AI Safety & Security

Threat Modeling AI

What could possibly go wrong? What can we do about it?

Surelio.ai

Slides adapted from Prof. Dr. Andrei Kucharavy

AMLD 2026

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- Cyber-Defence Campus Fellow (2020)
  “Generative ML in Cyber-Defence”
- Safety and Security
  @ Apertus Team
- ”On-Premises LLMS: the Safe Way”
  @AMLD ‘24/’25
- Scientific Editor:
  LLMs in Cybersecurity (Springer)
- Contributor: OWASP & NIST PWG GenAI

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APERTVS



Who We Are

Adrien O’Hana

- Leads the technical direction of AI audit activities
- Oversees behavioral testing and system security assessments

Gaetan Stein

- Leads business operations and client relations
- Oversees AI audit and safety activities

What is Threat Modeling?

Threat Modeling works to **identify, communicate, and understand threats and mitigations** within the context of protecting something of value.

Threat Modeling involves the **intersection of two models**: a **model of what can go wrong (threats)**, applied to a **model of the software you're building or deploying**, which is encoded in a diagram.



Why Threat Model?

- Anticipate problems when it's inexpensive to deal with them
- Communicate risk clearly to stakeholders
- Prioritize security investment where it matters most

What is YOUR Threat Model?

Four-Step Framework

1. What are you building?
2. What can go wrong with it once it's built?
3. What should you do about those things that can go wrong?
4. Did you do a decent job of analysis?

Examples

- A thief who could steal your money
- The company stakeholders who access sensitive documents
- An untrusted network
- An attacker who could steal your cookie

Introduction: OWASP and GenAI Security

- **OWASP** (Open Worldwide Application Security Project) is a global non-profit foundation focused on improving software security.
- It regularly publishes and updates widely adopted security frameworks and best practices (e.g., OWASP Web Top 10).
- OWASP also maintains a dedicated initiative, **the OWASP GenAI Security Project**, which focuses on identifying and mitigating security risks specific to **Large Language Models** (LLMs) and **AI agents**.



OWASP Top 10 Risk & Mitigations for LLMs and Gen AI Apps

- What if you use an open-weights model?
- What if your LLM takes no actions?
- What if your LLM has no access to sensitive information?
- What if you don't use Plugins?

👍 Useful to start conversation about LLM app security

👎 Offers little help as how to ensure it

👎 Does not necessary apply to your system



NIST AI Risk Management Framework

MEASURE 1.3: Internal experts who did not serve as front-line developers for the system and/or independent assessors are involved in regular assessments and updates. Domain experts, users, AI Actors external to the team that developed or deployed the AI system, and affected communities are consulted in support of assessments as necessary per organizational risk tolerance.		
Action ID	**Suggested Action**	**GAI Risks**
MS-1.3-001	Define relevant groups of interest (e.g., demographic groups, subject matter experts, experience with GAI technology) within the context of use as part of plans for gathering structured public feedback.	Human-AI Configuration; Harmful Bias and Homogenization; CBRN Information or Capabilities
MS-1.3-002	Engage in internal and external evaluations, GAI red-teaming, impact assessments, or other structured human feedback exercises in consultation with representative AI Actors with expertise and familiarity in the context of use, and/or who are representative of the populations associated with the context of use.	Human-AI Configuration; Harmful Bias and Homogenization; CBRN Information or Capabilities
MS-1.3-003	Verify those conducting structured human feedback exercises are not directly involved in system development tasks for the same GAI model.	Human-AI Configuration; Data Privacy
AI Actor Tasks: AI Deployment, AI Development, AI Impact Assessment, Affected Individuals and Communities, Domain Experts, End-Users, Operation and Monitoring, TEVV		

NIST AI Risk Management Framework



👍 Explains what needs to be done and why

👍 Comprehensive

👎 Does not explain what actually needs to be done

👎 Unclear how to fit into your deployment

Kill Chains

- LLM systems exist within traditional cyber infrastructure.
- Attackers can **chain between** the AI kill chain and the traditional cyber kill chain; using one as an entry point to the other.



Figure 1. NVIDIA AI Kill Chain: stages of an attack on AI-powered applications



👍 Useful to understand different goals of attacker at different stages

👎 Does not show interplay with other systems

MITRE ATLAS

ATLAS Matrix

The ATLAS Matrix below shows the progression of tactics used in attacks as columns from left to right, with ML techniques belonging to each tactic below. & indicates an adaption from ATT&CK. Click on the blue links to learn more about each item, or search and view ATLAS tactics and techniques using the links at the top navigation bar. View the ATLAS matrix highlighted alongside ATT&CK Enterprise techniques on the ATLAS Navigator.

Filter by Maturity

Feasible — Demonstrated — Realized

Reconnaissance&	Resource Development&	Initial Access&	AI Model Access	Execution&	Persistence&	Privilege Escalation&	Defense Evasion&	Credential Access&	Discovery&	Lateral Movement&	Collection&	AI Attack Staging	Command and Control&	Exfiltration&	Impact&
8 techniques	12 techniques	7 techniques	4 techniques	6 techniques	8 techniques	3 techniques	11 techniques	5 techniques	9 techniques	2 techniques	4 techniques	6 techniques	2 techniques	6 techniques	8 techniques
Active Scanning &	Acquire Infrastructure	AI Supply Chain Compromise	AI Model Inference API Access	AI Agent Clickbait	AI Agent Context Poisoning	AI Agent Tool Invocation	Corrupt AI Model	AI Agent Tool Credential Harvesting	Cloud Service Discovery &	Phishing &	AI Artifact Collection	Craft Adversarial Data	AI Service API	Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation	Cost Harvesting
Gather RAG-Indexed Targets	Acquire Public AI Artifacts	Drive-by Compromise &	AI-Enabled Product or Service	AI Agent Tool Invocation	AI Agent Tool Data Poisoning	LLM Jailbreak	Delay Execution of LLM Instructions	Credentials from AI Agent Configuration	Discover AI Agent Configuration	Use Alternate Authentication Material &	Data from AI Services	Create Proxy AI Model	Reverse Shell	Exfiltration via AI Inference API	Data Destruction via AI Agent Tool Invocation
Gather Victim Identity Information &	Develop Capabilities &	Evade AI Model	Full AI Model Access	Command and Scripting Interpreter &	LLM Prompt Self-Replication	Valid Accounts &	Evade AI Model	OS Credential Dumping &	Discover AI Artifacts		Data from Information Repositories &	Generate Deepfakes		Exfiltration via Cyber Means	Denial of AI Service
Search Application Repositories	Establish Accounts &	Exploit Public-Facing Application &	Physical Environment Access	Deploy AI Agent	Manipulate AI Model		False RAG Entry Injection	RAG Credential Harvesting	Discover AI Model Family		Data from Local System &	Generate Malicious Commands		Extract LLM System Prompt	Erode AI Model Integrity
Search Open AI Vulnerability Analysis	LLM Prompt Crafting	Phishing &		LLM Prompt Injection	Modify AI Agent Configuration		Impersonation &	Unsecured Credentials &	Discover AI Model Ontology			Manipulate AI Model		LLM Data Leakage	Erode Dataset Integrity
Search Open Technical Databases &	Obtain Capabilities &	Prompt Infiltration via Public-Facing Application		User Execution &	Poison Training Data		LLM Jailbreak		Discover AI Model Outputs			Verify Attack		LLM Response Rendering	Evade AI Model
Search Open Websites/Domains &	Poison Training Data	Valid Accounts &			Prompt Infiltration via Public-Facing Application		LLM Prompt Obfuscation		Discover LLM Hallucinations						External Harms
Search Victim-Owned Websites &	Publish Hallucinated Entities				RAG Poisoning		LLM Trusted Output Components Manipulation		Discover LLM System Information						Spamming AI System with Chaff Data
	Publish Poisoned Datasets						Manipulate User LLM Chat History		Process Discovery &						
	Publish Poisoned Models						Masquerading &								
	Retrieval Content Crafting						Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion &								
	Stage Capabilities &														

MITRE ATLAS



👍 What attacker can do

👍 When/why attacker would do it

👎 Does not explain how to apply it to your system

👎 At times questionable (security by obscurity)

STRIDE over DFD

TB01	External Endpoints	
	Strengths	Weaknesses
Spoofing		VULN01: Modify System prompt (prompt injection)
Tampering		VULN02: Modify LLM parameters (temperature, length, model, etc.)
Repudiation	Proper authentication and authorization (assumed)	
Information Disclosure		VULN03: Input sensitive information to a third-party site (user behavior)
Denial of Service		
Elevation of Privilege	Proper authentication and authorization (assumed)	

TB02	LLM	
	Strengths	Weaknesses
Spoofing		VULN05: Output controlled by prompt input (unfiltered)
Tampering		VULN05: Output controlled by prompt input (unfiltered)
Repudiation		
Information Disclosure		
Denial of Service		
Elevation of Privilege		



👍 Specific to your application

👍 Explains where you can stop the attacker

👎 Exhausting and unsexy

[1] https://aivillage.org/large%20language%20models/2023/06/06/threat-modeling-llm

MAESTRO (CSA)

"Multi-Agent Environment, Security, Threat, Risk, and Outcome"



👍 Designed for Agentic AI

👎 Overkill for simpler LLM-powered applications

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STRIDE over DFD for LLM apps

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Data Flow Diagrams

4 main components of a DFD

Element	Shape	Definition
Process		Task that receives, modifies, or redirects input to output
Data store		Permanent and temporary data storage
External entity		Task, entity, or data store outside of your direct control
Data-flow		Data movement between processes, data stores, and external entities
Trust boundary		Trust zone changes as data flows through the system



[1] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/training/paths/tm-threat-modeling-fundamentals/

STRIDE

STRIDE comes from Microsoft's security team in the 90s.

S	**Spoofing**	Pretending to be someone/something else
T	**Tampering**	Unauthorized modification of data
R	**Repudiation**	Denying having performed an action
I	**Information disclosure**	Exposing data to unauthorized parties
D	**Denial of Service**	Making Resources unavailable
E	**Elevation of Privilege**	Gaining unauthorized capabilities

It's a checklist of threat *types* to consider:

- Can someone fake identity?
- Modify data?
- Deny actions?
- Leak info?
- Break availability?
- Gain unauthorized access?

STRIDE for LLM apps

- Initially formulated in late 2023 (Inspired by Black Hat AI Village and Vogelsang & Majumdar's article in Andrei's LLMs in Cybersecurity book)
- Predicted several attacks & contributed to several internal threat modeling frameworks



Intersection of two models:

- How does the app work?
- What can an attacker do?

Ingress point:

- Where can the attacker enter?

Attack target:

- What is the attacker seeking to achieve?

Trust boundary:

- Where can we stop the attacker?

STRIDE for LLM apps



S	**Spoofing (data authenticity)**	Make LLM read from the wrong database
T	**Tampering (data integrity)**	Make LLM cite poisoned information
R	**Repudiation (data origin)**	Make LLM cite the wrong source
I	**Information disclosure (privacy)**	Make LLM extract private documents
D	**Denial of Service (data availability)**	Exhaust resources via expensive queries
E	**Elevation of Privilege (access rights)**	Make LLM run sudo shell commands

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Top 5 Threats & Mitigations

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Input Sanitization



MTG-1 – Input Sanitization

Do not use a prompted or fine-tuned LLM!



Common Open-Source approach:

- LLaMA-Guard (X generative)
- Prompt-Guard

Open Source:

- Rebuff.ai
- NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails
- LLM-Guard

NVIDIA

LLM Guard

API access:

- Lakera Guard
- Vijil Dome

LAKERA

vijil

Additional popular Guardrails Tools

Most LLM/Cloud APIs now offer built-in Guardrail capabilities:

Azure AI Content Safety

Amazon Bedrock Guardrails

Google Checks

Checks Guardrails API is now available in alpha version in private preview.

OpenAI Guardrails Preview



MTG-2 - Data Access Control

Do not rely on LLM alone for data access control!



Control methods of Database Security

Last Updated : 15 Dec, 2021

Database Security means keeping sensitive information safe and prevent the loss of data. Security of data base is controlled by Database Administrator (DBA).

The following are the main control measures are used to provide security of data in databases:

1. Authentication
2. Access control
3. Inference control
4. Flow control
5. Database Security applying Statistical Method
6. Encryption

These are explained as following below.

Dependencies

ML Python code (App)

App & Dataflow Piping

Python Dependencies

Build dependencies

You write this

You trust this

Hardware

Infrastructure

DeepSeek AI tools impersonated by infostealer malware on PyPI

By Bi

The Hacker News

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OpenAI Reveals Redis Bug Behind ChatGPT User Data Exposure Incident

Mar 25, 2023 Ravie Lakshmanan

OpenAI on Friday disclosed that a bug in the Redis open source library was responsible for the exposure of other users' personal information and chat titles in the upstart's ChatGPT service earlier this week.

The glitch, which came to light on March 20, 2023, enabled certain users to view brief descriptions of other users' conversations from the chat history sidebar, prompting the company to temporarily shut down the chatbot.

MTG-3 – Dependencies

Avoid version locking when you can!



Kreb's rule of online security 1:
If you didn't go looking for it, don't install it!

→ Validate dependencies

Kreb's rule of online security 2:
If you installed it, update it.

→ Weekly update rebuilds

Kreb's rule of online security 3:
If you no longer need it, remove it.

[1] https://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/05/krebss-3-basic-rules-for-online-safety/

External References





MTG-4 - External References

Treat external references as user inputs



Treat external references as user inputs

- Assume all external data as containing prompt injections
- Sanitize all external data as if they were user input

→ llama/Prompt-Guard

→ Better: referenced data control

Code Generation



Top 10 Anti-Patterns

RANK	ANTI-PATTERN	SCORE	KEY STATISTIC
#1	Dependency Risks (Slopsquatting)	24	5-21% of AI packages don't exist
#2	XSS Vulnerabilities	23	86% failure rate in AI code
#3	Hardcoded Secrets	23	Scraped within minutes of exposure
#4	SQL Injection	22	Thousands of instances in training data
#5	Authentication Failures	22	75.8% false confidence in AI auth
#6	Missing Input Validation	21	Root cause of all injection attacks
#7	Command Injection	21	CVE-2025-53773 real-world RCE
#8	Missing Rate Limiting	20	Very high frequency, easy to detect
#9	Excessive Data Exposure	20	APIs return full objects
#10	Unrestricted File Upload	20	Critical severity, enables RCE

MTG-5 - Code Generation

Treat code generated by LLMs as untrusted!



- Run LLM-generated code in sandboxed environment
  - Docker
  - chroot jail
- Block the use of libraries outside allowlist
- Block internet connections

Threat Modeling Will Take You Only So Far

No plan survives
contact with the enemy
- von Moltke, 1871

Real attacker are not limited by what defenders have anticipated.

Hence

We need the ability to detect them and analyze their actions.

Logging is essential

Logging: What to Do

1. Logs must be sufficiently detailed
2. Logs must not be removable
    - Deletion impossible even by admins
3. Logging must not be “off-turnable”
4. Logs must be retained for sufficiently long
    - Investigation must be able to use them
5. Logs must be treated as private information
6. Logs must be monitored
7. **Action must be taken in case of anomalies**

Logging: How To Do

- If local software logging system
  - Attach to it

- Otherwise
  - Local Logs
  - Push to External Services
    - WandB
    - Sentry
    - Discord
    - Slack
    - Mail
    - …

LLMOps Lifecycle



Evaluations & Observability Good Practices

Evaluations must evolve with the product.
Criteria are not fixed: they must follow the evolution of the model and its uses.

Benchmarks are indicators, not decisions.
They guide thinking, but they do not replace human or contextual judgment.

Your intuition (“vibe check”) becomes your first evaluation.
Perceived anomalies or weak signals during testing are already useful alerts.

Don’t overcomplicate everything with scores from 1 to 5.
Sometimes, a binary evaluation (sure / not sure, valid / not valid) is more effective.

Who we are.

Surelio.ai combines scientific, technical and operational expertise to evaluate how AI systems behave in real-world, high-stakes environments, ensuring organisations can deploy AI with confidence.

We work with private companies, industrial groups, public institutions and emerging tech organisations, always under strict confidentiality.

Meet the team

Gaetan Stein
Operations Lead

Adrien O'Hana
Technology lead

Prof. Dr. Andrei Kucharavy
Scientific Lead

Prof. Dr. Dimitri Percia David
Scientific Lead

Rémi Sabonnadière
Strategic advisor

Elliott Bertrand
Strategic advisor

Unlimtrust Campus

Thank you!

Please take 5 minutes to provide us with feedback:

Schedule a meeting with Surelio.ai

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Hes·so VALAIS WALLIS

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