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ACL 2024 Tutorial:

# Vulnerabilities of Large Language Models to Adversarial Attacks

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https://llm-vulnerability.github.io/

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# Participation and QA

All tutorial slides and reading lists are available at:

https://llm-vulnerability.github.io/

We will provide live Q & A on sli.do:

https://app.sli.do/event/9bcE9ic62byZnYNqPQ59V3 - TEST

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# Adversarial Attacks

Inputs that appear normal to humans but cause neural networks to *misbehave*.

: **Panda**

+



Adversarial Noise

=

: **Gibbon**

Appears to be a fundamental **vulnerability** of neural networks that has not been addressed even after a decade of study.

# Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Models

## LLM Misbehaviors




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# Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Models

**Preventing Harmful Content Generation:**




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# Jailbreaking In LLMs




**Jailbreaking:**

Safety Training is the proverbial “jail” and we wish to find methods that “break” this jail and cause the LLM to answer freely.

# Jailbreaking In LLMs




SmoothLLM: Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attacks

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# Threat Models and Attack Vectors

**Threat Models:**

1. White-box / Full Access — Attack knows the exact implementation of the victim.
2. Grey-box / Partial Access
3. Black-box / IO Access

**Attack Vectors for Large Language Models:**

Text (+Weights, Gradients, Activations)

# Adversarial Attacks on Vision Language Models

VLM Misbehavior




Harmful Content Generation

# Adversarial Attacks on Vision Language Models

## VLM Misbehavior



An image of a panda perturbed such that Vision Models mislabel it as a **Molotov**. (Ilyas et al. 2019)

VLM

*"First, you need gasoline …"*

*"How to make the object in the image?"*

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# Threat Models and Attack Vectors

**Threat Models:**

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**Attack Vectors for Large Language Models:**

Text (+Weights, Gradients, Activations)

**Attack Vectors for Vision Language Models:**

Text , **Image** (+ … )

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# Adversarial Attacks on Vision Language Models

Vision capabilities increase input space.

**Text Input Space:**

$$|Tokens| * |Vocabulary| = n|V|$$

**Multimodal Input Space:**

$$|Tokens| * |Vocabulary| + Height * Width * Channels * Range$$

For a 224x224 RGB image, the search space expands ~13 times!



# Multi-Modal Capabilities vs. Safety Training Generalization

**Input Embedding Space Expansion**
Adding visual modality dramatically expands the input embedding space; and hence, the malicious regions as well.

**Safety Training**
Safety training remains in the textual domain (text datasets) and is performed only on the LLM.

**Generalization Mismatch**
While malicious regions expand, safety training coverage remains the same leading to new uncovered areas (attack surfaces).




Jailbreak in pieces: Compositional Adversarial Attacks on Multi-Modal Language Models (Shayegani et al. 2024.)

# Roadmap of Causes




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# Roadmap of Defenses