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
## Primary Research Area:

- Generative AI
- Secure AI Systems
- Privacy/Security of ML & LLM
- Federated Learning


## Recent Research projects:

- ML models as storage channels and their (mis-)applications
- Bypassing guardrails in LLM

# Roadmap for Defenses




# Roadmap for Defenses



# Large Language Model Unlearning

## Overview




**Defense Category: Training time -> Alignment -> Unlearning**

# Large Language Model Unlearning

## Overview

- Penalizes the model when it generates responses that are similar to the undesirable outputs



**Defense Category: Training time -> Alignment -> Unlearning**

# Large Language Model Unlearning

## Methodology

### Gradient Ascent (GA)

- Update the model by following the opposite direction of the gradient of the loss function

***Defense Category: Training time -> Alignment -> Unlearning***

# Large Language Model Unlearning

## Methodology

### Gradient Ascent (GA)

- Update the model by following the opposite direction of the gradient of the loss function

### Mismatch

- Introduces data that is intentionally unrelated or mismatched with the original prompts

***Defense Category: Training time -> Alignment -> Unlearning***

# Large Language Model Unlearning

## Results:


Method	Harmful rate on Unseen harmful Prompts (↓)	leak Rate on Unseen Extraction Attempts (↓)	Hallucination rate on Unseen Misleading (In-dist) Question (↓)
original	51.5%	81%	45.5%
Fine Tuning	52.5%	81%	43.5%
GA	1%	0%	8.5%
GA + Mismatch	3%	1%	8.5%

**Table 1:** Experiment results for Llama-2 (7B)

**Defense Category: Training time -> Alignment -> Unlearning**



# Roadmap for Defenses



# Defense: Perplexity (PPL) Based Detection

Metric	Vicuna-7B	Falcon-7B-Inst.	Guanaco-7B	ChatGLM-6B	MPT-7B-Chat
Attack Success Rate	0.79	0.7	0.96	0.04	0.12
PPL Passed (↓)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
PPL Window Passed (↓)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00


**Table 2: Both basic perplexity and windowed perplexity easily detect all adversarial prompts generated by the optimizer, while letting all prompts in the AdvBench dataset through.**

- Drops benign user queries for many normal instructions from AlpacaEval.

# Certifying LLM Safety against Adversarial Prompting

## Methodology

- **Erase:** Removes tokens one by one from the original prompt  $P$




**Defense Category: Inference time -> Filtering -> Input Preprocessing**

# Certifying LLM Safety against Adversarial Prompting


## Methodology

- **Check:** If any of these sequences are harmful, the original prompt P is identified as harmful.



**Defense Category: Inference time -> Filtering -> Input Preprocessing**

# Roadmap for Defenses



# SmoothLLM: A randomized defense






Figure 2: Examples of insert, swap, and patch perturbations (pink)

# Methodology




# Methodology





# Methodology



# Methodology




Figure 3: (Left) An undefended LLM (cyan) takes an attacked prompt  $P$  as input and returns a response  $R$ . (Right) SMOOTHLLM (yellow), which acts as a wrapper around any LLM, comprises a perturbation step (pink), wherein  $N$  copies of the input prompt are perturbed, and an aggregation step (green), wherein the outputs corresponding to the perturbed copies are aggregated.

# Results

- At  $q = 10\%$ , the ASR for swap perturbations falls below 1%.





Figure 4: The dashed lines (red) denote the ASRs for suffixes generated by GCG on the AdvBench dataset for Vicuna and LLama2.

# Roadmap for Defenses





# Thank You!

## Q & A

<https://llm-vulnerability.github.io/>