments singling out minorities for harassment or stigmatization are rife on social media, made often by ruling party legislators and, on occasions when they feel politically threatened, by the leaders themselves.

From July 2019 to January 2021, the world’s largest, oldest, and richest democracies were all led by charismatic populists with authoritarian tendencies. Boris Johnson and Trump are now both gone, yet Modi remains. Even while they were in office, it seemed to me that Modi was more dangerous to the interests of his country than Johnson and Trump were to theirs. The reasons for this are structural as well as biographical. As the preceding discussion would have made clear, democratic institutions intended to act as a check on the abuse of power by politicians are far more compromised in India than in the United Kingdom or the United States. In the U.K., the press, Parliament, and the civil service all sought to thwart Johnson’s authoritarian tendencies. As for the United States, even if Trump sought to pack the Supreme Court, lower courts remained independent; so did the tax authorities and other regulatory institutions. Influential sections of the press did not capitulate to the cult of Trump; the universities remained crucibles of freedom and dissent. Even the person Trump chose as his vice president acted to endorse the results of the 2020 election, in consonance with the U.S. Constitution and in defiance of his boss.

Democratic institutions are far weaker in India than in the U.K. or the United States. And as an individual, too, Modi represents a far greater threat to his country’s democratic future than Johnson or Trump ever could. For one, he has been a full-time politician for far longer than they have been, with much greater experience in how to manipulate public institutions to serve his own purposes. Second, he is far more committed to his political beliefs than Johnson and Trump are to theirs. While Johnson and Trump are consumed almost wholly by vanity and personal glory, Modi is part narcissist but also part ideologue. He lives and embodies Hindu majoritarianism in a much more thoroughgoing manner than Trump lives white supremacy or Johnson embodies xenophobic Little Englandism. Third, in the enactment and fulfillment of his ideological dream, Modi has as his instrument the RSS, whose organizational strength and capacity for resource mobilization far exceed any right-wing organization in the U.K. or the United States. Indeed, if it lasts much longer, the Modi regime may come to be remembered as much for its evisceration of Indian pluralism as for its dismantling of Indian democracy.

I have presented a qualitative narrative so far; allow me to append just a few figures that show how far India’s democratic standards have slipped in recent years. In Freedom



From left: Viktor Orban in Szekesfehervar, Hungary, in 2018; Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul in 2017; Vladimir Putin in Moscow in 2022; and Donald Trump in Florida in 2021.

House's political rights and civil liberties rankings, India was among the countries with the largest declines in the last decade, dropping from "Free" to "Partly Free" in 2021. In the Cato Institute's Human Freedom Index, India fell from 75th in 2015 to 119th in 2021. In Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index, India fell from 140th in 2013 to 150th in 2022. Finally, in the World Economic Forum's most recent Global Gender Gap Report, released last July, India ranked 135th out of 146 countries in overall score and lowest (146th) when it came to health and survival.

**I'D LIKE TO END MY ESSAY WITH TWO PAST WARNINGS** by Indians against the unthinking submission to charismatic authority. The first warning is relatively well known. It is from B.R. Ambedkar's last speech to the Constituent Assembly of India in November 1949. In the speech, Ambedkar quotes the English philosopher John Stuart Mill, who cautioned citizens not "to lay their liberties at the feet even of a great man, or trust him with powers which enable him to subvert their institutions." This warning was even more pertinent in India than in England, for, as Ambedkar points out:

in India, *bhakti*, or what may be called the path of devotion or hero worship, plays a part in its politics unequalled in magnitude by the part it plays in the politics of any other country in the world. Bhakti in religion may be the road to the salvation of a soul. But in politics, bhakti, or hero worship, is a sure road to degradation and to eventual dictatorship.

The cult of Modi the Superman, like the cult of Indira the Superwoman that preceded it, shows that Ambedkar was right to be worried about the dangers to Indian democracy of the religious practice of *bhakti*, or blind hero worship.

The ruling party's presentation of Modi as Hindu messiah-cum-avenging angel falls on fertile soil. One would not expect the population of a free country to be so cravenly worshipful of a living individual—but, tragically, they are.

The second quote is far more obscure but perhaps equally pertinent. It is from a letter written to Indira Gandhi in November 1969 by S. Nijalingappa, who was president of the Congress party when Gandhi split the party and made it an extension of herself. Born in 1902, Nijalingappa came of age in an era of imperialism and fascism while being part of a freedom struggle that stood for democracy, nonviolence, and pluralism. The Congress party in which he had spent all his adult life was a decentralized institution with vigorous state and district units. It had many leaders, never just one. Now, as Gandhi sought to reshape the party and the country in her own image, Nijalingappa warned her that the history of the 20th century was "replete with instances of the tragedy that overtakes democracy when a leader who has risen to power on the crest of a popular wave or with the support of a democratic organization becomes a victim of political narcissism and is egged on by a coterie of unscrupulous sycophants who use corruption and terror to silence opposition and attempt to make public opinion an echo of authority."

History offers us a few lessons. One is that—as the cases of Stalin, Mao, Hitler, Mussolini, Putin, and others all show—personality cults are always bad for the country that fosters and encourages them. Historians have passed their judgment on the damage that the cult of Indira Gandhi did to Indian democracy and nationhood. The day will come, though perhaps not in my lifetime, when historians will pass a similar judgment on the effects on India's happiness and well-being of the cult of Modi. ■

**RAMACHANDRA GUHA** is a historian and biographer and the author of books including *Environmentalism: A Global History* and *India After Gandhi*. This essay draws on the author's George Herbert Walker Jr. lecture, delivered at Yale University on Oct. 6, 2022.





# NEW RULES FOR WAR

TWELVE EXPERTS ON WHAT THE  
WORLD NEEDS TO LEARN FROM  
RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE.

**P**redictions about the future of war follow narratives and intellectual fashions. At the beginning of the millennium, the emergence of high-tech drones—the U.S. military’s all-seeing eyes in Afghanistan—fueled futuristic visions of battles contested by robots and computers. By the mid-2010s, the success of Russian information operations, election interference, and weaponized corruption in Europe and the United States had given rise to the idea that even a major country could be controlled without the use of force. Others thought that mutual dependence on trade and commerce in a globalized age would render a major war unlikely—or keep it locally contained.

The outbreak of the largest and most brutal European war since 1945 has once again reminded us not to project our wishful thinking or extrapolate from the past. So much of what pundits, politicians, and journalists predicted in the early hours of Russia’s three-pronged attack on Ukraine was wrong: that Russia’s military machine would be overwhelming, that Ukraine would quickly collapse, and that the West’s response would be weak. Those were just the first surprises. Who’d have thought trenches and artillery would feature so prominently in a 21st-century war?

Drawing the right lessons from the first 10 months of the Russian invasion, then, not only matters for the survival of Ukraine. It is also vital for deterring and preventing a future conflict—and, if necessary, fighting one. The most obvious potential hot spot and one that involves even greater stakes is, of course, Taiwan. Yet for every parallel between Russia’s designs on Ukraine and China’s on Taiwan, there is a difference. Taiwan is a small island, whereas Ukraine is the second-largest country on the European landmass. China is a large and technologically sophisticated adversary, whereas most of us have been stunned to see how technologically, organizationally, and tactically unsophisticated the Russian military really is. Some of the lessons emerging from

Ukraine will therefore be only marginally relevant. Others should be quite useful.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not the only ongoing war in the world today, nor is Taiwan the only potential future one. What marks today’s conflict as generational is its nature as a war of conquest by a nuclear-armed power, its deadliness, and the fact that it has drawn in dozens of countries—if not as combatants, then as supporters. It is vital for humanity far beyond Ukraine that a war of this scale not become a new norm.

With the caveat that these are necessarily snapshots, FOREIGN POLICY asked 12 experts to give us their views on the most important lessons of Russia’s war. Each writer is a prominent specialist in his or her field, and they answer a broad range of questions. Why did prevention and deterrence fail? What have we learned about strategy and technology on the battlefield? How do we deal with the return of nuclear threats? Some of these lessons are general, while others apply specifically to a potential conflict in Asia.

At the same time, the epic failure of Moscow’s war plan in Ukraine may also be a lesson for future aggressors about the many things that can go unpredictably wrong even for a major power with a bristling arsenal. If we’re lucky—and depending on the extent to which Russia realizes any of its aims via negotiation or in battle—this war may have made a future one just a little less likely. If so, that would be a very good lesson indeed.—*Stefan Theil, deputy editor*

Previous spread: A man stands in front of a heavily damaged apartment building following a rainstorm in Borodyanka, Ukraine, on April 9, 2022.



## Turn Taiwan Into a Bristling Porcupine

By Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former NATO secretary-general and founder of the Alliance of Democracies

### ALLIANCES

**IT IS IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO DRAW PARALLELS** between Russia's attack on Ukraine and China's ambitions for Taiwan: a nuclear-armed autocracy threatening a smaller democracy, revanchist rhetoric about reuniting the motherland, a leader turning increasingly repressive at home and aggressive abroad. However, for every similarity there is a significant difference. China is now one of the world's two predominant powers, and the global consequences of a war in the Taiwan Strait would be manifestly greater. A China-Taiwan war would quickly draw in other countries.

Both Ukraine and Taiwan sit outside of formal treaty alliances, and neither benefits from a security guarantee like NATO's Article 5. This makes it even more important that the free world learns the right lessons from Russia's invasion of Ukraine if it wants to deter any attempt by China to take Taiwan by force.

First, when you do not have a treaty to rely on, words matter. In the buildup to the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin made his ambitions explicit: "True sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia," he wrote in July 2021. Days before the invasion, he called Ukraine an "inalienable part of [Russia's] history, culture, and spiritual space." Putin repeatedly denied Ukraine's right to exist, yet Western leaders ignored the risk of a full-scale invasion.

The world cannot make the same mistake with China. When Chinese President Xi Jinping says Beijing has the right to use all measures necessary to "reunite" Taiwan with China, we should take him seriously. As we should when a Chinese ambassador says Taiwanese citizens will need to be reeducated after reunification. China's actions

in Hong Kong show what the "One China" principle means in practice. There should be no doubt of China's ambitions or what they will mean for the people of Taiwan.

Second, any strategy for Taiwan to deter and, if need be, defeat an attack must be based on technological superiority. It was the Ukrainians' bravery that repelled the initial advance, but turning the tide of the war was achieved with superior Western-made weapons. Meanwhile, Russia has increasingly turned to crude Soviet-era equipment, not least due to the Western sanctions now hobbling the Russian arms industry.

China, despite making significant progress in recent years, is still crucially dependent on the United States and its allies for the most advanced microchips and the machinery to develop them. The United States' economic and technological advantages over China give the democratic world a significant military edge. Maintaining this edge will be vital to deterring any efforts to take Taiwan by force.

Third, allies and partners must act together. The free world has shown impressive unity in response to Russia's war in Ukraine—a unity Putin surely did not expect. Significant sanctions were agreed

in record time, not only by NATO allies but also by South Korea, Japan, Australia, and other countries. China, which is far more reliant than Russia on global supply chains, must understand that any attack on Taiwan would spark an equally unified response.

The lesson from Russia's invasion is that deterrence will fail unless the messaging is strong and united before war starts. That's why the economic consequences of a move against Taiwan must be made clear to Beijing now. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's visit to Beijing last November with a group of CEOs in tow sent the opposite message. Xi is actively working to address China's supply chain vulnerabilities—can Taiwan and its partners say they are doing the same?

Fourth, weapons are what counts. Although sanctions are important, it is the vast military aid provided predominately by the United States that has changed the reality on the ground in Ukraine. Superior weapons allowed the Ukrainians to repel the initial Russian advance and take back large swaths of territory. If Ukraine had had these capabilities before the war, Putin may have thought twice before launching a full-scale invasion. The same lesson applies to Taiwan. With the help of its partners, the island must become a porcupine bristling with armaments to deter any possible attempt to take it by force. China must calculate that the cost of an invasion is simply too high to bear.

Finally, the most important way to deter a Chinese move on Taiwan now is to ensure a Ukrainian victory. If Russia can gain territory and establish a new status quo by force, China and other autocratic powers will learn that the democratic world's resolve is weak. That in the face of nuclear blackmail and military aggression, it chose appeasement over confrontation. This outcome would make the entire world a more dangerous place. That is why all those who believe in a democratic Taiwan and a rules-based international order must work to ensure Ukraine prevails. ■

## To Deter War, Have a Better Sanctions Plan

By **Maria Shagina**, research fellow on sanctions at the International Institute for Strategic Studies


### ECONOMY

**DESPITE THREATENING RUSSIA** with massive sanctions in the run-up to its full-scale attack on Ukraine, the West failed to deter the Kremlin. Whether Moscow did not think the threats were credible or the signaled costs weren't high enough, sanctions are now aimed at a different purpose: constraining Russia's financial, economic, technological, and military capabilities as the war goes on.

China, Taiwan, and the West are each drawing their own lessons. Western governments, for one, have learned that sanctions alone are unlikely to prevent or stop military aggression. Russia has shown a high threshold for pain. China, too, would be willing to accept significant economic costs to pursue its declared goal of unification with Taiwan, by force if need be.

For the West to use economic statecraft against China, whose GDP is 10 times as large as Russia's, would be exceedingly difficult. Unlike Russia, China is so enmeshed in the global economy that any attempt to wage economic war would create considerable backlash, putting Western unity to the test. While Russia can weaponize energy and other commodities, China has many more options for retaliation. Cutting ties with China could turn into the economic version of nuclear war: mutual assured destruction where everyone loses.

But if China's global integration now works like a shield for Beijing,



the tide is gradually turning as more Western countries reconsider their exposure. Identifying chokepoints and decreasing vulnerabilities will enable the West to exert pressure more assertively. As the Europeans are learning this winter with respect to Russian energy, domestic resilience is the bedrock of statecraft.

The Russian case has shown the importance of a broad sanctioning coalition. This not only sent a strong symbolic message to Moscow, but it was also instrumental in freezing more than \$300 billion in Russian foreign reserves and cutting off Moscow's access to advanced Western technology. To target China, building a multilateral coalition would be just as essential but much harder. Bringing Asian and European allies on board would be particularly tricky due to their close economic relations with Beijing. With so many economic interests at stake, crafting exemptions—and the right combination of flexibility and toughness—would be key to keeping a sanctions coalition together.

For now, the United States is going ahead unilaterally using its unique position in semiconductor supply chains. Washington's sweeping export controls on advanced computing chips to China will stifle the country's ability to advance its capabilities in emerging technologies—including those with military applications.

Taiwan, keenly aware of the failure of deterrence as it pursues its contingency planning in case of an invasion, has been working on assembling a coalition of like-minded countries to stand up against China. In particular, the Taiwanese government is keen to build a multilateral sanctions coalition to send a strong message to Beijing about the high costs incurred by any potential aggression.

Beijing, in turn, has been carefully watching the sanctions against Russia unfold—in particular, the West's weaponization of finance—in order to prepare its own strategy regarding Taiwan. China is very conscious of its weakest spot: its high reliance on dollars and other Western currencies for international trade and foreign reserves.

China has taken several steps to reduce its exposure to the dollar system. For the first time since 2010, China now holds less than \$1 trillion in U.S. Treasury bonds. As part of China's financial decoupling, five state-owned enterprises voluntarily delisted from the New York Stock Exchange, including energy giants PetroChina and Sinopec. The Chinese Communist Party has banned its officials from owning foreign accounts and other property abroad, a step aimed at minimizing the impact of future sanctions. Beijing is also advancing the digital yuan, which would be independent of the existing global payments network and could help China evade the sorts of sanctions introduced against Russia.

However, seriously reducing dollar dependence would require many other regulatory, governance, and institutional changes that Beijing does not appear ready to implement—not least because the leadership has prioritized political stability. Still, Western financial sanctions have given Chinese efforts a boost insofar as they have raised the yuan's appeal for other countries hoping to sanction-proof their economies. Any development to price oil or other commodities in yuan—as

opposed to merely using the yuan as a settlement currency—has the potential to trigger a snowball effect in de-dollarizing other sectors.

The limitations of Western economic statecraft against China make planning all the more important. The United States and its allies should start to design a proactive policy of economic statecraft today. As Russia's war in Ukraine makes clear, not having a credible sanctions coalition and endgame in place greatly reduces the chance of deterring, stopping, or winning a war. ■



## A New Push for Nuclear Guardrails

By Rose Gottemoeller,  
lecturer at Stanford University and  
former NATO deputy secretary-general

### TREATIES

THE WORLD NEEDS A RUSSIA that is not playing with nuclear escalation and threatening nuclear holocaust. If Russia continues on its present course, we will be dealing with a very large nuclear pariah state with thousands of warheads and the missiles to deliver them. A major goal of U.S. policy must therefore be to move Moscow away from nuclear saber-rattling and back to the more responsible role it has played since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis in controlling nuclear weapons and avoiding their proliferation. Even in the darkest days of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union cooperated to avoid nuclear escalation.

The United States has also been looking for ways to talk to China about its nuclear intentions, but thus far, Beijing has kept silent. The Chinese are

pursuing a rapid nuclear modernization, including the construction of more than 300 new silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles and a major expansion of their warhead arsenal, from fewer than 500 today to more than 1,000 by the 2030s.

The meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the G-20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, last November hopefully broke the ice. Although the two leaders did not announce any planned nuclear talks, they did discuss nuclear policy, agreeing that a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought—and that nuclear weapons should not be used in Eurasia, widely seen as a direct reproof to Moscow. China also endorsed a statement by the G-20 that threatening the use of nuclear weapons, as Russia has done, is “inadmissible.”

Perhaps the renewed specter of nuclear weapons use during the war in Ukraine will open the door to nuclear consultations with China. An interesting place to begin would be the proposal that Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin put on the table in February 2022, as they met in Beijing just before Russia’s invasion. In their joint declaration, the two leaders broached the idea of a moratorium on intermediate-range missiles in Europe and Asia, an agreement that could replace the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

China owns a significant number of intermediate-range missiles and might be willing to consider some controls on them—in return for reciprocal controls on U.S. and Russian weapons. That will depend, of course, on what exactly Xi had in mind when he suggested a moratorium on such missiles in Asia.

With both Russia and China, the goal should be to move both countries away from threatening nuclear behavior and back toward a shared interest in controlling nuclear weapons and avoiding their proliferation. This goal will be easier to accomplish if negotiators can focus, at least to begin with, on pragmatic and narrow objectives—resuming inspections under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, resolving Russian concerns about U.S. implementation of the treaty, figuring out what makes sense for a new treaty, and understanding the ideas behind China’s proposed moratorium. Grander, more ambitious discussions of what makes for nuclear stability in the future can wait. ■

## Counter Russia’s and China’s Playbook

By **David Petraeus**, former CIA director and retired U.S. Army general, and **Vance Serchuk**, executive director of the KKR Global Institute

### STRATEGY

**ONE OF THE MOST POWERFUL MILITARY LESSONS** from Russia’s war in Ukraine is that China’s, Russia’s, and Iran’s strategy to keep the United States out of their respective backyards can also be employed against these revisionist powers in defense of the U.S.-led world order.

The concept of anti-access/area denial, or A2/AD, first emerged in the late 1990s, as Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran sought to devise asymmetric ways to thwart Washington’s ability to deploy its forces

Members of a Ukrainian drone unit watch the sky while hunting for Russian positions to target with artillery during a battle near the Russian-occupied city of Donetsk in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region on Oct. 20, 2022.



into what these geopolitical rivals considered their rightful spheres of influence. Having watched the United States decisively evict Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 and sail the U.S. 7th Fleet unmolested around Taiwan during the 1995-96 crisis over the self-governing island, U.S. adversaries went to school on the U.S. way of war and began investing in systems designed to disrupt that model at its weakest points.

In particular, China, Russia, and Iran started amassing large numbers of ever more capable precision-guided munitions, including cruise, ballistic, and surface-to-air missiles, hypersonic weapons, and, more recently, drones and loitering munitions, along with over-the-horizon targeting capabilities. These armaments offered the tantalizing promise of overwhelming the relatively small number of U.S. military bases and aircraft carrier strike groups that form the backbone of U.S. power projection in the Persian Gulf, Western Pacific, and other regions and of closing the skies to U.S. aircraft. Better yet, these weapons

could be acquired at a fraction of the cost of the exquisite U.S. assets they put at risk. Thus, the many and the cheap began to stack up favorably against the few and the expensive.

In an ironic twist, however, it is the Ukrainians who have now successfully thrown up a kind of A2/AD bubble to frustrate the Kremlin's power projection. Rather than attempting to match Moscow with aircraft, ships, and combat vehicles in a head-to-head contest, Ukraine has devastated the Russian invasion force and its vulnerable supply lines through relentless, large-scale application of short- and long-range precision firepower. This includes anti-tank guided missile systems, guided multiple launch rocket system rounds, precision artillery munitions, suicide drones, guided anti-aircraft missiles, and anti-ship missiles such as the Neptune cruise missile that sunk the prized flagship of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in April 2022.

Also indispensable to Ukraine's battlefield success has been the tactical virtuosity with which its soldiers have wielded these asymmetric weapons. Throughout history, military struggles have often been decided less by the balance of material resources than the creativity and determination with which they have been employed. By making its units both dispersed and highly mobile—firing and then rapidly repositioning themselves—Kyiv has been able to carry out relentless, withering strikes on Russian targets while evading counterfire. Conversely, Russian forces have achieved their greatest success in their ruthless attacks on Ukraine's critical civilian infrastructure—stationary, vulnerable targets such as power stations, water treatment plants, and electrical grids. But while the Russian attacks are inflicting terrible suffering on the Ukrainian population, they appear to have strengthened public resolve to liberate the country from the Russian invaders.

The Western Pacific is very different from Ukraine: predominantly maritime, encompassing vastly greater distances, and contested by combatants with far more technologically advanced capabilities. Yet the principles of A2/AD to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression are equally applicable. In particular, Ukraine points to the imperative for the United States and its



Indo-Pacific allies to prioritize the near-term ability to field large numbers of relatively inexpensive, highly mobile anti-ship and anti-air missiles that can be dispersed and maneuvered throughout the first and second island chains against Beijing's increasingly formidable naval and air forces. Large quantities of unmanned air, sea, and ground systems can amplify these missiles in the U.S. order of battle.

Russia's war also underscores the need for an allied industrial base that can sustain production of these weapons at scale and with speed. Kyiv has been rescued by the impressive willingness of Washington and other Western backers to draw down their own arsenals to arm Ukraine, as well as by its land borders with NATO countries, which facilitate this resupply. But in the event of conflict in the Western Pacific, no one will come to the rescue of an understocked U.S. military that runs out of munitions. Russia's invasion has thus delivered an invaluable wake-up call to Defense Department planners and congressional appropriators that the post-Cold War defense industry infrastructure and workforce are inadequate for the kind of sustained warfare that the new era of great-power competition may compel.

Lastly, the devastating effects inflicted by long-range fire in Ukraine are likely to spur even greater focus on significantly upgrading the protection, resilience, and redundancy of critical U.S. and allied bases, headquarters, and logistical depots, as well as the development of more effective integrated anti-missile and counter-drone defense systems—including accelerating disruptive defensive technologies such as directed energy and high-power microwave weapons. These may hold the greatest long-term potential to disrupt the current military balance favoring A2/AD weapons by providing inexpensive and affordable ways to interdict them.

Out of the tragedy unleashed by Russian President Vladimir Putin, it is possible to envision the emergence of a set of military capabilities that not only beat back Russia's assault on Ukraine but also dim other revisionist regimes' dreams of conquest. If so, the West will owe thanks to the Ukrainians for showing how the A2/AD playbook developed to defeat the United States and its allies on the battlefield can instead prove their salvation. ■

## Taiwan Must Make Up for Lost Time

By Lee Hsi-min, former chief of the general staff of the Taiwanese armed forces

### REFORMS

**THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSON** from Russia's war in Ukraine concerns the role of time. After licking its wounds following heavy losses to Russia in 2014, Ukraine implemented sweeping reforms to its military force structure and training to enable the resistance we are seeing today. This did not happen overnight. To be similarly ready to resist a Chinese attack, Taiwan needs to seriously prepare now.

Ukraine began its defense reforms with holistic, interagency reviews at the strategic, operational, tactical, and—importantly—institutional levels. The 2016 Strategic Defense Bulletin identified key shortcomings in Ukraine's national security architecture and priorities for transformation, including alignment with NATO principles and standards as well as reforms to force planning, cybersecurity, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), procurement, logistics management, military training, and more. Among many important changes, a reserve force was established to augment and fill gaps in the regular military's operations during war.

Ukraine's reforms were initiated with clearly stated strategic and operational objectives and expected outcomes, alongside institutional and legal changes that would support their implementation. They were complemented with frequent, realistic training to practice and test operational concepts. Training was bolstered by U.S. and other NATO militaries through initiatives such as the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine, established in 2015. Mentoring and advising Ukrainian military trainers as well as implementing effective training systems and facilities bolstered Ukraine's self-reliance on the battlefield. Command post exercises with allies and partners laid the groundwork for future communications and intelligence sharing.

Reforms and training take time to implement and institutionalize. Without time, Ukraine would not have achieved the level of combat readiness to resist Russia that it has today. Taiwan, facing an existential threat from Beijing, should learn from this example and clarify its defense strategy now, integrating three key elements: effective equipment, effective training, and strengthened will to resist.

An asymmetric defense strategy, like Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept, is anchored on denial and buoyed by mobile, dispersed, lethal, and survivable defense systems. It remains the basis for Taiwan's ability to resist an all-out invasion by China. Taking into account escalating Chinese coercion, Taiwan's military should allocate its limited resources toward weapons systems most suited for Taiwan to defend against both invasion and coercion. The joint operational plan should be flexible



Ukrainian soldiers train in the Kharkiv region on May 23, 2022.

to accommodate different wartime scenarios. Taiwan's military must be able to fight under decentralized command in a communications-denied environment. An all-volunteer territorial defense force should be established to train civilians in crisis responses, educate the public on national defense, and strengthen the will to fight. This would lay the groundwork for an all-of-society response during war.

In Russia's war of attrition in Ukraine, stockpiling and the constant flow of military supplies have benefited from Ukraine's unique geographic advantages, including its vast territory and land borders with NATO countries. Taiwan, on the other hand, sits 100 nautical miles off China's coast and would be cut off for resupply at the onset of war. Therefore, Taiwan must stockpile munitions, spare parts, other key military equipment, fuel, and food to survive a prolonged conflict—and build hardened, distributed facilities to protect this materiel. Even if Taiwan receives billions of dollars in security assistance from the United States and other like-minded nations, the first time a U.S. ship delivers supplies to Taiwan should not be during war. Communications and logistics networks, including access to commercial ones such as the Starlink satellite network, would be difficult to introduce and set up in the heat of war. In fact, Chinese countermeasures against Starlink are already being discussed, making it urgent for Taiwan to develop counter-countermeasures and redundant communications. China presents a more technologically and militarily sophisticated threat to Taiwan than Russia is for Ukraine, and its intentions cannot be calculated accurately. Timely stockpiling and other preparations need to be undertaken now.

Taiwan must reorient its priorities as soon as possible, and the United States could support reforms as it did for Ukraine after 2014. A U.S.-Taiwan joint working group could be established at both the policy and working levels to support reforms of force structure, weapons acquisition, military doctrine, operational planning, logistics management, tactics, and training. Bilateral contingency simulations and exercises

could identify key operational challenges and guide this transformation. With an almost \$19 billion backlog in U.S. weapons deliveries to Taiwan, a bilateral steering group on defense industrial cooperation and supply chain security could better identify and streamline processes for maintenance, repair, and overhaul, as well as joint manufacturing of weapons in Taiwan and collaborative research and development. Moreover, U.S. support could signal other allies to lay the foundation for intensified cooperation with Taiwan.

Russia made a strategic error when it attacked Ukraine in 2014. Ukraine's defeat laid bare its mistakes and shortcomings, and the devastation caused by Russia's invasion strongly motivated Kyiv to overhaul its military and prepare it for the fight we are witnessing today. While lessons from the current invasion are still being written, it is becoming abundantly clear that the Chinese Communist Party cannot afford to give Taiwan the time to reflect and rebuild as Ukraine was able to do. This could very well be the reason why China has incrementally raised the level of coercion against Taiwan, while keeping it below a threshold that would raise panic in Taiwan and elsewhere. For its part, Taiwan cannot afford to wait for a catastrophe like Ukraine's to stimulate the massive but slow-moving reforms it needs. Taiwan needs to act now to be ready for when Chinese leader Xi Jinping decides to attack. ■

—Eric Lee contributed to this article.

# Ukraine's Victory in the Information Space Is No Reason for Complacency

By Elisabeth Braw, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and columnist at FOREIGN POLICY


## INFO WAR

ON DEC. 3, 2021, the *Washington Post*

reported that U.S. intelligence was predicting an imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine. When December came and went without an attack, people began dismissing the reports—until the spies were proved right on Feb. 24. But the United States' willingness to share its detailed knowledge of Russia's war plans with the world put the Kremlin on the back foot from the start. Since most military attacks depend on the element of surprise, U.S. intelligence sharing made Russia's invasion far less potent than it could have been.

Strategic communications—the delivery of a unified message by governments through formal channels and information operations—have always been a powerful tool in war. But today, with belligerents and other interested parties able to target their messaging directly at population groups of their choosing, these kinds of information operations stand to become an even more crucial weapon.

Today, belligerents in a war can spread deception, flooding the information space with disinformation that at least some in the targeted audience will believe. Russia was long seen to have mastered the dark art of strategic communications laced with falsehoods, a key factor in its successful 2014 takeover of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine, during which many Western audiences were confused by competing claims. This time, Kyiv's communications teams have handsomely beaten Moscow's with their upbeat messaging focusing on the Ukrainians' strengths. While the Russians primarily rely on traditional communications, such as news outlets Sputnik and RT (now banned in many Western countries), in addition to stilted posts on social media, Ukraine's communicators excel in Hollywood-style videos, catchy memes, and messaging full of up-to-date colloquialisms and even humor. They've succeeded in making the Russians look as modern and credible as Brezhnev-era Soviets.



None of this, however, can prevent falsehoods—including those shared by social media users in the belief that such content helps their side—from contributing to a dangerous fog of war that muddies the perception of publics and decision-makers alike. The limitless availability of information and citizens' inability to verify it (how many of you have completed information literacy training?) only compound the problem. What if people can't tell whether a war has broken out in their country? That's exactly what happened in Poland in mid-November, when a missile struck Polish soil and killed two people. For a few febrile hours, Poles feared their country was at war, a feeling fueled by news and social media around the world. Only when U.S. President Joe Biden and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg explained that it was most likely a Ukrainian air defense missile that had strayed across the border did Poles feel safe.

Imagine if China wanted to frighten Taiwan into submission. Freedom House ranks Beijing's influence on Taiwanese media as being "very high," so China could begin by spreading, via Taiwanese media and on social media, accounts of Taiwanese government ineptitude and incompetence. Beijing could then share accounts of Chinese plans to attack Taiwan. Ordinary citizens would not be in a position to judge the difference between a credible military plan and mere deception. If an attack were to take place, China would then count on many Taiwanese to be too dispirited to contribute to the island's defense.

Just as a military's readiness to defend against an attack depends on constant exercising, ordinary citizens can train their information defense. In 2018, as Russian aggression above and below the military threshold was growing, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency published "If Crisis or War Comes," a leaflet that teaches the country's population about crisis preparedness and how to know whether a war has started. Swedes now know that their government will communicate an attack via radio, television, and push notifications on mobile phones. Imagine if every liberal democracy had similar leaflets and instructions. Instead of relying on media speculation and Twitter hysterics—possibly influenced by a belligerent state and its sympathizers as part of an information

operation—citizens would know exactly what to look for. Citizens would also have a better idea of how to verify information. “What is the aim of this information? Who has put this out?” the Swedish leaflet asks. That kind of information literacy is good advice for peacetime and war alike.

While some countries, such as Finland, teach information literacy in schools and consider it a civic competence, many others lack a comprehensive strategy to help their citizens understand the information coming at them. This informational chaos is fertile ground for subversive efforts by state and nonstate actors. Taiwan, too, has recognized this risk and launched a string of media literacy initiatives in 2021. One can only hope they take root very soon. ■

are far less reliable and precise. Russia’s strategic weapons systems, however, have performed with devastating effect, as cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missiles pummel cities, civilian infrastructure, and military targets.

With the establishment of a special coordination council in October 2022, Moscow has begun the urgent task of revamping its defense industrial base to meet the expansive needs of the armed forces in the ongoing war. This initial step will likely lead to a far-reaching makeover of Russia’s conventional defense industry in order to meet the enormous task of thoroughly rebuilding and rearming a broken military establishment.


For the Chinese defense industry, the starting question in assessing the war’s implications is the extent to which it is a useful template for future military conflict. Beijing’s pathway of long-term defense technological and industrial development is largely laid down by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine of “informatized local wars”—a term describing high-tech intensive wars in an information-centric environment with limited attention paid to industrial-era mechanized warfare. This is fundamentally the inverse of the Russia-Ukraine war—a classic industrial-era attritional war with pockets of 21st-century innovation, such

## Lessons for China’s Defense Industry

By Tai Ming Cheung, director of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation

### ARMS SECTOR

**THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR** has cast a dismal light on the state of the Russian defense industry, especially the limitations of its conventional weapons sector. The wide range of arms and equipment produced by the aerospace, naval, ordnance, electronics, and information warfare sectors have not provided the decisive edge for Russia to defeat a far smaller and technologically inferior enemy. As Russia’s stocks of advanced weaponry have dwindled, its forces are increasingly relying on old Soviet-era arms that



A Ukrainian BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launcher fires toward Russian positions near the front line in Ukraine's Donetsk region on July 27, 2022.

as the creative use of drones. China's military doctrine draws more on lessons of conflicts such as the U.S.-led campaigns against Iraq in 1991 and 2003. As China has already invested considerable effort and resources to build a defense industry whose central focus is information-centric warfare, increasingly deploying various disruptive technological capabilities emerging in the artificial intelligence age, the long-term impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on Chinese defense planning may be limited.

One obvious lesson for the PLA from this war is the need to ensure adequate munition stockpiles for a prolonged war. As China has not fought a major war since invading Vietnam in 1979, it has little institutional know-how on how to sustain a war.

For all of Beijing's efforts to forge an indigenous defense industrial base, the Russian defense industry and its Soviet predecessor still cast a long and influential shadow on the Chinese system. The organizational and industrial foundations of the Chinese defense-industrial complex were imported almost wholesale from the Soviet Union in the 1950s, and China has imported tens of billions of dollars' worth of weapons, components, technological know-how, and industrial capacity from Russia since the early 1990s, both legally and illicitly. Russia's military-technological imprint is clearly visible across the PLA's front-line arsenal, in which numerous types of Chinese fighter aircraft, transport planes, air defense systems, and naval vessels are derived from Russian models.

As the Russia-Ukraine war and Western sanctions will likely turn Russia into a net military importer for the foreseeable future, a golden opportunity has opened up for China to displace Russia as a top-tier arms exporter. The timing could not be better, as the Chinese defense industry is in the process of upgrading its brand image from a manufacturer of good-enough, lower-quality, affordable arms to a supplier of higher-end weapons. If this market grab is successful, it could create a highly lucrative income stream to help support China's ambitious defense transformation.

For now, the Russia-Ukraine war has paused the Sino-Russian defense industry relationship as Beijing has sought to avoid getting dragged into the conflict and to protect its companies from becoming entangled in Western sanctions on Russia. But this hiatus is likely to be short-term. The question is not if but when, at what scale, and in which

domains Sino-Russian cooperation on defense technology will resume.

The development of strategic deterrence capabilities, primarily directed against the United States, is where there appears to be the greatest convergence of mutual interests between the two countries. Moscow's latest defense modernization plans have placed top priority on the development of new generations of intercontinental ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, laser weapons, nuclear submarines, and autonomous systems—all areas of great interest to Beijing.

The Chinese and Russian leaderships know they have a far better chance of successfully meeting the challenges posed by Russia's war in Ukraine and intensifying techno-military competition with the United States together than separately. If their similarly state-directed defense industries are able to forge an effective and enduring defense technological and industrial relationship, they will pose a far more complex and credible military challenge to the United States. ■

## Don't Fight the Last War

By **Craig Singleton**, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies

### HYBRID OPERATIONS

**POLITICIANS, LIKE GENERALS,** have a tendency to fight the last war. But Chinese leader Xi Jinping likely understands that he cannot wage a future conflict over Taiwan by replicating the strategy that failed Russia in Ukraine. Instead, rather than risk a similar stalemate, Xi will almost certainly double down on the nonmilitary, less visible, and more cost-effective war that Beijing is already waging—and, in many ways, winning.

By declaring last September that the United States would defend Taiwan if China attacked, U.S. President Joe Biden complicated Xi's calculus about an amphibious invasion—Beijing's most ambitious and aggressive option to pursue reunification. No doubt the military balance of power in the Taiwan Strait is trending in China's direction. One day, the pace of China's military modernization and the poor state of Taiwan's defenses could render an invasion a rational decision for Beijing.

For Chinese leaders, however, the war in Ukraine has laid bare the undeniable risks and prohibitive costs associated with a full-scale assault on Taiwan. Trying to distill only the military lessons of Russia's war therefore distracts from much more likely Taiwan scenarios.

Indeed, Beijing has long recognized that a direct military engagement with Washington and its allies over Taiwan could result in a decisive defeat for China or lead to nuclear war. Beijing likewise understands that conventional conflict escalation often leads to strategic and political failure—even for a superpower. With these lessons in mind, China has hewed closely to a broad-spectrum gray-zone campaign focused on disrupting the Taiwanese government's functions, paralyzing the island's infrastructure, and leveraging an unrelenting disinformation campaign to undermine Taiwan's political processes and bolster pro-unification narratives.

Yet the status quo remains politically untenable for China, as Taiwanese



A Ukrainian soldier peers out of a captured Russian tank near the front line in the Donetsk region on Nov. 22, 2022.

sentiment on reunification drifts ever further from Beijing's goals. Moreover, China's short-of-war strategy, in which pressure necessarily begets more pressure, has thus far failed to achieve the degree of political control or military supremacy that Beijing requires to shift its focus toward more conventional military operations. Russia demonstrated the importance of establishing these prerequisites when it successfully invaded and annexed Crimea in 2014. In all likelihood, therefore, Beijing's coercive campaign against Taiwan will reach new heights in 2023.

To undermine the Taiwanese public's faith in the ability of the armed forces to protect the island's sovereignty, China's near-daily aerial and naval incursions will likely increase in number and intensity. So, too, will media images broadcast by Beijing about threatening military exercises—for instance, depicting Chinese forces storming a replica of Taiwan's presidential palace. Beyond straining Taiwan's defenses, such actions relentlessly reinforce China's narrative that reunification is inevitable, one way or the other. Nevertheless, what seems like the next logical step in the coercion campaign—applying an aerial or naval blockade—appears less likely, because doing so could galvanize separatist sentiment and international sympathy for Taipei, neither of which Beijing is currently prepared to counter.

With an imminent military scenario increasingly unlikely, the bulk of China's strategy will fall to its Central Propaganda Department, which trains cyberarmies and disseminates disinformation aimed at demoralizing and dividing Taiwanese society. In further weaponizing the information space, Beijing will progressively leverage social media platforms, online chat groups, and traditional media companies to bolster its reunification narrative. It will also use these channels to draw investment and tourists away from Taiwan and toward China. Additionally, Beijing will escalate cyber- and other network attacks against

Taiwan's critical infrastructure, financial institutions, and other targets. The goal is to exploit the island's asymmetric economic dependence on China to pressure its politicians from pursuing policies that would bring Taiwan closer to formal independence.

Lastly, China will escalate its nonmilitary war of attrition on Taiwan's political processes and international standing. Beijing will continue covertly funding pro-unification political parties and candidates before Taiwan's next national election in 2024. China will similarly sustain its efforts to diplomatically strangle Taiwan, principally by degrading its participation in international forums and further winnowing down the small number of countries that recognize Taiwan.

Xi's problem in all this—which he may not yet realize—is that China's aggressive attempts at maneuvering below a crisis threshold could have the unintended effect of catalyzing the very superpower crisis he seeks to avoid. Gaming out these gray-zone efforts suggests that seriously escalating these provocations could lead the United States and its allies to embrace more forceful counter-responses in the future. In other words, unchecked hybrid war against Taiwan runs the real risk of resulting in a hot war with Washington, perhaps sooner rather than later. Should that happen, all bets are off. Just ask Russia. ■

# Real War Trumps CyberWar

By Chris Krebs, partner at Krebs Stamos Group and former director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

## CYBERDEFENSE

AN ESPECIALLY intriguing aspect of the Russia-Ukraine war is the apparent absence of Russian cyberwarfare success.

Many cybersecurity experts have been wondering why. Did we overestimate the abilities of the Russian cyberjuggernaut? Were the Russians simply incompetent? Or is there something about the Ukrainian defenders? The answer may provide valuable lessons going forward—not just for the current war but a potential future one as well.

There is no question Russia has demonstrated prior ability to disrupt systems. Russian cyberattacks shut down the Ukrainian electricity grid in 2015 and 2016. In 2017, the NotPetya attack on Ukrainian banks, ministries, and other targets, ultimately spreading to many other victims, caused more than \$10 billion in total damages. At the start of the invasion last February, Russia was therefore expected to integrate cyberattacks into the conflict. But the Russians were no longer operating against unsuspecting, unprepared, and overmatched opponents. The Ukraine of 2022 was no longer the Ukraine of 2014.

Scoring the impact of cyberattacks in conflict is always a challenge. What we know is that Russia deployed several destructive attacks at the onset of hostilities. They knocked Ukrainian government websites offline, disrupted telecommunications capabilities, and paralyzed key government and industry networks. The cybersecurity industry immediately swooped in to tear apart the Russian malware, revealing an array of powerful toolkits that suggested years of development, diversification, and refinement. Moscow's failure to disable communications networks allowed the Ukrainian government to coordinate military defenses, communicate with Ukrainian citizens, dominate the information space, garner international support, and battle on.

What explains the Russians' lack of cyberdominance? Did their teams lack the necessary time to plan and get in position? Was it their hubris,



thinking Ukraine would be easily occupied in a matter of days? Did they want the networks to be intact for their own use after the invasion? All are possible, and only the Kremlin knows the answer.

Part of the answer may lie on the side of the defenders. Like their military preparations, the Ukrainians had improved the nation's cyber-resilience. It's well known in the tech industry that Ukrainian software engineers are some of the best around, so it should come as no surprise that they were able to stand up and defend their digital sovereignty. Also new to the equation were U.S. Cyber Command's Defend Forward teams, which had moved into Ukraine as war seemed imminent in December 2021. They helped kick Russian hackers out of vulnerable Ukrainian networks in advance of Russian military operations.

The private sector, too, sprang into action. Companies tooled up to protect their own operations in Ukraine and throughout Europe. Where Ukrainian domestic capacity wasn't enough, the global cybersecurity community stepped up. Innovative new partnerships emerged to help defend Ukrainian networks, including the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative, which brought together more than a dozen companies.

This defensive surge paid off. Even under constant Russian attacks, Ukrainian network defenders avoided catastrophe. One key lesson: Preparation, prevention, and resilience are possible in the face of a digital onslaught by a formidable adversary. Russia's persistent engagement with Ukrainian networks over the years allowed Ukrainians to practice defending against them.

When considering China's designs on Taiwan, there is no doubt they are both learning from Russia's experience in Ukraine. Although it is not certain that China will invade, the costs of being wrong are high. Defensive measures in the digital domain won't snap into place overnight, so planning and implementation by governments and businesses must begin now.

The main takeaway from Russia's invasion of Ukraine might be that cyberwarfare is more of a contributing factor than a deciding one, although even contributing factors can make an impact. The Ukrainians understood this relationship and, with help, prepared accordingly. In the absence of a clear, decisive, cyber-enabled victory over Ukraine, the Russians have demonstrated the most important limitation of cyberwarfare: In war, violence still dominates. ■

# Beware of Wrong Lessons From Unsophisticated Russia

By Mauro Gilli, senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich

## TECHNOLOGY

**THE STARTING POINT** for drawing lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war is the fact that Russian forces were significantly limited by the insufficient quality and quantity of their technology and capabilities. China, Taiwan, and the latter's allies are technologically more sophisticated and, most importantly, possess precise munitions. Looking at how accuracy and precision in battlefield sensors and munitions have shaped the war, we can extrapolate trends and derive important implications for the Taiwan Strait.

Modern sensors and precise munitions have made close combat extremely deadly, a trend that began with the firepower revolution of the late 19th century. Today, ground forces are exposed to a multitude of active and passive sensors that can detect their presence and expose them to enemy fire. Small commercial drones and larger military drones,

for example, have played a critical role in the war by scouting the territory, detecting and geolocating enemy forces, and enabling precise targeting with various weapons systems. Satellite-based radars have also played an important role, including radars that can penetrate tree foliage, which deprives ground forces of an easily accessible option for concealment. The posting of videos and photos in soldiers' social media accounts and the creation of online baits have created new opportunities for geolocating enemy forces, which further exposes them to fire.

Russia's lack of technological sophistication and capabilities should not obscure the fact that all weapons are targetable. With modern sensors and munitions, any platform that is not survivable in contested territory is a target. This trend started in the 1950s and became self-evident in the 1970s, when U.S. Army strategist William DePuy wrote: "What can be seen, can be hit. What can be hit, can be killed." Recent technological advances have further strengthened these trends. The Ukrainian



Police officers look at collected fragments of Russian rockets that hit Kharkiv, Ukraine, on Dec. 3, 2022.

government, for example, developed a mobile app that allows its citizens to provide real-time information about incoming missiles and aircraft flying at low altitude to avoid other forms of detection.

The growing availability of sensors, drones, and satellites, as well as advances in artificial intelligence, big data, and machine learning, will further enhance the ability to detect and locate enemy targets. Whether the target is a drone, a piloted aircraft, a ship, an artillery unit, a multiple rocket launcher, or an air defense system, any conventional military platform is vulnerable to being detected, identified, tracked, geolocated, and targeted by counter-battery fire, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, and the like. That's why widespread hype about "game-changing" weapons systems (such as Turkish TB2 long-endurance drones) is dangerously misplaced. No single system can, by itself, win battles, let alone wars.

The implications of these dynamics for a future conflict are straightforward. First, the overwhelming technological imperative driving military engagements will continue to be the competition between, on the one hand, detecting and precision-targeting the enemy at increasingly longer range and, on the other, avoiding detection by enemy sensors. This is true for land, air, and naval forces. For Taiwan, this imperative entails deploying air defense and sea denial assets that can threaten incoming Chinese air and sea power while avoiding suppression and destruction by Chinese fire.

Second, the competition between hiding and finding requires, first and foremost, highly competent, proficient, and disciplined personnel. As the historian Kenneth Werrell put it in his book *Archie to SAM*: "High-technology weapons demand high-quality personnel." As Russia's war in Ukraine has shown, the lethality of modern precision weapons has dramatically shrunk the margin for error; a single cellphone, for example, can quickly doom a unit. This is why, in addition to supplying weapons, the United States has also helped Taiwan with training in recent years.

Third, in the age of long-range engagements, communications are going to play an even more critical role in military operations; providing accurate real-time information about incoming missiles and other weapons, for example, is a necessary condition for survival.

Fourth, the role of sensors and real-time targeting will make reliability and redundancy in

communication networks even more important in future conflicts, which in turn requires competition in electronic warfare. In 1973, Soviet Navy Adm. Sergei G. Gorshkov predicted that "the next war will be won by the side that best exploits the electromagnetic spectrum." Gorshkov's prediction proved right in Syria in 1982, in Iraq in 1991, and in Ukraine in 2022. The Russian military's technological backwardness shouldn't distract the parties in any future conflict from this essential fact. ■

## Nuclear Weapons Still Matter

By Graham Allison, professor of government at the Harvard Kennedy School

### DOCTRINE

RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN'S threats to strike Ukraine with nuclear weapons are like a flash of lightning illuminating the international chessboard. They provide a stark wake-up call to the brute fact that nuclear arsenals containing thousands of warheads remain foundational in shaping relations among great powers. While experts, commentators, and many others have been urging Washington to discount or even ignore Putin's threats, U.S. President Joe Biden and his team know better. Claims that Ukraine lacks good targets, Russian bombs might not work, Putin's officers could refuse to execute orders, or the risk of radiation spreading into Russia would be unacceptable are dangerous wishful thinking. Biden, CIA Director William Burns, and U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan have concluded that Putin is deadly serious. As Sullivan acknowledged last September, "We have communicated directly, privately, at very high levels to the Kremlin that any use of nuclear weapons will be met with catastrophic consequences for Russia."

What does Biden know that makes him take Putin's threats so seriously, and what does that tell us about any future conflict? First, Putin commands a nuclear arsenal that can literally erase the United States from the map. During the Cold War, strategists coined the acronym MAD—mutual assured destruction—to make vivid the ugly reality that a major nuclear power can destroy its adversary but doing so would trigger a retaliatory response in which the attacker would be destroyed as well. Even in the 21st century, we must still survive in a MAD world.

Second, U.S. President Ronald Reagan's grand imperative still holds: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Why is the United States not sending Americans to fight on the battlefield alongside Ukrainians? Because that would mean killing Russian troops, and as Biden has repeatedly insisted, the United States will not fight World War III for Ukraine. In considering whether and how the United States enters a future conflict—say, against China over Taiwan—U.S. presidents know that Americans' essential national interest is the survival of their country.

Third, Putin's nuclear arsenal includes about 1,900 tactical nuclear weapons designed for use at shorter range. With an explosive impact equivalent to the bomb the United States dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, a single weapon striking Kharkiv or Kyiv in Ukraine could match the 140,000 deaths caused by the first atomic bomb.



Fourth, as students of strategy know, nuclear weapons are a weaker power's equalizer. During the Cold War, when NATO faced 100 Soviet divisions poised to attack West Germany and reach the English Channel in less than a week, how did the United States attempt to deter them? By deploying hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons to stop the Soviet advance—and announcing its readiness to use them. While the United States has largely phased out tactical nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War, Russia has made them a major pillar of its security posture.

Fifth, seven decades after the first and last use of nuclear weapons in war, what is now called the “nuclear taboo” has led many to believe that nuclear weapons are no longer usable in war—despite the fact that both the United States and Russia continue to rely on the threat to use nuclear weapons to defend themselves. This is the essence of nuclear deterrence. Moreover, the United States also provides a nuclear umbrella to protect treaty allies that choose not to acquire their own nuclear weapons by guaranteeing that the U.S. arsenal will be used to defend them. Ukraine, Georgia, and Taiwan, however, have no commitment from the United States to use nuclear weapons in their defense.

Finally, it is hard to deny an uncomfortable echo of similarity between Washington's nuclear umbrella over NATO allies and Putin's threat of nuclear retaliation against any attack on newly annexed territory. Both cases raise questions of credibility. During the Cold War, West Germans wondered whether the United States, in responding to a Soviet invasion,

would really risk Boston for Bonn. If U.S.-backed Ukrainians overrun Ukrainian territory that Putin now calls Russia, would Putin order nuclear strikes to stop them? Until it is challenged, it is difficult to distinguish between a serious threat and a bluff.

The United States is fortunate to have a seasoned Cold Warrior at its helm, applying lessons of statecraft and strategy from the defeat of the Soviet Union, recognizing the unique danger posed by nuclear weapons, thinking clearly about vital U.S. interests, and, at the same time, finding ways to meet challenges like Putin's without stumbling into nuclear war. Russia's war in Ukraine has taught us that the nuclear age did not end with the Cold War. As far as any eye can see, nuclear arsenals will remain a major pillar of the international security order. ■

## Put an End to Brinkmanship

By Anne-Marie Slaughter,  
CEO of New America

### DETERRENCE

2045 WILL MARK the first century of the nuclear age. The nations of the world should come together to make it the last. They should look at the Russian brinkmanship over Ukraine and past nuclear standoffs and say: enough.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly threatened nuclear escalation, emphasizing that “this is not a bluff.” If Russia were to cross the threshold—most likely with a tactical nuclear weapon on the battlefield, rather than an intercontinental strategic nuclear weapon—the United States would most likely respond with a conventional attack on a target in Russia or on the Russian navy. And the world would once again hold its breath as the clock ticks toward Armageddon.

Even as Putin wields his threats, Iran continues its march toward nuclear power status, and North Korea steps up its missile tests designed to remind neighboring nations of the consequences if those missiles were nuclear-tipped. It is just such proliferation that led former U.S. Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and former Sen. Sam Nunn to publish a joint call for a “world


free of nuclear weapons” in 2007. They warned of a world of 30 or more nuclear powers and concluded that relying on nuclear weapons to deter war was becoming “increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.”

The Kissinger-Shultz-Perry-Nunn declaration contrasts sharply with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s 1967 speech announcing that humanity’s future would be “overshadowed with the permanent possibility of thermonuclear holocaust.” To forestall that eventuality, he said, the United States had developed an “assured-destruction capability” vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The era of mutual assured destruction—rightly known as MAD—was officially launched. Despite arms control negotiations, treaties, and the appeals of statesmen and activists, it is still with us.

A principal legacy of Russia’s war in Ukraine should be the replacement of MAD with MAC—mutual assured cyberdestruction. Countries of all sizes can now develop the capability to bring one another’s societies to a grinding halt by depriving them of electricity, including the backup generators that keep vital emergency services running. In the coming era of electric vehicles, such an attack would bring transport to a halt as well.

If physical bombs destroy physical highways, digital bombs destroy data highways. Banking would stop, manufacturing would stop, and the delivery of medicines to pharmacies would stop. Grocery stores would run out of inventory and be unable to restock. Water treatment plants would cease to function. Communications would cease. Imagine the pandemic lockdown—but without internet, phones, transport, or essential services.

The resulting chaos would be the slower-acting equivalent of a neutron bomb, killing people while leaving buildings untouched. Death would be indirect, caused by the failure of systems designed to keep people alive rather than by actively killing them. The survivors of this mass death would gradually be able to return to preindustrial ways or, where there is enough



nondigital resilience built into existing systems, to a pre-cellphone, pre-internet era. Either way, the economic and social devastation would end life as we know it.

Military planners around the world have long assumed that the opening move of any conflict is to knock out enemy communications by disabling satellites, cutting undersea cables, destroying cell towers, paralyzing internet servers, and so on. Russia preceded its invasion of Ukraine with multiple cyberattacks on Ukrainian government websites and has waged a cyberwar against the Ukrainian energy, media, finance, business, and civil sectors, even as it continues its attacks on the government.

To date, these attacks have succeeded, above all, in stiffening the Ukrainian people’s will to resist. Hacks can be repaired, and defenses against them can be steadily strengthened. Like the evolution of nuclear doctrine, effective cyberdeterrence depends on the ability of each adversary to deliver a knock-out first strike. States are thus racing to perfect electromagnetic pulse bombs and other weapons that would paralyze the digital flows keeping infrastructure and economies alive.

This new arms race has plenty of dangers. The growing capacity of some powers to threaten others with total cyberdestruction could become more credible than the threat to use nuclear weapons, thereby destabilizing the balance of power. But compared with the use of even a fraction of today’s nuclear arsenals, all-out cyberattacks would be more manageable. MAC is still safer than MAD.

Even as the Russia-Ukraine war grinds on, as Ukrainians push Russians out of territory they have occupied, and as governments begin to imagine what a postwar peace might look like, it is not too soon to look further down the road. It is time to end the specter of thermonuclear holocaust once and for all. ■



## LEADERS IN GRADUATE EDUCATION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

WINTER 2023

*Photo top:* Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies

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A graduate experience is not defined solely by the degree program's curriculum. Of great importance is the transfer of knowledge, lessons, and skills from experts and educators—such as professors, deans, directors, and alumni—to students.

These leaders shape students' experience and create the next generation of global changemakers by teaching them how to approach complex global issues, guiding their skill development, and providing exposure to experiences that will serve them well after completing their degree. The crucial role these leaders play in graduate education makes them an important consideration for prospective students as they decide which degree program may be the best fit.

"Prospective students come in all the time, and the key thing that I'm trying to figure out is, how can I and the institution be of use to this person in helping them get to wherever they want to go?" says Yuval Weber, research assistant professor at Texas A&M University's Bush School of Government & Public Service.

This *FP Guide* interviews leaders from eight institutions across the United States to provide a glimpse into their background, expertise, and ways in which they mentor and support students to prepare them for a fulfilling career in international affairs.

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY  
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## Preparing Future Leaders with World-Class Education in Policy and Economics

The day US citizens voted in the midterm elections, Filipe Campante, vice dean for faculty affairs at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), participated in a discussion on the aftermath of the Brazilian presidential election.



### Filipe Campante

Vice Dean for Faculty Affairs, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

**"I tell students to think about where they want to be five to 10 years from now and then work backward. That way, you can break it down to what's the best choice today to put you in the best place to choose again tomorrow, to try and achieve that goal. This is an important lesson that you learn in economics."**

In his monthly column for Brazilian news outlet *Nexo Jornal*, Campante noted the role of "the big lie" in the campaigns of Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro and former US President Donald Trump. Adopting Trump's messaging about a rigged election, Bolsonaro launched Brazil on the same political trajectory as the US, Campante wrote.

"A certain sector of the US believes that election results are contestable, reflecting an authoritarian mindset and destabilizing governance in dangerous ways," says Campante. "Using the template created by Trump and echoed by Bolsonaro, future politicians could run elections in ways that make it harder for the opposition to win."

An expert in political economy, development economics, and urban and regional issues, Campante teaches and researches the impact of economics on politics and governance. He also co-directs the DC Political Economy Center—a hub for DC-area political economists that fosters research, shares briefs on critical issues with policymakers, and sponsors an annual conference.

Students at SAIS benefit immensely from the teaching and mentoring of renowned faculty like Campante—becoming well-grounded in the interplay between policy and economics, in the global and comparative context, and equipped to adapt quickly to changes in their career journey.



In fall 2023, SAIS will welcome students to its new home at 555 Pennsylvania Avenue NW in Washington, DC, providing unprecedented opportunities for mentorship and interdisciplinary collaboration involving students, faculty, and policymakers.

"I tell students to think about where they want to be five to 10 years from now and then work backward," says Campante. "That way, you can break it down to what's the best choice today to put you in the best place to choose again tomorrow, to try and achieve that goal. This is an important lesson that you learn in economics."

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Shambaugh**

Director of the Master of Science in Foreign Service Program, Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University



**"Initiatives that intimately involve our students and combine theory, practice, and commitment to service are at the heart of our community. When our students take on issues they're passionate about, those experiences epitomize and enrich every member of our community."**

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY  
WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE

## Preparing Leaders Through a Program Grounded in Ethics and Commitment to Service



Earlier this academic year, a student in the Master of Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) approached the director of their program about the possibility of hosting a roundtable discussion on the critical issues facing Venezuela, namely its humanitarian crisis and negotiations with its dictator.

Second-year student Carlos Chacon organized the event as part of his role as a Donald F. McHenry Global Public Service Fellow. MSFS, with its extensive global alumni network, then invited the speakers, which included key players in the Venezuelan situation: MSFS graduate James Story, the US ambassador to Venezuela, and Georgetown Law alumnus Carlos Vecchio, Venezuelan ambassador to the US.

Chacon, who witnessed numerous atrocities while growing up in Venezuela, and other students talked one-on-one with the speakers at a lunch following the roundtable, further reinforcing "the synergy of what's possible" through MSFS, says Professor George Shambaugh, director of the program.

"Initiatives that intimately involve our students and combine theory, practice, and commitment to service are at the heart of our community," Shambaugh says. "When our students take on issues they're passionate about, those experiences epitomize and enrich every member of our community."



### LEVERAGING THE POWER OF TECHNOLOGY TO ADVANCE SOCIAL CHANGE THROUGH GLOBAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Another McHenry Fellow, Juan Fernando Gómez, a second-year student in the Master in Global Human Development (GHD) program, has been mentored by several former ambassadors, inspiring him to engage confidently in critical conversations and approach global issues using empathy and systems thinking. As a World Bank intern, Gómez is



working on the Human Capital Index, a global effort to accelerate better investments in people for greater equity and economic growth. Using the knowledge and skills he's acquired in his master's program, which prepares students to work in the development

process in a variety of environments, Gómez hopes to land a job that enables him to use the power of technology for social good.

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Commitment to service, which is embedded in all aspects of the program, reflects Georgetown's Jesuit identity and focus on social justice. One of the graduation requirements for the students is demonstrating leadership, which is one of the program's core values. Examples include a practicum or internship, a leadership training program at the Gettysburg battlefield, service trips to Puerto Rico and Mexico City, diplomatic tours in Japan and Israel, and participation in international conferences like COP27.

Shambaugh concludes with, "Learning how to build trust in an ethical way, especially when you're an outsider managing difficult situations, is an invaluable lesson for our students as they prepare for careers in foreign service."

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**Marie Berry**

Director, Sié Chéou-Kang Center for International Security and Diplomacy, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver



**“Because we’re outside the Beltway, we can think out of the box. Our strength is in convening meaningful conversations among policymakers, researchers, and activists in the international affairs arena. Because it takes that to be able to design impactful, effective strategies for a world that is more secure for more people.”**

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER  
JOSEF KORBEL SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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## Initiative Teaches Community-Centered, Collaborative Responses to Security Crises

War in Ukraine, Yemen, and Ethiopia’s Tigray region. Ethnic violence and human rights violations in Myanmar, China, and Central America. Challenges to democracy around the world, and in the United States. These crises threaten people’s well-being around the world, and they push Professor Marie Berry to seek creative ways of challenging what she calls “systems of harm and oppression.”

“I don’t think it’s possible to be apathetic about human suffering. Seeking ways to be part of the solution is the only way to go through life,” says Berry, the director of the Sié Chéou-Kang Center for International Security and Diplomacy at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies.

Berry’s approach is to find collaborative, community-centered responses to complex crises. An initiative she launched at the Sié Center, the Inclusive Global Leadership Initiative (IGLI), concentrates on amplifying the work of women-identifying activists who work at the grassroots level for social change.

IGLI supports activists who teach courses in resisting authoritarianism and waging movements for social change. It also hosts an annual summer institute that brings 15 women-identified activists from around the world to Denver each summer. Past summer fellows include the leader of a Thai movement to end



### INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PHD CANDIDATE INSPIRED BY RADICAL NON-HIERARCHY IN CLASSROOM

Korbel School student Sinduja Raja says she models herself on the “tireless” efforts of her

PhD advisor, Sié Center Director Marie Berry, to make the world more equal and just. Raja, 27, from Chennai, India, recalls the awe she felt the first time she sat in a class taught by Berry, when the

professor explained that she was a feminist political sociologist, and this meant she would aim to move beyond traditional hierarchies expected between instructor and student in the classroom. “She continues to make sure her research and her ethical values feed into each other and inspires me to think of my own research in a similar way,” Raja says.

domestic violence and the Togolese leader of her country’s democracy movement against the longest-lasting dynasty in Africa.

“Our strength is in convening meaningful conversations among policymakers, researchers, and activists in the international affairs arena,” Berry says. “Because it takes that to be able to design impactful, effective strategies for a world that is more secure for more people.”

The Korbel School will launch a new certificate in global justice in fall 2023 to train students in community organizing and collective action. The certificate, which master’s students can add to their degree, will include a practicum in which students work with one of the movements represented by the IGLI summer fellows on activities such as communications and designing strategy.

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THE BUSH SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT & PUBLIC SERVICE

## An Education on International Power and Politics for the Real World



### **Yuval Weber**

Research Assistant Professor, Bush School of Government & Public Service, Texas A&M University

**"Prospective students come in all the time, and the key thing that I'm trying to figure out is, how can I and the institution be of use to this person in helping them get to wherever they want to go? ...All students need to be devoted to improving themselves."**

Yuval Weber's students at Texas A&M University's Bush School of Government & Public Service spend plenty of time in the classroom. But the true focus is on the powers and relationships outside those walls, in Washington, DC, and around the globe. In short, it's a real-world education.

"We support departments and agencies that are trying to solve really hard policy questions," says Weber, a research assistant professor at the Bush School DC. "We're giving you the academic background so that when you're in an intelligence agency or a planning or operations department, you're able to understand in real time the invisible part of the process."

That means not only basics about international political actors, but deep knowledge of the interests, motivations, tactics, institutions,

and networks at play. In master's degree programs that attract students with professional experience—and who often take positions in top federal agencies after graduation—the Bush School DC's mission is to help students reach the next level of their career.

"The key thing that I'm trying to figure out is, how can I and the institution be of use to this person in helping them get to wherever they want to go?" Weber says.

Weber's expertise is in hierarchy and resilience in international politics, and he has spent years studying how major powers like the United States, China, and Russia in particular, compete globally. He is leading a multi-year project, funded by a \$1 million U.S. Department of Defense grant, to create a next-generation research tool to help analyze relationships between countries more quickly.



Students serve as research assistants on the project and will be trained to use the tool on their own research. Those papers will then be used as case studies to show what the tool can do in the larger policy world.

"When we take it to the CIA or the State Department, we can show them: Here's a way that you think about real-life questions, and here's a tool to answer those questions much more quickly than you ever anticipated," Weber says.

### **GUIDANCE AND MENTORSHIP LEAD TO THE NEXT STAGE OF A CAREER**

Miranda Snyder worked for the federal government throughout college. At 24, with years of experience under her belt, she discovered that finding her next step was challenging.

When she met Yuval Weber, a research assistant professor at the Bush School DC who shared her passion for Russian studies,

he helped her see a new path. "He said, 'I think we've done Miranda 1.0, and you're ready for 2.0,'" Snyder recalls.

The path to 2.0 took the form of pursuing a Master of International Policy degree,

which will open a range of job options when Snyder graduates in 2024. Weber continues to support her next-stage ambitions. "She brings the academic chops to do the work, and the passion and the interest to keep it going," he says.

TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY, THE BUSH SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT & PUBLIC SERVICE

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# Texas A&M Plants Flag in Washington, DC

Texas A&M University has opened a new teaching site in Washington, DC featuring the Bush School of Government and Public Service, a graduate program founded by the nation's 41st president. **The Bush School DC offers a Master of National Security and Intelligence and a Master of International Policy.**

The Bush School DC is a state-of-the-art facility located in downtown DC within several blocks of the White House and other key government buildings.

## ACADEMIC FOCUS

Both the Master of National Security and Intelligence (NSI) and the Master of International Policy (MIP) aim to strengthen students' ability to understand complex issues through rigorous coursework. Well-published scholars and seasoned practitioners from federal agencies lead in-depth classroom discussions, collaborate on research, and mentor students in and out of the classroom. The programs seek to expand students' worldview and prepare them to advance their careers in national security, intelligence and international affairs.

## HIGHLIGHTS

- Courses offered in the evenings
- Ideal location in downtown DC
- Small class sizes
- Highly qualified faculty of academics and practitioners

- **MIP Degree:** 30-credit no thesis degree designed for working professionals
- **NSI degree:** 42-credit degree for recent college graduates and early career professionals.



*I chose the Bush School DC for my master's degree because I wanted a high-quality education while advancing my career in the nation's capital.*

—**Erika**, Department of Homeland Security



*I chose the Bush School in DC to learn from distinguished national security policy makers including CIA analysts and experts from DOD and the State Department.*

—**Fabio**, Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers



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**John D. Ciorciari**

Associate Dean for Research and Policy Engagement, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan



**"There has never been a day when I have been bored with my career choice. I have learned a lot about myself by engaging with other societies around the world. We want the students to be entrepreneurial and to craft programs that excite them in a similar way."**

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN  
GERALD R. FORD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY

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## Engagement With Different Cultures Leads to an International Affairs Career

John D. Ciorciari's journey to the field of international affairs began with a trip by his high school soccer team to play against teams in Japan in the 1990s. Ciorciari was "fascinated" by his observation that while Japan was as wealthy as the United States, its society was organized very differently.

While in college, Ciorciari studied abroad in Singapore and again saw a different model than at home—a more tightly controlled government with a greater relative emphasis on community well-being than individual liberties. He also built relationships with students from across the region. His volleyball team included a student from Myanmar, then governed by a repressive junta, and he played basketball with a Cambodian student who had survived the Khmer Rouge genocide.

After earning a law degree, while working at a firm, Ciorciari did pro bono work for asylum clients, including a Tibetan Buddhist monk and Somali and Nigerian refugees.

"It all follows a similar script," says Ciorciari, associate dean for research and policy engagement at the University of Michigan's Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy. "I got interested in individual human beings and I wanted to do something to help them and their families and societies."

The benefits of a career in international affairs include its staying power, because there will continue to be demand for people who can work across cultures, Ciorciari says.



### INSPIRED AND PREPARED

As a Rangel Fellow, Ford School student Radhika Arora, 26, from Chandler, Arizona, will join the Foreign Service after graduation. Inspired by Professor Shobita Parthasarathy for her mentorship, approach, and personal journey, Arora says, "She has challenged me to think critically about how to identify policy issues and questions, and then



evaluate which method(s) will best advance understanding of that issue and its possible solutions—a necessary skill for me to have as an emerging diplomat."

"The Ford School's MPP program is helping me develop into a more polished and capable Foreign Service Officer through its combination of hands-on, experiential learning opportunities as well as critical thinking and analysis frameworks and tools," says Arora.

"International affairs is endlessly intellectually fascinating and energizing," he says.

Ford School students have the opportunity to create their own version of Ciorciari's journey by designing projects that are part of the two-year curriculum for the school's flagship Master of Public Policy. Two examples of these projects:

- One student is researching the effects of multilateral sanctions on ordinary residents of Afghanistan.
- Six students visited the US-Mexico border to talk with officials, aid workers, and migrants in adjoining Brownsville, Texas, and Matamoros, Mexico, which were trying to manage the flow of immigrants in the absence of action by the US government.

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**Sophal Ear**

Senior Associate Dean of Student Success and Associate Professor, Thunderbird School of Global Management, Arizona State University



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THUNDERBIRD SCHOOL OF GLOBAL MANAGEMENT  
AT ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

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## A Digital and Global Mindset Propels Students Into Purpose-Driven Careers

A Cambodian refugee who escaped the Khmer Rouge, Sophal Ear, senior associate dean of student success and associate professor, credits his mother for his interest in international affairs and the global political economy. It was his mother's language skills that allowed his family to escape Cambodia, finding their way first to France and, eventually, to the United States.

"My late mother understood the power of language as a passport to freedom and culture," Ear says. "She imparted in me a global mindset that I nurture to this day." As a result, he speaks five languages and has written books on Cambodia, China, and, most recently, one titled *Viral Sovereignty and the Political Economy of Pandemics*.

This shared belief in the vital role of language in international business and leadership attracted Ear to Thunderbird School of Global Management at Arizona State University.

Ear's position as both a senior associate dean and professor keeps him attuned to the individual needs of the school's diverse student body. And students, he says, "feel free to approach me." He's collaborated with a student from the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

a fellow refugee who took an interest in Ear's work on the Board of Refugees International, on a project known as the Refugee Lab. From close mentorships to practical advice on salary negotiations, Ear draws from a wealth of professional experiences and connections working at the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme to guide students as they explore and develop their areas of interest.



### A SUPPORTIVE FACULTY THAT'S COMMITTED TO SEEING GRADUATES SUCCEED

When he graduates in May 2023, Steven Marshall, a former marine, wants to leave the world a better place than he found it. In addition to knowledge and know-how, he singles out Thunderbird's faculty as a major factor in sustaining his efforts. Marshall is currently working on publishing a paper alongside Thunderbird School of Global Management Associate Professor William Youngdahl, who,

he says, "has exhibited nothing but a desire to empower his students and assist them in any capacity." Marshall adds, "This program has given me the opportunity to articulate my 15 years of experience and leadership in a way that is appreciated by current and future employers—something that was a personal struggle for me in the past."

As a leader in international management and business education for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, Thunderbird equips graduates for global careers across industries and sectors. "We inculcate our incoming students with a digital, global mindset so that each T-bird can advance inclusive and sustainable prosperity worldwide," Ear explains. The school's curriculum ensures that students have a strong knowledge base and skill set, as well as an awareness and appreciation for the customs and culture of the international communities they will serve. The school offers study-abroad opportunities, and students must fulfill a second language requirement.

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**Justin Gest**

Associate Professor and Director of the Master of Public Policy Program, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University



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GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY  
SCHAR SCHOOL OF POLICY AND GOVERNMENT

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## Accessible Program Empowers Future Policymakers with Knowledge, Skills, and Professional Opportunities

The future of responsible policymaking will depend on our leaders' ability to understand complex new problems, says Justin Gest, associate professor and director of George Mason University's Master of Public Policy Program. "It's never been more important to help students from diverse backgrounds and knowledge sets develop the skills they need to enact real change," he says.

Gest identifies three major hurdles facing future policymakers. The first is "the government's ability to keep up with technological change," ensuring regulation and equality as new advancements proliferate. The second is how states and multinational businesses collectively seek innovative solutions when confronted with global phenomena, such as climate change, pandemics, and migration. The last is assuring that democratic institutions "reinforce themselves against the forces that undermine their integrity: misinformation, science skepticism, corruption, and ethnic and religious nationalism."

George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government graduates are poised to address these challenges head-on with a multidisciplinary program that stresses critical thinking, clear communication, and evidence-based decisions, while providing students with room to explore and craft focus areas based on individual strengths and interests. Likewise, the school's proximity to Washington, D.C., grants them exclusive access to leading public policy experts and professional opportunities post-graduation.



### DEDICATED PROFESSORS CONNECT STUDENTS TO BIG IDEAS AND PROFESSIONAL NETWORKS

Kathleen Sowder plans to be a program analyst to research political violence and the onset of civil wars in Francophone Africa. Her Schar School professors ensure that she's not only well informed on issues threatening national security, but also connected to the people shaping policy. The school has hosted guest speakers from



the National Security Council, CIA, World Bank, State Department, and Council on Foreign Relations.

She credits Ronald Marks, a visiting professor, for giving her "the confidence to analyze modern science and technology issues and effectively provide policy recommendations on how emerging technologies are disrupting and enhancing national security decision making." As a result, Sowder is looking at internships with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Gest and his colleagues take great pride in supporting Schar School's diverse student population, made up of recent college graduates as well as mid-career professionals looking to transition. "Because students have so much freedom to chart their own path and careers, we make ourselves available for the guidance they may need along the way," Gest explains. While earning a degree from a leading research university, students can also take advantage of low R1 tuition fees and flexible hybrid programming designed to allow students to earn a Master of Public Policy (MPP) without interrupting their career. Students also benefit from the cross-pollination of ideas between programs, which include biodefense, international security, and public administration.

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**Alnoor Ebrahim**

Professor of Management, The Fletcher School, Tufts University



**"Our Master of International Business degree aligns perfectly with our vast offerings in international affairs. These two domains of study prepare leaders for global challenges, whether that's addressing climate change, global health, global poverty, or human rights. The students that we attract are unabashedly purpose-driven."**

THE FLETCHER SCHOOL  
AT TUFTS UNIVERSITY

## Sustainability Is a Key Element of Combined Business, International Affairs Program

For Alnoor Ebrahim, professor of management at The Fletcher School at Tufts University, an ideal way to tackle complex global challenges is to pair studies in business with international affairs.

"Our Master of International Business degree aligns perfectly with our vast offerings in international affairs," Ebrahim says. "And these two domains of study—business plus international affairs—prepare leaders for global challenges, whether that's addressing climate change, global health, global poverty, or human rights. The students that we attract are unabashedly purpose-driven, as they want to use business and markets to address global problems."

Indeed, Ebrahim sees his mission as helping students align their values and purpose with the skills they need to succeed in leadership positions "around the kinds of global problems that we really need people to step up on today."

Ebrahim's course in leadership focuses on giving students the core skills needed to run an effective team. He looks to literature in both business and psychology to help students understand how to make their teams highly effective. His students are involved in at least a dozen projects during their time at Fletcher to help build those skills.


To that end, the program focuses this skill development around core global issues, such as sustainability. Ebrahim notes that many global businesses are asking, "How do we align what we deliver with the UN's sustainable development goals?" Factors related to sustainability are incorporated into all core classes. Students address questions related to



SPONSORED REPORT

### WITH A FOCUS ON SUSTAINABILITY, STUDENT EYES FUTURE IN ESG AREA

As an undergraduate student at Tufts, Stella Henderson was hired by Bhaskar Chakravorti, dean of global business at The Fletcher School, as an analyst for the Institute for Business in the Global Context. That work, she says, gave her the confidence and direction to continue her studies at the graduate level at The Fletcher School.



Now, Henderson is concentrating her

studies in environmental policy and business for social impact. "I am particularly excited to take Corporate Management of Environmental Issues and Impact Investing in the future," she says, referring to a couple of the courses on offer. "Many professors are experienced in these fields and are always happy to make time to discuss possible career paths, whether you are enrolled in their classes or not."

carbon emissions and supply chains and work with leaders and shareholders to incorporate sustainability into business decisions.

Additionally, the degree has a new STEM-eligible Quantitative Methods track, which Ebrahim says is a crucial component. Students in this track will develop strong quantitative skills—for example, in data science, geographic information systems, finance and valuation, econometrics, and modeling managerial decisions. International students in the STEM track may be eligible for up to three years of optional practical training work permission in the US.

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
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# REVIEW

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A worker climbs through a copper and cobalt mine in Kawama, Democratic Republic of the Congo, on June 8, 2016.

## The Dirty World of Green Cars

The path to electric vehicles is a costly one.

*By Bob Davis*

# C

lean cars drive some very dirty businesses and grubby regimes. That's the main takeaway from Henry Sanderson's fine new book,

*Volt Rush: The Winners and Losers in the Race to Go Green*. Among the winners he describes are copper miners exploiting child labor, nickel miners dumping tons of waste into the sea, corrupt businesspeople paying off venomous African politicians, and a host of Chinese billionaires. It's a far cry from the sanitized vision sold to Tesla owners.

*Volt Rush* is a useful corrective to the utopian rhetoric that portrays electric vehicles as cost-free environmental saviors. Sure, they help limit the greenhouse gas emissions pouring into the atmosphere and heating the planet. But the shift to Teslas and their competitors, financed by tens of billions of dollars in government subsidies worldwide, also involves significant environmental and geopolitical damage.

Happily for readers, Sanderson hasn't produced a 288-page guilt trip. While the author is clearly a geek—he says the most exciting part of electric cars is the battery—he has written a rollicking tale of greed, politics, and technology populated by a remarkable assortment of brigands, despicables, and visionaries.

They include an ultra-Orthodox Israeli who has exploited the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the scale of King Leopold II of Belgium, a Chilean whose marriage to the daughter of the country's then-dictator helped him dominate the lithium mining business, a onetime pal of Apple co-founder Steve Jobs who pitches mining as humanity's salvation, and a Chinese billionaire who bought an Airbus A319 to chauffeur his wife and lover.

Batteries are the heart of electric vehicles, and China is at the heart of advanced battery production. According to Sanderson, the industrial policy that helped turn China's Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Ltd. (CATL) into the global battery leader involved subsidies and protectionism—unsurprising given China's goal of dominating the next generation of cars and trucks. Beijing has mandated that 40 percent of vehicles sold in China by 2030 must be electric.

As part of its strategy, Beijing denied subsidies for several years to electric vehicles using foreign batteries, making the foreign battery-makers uncompetitive in China. That gave CATL a protected market and a big advantage over South Korean firms, which were ahead at one point technologically and remain big rivals.

But government aid doesn't fully explain the company's success. Beijing and local governments in China also encouraged

entrepreneurship, relentless cost-cutting, and foreign investment—even under the turn to state-owned firms that began in 2013 under Xi Jinping. In CATL's case, founder Robin Zeng ditched his job at a state-owned company in Fujian province and began working on batteries, initially with a former IBM scientist from Taiwan. Eventually, Zeng cut a deal with BMW's Chinese joint venture to produce electric vehicle batteries. BMW's stringent requirements helped raise CATL's game high enough for it to become the go-to supplier for other automakers.

CATL now looks to emulate the telecommunications giant Huawei in selling leading-edge equipment globally. In other words, in some clean industries China now isn't ripping off innovation but producing breakthroughs.


One overlooked secret to China's renewable energy success is ruthless domestic competition that drives down prices globally. While rock-bottom Chinese prices for solar materials and components, for instance, pushed European, Japanese, and U.S. competitors into bankruptcy, they also helped make solar power affordable. The question for policymakers then becomes whether to shut off Chinese imports to help domestic businesses or open the doors wider to help domestic consumers. University of Wisconsin solar specialist Gregory Nemet has called China's solar cost-cutting a "gift to the world."

Sanderson is a reliable guide to China's global technology role. As a *Bloomberg* reporter in China, where we crossed paths, he co-wrote *China's Superbank*, a look at how China Development Bank bankrolled the global expansion of Chinese firms. Then, as a commodities reporter at the *Financial Times* and executive editor at Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, a market research firm, he poked around in mines from Chile to China to Congo.

For Chinese firms to play a leading role in electric vehicles, they needed to expand into global mining—with government financing—because they lacked the raw materials at home. Lithium-ion batteries—the energy source of choice for electric vehicles—require big supplies of lithium, copper, nickel, and cobalt. Chinese mines don't produce nearly enough of any of these minerals, so Beijing had to look abroad. That created what Sanderson calls a "raw material rush."

It's a messy business. Electric cars require about three times as much copper as gasoline-powered ones. For electric buses, the difference can be as much as sixteenfold. Mining requires lots of energy, often provided by coal-fired plants, which cuts deeply into the overall emissions savings from electric cars versus conventional ones.

*Volt Rush* details how China acquired leading positions in the minerals it lacks. While China's foreign dealings are famously amoral, its tactics hardly stand out in that regard—especially in the cutthroat world of global mining. Consider Dan Gertler, the ultra-Orthodox Israeli adventurer who used his connections with Congolese President Joseph Kabila to acquire rights to Congolese cobalt and copper for



*Volt Rush: The Winners and Losers in the Race to Go Green*

HENRY SANDERSON, ONEWORLD PUBLICATIONS, 288 PP., \$27.95, SEPTEMBER 2022

a fraction of their worth and who acted as an agent for the commodities giant Glencore.

Between 2005 and 2015, the U.S. Justice Department later said, Gertler paid more than \$100 million in bribes to get “special access” to Congo’s mining sector. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned him in 2017.

Chinese companies acquired cobalt in Congo, too. Huayou Cobalt relied on what mining journalists bizarrely call “artisanal mining”—as if mining were like producing specialty wines. Instead, the term describes workers who dig on their own for cobalt for \$2 to \$3 a day without safety equipment, often using children as laborers. In 2019, China processed 90 percent of Congo’s cobalt, Sanderson reports, with Huayou as a big supplier.

After a 2016 Amnesty International investigation exposed Huayou for relying on child labor, Apple paused purchasing from the firm. In response, Huayou formed a Corporate Social Responsibility Working Committee, saying it wanted to be a world leader in ethical mining. Even so, Sanderson reports, the company continues to buy from artisanal miners.

Another Chinese firm, Tsingshan Holding Group, pursued a different strategy to corner nickel in Indonesia. Tsingshan’s founder, Xiang Guangda, isn’t “ostentatious personally,” Sanderson writes, though he owns a fleet of Bentleys and Hummers and may someday learn how to drive.

Early on, Tsingshan needed nickel to make stainless steel and opened a massive stainless steel factory powered by coal in nickel-rich Indonesia. When Indonesia banned nickel exports to create a domestic processing industry, Tsingshan was the chief beneficiary. To meet the surging demand for electric vehicles, the company used the nickel it mined in Indonesia to make battery materials there. Other Chinese companies followed suit and set up processing operations in Indonesia.

The mines and factories are often coal-powered, meaning that nickel produced for batteries in Indonesia likely produces triple the carbon emissions of similar operations in Canada and Australia, Sanderson estimates.

*Volt Rush* has all the advantages of a journalist-written book in terms of on-the-ground reporting and colorful, clear writing. But it has some of the disadvantages, too. The book lacks some needed analysis. The vivid examples of environmental depredation caused by mining left me

wondering just how the math shapes up when it comes to electric vehicles and emissions, especially given that their supposed green virtues are a major selling point.

The book would have benefited from some life-cycle accounting of the environmental costs of electric vehicles. Starting with the mining of lithium and other minerals through the typical lifetime of an automobile, what emissions advantage would a Tesla have versus a similar gasoline-powered car?

There are plenty of such estimates. In 2021, Reuters calculated that a Tesla Model 3 in the United States had to be driven 13,500 miles before it produced less environmental damage than a Toyota Corolla. (An average American driver spends 13,476 miles behind the wheel each year.) These are complicated calculations to make, and the estimates vary. Sanderson is well placed to sort them out.

There’s also little in the book about what can be done to lessen the environmental damage or ease China’s geopolitical hold on the market. Sanderson discusses battery recycling, which would be useful but, as he notes, won’t be sufficient to keep up with demand for electric vehicles. He also plugs a plan to mine lithium in Cornwall, England, powered by presumably nonpolluting geothermal energy as a model. That’s fine if it works, but it’s hardly sufficient to meet the challenge.

What’s needed is an industrial policy capable of competing with China. The domestic components would include money for research and incentives to manufacture domestically. The Biden administration took a step in that direction with two bills that were recently signed into law. One subsidizes semiconductor manufacturing; the other subsidizes renewable energy, including electric vehicles and solar power.

Significantly, the legislation ended a decades-long debate about how to define an American company eligible for help. During earlier administrations, “American” companies were those with headquarters in the country. Now, companies that manufacture in the United States qualify as American, presumably including Chinese-owned ones.

A clean-energy industrial policy would need a foreign component, too—specifically, a way to reengage with Beijing at a time when politicians compete to be “tough on China.” The latter usually means a further decoupling of the two economies. But when China leads on significant technologies and industries, including solar and batteries, the smarter route would be to encourage China to invest in the United States, send its researchers there, and count on U.S. openness to give America an edge.

But maybe that’s too much to expect from one book. *Volt Rush* makes a great contribution in understanding what a green future entails—and what costs it might involve right now. ■

**BOB DAVIS** is a freelance journalist and the co-author of *Superpower Showdown: How the Battle Between Trump and Xi Threatens a New Cold War*.

# Dynamic digital market thrives on cutting-edge technology backbone

With some of the best infrastructure on the continent, it is no surprise that Chile is blazing a trail in the digital arena and also driving new forms of decarbonization

Chile's digital revolution and the determined energy transition to renewables that is gathering pace and receiving many international plaudits, continue to set the benchmarks for other countries across Latin America and beyond to learn from and follow.

The forward-thinking nation of 20 million people has promised to become a leading force in both sectors over the coming years and with its public and private sectors working hard to fulfil that pledge, international investors can find a wealth of opportunities throughout those two sectors, as well as many others.

Its excellent provision of fiber-based Internet connections is helping to fuel its powerful economic engine and benefiting millions of individuals and enterprises daily.

Significant investment in modern telecoms infrastructure over the past few years has created a series of state-of-the-art networks that offer fast and inexpensive data services for cell phones, mobile devices, computers and data-driven commercial and industrial hardware.

According to data compiled by industry body Subtel — an organization that is overseen by the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications — Chile's dynamic digital market saw the number of fixed internet accesses jump 12.7% year-on-year to more than 4.3 million in late September 2022, with the amount of fiber-based connections accounting for 56.7% of that total.



**Enrique Coulembier**  
CEO, Mundo

The outlook for digital service providers is extremely positive, with fixed broadband revenues expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 4.6% in 2021-2026.

This upbeat forecast is due in part to the pro-business government's proactive role in supporting the sector through initiatives such as the Proyecto Nacional de Fibra Óptica (FON), the Fibra Óptica Austral and the deployment of 5G nationwide.

In the last five years, leading telecoms operator Mundo has established itself as an outstanding digital services provider with the second largest fiber optic network in the country. The firm has more than 700,000 customers and 10,000 kilometers of fiber optic trunk network. As experts in the deployment of fiber optics, Mundo is proud to have been a key player in the long-awaited reduction of the digital gap in Chile.

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**Plaza de las Armas, Santiago de Chile**

Not only does Mundo operate the fastest fiber optic network in Latin America, but its network is completely neutral, meaning it can be used by any company. The enterprise has also formed mutually beneficial alliances with the private sector to advance connectivity nationwide.

## Acquisition opens digital doors

In a clear show of faith earlier this year, Mundo was acquired by US-based global investment giant DigitalBridge. The new owner bills itself as the only dedicated, global-scale digital infrastructure firm investing across five key verticals: data centers, cell towers, fiber networks, small cells, and edge infrastructure. The investment major has more than \$50 billion in assets under management and is focused on real assets exposed to resilient,

competitive prices and quickly reach more homes," he says. "The more networks we have deployed, the more home passes we will have, thus increasing our clientele and subscriptions to our services. We have many plans, which need support to be carried out in a timely manner."

Mundo's — and indeed Coulembier's — excellent work has not gone unnoticed, with the industry expert recently included in a prestigious list of the world's top executives, technologists, and disrupters to watch in 2022 and beyond. His presence in the coveted Network X 50 rankings is a feather in the cap of Mundo and the Chilean business sector.

Heading into 2023, the CEO is setting his sights on fresh growth and new benchmarks as Mundo seeks to boost Internet accessibility to everyone and

**"With the investment of [US investor] DigitalBridge, we have an ideal partner to deploy networks at competitive prices and quickly reach more homes."**

Enrique Coulembier, CEO, Mundo

growing markets, with Chile firmly fitting that profile. The acquisition was warmly welcomed by Mundo CEO, Enrique Coulembier, who is excited at the many opportunities it provides in supporting his country's growth plans and strengthening Mundo's business both inside and outside of Chile.

"With the investment of DigitalBridge, we have an ideal partner to deploy networks at

encourage other telecommunications companies to bridge the digital divide. "We want to impact how other telecoms firms view their customers," he adds. "Mundo is extremely proud of its socially conscious team. We don't do things just by numbers; we also try to impact the daily life and day-to-day life of Chilean citizens. We are very proud of what we have achieved, but have much more to give."

# Economy electrified by green energy advance

Enviable solar and wind resources supported by government legislation that promotes zero-carbon energy projects has established the country as a hotspot for green fuels

With much of its incredibly long coastline and inland territory complemented by a hot, arid climate, Chile is making the most of its natural resources to attract billions of dollars of foreign direct investment (FDI) in renewable energies, especially in solar and wind power projects.

With a strategic location that means it lies opposite the large and lucrative energy markets of the Asia Pacific, the republic is well placed to take advantage of its favorable climate to generate zero-carbon energy derivatives like green hydrogen to serve industrial and agricultural customers at home and abroad.

The respected International Energy Agency (IEA) recently highlighted Chile's vast potential in renewables, noting an updated long-term energy policy was published by the government in mid-2022. The policy "re-emphasizes the pledge to net-zero, laying out a clear decarbonization pathway that addresses all sectors of the national economy," it said. "Chile has taken a globally leading role in clean energy, and emerged as a world-class destination for solar and wind energy developers."

Spearheading innovation and initiative in Chile's fast-growing clean energy sector is Grupo Cerro, a local company that now

manages more than 280MW of installed capacity. The ambitious firm is currently developing one of the world's largest Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) projects at Likana in the northern region of Antofagasta. The \$1.8 billion project will create 450-690MW of electricity once built.

"At Grupo Cerro, we have the goal of providing clean energy 24/7 to our clients," explains proud CEO, Fernando González. "That's what motivates us and that's what differentiates us, because we have a combination of technologies that can support delivering power 24/7. The core asset in our portfolio is the Cerro Denominador CSP. It generates 110MW at full capacity, but what makes it special is it offers 17.5 hours of storage in molten salts, which allows us to generate power through the night."

González believes Chile's resources for renewable energy are almost unlimited and he is looking forward to Grupo Cerro being at the forefront of the sector for many years. "We differentiate ourselves by only doing renew-



**Fernando González**

CEO, Grupo Cerro

ables and producing electricity 24/7. Having the first CSP plant in Latin America puts us in a good position. If you want a grid that is 100% renewable, you need plants that can provide similar services to those provided by fossil-fuel plants. That can be done with a CSP.

"Earlier this year, we acquired a set of mini hydroelectric power plants which complement our initial portfolio. We would like to expand internationally, but that takes time. We are just starting."

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**THE FASTEST INTERNET IN LATIN AMERICA**

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tumundo.cl

# Madrid: Your plug-and-play market to grow

Spain's capital region is a thriving modern hub for technology-based, future-focused industries that provides the perfect mix of business opportunities and quality of life

The region of Madrid is the dynamic engine of Spain's economy, contributing nearly 20% of the nation's €1.2-trillion gross domestic product and drawing in over 72% of its inward investments. "It's a land of opportunities that's booming, attracting investments in projects, businesses, digitalization, culture, tourism and sports, as well as students," says the president of the region's government, Isabel Díaz Ayuso.

Quality of life partly explains its magnetism for international companies and individuals, she asserts: "Madrid has it all. It's in the top rankings for everything from safety to life expectancy and public services, plus it's one of the most en-

joyable Spanish regions, with more culture, more leisure options and the highest percentage of protected natural space. It's a region of contrasts — you can live a thousand different lives in Madrid."

Those contrasts are reflected in Spain's vibrant capital, Madrid. The city that combines awe-inspiring heritage with modernity has become a prime location for future-oriented industries, states its mayor, José Luis Martínez-Almeida: "Since 2019, we've quadrupled investment in entrepreneurship to €2.8 billion, but we're clear that we want more companies involved in digital transformation, technology, innovation, knowledge and financial services to move here."



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A capital city on a human scale, Madrid offers a unique lifestyle

To help achieve this, the city is investing in vast infrastructure developments, such as the mixed-use Madrid Nuevo Norte. "It's the largest urban development in a European capital and will create a fully sustainable city of the future. As well as appealing to businesses, it will generate affordable housing, enabling us to retain our highly qualified young people and attract new talent," he reveals. According to Ángel Asensio Laguna, president of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Services of Madrid, there are many other advantages for investors: "Its location is strategic, as a key bridge to the Americas, Europe and Africa. It also offers institutional and legal security, low taxes, supportive authorities, large universities and a favorable ecosystem for growth."



**Isabel Díaz Ayuso**  
President of the Community of Madrid

ncts a huge range of destinations across Europe, the Americas, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. With the support of local authorities, Iberia plans to transform its extensive maintenance, repair and design facility by Madrid-Barajas Adolfo

**More than 90% of the Spanish aerospace industry is concentrated in Madrid."**

Isabel Díaz Ayuso, President of the Community of Madrid

One sector that illustrates how tech-driven industries are flourishing is aerospace: "More than 90% of the Spanish aerospace industry is concentrated in Madrid," notes Ayuso. A good example of how it nurtures that sector is Arquimea, one of Spain's fastest-growing firms, which aims to launch a Madrid-made satellite constellation in 2025. "A reason we're successful in selling our technology worldwide is there are great engineering schools and engineers here. It's competitive to engineer from Madrid, where there are many companies working on major projects for organizations like NASA, Airbus and Boeing," says Arquimea's president, Diego Fernández. The sector is led by Iberia, Spain's largest airline, that con-





A sign depicting former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping is seen above a tunnel in Shenzhen, China, on April 3, 2016. Its slogan reads: "Adhering to the [Chinese Communist] Party's basic line for a hundred years, with no vacillation."

# China's Decade of Buried Hopes

The 1980s remain a forbidden history.

*By Julia Lovell*

When I began visiting China in the late 1990s, the 1980s already felt untouchably remote. In English-language books on the 1980s in China, I read about an era in which the fundamentals of life were openly and fervently debated: the legacies of the Mao Zedong era (and especially of his most destructive campaign, the Cultural Revolution); the relevance of Western, capitalist societies to a socialist China; the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the country's modernization.

The China I personally encountered, as a first-time visitor, was very different: It was a place in which people's energies were absorbed in keeping up with the new speculative market economy; in which press freedom seemed limited to shuffling photographs of the leadership printed first in the CCP's main

newspaper, the *People's Daily*. By this point, the “China model” looked set in stone: breakneck economic growth, presided over by authoritarian, one-party rule. The memory and credibility of the 1980s—as a decade of open, imaginative possibilities—had been thoroughly erased from public history within China.


Julian Gewirtz’s excellent new book, *Never Turn Back: China and the Forbidden History of the 1980s*, provides the most detailed analysis so far written in English of the intense arguments about China’s political, economic, and social futures that raged throughout the 1980s. Since Xi Jinping became “paramount leader” in 2012, control over the writing of history, and access to sources, has dramatically intensified. China’s zero-COVID policy has, of course, made it impossible for most Western researchers to visit China in person for nearly three years.

But the tenacious, resourceful Gewirtz has been studying the 1980s long enough to have stockpiled a diverse, illuminating archive of firsthand sources on the decade—leaked internal documents, oral histories, flea market propaganda directives—which he deploys compellingly.

His book begins with the country’s emergence out of the Cultural Revolution and Mao’s shadow. Gewirtz, a former Harvard University scholar who now serves as a China director on the U.S. National Security Council, acknowledges that, as Frank Dikötter, Joshua Eisenman, and others have shown, farmers had already begun carving off private plots to stage a partial return to private production in the early 1970s. Yet poverty and underdevelopment remained widespread at the time of Mao’s death in 1976.

Roving researchers discovered shocking rural deprivation. In heavy and light industry and household consumption, China was years, even decades, behind the West and Japan. Ideologically, the country was also on the rocks. In the late 1960s, at the start of the Cultural Revolution, the cult of Mao had reached its feverish peak. In 1971, infatuation began to fade when Lin Biao—his designated successor and fellow architect of the Cultural Revolution—was killed in a plane crash while fleeing after allegedly attempting to assassinate Mao.

Straight after Mao’s death, party veterans purged the leader’s closest personal allies—including his wife—bringing the Cultural Revolution to an end. Ideological puritanism was, apparently, over, but what would replace it? The first option was the inadequate “Two Whatevers” of the brief rule of Mao’s immediate successor, Hua Guofeng: “We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave.” The harder option was that of Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s extraordinarily tough near-contemporary who survived the purges of the Cultural Revolution to oust Hua



*Never Turn Back:  
China and the Forbidden  
History of the 1980s*

JULIAN GEWIRTZ, HARVARD  
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 432 PP.,  
\$32.95, OCTOBER 2022

and become CCP leader by 1978. His solution to China’s complex economic, political, social, and cultural ills was “modernization.” The country and party would spend the next 11 years arguing—sometimes behind closed doors, sometimes on the streets and squares of China’s biggest cities—about what this term meant.

Deng clung, for the most part, to an optimistically simple definition. As Gewirtz writes, he hoped that modernization meant “getting richer” through “liberating the productive forces.” He ended the fanatical economic meddling of the Mao years, giving farmers and entrepreneurs “greater control over what they grew and encouraging new forms of ownership to make and sell clothes, gadgets, furniture and much more.” He was willing to contemplate political change also, insofar as it enabled economic transformation and market reforms. He was prepared to decentralize control, strengthen commercial law to boost entrepreneurial confidence and activity, and force ancient ideological die-hards to retire to make way for competent technocrats.

But Deng’s moderate, economically focused proposals for political reform emboldened others—including those deep inside the political establishment, as well as liberal intellectuals—to make far more extreme criticisms of China’s socialist system. In the fall of 1980, a CCP academic called for an end to the party’s control of the economy, culture, and media and for an independent press and judiciary. As the decade wore on, conversation about sweeping political change was normalized in once-orthodox venues. The pages of the *People's Daily* were studded with radical proposals: that Chinese socialism under Mao oppressed the individual as brutally as did bourgeois capitalism; that thought and speech should “be increasingly open and free.”

The bad fit between the dispositions of a conservative CCP leadership on the one hand and the freewheeling ideas of other parts of the political and intellectual elite on the other generated profound instability. The centerpiece partnership and then clash of 1980s China was between Deng and his protégé Zhao Ziyang, the pragmatic premier and then party secretary who advocated for China to open entirely to the global economic system.

Deng and other high-ranking political veterans were willing

to welcome foreign investment and technology to enable the country to catch up with the West and Japan. But they were deeply uncomfortable with other kinds of Westernization (political, social, cultural influences) that tended to creep in on the back of economic relaxation. “If you unlatch the window,” Deng observed in 1983, “it’s hard to stop the flies and mosquitoes rushing in.” Consequently, China throughout the 1980s jolted through alternating cycles of liberalization (*fang*) and tightening up (*shou*) as senior leaders sparred over “spiritual pollution”—a grab bag of pernicious external influences encompassing perms, lipstick, smuggling, and Jean-Paul Sartre—and whether there remained a role for socialist ideology in a China that was ever more closely integrated with global markets.

The tragic climax of the 1980s—the bloody suppression of nationwide protests in 1989—is often popularly imagined as a Manichean political fight: between pro-democracy students and a Communist gerontocracy determined to hang on to power at any cost. Gewirtz gives at least equal weighting to contention over an overheated economy. From the middle of 1988, the leadership argued about the risks posed to political stability by inflation. Zhao, backed most of the way by Deng, stuck to his mantra of rapid economic growth, even while urban prices soared; during 1988, inflation was running at some 30 percent.

By 1989, China’s Communist government faced a crisis in legitimacy caused by socioeconomic upheaval as well as by dreams of Western-style democracy. At this critical moment, economic instability dented Zhao’s credibility. When protests calling for “democracy and freedom” surged in the spring of 1989, Zhao’s relaxed stance toward opening China to the global system, and to the political and cultural influences that such liberalization might bring, was blamed by party elders for encouraging insurgency. Economics and politics, Gewirtz reminds us, were “inextricable” for “protesters who had motivations ranging from democracy to eradication of corruption and inflation.” Some of the earliest protesters at Tiananmen Square were not students but workers worried about price rises.

The decision to quash the protests with violence, in contrast to the decisions being made in Eastern Europe that same year, set the future course of China’s Communist leaders. After the

**Gewirtz’s book provides a fascinating, authoritative account of the paths for China’s future explored during a decade long buried by official, state-sponsored history.**



Chinese student protesters are partially obscured by a large red banner during the Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing in 1989.

hard-liners won the argument to send the People’s Liberation Army out against the people, they rewrote the history of the 1980s as one of smooth economic growth, only briefly interrupted by Zhao’s failure to maintain “ideological and organizational purity.” They recast China’s path to modernization as requiring obedience to a “single ‘core’ leader” and to the CCP’s definition of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, effectively outlawing public disagreement about Chinese politics.

The often turbulent but fascinatingly open-ended debates of the 1980s were, along with Zhao himself, officially erased from history. The CCP’s handling of 1989 also determined the leadership’s primary attitude to the West since. After the crisis, China’s leadership cast the United States and other Western powers as machinating to change “socialist countries into capitalist democracies.” Foreign manipulation had directed the turmoil: “Some political forces in the West,” Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong explained in 1989, “always attempt to make socialist countries, including China, give up the socialist road, eventually bringing these countries under the rule of international monopoly capital and putting them on the course of capitalism. This is their long-term, fundamental strategy.”

Gewirtz’s book provides a fascinating, authoritative account of the paths for China’s future explored during a decade long buried by official, state-sponsored history. It recalls the vibrancy of post-Mao Chinese society and how deeply responses to the chaotic contingencies of the late 1980s have shaped China since. Chinese elite politics today insists that China can only be a successful, wealthy nation if ruled by an authoritarian, one-party government. Gewirtz’s crucial history of the 1980s reminds us of how much there was—and still is—to argue about in China. ■

JULIA LOVELL is a professor of modern Chinese history and literature at Birkbeck, University of London.

# Exports conquer new markets far and wide

By offering a diversified range of quality products and services to international markets, Costa Rica has built an outstanding reputation with the help of dynamic trade entity Procomer

Juggling the twin goals of attracting major FDI and promoting Costa Rican goods and services to scores of export markets, Promotora de Comercio Exterior de Costa Rica (Procomer) is a key figure in the country's thriving trade and industry arena.

As a Public Private Partnership (PPP) dedicated to international commerce, Procomer is highly active in a host of sectors. Its core activities include export promotion and the development of free trade zones. The agency has more than two dozen branches worldwide as it works to grow Costa Rica's global trade footprint across continents.

Exports now represent 36% of GDP and are responsible for more than 700,000 jobs. The country exports more than 4,000 different products to 160 countries. According to Procomer Managing Director Pedro Beirute, this very diversified pool of products and services boosts competitiveness and reduces exposure to risks associated with various market circumstances. Meanwhile, a long-running country branding campaign has been hugely successful, as he explains.

"Nine years after its launch, our country branding 'Essential Costa Rica' has proven to be a very powerful and successful international



**Pedro Beirute**  
Managing Director, Procomer

promotion and positioning tool, as evidenced by the figures for exports, tourism and foreign investment; sectors that represent the great engines of the economy, as well as generators of employment and well-being for the country," he states.

"Likewise, this country branding has been successful due to reasons such as its apolitical nature, comprehensive messages and a human talent that stands out in each exported product, in each worker hired by a multinational company and in each person who expresses our culture and idiosyncrasy."

"For all this, for the future we foresee the generation of more messages focused on sustainabil-



**ECO 30 protocol creates carbon offsets by planting healthy new trees**

ity, not only environmental as mentioned above, but also economic and social. Costa Rica has been a model of sustainability for many years and we must continue taking advantage of that good reputation to generate well-being for Costa Ricans, and that applies to the trade, tourism and investment sectors."

The senior executive adds that national socioeconomic development is not just related to fiscal performance, but to citizens' quality of life and the services they enjoy. "Our way to differentiate ourselves from the rest of the world is by developing businesses with purpose; businesses in which we build value through our values," he adds. "We are contributing to humanity by being a role model to the world; a country in which all our electricity is renewable."

One of Costa Rica's success stories is GBM, a leader in technology services and exclusive distributor for IBM. The enterprise also represents many other famous brands, such as Lenovo, Cisco, SAP and Microsoft.

The award-winning firm employs 2,000 people in nine countries and offers a broad range of infrastructure, software and IT services, as well as support and advice on the planning and implementation of new technology for companies of all sizes. GBM has been recognized as one of the leading employers in Latin America due to its excellent working conditions and strong focus on staff welfare.

"We want to take our clients' systems and transform them to the latest technologies; but instead of handing it back to them, we want to manage everything for them, with more security and with better practices," says GBM CEO, Ramón J. Aguilar Revelo.

"When you digitally transform and move systems to the cloud, they become more complex to manage. There is also the issue of security. When a computer is inside a room, it's very secure, but when all the systems are moved to different clouds, your footprint gets bigger and your security gets more complex."

13 years leading technology services

GBM is a technology advisor and integrator that increases the competitiveness of its clients through **digital solutions**. With **innovation** and **digital transformation**, it leads the Central America and Caribbean region.

GBM represents **leading brands** such as IBM, Cisco, Lenovo, Red Hat, and SAP, among others.

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 GBMCorp



# Diversified and open economy offers ideal platform for growth

Now is the ideal time to invest in one of Costa Rica's many thriving sectors as the pro-business government rolls out a red carpet for investors and removes red tape

Boasting the most powerful economy in Central America and an enviable reputation as a leading destination for global technology giants thanks to its excellent manufacturing capabilities and skilled human resources, Costa Rica is going from strength to strength and is ideally positioned to take advantage of the trend for nearshoring by US companies as they retreat from Asia Pacific nations.

Long popular with international tourists given its favorable climate, safe and welcoming civil environment and superb flora

and fauna, the country of 5.2 million people has grown into a major technology and outsourcing hub for hardware and software companies, as well as manufacturers of cutting-edge medical technology (medtech) devices.

President Rodrigo Chaves heads a business-friendly administration that — through various organizational channels — is committed to streamlining and simplifying trade and commerce legislation and regulations to boost foreign direct investment (FDI) in a host of sectors. Courtesy of a trade liberalization



Known for its natural beauty, Costa Rica's growing economy is also very attractive

© Julieth Mendez



**Rodrigo Chaves**  
President



**Manuel Tovar**  
Minister of Foreign Trade

policy and preferential trade agreements with 51 countries, the economy is forecast to grow 4.3% in 2022 as tourism and exports perform strongly. Exports in 2021 surged 24% over 2020.

"Vision without action is an illusion," says President Chaves. "Our vision is to bring Costa Rica to the world through our products and services, in practical terms, that means more international trade and international trade facilitation. Instead of red tape, investors will enjoy a red carpet; we are removing all

restrictions, simplifying procedures and improving legal certainty so that Costa Rica is the ideal investment destination."

This upbeat view is echoed by Manuel Tovar, Minister of Foreign Trade, who notes the nation enjoys preferential access to two-thirds of global GDP and one-third of the world's population.

"In addition, we wish to join the Pacific Alliance [Latin American trade bloc] and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)," he says.



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# Coming to America

## The case for immigration optimism.

*By Reihan Salam*

A

merica's immigration wars are at an impasse. With illegal crossings surging at the southern border and the backlog in green card petitions reaching new heights, there is a widespread sense that the U.S. immigration system is badly broken. Yet there's no prospect of bipartisan agreement about what exactly it would mean to fix it—at least not in the near future.

Conservatives are largely united in believing that the system should focus first and foremost on deterring

unauthorized migration, enforcing the rule of law, and ensuring that the United States can select newcomers who are best positioned to succeed in a modern market democracy. The left, meanwhile, has come to embrace a more open approach, one that creates more legal pathways for the poor and ambitious.

Against this backdrop, Ran Abramitzky and Leah Boustan, economists at Stanford and Princeton universities, respectively, have published *Streets of Gold: America's Untold Story of Immigrant Success*, an engaging brief for immigration optimism. While some on the restrictionist right warn that openness to immigration is giving rise to a new underclass, the authors urge their readers to “think of immigration policy on the level of generations, rather than years.” Over the course of a generation or two, they argue, the descendants of today’s immigrants will fare just as well as the children and grandchildren of immigrants from earlier eras, regardless of their wealth or level of education.

A child glances back toward Mexico after crossing the border into the United States in La Joya, Texas, on April 14, 2021.

But though Abramitzky and Boustan's case for optimism about the very long-term prospects of second- and third-generation Americans is plausible enough, their chief takeaway from it—that it would be "misguided" for the U.S. government to preselect educated immigrants, who they readily acknowledge "enjoy high earnings, contribute to scientific innovation, and pay more than their fair share of public funds" on arrival, because the children and grandchildren of even the poorest immigrant workers would do just fine—is less convincing.


Given that Abramitzky and Boustan acknowledge that "open borders" is a political nonstarter, a more selective, skills-based immigration system would—by their own logic—prove at least as beneficial as a skills-blind approach, if not considerably more so, and over a much shorter time horizon. In an age of economic volatility and intense political dissension over migration, that is no small thing. Virtually all of the world's market democracies have moved toward points-based systems that select migrants on the basis of language proficiency, educational credentials, employment offers, and other characteristics that predict labor market success and rapid integration, and there is a reason for that.

Destination countries that most closely adhere to this script, most notably Canada and Australia, where it was pioneered, have admitted significantly larger immigrant inflows relative to their smaller populations than the United States while eliciting significantly less backlash, a lesson that U.S. immigration partisans would do well to heed.

As much as I might disagree with Abramitzky and Boustan's policy approach, it is important not to diminish their considerable achievement. Drawing on numerous data sources and synthesizing their own groundbreaking academic work, *Streets of Gold* is no mere polemic. In addition to being a pleasure to read, the book does a great deal to enrich our understanding of how immigrants are incorporated into U.S. economic and cultural life. Though the authors are partisans of a more permissive immigration policy, they are exceedingly fair-minded in presenting their findings.

**ONE FAMILIAR ASPECT** of the contemporary immigration debate is that pessimism about newer immigrants and their prospects is often bound up with the sense that previous immigrant generations quickly moved from "rags to riches." As Abramitzky and Boustan demonstrate, however, while immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration from Europe, stretching from 1850 to 1913, earned much higher incomes than they would have in their native countries, their fortunes improved only modestly as they made their way in American life, a pattern entirely similar to what we see among more recent immigrants.

The implication is that our excessively romantic conception of how European immigrants navigated the labor market of yesteryear is causing many Americans to discount the gains made by more recent arrivals from Latin America and elsewhere.



*Streets of Gold:  
America's Untold Story  
of Immigrant Success*

RAN ABRAMITZKY AND LEAH BOUSTAN, PUBLICAFFAIRS,  
256 PP., \$29, MAY 2022

It is also true, however, that between the Age of Mass Migration and the modern era, the income gap between native-born workers and newcomers has grown significantly. Abramitzky and Boustan note that newly arrived European immigrants in the 1900s on average had "similar jobs" to U.S.-born workers, which is to say they mostly started out on the middle rungs of the occupational ladder. In the modern era, in contrast, they find that the mean immigrant has initial earnings 30 percent *below* the average among natives, a reflection, in part, of the fact that the skills gap between, say, the United States and Honduras in 2022 is larger than that separating the United States and Germany in 1902.

In both periods, Abramitzky and Boustan observe, immigrants made gains relative to natives as they gained labor market experience. Low-paid immigrants in the 1900s earned about 10 percent less than their native counterparts, and they closed about a third of that gap over the course of their working lives. The earnings gap between modern immigrants and modern natives tends to drift down as well, falling to 16 percent after 20 years.

But to the authors, the solid but unspectacular gains made by immigrant workers over the course of their working lives matter far less than what happens in subsequent generations—the narrative heart of *Streets of Gold*. By carefully linking the tax records of individuals born around 1980 to those of their parents, Abramitzky and Boustan are able to compare intergenerational progress between children of native- and foreign-born parents. They find that if a child has native-born white parents at the 25th percentile of earnings, they tend to rise to the 40th percentile as an adult. Children of foreign-born parents who start out at the 25th percentile rise further still, to the 50th percentile. Building on census data, the authors find that this pattern of intergenerational improvement is similar to that observed a century ago.

What is it about having an immigrant parent that might account for this advantage? Here is where *Streets of Gold* really shines. Rather than suggest that immigrants are somehow more virtuous than their native counterparts—for example, it's not uncommon for people to praise immigrants over, say, native-born Black Americans or argue that "Asian culture" accounts for academic success among immigrants and second-generation Americans of Asian descent—Abramitzky

and Boustan focus on two more prosaic possibilities, which shed a great deal of light on how immigrant assimilation actually works in practice.

First, because immigrants are by definition less tethered to a given U.S. locale than native-born Americans, who may have deep, multigenerational roots in their communities, they are more open to moving in search of opportunity. As a result, immigrants tend to settle in more opportunity-rich cities and neighborhoods, which gives their children a leg up. This is true even when opportunity-rich communities are more expensive, as immigrants are more amenable to living in multifamily housing, which is cheaper, and they often care more about sending remittances to family members in their country of origin than they do about keeping up with the (American) Joneses, which means they care less about the local cost of living.

“One implication of our findings,” Abramitzky and Boustan observe, “is that it is very likely that US-born families would have achieved the same success had they moved to such high-opportunity places themselves.” Though the authors don’t dwell on this point, it’s a reminder that excessive land-use regulation and other policies that raise the cost of living in the United States’ most prosperous regions are profoundly damaging the prospects of rising generations.

Second, there is a sense in which the apparent mobility advantage experienced by children of immigrants stems from the *disadvantage* of their immigrant parents. Immigrants, and particularly recent immigrants, often confront obstacles that create a mismatch between their earnings and their underlying talents, e.g., a language barrier; a need to take low-paying jobs rather than invest in higher education; or difficulty leveraging the education or skills they acquired in their home countries.

As Abramitzky and Boustan put it, “Think about the proverbial Russian scientist who ends up driving for Uber.” In these instances, the children of immigrant parents are “upwardly mobile” relative to their parents’ actual earnings in the U.S. labor market but not nearly as much relative to their parents’ capabilities, which parents can pass on to their children in a number of ways. In a similar vein, sociologists of immigration refer to the “class-specific resources” of immigrant parents who were raised in the upper strata of their home countries, i.e., the cultural practices, social networks, and narrative self-understandings that can help their children climb the occupational and social ladder.

**As the costs of migration decline, immigrants from a given country of origin are less likely to be drawn from the ranks of the most enterprising of their compatriots.**

What Abramitzky and Boustan don’t fully reckon with, however, is the possibility that as the costs of migration decline, immigrants from a given country of origin are less likely to be drawn from the ranks of the most enterprising of their compatriots. The Stanford economist Edward Lazear famously observed that because the United States rations immigration slots in a manner that treats some countries more generously than others, the most successful immigrants in the United States come from countries that send the fewest immigrants to America relative to their population.

To illustrate the point, Lazear contrasted immigrants from two developing countries, Nigeria and Tonga: It is much harder for Nigerian citizens to secure green cards than Tongan citizens, and the Nigerians who do make it to the United States earn more than twice as much as their Tongan counterparts on average.

In the absence of this rationing of immigration slots through formal rules and restrictions, international migration has become less costly than in earlier eras, which in turn means that it’s not just the most ambitious strivers who’d be in a position to move. Cheap air travel and long-distance communication have greatly lowered the material and psychic barriers to migration, and life can be much easier for migrants joining existing ethnic enclaves than for the pioneers who establish them.

This is one respect in which immigrants in the Age of WhatsApp really are different from those who arrived in the United States in the Age of Steam, and it is not unreasonable to expect that this could have implications for the pace of immigrant success. One could argue that explicit modern efforts to select immigrants on the basis of skills represent a substitute for the ways in which the high cost of a trans-Atlantic sea crossing, or the absence of distance-collapsing tools such as WhatsApp or WeChat, tended to deter the less ambitious. And that’s why Abramitzky and Boustan’s brief for a relatively indiscriminate approach to immigration is ultimately unconvincing.

Essentially, *Streets of Gold* asks policymakers in the United States and other migrant destinations to be patient. Over time, past experience strongly suggests that the descendants of newcomers will eventually converge with natives, so why deny yourself the gift of global talent? As an argument against calls for a reduction of immigrant inflows, this is compelling. Given the rapid aging of the U.S. population, immigration represents an important source of demographic vitality. But as an argument against immigrant selection, the book falls short.

**EVEN IF ONE STIPULATES THAT THE DESCENDANTS** of all immigrants will fare equally well in the long run, a claim that goes beyond the historical evidence Abramitzky and Boustan carefully present, a more selective approach could yield large dividends in the interim. As the immigration advocates



People riding the ferry to Ellis Island for a naturalization ceremony pass the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor on Sept. 17, 2022.

Alec Stapp and Jeremy Neufeld of the Institute for Progress recently put it, “For a given level of immigration, scientists, engineers, inventors, and entrepreneurs deliver the largest benefits.” Faced with two job candidates—one of whom will create value for the company immediately when they start, while the other, despite the same underlying talent, will require months of training and practice—no one would expect an employer to merely shrug at the difference.

So, it is telling that nowhere in *Streets of Gold* do Abramitzky and Boustan offer a sustained case against immigrant selection. Indeed, they arguably offer more evidence against their case for a skills-blind immigration policy than for it. For example, they report that, like the children of low-income immigrants, the children of high-income immigrants outearn natives who were raised in similar material circumstances, which is to say the immigrant advantage is not limited to newcomers with earnings at the 25th percentile.

They further note that even when we focus narrowly on immigrant parents who start at the 25th percentile, there is a wide range of outcomes across countries of origin. For example, Abramitzky and Boustan observe that the children of immigrants from higher-skill populations, e.g., second-generation Americans of Chinese and Indian origin, perform exceptionally well, perhaps because they are able to draw on social connections from a high-skill community even when their own parents are not high earners—a finding consistent with Lazear’s thesis about immigrant selection.

Rather anticlimactically, Abramitzky and Boustan’s main argument for openness to low-skill immigration is that the U.S. economy is currently experiencing strong demand for low-wage labor in sectors such as construction, the restaurant industry, child and elder care, and agriculture, which is no doubt true. Leaving aside that this cyclical condition is subject to change, it’s worth reflecting on how these industries might evolve in the coming years.

Consider that there is growing political support for raising wages and labor standards in the service sector, as demonstrated by the recent spate of minimum wage increases in states and cities across the country. Over time, efforts to upgrade low-wage jobs in these historically undercapitalized industries can be expected to foster automation and business model innovation, making them less labor-intensive and more attractive to native-born workers in the process.

Then there is the ongoing globalization of the service sector. The rise of remote work and stringent immigration restrictions are encouraging more U.S. employers to embrace offshoring, a form of “virtual immigration” that can complement local workers while serving as a substitute for traditional immigrant labor. At the same time, U.S. retirees are increasingly settling in Mexico and other lower-cost destinations—a development that has the potential to reshape the elder care industry.

One need not believe that robots or offshoring will destroy jobs en masse to recognize that they may cause considerable dislocation for less educated workers, whether native- or foreign-born, in the years to come. Sophisticated proponents of low-skill immigration have recently countered that there will always be demand for low-skill “fundamental workers” whose jobs can’t be automated or offshored, such as caregivers and chefs. But if higher wages and better working conditions are on offer, these fundamental jobs can be done just as well by higher-skill workers who find them more engaging, fulfilling, or flexible than serving as members of the laptop class.

If I had to guess, I’d say that Abramitzky and Boustan’s policy stance is grounded in a humanitarian commitment. Many Americans, mostly though not exclusively on the political left, believe that immigrant selection represents a betrayal of the United States’ history as a refuge for people seeking freedom and a better life. Though Abramitzky and Boustan are careful to avoid strident language, there are hints of this cosmopolitan commitment throughout the book. It is worth reiterating, however, that destination countries that fully embrace immigrant selection tend to admit more immigrants on a per capita basis than the United States, presumably because their citizens deem inward migration more enriching and less burdensome. That, too, has humanitarian benefits.

Regardless, the beauty of *Streets of Gold* is that you don’t have to embrace the authors’ conclusions to learn from their scholarship. Abramitzky and Boustan have made an immense contribution to our understanding of the economic history of immigration and what it can teach us about upward mobility in the United States. And, in doing so, they’ve perhaps inadvertently made the case for a more selective national immigration strategy. ■

**REIHAN SALAM** is the president of the Manhattan Institute and author of *Melting Pot or Civil War? A Son of Immigrants Makes the Case Against Open Borders*.

# Spirit of the Caribbean thrives on innovation and robust economy

The stunning archipelago is ushering in an exciting era of change as it welcomes the return of tourists, diversifies its strong economy and creates sustainable returns

In the countdown to the beautiful and bold country's 50th anniversary of independence in 2023, a bright new era dawned in the Bahamas. International visitors not only returned in droves to its vast range of upscale tourism offerings, but an economic diversification drive was launched by the pro-business government as the administration also unveiled an exciting strategy to generate sustainable returns from its various sectors.

Guided by the steady hand of Prime Minister Philip Davis since late 2021, the Bahamas is boosting its fine reputation for its incredible tourism offering — it boasts many of the world's best beaches — and cutting-edge financial services infrastructure that has made it a successful digital hub for major banks, insurers and other large fiscal enterprises from the US and beyond.

Hailing an extremely positive first-quarter economic performance, Davis highlighted how a deficit of just \$20.6 million was the lowest for the three-month period in more than a decade. "We have been able to achieve [this success] by holding fast to our commitment to fiscal prudence and implementing sound policies to stimulate the economy and generate revenue," he said.



**Philip Davis**  
Prime Minister

Around the same time as his speech, clear evidence of his administration's global ambitions were underlined via a historic alliance with the Africa Export-Import Bank. Traditionally focused on markets in the Americas and Europe, the pact will open new trade channels in large consumer markets across the Atlantic. "This partnership holds much promise," Davis noted. "It provides for the promotion and financing of 'South-South trade' between African countries and Caribbean member states."

As a sun-soaked archipelago of 700 islands, the Bahamas' tourism offering is second to none and its outstanding reputation as a safe, fun and friendly desti-



© The Bahamas Ministry of Tourism, Investment & Aviation



**Isaac Chester Cooper**  
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Tourism,  
Investment and Aviation

nation is shown in the strong rebound in arrival numbers that has delighted officials.

"In a post-COVID environment, we are incredibly optimistic about the future of our econ-

attracted 7.2 million visitors. We are on track to beat those levels in 2022.

"We have world class brands and our product is exceptional. We are attracting a lot of investment in the tourism sector — more than \$5 billion in the past year — which includes the construction of hotels and boutique, high-end brands. We are investing in our infrastructure, such as in new marinas, ports and eight airports. We are sending the message of being open for business and that tourism remains our most important industry."

This view is echoed wholeheartedly by Latia Duncombe, Acting Director General of the Bahamas Ministry of Tourism, Investment & Aviation (BMOTIA). "What makes the Bahamas unique is

**We have world class brands and our product is exceptional. We are attracting a lot of investment in the tourism sector — more than \$5 billion in the past year."**

Isaac Chester Cooper, Deputy PM and Min of Tourism, Investment and Aviation

omy and the future of tourism — which is rebounding with a vengeance," says Isaac Chester Cooper, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Tourism, Investment and Aviation. "We're in line with pre-pandemic levels; 2019 was a record year in which we

the 16-island destination," she explains. "It's 16 unique experiences in one destination. If you want nightlife, cosmopolitan flair and casinos then head to Nassau. We also have many family islands and lots of places for adventure, eco-tourism and cultural events."

## Prisma Reports wishes to thank its esteemed partners for their contribution to this project:



# Major maritime sector on the crest of a wave

With more than 1,400 vessels flying its flag, the country is well aware of the importance of its maritime activities and enjoys a seat at the top table of industry regulators

Blessed with a strategic location between several continents and proximity to crucial transhipment lanes that serve a comprehensive range of global consumer, industrial and commodity markets, it is no surprise the Bahamas has established an experienced and efficient maritime sector that complements other segments of the transportation and logistics industries.

Founded on centuries of seafaring tradition, the country's maritime sector benefits from a rich legislative and judicial background. The Bahamas Register is closely modelled on that of the UK, meaning shipowners, lawyers, bankers and other professionals involved in international shipping are familiar with it.

With hundreds of vessels flying its flag, the country is well aware of the importance of overseeing a diverse and varied portfolio of ships registered across a range of market sectors. The registry has developed an in-depth knowledge and understanding of each sector's specific needs, including in the cruise, bulk, general cargo, chemical and LNG tanker, and offshore oil and gas support vessel categories.

Much of the industry's success can be attributed to the work of The Bahamas Maritime Authority (BMA). The authority was formed three decades ago to ensure the sector continued to grow while adhering to the strictest regulatory and industry standards. The BMA's comprehensive range of responsibilities includes the registration of vessels, enforcement of ship safety requirements and year-round monitoring and improvement of operational standards.

The body — governed by a board of highly experienced and influential representatives from the government, transport and

shipping sectors — also represents the Bahamas at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and other key bodies like the European Commission and the US Coast Guard.

"The maritime sector has established itself because of our unique location," states Jobeth Coleby-Davis, Minister of Transport and Housing. "We have the access to tankers, vessels, transiting through our waters to get to the US side and to get over to the European side and Africa."

"Over the years, we have built relationships with various transhipment companies, transhipment hubs and other countries to connect our ports. We have created strong relationships with the cruise ship industry as that also helps us to balance our tourism product because the cruise ships berth at our ports, then disembark guests who take part in excursions and support our small business owners, local vendors and taxi drivers."

According to the highly-qualified minister, who has vast experience in legislative matters having been a lawyer, the maritime sector has been updating legislative agenda and regulatory agenda so it falls in line with IMO edicts. "We are a voice on behalf of all our flag members," she adds. "The firms flying our flags on their vessels expect the Bahamas to be their voice."

**Choppy fiscal waters overcome**  
Having taken the helm at the BMA only a year before the pandemic, CEO and MD Capt. Dwain Hutchinson faced a major challenge when it came to steering the authority through some of the toughest ever periods for shipping and tourism.

Having done so with aplomb, the experienced seafarer is eager to highlight the success of

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Hundreds of goods and passenger vessels fly the flag of the Bahamas worldwide



**Jobeth Coleby-Davis**  
Minister of Transport and Housing



**Capt. Dwain Hutchinson**  
CEO and MD, The Bahamas Maritime Authority

the authority and its vital role in running the seventh largest flag registry in the world — one that features an impressive total of more than 1,400 vessels.

"One of our strategic objectives has always been to provide a quality customer service that allows our vessels to continue to operate," he says. "Because of the pandemic we had to advance a lot of the processes that we have in place and a lot of it was centered around automation and leveraging the online tools. That became a big part of the BMA's ability to continue to support the industry. That is also reflected globally within shipping, because throughout the pandemic the ships were continuing to trade, whereas aircraft were not flying."

"The Bahamas is the number one flag for the cruise ship sector and we were able to support that industry. We have more than 140 cruise ships with the Bahamas

flag, so during the pandemic many were not operating."

## Full speed ahead for the BMA

With the global shipping industry facing hurdles ranging from container costs, supply chain disruption, climate change and geopolitics, the Bahamas is strengthening international collaboration to support the sector and ensure smooth passage.

"The BMA has a dedicated team that attends every IMO meeting and that is supported by all our different departments and the various agencies in the Bahamas," Hutchinson adds. "When we sit at the table at the IMO or the International Labour Organisation (ILO), we bring views that reflect the Bahamas' perspective and our policy position and that reflect the practical realities of ship operating; hence why we are seen as a pragmatic maritime organization."

# Passenger numbers up as aviation links boost islands' accessibility

The US has long been the principle source of tourists for the Bahamas and with a bilateral Open Skies policy now in place, airlines are busy launching new routes

As the Bahamas' enviable reputation as a picture-perfect getaway for a short-haul or long-haul escape all year round continues to grow, so does the number of ways to arrive, with new cruise itineraries and aviation routes bringing the country ever closer to more people than ever before.

The latest aviation milestone was achieved in November when leading operator Bahamasair launched a new, non-stop twice-weekly service to and from North Carolina. The inaugural nonstop flight from Raleigh to Freeport, Grand Bahama was roundly welcomed by airline and tourism chiefs.

"This is an exciting moment, not only for Freeport but also for the Bahamas at large," commented the BMOTIA's Duncombe during a special ceremony to mark the occasion. "We are happy to see renewed interest among North Carolinians, with visitor arrivals doubling since 2021.

"It's important to have 16 self-sustaining economically viable economies and we're doing everything to ensure that Bahamians have an opportunity to experience the economic pie. Through our tourism development corporation and our small business development center we are able to attract tourism and tourism-related industries and business partners; entrepreneurs



**Latia Duncombe**  
Acting Director General, BMOTIA

can set up here and benefit from the ease of doing business. We're providing access to expertise, financing, opportunities; so we're at a place where we're firing on all cylinders but we're ensuring that Bahamians are able to touch, see, feel, and benefit economically from the number one industry."

## Tourism take-off on new routes

Given the Bahamas' attractive status as a great place to live and a safe place to invest, there has been an uptick in the number of digital nomads and people relocating or retiring from elsewhere, meaning aviation links to major cities in the US and other countries are incredibly important.

In 2021, the Bahamas and the US signed an Open Skies Bilateral Agreement in a move welcomed



Tourism is taking off again as visitors flock to luxurious hotels and golden beaches

by industry players. Leading airline operators offer daily services to the archipelago, but an experienced and increasingly active key player is state-owned operator Bahamasair. Also set to celebrate its 50th anniversary in 2023, the award-winning airline is growing its fleet of aircraft steadily, with cities including Miami and Orlando among its most popular air corridors.

The household name scooped the title of the Caribbean's Leading Airline in 2020, 2021 and 2022 in the World Travel Awards and carried nearly one million

ance facility in Nassau, it makes our ability to fly to practically anywhere in the US achievable.

"Everybody in the Bahamas knows about Bahamasair and we understand our people and what they want from us as an airline. Bahamians traveling to the US usually combine vacations with shopping and we facilitate this need and travel option via very generous luggage allowances."

Vacationers are spoiled for choice when it comes to upscale accommodation choices, but the stunning Margaritaville Beach Resort Nassau is regarded as the

**Everyone in the Bahamas knows about us and we know our people and what they want from us as an airline."**

Tracy Cooper, Managing Director, Bahamasair

passengers per year prior to the pandemic, an impressive figure it expects to achieve again shortly.

"We are seeking to take advantage of the bilateral agreement with the US," says Bahamasair Managing Director, Tracy Cooper. "We have approval from the US Department of Transportation for Open Skies facilitation. With that in hand, and with the Bahamas having a US pre-clear-

crown jewel of downtown Nassau and a very new and hip-trendy resort that is especially popular with US tourists and families.

"We are a great family destination for the mid-scale to upper scale type of market," says hotel General Manager, Craig Martin. "Our great range of amenities includes a large movie theater, huge entertainment center, water park and bowling lanes."

**MARGARITAVILLE**  
*Beach Resort*  
NASSAU, BAHAMAS

**TREAT YOUR GROUP TO AN**  
*Island Escape*

# Infrastructure projects cultivate connectivity

Through the implementation of dynamic funding mechanisms like public-private partnerships (PPPs), the nation is rolling out new capital projects to enhance socioeconomic development

Although blessed with a wonderful selection of natural assets, the size and spread of the Bahamas' many islands, not to mention its vulnerability to powerful hurricanes and tropical storms, mean reliable and durable telecoms and transport infrastructure are of vital importance.

As a disparate country with dozens of inhabited islands stretched across 100,000 square miles of sea, ensuring residents, visitors and businesses can move around and thrive has required substantial investment in socio-economic projects, often with the financial assistance of foreign entities and companies.

"In the past decade we have lost more than \$8 billion in damages due to hurricanes," laments Minister of Works and Utilities, Alfred Sears. "We are among the most vulnerable countries to climate change and global warming as declared by the United Nations. When building transport infrastructure, we have to construct sea walls to protect the roads and communities from sea surges during hurricanes. Having very resilient defenses for the community and the road infrastructure is important."

The senior government official compares his ministry to a large design, engineering, quantity surveying and maintenance firm given the wide scope of the many public infrastructure projects under its umbrella. By embracing PPPs in recent years, the government has been able to move

more aggressively and rapidly, without having to come up with the up-front capital to fund the work of the administration.

"PPP is an important mechanism for the capital development for the Bahamas because it enables the government on a more rapid basis to roll out its capital projects," he states. "Currently, there are several PPPs in the area of road building and airport redevelopment and construction. We also have several bridges already designed and quantified that are ready to go and may involve PPPs."

## Reliable telecoms services vital

The highly unpredictable nature of the Caribbean weather during its annual hurricane season underlines the importance of strong and reliable telecoms infrastructure and service coverage.

In September 2019, Hurricane Dorian battered the region and knocked many cable and wireless networks offline for a considerable amount of time. Lessons were learned from that unfortunate ordeal and the industry, together with the government, has invested significant sums to ensure the situation is never repeated. Secure and reliable digital systems and networks are essential to the flourishing financial services sector.

As the only 100% Bahamian-owned communications provider, delivering residential and corporate broadband internet, cable television, fixed line and

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Given its unique topography, modern and resilient telecoms systems are utilized

mobile telephone and data services to the vast majority of the Bahamian population, Cable Bahamas Ltd is at the forefront of industry innovation across the long chain of islands.

"Coming off the impact of Dorian — where we saw significant infrastructure impacted — we are very proud of how [our mobile network] ALIV performed as we never lost fiber connectivity," says Cable Bahamas CEO, Franklyn Butler.

"We learned some lessons from that experience on resiliency and how do we harden and create additional resilience and redundancy from a network perspective. The pandemic further compounded that issue where we saw this explosion of the use of data, with lockdowns and people working from home."

Butler describes the Bahamas' digital infrastructure as "very strong and getting better" as tens of millions of dollars are invested in state-of-the-art infrastructure by leading players. "We have continued to invest in the expansion of our fiber backbone" he adds.


The pandemic and governments' reaction had a hugely

negative impact on international tourism and related industries, but did lead to a major uptick in the number of people opting to ditch commercial airlines for private jets and corporate aircraft.

This trend has been especially prevalent in the North American market and with the Bahamian brand well positioned in the luxury tourism segment given its many high-end hotels and resorts, business has boomed.

A family owned and operated company with more than 25 years of expertise, Jet Nassau offers a range of aviation services to business and leisure aircraft. As a Fixed Base Operator (FBO) — a coveted status given to a company that has been granted the right to operate at an airport — the firm is flush with success.

"In the Caribbean, we probably account for 60% of all corporate jet arrivals and will be investing heavily in infrastructure and assets, including new hangers and facilities, as it is required right now based on the projections from our clients that travel back and forth to the Bahamas," says proud General Manager Charles Bowe.



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# Banking and financial services players shine

Renowned for its expertise in financial services, the Bahamas has firmly positioned itself as the leading banking jurisdiction in the Caribbean and beyond

The financial services industry is considered the second pillar of the Bahamian economy, contributing about 15% of its GDP. Despite the pandemic, the country has maintained its status as a global financial leader, modernized key financial services legislation, and launched its digital currency: Sand Dollar. Issued in 2020, the Sand Dollar is the digital version of the Bahamian Dollar. It possesses identical legal status as the tangible currency and can be spent and earned via a wide range of transactions.

The Bahamas Financial Services Board (BFSB) adopts a multidisciplinary approach to complement the Bahamas' multiple financial services associations and represent all segments of the sector, from wealth management to investment funds. In addition, the forward-thinking entity has the key role of promoting the Bahamas among interna-

tional businesses and investors.

"We are a unique Public/Private partnership. Our membership is comprised of the full range of financial institutions; but we have a very close relationship with policy makers and regulators. We're not a regulatory body, but have influence on regulation and how it evolves," says BFSB CEO and Executive Director, Tanya McCartney.

"Our strategic priorities are to create a greater international awareness that the Bahamas is a financial services jurisdiction committed to the highest standards of regulation, committed to international cooperation, and a very well-regulated jurisdiction. The Bahamas has a very diverse financial services toolkit catering to institutional clients and to private individual clients."

Many of the world's leading insurers and reinsurers have a presence in the Bahamas, with

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**The beautiful Bahamian Parliament Building sits in the lovely capital of Nassau**

the number of licensed captive insurance entities growing steadily over the past decade as more and more firms seek out its many competitive advantages.

Watchdog the Insurance Commission of The Bahamas was launched just over a decade ago and in its role as both the prudential and market conduct regulator, its purpose is to ensure a sound and stable insurance marketplace and consumer confidence in the insurance industry.

"The Bahamas is a welcoming jurisdiction with a robust insurance regulatory regime along with knowledgeable and highly qualified financial services professionals," says Superintendent of Insurance Michele Fields.

The Securities Commission of The Bahamas is responsible for regulating and overseeing investment funds, securities and the capital markets. The commission utilizes market surveillance, regulatory oversight, enforcement of securities laws and its investor education program to protect investors, maintain fair, efficient and transparent markets, and reduce systemic risk.

"We continuously develop and improve upon our regulatory capacity, which includes the infrastructure, experience, foresight and talent necessary to develop and oversee an appropriately robust, thoughtful and innovative regulatory framework," says Executive Director, Christina Rolle.



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# Digitalization decisive to success of services

The ease of doing business in the Bahamas is becoming even simpler as digitalization of government systems and processes makes investment applications smoother still

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To little fanfare slightly over three years ago, an exciting new government business unit was born with the aim of reducing red tape and bureaucracy to improve investor appeal, enhance competitiveness and improve access to many public services.

The Department of Transformation and Digitization (DTD) strives to make “all major government services accessible on online platforms, thereby creating a more effective and seamless process for business to be conducted both locally and internationally with the government.”

Funded by a \$30 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the project will be completed in phases by 2026. Specific objectives comprise the streamlining of government procedures and making them available online to reduce the cost of government bureaucracy; increasing the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in the public sector; and improving transparency of government activities and strengthening auditing and control mechanisms.

“We recently digitized the application process which means it has been streamlined for inter-

national business and tourism investments, as well as financial services,” confirms Deputy Prime Minister Cooper. “We are making it easier and faster to do business and the result of that over the course of the past year has simply been phenomenal.”

## Banking sector reaps rewards

Similar success and progress has been recorded in the private sector, where excellent ICT infrastructure has helped companies in a broad range of industries, but particularly in the crucial banking and financial services sector, to thrive and become the second largest source of GDP.

Founded in the 1930's in the Bahamas by entrepreneurs and traditional bankers, Deltec Bank & Trust is a fully licensed and regulated financial services provider, offering traditional private and corporate banking services to clients globally in both innovative and traditional sectors. The bank has innovation in its DNA, and is known for bringing personalized, expert partnership to its traditional banking services.

“Our client experience is key and top of mind; we want our clients to have an ease of doing business,” explains CEO, Odetta

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Due to highly reliable ICT infrastructure, the remote working trend is growing fast

Morton. “We expect some of our upcoming investments in technology to continue to enhance the client experience. We want to make sure that we are fully supporting our clients, so that they don't have to worry about the business of doing banking and can focus on being innovators.”

Celebrating its 75th anniversary in 2023, Higgs & Johnson is a full-service law firm focused on the four core areas of dispute resolution, real estate and develop-

ment, private client and wealth management, and corporate and commercial. The firm has grown to have 104 members, 37 lawyers and 19 partners.

“We practice on an international level and with the large multinational law firms from around the world,” says Oscar N. Johnson, Co-Managing Partner. “We are looking to ensure we focus on client centered services by leveraging the technology present, and that is developing.”

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# Core pillars of stability inspire true confidence

Many leading international players in the banking and financial services sectors have arrived in recent decades, but there is still lots of space for dynamic smaller players

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Years of economic, political and civil stability, along with a sound and well-established legal framework based on English Common Law, have allowed the Bahamas' robust regulatory environment to flourish.

The Central Bank of The Bahamas has worked hard to foster an environment of monetary stability conducive to economic development, and to ensure a stable and secure financial system. Its success in creating a favorable operating environment has not just enabled huge multinationals to prosper, but smaller overseas operators as well as domestic players. With living standards high compared to other regions

of the Caribbean, the opportunities generated by well-paid employment and trickle down investment means consumer credit providers are in high demand.

Bank of The Bahamas (BOB) is a modern, full-service domestic bank providing innovative financial solutions for personal and corporate banking. The company operates a dozen branches on eight islands, namely Nassau, Grand Bahama, Andros, Bimini, Cat Island, Eleuthera, Inagua and San Salvador, and boasts a long history of firsts in the local banking industry.

The company's solid financial product portfolio includes mortgages, personal loans, savings

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**The Bahamas lives and breathes high-end tourism, but is also very family friendly**

and checking accounts, term deposits, wire transfers, online banking, and prepaid cards. Simultaneously, BOB's corporate and commercial, premier banking and merchant services departments facilitate the needs of leading business establishments throughout the country.

## Catering to the wealthy's needs

In the larger international arena, BOB's Premier Banking arm caters to high-net-worth clients seeking banking products and services that are suitable for their profiles and financial objectives. Customers can rely on a team of trained professionals with plenty of wealth management expertise and experience.

Like many of its competitors, BOB endured a challenging period during the disruption from the COVID-19 crisis and subsequent closure of international borders that rippled through an economy highly-dependent on foreign visitor spending and tourism-related investments.

Asked about the impact of the pandemic on BOB's operations and fortunes, Managing Director, Kenrick Brathwaite, noted it pushed his organization closer to the fast-moving digital world. "We realized that we must move more towards where cash is eliminated or reduced, and checks have been eliminated or reduced," he says.

"We are now in a world where we want to push the use of any kind of digital currency or credit cards. The Central Bank has introduced the Sand Dollar and the pandemic has shown us that it is easier than we thought. We can move towards it. Our disaster recovery planning is now more robust. We can shut down today and over 50% of my staff can work from home; the pandemic has shown us we are resilient."

"After the pandemic we adjusted our existing three-year strategic plan after a full analysis of the overall impact on the bank," he explains. "We were able to think about ways to capitalize."

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



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Kent Renk, Dec. 31, 2022

# What in the World?

*By Alexandra Sharp*

The following is adapted from past editions of FP's weekly online news quiz.

Test yourself every week at [ForeignPolicy.com](http://ForeignPolicy.com).



**1. Britain's longest-serving ruler, Queen Elizabeth II, died last September. How old was her son and heir when he took the throne as King Charles III?**

- a. 55
- b. 68
- c. 73
- d. 81

**2. Which country did Chinese President Xi Jinping travel to last fall in his first international trip since the COVID-19 pandemic began?**

- a. India
- b. Kazakhstan
- c. The United Kingdom
- d. Spain

**3. In recent months, Haiti has faced widespread protests in response to gang violence, economic turmoil, and a cholera outbreak. Who is the country's unelected prime minister?**

- a. Jovenel Moïse
- b. Ariel Henry
- c. Claude Joseph
- d. Joseph Lambert

**4. Members of OPEC and other major oil exporters agreed to slash oil production last October by how many barrels per day?**

- a. 500,000 barrels
- b. 1.3 million barrels
- c. 2 million barrels
- d. 7 million barrels

**5. Also that month, a livestream of which perishable food went viral after short-lived British Prime Minister Liz Truss announced her resignation?**

- a. A gallon of 1% milk
- b. A loaf of multigrain bread
- c. A 68-cent head of lettuce
- d. A bowl of avocados



**6. How long had Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandogo Damiba led Burkina Faso's junta before a coup ousted him last September?**

- a. Eight months
- b. One year
- c. Three years
- d. Seven years

**7. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was the only world leader permitted to do what at last year's United Nations General Assembly?**

- a. Give a speech via prerecorded video
- b. Send his vice president in his place
- c. Stay in the secretary-general's suite
- d. Speak in a nonofficial U.N. language



**8. Tehran has pledged to sue Washington over its alleged "direct involvement" in the anti-government protests that erupted in Iran last September. What initially catalyzed the unrest?**

- a. The anniversary of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei taking power
- b. Iran's stated support for Russia in its war with Ukraine
- c. President Ebrahim Raisi's tax cuts for Iran's wealthiest
- d. The death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini while in police custody

**9. Which country has helped mediate peace negotiations between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front?**

- a. Rwanda
- b. South Africa
- c. Zimbabwe
- d. Ghana



**10. In addition to taking over Twitter, billionaire Elon Musk has also entered the perfume industry. What is his personalized fragrance called?**

- a. Space Dust
- b. Forest Fire
- c. Burnt Hair
- d. Natural Musk

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