

An Introduction to My Research and Teaching

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Goals for Today

1. Discuss research and teaching credentials.
2. Outline my trajectory for research and teaching.
3. Emphasize fit with the School of Social and Political Sciences.



The Two Planks of My Research Agenda

My research clusters on two big questions:

1. How do conflict and threat influence political attitudes?
2. How do we understand conflict processes?

My research complements both quantitative peace science in IR and comparative political behavior.

How Do We Behave (Politically) When We're Threatened?





My Research Perspective

Individuals are stakeholders in politics.

- They react to various contextual threats to their well-being.
- Individuals react to these threats by empowering leadership to provide for them.

Under these conditions, liberal democracy is unlikely to endure or prosper.

Major Findings: Threat Reduces Conditions for Democracy

Finding	Publication
Terrorism reduces confidence in independent judiciaries.	<p>The Effect of Terrorism on Judicial Confidence</p> <p>Steven V. Miller[†]</p> <p><small>Political Research Quarterly 2015, Vol. 90(3), 794-805 © 2015 University of Utah Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1042717115287007 journals.sagepub.com/home/prq</small></p> <p></p>
Territorial threats lead to preferences for autocracy.	<p>Individual-level expectations of executive authority under territorial threat</p> <p>Steven V. Miller Clemson University, USA</p> <p><small>Conflict Management and Peace Science 2017, Vol. 34(3), 528-545 © The Author(s) 2015 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0898010115600884 journals.sagepub.com/home/cmp</small></p> <p></p>
Economic downturns dampen support for democracy.	<p><small>Polit Behav DOI: 10.1007/s11109-016-9363-7</small></p> <p>ORIGINAL PAPER</p> <p>Economic Threats or Societal Turmoil? Understanding Preferences for Authoritarian Political Systems</p> <p>Steven V. Miller[†]</p> <p><small>CrossMark</small></p>
Individuals permit government corruption under territorial threat.	<p><small>DISCUSSION</small></p> <p>External Territorial Threats and Tolerance of Corruption: A Private/Government Distinction</p> <p>Steven V. Miller[†]</p> <p><small>[†]Department of Political Science, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, USA; E-mail: smiller@clemson.edu http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-017-9370-8</small></p>

How Do We Understand Conflict Processes?

1. What explains patterns of war and peace?
2. What data can we bring to these questions?

Major Findings On What We Know About Conflict and Conflict Data

Finding

Our most widely used conflict data has some major errors (that we fix).

Publication

International Studies Quarterly (2015) 69, 719–739

An Analysis of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Dataset, 1816–2001

RESEARCH NOTE

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University of Alabama
STEVEN V. MILLER
Clemson University
doi:
10.1017/XIS.2015.10

Journal of Peace Research

External territorial threat, state capacity, and civil war

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Territorial threat reduces civil war onset.

Conflict Management and Peace Science
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cmps

Democracies, Territory, and Negotiated Compromises*

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Joint democracy has no independent effect on peaceful conflict resolution.

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Quick Victories? Territory, Democracies, and Their Disputes

Douglas M. Gibler¹ and Steven V. Miller¹

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DOI: 10.1177/0022002712446126
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Democracies have no discernible conflict selection advantages.

Works in Progress and Working Papers

Finding

A new estimate of country-year territorial threat (1816-2010).

Manuscript

A Random Item Response Model of External Territorial Threat, 1816-2010*

STEVEN V. MILLER, *Clemson University*

Multiple scholars have shown that external territorial threat, conceptually the level of concern for a state that its territorial integrity is subject to violent conflict and imposed restrictions by other states, has major implications for the state's domestic political environment. However, the standard of scholarship that agrees on the domestic political effects of external territorial threat disagrees on how to code this important concept. These works either rely on binary indicators that do open self-communicating, "succeeding" or "failing" territorial threat, or use the ordinal indicators of conflict preparedness as a stand-in for a state-year level observation. I use this research note to offer an empirical measurement of nine-year external territorial threat based on a Bayesian random item response model for all states from 1816 to 2010. I assess the face validity and construct validity of the data then model-generate all of which suggest the measure does well to capture the concept in question. I close with a statement of the reliability of the data and its potential applications.

Keywords: territorial threat, item response, mixed effects

peaceScience: Tools and Data for Quantitative Peace Science

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peaceScience is an R package for creating, analyzing, and visualizing data for quantitative peace science. It is designed to be used by researchers in the field of peace science, and it is designed to be used by researchers in the field of peace science. It is designed to be used by researchers in the field of peace science, and it is designed to be used by researchers in the field of peace science.



Installation

You will need some R skills to install this in R (link to R skills).

(link to package "peaceScience")

The Militarized Interstate Confraction (MIC) Dataset, 1816-2010

Douglas W. Galt, *University of Illinois, Chicago*

We use this article to introduce the Militarized Interstate Confraction (MIC) Dataset, which is a new dataset for international conflict with a host of innovative features. The MIC data corrects thousands of errors in existing, uncorrected MIC data and provides highly reliable data for all conflicts, with meaningful yearly estimates. Thus, the MIC data has missing data problems that had plagued researchers from studying qualitative and selected issues because of the lack of integrated conflict and war data. We also identify and describe specific datasets for the low-level conflict of state-territorial relations that are peace agreements. These are studies on shipping, fishing, trade, and other, that are included because the average of those private citizens provided. We discuss our extensive search for new conflict cases and the new conflicts we found, and, finally, we provide a replication that demonstrates the reliability of the data.

A new data set on international conflicts (1816-2010).

External Territorial Threat and Attitudes Toward Redistribution*

STEVEN V. MILLER, *Clemson University*

What do individuals expect from their state leader when the territorial integrity of the state is threatened? Intuitively, individuals want the leader to provide for their security and broadly represent the leader that that and not issues like the "border" (border/warfare) in 1945 and Abdul Basim's surprising presidential win in Ecuador in 1996 suggest individuals want something more than just territorial defense. I control these cases indicate a broader trend that we have yet to formalize in the study of territorial conflict. I present an argument that individuals under territorial threat expect security from the state that beyond simple physical security. This argument is that the demands for income equality for the case of public welfare as a government responsibility. I test this argument across four waves of World Values Survey data and find support for this argument. My findings suggest scholars interested in redistribution and income inequality can learn much about territorial threat as an important contextual influence on redistributive demands of the state.

An analysis of territorial threat's effect on attitudes toward wealth redistribution.

Bigger Plans/Projects Over the Next Five Years

My bigger plans require external funding to support research teams.

- The role of paramilitaries and pro-government militias in inter-state conflicts.
- A typology of disputed issues and issue evolution in conflict.
- A full data set on militarized territorial occupations.
- A military-based estimate of national capacity for war.
- A survey barometer on territorial threat in Asia.

Plan: pitch these projects to major funding research agencies.

- Economic and Social Research Council
- UK Research and Innovation (international collaboration with U.S. NSF)
- European Research Council (Advanced)

My Teaching Philosophy

My teaching philosophy stems from my background in quantitative peace science.

- Start with a definition of terms/concepts.
- Encourage students to think of goal-oriented behavior in strategic settings.
- Frame discussion as puzzle- or problem-solving.
- Get students to look at data related to in-class discussion.

Share knowledge with the general public.

- My lecture slides are always online at dedicated course websites.
- My Github contains reproducible code for all lectures.


What I Can Teach

Topic	Classes
<i>American politics</i>	introduction to American politics, public opinion
<i>Comparative politics</i>	intro to comparative politics, comparative political behavior
<i>IR</i>	intro to IR, U.S. foreign policy, international conflict
<i>Methods</i>	research design, any quant sequence beginner to advanced

Teaching Plans

- Expand quantitative methods instruction into data science.
- Build a workflow guide/curriculum for grad students around reproducible research.
- Teach quantitative methods around book project in progress.
- Enhance international conflict offerings with a peace science framework.

Check Out svmiller.com for More



Welcome

This is my academic website, where you can find information on my current research and the classes that I teach. I am an associate professor in the [Department of Political Science](#) at [Clemson University](#) and a [BITSS Catalyst](#) with the [Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the Social Sciences](#).

I use statistics and machine learning to understand why people adopt authoritarian political beliefs or embrace autocratic leaders in response to real or perceived threats. This puts my research and teaching interests at the broad intersection of international conflict and political behavior. My research outputs have appeared in peer-reviewed journals like *Comparative Political Studies*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Peace Research*, *Political Behavior*, and *Political Research Quarterly*, to name a few. More recent research is funded by the National Science Foundation and has even been highlighted in newspapers like *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*.

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