

Threat Modeling AI

What could possibly go wrong? What can we do about it?

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 @AMLD ‘24/’25
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 LLMs in Cybersecurity (Springer)
- Contributor: OWASP & NIST PWG GenAI

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 Hochschule für
Wirtschaft



^ P E R T V S



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Valentin Mulder · Alain Mermoud ·
Vincent Lenders *Editors*

Large
Language
Models in
Cybersecurity

Threats, Exposure and Mitigation

OPEN ACCESS

 Springer

Who We Are



Adrien O'Hana

- Leads the technical direction of AI audit activities
- Oversees behavioral testing and system security assessments



Gaetan Stein


- Leads business operations and client relations
- Oversees AI audit and safety activities



What is Threat Modeling?

Threat Modeling works to **identify, communicate, and understand threats and mitigations** within the context of protecting something of value.


Threat Modeling involves the **intersection of two models**: a **model of what can go wrong (threats)**, applied to a **model of the software you're building or deploying**, which is encoded in a diagram.



Why Threat Model?



- Anticipate problems when it's inexpensive to deal with them
- Communicate risk clearly to stakeholders
- Prioritize security investment where it matters most



What is YOUR Threat Model?

Four-Step Framework

1. What are you building?
2. What can go wrong with it once it's built?
3. What should you do about those things that can go wrong?
4. Did you do a decent job of analysis?

Examples

- A thief who could steal your money
- The company stakeholders who access sensitive documents
- An untrusted network
- An attacker who could steal your cookie



the grugq
@thegrugq

Following

Your threat model is not my threat model.




9:42 AM - 15 May 2017



Introduction: OWASP and GenAI Security

- OWASP (Open Worldwide Application Security Project) is a global non-profit foundation focused on improving software security.
- It regularly publishes and updates widely adopted security frameworks and best practices (e.g., OWASP Web Top 10).
- OWASP also maintains a dedicated initiative, [the OWASP GenAI Security Project](#), which focuses on identifying and mitigating security risks specific to Large Language Models (LLMs) and AI agents.



OWASP Top 10 Risk & Mitigations for LLMs and Gen AI Apps

- What if you use an open-weights model?
- What if your LLM takes no actions?
- What if your LLM has no access to sensitive information?
- What if you don't use Plugins?

👍 Useful to start conversation about LLM app security

👎 Offers little help as how to ensure it
👎 Does not necessarily apply to your system

 LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection A Prompt Injection Vulnerability occurs when user prompts alter the... Read More	 LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure Sensitive information can affect both the LLM and its application... Read More	 LLM03:2025 Supply Chain LLM supply chains are susceptible to various vulnerabilities, which can... Read More	 LLM04:2025 Data and Model Poisoning Data poisoning occurs when pre-training, fine-tuning, or embedding data is... Read More	 LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling Improper Output Handling refers specifically to insufficient validation, sanitization, and... Read More
 LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency An LLM-based system is often granted a degree of agency... Read More	 LLM07:2025 System Prompt Leakage The system prompt leakage vulnerability in LLMs refers to the... Read More	 LLM08:2025 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses Vectors and embeddings vulnerabilities present significant security risks in systems... Read More	 LLM09:2025 Misinformation Misinformation from LLMs poses a core vulnerability for applications relying... Read More	 LLM10:2025 Unbounded Consumption Unbounded Consumption refers to the process where a Large Language... Read More



NIST AI Risk Management Framework

MEASURE 1.3: Internal experts who did not serve as front-line developers for the system and/or independent assessors are involved in regular assessments and updates. Domain experts, users, AI Actors external to the team that developed or deployed the AI system, and affected communities are consulted in support of assessments as necessary per organizational risk tolerance.

Action ID	Suggested Action	GAI Risks
MS-1.3-001	Define relevant groups of interest (e.g., demographic groups, subject matter experts, experience with GAI technology) within the context of use as part of plans for gathering structured public feedback.	Human-AI Configuration; Harmful Bias and Homogenization; CBRN Information or Capabilities
MS-1.3-002	Engage in internal and external evaluations, GAI red-teaming, impact assessments, or other structured human feedback exercises in consultation with representative AI Actors with expertise and familiarity in the context of use, and/or who are representative of the populations associated with the context of use.	Human-AI Configuration; Harmful Bias and Homogenization; CBRN Information or Capabilities
MS-1.3-003	Verify those conducting structured human feedback exercises are not directly involved in system development tasks for the same GAI model.	Human-AI Configuration; Data Privacy

AI Actor Tasks: AI Deployment, AI Development, AI Impact Assessment, Affected Individuals and Communities, Domain Experts, End-Users, Operation and Monitoring, TEVV



NIST AI Risk Management Framework

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A

- 👍 Explains what needs to be done and why
- 👍 Comprehensive

- 👎 Does not explain what actually needs to be done
- 👎 Unclear how to fit into your deployment

Involved in system development tasks for the same GAI model.

Privacy

AI Actor Tasks: AI Deployment, AI Development, AI Impact Assessment, Affected Individuals and Communities, Domain Experts, End-Users, Operation and Monitoring, TEVV



Kill Chains

- LLM systems exist within traditional cyber infrastructure.
- Attackers can **chain between** the AI kill chain and the traditional cyber kill chain; using one as an entry point to the other.





Figure 1. NVIDIA AI Kill Chain: stages of an attack on AI-powered applications

THE CYBER KILL CHAIN



👍 Useful to understand different goals of attacker at different stages

👎 Does not show interplay with other systems



MITRE ATLAS

ATLAS Matrix

The ATLAS Matrix below shows the progression of tactics used in attacks as columns from left to right, with ML techniques belonging to each tactic below. & indicates an adaption from ATT&CK. Click on the blue links to learn more about each item, or search and view ATLAS tactics and techniques using the links at the top navigation bar. View the ATLAS matrix highlighted alongside ATT&CK Enterprise techniques on the [ATLAS Navigator](#).

Filter by Maturity

Feasible Demonstrated Realized

Reconnaissance&	Resource Development&	Initial Access&	AI Model Access	Execution&	Persistence&	Privilege Escalation&	Defense Evasion&	Credential Access&	Discovery&	Lateral Movement&	Collection&	AI Attack Staging	Command and Control&	Exfiltration&	Impact&
8 techniques	12 techniques	7 techniques	4 techniques	6 techniques	8 techniques	3 techniques	11 techniques	5 techniques	9 techniques	2 techniques	4 techniques	6 techniques	2 techniques	6 techniques	8 techniques
Active Scanning & Gather RAG-Indexed Targets Gather Victim Identity Information & Search Application Repositories Search Open AI Vulnerability Analysis Search Open Technical Databases & Search Open Websites/Domains & Search Victim-Owned Websites &	Acquire Infrastructure Acquire Public AI Artifacts Develop Capabilities & Establish Accounts & LLM Prompt Crafting Obtain Capabilities & Poison Training Data Publish Hallucinated Entities Publish Poisoned Datasets Publish Poisoned Models Retrieval Content Crafting Stage Capabilities &	AI Supply Chain Compromise Drive-by Compromise & Evade AI Model Exploit Public-Facing Application & Physical Environment Access Prompt Infiltration via Public-Facing Application Valid Accounts &	AI Model Inference API Access AI Agent Clickbait AI Agent Context Poisoning AI-Enabled Product or Service Command and Scripting Interpreter & Full AI Model Access Deploy AI Agent LLM Prompt Injection Manipulate AI Model Modify AI Agent Configuration User Execution &	AI Agent Tool Invocation AI Agent Data Poisoning LLM Prompt Self-Replication Deploy AI Agent Manipulate AI Model Modify AI Agent Configuration Poison Training Data Prompt Infiltration via Public-Facing Application RAG Poisoning	Corrupt AI Model LLM Jailbreak Valid Accounts &	Delay Execution of LLM Instructions Evade AI Model False RAG Entry Injection Impersonation & LLM Jailbreak Unsecured Credentials &	AI Agent Tool Credential Harvesting Credentials from AI Agent Configuration OS Credential Dumping & RAG Credential Harvesting Discover AI Artifacts Discover AI Model Family Discover AI Model Ontology Discover AI Model Outputs Discover LLM Hallucinations Discover LLM System Information Process Discovery &	Cloud Service Discovery & Discover AI Agent Configuration Phishing & Use Alternate Authentication Material &	AI Artifact Collection Data from AI Services Data from Information Repositories & Data from Local System &	Craft Adversarial Data Create Proxy AI Model Generate Deepfakes Generate Malicious Commands Manipulate AI Model Verify Attack	AI Service API Reverse Shell Exfiltration via AI Inference API Exfiltration via Cyber Means Extract LLM System Prompt LLM Data Leakage LLM Response Rendering Evade AI Model External Harms	Cost Harvesting Data Destruction via AI Agent Tool Invocation Denial of AI Service Erode AI Model Integrity Erode Dataset Integrity Spamming AI System with Chaff Data			



MITRE ATLAS

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Filter by Maturity

Future Demonstrated Realized

Reconnaissance

- 8 techniques
- Active Scanning *
- Gather RAG-Indexed Targets
- Gather Victim Identity Information *
- Search Application Repositories
- Search Open AI Vulnerability Analysis
- Search Open Technical Databases *
- Search Open Websites/Domains
- Search Victim-Owned Websites *

Impact

- 8 techniques
- Cost Harvesting
- Data Destruction via AI Agent
- Tool Invocation
- Denial of AI Service
- Erode AI Model Integrity
- Erode Dataset Integrity
- Evasion AI Model
- External Harms
- Spamming AI System with Chaff Data

What attacker can do

When/why attacker would do it

Does not explain how to apply it to your system


At times questionable (security by obscurity)



STRIDE over DFD

External Endpoints		
	Strengths	Weaknesses
Spoofing		VULN01: Modify System prompt (prompt injection)
Tampering		VULN02: Modify LLM parameters (temperature, length, model, etc.)
Repudiation	Proper authentication and authorization (assumed)	
Information Disclosure		VULN03: Input sensitive information to a third-party site (user behavior)
Denial of Service		
Elevation of Privilege	Proper authentication and authorization (assumed)	


LLM		
	Strengths	Weaknesses
Spoofing		VULN05: Output controlled by prompt input (unfiltered)
Tampering		VULN05: Output controlled by prompt input (unfiltered)
Repudiation		
Information Disclosure		
Denial of Service		
Elevation of Privilege		



- 👍 Specific to your application
- 👍 Explains where you can stop the attacker
- 👎 Exhausting and unsexy

MAESTRO (CSA)

"Multi-Agent Environment, Security, Threat, Risk, and Outcome"



👍 Designed for Agentic AI

👎 Overkill for simpler LLM-powered applications




STRIDE over DFD for LLM apps

Data Flow Diagrams

4 main components of a DFD

Element	Shape	Definition
Process	○	Task that receives, modifies, or redirects input to output
Data store		Permanent and temporary data storage
External entity	□	Task, entity, or data store outside of your direct control
Data-flow	↔	Data movement between processes, data stores, and external entities
Trust boundary	□	Trust zone changes as data flows through the system



STRIDE

STRIDE comes from Microsoft's security team in the 90s.

S

Spoofing

Pretending to be someone/something else

T

Tampering

Unauthorized modification of data

R

Repudiation

Denying having performed an action

I

Information disclosure

Exposing data to unauthorized parties

D

Denial of Service

Making Resources unavailable

E

Elevation of Privilege

Gaining unauthorized capabilities


It's a checklist of threat *types* to consider:

- Can someone fake identity?
- Modify data?
- Deny actions?
- Leak info?
- Break availability?
- Gain unauthorized access?



STRIDE for LLM apps

- Initially formulated in late 2023 (Inspired by Black Hat AI Village and Vogelsang & Majumdar's article in Andrei's LLMs in Cybersecurity book)
- Predicted several attacks & contributed to several internal threat modeling frameworks



Intersection of two models:

- How does the app work?
- What can an attacker do?

Ingress point:

- Where can the attacker enter?

Attack target:


- What is the attacker seeking to achieve?

Trust boundary:

- Where can we stop the attacker?



STRIDE for LLM apps





S	Spoofing (data authenticity) Make LLM read from the wrong database
T	Tampering (data integrity) Make LLM cite poisoned information
R	Repudiation (data origin) Make LLM cite the wrong source
I	Information disclosure (privacy) Make LLM extract private documents
D	Denial of Service (data availability) Exhaust resources via expensive queries
E	Elevation of Privilege (access rights) Make LLM run sudo shell commands




Top 5 Threats & Mitigations

Input Sanitization




Input Sanitization



MTG-1 – Input Sanitization

Do not use a prompted or fine-tuned LLM!



Common Open-Source approach:

- LLaMA-Guard (X generative)
- Prompt-Guard



Open Source:

- [Rebuff.ai](#)
- [NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails](#)
- [LLM-Guard](#)




API access:

- [Lakera Guard](#)
- [Vijil Dome](#)



MTG-2 - Data Access Control

Do not rely on LLM alone for data access control!



Control methods of Database Security

Last Updated : 15 Dec, 2021


Database Security means keeping sensitive information safe and prevent the loss of data. Security of data base is controlled by Database Administrator (DBA).

The following are the main control measures are used to provide security of data in databases:

1. Authentication
2. Access control
3. Inference control
4. Flow control
5. Database Security applying Statistical Method
6. Encryption

These are explained as following below.

Dependencies



Dependencies

DeepSeek AI tools impersonated by infostealer malware on PyPI

By Bill Toulias


February 3, 2025

11:33 AM

0

You
write
this

You
trust
this



Dependencies

ML Python code
(App)

App & Dataflow
Piping

Python
Dependencies

Build dependencies

Hardware

Infrastructure

You
write
this

You
trust
this

DeepSeek AI tools impersonated by info-stealer malware on PyPI

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OpenAI Reveals Redis Bug Behind ChatGPT User Data Exposure Incident

Mar 25, 2023 · Ravie Lakshmanan


OpenAI on Friday disclosed that a bug in the Redis open source library was responsible for the exposure of other users' personal information and chat titles in the upstart's ChatGPT service earlier this week.

The [glitch](#), which came to light on March 20, 2023, enabled certain users to view brief descriptions of other users' conversations from the chat history sidebar, prompting the company to temporarily shut down the chatbot.



MTG-3 – Dependencies

Avoid version locking when you can!



Kreb's rule of online security 1:

If you didn't go looking for it, don't install it!

→ Validate dependencies

Kreb's rule of online security 2:

If you installed it, update it.


→ Weekly update rebuilds

Kreb's rule of online security 3:

If you no longer need it, remove it.

[1] <https://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/05/krebss-3-basic-rules-for-online-safety/>

External References



≡ cybernews®

Home >> News


Hackers poison Google search results by spreading malware as spoofed VPN solution

Updated on: September 02, 2024 2:09 PM



Ernestas Naprys, Senior Journalist

The screenshot shows a news article from cybernews.com. The headline is "Hackers poison Google search results by spreading malware as spoofed VPN solution". The article was updated on September 02, 2024, at 2:09 PM. The author is Ernestas Naprys, Senior Journalist. The background of the page features the Google logo.

External References




External References



MTG-4 - External References


Treat external references as user inputs



Treat external references as user inputs

- Assume all external data as containing prompt injections
- Sanitize all external data as if they were user input
 - Ilama/Prompt-Guard
 - Better: referenced data control

Code Generation




Top 10 Anti-Patterns

RANK	ANTI-PATTERN	SCORE	KEY STATISTIC
#1	Dependency Risks (Slopsquatting)	24	5-21% of AI packages don't exist
#2	XSS Vulnerabilities	23	86% failure rate in AI code
#3	Hardcoded Secrets	23	Scraped within minutes of exposure
#4	SQL Injection	22	Thousands of instances in training data
#5	Authentication Failures	22	75.8% false confidence in AI auth
#6	Missing Input Validation	21	Root cause of all injection attacks
#7	Command Injection	21	CVE-2025-53773 real-world RCE
#8	Missing Rate Limiting	20	Very high frequency, easy to detect
#9	Excessive Data Exposure	20	APIs return full objects
#10	Unrestricted File Upload	20	Critical severity, enables RCE



MTG-5 - Code Generation

Treat code generated by LLMs as untrusted!



- Run LLM-generated code in sandboxed environment
 - Docker
 - chroot jail
- Block the use of libraries outside allowlist
- Block internet connections



Threat Modeling Will Take You Only So Far



*No plan survives
contact with the enemy*
- von Moltke, 1871

Real attacker are not limited by what defenders have anticipated.

Hence

We need the ability to detect them and analyze their actions.

Logging is essential



Logging: What to Do

1. Logs must be sufficiently detailed
2. Logs must not be removable
 - Deletion impossible even by admins
3. Logging must not be “off-turnable”
4. Logs must be retained for sufficiently long
 - Investigation must be able to use them
5. Logs must be treated as private information
6. Logs must be monitored
- 7. Action must be taken in case of anomalies**




Logging: How To Do

- If local software logging system
 - Attach to it
- Otherwise
 - Local Logs
 - Push to External Services
 - WandB
 - Sentry
 - Discord
 - Slack
 - Mail
 - ...



LLM Ops Lifecycle



Evaluations & Observability

Good Practices

Evaluations must evolve with the product.

Criteria are not fixed: they must follow the evolution of the model and its uses.

Benchmarks are indicators, not decisions.

They guide thinking, but they do not replace human or contextual judgment.

Your intuition (“vibe check”) becomes your first evaluation.

Perceived anomalies or weak signals during testing are already useful alerts.

Don’t overcomplicate everything with scores from 1 to 5.

Sometimes, a binary evaluation (sure / not sure, valid / not valid) is more effective.

